
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The New York Times Current History

THE EUROPEAN WAR

VOLUME VII

April—June, 1916

With Alphabetical and Analytical Index
Illustrations, Maps and Diagrams

NEW YORK
THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY

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Times Square, New York City

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THE EUROPEAN WAR

Period April, 1916—June, 1916

INTRODUCTION

After the war had been in progress nineteen months, eventful as the conflict of the nations had so far been, still more momentous happenings were destined to fill the record of these moving times. Some of them fell within the period which extended from the 1st of March to the last day of May, 1916, that is, the twentieth, twenty-first, and twenty-second months of the war. In regard to the actual fighting no bloodier chapter had ever been written in the history of warfare than those required to describe the German offensive for the possession of Verdun. Yet, if the battle of Verdun held the attention of the world by reason of its protracted violence and slaughter, the great naval engagement between the British and German fleets off the coast of Jutland, lasting but a few hours, produced a vibrant thrill throughout the world. The success of the German plan at Verdun might have conquered the Allies on land and made the Central Empires masters of Europe, but a decisive victory for the German fleet would have been the undoing of the British Empire and the recasting of the balance of power throughout the world. For that reason the naval battle on May 31 had an importance far greater than any event since the beginning of the war.

Nor was it the only occurrence which tried the temper of Great Britain during the period under review. The defeat and surrender of a British army in Mesopotamia, though not a serious blow in a military sense, was certainly humiliating and did have an adverse effect upon British prestige and political influence. Again, the ill-considered attempt to hoist the flag of rebellion in Ireland was easily enough suppressed, but it helped materially to aggravate the unhappy situation which made Ireland a thorn in the side of Great Britain instead of a loyal and helpful partner in a common cause. The battle off Jutland, the struggle for Verdun, the British disaster in Mesopotamia, and the rebellion in Ireland, these were the most important events of the three months under review as far as the belligerents were concerned. But, in the light of what happened nearly a year later, an act of far-reaching consequence was the warning issued to Germany by President Wilson, in the name of the United States, that, unless the Kaiser's Government changed its methods of submarine warfare, diplomatic relations between the two countries would be broken off.

The Battle off Jutland

The battle off the coast of Jutland, near the Skagerrak, was the greatest naval engagement in modern times, both on account of the number and size of the ships which took part in it and of the tremendous power and skill with which science and invention had equipped the fleets. The great dreadnoughts, however, did not participate in the action till the end of the battle, and then without the chance of testing their strength to the full.

On the afternoon of May 31 the British Grand Fleet, under the command of

Sir John Jellicoe, was patrolling the North Sea, when the cruiser division under Rear Admiral Sir David Beatty, which was doing duty as an advance guard, sighted the cruisers acting in a similar fashion for the German High Seas Fleet under Admiral von Scheer. Beatty at once proceeded to attack the enemy, while the British main fleet, now informed by wireless that the German Navy had at last come out of its safe quarters behind the mine fields and coast defenses of Heligoland and the Kiel Canal, was steaming at full speed to reach the scene of action.

How far Jellicoe was away may be judged by the fact that it was three and a half hours before he came into contact with the German fleet. The greater part of the battle was therefore fought on the British side by Beatty. The five German battle cruisers, commanded by Rear Admiral Hippar, on being sighted by Beatty's squadron, began to run southwest toward the German main fleet. Beatty pursued with his six heavier and more powerful ships, supported further off by four ships of Rear Admiral Evans-Thomas's battle squadron. At a distance of nearly eleven miles the action between the battle cruisers began. The British lost an important ship almost at once. This was the battle cruiser Indefatigable, which went down with all its crew of 900 officers and men, except two survivors.

The battle squadron, now only a mile behind Beatty's battle cruisers, opened fire and one of the German ships was seen to be on fire. Then the British lost another battle cruiser, the Queen Mary, which sank in the midst of a terrific explosion. Out of a crew of 1,000 only a score or so were saved.

The first part of the battle lasted about an hour, and a new phase began with the arrival on the scene of three divisions of the German battle fleet. The odds were now heavily against Beatty. He thereupon changed the course of the cruiser squadron and, followed by Evans-Thomas's battle squadron, ran to the northwest, his object being to draw on the German main fleet so that it would have to fight the British dreadnoughts under Jellicoe.

During this phase of the operations Beatty's squadron, which had been reduced from six to four battle cruisers through the loss of the Indefatigable and the Queen Mary, executed a daring manoeuvre by crossing in front of the German fleet so that not only would the way be clear for Jellicoe's dreadnoughts, but also the German fleet would be cut off from its base. Evans-Thomas's battle squadron bore the brunt of the fighting against the four German cruisers supported by the German battleships. One of the German cruisers were sunk just a little while before the first of Jellicoe's ships were sighted by Beatty's squadron.

This was a few minutes before 6 o'clock, and twenty minutes later the third British battle cruiser squadron under Rear Admiral Hood opened fire at a range of about four and a half miles. Hood's flagship, the Invincible, was sunk, only six of the crew surviving and Hood himself being among those who perished. The two other battle cruisers which had been under Hood's command joined Beatty's squadron.

Now came what promised to be the most terrible of all naval battles. Jellicoe's great fleet of dreadnoughts, disposed in three squadrons, arrived on the battle area and prepared to throw the weight of the greatest navy the world has ever seen against the German fleet. But at this dramatic point the mists which hung over the water blotted out the German fleet from sight, thus preventing a decisive engagement and giving the German ships a chance to escape, which they at once availed themselves of. There was, however, some spasmodic fighting for the next couple of hours, but when night fell the battle was practically at an end except for the attacks of the British light cruisers and destroyers, which inflicted considerable damage on the escaping enemy. Jellicoe decided not to pursue the German fleet too far because of the dangers of the mine fields. The British fleet remained on the battle area till next day, when it returned to its base near the Orkneys.

The German ships, which arrived at

their base first, claimed a victory, and a startled world for at least a day believed that Britain's naval power had been shattered until the material fact emerged that, while the German fleet had hastened back as quickly as possible to the safety of port, the British were still in control of the high seas. The British Admiralty freely admitted that its losses were heavy. In addition to the Queen Mary, 27,000 tons; the Indefatigable, 18,750 tons, and the Invincible, 17,250 tons, the British lost three armored cruisers and eight destroyers, the total tonnage amounting to 114,100, while the officers and men who had perished numbered 5,613. Though no battleship was lost, the Marlborough was torpedoed, but continued to act as a flagship for nearly eight hours afterward and, until the German fleet retreated, maintained a heavy fire. The Warspite had an extraordinary experience. Through damage to its steering gear, it ran into the German lines and came under the concentrated fire of six German battleships without being sunk. Both the Marlborough and the Warspite were taken back to port.

About the German losses there was considerable doubt. It was admitted that they included the battle cruiser Lützow, 26,600 tons, the battleship Pommern, 13,200 tons, four light cruisers, and five destroyers, the total tonnage being 63,015 and the loss in officers and men 3,966. But according to the reports from the naval commanders received by the British Admiralty, the Germans lost four battleships, three of which were seen to sink, while the total number of vessels of all kinds was eighteen, with a tonnage of 113,435.

Admiral Jellicoe's estimate gave a still higher number, enumerating twenty-one ships as probably lost. For several days the British and German Admiralties issued statements impugning the truth of one another's reports both in regard to losses of ships and the details of the battle, but, as was more than once pointed out, the British fleet still held the sea, and it was therefore illogical to speak of a British defeat.

Admiral Beatty gained the greatest share of the credit among the British commanders for his bold attack on the German fleet at the beginning of the battle and for his daring tactics in holding it in action when heavily outnumbered and manoeuvring for the British main fleet to get its opportunity. Only the haze and mist saved the German fleet from the ordeal of facing Jellicoe's superior force and crowning Beatty's efforts with complete success.

Verdun

Verdun is the name which stands out in vivid letters of blood during the fighting on the western front, which occupied nearly all the first half of the year 1916. In no war that history has recorded have there been bloodier struggles or more wholesale slaughter. On several occasions during these months of March, April, and May, artillery fire attained a concentration that had previously been thought impossible. The Germans once more used the massed formation, hurling forward whole divisions of men at a time and having them slaughtered in thousands. In the valleys between the hills and other points of vantage, for the possession of which hundreds of thousands of lives were sacrificed, the dead could be seen lying in heaps literally as thick as flies. There was a great reason for Verdun becoming a focus of destruction and devastation, since, commanding the valley of the Meuse, it had helped to spoil German strategy in the movement on Paris in the first weeks of the war and it had remained throughout the keystone of the French defense. Without Verdun neither could the German Army advancing on Paris have free communication with Germany, nor could there be any sure protection for Metz. Besides, the Germans had a special interest in gaining a firm hold on this region on account of its resources in iron ore. After the first furious onslaughts (described in the previous volume) with which the Germans opened the battle there was a slight pause, and then an increase of artillery fire west of the Meuse. The bombardment lasted four days and was followed by the first German infantry attack on the west bank. The fighting was also renewed east of the Meuse.

Nearly the whole of the month of March was spent by the Germans in costly but fruitless attempts to reach the main French line. Around Dead Man Hill (Le Mort Homme) and Hill 304, the vital points in the advance line held by the French west of the Meuse, the struggle raged with particular fury. Then, after a rest of about a week, the Germans began and maintained a determined offensive on both banks of the Meuse, which lasted four weeks with hardly an interruption. The French counterattacked several times.

During this phase the Germans captured Malancourt, on the extreme left of the French line, Haucourt and Béthincourt, but were driven out of several other positions almost as soon as they occupied them.

After two months' fighting the situation was that the Germans had reached the French main line east of the Meuse and gained possession of a small part of Douaumont, but they had not been able to get to the main position west of the Meuse nor secure a permanent footing on Dead Man Hill or Hill 304.

Early in May the Germans once more attempted to occupy those two hills and Avocourt Wood to the westward. After a heavy bombardment, lasting three days and nights, German infantry gained a foothold on the edge of Dead Man Hill, but on May 10 the French regained the position.

A week later came one of the deadliest struggles of the whole war. The Germans now tried to get at Dead Man Hill by an attack on Avocourt Wood. Again there was a three-day bombardment, followed by an infantry assault. This was successful in establishing the Germans on the northern side of the hill. Three days later, (May 23,) the Germans occupied the position at the foot of Hill 304, but the French were still firmly intrenched on the western side. Next day the French were driven from Cumières. On May 28 the Germans in a tremendous attack to capture the French lines between Dead Man Hill and Cumières maintained for twelve hours what is said to have been the heaviest concentration of artillery fire in the whole history of warfare. When it concluded, five fresh divisions of the German Army were hurled against the French lines, but so determined was the resistance that the attack failed, and with this the German offensive west of the Meuse practically came to an end after a vast sacrifice of men.

General Nivelle, who early in May succeeded General Pétain as French commander, recaptured Douaumont Fort by a surprise attack on May 22, but two days later the Germans were once more in possession of the fort, now a heap of ruins. On May 31 the bombardment of Fort Vaux, which had been unceasing since March, was increased to such an extent that the fort became isolated. For another month the German offensive was to continue, but, as will be seen in the later volumes, without decisive gains.

During the months of March, April, and May the rest of the western front was comparatively quiet. The British, who held most of the line from the Somme to the sea, were engaged in fighting of only minor importance. But preparations were steadily going forward on a large scale for the opening of the great "drive," which actually began in July. The reformed and refitted Belgian Army held a portion of the line on the extreme left of the British—on the narrow strip of Belgian territory which had not been occupied by the Germans.

Other Battle Fronts

On the eastern front the Russians launched an important offensive in March for the purpose of forcing the Germans to call away troops from Verdun. The Russian objective was Vilna, which was strategically of greater value to the Germans than any other point north of the Pripet. The attack was made in two directions, beginning with a bombardment on March 16. The Germans counterattacked with infantry, but were repulsed. Until the weather caused a temporary stoppage of operations the Russians made slight gains, but all these were lost again toward the end of April as the result of vigorous attacks by the Germans. There was no more important fighting on this front till the launching of the great Russian offensive in June.

The Austro-Italian campaign was also influenced by events at Verdun, for the offensive begun by the Italians on March 14, when they began shelling the Austrian positions on the Isonzo, was undertaken for the purpose of preventing Teutonic reinforcements being sent to the western theatre of the war. The Italians made some gains on the Carso Plateau. There were various other attacks and counterattacks and losses and gains of secondary importance during the rest of March and April. But the great struggle was to come a few weeks later. About the middle of April the Austrians under the Archduke Eugene began concentrating in great force in the Trentino along the line Bolzano-Trento in preparation for an offensive on a large scale. This was initiated on May 14 with a heavy bombardment of the Italian positions from Val Giudicaria to the sea. The Italians were, to some extent, caught napping by the Austrians, who had 350,000 men and a very large quantity of artillery, and in consequence were soon forced back, so that the Italian Commander in Chief, General Cadorna, was compelled to withdraw his centre and set about the formation of a new army to hold back the Austrians in this region. The Austrians made gains all along the line, particularly in the Trentino and Tyrol. The purpose of the Austrian campaign was to isolate the Italian Army on the Isonzo, cause it to capitulate, and then force Italy out of the war, leaving the Franco-Italian frontier open to Austria behind the western front in France. But as will be seen later, the Italians were able to pull themselves together for a vigorous counteroffensive, and the Austrian plan did not mature.

The new Serbian Army, which had been formed out of the survivors of the retreat before the Austrian invaders, began to arrive at Saloniki in April. The Serbians had been given time to recuperate on the Island of Corfu, and, refitted by the Allies, to the number of 100,000, now reinforced the Franco-British army, which had an estimated strength of 550,000. During April and May preparations were pushed ahead for the Macedonian campaign. To anticipate the Allies' plans the Bulgarians on May 26 entered Greek territory down the Struma and took possession of several Greek forts with the permission of King Constantine's Government, but after some opposition on the part of the garrisons. The attitude of Greece in favoring the Central Powers will be explained presently.

Outside Europe the most interesting military events were taking place in Turkey's Asiatic territories, where a Russian army was operating from the direction of the Caucasus and a British force was coming to grief in Mesopotamia. The Russians, who had taken Erzerum on Feb. 16, followed up this success by the capture on March 2 of the important fortified City of Bitlis, near the western end of Lake Van, 110 miles south of Erzerum and commanding the road which descends from the Armenian plain into Mesopotamia. Two days later the Russians landed troops on the Black Sea coast and captured Atina, sixty miles east of Trebizond, and on April 18, supported by the Russian Black Sea fleet, Trebizond itself, an important Turkish port and the starting point of the great caravan route to the East.

But the general Russo-British plan in Asiatic Turkey was paralyzed a few days later by the British disaster on the Tigris. The army under General Townshend, consisting of British and Indian troops, had been shut up in Kut-el-Amara by the Turks, and, despite its gallant resistance, was helpless. It was undergoing great hardships, and its only hope was that the relief column under General Aylmer could fight its way through and raise the siege. But on April 23 General Aylmer was checked by the Turks at Sanna-i-Yat and unable to make further progress. An attempt was made to send a hospital ship with supplies along the Tigris into Kut, but this failed. Aviators, however, managed to drop some provisions in the town. On April 29 General Townshend finally found himself in such a hopeless condition that he surrendered with 2,970 British troops, 6,000 Indian troops, and 5,000 camp followers. The siege had lasted almost five months. and, though it ended disastrously for the British, there was no doubt that General Townshend had made a gallant stand while suffering from shortage of food and illness. The expedition had been undertaken without proper preparation or supports and was one of those adventures which could be successful only when attended by the best of luck. The Suez Canal was the object of a Turkish advance which was repulsed by the British in some minor engagements during March and April.

The last of Germany's colonial possessions, German East Africa, with an area of 384,000 square miles, now remained to be conquered by the Allies. The British have a colony on the north, namely, British East Africa; the adjoining territory on the west is the Belgian Congo; and on the south lie British Nyassaland and Portuguese East Africa, (Mozambique.) Through Portugal's entry into the war on the side of the Allies, which occurred during this period, the German colonial army had no neighboring neutral territory into which it could retreat as the defenders of the Cameroons had done when they sought safety in the Spanish Congo. Germany had held out longer in East Africa than in her other colonies, for a large native army had been formed and was well equipped. Besides the railroad which crossed the territory from Dar-es-Salaam on the Indian Ocean to Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika and a shorter line running from Tanga on the coast to Moshi in the rich plantation district around Mount Kilimanjaro, the Germans had the advantage of forts scattered throughout the colony. When the new campaign opened, the German forces were concentrated in British territory to the east of Kilimanjaro and actually held Taveta in British East Africa. The British forces under General Smuts advanced along the British railroad which starts at Mombasa on the coast and branches off at Voi to Taveta. On March 9 Smuts captured Taveta and began driving the German troops back. On March 11 a battle was fought on the Kitovo Hills, lasting all day and well into the night and resulting next day in the further retreat of the German colonial force. On March 13 Smuts took Moshi, while the German troops continued to retire along the railroad to Tanga. A few weeks later another British column, under General Van Deventer, was successful in clearing the country to the west of Kilimanjaro. Meanwhile other British as well as Belgian and Portuguese forces were operating in the western and southern parts of the colony. On May 13 the Belgians under General Tombeur drove back the Germans near Lake Kvu and on May 25 a British force under General Northey advanced from Rhodesia northeast between Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika. About the same time the Portuguese advanced from the south. At the end of May the British in the northeast of German East Africa were advancing along the Tanga railroad upon Wilhelmstal, the centre of a large plantation district. The conquest of the colony was not yet complete, but the various British, Belgian, and Portuguese forces had all made considerable progress in a territory equal in size to Texas and New Mexico combined, which gave the Germans excellent opportunities for defensive operations because of its unsettled character. Nevertheless, a very considerable portion of the colony had already passed from German possession.

Aerial Battles

Although the belligerent Governments kept their airplane designs secret, it was known that in the Spring of 1916 great progress had been made in machines for war purposes. A new type, much larger and heavier, known as a "gun carrier," came into vogue for a time. These machines carried as many as three guns. They were, however, succeeded by the "tactical scout" type, while the "gun carriers" were used as convoys in bombing raids. To describe all the aerial combats and raids would be to catalogue practically all the fighting that took place, but some episodes call for special mention, for they were encounters on a large scale and in addition to the ordinary aerial operations that form part of a modern battle. On March 20 a great fleet of sixty-five airplanes was sent by the Allies on a raid against the Belgian coast. Zeebrugge, the German submarine base, was bombarded. Another allied attack was on Mülhausen. The Allies had twenty-three machines and were opposed by an even larger German air squadron. At least fifty airplanes were engaged in this battle in the air. During the fighting around Verdun four German airplanes were brought down in one day. In retaliation for an air raid on Dunkirk, the Allies sent airplanes to drop bombs on Essen and other German towns. During April twenty-six allied airplanes were shot down by German aviators on the western front, while the Germans lost twenty-two machines. During May aerial activity became extraordinarily intense. It was reported on May 18 that within the few previous days at least sixty air fights had taken place. On all other fronts there was also a great deal of raiding and fighting in the air. Ten Austrian naval airplanes made a successful raid on Ancona. On May 4 an Austrian air squadron attacked Ravenna and engaged in a running fight with Italian destroyers southwest of the mouth of the River Po. Italian reprisals took the form of several bombing expeditions to Trieste. An Austrian raid on Bari on the Italian coast resulted in the death of eighteen civilians. Russian positions on the Gulf of Riga were attacked by German aircraft. Finally, among more notable exploits was the British raid on Constantinople on April 14, when bombs were dropped on a powder factory and the Turkish airplane hangars. This was followed on April 27 by another raid on Constantinople, this time by Russian seaplanes.

Great Britain received many visits from Zeppelins during the months of March, April, and May, the number of lives lost during this period being well over a hundred and the number of persons injured about three hundred. On March 5 the Zeppelin attack on the eastern counties resulted in 18 killed and 52 injured. A more serious raid took place on March 31, when Zeppelins visited the northeast coast and the eastern counties, killing 43 and injuring 66. One of the Zeppelins was brought down and sunk in the Thames. On three successive nights, those of April 24, 25, and 26, Zeppelins were active, but they were driven off by British airplanes, and there were no casualties. On May 2 five Zeppelins attacked the northeast coast of England and the southeast coast of Scotland, killing 36 persons.

Submarine Warfare

The 1st of March was the date set by the German Government for its new submarine campaign, and in the three ensuing months it was estimated that the loss to allied and neutral shipping amounted to over 320,000 tons. The total number of vessels sunk during the three months was 196, consisting of 153 belonging to the Allies and 43 to neutrals. The number of lives lost on allied ships was 205 and on neutrals 18, a total of 223. The heaviest losses were in April, when the number of merchant vessels sunk was 96 and lives lost 141. Among the most serious cases were those of the sinking of the Norwegian Silius, without warning and with seven Americans on board, March 10; the Dutch liner Tubantia, without warning and with Americans on board, March 16; the Dutch steamer Palembang, without warning, March 18; the Channel steamer Sussex, unarmed and with Americans on board, March 24; the British bark Bengairn, with Americans among the crew, April 3; the Belgian relief ship Hendonhall, without warning, May 2; the liner Cymric, without warning, May 8, and the Batavia II., with the loss of one American life, May 17.

The sinking of the Sussex was one of the most flagrant acts committed by a submarine commander, and not only caused the most painful impression and greatest indignation since the sinking of the Lusitania but was also the beginning of the serious controversy between the American and German Governments which culminated in the severing of diplomatic relations. The Sussex was doing its usual work of conveying passengers across the English Channel from Folkestone to Dieppe, was unarmed, and received absolutely no warning. The whole forward end of the vessel was blown to pieces by a violent explosion which killed and injured a considerable number of passengers and members of the crew. The after part continued to float, thus saving many lives by a chance with which the attackers had nothing to do. Altogether about eighty of the passengers, noncombatants of all ages and both sexes, including American citizens, were killed or injured, the number of lives actually lost being about fifty. In some quarters, and particularly in Germany, the doubt was expressed whether the Sussex might not have been struck by a floating mine and not by a torpedo deliberately aimed at it by a submarine.

The United States Ambassador in Berlin on first taking the matter up with the German Government was assured that no German submarine was responsible for the deed, but the Ambassadors in London and Paris obtained affidavits from American survivors and collected other evidence to the effect that the wake of a torpedo had been distinctly seen. Fragments of the explosive apparatus which had destroyed the Sussex were identified as parts of a German torpedo, and some of these, with the affidavits, were sent to Washington. Rear Admiral A. Grasset, Assistant Chief of the French General Staff, after an investigation officially reported that the Sussex had been sunk by a torpedo deliberately fired by a submarine.

In a note dated April 10 the German Government admitted having sunk a vessel in the English Channel at almost the same time and place as the Sussex was sunk, but drawings were submitted by the submarine commander to show that it was an entirely different vessel. To this the United States Government replied in a note dated April 18 that "a careful, detailed, and scrupulously impartial investigation by naval and military officers of the United States" had "conclusively established the fact that the Sussex was torpedoed without warning or summons to surrender, and that the torpedo by which she was struck was of German manufacture."

The German rejoinder, dated May 4, stated that the German Government was "alive to the possibility" that the ship mentioned in its previous note of April 10 might be identical with the Sussex. Finally, the German Government, in a supplementary note dated May 8, admitted that one of its submarines had sunk the Sussex, declared its readiness to pay an adequate indemnity to the injured American citizens, and stated that the submarine commander had been appropriately punished. Two of the notes in this correspondence, that of April 18 from the United States Government and that of May 4 from the German Government, dealt with the larger issues of submarine warfare. The American note contained the historic threat to sever diplomatic relations. The progress of the dispute will be described later.

Portugal's entry into the war has already been mentioned in connection with the fighting in German East Africa. In February the Portuguese Government had seized thirty-eight German and Austrian merchant ships which had remained tied up in the Tagus since the beginning of the war. This was followed by similar seizures in the Portuguese colonies. On March 1 Germany sent an ultimatum demanding the release of the ships within forty-eight hours. Portugal refused to comply with the demand, and on March 9 Germany declared war, stating at the same time that Portugal had been guilty of other unfriendly and unneutral acts, such as giving permission to British troops to pass through Portuguese territories in Africa, allowing the British navy to use Madeira as a base, and also participating in military operations in the African colonies. Portugal in going to war on the side of Great Britain recalled the fact that the two countries were bound together by an alliance which had been unbroken for five centuries. Some of the ships that had been seized were transferred to British control. Otherwise Portugal was unable to play any great part in the war, since she was not open to attack by the Central Powers. The only internal effect was to bring about a change of Ministry. Dr. Costa, the Premier, resigned and was succeeded by Dr. Antonio de Almeida.

The Royalists, still hoping to discredit the republican Government, were responsible for a number of disturbances in Lisbon during April and May.

The Neutrals

Rumania's indecision about entering the war continued to perplex those who were watching the Balkan situation. In March it was believed that the pro-Entente party was gaining the upper hand. The fact that Russia was supplying munitions to Rumania was taken to indicate that the bond between the two countries was growing closer in spite of the dynastic influences which drew the Hohenzollern rulers of Rumania toward Germany. On April 7 a convention, however, was signed between Germany and Rumania restoring ordinary commercial relations, and soon after the Rumanian Government entered into arrangements with Germany and Austria-Hungary to supply them with grain. On May 18 Rumania concluded with Austria-Hungary a commerial treaty similar to that with Germany. These circumstances were in turn pointed to as evidence that Rumania was leaning toward the Central Powers. Both groups of belligerents were, as a matter of fact, negotiating with Rumania, and the real situation at this time was that Rumania was waiting for the safest and best bargain she could get in return for her support in the war. In the light of afterevents the negotiations with Russia to settle what territorial compensation Rumania should receive to join the Allies were the more important, although they proceeded with more than one breakdown.

Greece, like Rumania, was largely under the influence of a monarch with Teutonic sympathies, but, unlike Rumania, had to face a very difficult problem in maintaining her integrity as a neutral. Following the blockade of Greek ports and the landing of troops at Phaleron by the Allies, Cephalonia was seized in April for use as an allied naval base. The Allies now wished to transport the Serbian Army, which had been reorganized on the Greek Island of Corfu, by rail from Patras to Saloniki. The Greek Premier, Skouloudis, refused and declared that the Greeks would rather destroy the railroad bridges and tunnels. The Central Powers warned Greece that if the Greek railroads were used by the Allies it would be regarded as an unfriendly act. Early in May there seemed to be a better feeling between King Constantine's Government and the Allies, and on May 15 the British Foreign Office announced that all differences had been amicably settled. But this appearance of harmony was deceptive, for only eleven days later, May 26, an entirely new situation was created by the invasion of Greece by Bulgarian troops and the handing over to them of several Greek forts with hardly any opposition on the part of the garrisons. The commanders had been instructed by the Greek Government to offer no resistance. The allied Governments were at once roused to adopt stern measures, but the further development of the situation belongs to the later record.

The inhabitants of the Belgian and French territories occupied by Germany began to be subjected in April to a policy which the Allies denounced as slavery. During the days just before and after Easter about 25,000 French subjects, ranging from girls of 16 to men of 55 years, without distinction of social condition, were forcibly taken away by the German military authorities from their homes and families at Roubaix, Tourcoing, and Lille and deported to the Aisne and Ardennes districts, where they were compelled to work in the fields. The German explanation was that the scarcity of food necessitated compulsory employment in agriculture, since the inhabitants had refused to work when asked to do so as volunteers. The French Government stated that agriculture was not the only kind of labor imposed upon those who had been deported, that the men were forced also to do road work, make munitions, and dig trenches, and the women to cook and wash for the soldiers and take the place of officers' orderlies. On May 15 the German policy of enforced labor was applied in Belgium by a decree of that date issued by the Governor General, von Bissing. But at this time the most serious feature of the treatment of the conquered populations had not developed. As will be seen later, the inhabitants of Belgium were not only forced to work in their own country according to German requirements, but were also deported to Germany itself.

Irish Rebellion

Ireland, still resentful because of the holding back of self-government, became the scene at Eastertime of an ill-considered and disastrous attempt to overthrow English rule. The chief organizers were members of the Sinn Fein, an intensely nationalistic association. But an equally important source of the trouble was the condition of the Dublin laborers, whose leader, James Connolly, was as well known in America as in Ireland as a Socialist and a preacher of working-class revolt. Connolly had taken up the work begun by James Larkin, who organized the Dublin strike of 1913 and who later went to America. When that strike was suppressed the transport and other workers who had taken part in it decided, at the suggestion of some of the intellectual leaders of Irish nationalism, to arm themselves and drill, for the purpose of effectively resisting the police in future strike troubles, and accordingly the Citizen Army was formed in Dublin. About the same time the National Volunteers came into existence as a counterblast to the Ulster Volunteers. Later, the National Volunteers split into two sections, the secessionists calling themselves the Irish Volunteers and becoming associated with a secret revolutionary organization known as the Irish Republican Brotherhood. Finally, the Irish Volunteers, representing the anti-English extremists among the professional, business, and farming classes, came to an understanding with the Citizen Army, which was more under the influence of Socialist than of Nationalist ideas. But both had revolutionary aims and wished to overthrow the English ruling class. There were some other elements in the movement, such as Fenians of the old type and German agents. Sir Roger Casement, a former Consul General and the author of the famous Putumayo report, [a report on the cruelties inflicted on the rubber workers in Peru, South America,] had gone to Berlin to arrange for German aid, and it was on his return to Ireland that the signal for revolt was given.

But Casement's part in the rebellion was a fiasco from the start. On Good Friday, April 21, he was captured as soon as he landed from the German submarine which conveyed him to the west coast of Ireland, and at the same time the German auxiliary cruiser Kiel, disguised as a Norwegian merchantman and loaded with 20,000 rifles and ammunition, was sunk by its own crew, who were also made prisoners. The announcement of Casement's capture was published by the British Government on Easter Monday, April 24. The same day the revolt began in Dublin. A proclamation was issued by "the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic to the people of Ireland" and signed by Thomas Clarke, S. MacDiarmad, Thomas MacDonagh, P. H. Pearse, E. Ceannt, (E. Kent,) James Connolly, and Joseph Plunkett, the last-named a member of a well-known aristocratic family. The General Post Office was first seized, the officials driven from their posts, and the telegraph and telephone lines cut so as to prevent communication with England and the rest of Ireland. Fighting began in the streets, the initial advantage being with the rebels through the military and police authorities having been taken totally unawares. The rebels soon established themselves in the City Hall, Stephen's Green, and in a number of houses in Sackville Street. They had other strongholds such as Liberty Hall, the former strike headquarters and since the home of the Citizen Army. An attempt to seize Dublin Castle failed. In the sharpshooting which the rebels indulged in a number of peaceful citizens were killed and wounded. On April 25 the military authorities were still unable to cope with the situation, but troops were on the way from England, under the command of General Sir John Maxwell, who was given unlimited powers as military dictator. On the morning of April 26 a cordon was drawn around Dublin and the troops began to close in on the rebels. A gunboat in the Liffey shelled and demolished Liberty Hall. The rebels had plenty of ammunition and serious fighting began, lasting for three days with great fury. The rebels held strong positions in a number of buildings, and to dislodge them the British troops used artillery, which also did a great deal of damage to property and caused many fires. The Post Office was shelled, forcing the rebels to retire. As they were dislodged from this and other buildings the rebels set them on fire, so that on the night of April 28 the sky for miles around Dublin was aglow with the light from the flames.

By now the rebels began to realize that in the face of the superior military force opposed to them the situation was hopeless, and early on Saturday morning, April 29, they decided to surrender unconditionally "in order to prevent the further slaughter of unarmed people and in the hope of saving the lives of our followers, who are surrounded and hopelessly outnumbered." Some of the rebels, however, kept up the resistance for another day. The final collapse came on Sunday, April 30, when the main body of the rebels laid down arms. General Maxwell immediately began to mete out penalties by court-martial and to send prisoners to England, where penalties of death and imprisonment were also inflicted in a summary manner. Fourteen leaders of the rebellion, including all who had signed the proclamation of the Irish Republic, were executed; 73 were condemned to penal servitude, in some cases for life; and 1,706 were deported from Ireland and imprisoned in England. The death sentence that had been passed on the Countess Markiewicz, an Irishwoman married to a Polish nobleman, was commuted to life imprisonment. The shooting of F. Sheehy Skeffington by order of a military officer, afterward alleged to be insane, caused a feeling of deep revulsion, for Skeffington was not among the rebels and tried to prevent bloodshed in accordance with his pacifist ideas. On May 12 Mr. Asquith stated that the losses during the fighting were: Civilians and rebels killed 180, wounded 614; British troops killed 124, wounded 388. The damage to buildings in Dublin was estimated by the Fire Department at $5,000,000 and to stock at $3,750,000. Altogether 179 buildings, including houses, were destroyed.

In other parts of Ireland the rebellion was very feeble and easily suppressed in the few centres where it broke out. Lord Wimborne, the Lord Lieutenant; Augustine Birrell, the Irish Secretary in the Cabinet, and Sir Matthew Nathan, the Under Secretary, resigned. Lord Hardinge, former Viceroy of India, headed a royal commission to investigate the causes of the rebellion. Wimborne and Nathan were exonerated, but Birrell, whose conduct of Irish affairs had always been sympathetic to the Irish people, was sharply criticised for his alleged neglect of seditious indications and his lack of prophetic powers.

A reaction set in against the harsh treatment of the Irish and a new effort was made in England to convert hatred into loyalty by devising some scheme of self-government. The Government intrusted Lloyd George with the task of peacemaker. This phase of the home rule question, as well as the trial of Sir Roger Casement, are described later.

One consequence of the revolt was that Ireland was exempted from the new Conscription act passed by the British Parliament in May. The first compulsory service law, applying to single men, had not produced the results expected by the Government, and on May 4 a bill was introduced in the House of Commons making all males between the ages of 18 and 41 years, whether married or single, liable to serve in the army. The bill was passed by Parliament on May 24 by a large majority, but it led to a strong agitation on the part of the No Conscription Fellowship and its supporters among Socialists and pacifists. About three thousand "conscientious objectors," practically all members of the Fellowship, were imprisoned in different parts of Great Britain. Cases of suicide and various forms of self-mutilation to avoid military service were not uncommon. But the new law had the desired effect of increasing the number of men on active service.

War Finances and Economies.

The demand for money as well as men in all the belligerent countries grew greater as the war progressed. It was estimated that the war loans up to the middle of March aggregated $32,000,000,000, of which the Allies had raised $21,000,000,000 and the Central Powers $11,000,000,000. On April 4 Reginald McKenna, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his budget statement in the House of Commons, said that he estimated the expenditures for the year beginning April 1, 1916, would amount to $9,125,000,000, which was at the rate of $25,000,000 a day, and the interest and other charges on this new debt would require an additional $400,000,000 a year to be raised out of taxation. On May 23 the House of Commons voted a new credit for $1,500,000,000, the previous one for a similar amount having been voted on Feb. 21.

The German Government closed its books on its fourth war loan in March with the statement that subscriptions were in excess of $2,600,000,000, bringing the total of all war loans to $9,000,000,000. The interest rate was being kept down at the 5 per cent. level.

In May the Austro-Hungarian Government raised its fourth loan of $800,000,000 at 5½ per cent. at 96.

In France the war credit voted to cover the first quarter of 1916 was for $1,600,000,000 and for the second quarter $1,560,000,000.

The Russian Duma in April voted appropriations for $1,699,000,000 in addition to war expenditures estimated at $5,500,000,000, as compared with $4,000,000,000 in 1915.

Italy's war expenditure was about $25,000,000 a month, as much as Great Britain was spending in a day. Turkey was obtaining money by Treasury bills jointly guaranteed by Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Part of the British war loans was used to finance certain of the Allies and also the Colonial Governments. The war at this time was costing the belligerents altogether about a hundred million dollars a day. But the real burden was not to be measured by the amounts of the war debts, but by the increasing annual interest and sinking fund charges which had to be provided for out of revenue by means of taxation. Hence, particularly in Great Britain, France, and Germany, there were during these months still further increases in taxation. As will be seen later, this was far from the limit to which levies on income and other forms of wealth were pushed.

The necessity of economizing in every direction became more and more of vital importance. At a great public meeting in the Guildhall, London, on March 1 a national campaign was initiated to rouse the people to the danger of extravagant and unwise spending. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and other members of the Cabinet were among the speakers who urged a policy of thrift whereby labor and capital would not be employed in satisfying private demands to the detriment of carrying on the war. In Germany the stage had already been reached where the scarcity and high prices of food were forcing economies on the people without any choice in the matter and actually causing distress. The Conservatives, the party of the Prussian Junkers, blamed the British blockade and were loud in their demands for a more ruthless submarine warfare. But there were many critics in Germany who declared that the Junker landowners were themselves to blame for the scarcity and dearness of food among the people through the control they exercised. On both questions of submarine warfare and food regulation the Government was determined to pursue a fair-minded policy. Von Tirpitz, the head of the German Admiralty and as such responsible for the conduct of the submarine campaign, resigned on March 16, much to the annoyance of the Junkers; and their bitterness against the Imperial Chancellor was intensified when the Government decided upon a drastic system of regulation for food supplies and prices. Delbrück, the Secretary of the Interior, who had so far directed the food policy, resigned on May 13 and was succeeded by Dr. Karl Helfferich. On May 23 a Food Regulation Board was set up under the Chairmanship of Adolph von Batocki, who became known as the "food dictator." Soup kitchens were established in the larger cities and preparations made for a system of meat cards. But, as will be seen later, von Batocki's dictatorship was unable to master the interests that were aiding hunger to make the people's burden heavier.

It was in March that the first definite step was taken by the Allies toward a "trade war after the war." At a conference in Paris at the end of the month the principal subject of discussion was unity of action in regard to the war, but economic policy in the future was also debated, and the general proposition was laid down that the existing alliance should be supplemented by an economic union. The fuller consideration of the scheme was adjourned to the special economic conference held in Paris in June. An interesting phase of the situation in Great Britain was the growth of the opinion among some sections of free traders that the policy which had so long been best adapted to British trade interests must now be abandoned and that the empire should form a closer union on an economic basis and thereby be in a position more effectively to cooperate with other nations in preventing a new growth of German commerce after the war. At the same time leaders of German opinion were urging closer economic union with Austria-Hungary, which would also include Turkey, and thus give the Teutonic Powers a hold on the whole of the territory stretching from Hamburg to Bagdad and even the Persian Gulf. Propaganda to draw Holland and other European countries closer to the Teutonic economic union was rife, the idea being that Mittel-Europa (Middle Europe) might be made into a self-sufficing unit of economic activity.

Political Changes

The most important political changes during the three months under review were the resignations of von Tirpitz and Delbrück in Germany, which have already been noted. Eduard von Capelle became the new head of the Admiralty and Helfferich succeeded Delbrück as Imperial Secretary of the Interior. Bethmann Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, was opposed by the Conservatives on one side and on the other by the extreme pacifist wing of the Socialists, which constituted a minority in the party. Karl Liebknecht had already been expelled by the majority, and on March 24 Haase was similarly dealt with for his refusal to accept the nationalist aims which the Socialist Party now indorsed. The schism in the party eventuated in eighteen members of the Reichstag seceding and forming a separate group under the leadership of Haase and Ledebour, but without including Liebknecht, who remained independent of either group and whose political career was interrupted by his arrest for a speech at a May Day peace meeting in Berlin and a sentence of four years' imprisonment.

In France the political situation was characterized by continuous attacks on the Government by the Radical-Socialists and Socialists, who were afraid that the Cabinet was trying to ignore its responsibility to the National Legislature. The majority of the Socialists throughout the country, however, were thoroughly patriotic, as was shown by the vote of the National Council of the party on April 9, when a motion was adopted condemning the resumption of relations with the Socialist Parties of enemy countries by a two-to-one majority.

The Russian Duma, which was in session during the months of March, April, and May, kept up an unceasing attack on the Czar's Ministers for their lack of vigor and gross inefficiency in the conduct of the war. The Liberal and Radical elements demanded in addition to Ministerial responsibility the application of enlightened ideas, and were the chief participants in the tumultuous debate in March on the subject of Jewish persecution which ended with the Conservatives leaving the Duma hall in a body. Khvostoff, the Minister of the Interior, was driven to resign by the attacks made on his administration by members of the Duma, and so, too, on March 29, was Polivanoff, the Minister of War, who was succeeded by General Shuvayeff. The Duma showed an earnest desire to make Russia a more effective factor in the war and more capable of development on the return of peace. The extension and improvement of the railroad system, the promotion of co-operative enterprise, food regulation, the suppression of the vodka traffic, and larger appropriations for education were among the principal subjects dealt with during the session. There was no doubt that the strength of the Duma was growing, though apparently not to the extent which would have led observers to forecast the advance toward parliamentary government made in November and still less the revolution in March, 1917.

In Italy dissatisfaction with the military administration caused the resignation on April 5 of General Zupelli, the War Minister, and the appointment in his place of General Paolo Morrone. Baron Sonnino was able to obtain a substantial vote of confidence in the Government's conduct of foreign affairs after the debate in the Chamber of Deputies on April 16, but in May the unpreparedness of the army authorities for the Austrian offensive in the Trentino brought about an acute parliamentary crisis, and the days of the Salandra Ministry were numbered. Ill-health caused the resignation of War Ministers in two of the allied countries. General Gallièni resigned in France on March 16 and died a couple of months later. His successor was General Roques. In Japan General Oka resigned on March 30 and was replaced by General Oshima.

The three Scandinavian countries held a joint conference at Copenhagen on March 9 to consider the difficulties which were involved in the maintenance of their rights as neutrals. For that purpose they decided to act together as closely as possible and also to safeguard their sea-borne trade by taking precautions against mines. Sweden was the most determined of the three countries in preserving its integrity, and on March 29 the Riksdag voted $27,870,000 to strengthen the military establishment. Those who favored intervention to protect Swedish interests directed their propaganda against the Allies, with whom relations were strained on account of the interference of Great Britain with the mails. Fear of Russian designs for expansion northward to the sea also influenced opinion against the Allies.

Attitude of the United States

But it was the United States which continued to be the neutral country whose interests were most deeply affected by the war. In March Congress was still occupied with the controversy raised by the Gore resolution in the Senate and the McLemore resolution in the House that American passengers should be warned off armed ships belonging to belligerents. President Wilson was strongly opposed to such a surrender of the rights of American citizens. Eventually the Senate, on March 3, without expressing itself directly on the issue, left the matter in the President's hands, while the House on March 7 tabled the McLemore resolution and thereby subordinated its own views to those of the Chief Executive. Secretary of State Lansing's note of Jan. 18, in which he urged the Allies to abandon the practice of arming merchant ships, received a reply on March 23 to the effect that the allied Governments were unable to give up their acknowledged rights or to accept the assurances given by Germany to the United States.

The sinking of the unarmed steamer Sussex, which has already been described, opened a new and highly important phase of the submarine controversy with Germany. On April 18 the United States Government addressed a note to Germany dealing not merely with the Sussex case, but with the whole submarine situation. The note created an acute crisis, for it declared that the sinking of the Sussex was only one instance among many of Germany's disregard for humanity. The time had come for Germany to call a halt, or else the Government of the United States could "have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether." The following day, April 19, President Wilson went to the Capitol and addressed the two houses of Congress in joint session. After explaining how he had come to his decision to warn Germany, he declared that the United States owed it to a due regard for its own rights as a nation, to its sense of duty as a representative of the rights of neutrals the world over, and to a just conception of the rights of mankind "to take this stand with the utmost solemnity and firmness." The German note of May 4 gave a definite assurance that no vessel should be sunk without warning and without saving human lives unless it tried to escape or offered resistance. The note also contained the suggestion that, since this assurance was now given, the United States should take steps to prevent the Allies from violating international law in regard to the freedom of the seas. But Secretary Lansing's reply of May 8, while accepting the German pledge, refused to consider its fulfillment conditional on any action the United States might take with regard to Great Britain.

After a delay of six months the British Government replied on April 24 to the representations made by the United States on Oct. 21, 1915, regarding British restraints on neutral commerce. Great Britain adhered to its previously stated position and offered practically no concessions beyond those already made. The "letters of assurance" issued by the British Embassy at Washington for shipments to Scandinavian countries were referred to as one of the methods designed to lighten the burden on neutrals. Efforts would continue to be made, it was added, to render the exercise of British belligerent rights as little oppressive as possible. Another American grievance was the interference by Great Britain and France with mails in transit to and from Scandinavian and Dutch ports. This was the subject of a vigorous identic note, dated May 24, from the Secretary of State to the British and French Ambassadors, in which he said: "Only a radical change in the present British and French policy, restoring to the United States its full rights as a neutral power, will satisfy this Government." No reply from the British and French Governments was forthcoming till October.

Within the United States the Government had a great deal of trouble with German agents, who were active in various conspiracies and violations of neutrality. Disclosures made by Major von der Goltz as to another plot to destroy the Welland Canal and papers found on Captain von Papen by the British authorities when he was returning to Germany after his recall resulted, on April 17, in the indictment of von Papen, Wolf von Igel, who had been von Papen's Secretary; Captain Hans Tauscher, an agent for Krupps, and two others. The most serious feature of this case was the allegation that the German Embassy itself was involved in the violation of neutrality laws. The German Consul at Baltimore, Carl A. Luederitz, was indicted on May 8 for conspiring with von der Goltz to obtain a passport by fraud. Robert Fay, Walter Sholz, and Paul Daeche were sentenced to imprisonment on May 9 for having conspired to destroy munition ships. On April 28 Dr. Walter Scheele, President of a New Jersey chemical firm, and eight Germans connected with the Hamburg-American and North German Lloyd Steamship Companies were indicted for manufacturing bombs and placing them in munition ships. There were other cases pending in the courts, and, although some of them were not finally disposed of for some time, there was an accumulation of evidence to show that German agents in the United States were a source of considerable danger.

The substantial increase in the national defense forces, which had been urged by President Wilson, was provided for in the National Defense act which emerged at the end of May from the discussion of the bills introduced respectively by Mr. Hay in the House on March 6 and by Mr. Chamberlain in the Senate on March 17. The leading features of the act were the increase of the regular army to 186,000 officers and men, a federalized National Guard to reach gradually a peace strength of over 425,000, and Government plants costing $20,000,000 for the production of nitrates and other products. Naval increases were voted later in the session.

Although there was little hope of peace in Europe at this time, American opinion, as expressed by President Wilson, exhibited a rapidly growing recognition of the nation's duty to work for peace on broad, sane lines, as well as of the changed position which the United States must occupy as a world power after the war. "The only excuse that America can ever have for the assertion of her physical force," the President said in a speech on April 17, "is that she asserts it in behalf of the interests of humanity." On May 27 he outlined the conditions on which the United States, if called upon to do so, should initiate a movement to end the war. There should be, he said, "a universal association of nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of the nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence." The United States would be willing to become a partner in any such "feasible association of the nations." Discussing the question of "entangling alliances," the President said on May 30 that he would gladly assent to "a disentangling alliance, an alliance which would disentangle the people of the world from those combinations in which they seek their own separate and private interests and unite with the people of the world to preserve the peace of the world upon a basis of common right and justice." This and other utterances were the prelude to President Wilson's historic peace move to be described later.

PERIOD XIX.

The Armed Liner Issue—Battle of Verdun—Women in British Industry—Germany's Peace Conditions—Paris and the Zeppelins—Recruiting in Canada—How Men Died for France—Raiding on the Black Sea—The Storming of the Hill at Loos—The Coming Victory—What Changes Will the War Bring?—Economic Strength of Russia—Serbia's Future.

WORLD EVENTS OF THE MONTH

THE OUTLOOK

HAVE the events of the month brought the war visibly nearer to an end? Anxious hearts throughout Europe and over the whole earth are asking the question, and some there are who think they see at least a hint of an affirmative answer. M. Ribot, the French Minister of Finance, has publicly declared his belief that "the end is in sight." While this is probably too sanguine a statement, recent events have suggested something of the kind.

The failure of Germany to reach any vital spot at Verdun after a month of desperate fighting may not be particularly significant, for Verdun is one of the strongest fortresses in the world; but the indication that some inner force or fear in Germany herself was behind the attack, prompting and impelling it regardless of the cost in lives, has led many neutral observers to believe that the Berlin Government is no longer sure of its own allies or its own resources, and that there is a waning even of the national enthusiasm which has thus far responded to every call for sacrifice.

Has Germany passed the zenith of her war strength, and is Verdun, like Napoleon's Moscow campaign, to mark the beginning of the slow disintegration of the power behind it? Only time can tell. Meanwhile Lloyd's is quoting prohibitive rates to munition firms who wish to wager that the war will last beyond next Autumn, and the impression is gaining ground in many quarters that Germany's rôle henceforth will be more largely defensive than offensive.

SUBMARINE WARFARE

APPARENTLY there was a close relation between President Wilson's determined stand on behalf of armed merchantmen and Admiral von Tirpitz's sudden resignation. The head of the German Admiralty was known to be the author of the whole submarine campaign against merchant ships, and was believed to favor even a more ruthless policy than that embodied in the sink-without-warning order of March 1. Certainly some of his supporters were outspoken for a policy, as the Berliner Tageblatt remarks, of "unlimited, unchecked, indiscriminate torpedoing directed against every nationality and every kind of ship."

The German Government's desire to remain on good terms with the United States would naturally come into conflict with any such policy, and the demonstration in Congress that President Wilson's firm attitude was the American Nation's attitude could hardly fail to deepen the rift between the Admiral and the Chancellor.

But it is reported that an influence closer home was working toward the same end. Albert Ballin, head of the Hamburg-American Line and a close friend of the Kaiser, marking the world-wide storm that followed the sinking of the Lusitania, it is stated, took measures to forestall the growing danger of a break with the United States and the probable loss, in case of war, of the great German liners interned in American ports. Indirectly, then, it was Herr Ballin who forced concessions to the United States by securing the appointment of his friend Baron Holzendorf to the command of the submarine division. Thus for many weeks past Admiral von Tirpitz is said to have been powerless to carry out his own policy. His resignation naturally followed. Such seems to have been the curious connection between President Wilson's demands and the Grand Admiral's downfall.

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MILITARY EVENTS

ONLY two large military developments have marked the month just past—the German assault on Verdun and the Russian advance in Asia Minor. Both have favored the Entente side. The fighting at Verdun is fully treated elsewhere in this magazine. In Asiatic Turkey the Russians have gone slowly but steadily forward in four columns, one moving out of Persia toward the besieged Britishers in Mesopotamia, another heading westward along the Black Sea littoral toward Trebizond and ports beyond; a third is pursuing the Turkish Army westward from Erzerum, and seems about to come to grips with it at Sivas, while the fourth column is driving southward through the Lake Van country, where at last accounts it had taken Bitlis on its way to some point on the Bagdad Railway. Thus far the main effect of the Grand Duke's aggressive campaign is found in persistent rumors of alarm and disaffection at Constantinople. On the Russian front in Europe nothing of importance has happened, though there are signs of preparations for a Spring campaign. Italy has undertaken another determined offensive on the Isonzo front, but with only slight gains thus far. In Albania the last remnant of Italian and Albanian resistance faces a superior Austrian army at Avlona. Italian hopes of a sphere of influence on that side of the Adriatic are very dim at present.

* * *

A USEFUL WAR MAP

THE double-page map of the world war printed in this issue of CURRENT HISTORY gives a convenient birdseye view of the areas on three continents which have been directly affected by the conflict. The vast regions and magnificent distances involved are in themselves a good index to the greatness of the struggle. It is also useful to have at hand a map which shows at a glance the exact location of the four large German possessions in Africa where fighting has been going on; likewise the relation of the campaign in Asia Minor to that on the European side of the Bosporus.

* * *

THE NEW SECRETARY OF WAR

THAT well-worn phrase, the irony of fate, seems to apply with peculiar aptness to the case of Newton D. Baker, who was sworn in on March 9 to succeed Lindley M. Garrison as Secretary of War. Secretary Baker, a former Mayor of Cleveland, Ohio, is a progressive Democrat of the reform school of the late Tom L. Johnson, and a member in good standing in three peace societies. On the very day of his entrance into office he was plunged into the Mexican affair and found himself working far into the night preparing the necessary equipment for 5,000 troops bound on a mission that meant war on a small scale, and might mean war on a large scale. Though a man of peace, he promptly demonstrated his ability to handle the details of the War Office.

* * *

PUNISHING MEXICAN BANDITS

THE murderous assaults of Mexican outlaws upon American citizens have at length become unbearable even for a patient nation. Before dawn on March 9 Francisco Villa and 1,500 of his followers crossed into New Mexico and attacked the town of Columbus in Indian fashion, setting fire to the houses and assassinating eighteen persons, nine of them defenseless civilians, and nine soldiers of the Thirteenth United States Cavalry guarding the border there. Villa's main object, besides that of loot, seems to have been to revenge himself upon both Carranza and the United States Government by provoking a war between the two countries.

A small body of American troopers pursued the bandits a few miles into Mexican territory, killing forty-six and seriously wounding many others; but the

DAVID R. FRANCIS
Our New Ambassador to Russia, Formerly Governor of Missouri

NEWTON D. BAKER

Newly Appointed Secretary of War, Formerly Mayor of Cleveland, Ohio

(*Photo © Lawrence-Figley*)

main body, with their leader, escaped. President Wilson at once ordered an organized pursuit with an adequate force of troops, regardless of consequences, though with the sole purpose of bringing the assassins to justice. Congress and the nation heartily indorsed the decision. Even Mr. Bryan admitted that we had borne enough.

Under the direction of Major Gen. Frederick Funston a force of at least 5,000 picked cavalry, with field-gun detachments and several companies of infantry, was organized at Columbus, and on March 16 it crossed the Mexican line under Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing, heading southward through the Chihuahua desert in the hope of intercepting Villa in his rendezvous beyond Casas Grandes. Somewhere near the start the expedition was divided into two columns, the second being under command of Colonel Dodd. By March 20 the cavalry divisions had reached a point 110 miles south of the line. Other details of the advance were concealed under the blanket of an effective censorship.

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A Delicate Situation

GENERAL PERSHING is instructed to confine his activities in Mexico solely to the capture and punishment of Villa's outlaw band, and the Administration is making every effort to keep the episode from developing, as Villa intended, into a war with Mexico. Hope of being able to do this is increased by the present friendly co-operation of General Carranza, the de facto head of the Mexican Government. The situation at best, however, is extremely delicate.

A doubtful moment came at the beginning, when President Carranza issued a manifesto declaring that he would never consent to the expedition unless his Government were granted the reciprocal privilege of sending troops into American territory in a similar emergency. President Wilson readily agreed and since then Carranza has done what he could to aid the success of the undertaking, being apparently convinced of the sincerity of Secretary Lansing's statement

> that the military operations now in contemplation by this Government will be scrupulously confined to the object already announced, and that in no circumstances will they be suffered to infringe in any degree upon the sovereignty of Mexico or develop into intervention of any kind in the internal affairs of our sister republic.

Mr. Lansing's words were confirmed by a resolution which passed the United States Senate, declaring that the expedition was punitive and in no sense "an intervention." The friendly intention thus announced can be frustrated only by the Mexican people themselves, but the dangers of a misunderstanding are obvious. By ordering General Pershing to avoid towns as far as possible the American authorities have done what they could to minimize the danger of "sniping" by irresponsible partisans of Villa. In the circumstances it seems likely that Villa's scheme of embroiling the two nations will fail, and that he will be hoist with his own petard.

* * *

Increasing the Army

IN a recent address in New York Colonel Edwin F. Glenn of the United States Army called our present military establishment "the most pathetic thing that ever came along in history," referring to its inadequacy in numbers. The Mexican episode has brought a favoring wind to the sails of the preparedness advocates. An emergency bill authorizing the President to recruit 20,000 more men, bringing the army up to a maximum war strength of 120,000, passed both houses of Congress almost without a dissenting vote.

Colonel Glenn told his hearers that if real trouble should develop in Mexico it would require 500,000 men and five years of fighting to win peace. There would be no lack of adventurous young men to enlist, but they would be useless without six months or a year of training. These facts lend a livelier interest to the two army bills now before Congress. Representative Hay's measure calls for a standing army of 140,000, a reserve of 60,000, a National Guard of 129,000, and the construction of a Government plant for the manufacture of nitrogen used in explosives. The Senate bill, offered by Mr. Chamberlain, provides for 178,000 men of all arms within five years, with a plan for a full war strength of 225,000. Besides, it calls for a Federal volunteer force in peace times somewhat like the Continental Army advocated by Secretary Garrison. Both bills call for the federalization of the National Guard, with pay for the men during periods of training.

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EUROPE'S BURDEN OF DEBT

THE burden of debt which the war entails upon Europe is mounting to such colossal figures that the imagination cannot measure its prodigious proportions by any previous standard. It is estimated that the war loans up to the middle of March total $29,000,000,000. The following is an approximation of the obligations of the respective nations to date in millions of dollars:

	Previous war debt.	War loan.	Present debt.
Great Britain	$3,485	$7,670	$11,155
France	6,607	6,659	13,197
Russia	4,537	4,117	8,654
Italy	2,836	1,465	4,301
Total for Allies...	$17,465	$19,842	$37,307
Germany	5,198	6,415	11,613
Austria-Hungary ...	3.970	2,547	6,517
Turkey	640	214	854
Central Powers....	$9,808	$9,176	$18,984
Grand Total......	$27,273	$29,019	$56,292

In these figures it will be observed that the war loans of the Entente reach approximately $20,000,000,000 and those of the Central Powers over $9,000,000,000. It is estimated that the war is costing about one hundred millions a day, or over $4,000,000 every hour. Of Great Britain's loans approximately $2,500,000,000 have gone to her allies. Assuming that the war will last another year, additional loans of over $35,000,000,000 will be required, which will bring the grand total of debts of the belligerent powers to the astounding total of $92,000,000,000 as against $27,273,000,000 previous to the war. When it is remembered that each of the powers prior to the war was seriously perplexed to discover new sources of taxation to meet interest charges, the problem becomes apparently insoluble with these charges nearly quadrupled.

The estimated population of the seven powers enumerated in the above table is 417,000,000, hence if the war lasts another year, the total debts will exceed $220 per capita. The interest bearing debt of the United States is less than $10 per capita.

* * *

MEN AGAIN IN ARMOR

THE use of metal protectors by all the belligerents is increasing, and the equipment of the modern soldier is noticeably reverting to the fashions of mediaeval periods. Since August, 1915, 4,000,000 metal helmets have been made for French soldiers. The head of the Paris Military Medical Service, Dr. B. Roussey, in an official report to the Academy of Medicine, stated that in July and August, prior to the adoption of the helmet only 8½ per cent. of the wounds were in the skull, whereas in the following December and January, when a part of the troops had been equipped with helmets, the percentage of wounds in the skull had doubled, the inference being that fully 8½ per cent. were saved from death on the battlefield by the protectors. He recommended that metal protection be provided for other parts of the body, especially the thorax and abdomen. He exhibited a helmet, struck by a bullet fired at a distance of 200 yards; the metal was torn, but the soldier who wore it was only slightly wounded, whereas had the bullet not been deflected, he would have been killed.

* * *

EXPORTS OF MUNITIONS

WITHIN a period of thirty-six hours ending March 5, 1916, nine transatlantic steamships left New York for belligerent European ports, viz.: The Canopic for Naples, the Southerdown for St. Nazaire, France; the Cedric for Liverpool, the Rochambeau for Bordeaux, the Headley for London, the Napoli for Genoa, the Ardgorm for London, the Appenine for Cardiff, the California for Liverpool. Their manifests reveal the enormous amount of munitions and war material which is going from this country to Europe. As an illustration, the Cedric carried the following:

23,981 cases empty shells, 3,528 cases of cartridge cases, 105 cases of projectile bands, 5,200 cases of cartridges, 1,579 cases of fuses, 23 cases of rifles, 20 cases of rifle barrels, 46 cases of bayonets, 16 cases of revolvers, 341 cases of cannon primers, 285 cases of forgings, 1,047 cases of brass rods, 100 pieces steel strips, 889 plates of spelter, 98 cases copper tubes, 13,792 ingots copper, 67 aeroplanes and parts, 11 tractors, 5,912 bundles shovels, 73 automobiles, 51 cases tents, 1,265 barrels lubricating oil, 4,314 bales cotton, 850 cases rubber boots and shoes, 240 cases harness.

The Napoli carried the following:

80,000 lb. trinitrotuluol (high explosive,) 49 barrels formaldehyde, 31,722 cathodes copper, 3,755 bundles wire and wire rods, 659 coils copper wire, 266 cases brass, 92 packages old chains and anchors, 49 cases military equipment, 30 cases magnetos, 11,144 ingots copper, 98 bundles wire, 30 iron pipes, 1,500 boxes brass, 3 cases bar steel, 16 cases emery wheels and drills, 24 cases lathes, 1,025 bags wax, 2,500 bales cotton, 8 cases gas engines, 7 cases motor cycles, 6 cases blankets, 1,897 cases shoes, 257 cases mining, wood and metal working machinery, 53 cases hospital supplies, 850 horses.

Each of the other vessels carried similar cargoes. The total exports from the Port of New York alone for the week ending March 4, 1916, was $57,554,366 against $21,051,057 for the corresponding week of 1914. During the March week alone the value of loaded projectiles, smokeless powder, empty shells, and commercial automobiles exported amounted in round numbers to $11,400,000. The exports in 1915 of articles utilized for war purposes were in value $831,695,000 against $180,128,274 in 1914 and $147,979,526 in 1913. The value of exports classified as "explosives" in 1915 was $181,778,033, against $5,525,071 in 1913.

* * *

A TREATY THAT WAS NO "SCRAP OF PAPER"

PORTUGAL, in explaining her entrance into the war, evidently desired to emphasize satirically the fact that her treaties are not scraps of paper. Viscount de Alte, the Portuguese Minister to the United States, announces that his country's entrance into the war on March 9 was in fulfillment of a treaty obligation entered into between England and Portugal on June 16, 1373, just 543 years ago lacking about ninety days. This treaty, which provided that Portugal should join England in warfare when called upon to do so, was concluded between Ferdinand of Portugal and Edward III. of England and has endured through the centuries without a break. In 1703 Portugal fought with England in the war of the Spanish succession and again fought by her side in the bloody struggles on the Peninsula during the Napoleonic epoch. It is a curious circumstance that while Portugal is drawn into this war by her alliance with England, her exiled King Manuel finds asylum in the British Isles to conduct there unchecked his conspiracy against the de facto republic for his restoration to the Portuguese throne.

* * *

SAZONOFF'S PERSONALITY

DURING the last twenty history-making months all the portfolios in the Russian Cabinet have changed hands, in some cases several times, save that of M. Sazonoff, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Broad and clear of vision, steady in his purpose and strong in his determination, M. Sazonoff has kept his post and managed it with such ability that he has come to be regarded as the man at the helm on Russia's political seas, perhaps the most tempestuous and treacherous in Europe. It is, therefore, only natural that his word, spoken, as the London Daily Chronicle correspondent says, "with all the passion and fire of profound spiritual conviction," should attract more attention than that of any other Russian statesman or public man. Speaking of disarmament, M. Sazonoff said to the same correspondent:

> If Prussian militarism is destroyed, if that evil thing which has darkened all our lives for so many years is finally destroyed, as I believe most firmly it will be destroyed, then I think some measure of disarmament may be possible. It should be quite possible, for with England and Russia friends the rest of the world is safe. We shall fight on until the nations feel themselves safe—and not until German militarism is destroyed to its roots can any nation feel safe. England, France, and Russia are responsible now for

the future of Europe, which means the future of civilization, the fate of the world.

M. Sazonoff's ringing words at the opening of the Duma, in which he emphatically reiterated the Government's determination "to continue the struggle to conquer the enemy," have drowned even the utterances of the Czar and the Premier on that memorable occasion.

* * *

GENERAL KUROPATKIN

IN appointing Alexei Kuropatkin Commander in Chief of the Russian armies on the northern front, the Czar has pitted against Germany's greatest military genius, von Hindenburg, a General who in experience, knowledge, and ability is, save the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievitch, second to none in the Russian Empire. As author of numerous works on military and political subjects, as participant in the Turkish campaign of 1877-78, as Minister of War, and, finally, as Commander in Chief of the Russian armies in the Russo-Japanese war, General Kuropatkin has shown noteworthy talents. As to the causes of the Russian failure in Manchuria, he proved in his comprehensive work on the Russo-Japanese war, to the satisfaction of the world's military experts and especially of the Russian public, that they were to be found in the inefficiency and chaotic condition of the Government at Petrograd, and that his strategy, if properly supported and given the opportunity to develop, would inevitably have led to victory. Politically, the appointment of Kuropatkin, who belongs to the progressive flank of Russia's military artistocracy, will doubtless produce a salutary effect on that country's public opinion.

Interpretations of World Events

Ministerial Changes in Germany and France

THE several times repeated rumor that High Admiral von Tirpitz would resign seems at last to be true. It is conjectured that this means a triumph of humanity in the methods of submarine warfare, as to which the High Admiral has been known to be ruthless; and we are told that the change represents a triumph for the Imperial Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, who has counseled moderation and the conciliation of neutrals, especially the United States. But this surmise is very much weakened by the report that Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg is himself to resign, being replaced by Prince von Bülow, and by the further report that the submarine warfare will go on unabated, a view borne out by the fate of the Dutch liner Tubantia and the narrow escape of the Patria. It is more likely that Ministerial changes in Germany simply represent another shuffling of the cards, in the hope of a better hand. In France there has also been an important change. General Gallieni, who was first Military Governor of Paris, and later War Minister, has, it seems, broken down in health as a result of his unceasing toil for the republic. He is to be replaced by a man several years his junior, whom he has known, as it happens, for many years. General Pierre Auguste Roques was born at Marseillan in the Department of Herault, on the Gulf of Lyons, not far from Joffre's birthplace at Rivaltes; he was a boy of 14 at the time of the Franco-Prussian war, in which Joffre, Gallieni, and Pau fought. General Roques entered the Ecole Polytechnique at Paris in 1872, two years after Joffre had been graduated, and in 1874 he became a Second Lieutenant of Engineers. At that time the French colonies in Asia and Africa had hardly begun to develop, but they very soon became exceedingly important, and in 1888 Lieutenant Roques went out to Tonkin with Admiral Courbet's expedition, of which Joffre was a conspicuous member. In 1889 he served in Algiers, and in 1892 in West Africa, where Joffre also saw much hard fighting. Then came a period of work at the

War Ministry at Paris, once more exactly as in Joffre's case, and then, about 1900, General Gallieni, who had already served four years as Governor of Madagascar, brought Colonel Joffre, as he then was, out to Diego Suarez, at the extreme north end of Madagascar, to build the immense fortified harbor there. Captain Roques was one of Joffre's assistants in this work. Then work in the department of aeronautics was followed by command of a division, and, in due course, of the Twelfth Army Corps, stationed at Limoges, in the southwest of France; he began the war as commander of this corps. At the beginning of 1915 he was promoted to command of one of the string of armies that guard the French battle line, and now he reaches the highest military post in the republic as Minister of War.

Morocco and the War

IT would probably be true to say that, while the impulse which brought Austria into the war began with Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was Morocco which directly involved Germany. The first friction between France and Germany over Morocco came in 1904, and was adjusted, in a sense unfavorable to Germany, by the Algeciras treaty of 1906. Five years later the trouble began again. Germany brusquely asserted her interest in Morocco by sending to Agadir the gunboat Panther and the cruiser Berlin, the former on July 1, 1911. It was made evident that England meant business, and might mean war. Germany, checked, replied by larger military preparations in the Spring of 1913, and added four new corps to her army. Nine months after came the present war. It is, therefore, interesting to learn the present situation in Morocco. The French report a severe defeat inflicted there by Colonel Simon on the agitator Abd el Malek, who, in the region of Taza, had raised the tribesmen against the influence of France, and they consider this defeat a serious check for the Germans, who had been subsidizing these tribes as they had subsidized the Senoussi, to fight against England in Egypt at the other side of Africa. General Henrys, commanding in the absence of General Lyautey, attacked Abd el Malek, captured his camp of 150 tents, and drove him off to the Rif, where the question of pursuit will resemble a problem of the United States nearer home. It is also reported from Tripoli, and from that part of the coast of Tripoli which borders on Egypt, that the tribesmen opposed to Italy and England are losing ground, so that along the whole of Northern Africa, as in the Cameroons and opposite Madagascar, the Entente interests are able to report recent successes.

The Cameroon Protectorate and German East Africa

THE French Government is already providing a civil administration for the Cameroon region, which has been completely wrested from Germany; and this is interesting as being the first indication of the final disposition of this enormous district. France has, of course, special claims to the Cameroons, as the whole eastern section belonged to France before 1911, when it was taken by Germany as compensation for France's privileges in Morocco. On the other side of the African continent General Jan Christian Smuts is doing what General Botha did in Southwest Africa. On March 13 he occupied Mushi, and was pushing on toward Arusha, which the Germans were thought to have evacuated. He reported also that the Germans had been severely defeated at Kitovo. The general direction of the fighting seems now to be under Mount Kilimanjaro, the highest mountain on the African continent, higher than any in America north of Panama; only Mount St. Elias in Alaska and Orizaba in Mexico approach its height of 17,800 feet. Crowned with everlasting snow, it is called by the natives "the Mount of Silver," and this may be the foundation of the curious tradition recorded by Aristotle that the Nile rose beneath a silver mountain. But this vast peak is only one of many summits that crown the eastern edge of the great plateau of equitorial Africa, a plateau which has the most important bearing on the future of this whole region, for its great elevation, with the cool winds from the snow fields, makes it much more available for white colonization than the torrid coast lands are. General Smuts's sons and grandsons, to the third and fourth generation, may be destined to find a home here under the shadow of the Silver Mount.

Balfour, Churchill, and the Allied Fleets

WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL, whose military career was recently outlined in these pages, and who has since risen to the rank of Colonel, is said to have had premonitions of early death and, to clear his conscience, deemed it necessary to return to the scene of his former triumphs in the House of Commons, and to direct a ruthless attack against Arthur James Balfour, his successor at the Admiralty. We can get a very valuable sidelight on the controversy between them from a summary of the fleets which might oppose each other in the North Sea, a summary drawn up by Rear Admiral Degouy, whom one might call the Admiral Mahan of France. According to this high authority, Germany has, to count major units only, forty-four battleships and battle cruisers; this includes units under construction when the war broke out. England has of these same classes (counting pre-dreadnoughts of the class of the Edward VII., dreadnoughts and superdreadnoughts) at least sixty-five. England, further, has twenty-eight armored cruisers against two or three that remain to Germany. To the English fleet, moreover, should be added the French dreadnoughts and predreadnoughts, (of the class of the Diderot,) or eleven battleships. If we add to these the armored cruisers which have been on duty in the English Channel for the last eighteen months we shall have a total, says Admiral Degouy, of more than 110 battle-line units. Nor does this complete the strength of the Allies. There remains Russia's Baltic fleet, a thoroughgoing renaissance of which was begun shortly after the disasters of the war with Japan. By the time the ice is off the Gulf of Finland Admiral Degouy estimates that Russia will have eight battleships in the Baltic, four of which are of the newest type, and probably four formidable battle cruisers. In order to arrive at a conservative result, Admiral Degouy counts only half the probable Russian strength, and thus reaches a total of 116 battle-line units, as against forty-four, as we saw, for Germany.

The Situation at Constantinople

SIGNS multiply of coming convulsions at the capital of the Turkish Empire. There was the death of the heir apparent, Prince Yusef Izeddin, of whom Pierre Loti has just written a beautiful obituary sketch; a death which one side calls suicide, while the other boldly brands it as assassination. There were sudden and violent dislocations of Turkish troops, announcing counsels of desperation. We are told that a majority of the Turkish soldiers who were in Bulgaria or on the Greek frontier, on the Sea of Marmora, in the neighborhood of Smyrna, or other parts of Western Asia Minor, are being hastily sent to Angora and Sivas, to oppose the Russian sweep from Erzerum toward the Bosporus. It may be said, in passing, that it will suit Russian policy very much better if her armies can reach Stamboul along the Black Sea and Asia Minor route thus indicated, than if France and England had got there first, through the Dardanelles; for the reason that a success of her own will give Russia a claim by so much the stronger to the ultimate possession of the Bosporus, and that "front door of the Black Sea" which she has so long desired. Meanwhile, three divisions of the forces which swept through Erzerum have now undertaken the capture of Trebizond, Erzingan, and Kharput; another force, from Lake Van, is making certain of Diarbekir, while the Persian detachment has swept past Kermanshah and Kirind and is swiftly approaching Bagdad. It will be seen that the foothold of the isolated Turkish armies, which are involved in this net of greatly superior Russian forces, is precarious in the last degree; and the reaction from all this is keenly felt on the Golden Horn. All of which makes Bulgaria more than uneasy.

Decisive Military Victory

THE Battle of Verdun is perhaps the only major operation of the present world war which is like the battles of all former wars in the fact that it was fought at a definite place and within the limits of a definite time. The Battle of the Marne, the Battle of the Aisne, the Battle of the Dwinsk, take their names from rivers, simply because rivers cover the enormous spaces occupied by modern battles, and, in a general way, mark folds in the country, along which troops naturally find defensive positions. But it can hardly be said that the Battle of the Marne was fought in any particular place, or only on the Marne. The defense of Verdun by General Sarrail, now in chief command at Saloniki, was a vital part of it, and Verdun is on the Meuse, far from the Marne. The Battle of the Marne had definite dates, but the Battle of the Dwinsk is going on still, and may go on for months. And it is only by comparison, by a sort of artificial isolation, that the recent Battle of Verdun can be said to have begun and ended. There was fighting in the same region, almost on the same lines, ever since the first few weeks of the war. Whether in time or space the recent fighting at Verdun is only a knot on a nearly endless string; in space, a string stretching from Ostend to Switzerland; in time, but a tenser episode in long months of fighting. So that, in the warfare of today, such a thing as a decisive battle, a decisive victory, is becoming impossible, because armies hundreds of miles long cannot be surrounded, though they can be forced backward, as happened in Russia. But even that tremendous migration decided nothing for the outcome of the war. Again, it is no longer a question of a group of professional soldiers, who may be completely surrounded, like the French armies at Sedan or Metz or Paris, leaving the nation comparatively untouched. It is a question of nations in arms; in France, as in Germany and Austria, to say nothing of Serbia, it is a question of the entire manhood of the nation. England is approaching the same condition. Russia alone, by virtue of her vastly larger population and smaller resources in equipment, is still far from it. It is evident that decisive victory, when it comes, will come in some new way, whether through a tremendous increase of internal outbreaks, such as are persistently reported from the Central Empires, or by a breaking away of allies, as seems likely in the case of Turkey and perhaps also Bulgaria, or by the killing off of the men, or by economic exhaustion. Since this last is, among many incalculable elements, the one which is, perhaps, the most definitely calculable, and so one of the most satisfactory to work upon, it is entirely intelligible that the Entente Powers, far from being willing to relax their present economic pressure on the Central Empires, are likely to increase that pressure steadily, by every means in their power.

Rumania Getting Ready

THE continued indecision of Rumania is one of the standing problems of the war, but there are indications—straws in the wind—which show a rising current toward the Entente Powers. To begin with, there are certain significant changes in the Rumanian Staff. The nomination of General Averescu as Corps Commander of the First Army Corps of the Rumanian Army, the nomination of General Gotescu as Corps Commander of the Second Army Corps, and of General Presan as Corps Commander of the Third Army Corps, with the designation of the date, April 14, on which they are to take charge, are both regarded as indicative of the growing predominance of the party which desires to enter the war on the side of the Entente Powers. And the fact that Rumania is being supplied with munitions of war from Russia shows two things: First, that Russia now has supplies for herself and to spare; second, that the bond between Rumania and Russia is growing closer in spite of dynastic influences which draw the Hohenzollern rulers of Rumania toward the mightier Hohenzollerns. The absence of all representatives of the German imperial house from the funeral of "Carmen Sylva," the Queen Mother of Rumania, was made the occasion of a curious story—that Prince August Wilhelm, the fourth son of the Kaiser, was sent to the ceremony of mourning and actually got as far as the border of Rumania, when the German Minister at Bucharest sent him an urgent message to turn back because it was feared that he might be made the object of hostile demonstrations on the part of the Rumanian people. It seems certain at least that at the last moment an excuse was sent from the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier. The incident was the more striking because of the high honor in which "Carmen Sylva" was always held in Germany.

Discontent in the Bundesrat

BESIDES repeated rumors of popular outbreaks, now at Berlin, now at Cologne, there comes a curious report, by way of Holland, that there have been marked feelings, if not actually expressions, of discontent in the Bundesrat in Berlin. The Bundesrat is more like the United States Senate in its essential character than almost any other existent body, because it represents the different States in a larger Federal unity; while the popular and popularly elected Reichstag is, both in numbers and in constitution, fairly comparable to our House of Representatives. But both German bodies are smaller than their analogues in the United States, the Bundesrat having only sixty-one members, or one-third less than the Senate, and it further differs from the United States Senate in the fact that the different federated States are not all represented on an equal footing. For Prussia has 17 out of the 61 members, the Kingdom of Bavaria has 6, the Kingdoms of Saxony and Württemberg have 4 each, the Grand Duchies of Baden and Hesse have 3 each, the Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and the Duchy of Brunswick have each 2, Alsace-Lorraine has 3, while 17 smaller units have each 1 member; 3 of these are towns, and Hamburg, with about 1,000,000 inhabitants; Bremen, with 250,000, and Lübeck, with less than 100,000, are held equal. Once more, like the United States Senate, the Bundesrat does much of its work by standing committees, of which there are a dozen, one each for the army, navy, taxation, trade, railroads, law, foreign affairs, railroad tariffs, standing orders, constitutional questions, and Alsace-Lorraine. Each of these standing committees consists of representatives of at least four States of the empire; but the Bundesrat Committee on Foreign Affairs includes only representatives of the three kingdoms, (other than Prussia,) namely, of Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg, together with two other representatives to be elected every year. Thus, the Bundesrat Committee on Foreign Affairs represents the feeling of the southern German kingdoms, as contrasted with the dominant tendency of Prussia, and there has always been much latent jealousy toward the dominating northern neighbor, whether in Dresden or in Munich. But it is difficult to see just what the committee can do, beyond protesting to the Chancellor of the empire, under whose general Presidency the Bundesrat sits; and as Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg is, under the Constitution, responsible to the Kaiser, and to the Kaiser alone, these protests will only have the value of "pious opinions."

The President-Emperor of China

ONE might receive the impression, from the cablegrams, that the President-Emperor of China (to express an anomalous position by an anomalous title) is hard pressed by armies of revolutionists such as were gathered at Canton in the days of the "Chinese revolution," under the leadership of a group of liberals educated in foreign lands and inspired by foreign ideals. But, while it is true that fighting is going on over an extensive area of Chinese territory, it is none the less true that this fighting offers no menace at all to the plans of Yuan Shih-kai, and seemingly not less true that it has nothing to do with the revolutionary Liberals of Canton. At present the fighting is practically confined to the Province of Yunnan, and Yunnan, tucked into a corner of British Burma, is 1,500 or 1,600 miles from Yuan Shih-kai's capital at Peking, and this in a country with almost no railroads and only very feebly supplied with roads. And against these exceedingly distant malcontents Yuan's forces seem to be making quite considerable headway. The two neighboring provinces to the north and east of Yunnan are Szechuan and Kweichau. In each of these Yuan has a Military Governor in command of a sufficiently strong force, pressing in upon the Yunnan rebels. The upper waters of the Yang-tse-Kiang, which at that point bear the poetical name of Kincha-Kiang, "River of Golden Sand," make a deep bend south into the northern half of Yunnan; at this point Yuan's forces have just crossed the river, and are driving southward against the rebel stronghold at Yunnan-fu, which means "the walled City of Yunnan." And from the Province of Kwang-Si, on the southeast of Yunnan, yet another of Yuan's armies has just crossed the Yunnan border and seized Kiang-nan. So that the distant rebellion is likely soon to end. And its cause, so far from being an enthusiasm for liberal ideas and triumphant democracy, is said to be the fierce discontent of the opium planters because the Peking Government has forbidden the further production of "the herb of dreams."

Portugal Enters the War

CURIOUSLY enough, the real cause of Portugal's entering the war and adding her name to the long list of belligerent nations seems not to have been put down in black and white, though after a moment's thought it is entirely evident. The naval authorities of Portugal, we were first told, seized some dozen German steamships which were interned in the mouth of the Tagus. Next, we heard that Germany had sent an ultimatum, bidding Portugal give up the steamships, or accept war with Germany. Then, a few days later, when this ultimatum had been ignored and technically war was on, we learned that it was at the instance of England that the ships had been seized. That really gives the answer. The British view apparently was that these steamships were likely to do what German steamships in South American harbors had already done: ask for permission to go for a little spin, and then forget to return, presently turning up on the high seas as commerce destroyers. The German declaration of war can have very little practical effect. Portugal was already allied to England, and therefore on the Entente side. Germany cannot send troops there, though she may possibly operate against Portuguese shipping and fishing craft with submarines on their way to the Mediterranean. But in that case England will pay the bill. There is, however, one region where Portuguese and German territories touch: in East Africa, from Cape Delgado, up the Rovuma River to Lake Nyasa; and here Portuguese colonial troops may co-operate with General Smuts, who has still some hard fighting before him in the task of dislodging the German garrisons there.

A Verdict on Zeppelin Raids

The intense indignation and deep resentment aroused among the people of England in interior towns by the Zeppelin raids find expression in the verdicts of Coroners' juries. In Staffordshire a jury declined to accept the suggestion of the Coroner on the form the verdict should take and reported their unanimous finding in the following mordant sentence:

> *That the thirteen persons whose bodies we have viewed were killed by explosive bombs dropped from enemy aircraft, and that a verdict of "willful murder" be recorded against the Kaiser and the Crown Prince as being accessories to and after the fact.*

The killed included four children, whose ages ranged between 8 and 12 years, and three sexogenarians. In the raid on March 6, at one town, an invalid father and four small children were killed, and in another a blind paralytic over 80 years of age.

The World War: Where All the Armies Are Fighting

Map from The London Daily News.



The Western Front. Gen. Sir Douglas Haig commanding British Army.

Salonika. Gen. Sarrail in command of Allied Forces.

Mesopotamia. Gen. Aylmer's force.

Gen. Townshend's force holding Kut.

Gen Wallace's operations against the Senussi

Egypt. Gen. Maxwell in command.

Aden. Turkish raiding forces from Yemen driven back.



Togoland
Surrendered to Allied forces August 26th 1914

Cameroons
Conquest by Allied forces practically complete.

German East Africa
Gen. Sir H. Smith-Dorrien in command

German S.W. Africa
Surrendered to Gen Botha, July 1915.

ARMED LINER ISSUE

Serious War Problem Confronts the President and Causes a Tempest in Congress

By the Editor

WHEN the Teutonic powers announced to neutrals in February that they would order their submarines to sink armed merchant vessels without warning after March 1, 1916, they forced upon the United States the necessity of deciding what course to pursue for the protection of American citizens on such vessels.

There was a choice of four possible courses. We might protest against the German submarine policy as inhuman and contrary to existing international law; we might insist on the disarming of all merchant vessels coming to our shores, thus pursuing the policy that had been tentatively suggested in Mr. Lansing's circular note of Jan. 18 to the Entente Powers; again, we might warn all Americans to stay off armed vessels, foregoing our right as American citizens to travel on the high seas in any vessels we choose; or, finally, we might await a repetition of the Lusitania disaster.

SURVEY OF THE CASE

The problem was one involving our relations with Great Britain and likewise with Germany. The decision, if it had any backbone in it, would necessarily be in partial opposition to one or the other of the great warring groups of nations in Europe. Involuntarily the American Government had become a sort of world tribunal for the trial of this unprecedented case in international law. Both sides have presented evidence, and though a decision has not been reached at this writing, (March 20,) CURRENT HISTORY is able to present a broad survey of the case, with its latest official documents, and of the dramatic side issue which it forced upon President Wilson in his relations with a hostile minority of his own party in Congress.

Secretary Lansing's circular note regarding the disarming of all Entente merchantmen (published in the March issue of CURRENT HISTORY) had already had the unfortunate effect of causing the Teutonic Powers to expect official American action along that line. But President Wilson had returned from his Western tour convinced that the nation, even though unprepared in a military sense, would support him in a firmer demand for our rights as a neutral power at sea under existing law. Thus one of the first effects of Germany's submarine order was an abrupt pause in the Lusitania negotiations.

GERMANY'S ATTITUDE

On Feb. 17 Secretary Lansing informed Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, that the United States Government would not accept the proposal for settlement of the Lusitania affair until the Berlin Government gave definite guarantees for the future. He made it clear that the United States must have written assurances that submarine warfare would not be conducted in such a way as to imperil Americans traveling on the high seas. Great Britain stood firmly on the ancient law and usage which permits a defensive armament on merchant ships without altering their status.

Three days later at Berlin the German Foreign Minister, Herr von Jagow, gave out an interview in which he contended that under modern conditions there was no longer any such thing as a merchant ship armed defensively only; that modern guns and gunners aboard such a vessel made it an auxiliary warship for offensive purposes at will, and that there no longer existed any sound reason for arming merchant ships. He added:

"British merchantmen are armed with modern guns; they have trained gunners aboard. We have submitted proof that the English Admiralty have given minute and detailed instructions and orders to take the offensive against submarines at sight. We have submitted proof of the execution of these offensive instructions. Our standpoint is that the so-called defensive armament as it exists on British merchantmen in a practical sense is a fiction of the law; that the use repeatedly made of such armament * * * has given such armed merchant ships the character of auxiliary warships, and Germany will consider and treat them as such after the expiration of the notice given to neutrals."

The strained relations between the United States and Germany over the Lusitania had apparently been on the eve of adjustment. The new issue threw the negotiations back again into the danger zone. A diplomatic break between the two nations again loomed near, with the possibility of war somewhere in the background.

CONGRESS TAKES A HAND

Meanwhile, certain members of Congress were becoming alarmed over the President's new policy of dealing firmly with Germany's revival of submarine warfare, and rumors of divided counsels at Washington quickly reached Germany. On Feb. 23 the movement broke into open revolt. Leaders of the House of Representatives virtually served notice on President Wilson that unless within forty-eight hours he agreed to warn American citizens that they must not take passage on armed ships, the House would issue such a warning in the form of a resolution. A resolution of the kind, already submitted by Representative McLemore of Texas, was in readiness. The entire Committee on Foreign Affairs, headed by Mr. Flood, was found to be against the President's policy, and Speaker Champ Clark and Representative Kitchin, Democratic floor leader, were in favor of warning Americans to stay off armed liners, for fear of involving this country in war, though they advised against forcing the President's hand too summarily.

SENATOR GORE'S RESOLUTION

In the Senate, Mr. Stone, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, held a similar attitude, being supported by Senator Kern, Democratic leader of the upper house, and a stormy interview of these two with the President the night before had won no concessions from him. A concurrent resolution was offered by Senator Gore of Oklahoma, ending as follows:

> Resolved, By the Senate, the House of Representatives concurring, That it is the sense of the Congress, vested as it is with the sole power to declare war, that all persons owing allegiance to the United States should in behalf of their own safety and the vital interest of the United States, forbear to exercise the right to travel as passengers on any armed vessel of any belligerent power, whether such vessel be armed for offensive or defensive purposes, and it is the further sense of the Congress that no passport should be issued or renewed by the Secretary of State, or any one acting under him, to be used by any person owing allegiance to the United States for purpose of travel upon any such armed vessel of a belligerent power.

At this juncture Senator Stone wrote a letter to the President on the subject and received a ringing reply which declared: "I cannot consent to any abridgment of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honor and self-respect of the nation is involved. We court peace and shall preserve it at any cost but the cost of honor."

SENATOR STONE'S LETTER

"United States Senate,
"Washington, Feb. 24, 1916.

"Dear Mr. President:

"Since Senator Kern, Mr. Flood, and I talked with you on Monday evening I am more troubled than I have been for many a day. I have not felt authorized to repeat our conversation, but I have attempted, in response to numerous inquiries from my colleagues, to state to them, within the confidence that they should observe, my general understanding of your attitude. I have stated my understanding of your attitude to be substantially as follows:

" That while you would deeply regret the rejection by Great Britain of Mr. Lansing's proposal for the disarmament of merchant vessels of the Allies, with the understanding that Germany and her allies would not fire upon a merchant ship if she hauled to when summoned, not attempting to escape, and that the German warships would only exercise the admitted right of visitation and capture, and would not destroy the captured ship except in circumstances that reasonably assured the safety of passengers and crew, you were of the opinion that if Great Britain and her allies rejected the proposal and insisted upon arming their merchant ships they would be within their right under international law.

" Also that you would feel disposed to allow armed vessels to be cleared from our ports. Also that you are not favorably disposed to the idea of this Government taking any definite steps toward preventing American citizens from embarking upon armed merchant vessels. Furthermore, that you would consider it your duty if a German warship should fire upon an armed merchant vessel of the enemy upon which American citizens were passengers to hold Germany to strict account.

" Numerous members of the Senate and the House have called to discuss this subject with me. I have felt that the members of the two houses who are to deal with this grave question were entitled to know the situation we are confronting as I understand it to be.

" I think I should say to you that the members of both houses feel deeply concerned and disturbed by what they read and hear. I have heard of some talk to the effect that some are saying that after all it may be possible that the program of preparedness, so called, has some relation to just such a situation as we are now called upon to meet.

" I have counseled all who have talked with me to keep cool; that this whole business is still the subject of diplomacy, and that you are striving to the utmost to bring about some peaceable adjustment, and that in the meantime Congress should be careful not to 'ball up' a diplomatic situation by any kind of hasty and ill-considered action. However, the situation in Congress is such as to excite a sense of deep concern in the minds of careful and thoughtful men.

" I have felt that it is due to you to say this much. I think you understand my personal attitude with respect to this subject. As much and deeply as I would hate to radically disagree with you, I find it difficult from my sense of duty and responsibility to consent to plunge this nation into the vortex of this world war because of the unreasonable obstinacy of any of the powers upon the one hand, or, on the other hand, of foolhardiness, amounting to a sort of moral treason against the Republic, of our people recklessly risking their lives on armed belligerent ships. I cannot escape the conviction that such would be so monstrous as to be indefensible.

" I want to be with you and to stand by you, and I mean to do so up to the last limit; and I want to talk with you and Secretary Lansing with the utmost frankness—to confer with you and have your judgment and counsel—and I want to be kept advised as to the course of events, as it seems to me I am entitled to be.

" In the meantime I am striving to prevent anything being done by any Senator or Member calculated to embarrass your diplomatic negotiations. Up to the last you should be left free to act diplomatically as you think for the best to settle the questions involved. I need hardly say that my wish is to help, not to hinder, you.

" With the highest regard and most sympathetic consideration, I have the honor, Mr. President, to be, very sincerely yours, W. J. STONE.

" The President."

THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY

" The White House,
" Washington, Feb. 24, 1916.

" My Dear Senator: I very warmly appreciate your kind and frank letter



RICHARD HARDING DAVIS
Novelist and War Correspondent, Who Traversed the War Zone for the New York Times
(Photo © Pirie MacDonald)

HENRY MORGENTHAU
American Ambassador at Constantinople, Recipient of Honors During a Brief Home Visit
(Photo © Underwood & Underwood)

of today and feel that it calls for an equally frank reply.

"You are right in assuming that I shall do everything in my power to keep the United States out of war. I think the country will feel no uneasiness about my course in that respect. Through many anxious months I have striven for that object, amidst difficulties more manifold than can have been apparent upon the surface, and so far I have succeeded. I do not doubt that I shall continue to succeed. The course which the Central European Powers have announced their intention of following in the future with regard to undersea warfare seems for the moment to threaten insuperable obstacles, but its apparent meaning is so manifestly inconsistent with explicit assurances recently given us by those powers with regard to their treatment of merchant vessels on the high seas that I must believe that explanations will presently ensue which will put a different aspect upon it. We have had no reason to question their good faith or their fidelity to their promises in the past, and I for one feel confident that we shall have none in the future.

"But in any event our duty is clear. No nation, no group of nations, has the right while war is in progress to alter or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors and sufferings of war; and if the clear rights of American citizens should ever unhappily be abridged or denied by any such action we should, it seems to me, have in honor no choice as to what our own course should be.

"For my own part, I cannot consent to any abridgment of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honor and self-respect of the nation are involved. We covet peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humilation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere, and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesmen, even amidst the turmoil of war, for the law and the right. It would make everything this Government has attempted, and everything that it has achieved during this terrible struggle of nations, meaningless and futile.

"It is important to reflect that if in this instance we allowed expediency to take the place of principle the door would inevitably be opened to still further concessions. Once accept a single abatement of right, and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands piece by piece. What we are contending for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her own impotency as a nation, and making virtual surrender of her independent position among the nations of the world.

"I am speaking, my dear Senator, in deep solemnity, without heat, with a clear consciousness of the high responsibilities of my office, and as your sincere and devoted friend. If we should unhappily differ, we shall differ as friends; but where issues so momentous as these are involved we must, just because we are friends, speak our minds without reservation. Faithfully yours,

"WOODROW WILSON.

"To Hon William J. Stone,
United States Senate."

This letter gave the insurgent legislators pause, though Speaker Clark led a delegation to interview the President, and told him that the McLemore resolution would carry two to one if put to the test. The German Foreign Office sent an explanation that no enemy merchantman would be torpedoed without warning unless the presence of armament on board had been proved. A memorandum to that effect was presented to the United States Government by Count von Bernstorff, and the tension subsided in that quarter.

GERMANY MISLED

But the rumor that the President did not have the backing of Congress and the nation behind his foreign policy continued to be the subject of damaging comment and misinterpretation in Europe. A writer in the Vienna Zeit merely echoed what was being said throughout the Teutonic Empires when he rejoiced in the activities of "the pro-German party in the United States Senate" and continued:

> This disposes of the assertion that the whole country approves of what President Wilson has done, and will re-elect him, in order that he may be able to continue his fruitful activities. If the President does not give way, he will not be able to carry through his program of strengthening the army and the navy and creating a mercantile marine and land credit banks. Either he must change his course, or he will perish ingloriously. In spite of all his stubbornness his first desire is to be elected, and he will submit. We can therefore hope that we are on the eve of better times.

It was therefore President Wilson who furnished the next surprise by demanding that Congress act one way or the other upon the resolutions with which it had threatened to intervene in his domain. The demand came on Feb. 29 in the form of a polite but very firm letter to Representative Edward A. Pou of North Carolina, Acting Chairman of the Committee on Rules. A few days earlier the House Committee on Foreign Affairs had been ready to rush through the McLemore resolution, and had been looking to the Committee on Rules to furnish a speedy way of doing it. Now the President went straight to that committee and asked it to do its best in the same line. His demand was extended equally to the Senate and its Gore resolution.

"The report," he wrote, "that there are divided counsels in Congress in regard to the foreign policy of the Government is being made industrious use of in foreign capitals. I believe that report to be false, but so long as it is anywhere credited it cannot fail to do the greatest harm and expose the country to the most serious risks."

THE ISSUE IN CONGRESS

His challenge placed the insurgents of both houses in a predicament whose outcome was watched with interest all over America and Europe. It was a call by President Wilson not only for a vote of confidence, but for national unity at a critical time. He staked his leadership on the outcome. By this time, however, the insurgents were aware that they were in a hopeless minority, and would have to swallow their own threats. They took their medicine with many contortions and wry faces, but they had to take it.

In the Senate the Gore resolution was forced to a vote on March 3, and was tabled by 68 to 14. Foreseeing some such result, Senator Gore had resorted to the parliamentary trick of first amending the life out of his own resolution and then voting against it himself. By thus clouding the issue the triumph for the President's policy was somewhat lessened, and the real meaning of the result was incomprehensible to even the best-informed observers in Germany.

But if nobody was quite satisfied with what had taken place, the episode brought forth speeches on a high nonpartisan plane from both Republicans and Democrats, and the next day, when the debate was revived over a similar resolution reintroduced by Senator McCumber (Republican) of North Dakota, both sides were ably represented.

SENATOR McCUMBER'S VIEW

"I do not agree with the President," said Senator McCumber, "that it would be improper to suggest to the American traveling public that they refrain from doing that which by every principle of patriotic duty they ought to refrain from doing without any suggestions from any source. I am not in accord with his views as to the full extent of our right to control the methods which may be adopted by belligerents to prosecute their warfare to a successful issue. And I further believe that Congress, representing the sentiment of the country, can very properly give expression to its views, although, as I have suggested, I feel that just at this crucial and critical period of our diplomatic controversy we might well have deferred our action until the Executive Department had announced either an agreement or a disagreement.

"No one questions what the rule of

international law heretofore has been. That rule is that a merchant vessel, armed with a stern gun for defense only, has the same rights and the same status as an unarmed merchant vessel. That rule would forbid such vessel being torpedoed or sunk without notice by a submarine.

" It is equally true that writers of international law agree that, as all nations are supposed to conform to international law and practice obtaining before war, and to make their preparations for war in the light of such rules, and in the expectation they will be followed should war ensue; therefore, the insistence by a neutral power that such rule be modified during the progress of the war would be an unneutral act.

" But the science of war may develop so rapidly during a great world struggle like that now prevailing, and such exigencies involving the very life of a belligerent nation may arise as would not only justify but necessitate that nation to decline to follow a rule adopted under conditions which no longer prevail, or which are so materially modified by new instrumentalities of warfare as to require a change.

" While a neutral may do nothing to weaken or modify the rule, there may be justification for the belligerent, in defending its very existence, to do so. And the same exigency that will justify a warring nation in the throes of a desperate encounter to deviate from old rules of international law ought to appeal to every neutral nation to lessen the rigor of its demands for conformity by a belligerent in every detail to previous international law. And this charitableness should apply with just as much force to the Entente Powers as to the Central Powers.

" Our contention and insistence upon any rule of conduct to be followed by any belligerent ought to be founded upon justice, not alone to ourselves, but to the nation against which it is urged. Our contention should be unquestionably right, absolutely fair, and everlastingly consistent.

" I confess I cannot see anything fair in the proposition that while a submarine, which may easily be sunk by a single shot from one of these defensive guns, must give notice before it fires at the armed merchant vessel, the armed vessel need not give notice that it purposes to fire at the submarine. If I know that you are armed I cannot convince myself that a code of action which says that you can shoot me at sight but that I must give you timely notice to surrender is entirely fair."

SENATOR LODGE'S VERDICT

Henry Cabot Lodge, ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, spoke on historical aspects of the subject, bitterly assailing the proposition to warn Americans against traveling on armed merchant ships. He had already covered the subject still more thoroughly in a speech a few days earlier, and it is from this that we quote:

" It was established by centuries of practice and by universal assent that a merchantman armed only for defense did not thereby lose her character.

" The only point to be determined was whether by her acts or by the character of her armament and the numbers of her crew she was within the rules applying to the merchantmen, or whether she had taken herself out of those rules and had come within the class of the ship of war or the privateer.

" It was universally agreed by all authorities that the armament of the merchantman could be used only in self-defense, although that self-defense might extend to capturing the vessel which attacked. If an armed merchantman took the offensive she at once passed out of the category of merchantman, and not having any commission or letters of marque, like a privateer, would have been treated not merely as a ship of war but would have been within range of the definition of piracy.

" The first qualification, therefore, was that the armament of the merchantman could be used only for defense. The next qualification was the character of the armament, and that had to be determined in each case. It was a question of fact. No exact line as to the amount of armament had ever been drawn. * * *

" There can be no question as to the breadth and strength of the decisions as to the right of the neutral to place goods or take passage upon an armed belligerent merchantman provided that the merchantman came within the rules affecting the armament of merchantmen.

" But little is said about passengers, because it had never then occurred to any one that a passenger on a belligerent merchantman armed for defense was not there in the exercise of an undoubted right. The rule that the crew of a captured belligerent were to be treated as prisoners of war and neutral passengers were to be set free at the first opportunity, and that all alike were to be taken on board the captor and kept there in safety, was never questioned for a moment by any authority.

" We may, therefore, take it as demonstrated by the decisions of the courts and the opinions of all the best writers on international law that a neutral has a clear right to take passage and ship goods on a belligerent merchantman, and that the merchantman being armed for self-defense does not impair this right in the slightest degree or take the merchantman out of the class or deprive it of the privilege of the unarmed trading vessel."

Senator Lodge read the order issued by President Lincoln in August, 1862, when Great Britain directed his attention to the fact that " a British steamer had been chased and fired upon by a United States cruiser which had not displayed her colors and had then been captured without search." He continued:

" This led Mr. Lincoln to direct that the following instructions be issued to our vessels of war: ' Secondly, that, while diligently exercising the right of visitation on all suspected vessels, you are in no case authorized to chase and fire at a foreign vessel without showing your colors and giving her the customary preliminary notice of a desire to speak and visit her.'

" Mr. Lincoln made it evident by this that he was utterly opposed to having a ship of the United States creep up under false colors or in any disguise upon a merchantman and capture or destroy her without visit and search. I think we may say with certainty that that great President would never have assented to having a United States submarine creep up on a merchantman under water and destroy her and all on board, including neutral and noncombatant men, women, and children, without giving them any opportunity to escape.

" The difference in instrument makes no difference in the principle laid down by Lincoln in the instructions I have just quoted.

" Contrast the instructions of Lincoln and McKinley, with their humanity, morality, and respect for law, with what was actually done in the case of the Lusitania, the Arabic, and the Ancona.

" Such in outline has been the practice of all nations in regard to the armed merchantman. Such has been the position of our own Government down to a year ago. It seems utterly incredible that this position should be in any way altered now or that our Government should be ready to surrender the unquestioned rights of Americans to travel or ship goods on a belligerent merchantman subject to all the rules which have been established by the courts and by all international authorities for at least twenty centuries. The just rights of the citizens of any nation cannot be maintained by their surrender.

" The abandonment of those rights by any neutral Government on the ground that the invention of submarines with the necessary limitations upon the powers of capture possessed by those boats is inconceivable.

" Such abandonment could only rest on the ground that the rights of neutrals, the rules which for centuries have been agreed upon by all nations for the protection of innocent lives upon vessels captured in war, must be thrown aside and discarded in order that a new instrument of maritime destruction must not be impeded in its work of death and murder. Such a doctrine is revolting to every instinct of humanity, to every principle of law and justice.

" There is, however, another side to this matter which is of even graver importance. There can be no question that any act by a neutral which alters conditions created by the war is an unneutral act and places the neutral upon the side of one belligerent or the other.

"This is eminently true of any form of embargo, and there is no need that I should repeat the unanswerable argument on this point embodied by Mr. Lansing in his note of last August to the Government of Austria-Hungary. The war, and the war alone, has also created conditions under which any change at this time in the attitude which we took officially at the outset of the war in regard to armed merchantmen would be an unneutral act.

"The merchantmen of one belligerent have been swept from the seas. Therefore if we should abandon all the principles on this subject that we have ever sustained, if we should abandon the rules laid down by Mr. Lansing in his circular of September, 1914, and declare that our ports were closed to armed merchantmen or that goods and passengers from the United States could not be placed on an uncommissioned merchantman armed solely for self-defense, our action would affect only one belligerent; it would alter conditions created by the war, and would, therefore, be unneutral.

"It would make us the ally of one belligerent and expose us to the just hostility of the others. It would be a step toward war."

SENATOR BORAH'S SPEECH

Senator Borah (Republican) of Idaho, who is regarded as an authority on constitutional questions, spoke with similar vigor.

"I have had but one rule to guide my conduct," he said, "since this unfortunate conflict in Europe began, and that was, whenever I conceived American right to be challenged by any country or nation, to meet that challenge without vacillation or compromise. I should, therefore, had I been permitted to do so, have voted for the principle that an American citizen has the right to travel on a merchant ship armed for defensive purposes.

"It is a right which has been established under international law for these five hundred years, and in my judgment this is not the time for the great American Republic to begin to temporize and compromise with reference to those national rights which have been so long established and which every belligerent power has at some time in its history recognized. If these principles of international law are made unsound by changed conditions of warfare now is not the time for us to change them. Our purpose in doing so would be misunderstood and misconstrued.

"Firmness and decision will more often prevent war than bring on war. The opposite policy has time and again led to a different result from that which it was anticipated would be the result. I am one who believes that it was the firmness, the quick decision, the positiveness of Jackson in the '30s which prevented civil war. It was the timidity, the compromising attitude, the disposition of Buchanan to write theses on the Constitution when he should have acted, which aggravated and helped to bring on the civil war more than any other one thing in the '60s.

"Decision, firmness in upholding your rights under all circumstances will be respected by all the nations of the earth. I say, therefore, I am ready and willing for the American Republic to go on record to the effect that Americans have the right to travel upon merchant ships armed for defensive purposes and that the nation which challenges that right or violates it will be held to a strict accountability."

HOUSE VOTE DECISIVE

In the House of Representatives the McLemore resolution came to a final vote on March 7, after seven hours of exciting discussion, and was laid on the table by a decisive vote of 276 to 142. President Wilson and his policy regarding submarines had triumphed by a majority of 134, of whom 93 were Republicans. Thirty-three members of his own party had voted against him. Speaker Clark's prediction that the resolution would pass by a majority of 2 to 1 had been almost exactly reversed. The House and the country had taken a decisive stand in support of President Wilson's declaration that American citizens must be protected on the seas, whether they sailed in belligerent or neutral, armed or unarmed, vessels.

The event cleared the air and left the President free to resume negotiations with Germany and Austria on the armed ship question, with the knowledge that the representatives of the American people approved of his firmer attitude. It practically served notice upon the European belligerents that the President's new policy regarding submarine warfare was the policy of the nation.

AN OPPOSITION SPEECH

The debate in the House brought out many strong speeches on both sides. One of the most eloquent on behalf of the McLemore resolution was delivered by Perl Decker, a Missouri Democrat, who strode from one end of the House to the other while he painted a word picture of war. He said in part:

"The question is, will you go to war on what Mr. Lansing says is a doubtful right? I am willing to go to war if necessary. But I say to you, the private citizens of this country, the men who pay the taxes, the men who if there is a war will die in the trenches, the men who will breathe the asphyxiating gas, the mothers of the boys whose flesh and blood will be scattered and spattered on the fields of battle, want to know before war is declared why they have to go to war.

"I have stood by the President of the United States. I have stood by him in his efforts to carry out the mandate of the American people. He has said that if an American citizen on board an armed merchant ship is drowned by a German submarine without warning he will hold Germany to strict account. Stripped of its diplomatic language, it means that if an American life is lost as the result of the sinking of an armed merchant ship without warning—it means war. I am willing to go to war for an American right, but not for a 'doubtful legal right,' as Mr. Lansing says.

"I am willing to go to war for an American right, but it must be a vital right. Our people had rights down in Mexico. They were valuable rights. They were definite, specific, and certain, based upon treaty obligations. Oh, I know there was no responsible Government down there to call to account for the violation of those rights, but neverless we could have sent an army to maintain those rights. But I believe the President did right when he said, in behalf of the lives and the welfare of the mass of American citizens, 'We will not sacrifice the lives of our American citizens for the sake of a few Americans in Mexico,' and warned those Americans in Mexico to come home. Now, if it is right to warn Americans in Mexico to come home, who have certain definite and established rights there, in the name of God, why am I a traitor and a coward when I stand in the halls where Henry Clay stood and say, You shall not hurl the miners and the farmers of my district into this hell of war, you shall not take the sons from the mothers of my district and sacrifice them at Verdun or in the trenches of Europe in order to maintain a doubtful right."

SUTHERLAND'S ADDRESS

One of the most significant speeches in support of President Wilson's policy was delivered on the same day in the Senate by Mr. Sutherland of Utah, a Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

"I do not want war at any time," said Senator Sutherland, "and I pray God that it may not come now, but I would rather have war, with all its sacrifices and suffering, than that this nation, with its long history of heroism and glory, should play the poltroon when confronted by a supreme national duty, because it places a greater value upon its ease than upon its honor.

"I am one of those who desire peace; but a nation, when all other means fail, that will not resent a flagrant and illegal attack upon the lives of its own citizens is only less detestable than a man who will not fight for his wife and children. And, believing as I do about that, if the life of an American citizen is again taken by the illegal and deliberate sinking without warning of a merchant ship, unarmed or armed only for defense, that this Government should hold the offending nation to a stern reckoning. I shall never give my consent to the issuance of a formal and official notice such as has been proposed, which, if not heeded, would, without minimizing our duty in the least, have the effect of embarrassing and weakening our moral standing if we should once more be under the sad necessity of seeking reparation for the destruction of the lives of our people."

SUBMARINE MUST YIELD

Senator Sutherland discussed the legal status of armed merchant ships under international law and the relation thereto of the newly developed submarine.

"The proposition now insisted upon, baldly stated," he declared, "is simply this: That when a new engine of destruction is invented that cannot be made entirely effective without violating the law, the law is ipso facto automatically modified. Under these circumstances, my own view of the matter is that the new weapon must yield to the law and not that the law must yield to the new weapon.

"If we concede that the rule no longer applies to ships armed for defense alone we must be prepared to face a probable condition much more serious than that involved in the destruction of an armed vessel without warning. To concede the right of a submarine to sink a vessel so armed without giving warning and opportunity for crew and passengers to escape in safety will be to invite the sinking of unarmed vessels without warning as well, since it is well-nigh impossible for the officers of a submarine to determine in advance whether a given vessel is armed or not.

"The question next arises—and indeed it is really the crucial question—shall our citizens be officially advised to forbear from traveling upon belligerent merchant vessels armed for defense only? Or, indeed, shall we go further and forbid their doing so under penalty for disobedience? If I am correct in what I have already said, namely, that these merchant ships have the right to carry defensive armament, it follows that such a ship has the same status as though unarmed, and that the right of a neutral citizen to transport his goods or travel upon either is the same and not a different right, and that, in fact, is the decision of our own Supreme Court in a great case decided many years ago and never since over-ruled or modified.

"If, therefore, a citizen take passage upon a ship so armed and lose his life by the sinking of the ship without warning, what must be the contention and claim of this Government? To my mind, clearly this: That the citizen, in the exercise of a clear right, has been deprived of his life by the deliberately illegal act of the belligerent Government which sent the submarine on its mission of death. I can conceive of no other position for this Government to assume, and unless it is willing to forfeit the respect of mankind by becoming a craven thing, it must be prepared to sustain that position at whatever cost or consequence."

The decisive vote of Congress on the armed ship issue cleared the air at home and abroad. In the light of a better understanding, the Berlin Government resumed the Lusitania negotiations, which had been abruptly broken off two weeks before. On March 8 Count von Bernstorff called upon Secretary Lansing and presented a long memorandum relating to the U-boat controversy, and the next day the British Embassy at Washington submitted a reply. Both of these documents are reproduced in full, with others, in the following pages of this issue of CURRENT HISTORY. The decision as to America's final course regarding submarines and armed merchantmen is still in the balance at this writing.

Armed Ships: Official Documents

IN a special supplement issued Feb. 11, 1916, the North German Gazette published the full text of the German memorandum which was sent out to neutral Governments before issuing the naval order to treat all armed merchant vessels as warships after March 1, and sink them without warning.

There were twelve annexes to the document, beginning with Winston Churchill's declaration in the House of Commons on March 26, 1913, a letter from Sir Cecil Spring-Rice to the Secretary of State at Washington, dated Aug. 25, 1914, a written declaration by the German Government on Oct. 13, 1914, concerning the treatment of armed merchant vessels in neutral harbors, and a collection of cases in which enemy merchant vessels fired on German or Austro-Hungarian submarines. (There were twenty such cases given, in thirteen of which the attacking steamer was stated to be unknown.)

The fifth, sixth, and seventh annexes were translations of confidential documents, alleged to have been found on the steamer Woodfield, emanating from the Admiralty, containing rules for the employment and careful maintenace of the armament of merchant vessels which are armed for defensive purposes

The eighth annex, also alleged to have been found on the Woodfield, contained instructions for the use of quick-firers. Its contents were stated to be only of military interest, and were not published.

The ninth and tenth annexes also reproduced documents found on the Woodfield which contain instructions regarding the measures to be taken when merchant vessels are pursued by enemy submarines The eleventh annex, also alleged to have been found on the Woodfield, contains instructions to the Captains of transport vessels regarding the use of rifle and machine gun fire against enemy submarines or torpedo boats.

The twelfth annex was a communication from the Admiral Superintendent at Malta, dated June, 1915, found on the steamer Linkmoor, and giving instructions for British steamers in the Mediterranean. The memorandum follows:

Text of German Memorandum

ALREADY before the outbreak of the present war the British Government gave British shipowners an opportunity to equip their merchant vessels with guns. On March 26, 1913, the then First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, made a declaration to the British Parliament (Annex I.) that the Admiralty had called on shipowners to arm a number of first-class liners as protection against dangers threatening in certain cases from quick auxiliary cruisers of other powers, but said that these liners would not thereby in any way assume the character of auxiliary cruisers. The Government was willing to place at the disposal of shipowners guns, sufficient ammunition, and the personnel necessary for drilling gun crews.

British shipowners readily complied with the suggestion of the Admiralty. Thus, the President of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, Sir Owen Philipps, was already, in May, 1912, able to innform the shareholders that the company's larger steamers were equipped with guns.

Further, the British Admiralty published in January, 1914, a list according to which twenty-nine steamers of various English lines carried aft guns, (Heckgeschütze.) Soon after the outbreak of war German cruisers established the fact that British liners were armed. For example, the steamer La Correntina of the Houlder Line, Liverpool, which was held up on Oct. 7, 1914, by the German auxiliary cruiser Kronprinz Wilhelm, carried two 4.7-inch aft guns. Again, on Feb.

1, 1915, a German submarine in the Channel was bombarded by a British yacht.

The British Government, so far as its own merchant vessels were concerned, was of opinion that such ships maintained the character of peaceful merchant vessels as long as they carried their arms only for purposes of defense. In accordance therewith the British Ambassador at Washington, in a letter dated Aug. 25, 1914, gave the American Government far-reaching assurances that British merchant vessels had never been armed for purposes of attack, but solely for defense, and that therefore they would never fire unless they had been attacked first.

On the other hand, for armed vessels under other flags the British Government brought forward the principle that they should be treated as war vessels. In the prize court rules, which were enunciated by the Order in Council of Aug. 5, 1914, under No. 1 of Order 1, it is expressly laid down that the expression " ship of war " shall include any armed ship.

The German Government does not doubt that merchant vessels by being equipped with guns acquire a warlike character, whether the guns serve for defense only or also for attack. The German Government considers any warlike activity on the part of enemy merchant vessels to be contrary to international law, though it takes into consideration also the contrary conception by treating the crews of such vessels not as pirates but as belligerents. Its standpoint is given in detail in the Declaration (Aufzeichnung) of October, 1914, communicated to the American Government, the contents of which declaration were also communicated to other neutral powers, concerning the treatment of armed merchant vessels in neutral harbors. (Annex 3.)

Some neutral powers concurred in the British view and accordingly permitted the stay of armed merchant vessels of belligerents in heir harbors and roadsteads, without those restrictions which they had imposed on warships by their neutrality stipulations, while others were of the opposite opinion, and held the armed merchant vessels of belligerents to be subject to the neutrality laws which are in force as regards war vessels.

In the course of the war the arming of British merchant vessels was carried out on a more general scale. From the reports of the German naval forces numerous cases have become known of British merchant vessels not only offering armed resistance to German war vessels, but even of attacking them without hesitation under the repeated use of false colors.

A list of such cases, which, it is asserted, comprises only a part of the attacks made by merchant vessels, is appended to the memorandum to prove that the attitude of British merchant vessels has been imitated by the merchant marine of Great Britain's allies. The list contains nineteen cases said to have occurred between April 11, 1915, and Jan. 17, 1916. The memorandum then tries to explain the attitude of the armed British merchant vessels by publishing secret directions issued by the British Admiralty, stated to have been seized on board British steamers by German vessels, and continues:

These directions regulate in detail the rules for artillery attack by British merchantmen on German submarines. They contain exact regulations regarding the treatment and control of British gun crews on board merchantmen, who, for instance, when in neutral ports, are not allowed to wear their uniforms which mark them out as belonging to the British Navy.

Above all, it can be perceived from this that these armed vessels are not to await warlike action by German submarines, but are to attack them at once. In this connection the following prescriptions are especially instructive: (A) Rules for the employment and careful maintenance of the armament of merchant vessels which are armed for defensive purposes, (Annexes 5 and 6.) They prescribe under the section " Battle " under No. 4:

" It is not advisable to open fire at a greater distance than 800 yards unless the enemy has opened fire previously."

In point of fact, a merchant vessel,

according to this, has the right to open fire without regard to the attitude of a submarine. The instructions (B) regarding submarines issued for ships which are armed for defensive purposes (Annexes 9 and 10) prescribe, under No. 3, that when by day a submarine is obviously pursuing a ship, and when it appears to the Captain that it has hostile intentions, the pursued ship shall open fire for defense, even if the submarine has not yet committed any decisively hostile action, as, for instance, by firing a gun or torpedo. Also, according to this, the mere appearance of a submarine in the wake of a merchant vessel suffices as a motive for an armed attack.

The greatest stress is laid upon keeping secret these orders, which do not apply to the naval war zone around Great Britain, but are unlimited as regards the sphere of activity of merchantmen, which is contrary to international law and in full contradiction to British assurances to the enemy and neutrals.

It is now proved that armed British merchantmen have an official order treacherously to attack German submarines wherever they meet them; that means mercilessly to wage war against them. As British sea rules have been adopted by Great Britain's allies without hesitation, this proof must also be regarded as established as concerns armed merchantmen and merchantmen of other belligerent States.

In view of the aforesaid circumstances, enemy merchantmen carrying guns are not entitled to be regarded as peaceful merchantmen. The German naval forces, therefore, after a short interval, in the interests of neutrals, will receive an order to treat such vessels as belligerents.

The German Government notifies neutral powers of this state of affairs, in order that they may be able to warn their subjects before intrusting their persons or properties to armed merchantmen of powers at war with the German Empire.

British Instructions to Armed Liners

An Official Reply

By way of reply to the German memorandum the British Admiralty issued the following official statement on March 2:

IN view of the recent issue by the German Government of a memorandum on the treatment of armed merchant ships, the Admiralty has decided to make public the instructions actually governing the actions of British merchant vessels armed for self-defense:

Instruction, dated 20th of October, 1915, *in re the status of armed merchant ships:*

(1) The right of the crew of a merchant vessel to forcibly resist visit and search and fight in self-defense is well recognized in international law and expressly admitted by the German prize regulations in an addendum issued June, 1914, at a time when it was known that numerous merchant vessels were being armed for self-defense.

(2) Armament is supplied solely for the purpose of resisting attack by an armed enemy vessel and must not be used for any other purpose whatsoever.

(3) An armed merchant vessel, therefore, must not in any circumstances interfere with or obstruct the free passage of other merchant vessels or fishing craft, whether these are friendly, neutral, or hostile.

(4) The status of a British armed merchant vessel cannot be changed upon the high seas.

Rules to be observed in the exercise of the right of self-defense:

(1) The master or officer in command is responsible for opening and ceasing fire.

(2) Participation in armed resistance must be confined to persons acting under the orders of the master or the officer in command.

(3) Before opening fire the British colors must be hoisted.

(4) Fire must not be opened or continued from a vessel which has stopped, hauled down her flag, or otherwise indicated her intention to surrender.

(5) The expression "armament" includes not only cannon, but also rifles and machine guns in cases where these have been supplied.

(6) The ammunition used in rifles and machine guns must conform to Article XXIII., Hague Convention, 1907, that is, bullets must be cased in nickel or other hard substance and must not be split or cut in such a way as to cause them to expand or set up on striking a man. The use of explosive bullets is forbidden.

Circumstances under which armament should be employed:

(1) The armament is supplied for the purpose of defense only. The object of the master should be to avoid action whenever possible.

(2) Experience has shown that hostile submarines and aircraft have frequently attacked merchant vessels without warning. It is important, therefore, that craft of this description should not be allowed to approach to short range, at which a torpedo or bomb launched without notice would almost certainly be effective. British and allied submarines and aircraft have orders not to approach merchant vessels. Consequently, it may be presumed that any submarine or aircraft which deliberately approaches or pursues a merchant vessel does so with hostile intention. In such cases fire may be opened in self-defense, in order to prevent the hostile craft from closing to a range at which resistance to a sudden attack with bomb or torpedo would be impossible.

(3) An armed merchant vessel proceeding to render assistance to the crew of a vessel in distress must not seek action with any hostile craft, though if she herself is attacked while doing so fire may be opened in self-defense.

(4) It should be remembered that the flag is no guide to nationality. German submarines and armed merchant vessels have frequently employed the British, allied, or neutral colors to approach undetected. Though, however, the use of disguise and false colors to escape capture is a legitimate ruse de guerre, its adoption by defensively armed merchant ships may easily lead to misconception. Such vessels, therefore, are forbidden to adopt any form of disguise which might cause them to be mistaken for neutral ships.

Admiralty comment:

These instructions, which are those at present in force, are the latest issued. Successive issues have been made, not by reason of a change in policy—the policy throughout has remained unaltered—but by improvement in wording and greater clearness of expression, to emphasize the purely defensive character of the armament of merchant vessels.

It is because of the distorted interpretation given these instructions as a whole and the very forced character of the interpretation given by the German Government to portions which they quote from an earlier issue of the instructions that the Admiralty felt it desirable, with a view to allaying neutral anxiety, to publish them in extenso.

Germany's Special U-Boat Memorandum

Following is the complete text of the memorandum on Germany's submarine policy which Count von Bernstorff presented to Secretary Lansing upon the resumption of negotiations on March 8:

THE Imperial German Government, on account of the friendly relations which have always existed between the two great nations, and earnestly desiring to continue them, wishes to explain the U-boat question once more to the American Government.

At the outbreak of the war the German Government, acting upon the suggestion of the United States, immediately expressed its readiness to ratify the Declaration of London. At that time a German prize code had already been issued, which was entirely and without modification based upon the rules of the

Declaration of London. Germany thereby proved her willingness to recognize fully the existing rules of international law which insure the freedom of the seas for the legitimate trade of neutral nations, not only among themselves but also with belligerent countries.

Great Britain, on the other hand, declined to ratify the Declaration of London, and, after the outbreak of the war, began to restrict the legitimate trade of the neutrals in order to hit Germany. The contraband provisions were systematically extended on Aug. 5 and 20, Sept. 21, and Oct. 29, 1914. On Nov. 3, 1914, the order of the British Admiralty followed, declaring the whole North Sea a war zone, in which commercial shipping would be exposed to the most serious danger from mines and men-of-war. Protests from neutrals were of no avail, and from that time on the freedom of neutral commerce with Germany was practically destroyed. Under these circumstances Germany was compelled to resort, in February, 1915, to reprisals in order to fight her opponents' measures, which were absolutely contrary to international law. She chose for this purpose a new weapon the use of which had not yet been regulated by international law, and in doing so could and did not violate any existing rules, but only took into account the peculiarity of this new weapon, the submarine boat.

The use of the submarine naturally necessitated a restriction of the free movement of neutrals and constituted a danger for them which Germany intended to ward off by a special warning analogous to the warning England had given regarding the North Sea.

As both belligerents—Germany in her note of Feb. 17 and Great Britain in those of Feb. 18 and 20, 1915—claimed that their proceeding was only enacted in retaliation for the violation of international law by their opponent, the American Government approached both parties for the purpose of trying to re-establish international law as it had been in force before the war.

Germany was asked to adapt the use of her new weapon to the rules which had been existing for the former naval weapons, and England not to interfere with the food supplies intended for the non-combatant German population and to admit their distribution under American supervision. Germany on March 1, 1915, declared her willingness to comply with the proposal of the American Government, while England, on the other hand, declined to do so. By the Order in Council March 11, 1915, Great Britain abolished even what had remained of the freedom of neutral trade with Germany and her neutral neighbors. England's object was to starve Germany into submission by these illegal means.

Germany, after neutral citizens had lost their lives against her wish and intention, nevertheless in the further course of the war complied with the wishes of the American Government regarding the use of her submarines. The rights of neutrals regarding legal trading were, in fact, nowhere limited by Germany.

Then England made it impossible for submarines to conform with the old rules of international law by arming nearly all merchantmen and by ordering the use of guns on merchant vessels for attack. Photographic reproductions of those instructions have been transmitted to neutral Governments with the memorandum of the German Government of Feb. 8, 1916. These orders are obviously in contradiction with the note deliverad by the British Ambassador in Washington to the American Government on Oct. 25, 1914. On account of the proposal, made by the United States on Jan. 23, 1916, regarding disarmament, the Imperial Government hoped that these facts would enable the neutral Governments to obtain the disarmament of the merchant ships of her opponents. The latter, however, continued with great energy to arm their merchantmen with guns.

The principle of the United States Government not to keep their citizens off belligerent merchant ships has been used by Great Britain and her allies to arm merchant ships for offensive purposes. Under these circumstances merchantmen can easily destroy submarines, and if their attack fails still consider themselves in safety by the presence of American citizens on board.

The order to use arms on British merchantmen was supplemented by instructions to the masters of such ships to hoist false flags and to ram U-boats. Reports on payment of premiums and bestowals of decorations to successful masters of merchantmen show the effect of these orders. England's allies have adopted this position.

Now Germany is facing the following facts:

(a) A blockade contrary to international law (compare American note to England of Nov. 5, 1915) has for one year been keeping neutral trade from German ports and is making German exports impossible.

(b) For eighteen months through the extending of contraband provisions in violation of international law (compare American note to England of Nov. 5, 1915) the overseas trade of neighboring neutral countries, so far as Germany is concerned, has been hampered.

(c) The interception of mails in violation of international law (compare American memorandum to England of Jan. 10, 1916) is meant to stop any intercourse of Germany with foreign countries.

(d) England, by systematically and increasingly oppressing neutral countries, following the principle of "might before right," has prevented neutral trade on land with Germany so as to complete the blockade of the Central Powers intended to starve their civil population.

(e) Germans met by our enemies on the high seas are deprived of their liberty, no matter whether they are combatant or noncombatant.

(f) Our enemies have armed their merchant vessels for offensive purposes, theoretically making it impossible to use our U-boats according to the principles set forth in the London Declaration, (compare American memorandum of Feb. 8, 1916.)

The English White Book of Jan. 5, 1916, on the restriction of German trade boasts that by British measures Germany's export trade has been stopped almost entirely, while her imports are subject to England's will.

The Imperial Government feels confident that the people of the United States, remembering the friendly relations that for the last hundred years have existed between the two nations, will in spite of the difficulties put into the way by our enemies appreciate the German viewpoint as laid down above.

British Reply to German Memorandum

In answer to the foregoing German statement, and especially to its plea that German submarine lawlessness was provoked by the British starvation policy, the British Embassy at Washington issued the following:

ACCORDING to the German statement, German submarine warfare was enforced on Feb. 18, 1915, as an act of reprisal against illegal acts of Great Britain.

The Amiral Ganteaume, with 2,000 unarmed refugees on board, mostly women and children, was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine on Oct. 26, 1914. Two British merchant vessels were torpedoed without notice on Jan. 30 and the British hospital ship Asturias fired at with a torpedo on Feb. 1.

The illegal acts complained of are apparently the nonacceptance of the London Convention of 1909, the enlargement of the list of contraband, the warning to merchantmen as to mines in the North Sea, and the capture of the Wilhelmina with foodstuffs on Feb. 9.

The Declaration of London of 1909 was never ratified by the British Government and was never binding on them. One of the reasons of the nonratification of the convention was the claim of the German Government as to the right to treat foodstuffs as contraband. The enlargement of the list of contraband is an acknowledged belligerent right; the warning to merchant vessels in November was due to the fact that the Germans had sown mines in the high seas, resulting in the destruction of many innocent merchant vessels, foreign as well as British. The Wilhelmina, with a cargo of foodstuffs for Hamburg, was only stopped after the German cruisers had destroyed the Dutch vessel Maria (September, 1914) and the Frye, (January, 1915,) which were conveying grain from California to Ireland.

(Signed) BRITISH EMBASSY,
March 9, 1916. Washington.

Freedom of the Seas

By Albert Bushnell Hart

THE real freedom of the sea desired by the Germans seems to be a state of things in which the Germans would have no apprehension either of British trade rivalry or naval supremacy. What they wanted the sea to be free from was what they thought to be the baneful influence of the union jack.

The United States did not share in these apprehensions, partly because for a hundred years we have not felt the pressure of the British naval power and partly because the existing commercial freedom of the seas has been very favorable to us. Our exports have increased by leaps and bounds. English and German carriers were alike welcome in our ports. Our whole system of trade and commerce was keyed upon the presumption that peace would last indefinitely; and the peaceful freedom of the seas suited us well.

When the war broke out, therefore, the natural belief and expectation of American statesmen was that commercial freedom of the seas would continue, except so far as it was interrupted by actual hostilities. The United States claimed no right to send vessels or goods into the midst of warring fleets and armies, and also no right to ship munitions of war and other contraband free from the danger of being picked up and captured by the cruisers of the belligerents. So far, however, as concerned trade in innocent articles to neutral ports, or to the ports of belligerents which were not the actual scene of hostilities, we claimed the same freedom of the seas that normally existed in time of peace. We claimed the right to carry whatever commodities we chose, to whatever port we chose, by whatever route we chose, through whatever strait we chose, and over such sections of the high seas as we chose—always subject to lawful contraband and real blockade.

Nobody can say how the Germans would have received this conception of our rights, had they been able to take physical command of the seas. Their treatment of the ship W. P. Frye does not show a high regard for freedom of the sea in time of war. Nevertheless, their cruisers were so quickly driven from the seas that there was little opportunity for them to raise disagreeable questions of contraband. They did, however, develop a system of warfare by submarines which tended to destroy the freedom of the seas for vessels bound in and out of British ports, whether American or British. The German Government appears to be on the point of admitting that those restrictions cannot be applied to neutral ships, or to neutrals on board enemy's ships.

The whole difficulty with the submarine question is that a type of vessel has been evolved which is the most formidable in attack that has ever been known in the world, able to sink the largest merchantman or the most powerful ship of war, and at the same time is one of the most defenseless craft that navigates. The torpedo of the submarine will sink a Lusitania and a three-inch gun on a launch will sink the submarine. It is a ticklish problem to claim for the submarine all the rights that used to be enjoyed by three-decker wooden ships, while it is nothing but a steel eggshell.

A far more serious abridgment of the freedom of the sea is the German proclamation of Feb. 6, 1915, that "the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel, are hereby declared to be war zone." These waters, however, are not German. They are not even English. They belong to the United States of America, in common with Germany, Great Britain, and all other maritime countries. To capture or sink an American vessel because she is crossing her own sea, over a field that the Germans have declared to be a war zone, is an absolute violation of the whole principle of the freedom of the seas. If the United States had acquiesced, it would not have relieved that area from the proprietorship of the other powers of the world.

It is true that the Germans have apparently ceased to capture our ships which have entered on the so-called war zone, but in the memorandum of Feb. 4, 1915, they notified the world that "it will not always be possible to prevent a neutral vessel becoming the victim of an attack intended to be directed against a vessel of the enemy." The natural inference from these announcements and the consequent captures is that Germany cannot be relied upon to stand by the principle of the freedom of the seas in time of war, and therefore cannot be a safe guardian of that principle in time of peace.

The Germans justified their war zone policy as a reprisal against the British withdrawal of the freedom of the sea for vessels carrying an innocent cargo, and for their declaring the North Sea to be a "seat of war." The British Government maintained the practice thus complained of, and as a reprisal against the reprisal, announced that the Strait of Dover and the passages to the north of Scotland were included is a measure against neutral commerce which they sometimes call a blockade, but which is in reality no blockade; for it involves an absolute disregard of the customary freedom of the sea. The outlook in The London Review justified these acts in the terms:

> At last Britain is in earnest about the war. At last she is fighting with both hands. We have declared no fictitious blockade or war zone; we have resumed our old-time rights at sea which have been ever effective in the past. * * * We have ample means of enforcing our policy, and though some vessels may escape through the meshes, the probable risk of capture will be so great as to deter owners and shippers as a class from braving the penalties of delay and loss.

The London Spectator backed up this defiance of neutral rights as follows:

> But we deny that there are any hard-and-fast rules in such matters as blockade, and consequently we deny that we are yielding to necessity in the German sense. * * * We sincerely hope that the Government will make it clear to the United States that, in Stevenson's phrase, she cannot "fight us with a word." Our methods may be called a blockade, or may be refused the title of blockade, according to taste.

This is freedom of the sea with a vengeance. It authorizes the capture of vessels carrying any sort of cargo, if bound to or from German ports; it authorizes the capture of similar cargoes bound to neutral ports which the English think will find their ultimate destination in Germany. If it is a blockade then it includes the blockade of Holland, Norway, and Denmark, and there is no such thing as the "blockade" of a neutral. If it is not a blockade it is a violation of the recognized principle of the freedom of the sea for the commerce between a neutral and a belligerent, even in time of war. It renews a claim to close the Strait of Dover, against which the world has successfully protested for two centuries and a half. Public meetings in England are calling for a "stricter blockade," by which they simply mean that Great Britain should interdict all commerce, even in the most unwarlike articles, between the United States and those other neutrals.

Great Britain and her allies have command of the sea for the time being. They have the physical power to make prize of practically every vessel of every nation bound in or out of the North Sea. There is no more freedom of the sea, if freedom is to depend upon a furious and passionate belligerent, seeking how worst to injure another furious and passionate belligerent. In this crisis, when the two greatest maritime powers in the world unite to smash that freedom of the sea for which they both claim to be champions, it is the duty of the United States—which is the third nation in commercial importance—to stand for our rights. In so doing we stand also for the rights of all other neutral nations, and equally for the rights of the other belligerent powers, which, when the war is over, will need and claim a return to true freedom of the sea.

Let us not be deceived. No one will assert or defend the rights of the United States if the people of the United States through their lawful authorities fail so to do. If we do not maintain our neutral rights in this crisis, if we do not make both parties understand that though they have the immediate physical power to capture our vessels and interdict our trade, there will come a day of reckoning, then the opportunity may go by forever. Surely Great Britain and Germany will never be more zealous for the freedom of the sea than the United States. In their blind fury against each other they are maintaining principles which are contrary to the interests not only of neutrals but in the long run of themselves. The guardianship of the seas cannot be intrusted to the sole decision of Great Britain or Germany, or of both together. It belongs to mankind, and the natural leader in its protection is the United States of America, which must continue to demand and receive the freedom of the sea.

Armed Merchantmen and Submarines

In a further discussion of the freedom of the seas Dr. Albert Bushnell Hart discusses the problem of merchantmen that carry guns to defend themselves against submarines. He reviews the court decisions on the rights of captured merchantmen, as enunciated by Sir William Scott in the British High Court of Admiralty in 1799 *and* 1800, *by Chief Justice Marshall in* 1815, *and by Justice Johnson in* 1818, *and, referring to these decisions, writes:*

THESE might be called the parent cases of the international law on the subject, and they bear strongly in favor of the doctrine that for a ship to be armed and even for it to resist capture rightfully involves no further penalty than the condemnation of the vessel. Scott, Marshall, and Johnson all agreed that under those circumstances a neutral cargo, neutral passengers, were subject to no penalty at all except the inconvenience incident to capture. Story alone considers it a breach of neutrality for a neutral to take passage or ship goods in an armed vessel.

The theoretical question of armed ships became practical and pressing when the European war broke out, inasmuch as both sides, and especially the Germans, let loose commerce destroyers. Unless steamers that are subject to capture carry some defense, they might be captured by a tug or a boat's crew. Very early in the struggle, therefore, (Sept. 19, 1914,) the State Department drew up and published a set of rules defining the degree of armament which a vessel might carry and still be treated in our ports as a merchant ship. The principal points in these rules are the following:

1. A merchant vessel of belligerent nationality may carry an armament and ammunition for the sole purpose of defense without acquiring the character of a ship of war.
2. Evidence necessary to establish the fact that the armament is solely for defense and will not be used offensively * * * must be presented in each case independently at an official investigation.
3. The calibre of the guns carried does not exceed six inches.
4. No guns are mounted on the forward part of the vessel.
5. The vessel is manned by its usual crew, and the officers are the same as those on board before war was declared.

The German Government at once protested (Oct. 15, 1914):

> This ruling wholly fails to comply with the principles of neutrality. The equipment of British merchant vessels with artillery is for the purpose of making armed resistance against German cruisers. Resistance of this sort is contrary to international law, because in a military sense a merchant vessel is not permitted to defend itself against a war vessel.

To this the United States replied (Nov. 7, 1914):



SENATOR WILLIAM J. STONE
Chairman of Committee on Foreign Relations in the United States Senate
(From a New Drawing by E. S. Klempner)

MAJOR GENERAL SAM HUGHES
Chief Commander of Canadian Militia and of Troops Recruited for the European War
(Photo by Pittaway Studio)

The practice of a majority of nations and the consensus of opinion by the leading authorities on international law, including many German writers, support the proposition that merchant vessels may arm for defense without losing their private character, and that they may employ such armament against hostile attack without contravening the principles of international law.

* * * * * * *

The Germans seemed to accept the principle that unarmed ships are entitled to special consideration. As late as Jan. 7, 1916, they announced that " German submarines are therefore permitted to destroy enemy merchant vessels in the Mediterranean—i. e., passenger as well as freight ships as far as they do not try to escape or offer resistance—only after passengers and crews have been accorded safety." On the other hand, for more than a year they have been protesting against alleged orders of the British Government to all merchantmen who had arms on board to pursue and sink submarines. In the note of May 28, 1915, on the Lusitania, they allude to " a secret instruction of February of this year," by which the British Admiralty directed British merchant ships " to attack German submarines by ramming them." They insisted that the sinking of the Arabic on Aug. 19 was due to an effort of the liner to destroy a submarine by ramming; the United States Government has recently been informed that the Germans have copies of specific orders of the British Government, dated October last, to all merchant ships to destroy submarines. Therefore they considered it a measure of self-protection to announce under date of Feb. 10, 1916, that on and after March 1 they would sink all " armed merchantmen."

Several different issues are raised by this declaration. If an unarmed ship has the physical power to destroy a submarine by ramming, does that make it an armed ship? If a ship has no arms on board, but a submarine thinks it has, will it be sunk on sight? Are Great Britain and the United States right in their joint understanding that " defensive armament " is something different from " offensive armament," and may be allowed? This last distinction is very finedrawn. The same shell from the same gun would be " defensive " after a submarine had fired on it or was supposed to be approaching in order to fire, but " offensive " under the same circumstances if the submarine supposed that the ship was unarmed and therefore did not mean to sink it without warning.

* * * * * * *

There is no use in trying to blink the fact that the German contention has some strong arguments in its favor. A vessel that is really armed sufficiently to cope with a submarine, and acts under orders from the English Government to attack the submarine if possible, forfeits its special privilege as an innocent, peaceful merchant vessel manned by noncombatants. The German Government has a right to insist that the noncombatant shall not be in a position to assume combatancy at his option. It is contrary to reason for the English to insist that their ships shall be held innocent while at the same time they are supplied with explosive machines which are just as easily used for offense as for defense.

On the other side, to divest merchant ships of all their armament means to deliver them up to any tugboat armed with one gun which is fast enough to have the legs of them. What would prevent the Germans from sending out a fleet of 30-knot launches, each carrying a 3-inch gun? They might thus sweep the sea free of merchantmen, since unarmed British ships would be defenseless against them and might be captured and sunk provided an opportunity of escape were given to the personnel.

The truth is that submarine warfare applied to commerce destroying does not fit in with the received international law with regard to the resistance of ships and the opportunity of persons to escape. Both sides seem determined to manufacture an international law to suit their own convenience and to apply it to the limit of their physical strength. The British expect the United States to take a decided stand favorable to them, while at the same time drawing closer and closer the net of the alleged blockade upon American ships. The Germans expect Americans to accept the reports of their submarine commanders, in the face of the fact that on their own showing the commander of U-17 attacked and sank the Arabic on a "misapprehension" in which for some time they justified him.

[Dr. Hart believes that our Government should not rigidly stand by the letter of the law and suggests the following concessions:]

1. Notify Great Britain that hereafter no clearances or reception in our ports will be granted to vessels which carry such armaments as would enable them to make an offensive attack; at the same time modifying the circular of Sept. 19, 1914, so as still further to limit the degree of armament which, up to this time, has been allowed. This will practically give every belligerent vessel which is allowed to leave or enter our ports a certificate that it comes within the American definition of unarmed ships; and, therefore, the United States will protect any of its citizens who take passage thereon.

2. Notify Germany that the United States will not claim protection for citizens who may be lost on a vessel armed in a manner which would give it offensive power, or acting under orders from the British Admiralty, even though it be attacked without warning and sunk by German submarines. This means simply treating such vessels as what they really are. The United States is not called upon to claim noncombatant privileges for what are virtually ships of war.

This method would go as far as anything could to prevent Americans from going on board any belligerent vessels except those which are outside the scope of the German complaints. At the same time it would suspend the sailing of the vessels which were most likely to get into trouble. It is true that Americans have a prima facie right to travel where they will upon the sea, even in belligerent merchantmen; but we have never denied the right to capture and sink such merchantmen, and we cannot claim even the right of escape from any vessel on either side which is participating in warfare.

Such a course as is here suggested would not lead to war. No nation in Europe wishes to get into war with the United States. Germany has much abated from her original claims on this general subject, and will undoubtedly abate still further if we require the English to make the proper distinctions between defensive and offensive armaments. War by the United States upon such an issue would be a crime. The American extreme contention is founded upon conditions of seafaring which have long since passed away. The one thing that we must stand by through thick and thin is the great principle that actual noncombatants shall be treated as noncombatants, leaving virtual fighting men and fighting ships to take care of themselves, according to the laws of maritime warfare.

A British View of Armed Merchantmen

By Archibald Hurd

Noted English Naval Expert

GERMANY'S new threat against merchant ships is not more dastardly than that of a year ago when the campaign of murder on the high seas was inaugurated, with the result that thousands of defenseless men, women, and children of all nationalities, travelers on the Falaba, Lusitania, Persia, Ancona, and other vessels, have been done to death; but it may prove more formidable.

Among the new vessels built in Germany are what may be best described as submarine monitors. They have already been seen at sea, and there is no doubt as to their existence, for they are the talk of neutrals who move about the Baltic on business. They are fairly big vessels. Above the more or less cylindrical hull is built a long battery, well protected by armor, which can be made completely water-tight. It extends for a considerable distance along the hull, and in the centre is the commander's tower, from which orders are issued. Within this water-tight battery are mounted guns; their calibre is unknown, but they are certainly more powerful weapons than anything the Germans have hitherto had. Such vessels as these, which are no doubt of high speed—much swifter than the vessels hitherto employed—will prove formidable.

Like the smaller vessels, of which the Germans have lost so many, they possess the facility of becoming submerged. That is of value offensively and defensively. It enables such a submarine monitor—or cruiser—to approach her unsuspecting prey—a merchantman. She can bring the armored battery just above the water, leaving the hull of the submarine, which would otherwise be riddled with shot, still submerged. In this awash condition she may be immune from the very light artillery of a merchant ship—the submarine's guns, as well as the crews serving them, being out of harm's way behind the steel walls. Should a British man-of-war come on the scene, it will be easy to close the battery and dip down beneath the surface.

Such vessels, I imagine, will be used in the new campaign—ships which have the qualities of the original American monitors, and, in addition, the offensive and defensive power of submergence.

What will neutrals—particularly the United States—say to the claim that these men-of-war can be sent out on the seas to sink at sight anything, liner or cargo boat, which has a gun on board as a poor means of defense against the new piracy? The custom of arming commercial vessels dates back to the seventeenth century, when the British Government, in view of the peril from pirates, insisted on merchant ships being armed with weapons to enable them to protect themselves if attacked. It was an offense not to have guns on board.

Down to the eve of the present war there was hardly an international lawyer in the world, outside, of course, Germany, as might have been anticipated, who denied the right of merchant ships to protect themselves. A year before the war the Admiralty, recognizing the danger which threatened owing to Germany's suspicious actions in secretly arming merchant vessels, determined to assist shipowners to arm their vessels, light guns being mounted aft. In April, 1914, the American Navy Department, evidently impressed by the information as to Germany's plans for attacking commerce in time of war, had a bill introduced into the Senate for authorizing the arming of a line of ships which were to ply to and from South American ports. At the same time the State Department frankly stated that anything not more powerful than a 6-inch gun migh be carried by merchant ships as a means of protection; it was contended that that right rested on precedent. This right is recognized either directly or inferentially by the following National Codes or Naval Instructions:

> The United States Naval War Code, (1900,) Article 10, paragraph 3: "The personnel of merchant ships of an enemy who, in self-defense and in protection of the vessel placed in their charge, resist an attack, are entitled, if captured, to the status of prisoners of war."
>
> The Italian Codice per I Marine Mercantile, (1877,) Article 209: "Merchantmen, on being attacked by other vessels, including war vessels, may defend themselves against and even seize them."
>
> The Russian Prize Regulations, (1895,) Article 15. "The right to stop, examine, and seize hostile or suspected vessels and cargoes belongs to the ships of the Imperial Navy. Vessels of the mercantile navy have a right to do so only when they are attacked by hostile or suspected vessels," &c.

There was no thought a few years ago that submarines as big as cruisers would roam about the seas, pursuing a policy of piracy. Germany by her acts should strengthen the law of nations; for the large submarine is merely a small cruiser, with the additional power of stealthy approach under water, and also of stealthy retirement if threatened with interference in her work of murder by a more powerful man-of-war.

No neutral power—the United States, with her long seaboards, less than any other—can admit Germany's claims without selling its birthright to use the seas. The submarine will go on developing. Is it to be a crime punishable by death by a belligerent, as the Germans suggest, for a merchant ship of another belligerent, British, American, Norwegian, Swede, or Dutch—to carry a couple of guns to enable some sort of defense to be offered against piracy? That is the outlook, and it is surely time neutrals realized that in practicing frightfulness at sea and creating precedents for murder the enemy is infringing their liberties. When war again occurs—and this is not assuredly the last of all wars, for accounts have to be settled by our enemy with the United States, according to Bernhardi and other semi-official writers—Germany may claim to act against American vessels as she is threatening to do against vessels of the Allies.

The Battle of Verdun

Story of the Most Desperate Conflict Since That of the Marne

(Map of the Verdun District on Page 42.)

THE past month of almost continuous bloodshed along the Meuse River will go into history as the battle of Verdun, one of the great battles of all time, and probably an important element in determining the final outcome of the war. The fortress of Verdun consists of a circle of about forty forts in the hills on all sides of the city. From the beginning of the war it has protruded as a salient far into the German lines, and from the first it seems to have been the special objective of the German Crown Prince and his army. Against this strongest point in the whole line of French defenses he has been hurling a force estimated at 300,000 or 400,000 men with a fierceness of attack and a perseverance matched only by the courage and deadly gun work of the French defenders under Field Marshal Joffre and General Petain.

As an artillery combat Verdun has been absolutely without a precedent. More than 4,000,000 high explosive shells were fired in the first four days, uprooting forests, shattering trenches, and plowing up every foot of earth over large areas. Both sides had abundant ammunition and were skilled in marksmanship, the French guns making up in rapid accuracy for the terrific blows of the Germans' heavier calibres. As usual, the German method of attack was first to pulverize the enemy trenches and wire entanglements by hours of shell fire, then to follow with massed bodies of infantry. These dashed into the hail of French shrapnel, machine gun, and rifle fire, pressing on over the bodies of the fallen, until they captured the position or died in the attempt.

The loss of life was very heavy, but the figures are still concealed by both sides. The French censor has allowed the publication of an estimate placing the French losses for the first two weeks at 40,000. As the losses of the attacking force were necessarily much heavier, the German casualties up to that time could scarcely have been less than 100,000. Those who saw the heaps of slain estimate the German dead alone at that figure. The true figures on both sides, however, may not be revealed until after the war.

The battle began eight miles northeast of Verdun on the morning of Feb. 21 with a German artillery "drumfire" of an intensity never known before. The next day the intensity of the fire was doubled. One of the soldiers defending Haumont said of this terrific German bombardment on the 22d: "From ten big shells a minute at 10 o'clock the number went to twenty at 2 o'clock. Ruins piled on ruins, yet in the midst of the inferno our men preserved remarkable placidity. The village had seemed to sink into the earth, while the concrete redoubt on which we had counted crumbled and buried eighty men and several machine guns and destroyed our ammunition depot. Still no one budged. What we then held was nothing more than a razed village with the earth upheaved and transformed into a series of crevices devoid of shelter." He ends with details of the remarkable retreat from that point.

This vast expenditure of shells continued at intervals throughout the next four days. The noise itself was so deafening as to stun the men who endured it. The roar of the battle is said to have been heard more than a hundred miles away. Thousands of civilians assembled on distant hills to witness the spectacle. Aeroplanes high in the air added to the terrors of the scene, and even underground, in a cave leading from a quarry, men fought by the garish light of liquid fire used in the German attack.

Foot by foot and mile by mile the German infantry fought its way southward four miles along a six-mile front. This was the largest and most rapid gain. In the course of those five terrible days the French gradually fell back—always in good order and fighting every step of the way—evacuating Herbebois, Haumont, Beaumont, Samogneux, and other villages. One of the first steps in the retreat—the evacuation of Herbebois—is thus described by an official French eyewitness:

" In the afternoon of Feb. 23, while we had not retired a single foot, order was given us to withdraw carefully, for, the Waville wood having been taken, we ran the risk of being surrounded. We waited for the night to come. Some of our men, when they learned that we were to leave, protested, asking to be allowed to fight and die on the spot. However, tactical reasons obliged us to evacuate Herbebois, and we had to reckon with the general situation.

" The retirement order was executed, and we went to take a position in front of La Chaume wood, in communication with the units on our right and left.

" The defense of Herbebois will certainly remain one of the most glorious pages in the annals of our regiment. More than 3,000 Germans came in successive waves to smash themselves against our ranks, although we were in a fighting position of the most disadvantageous kind. We voluntarily abandoned the ground, where hundreds and hundreds of German corpses show sufficiently how effective was our resistance.

" Neither the bombardment, nor the snow, nor the difficulties of obtaining provisions, nor fatigue could overcome the stubborn bravery of our infantry. By thus holding firm in this corner of Herbebois they for their part contributed to win time for the arrival of the necessary reserves, and they seriously interfered with the advance of the Germans. It was sacrifices of this kind, repeated at numerous points on our front, which held back the enemy flood."

Just outside of Belmont the French had mined Caures Wood, connecting the mine electrically with a station in the village. According to French dispatches, when the Germans had advanced, fully a division strong, to attack this wood, the regiment defending it ran back into the village, as if in panic, until the Germans pursued with shouts of victory. As soon as the pursuers were all in the mined area a French sapper touched a button. There was a tremendous roar, drowning for the moment even the roar of the cannon. The wood was covered with a cloud of smoke, and even on the French trenches " there rained a ghastly dew." When the French re-entered the wood they found not a single German unwounded and hardly a score alive.

Another French account describes the unsuccessful German attack on the heights of the Côte du Poivre (Pepper Ridge) amid the snowstorm of Feb. 26:

" Suddenly the telephone operator gave the signal and we began firing at 1,800 meters. We fired at full speed for twenty minutes. When 'cease fire' came there was a heap of shell cases fully man-high behind our guns. At the order I rushed to look out of the trench at the side of the battery. At the top of the ravine, on the edge of the plateau, was a great heap of Germans. They looked like a swarm of bees crawling over one another; not one was standing. Every minute shells threw bodies and débris into the air. The whole ravine slope was gray with corpses; one couldn't see the ground they were so numerous, and the snow was no longer white. We calculated that there were fully 10,000 dead at that point alone, and the river ran past dappled with patches and streaks of blood."

No amount of casualties, however, could daunt the German regiments, which pressed steadily onward wherever there were enough men left to advance.

This first phase of the battle reached its climax in the fierce fighting around Fort Douaumont on Feb. 25-27, when the plateau changed hands three times and was finally held by the Germans. On the night of the 24th the Crown Prince and his staff remained on the field all night. The darkness was lighted up with the tremendous bombardment directed at Fort Douaumont, Fort Vaux, and Fort Michel by the heavy ordnance and field guns playing on the retiring French. The Germans advanced under cover of the darkness to villages further up the Meuse, and took the intrenched places of Cotelettes, Marmont, Beaumont, Chambrettes, and Ornes. The terrific nature of their artillery fire is indicated by the fact, stated in German news dispatches, that the concentration of shells prevented many French regiments from retreating and caused the capture that night of 10,000 of the 27,000 French prisoners claimed by the German official reports.

The second phase consisted of a similar drive in the flat Woevre region southeast of Verdun, resulting in the capture of Fresnes and reaching another terrific climax in the struggle for Fort Vaux, two miles east of Fort Douaumont. This second fort was stormed by the Germans on March 9 at great cost, but the French forces holding the village of Vaux resisted stubbornly. Here, as elsewhere, the drive had come up against the hills, which are the main strength of Verdun. As one German critic explains:

"The whole area north of Verdun which was in the hands of the enemy is a bewildering maze of fortifications. There can be no question here of a rapid onslaught and overthrow or of the brilliant spectacle of overrunning the enemy again and again. One has to remove obstacles, blow up critical positions, shell away forests, conquer defended villages, and plaster excellently fortified fronts with artillery preparatory to capturing them by the bayonet."

What may be called the third phase of the great battle came in the drive on the north side of the salient, that is, on the west bank of the Meuse, eight or nine miles northwest of Verdun. Here the village of Forges was taken on March 7 after stubborn resistance, and four days later the blood stained and shattered remnants of Corbeaux Woods were largely in German hands. At this writing the Teutons have made an advance of three miles in this sector, and the struggle is raging about the hill that bears the appropriate name of Le Mort Homme. The offensive, however, seems to have lost much of its force. Apparently the Germans have decided that, in the light of the last month's events, the main defenses of Verdun cannot be taken without a loss which nothing could repay.

The fact is that at Verdun the Germans are fighting against a new system of defense brought about by their own improvements in artillery. Thus, though Douaumont was an important position and its capture a historic achievement, the fort itself had ceased, many months before, to constitute a vital part of the defenses of Verdun. The Germans' seventeen-inch guns at Liége a year and a half before had taught the French the uselessness of the old style of fortifications. The new system of war, for which Verdun was fully prepared, is no longer a siege wherein heavy artillery can reduce fort after fort at long range with a few well-directed tons of high explosive. It is a regular field of battle, which has to be carried with infantry in the face of the most deadly modern instruments of death. In other words, Verdun is a fortress with mobile defenses, which nothing but mobile forces can storm, and then only at prohibitive cost.

This vast and protracted battle has been notable for the greatest artillery duels in the history of warfare, and for the extraordinary sacrifices of massed

German infantry in the face of rapid-fire guns. Many of the charges were stopped by the so-called French "curtains of fire," which are zones of fifty yards or thereabout in breadth, filled at intervals of a few seconds with showers of shrapnel. A great number of attacks were thus frustrated by the utter destruction of the dense lines in which the German infantry charged. But these lines were followed by others which came on in gray waves, charge upon charge, until finally they got through. Meanwhile the German artillerists never ceased hurling missiles of every sort and size over the heads of their infantry, so as to paralyze the defense and prevent its reserves from coming into action.

When once the attacking infantry reached the objective trench the advantage lay with them, for men in trenches are at a disadvantage in hand-to-hand fighting. But no sooner were they esconced in their new position than the rôles were reversed. A trench usually has no parapet on the reverse side, and here the dauntless Frenchmen came dashing upon them in a fierce countercharge, often recapturing the ground. In this manner the deadly struggle swayed to and fro in the snow and mud and bitter wind, without truce or prolonged pause, until both sides were so exhausted that many men fell to the ground overcome with sleep as with a drug.

Skillful use of the strong French reserves in large units at the right time seems to have been an important element in checking the Teutonic torrent, and even forcing the aggressive foe to a defensive attitude in his new positions.

The most graphic descriptions of the scene are devoted to the storming of Fort Douaumont. For five days the French had been steadily driven back, and at last the main defenses of Verdun were to be put to the test. The German attack upon this great wall moved down from three directions, and the fiercest of these, from the Bois de la Vauche, was led by the crack Twenty-fourth Brandenburg Regiment, which finally gained the plateau and captured the shattered ruins of Fort Douaumont.

The rage and fury of the battle for this plateau is graphically described by an eyewitness who watched the whole scene from an observation post in front of the Douaumont range, with shells bursting around him.

"Thousands of projectiles are flying in all directions," he wrote, "some whistling, others howling, others moaning low, and all uniting in one infernal roar. From time to time an aerial torpedo passes, making a noise like a gigantic motor car. With a tremendous thud a giant shell bursts quite close to our observation post, breaking the telephone wire and interrupting all communication with our batteries.

"A man gets out at once for repairs, crawling along on his stomach through all this place of bursting mines and shells. It seems quite impossible that he should escape in the rain of shell, which exceeds anything imaginable; there has never been such a bombardment in war. Our man seems to be enveloped in explosions, and shelters himself from time to time in the shell craters which honeycomb the ground; finally he reaches a less stormy spot, mends his wires, and then, as it would be madness to try to return, settles down in a big crater and waits for the storm to pass."

When this preparatory bombardment ceased every vestige of trenches, parapets, and barbed wire entanglements had vanished. The ground was as flat as a new-plowed field. The time had come for the infantry charge.

"Beyond, in the valley," wrote the same French observer, "dark masses are moving over the snow-covered ground. It is German infantry advancing in packed formation along the valley to the attack. They look like a big gray carpet being unrolled over the country. We telephone through to the batteries and the ball begins. The sight is hellish. In the distance, in the valley and upon the slopes, regiments spread out, and as they deploy fresh troops come pouring in.

"There is a whistle over our heads. It is our first shell. It falls right in the middle of the enemy infantry. We telephone through, telling our batteries of their hit, and a deluge of heavy shells is poured on the enemy. Their position becomes critical. Through glasses we can see men maddened, men covered with earth and blood, falling one upon the other. When the first wave of the assault is decimated, the ground is dotted with heaps of corpses, but the second wave is already pressing on. Once more our shells carve awful gaps in their ranks. Nevertheless, like an army of rats the Boches continue to advance in spite of our 'marmites.' Then our heavy artillery bursts forth in fury. The whole valley is turned into a volcano, and its exit is stopped by the barrier of the slain."

The Germans took Fort Douaumont, though at a ghastly cost. The same evening, however, a French counterattack by the famous Iron Division wrested from them all but the bare fort, within which the Brandenburgers still held their own. A French soldier who took part in that charge said afterward:

"At last our turn came. I had taken part in the Champagne charge, but it was nothing like this. We were mad. Nothing could have stopped us. Despite the German fire, which perhaps was hampered by the fear of hitting their own men on the spur, we hurled ourselves at them with the bayonet among the shell holes and ruined emplacements.

"This was real war as I had never seen it. For a moment it was furious and equal. Then came another blue-clad wave, and another. We hurled them back, screaming, over the hillside. It was a battle without quarter. We captured only corpses. Douaumont Ridge was French once more. As we lay there, panting and too exhausted to cheer, I suddenly found that my thigh was bleeding from a deep stab. My boot was already full of blood, but I had not noticed it."

In the fighting for Vaux similar scenes were enacted. As late as March 17 both the fort and the village at that point were still bitterly disputed, and the Germans were reported to be attacking at last with their reserve guard. A French Captain thus describes the drive against the Vaux-Douaumont ridge on March 14 and 15:

"Heavy shell fire is not as deadly as one imagines, especially if one keeps cool, holds his shelter in a shell hole, or under a tree stump, and jumps out of the way when he hears a big shell coming. That was where the Boches made their mistake. They thought we could not stand the hammering.

"Soon after midnight the lookout gave the alarm. Our searchlights pierced the darkness and we saw a dark mass slowly approaching up the hillside. When the light hit them they began shouting loudly. Then our guns and mitrailleuses began, and that took the song out of them.

"The first lot never got within striking distance of us, though a few bullets whizzed over our heads, fired mostly from the hip as they ran forward.

"A second rush followed immediately without further gun preparation. These got right up to our barbed wire, where a lot of them stayed. We could hear them shouting, despite the bursting shells, but my men fired coolly. They would have preferred to charge, but knew it was unnecessary.

"Nothing stops a charge like mitrailleuse or rifle fire. We simply swept them away in rows.

"There was one group bunched up against our wire so close that they continued to stand after they were dead, supporting each other. Some were headless and others had half their bodies torn away. It was horrible—but we don't regard the Germans as human beings.

"They looked fine and healthy, and from the buttons which many of our men cut off to set in rings, they were evidently guards, as the buttons bore the Imperial Eagle or guard numbers. There will be no shortage of guard-button rings in France when my poilus have leisure to work.

"The worst part was the moaning of the wounded after the attack failed. We could not help hearing it when the cannonade ceased."

At this writing (March 20) the energy of the German attacks at Verdun, both north and south, has perceptibly lessened, and the military critics are convinced that the battle is practically ended. If so, it must go down in history as a German defeat, notwithstanding the ground won.

War Events From Two Viewpoints

In order that no phase of the truth may be overlooked, CURRENT HISTORY offers two expert interpretations of the military events of the month, one written from the German, the other from the American point of view.

[A TEUTONIC INTERPRETATION]

Military Survey of the War

From February 15 to March 15, 1916

By Kurt Wittgenstein

First Lieutenant in the Austrian Army

ONE of the fiercest of the many sanguinary struggles which this war has witnessed is now being fought in the neighborhood of one of the most ancient and yet perhaps the most modern of all fortresses, Verdun.

At the least expected moment, in the midst of Winter, and in the very section of their lines where, to the mind of most military experts and, as events have since proved, even to Gen. Joffre's mind, an attack against the tremendously strong French positions seemed utterly out of the question, the Germans have launched an offensive on a scale unparalleled ever since the first Teuton onslaught on the allied lines, in August, 1914.

What definite aims the German General Staff has in view with the mighty drive against the strongest of all French strongholds, nobody but a few chosen men, outside of that exclusive body, positively knows. Unmatured as events are, there is even still doubt among military experts, whether the Germans really intend to capture Verdun. One thing, however, is certain, as has been proved many a time in this war: If the Kaiser's General Staff is bent on taking the fortress, it *will* fall. It is, in fact, still possible, though not very probable, that operations around Verdun will be broken off in an apparently undecided stage, in full accordance with prearranged plans. The success achieved in this case, for being merely tactical, would nevertheless be well worth the sacrifices made. Up to the middle of March the Germans have shortened their lines around Verdun by more than six miles. Figuring on an average of four men to the yard, or 7,000 men to the mile of the front, (an average justified by the importance of the section, this would mean that about 42,000 German soldiers, formerly needed for the only purpose of guarding the surplus lines, have been freed since for other duties. Furthermore, the French, according to German estimates, have up to March 10 lost between 70,000 and 80,000 men; supposing, for argument's sake, the equivalence of the French and the German soldier, the total gross profit in fighting forces gained by the Germans up to the present amounts to about 120,000 men. This is more than three times as much as the Kaiser's troops have lost in the same period.

Moreover, the vast semicircular salient which the battle line from the northwest to the southeast of Verdun formed before the present offensive, having the fortress as the centre, was pre-eminently suited for the massing of huge French forces for a drive against Metz, only thirty miles distant from Verdun. Now, with the shrinking of that half circle to a radius of scarcely five miles and with all the roads leading from the French fortress to the north, east, and southeast in range of the German big guns, a massing of troops in that sector is wholly out of the question.

With their present offensive, however, the Teutons have already scored a third



SCENE OF THE GREAT GERMAN OFFENSIVE AT VERDUN.

success, the importance of which, it is true, cannot be expressed by figures. As the writer pointed out in the last issue of this review, there exists in the German lines in France a vulnerable spot, namely, the section between Arras and Lens, known as the Vimy heights. The much-talked-of Anglo-French offensive planned for the coming Spring was, as a matter of course, to be launched against that weak spot. Now, with their unexpected drive against Verdun the Germans have utterly foiled whatever plans the Entente may have made for warmer days and forced the French to shift most of their troops from the Artois to the Meuse and to give battle in midwinter and on grounds chosen by their enemies.

The amazingly rapid advance of the Kaiser's gray-clad hosts during the first two weeks of their offensive and the enormous number of prisoners and booty taken from the French are significant for the prodigious fighting spirit of the Teutons, and this may be said to the credit of Joffre's fighters, for the unexpectedness of the German attack. Berlin official bulletins up to March 10 reported the capture of 414 officers and 27,000 soldiers, most of them unwounded, as well as of 190 guns, including 40 heavy pieces, 230 machine guns, and a proportionate quantity of other war supplies.

Inspired dispatches from London and Paris now endeavor with all means to minimize the importance of Verdun, known hitherto on both sides of the Rhine as the "key to France." This may be taken as a symptom for the impending fall of the fortress. In the presence of those misleading statements, it may not be amiss to consider beforehand the possible consequences of Verdun's surrender.

The first and immediate consequence would be of a *tactical* nature, inasmuch as the Germans would shorten their lines between St. Mihiel and Varennes by some ten miles more and, according to what we have seen above, save about 70,000 soldiers for other parts of their various battle fronts.

The second result would be a *strategical* one. The fall of Verdun would bring the Germans into the flank of the French armies south of the Verdun-Metz line and their left wing, now resting on the French fortress, would be in peril of being rolled up and routed. (That the German General Staff should plan another march on Paris from Verdun seems out of the question to the writer. It may be taken for granted that every yard of the 150 miles separating the capital from the important stronghold has long ago been fortified.)

The third and most far-reaching effect of Verdun's downfall, though, would be the *political* one. When the Germans, nineteen months ago, surrounded as they were by enemies, and in order to save their country from ruin, decided to strike the first blow and invaded France, they chose the gate offering the least resistance, namely, Belgium, the front door being too strongly guarded by the formidable belt of fortresses Verdun, Toul, Epinal, and Belfort. With Verdun captured, the remaining links of that chain would become as valueless as the stones of an arch after the keystone has been removed, which has been clearly demonstrated in the case of Ivangorod in Russia. Germany once in control of the fortified positions on the Meuse and the Moselle, could afford to offer concrete peace proposals to France, pledging herself to restore Belgium to liberty, but, in compensation, reserving to herself the cession by France of French Lorraine as far as that belt of fortifications.

The different stages of the battle of Verdun, characterized by the clocklike co-operation of heaviest artillery fire and immediately following infantry attacks in overwhelming masses, can be easily followed with the aid of the annexed map.

Feb. 21. After a continuous shell fire lasting nine hours, the Germans made their first infantry attack against the Haumont Woods, which they captured.

22. Village of Haumont and Caures Woods taken.

23. Brabant, Samogneux and Herbebois (one mile northeast of Beaumont) fall.

24. Beaumont captured.

25. Fort Douaumont stormed during a blizzard. (Note the distance between Beaumont and Fort Douaumont.) French resistance in the Woevre breaks down all along the line from Maucourt to Fresnes.

26. Mormont (one mile northwest of Louvemont), Beaumont Chambrettes (one mile northeast of Louvemont) and Ornes taken.

27. Champneuville and Côte de Talou captured. Fortifications of Hardaumont stormed.

28. Meuse peninsula cleared of the French.

29. Great drive in the Woevre, where Dieppe, Abaucourt, Blanzee, Manheules, and Champlon are taken.

After a comparative lull of a week, the Germans, in order to bring their lines west of the Meuse in accordance with those to the east of the river, shifted the attack to the section between Bethincourt and Forges.

March 7. Hill 265, northeast of Côte de l'Oie captured.

9. Corbeaux Woods cleared, villages of Vaux, Forges, and Regneville taken.

10. Cumières Woods cleared, Fresnes captured.

12. Heights of Le Mort Homme stormed.

The Germans furthermore delivered successful attacks in the Champagne, where they took Navarin Farm, and near Ville au Bois, northeast of Rheims, where French positions extending over more than a mile were carried. In both drives, whose obvious aim was to divert the enemy from the scene of the main offensive, the Germans took altogether 1,700 prisoners.

* * * * * * *

In comparison to the importance of the struggle in France, for the present the main theatre of the war, whatever events happened on other fronts during the last month fade into practical indifference, to the mind of the discriminating observer.

The Italian adventure in the Balkans is slowly but irresistibly approaching its inevitable end, namely, the final evacuation of Albania by the Italians and the annihilation of their ambitions regarding the east coast of the Adriatic. Already, toward the end of February, a great part of King Victor Emmanuel's forces have, practically without firing a shot at the advancing Austrians, left Durazzo precipitately, abandoning a great many cannon, including the coast defense guns, 10,000 rifles, and vast quantities of ammunition and other war supplies.

The latest of the very meagre reports from that front indicate that the Austrians and Bulgarians are closing in from all sides on the seaport of Avlona, apparently the only place in Albania still occupied by Italian troops. A decisive battle may therefore be anticipated for the near future, although experience would rather point at the probability of a withdrawal of General Ameglio's troops from Albanian soil without fighting.

Communications from allied sources are trying to lend a color of far-reaching importance to the cheap successes of Russian troops in Transcaucasia, a theatre of secondary significance only. This is characteristic for the state of mind of the Entente powers, their incapacity on the European battlefields, and their endeavor to achieve something resembling a victory somewhere, somehow.

Grand Duke Nicholas's avowed objective in invading Armenia at the head of a huge army was twofold: First, to divide the Turkish Empire by cutting off the Turkish domains in Asia south of the Erzerum-Alexandretta line from Asia Minor proper and from Turkey in Europe. Second, to open up to Russia a direct overland route to the Mediterranean Sea.

Had the Grand Duke succeeded in trapping the Turkish garrison of Erzerum, numbering between 150,000 and 180,000, the fall of that fortress might have contributed substantially to the accomplishment of those lofty aims. As it was, however, the Turks had time to evacuate the stronghold, men, guns, and all, and to join the powerful reinforcements under General Liman von Sanders, which were on the way to Erzerum from the west when the fortress fell. In view of those Turkish forces, the Russian General Staff seem to have relinquished their original designs and decided on a relief expedition for their British allies in Mesopotamia. For that purpose they divided their forces in two armies marching south on both sides of the Taurus range, which forms the natural boundary between Turkey and Persia. The west army, up to the present, has advanced as far as Bitlis, 500 miles north of Bagdad, while the east column has reached the Persian town of Khanikin, 200 miles northeast of the Turkish city. Taking into consideration what such distances mean in mostly hostile countries, where means of communication and transportation are few and poor beyond description, reports fabricated in London and Petrograd, telling of the "virtual co-operation of the Russians with the British in Mesopotamia," can easily be discounted to their real value by the judicious reader.

As it is, General Aylmer's division, in a recent fight with Turkish forces near Fellahie on the right bank of the Tigris, has again been defeated and is said to have left 2,000 dead on the battlefield.

On the other fronts nothing of importance has happened.

[AN AMERICAN INTERPRETATION]

The Month's Military Developments

From February 15 to March 15, 1916

By J. B. W. Gardiner

Formerly Lieutenant Eleventh United States Cavalry

THE most interesting if not the most important action that the western front has seen since the German drive toward Calais is the struggle for Verdun, which, as this article is being written, has been going on for just twenty-three days. The attack on the French positions began on Feb. 21—began before the Spring had set in, when the ground was in anything but a satisfactory condition for offensive military operations. Two questions at once arise as to this effort. The first is why it was made at such a time, and, second, once it had been decided to make it, why was Verdun, the strongest point in the whole French line, chosen as the point of attack?

There are a number of answers to the first, none of which is complete in itself, but all of which probably have weight.

Germany's man power is dwindling. There can be no question of that. The available number is much less than that of the Allies, and unless Germany can inflict losses upon her enemies out of all proportion to those which she herself sustains in the process, sooner or later she will be worn out. This is merely a matter of arithmetic. Whether Germany has already reached the point where, through wastage she is unable to make good her current losses is another matter. The indications are, however, that such a point has been or soon will be reached. In other words, Germany has reached or soon will reach the point where every loss is a permanent loss and therefore is a permanent weakness. Her enemies, on the other hand, have not yet reached their maximum strength. As Germany grows weaker, her enemies will grow stronger. Therefore, to win, Germany must strike, and strike with her maximum power, in an effort, not to win a battle, but to gain a decision.

Again, there is the situation created in the Far East by the continued successes of the Russians in the Caucasus. This situation will be discussed later, but it may be noted here that if the Russian advance continues, all that German arms have accomplished since the taking of Belgrade will be transferred to a net loss. But even without further gains, what the Russians have accomplished so far has had a tremendous influence on the Balkan States. This must be offset. Rumania is hanging on to neutrality by a very thin thread. As soon as she can do so without laying three of her frontiers open to simultaneous attack, she will enter the war on the side of the Allies, as only through them can she attain her national ambition, achieve her destiny, as her statesmen put it. Rumania's strategic position on the Teuton flank in Bukowina is of too much importance to be disregarded. Therefore, the Russian success must be discounted by a Teuton success in another field.

There is also the domestic situation in Germany. When the Serbian campaign was brought to a successful termination the German press immediately commenced to inquire why, with Germany victorious in every theatre, the Allies did not commence to sue for peace. Instead, it has dawned on them that the day of peace is as far off as it was last August, and that, instead of asking for peace, the Allies have renewed their agreement to stand together until Germany is brought to her knees. To prevent unrest German arms cannot remain quiescent. Finally, there is the situation of the Crown Prince, who, if reports of his father's illness have not been grossly exaggerated, may soon find himself on his father's throne. He is the leader of the military party in Germany, and to him was given the task, at the outset, of taking Verdun. In the attack on Verdun in the early months of the war, owing to the genius of General Sarrail, he was unsuccessful. Since then he has made several efforts to drive down the west bank of the Meuse so as to reach the salient at St. Mihiel and invest the French fortress, but each time he has been checked with severe losses and insignificant gains. Something startling in its conception and dramatic in its execution had to be started to restore his prestige and to establish his right, through ability, to continue to lead.

This is not only a reason why the present attack was planned, but is also the reason why Verdun was the point selected.

The attack was first launched over a narrow front of only a few miles, from the Meuse near Consenvoye, east to Ornes. Between Feb. 21 and 26 the French retired slowly, evacuating, one after the other, Brabant, Samogneux, Haumont, and Beaumont. There was nothing precipitous in the retirement. It seemed designed rather as a means of avoiding punishment. At the same time it is certain that severe losses were inflicted on the invaders. They had deliberately selected as the location of their attack the hardest part of the Verdun salient. In all other German operations during the war they had never failed to adopt the standard military practice of eliminating a salient by crushing in the sides. Here they took the much more costly and more hazardous course of driving against its apex. After the shock of the first few days the French stood fast, and since Feb. 26 they have not lost more than a quarter of a mile of ground to the north.

Checked from this direction in spite of the most desperate infantry charges, the attack swung around to the east and southeast. Here the same operation was repeated, the French retiring at first only to take up a strong position, previously prepared, along the crests of the high hills which run in almost a straight line southeast from the town of Vaux. From this hill line the Germans have been unable to budge them. Terrific fighting has occurred for possession of the town and fort of Vaux, but it still seems to be held by the French.

With this check the Germans then opened an attack on the west bank of the Meuse, east of the Argonne, but thus far their advance has been immaterial.

The fighting in the Verdun sector has unquestionably not been equaled for severity in any of the war theatres since the war began. Artillery has been used on a scale not before dreamed of even in the British and French attacks of September. The losses have been cruel, both sides suffering terribly, although, as is always the case with the troops on the offense, the Germans have suffered more than the Allies. The statement from Berlin that the Germans have lost but a few thousand is of course too ridiculous for serious consideration.

In spite of the fact that the Germans have made no gain yet that puts Verdun in jeopardy, it must be realized that, except as a figure of speech, no place is truly impregnable on this or on any of the fronts. It is merely a question of how much it is worth in men and shell, and how much will have to be paid to take it. The relation of these values will determine whether the effort is worth while. In the case of Verdun, it is sure to cost the Germans at least 400,000 men before it falls, and to judge purely from a military standpoint, putting aside all political considerations, which of course we cannot measure, it is most certainly not worth the price.

The Germans, moreover, find themselves in rather a predicament. They have launched the most terrifying attack of the war at a time and place not altogether favorable for success, in a tremendous bid for a decision in the west. The Berlin press and the German people so believe, and are encouraged in this belief. The military authorities dare not stop. To do so would lessen their prestige all over the world.

Of much greater importance than the action about Verdun, though less interesting because of its distance, is the capture of the fortress of Erzerum by the Russian Army of the Caucasus. This is the greatest success the Allies have



ONE RUSSIAN COLUMN HAS ADVANCED THROUGH KERMANSHAH (1). TO KHANIKIN (2), AND IS ON ITS WAY TO BAGDAD (3), OR PERHAPS TO KUT-EL-AMARA, WHERE IT WILL RELIEVE THE BRITISH. ANOTHER RUSSIAN COLUMN HAS ADVANCED FROM ERZERUM TO BITLIS (4), ITS OBJECTIVE BEING THE BAGDAD RAILWAY. A THIRD IS ABOUT TO TAKE TREBIZOND.

been able to record since the fall of Przemysl, and Erzerum possesses certain points of similarity with the Galician stronghold. The importance to the Allies of neither place is in itself great. Rather does it lie in what follows. The history of what followed the fall of Przemysl is too well known now to need comment.

It is but fair, however, to note that there are certain elements in the Armenian field which are essentially different from those that existed in Galicia a year ago. The failure of the Russians in Galicia was due largely, if not entirely, to the German element in the armies that were opposing the Russian advance. The Austrians had been most thoroughly bested by the Russians for the seven months that preceded the surrender of Przemysl. At no point had they been able to stem the Russian advance that swept through Galicia from Lemberg to Cracow. But when Przemysl fell, the Germans saw the danger that lay in a continuation of Russian successes; saw the possibilities of Austria being beaten into a separate peace unless help was sent immediately. Operations on all other fronts were, therefore, suspended and all available forces were hurried to the Carpathians and to the Dunajec. The result was that, owing to this stiffening of the Austrian defense, the Russians were first held in position and then driven back through Galicia, through Poland, until their present line was reached.

This is not possible in Armenia. Germany has no troops to spare for such a distant field, nor can the larger of the German guns be brought to bear in the far eastern field. Transportation facilities are entirely lacking. There is no railroad reaching the front, and the dirt roads are not of such character as to admit of such heavy draft as is involved in the passage of guns and shell of the larger calibres. Consequently it is left for the Turks to fight the situation out alone. The Turkish troops in this theatre are even less efficient than were the Austrians in Galicia. With every advantage conceivable except possibly numbers, they have been utterly unable to place any effective obstacle in the Russian commander's path.

The Russians advanced in three columns, or rather by three different routes, from bases which they had previously established. One of these was at Olti, another at Kars, and the third at Melasgird. The downfall of the fortress, however, seems to have been accomplished mainly by the attack from the north, which was a frontal attack made with the aid of guns of large calibre. The entire operation from the time the first Russian gun was fired against the first of the eighteen forts that make up the defenses was only five days, a fact which in itself gives evidence of the lack of quality in the troops defending the position. At the end of that time all eighteen forts had been evacuated, although nine were of comparatively recent construction and had been designed and built under the supervision of the German Engineer Corps. Very naturally a large number of prisoners with many guns and considerable quantities of military stores also fell into the hands of the Russians. So much for the actual operation itself.

Erzerum is the only fortified point in the interior of Asia Minor. It protects Western Armenia and Anatolia, and commands all the best roads of Transcaucasia. With Erzerum out of the way, therefore, there is nothing but the disorganized army of the Turks to prevent the Russians from sweeping forward at least until they have reached the line from the Gulf of Alexandretta to the Black Sea. The Black Sea, it may be mentioned in passing, is to all practical purposes a Russian lake. While it is true that, as the Russians move forward, they will be getting further and further from their bases, they will have nevertheless the supply points on the Black Sea from which to draw supplies. Therefore, in this advance, it is necessary that the Russian right on the sea advance with the rest of the line and take the principal seaport cities. This Russia has done without delay. Trebizond is now being evacuated by the Turks and will serve the Russian purposes of supply for another advance of at least fifty miles.

South of Erzerum, in the Lake Van district, the advance has been equally rapid. The towns of Mush and Bitlis have been taken, so that this whole lake district is now under control. This brings the Russian centre within fifty miles of the Bagdad railroad. The centre of the Russian army is still advancing against Diarbekr, while the left, swinging rapidly around like the lash of a whip, is pivoting on Bitlis and hurrying through Persia.

Bagdad is, of course, the objective of the left wing, just as it is of the British army which has been in such straits at Kut-el-Amara. The cutting of the railroad therefore at any point south of Mush and west of Mosul would cut off and corner the Turkish force operating against the British east and southeast of Diarbekr. Moreover, it seems now that it is impossible for the Turks to prevent a juncture of the Russians with the British forces on the Tigris.

As matters stand now, the entire Turkish Empire in the east is in danger, and, inasmuch as Turkey alone of all the belligerents has nothing to gain in the war other than the money she has already received, it is possible that she may be beaten into a separate peace rather than see her empire crumble as a sacrifice to Teuton ambitions. In such a case all the German losses incurred through the Serbian operations would have been in vain. The Allies, then, in looking around for comfort, can find it in the Near East, where the chances of a decided, though not a decisive success, are distinctly bright.

KAISER WILHELM II.

New Portrait Taken by the Court Photographer at Potsdam on the Emperor's 57th Birthday



CROWN PRINCE WILHELM

Commander of the German Army in the Historic Attack Upon the French Fortress of Verdun

(New Portrait by the Court Photographer)

How England Is Paying for the War

THE address of Premier Asquith in Parliament on Feb. 21, 1916, asking for a new war loan, dealt with sums and figures never before known in the history of deliberative assemblies. He asked for a supplementary vote of £120,000,000 for the present financial year, making a total of £1,420,000,000, or approximately $7,000,000,000 for the year. This was expected to meet requirements of the situation up to March 10, 1916. The credit was voted with practical unanimity.

In the financial year 1914-15 there were three votes of credit between Aug. 6, 1914, and March 1, 1915, amounting to £362,000,000. In the financial year ended March 1, 1916, there were six votes of credit, as follows: March 1, 1915, £250,000,000; June 16, £250,000,000; July 20, £150,000,000; Sept. 16, £250,000,000; Nov. 10, £400,000,000; Feb. 22, £120,000,000.

In discussing the expenses of the war the Premier said:

The total actual issues on the vote of credit between April 1 and Feb. 19 were £1,198,000,000. But if, as on previous occasions, we make allowances for unspent balances and for special advances made with a view to financing expenditure which will not come into the charge until after the period under review, the total deduction required in order to adjust the account is £65,900,000.

The result is that we arrive at an adjusted expenditure for the period in question of £1,132,100,000. Every allowance has been made, including the American bonds. The figures showing the adjusted expenditure on votes of credit from April 1 to Nov. 6 are divided into three periods. The adjusted expenditure was:

April 1 to July 17 (108 days)	£301,000,000
July 18 to Sept. 11 (56 days)	198,500,000
Sept. 12 to Nov. 6 (56 days)	243,600,000
Making a total for 220 days of	£743,100,000

From Nov. 7 down to Feb. 19 represents 105 days, with an adjusted expenditure of £389,000,000.

It therefore follows that the aggregate for the financial year up to Feb. 19 (325 days) was £1,132,100,000.

The daily average rates for the periods work out as follows:

From April 1 to July 17	£2,800,000
From July 18 to Sept. 11	3,500,000
From Sept. 12 to Nov. 6	4,350,000

The figures of the third period were swollen by repayments to the Bank of England for various advances made on behalf of the Government. Further liabilities had been incurred by the Bank at the request of the Government in respect of further advances to foreign powers. These would in due course be discharged out of the vote of credit, but so far it has not been found convenient to repay to the Bank any portion of these advances or certain other advances which have been made by them. Consequently the adjusted figure for the period from Nov. 7 to Feb. 19 does not include any payment in respect of this liability of the Government to the Bank.

If we add what is due to the Bank under that head, the daily average expenditure for this period does not differ to any substantial extent from the daily aggregate for the immediately preceding period.

The average may be put now as between £4,300,000 and £4,400,000 a day.

The speaker gave the following figures as loans to Allies and Canada:

From April 1 to Nov. 6 (220 days)	£517,300,000
From Nov. 7 to Feb. 19 (105 days)	£317,500,000
And the total for the 325 days, from April 1 to Feb. 19	£834,800,000

Loans to allied powers and to the dominions, which up to Nov. 6 were £98,300,000, have been followed between Nov. 7 and Feb. 19 by a further expenditure of £70,600,000, making a total of £168,900,000.

The last item (food supplies, railways, and miscellaneous), which, from April 1 to Nov. 6, was £23,500,000, amounted from Nov. 7 to Feb. 19 to £6,900,000, making a total from April 1 to Feb. 19 of £30,400,000.

From April 1 to Nov. 6 the aggregate expenditure out of the votes of credit was £743,100,000, and from Nov. 7 to Feb. 19 it was £389,000,000, making a total of £1,132,100,000.

The expenditure for the army, navy, and munitions from Nov. 7 to Feb. 19 was £317,500,000.

That gives an average for that period of just over £3,000,000 a day.

If from this we deduct, as we ought, the normal peace expenditure on the army and the navy, which has been taken throughout on a basis of £220,000 a day, the net war expenditure on the army and navy services, including munitions, comes to £2,780,000 a day for the period which we are now considering. Our average daily war expenditure on the army, navy, and munitions from November to the present date has gone up £400,000.

Loans to allied powers and dominions out of votes of credit show a very substantial increase, having grown from £98,300,000 on Nov. 6 to £168,900,000. The growth in the rate of expenditure under this category is entirely attributable to advances to allies directly from votes of credit. That does not by any means represent the total amount we have advanced. In addition to the advances from the votes of credit there are advances which have been made by the Bank of England at the request of the Government. No separate totals can be given, but I can assure the House that the total of £423,000,000 given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in September last on account of advances will not be exceeded during the current financial year. I am afraid, however, they will not fall far short of that sum.

It is anticipated that the funds now in hand will last till abount March 10, leaving twenty-one days of the current financial year to be provided for. On the basis hitherto adopted of £5,000,000 a day, twenty-one days will require £105,000,000. Honorable members may ask why I say £5,000,000 a day when our expenditure has never exceeded £4,400,000 a day.

It has been thought advisable to allow a margin, and I am now asking the House to vote £120,000,000, which brings us to the total of £1,420,00,000, allowed for in the budget statement of September last.

* * * * * * *

This will be the tenth vote of credit since the war began, and it will raise the total votes of credit to £2,082,000,000.

This is not only unprecedented, it is a sum beyond the imagination of any financier in any country in the past.

As regards the probable rate of expenditure out of this new vote, we cannot see that it will be in any way probable that it will rise above £5,000,000 a day. That is, I think, a liberal estimate.

On that basis the vote will last us sixty days, from April 1 to the end of May.

No Minister has ever asked the House of Commons or any other democratic assembly during the course of less than two years to sanction an expenditure out of votes credit approaching or anywhere near the sum of £2,000,000,000, and the House will very reasonably require definite and positive, and possibly categorical, assurances that in the expenditure of this enormous sum adequate provision is being made, and proper safeguards taken, against extravagance and waste.

The conduct of war-like operations on such a scale as that which now prevails, and under conditions which could never have been foreseen either by ourselves or by any other nation, of course gives rise to infinite possibilities of extravagance, carelessness, and actual waste. The Retrenchment Committee, which was appointed with the consent of the Government, was wisely confined by the terms of its reference to civil expenditure, because it was felt that an inquisition by an outside body of the spending departments in the stress of war might hamper and paralyze the efficient conduct of administration.

But the Government, when they assented to or perhaps insisted upon that limitation of the reference to the Retrenchment Committee, were not insensible to the vital importance of providing some efficient and vigilant safeguard against extravagance in the military and naval departments.

The Finance Committee of the Cabinet discussed the matter with great care in the Summer and Autumn of last year, and as a result of their deliberations we have now had for some time past in the three great spending departments which are concerned with the prosecution of the war—the Navy, the Army, and the Ministry of Munitions—we have had installed committees—a committee for each department—composed of outside persons, men of great business experience and authority. In the case of two of these departments the committee is presided over by a Cabinet Minister who has no connection whatever with the actual conduct of the department.

These committees have, week by week, and almost day by day, been devoting their energies with, I think, very good results, not, of course, to interfering with administrative responsibilities—for that must rest with the heads of departments and those who dictate the policy of the Government—but to taking adequate precautions and care that there should be no avoidable waste; that whatever was done was done with economy as well as with efficiency.

I do not believe that we could have a better or more practical machinery for securing that the enormous sums which the House was willing and, indeed, eager, to vote for the successful prosecution of the war and the attainment of the end we have in view, should be expended by the departments immediately responsible without avoidable waste or extravagance.

That machinery has now been in operation for a considerable time and it is working, I have every reason to believe, with admirable results. Under the conditions in which we live I do not think it would be desirable, or even possible, to substitute for it anything more efficient, more prompt, or more easily workable.

Having taken some considerable pains myself to follow the proceedings of these bodies and to see what results they have attained. I can assure the House that in my opinion very substantial economics have been effected, and the war is now being carried on on this gigantic scale and with the enormous resources which Parliament and the country are so willing and eager to bestow—the war is being carried on, so far as expenditure is concerned, under rigorous conditions which we not only hope but believe will prevent any substantial part of the money which Parliament votes, and which the country has to raise by taxation, from being devoted to any other purpose than the successful prosecution of our cause.

Standing here I feel an enormous and, indeed, overwhelming responsibility in asking the House to assent to this gigantic expenditure. I could not do so, and none of my colleagues could do so unless we were satisfied, first of all, that we had most carefully explored the ground and that we were not asking Parliament to vote a penny more than the exigencies of our cause and the great historic responsibilities we have taken on ourselves necessitate. We could not ask them to assent to that expenditure unless we were at the same time satisfied that every possible precaution is taken to see that the money of the taxpayer flows wholly and exclusively through the channels for which it is intended, and by which it can most successfully attain the object we have in view.

Having satisfied ourselves of this we should be false to the trust which the nation and Parliament has reposed in us if we did not, in addition to the enormous burdens which the country has so willingly undertaken already, ask the people to take on their shoulders this additional load, confident as we are, and as we always have been, in the justice of our cause and in the necessity of the case, and confident also that if the country will—as I am sure it will—respond to our call, the just cause will prevail.

[Written for CURRENT HIISTORY]

Woman's Invasion of British Industry

An Economic Drama and Its Possible Dénouement

By Spencer Brodney

An English Journalist

A WOMAN'S proper place is in the home—but not in the belligerent countries, and least of all in Great Britain. There, to an extent the most enthusiastic exponent of woman's economic independence never dreamed of, the war has wrought a change. Woman as a self-supporting wage-earner has come into her own—for the time being at an rate. It is easy to understand the process which has taken place under our eyes; but how are we to gauge the effects after the war, when the men come home again and want their jobs? Is the "provisional occupation" of the industrial field to be brought to an end, and are the women to be displaced in favor of the original occupiers? Will not the women fight hard for the jobs which the fortune of war has given them, particularly the many jobs by which they are earning as much as the men and justifying the claim of "equal pay for equal work"?

Here, then, in the displacement of men called to the duties of the battlefield we have the first act of a great social and economic drama. The second act will be the clashing of the sexes for the industrial field won by the women, with possession worth its nine points in law. The third act will bring the dénouement, perhaps the most startling in the history of man—and woman—for there is already more than a hint of a revolutionary solution which Governments may have to adopt to get women back to their proper place in the home.

It is not easy to imagine an able-bodied and intelligent young woman who has proved that she is capable of earning a man's wage at a steel lathe or in the driver's seat of a street car relinquishing her position without protest in a country where before the war the excess number of women over men made marriage not the certainty it ought to be. After the war the number of marriageable men will be still smaller by reason of those lost in the war or crippled and invalided by service at the front. At the same time the men able to marry will be less likely to do so when good employment is scarcer and the cost of living higher.

The woman who is now economically independent, as she has never been before, will have acquired the skill and training required for her work; she will have a grasp of it, and therefore in many cases she will be kept at it by her employer, who will prefer not to dislocate his business by bringing in a man who has been unfitted for civil life by soldiering. No employer is anxious to lose an employe who is competent, whatever he may say in his moments of patriotic enthusiasm about finding a place for the man who has served his country at the front. This is no cynical view of human nature; this thing happened in England after the South African war and will happen again.

When, therefore, the men return after the war the women who have displaced them will have many allies among the employers. In a country burdened by the cost of war the most serious result from the returning soldiers' standpoint will be the tendency for wages to drop. Economic pressure will force the employers to turn to their advantage the discovery that women can do all kinds of work for which it was thought formerly only men were suited. Female labor will have the preference because it is cheaper.

In a world in which everything harmonized as prettily as in a fairy tale, the returning soldier would no doubt solve the problem by marrying the girl whose job he wanted, and she would go home to fulfill the functions of wife and mother for which nature intended her. But England after the war is going to be no land of faery, but one where illusions will be stripped aside by disconcerting realities. One series of these illusions—masculine illusions for the most part—which will disappear will be those concerning the work which women have not been supposed able to do. The war has shown that there is apparently nothing that a woman cannot do. In fact, it is conceivable that, apart from the necessity of having fathers for the succeeding generations, women could get along quite easily without men, and that, in contradiction to all our most cherished masculine beliefs, woman is after all the more important sex. Without being formulated in this extreme form, this idea or tendency of thought has subconsciously developed in women's minds since the war, and will give new color and force to the feminist movement when it again surges forward after peace returns. A modern industrial state is no figment of the imagination, because England is every day the war lasts falling more and more into the hands of the women, and it is certain they will retain a substantial part of what they have gained.

Before the war the woman's movement was already a solvent in the problem of modern civilization in England. The demand for political rights by the suffragettes and their—to some minds—outrageous methods of propaganda were only outward signs of a much deeper tendency. Without going back so far as the publication in 1790 of Mary Wollstonecraft's "Vindication of the Rights of Women," we may say that the woman's movement began in the middle of the nineteenth century when Frederick Denison Maurice became the pioneer of the higher education of women. Within a few years came the foundation of the political movement, followed by the election to Parliament of John Stuart Mill, who placed woman's suffrage in his election address.

The result of over sixty years' activity in education is that today England is remarkable for the number of women in every branch of learning and public life. Probably nowhere else and at no other time in history have women counted for so much. It is true that they cannot vote for or sit in Parliament, and that they cannot practice as barristers, but in every other walk of life they are strongly in evidence. Even in the highest political circles their influence is enormous, and not merely because of the feminine capacity for intrigue, which is common enough everywhere at the courts of monarchs and in the councils of statesmen, but by reason of genuine qualities of intellect and character. Could the secret history of the day be made an open book, it would reveal a striking spectacle of feminine influence. But without going behind the scenes, we can see enough of women in public life to estimate them as a factor of first-class importance.

One result of the splendid position which women of education have won in a couple of generations is that the great mass of their less fortunate sisters have excellent leaders in all the social and political movements which affect them. How much, for example, has been done since the war began for woman wage-earners by the leaders of their trade-union movement it is at the moment impossible to calculate. And these leaders are only a section of those who may be depended upon to stand up for the women when the new struggle for their position in the industrial world begins.

Let us try to get some idea of how much industrial territory women have invaded since the war. In the manufacture of munitions alone there are now nearly 300,000 employed. According to an official report, presented to Parliament in January of this year, these workers include dressmakers, laundry workers, textile workers, domestic servants, clerical workers, shop assistants, university and art students, women and girls of every social grade and of no previous wage-earning experience; also, in large numbers, wives and widows of soldiers, many married women who had retired altogether from industrial life, and many again who had never entered it.

We reach the millions when we try to estimate the number of women who are now doing the work formerly done by men in professional, commercial, and industrial pursuits.

It is well-nigh impossible to mention any kind of job, from policeman, car conductor, engineer to specialized machinist, into which women are not stepping every day, and the remarkable thing is that—except where several years of special or technical training are essential—they are acquiring the required skill and knowledge and adapting themselves to their new occupations with a rapidity not easy to credit. One reads, for example, of a turbine segment building where women are cutting off blades, boring the distance pieces and blades, building up the turbine segments, and brazing the whole, and that this work was before the war considered to be so highly skilled that an expert fitter received a good deal above his ordinary rate for doing it. Imagine the look of incredulity or consternation on the face of one of those highly skilled fitters before the war if he had been told that a woman, a mere woman, could take his job and make good on it in a few months.

The factories making munitions will, of course, close down as soon as the war is over, and the women, as well as the men, who have been drawn on for this labor will no longer be required. But there will still be the women in the other professional, commercial, and industrial occupations in which there will be no closing down. It is there that the great struggle will take place. The readjustment to normal conditions will withdraw part of the women, but the outstanding fact will be that the number of female wage earners will be enormously greater than before the war, that many will have learned the meaning of economic independence, and in so learning will have acquired new ways of life and thought.

The problem of unemployment among men will, as we have seen, be acuter than it has ever been. It will not be the only problem. There will be another, the solution of which, along the lines that are now being suggested, may ultimately prove the way out of the difficulties to which women's invasion of industry has given rise. Great Britain, like the other belligerent countries, is suffering from a terrible wastage of manhood. The loss cannot be made good in less than a generation. But even then the nation's supply of men will not be fully replenished unless it be possible for the women of this generation to become mothers. If the women engaged in industry increase, so far from the wastage being restored, the tendency will be in the opposite direction, and a still greater fall in the birth rate will take place. Obviously, as the French Government has clearly recognized, means must be found whereby women may become mothers instead of remaining wage-earners. In some quarters it is urged that every woman able to fulfill her natural function should as a duty become a mother; and so, for the first time in Christendom, we get a hint that partial polygamy is to be pardoned in the interests of the State, and more boldly the demand that the unmarried mother should no longer be regarded as a sinner.

It is curious how the war should have led to this departure from moral tradition when we remember that one of the origins of polygamy and concubinage among less civilized peoples has been precisely the same national, or tribal, necessity of replenishing the supply of men killed in war. We have here an illustration of the saying of a certain moralist that the only difference between polygamy, polyandry, and monogamy is arithmetical.

But whatever the moral issue may be, since the war is inevitably going to alter the moral status, as well as the social and economic position of women, we have to recognize that statesmen are more accustomed to mold their morality to the needs of the nation than to make national policy subservient to morality. For the good of the State it will be necessary after the war that women should be mothers rather than wage-earners, and that as mothers they should be enabled to bear and bring up the healthiest children possible.

The solution, then, that is now being suggested is that the State should offer women an inducement to become mothers, or, in other words, pay them for their services as mothers so that they can afford to abandon their wage-earning activities. In many countries social legislation already contains the germs of the more comprehensive measures which will be forced upon the belligerent nations. If the problem is solved as is now being proposed, it will go a long way toward sending the women back to their proper place in the home and leaving industry open to men, not because, as we have now learned, the men cannot be dispensed with, but because, unlike women, they are of no use except as wage-earners. That woman will prefer the home to the factory, provided an equivalent inducement is offered, is certain, since it is a primary fact that woman would rather perform her natural function as mother.

If this solution is going to be effectively embodied in legislation, it will provide the happy ending to the drama, the first act of which is already being enacted by the women who have in such overwhelming numbers invaded man's industrial domain and are there so strongly intrenched under the flag of economic independence. For the men the happy ending would be the reconquest of their position in the industrial world, and for the women the guarantee of their economic independence, not as rival wage-earners, but in their own territory, the home.

[Written for CURRENT HISTORY.]

Is England Going to Abandon Free Trade?

By a British Observer

IS free trade in Great Britain doomed? This is the question that is now agitating the land of Cobdenism. Already the tariff controversy has been reopened, and free traders and protectionists are bringing their arguments up to date to apply to altered conditions. If Great Britain abandons the free trade system, it will be among the greatest of the world changes wrought by the war, for free trade is the traditional policy under which for seventy years she has grown and prospered, and on which the whole fabric of her industrial and commercial life has rested.

The last great attempt to convert England to protectionist ideas was that initiated in 1903 by the late Joseph Chamberlain, who succeeded in securing the adoption by the Unionist Party of a scheme of tariff reform and colonial preference. But the overwhelming defeat of the Unionists at the general election of January, 1906, and the return to power of the Liberal free trade party, proved a decisive setback to the cause of imperial fiscal union. One reason for the failure of Mr. Chamberlain and the tariff reformers to convert the great mass of the people was his bold declaration that "if you are to give a preference to the colonies, you must put a tax on food," (House of Commons, May 28, 1903.) Finally, after about a decade of agitation and controversy, the Unionist Party saw that it was necessary to drop its food taxation proposals, and in doing so it virtually abandoned its protectionist ideas and struck tariff reform out of its official program. Protection in England was once more, to quote Disraeli's words, "not only dead, but damned."

But the war has resurrected the old issue. The tariff reformers are once more extremely active, for two new sets of circumstances have given them the basis of what they believe to be a new case for a protectionist policy. One is the enormously increased taxation which will be required to meet the new war liabilities; the other is the determination to maintain Great Britain's industrial and commercial position and to destroy Germany as a trade rival after the war. The rise of these two new questions has already influenced free traders, and even by Liberal members of the Coalition Cabinet it is being admitted that the people should keep an open mind on the fiscal system.

The most surprising illustration of the change that is taking place comes from Manchester, the home and centre of Cobdenism, and until now unshakable in its opposition to the least suggestion of protection. For the first time since the death of Cobden in 1865 the Manchester Chamber of Commerce declared against free trade when at a meeting on Feb. 14, 1916, a memorandum was brought forward by the Directors to the effect that it was highly undesirable and premature at the present time to consider any such drastic change of national policy as a reversion to protective duties. Those present at the meeting refused to approve the memorandum. In the course of the discussion the free traders' point of view was expressed by the President, R. Norton Barclay, who said that many of the considerations which were being put forward were not economic considerations at all, but were in the nature of reprisals. He continued:

> The protectionists have seized this exceptionally favorable opportunity to force this hoary question on you in the hope that in the excitement of the war they may carry their point. If they succeed, the floodgate will be open and the whole torrent of protectionist fallacy will sweep through. Do not let us be too much swayed by the naturally bitter feelings of the moment. Your action today concerns not times of war, but the long and, I trust, fruitful years of peace which are to follow.

H. Derwent Simpson, a Manchester lawyer and conservative in politics, denied that protectionists were seeking to impose their nostrums upon the country and said that the memorandum meant nothing more or less than that there should not be free trade with Germany after the war. They wanted definite action to keep our enemy traders. Another speaker said that free trade had guaranteed the life, extension, and vigor of German industries, and that after the war there would be no such thing as a free trade meeting in England. The vote at the meeting was not regarded as conclusive, and a poll of all the members was accordingly taken. This resulted in 988 votes being cast against the memorandum to 527 for adhering to the policy of free trade.

Such a result must be regarded as significant. In conjunction with it may be read recent utterances of Liberal Cabinet Ministers. E. S. Montagu, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Financial Secretary to the Treasury, speaking at Cambridge, advised his Liberal friends " to keep an open mind " on the fiscal system, " the whole of which would have to be rearranged," and also in " our relations with the colonies, which would have to be considerably altered." Tariff reformers take this to be a hint that their ideas are at last in the realm of practical politics, as they do a recent statement by Sir Thomas MacKenzie, the High Commissioner in London for New Zealand, that he believed that Mr. Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade and a free trader, was going to take up some measure involving a protective tariff. Then there is the speech delivered by Reginald McKenna, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, a Liberal and free trader, to the Executive Committee of the British Association of Chambers of Commerce on Feb. 29, 1916, when he said:

> There is an issue which once divided the nation and on which the opinions of most of us probably remain unchanged. But it does not follow, because we stand now as we stood before, that there is not a very large field for common agreement among us. Because trade is free it does not follow that the Government should not assist our traders, and we are prepared to give the assistance of the Government to the development of foreign trade in order that it may no longer be controlled by our enemies.

There is nothing in this statement to

indicate that Mr. McKenna has surrendered his free trade principles, but in the light of the present political situation it suggests that the influence of the protectionists is being exerted within the Cabinet itself, which includes Bonar Law and Austen Chamberlain, the two leading successors of Joseph Chamberlain in the agitation for tariff reform. The coalition, while it represents national unity as required by war, must necessarily be based upon compromise in regard to other matters. It is more than likely that the fiscal question will be dealt with in this way in view of the pressing need for new revenue. The free trade section may decide that a tariff, not as an expression of protective ideas, but merely as a means of raising revenue, may be the only way of solving the Government's financial problem.

It is not only the necessity of finding money that is making itself felt. The antagonism to Germany as a trade rival is a potent influence running in the same direction. At the conference of the British Association of Chambers of Commerce, which was opened on Feb. 29, 1916, with an attendance of a thousand delegates, several important resolutions were adopted, two of them reflecting overwhelmingly the sentiment for an entire readjustment of British economic and trade policy. The first resolution, unanimously adopted, declared that

> the experience of the war has shown that the strength and safety of the British Nation in time of national peril lies in the possession by this nation of the power to produce its requirements from its own soil and its own factories rather than in the possession of values which may be exported and exchanged for products and manufactures of foreign countries.

The chief point in the discussion was that the country's internal production was more important than exports and foreign trade, on which hitherto the nation has relied. The other resolution, for trade reciprocity and tariffs, was opposed by free trade delegates, but finally prevailed by a large majority. It provided for

1. Preferential trading relations between all British countries.
2. Reciprocal trading relations between the British Empire and the allied countries.
3. Favorable treatment of neutral countries.
4. Restriction by tariffs and otherwise on all trade relations with enemy countries, so as to make it impossible to return to pre-war conditions.

Despite all these signs that tariff reform is again a live issue, it is too early yet to say that they spell the doom of free trade, since there are other factors to be considered, the most important being the workers, whose determination to prevent food taxation and a general increase in the cost of living makes them the backbone of the opposition which defeated tariff reform and may do so again. The recognition of the fact that it is really the great mass of the nation, the working classes, that has to be weaned of free trade ideas is seen in the line of argument employed by The London Morning Post, the most representative newspaper organ of the British Conservative and Tariff Reform Party. In an editorial on Feb. 21, 1916, that journal says:

> We have never believed that a tariff would be anything but in the highest degree beneficial to the working classes. We commend the very interesting account by Mr. Wise, the Agent General for New South Wales, of the labor policy of Australia, as reported in our issue of Saturday. Mr. Wise reminded his audience that the Labor Party of Australia erected a tariff because Australia "dared not expose their well-paid artisans to competition of the low-paid trades in England." His case for protection was the well-being of labor. "They could not have a standard wage, a living wage, in an industry exposed to the unrestricted competition of the same industry in another country where the wages and standard of living were much lower." That is an example which the workingman should consider.

An important phase of the new controversy is whether it should be settled at once or deferred till after the war. The tariff reformers urge that there should be no delay. "If the tariff is to be chiefly directed to meet German plans for commercial supremacy after the war," says The Morning Post, "it is of first importance that it should be imposed before the Germans can deploy their commercial forces. If, on the other hand, it is wanted to raise revenue, the sooner we begin it the better. It is important that this question should be settled before the end of the war, because when peace comes there will be a rush of new and distracting questions. Our men will crowd back from the front, and their needs will demand attention; there will be peace questions, all manner of thorny and intricate problems to be discussed." The real meaning of this demand for no delay is, according to the free traders, the protectionists' "hope that in the excitement of the war they may carry their point"; or as The London Daily News, a leading Liberal free-trade organ, puts it in an editorial on Feb. 15, 1916, the exploitation of the feeling against Germany "to achieve an end which has nothing to do with our hostility to Germany." From the standpoint of the working classes, it is an attempt to rush through a protective tariff at once, because after the war the labor movement will once again be such an important factor in the situation as to force quite a different solution of the problem. The workers will refuse to make all they consume dearer "in order that," as The Daily News says, "we may keep the taxes of the rich and well-to-do lower."

The most striking criticism of the new protectionist propaganda comes from W. C. Anderson, M. P., a leading Labor representative. In an article in the issue of The Daily News, already quoted, he writes:

> The only pro-Germans I have encountered in England are the men who, Prussians themselves in their outlook and viewpoint, desire to riviet upon us the military despotism and economic crudities which for many years have bound and robbed and enslaved the German people. The demand for protection will go forward this time backed by the war heritage of anger and passion. It will be made by men who, while they are fighting, do not know how to make war, and, when they have stopped fighting, do not know how to make peace. They may conceivably add free trade to the various scalps which already adorn their wigwams. Is it proposed that food should be taxed? If food is to be taxed, who is going to reap the benefit of the change? It will hardly be argued that a momentous fiscal departure should be made in order that certain privileged individuals and classes may be further enriched at the expense of the working populations of the towns. The fresh impost on food would be paid by those least able to pay.
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> It will be impossible to raise the protectionist issue without evoking sharp and bitter controversy between the possessing classes and the dispossessed. Already the idea of conscripting surplus wealth, especially landed estates, is being keenly debated by many of the working people. Probably the only alternative to the drastic conscription of wealth is tariff reform and indirect taxation by which the rich will be made still richer, and the poor still poorer. Hence the protectionists are apparently obliged to gamble in stakes that may easily destroy them; certainly the struggle will not be between tariff reform and what they call orthodox Cobdenism.
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> What is true of the taxation of food is equally true of the taxation of manufactured articles. If the State needs money, it is no answer to offer proposals by which out of the increased exploitation of the poor some revenue would pass to the national exchequer, but accompanied by such leakage and political log-rolling that favored capitalists in protected industries would be enriched at the same time. The working people will stand a good deal, but they are not going to stand that.

It will thus be seen that the British fiscal controversy has been revived with all its old-time acrimony. Even if before the war ends the Government imposes a tariff, the controversy will only be at its beginning, because it will not be until after the war that the great new problems will really arise in their most acute form, and when they do, the contention will not merely be a clash between the ideas of protectionists and free traders, not, as Mr. Anderson significantly remarks, between tariff reform and orthodox Cobdenism, but a struggle between such diverse interests as those of the landowners and farmers, the manufacturers who want their industries protected, the mercantile classes that still see their benefit in freedom of trade, the middle classes that look at things primarily from the viewpoint of the consumer, and last, but by no means least, the great mass of the working people and the legions of the poor.

The Purpose of the Kaiser

By Count Ernst Reventlow

Germany's Most Noted Military Critic

On account of the author's close relations with the ruling spirits of Germany this article from the Illustrirte Zeitung of Leipsic may be regarded as more or less authoritative.

WHEN German troops, operating with the Austro-Hungarians and Bulgarians, opened the road to Constantinople through Serbia, so that there loomed new possibilities for Germany and her allies to become factors in the Orient, outspoken opinions were heard throughout Germany that the nation's future now, more than ever, lay in the southeast, on land, rather than on the sea. The events of the war with incontrovertible logic have turned the eyes of the Germans away from the water to Mesopotamia, Central Africa, Asia. It is time to reflect what are the thoughts of Emperor William II. regarding Germany's future.

One of the first acts of the Emperor when he ascended the throne was to order the naval authorities to work out plans for four large battleships, and to place the project of their construction before the Reichstag. Since the time of Admiral von Stosch no large battleships had been built, and his successor, Caprivi, had to be satisfied with a fleet largely for coast defense. As a result a number of small ships appeared, ships that subsequently were found to be useless.

The German Emperor's command for the immediate construction of four big warships meant more than the mere addition of these ships to the navy. The matter was symbolical to the extent that it was meant to be the first step toward the creation of a German fleet of the high seas. It was the denial of the established order that the first aim of the German Navy was to do coast service. That was the first step, and the Kaiser for ten years—that is, up to 1897—had to fight his way until the second step could be taken, the enactment of the naval laws which von Tirpitz first brought into being.

Early in his reign the German Emperor went to Constantinople, and then, in the Fall of 1888, there followed the first concession of the Turkish Government for the building and operation of the Anatolian railroad, with the privilege of extending the line to Diarbekir and Bagdad.

Before the Kaiser departed on his journey Emperor Alexander III. of Russia asked Prince Bismarck, "And how about Constantinople?" Bismarck answered that the trip meant nothing that would affect the status quo in the Orient, and this satisfied the Czar. Bismarck spoke the truth. The journey of the Kaiser was not for the purpose of changing the status quo, but rather to maintain and strengthen the situation as it existed. Since the time of Peter the Great it had been the aim of Russian policy, by diplomacy or conquest, to upset the status quo of the Near East.

In the beginning of 1914 Sazonoff, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that Constantinople and the waters thereabout had long been Russia's goal in war. And Russia is waging the present war against Germany to gain Constantinople by way of Berlin.

Emperor William long ago made it clear that Germany's economic existence is closely related to the fate of Constantinople. It was no policy of aggression that the Kaiser desired to follow, nor was it a policy of expansion that prompted his activity in the southeast; but his mind was set upon obtaining economic advantages for the Germans of the future. This purpose actuated the Kaiser in his plan for the navy. The fleet was to give security for the trade and traffic of the German merchant fleet on all the seas; to facilitate Germany's intercourse with the oversea colonies and with other markets in foreign lands.

The task of creating such a navy was extraordinarily difficult. The difficulty was increased by the fact that the German people failed to understand the necessity, and for ten long years opposed the plan. Slowly victory was gained, but, as the war has shown, too slowly. For in the Summer of 1914 the fleet was not strong enough to risk itself in the cause of maintaining peace.

Considered by itself, the task of securing safety for German shipping was much less complicated than the German aim in the Orient. The former was merely a question of building a fleet that should be powerful enough to maintain peace, or in case of war give a good account of itself. The Kaiser's policy in the East had to do with more numerous factors and circumstances. It is true that the latter presented both internal and foreign problems, but no matter what the opposition at home and England's dissatisfaction with the threatened competition, the question itself was simple enough. It was different in the Orient. Here economic and political problems crossed each other—problems of the most delicate and complicating sort. The Turkish Empire was weak, and was under international financial control, principally that of England and France. Those countries looked upon this control as a means for making their influence felt at the expense of Turkey, so as better to prepare for its eventual partition.

On the other side stood Russia, and only the jealousy between Russia and England prevented these from attempting separately to crush Turkey. Sultan Abdul Hamid, who was a diplomatic artist of the first rank, understood always how to play the powers against each other. And he used the same method with the Balkan nations. But it cannot be denied that Turkey's condition was becoming more and more deplorable. The powers mentioned were doing everything to foster disturbances within the Turkish Empire. Germany's interests in the matter were diametrically different; she needed a strong, independent Turkey, with capacity to make heavy purchases.

For the same reason it was to Germany's interest that Turkey should shake off the economic and political influence of the subsequent Quadruple Entente. The shrewd Abdul Hamid realized that the new German desire for political participation in the East differed fundamentally from what the other powers proposed to do. In addition to this, the German Empire did not border on Turkey, as does Russia, nor did its fleet sway the oceans and the Turkish waters, as in the case of England and later the Anglo-French navy. Germany could do Turkey no harm, but, on the contrary, serve it and give it support.

Abdul Hamid, therefore, not only met the confidence of the German Emperor with readiness, but he knew how to utilize his statesmanship, and then, when the German financial group obtained a concession for constructing a railroad, began a work that has been famous for years—the Bagdad railway. The history of the development of this enterprise, with its many obstacles and delays, is closely interwoven with European political history. As the present war has shown, the movement which Emperor William at that time instituted with his new policy for the Orient has proved of enormous benefit to German prestige. With ever-increasing force this has been apparent in the Balkans within the last year. To Germany and German trade and industry the Orient was accessible only by way of the land route. This route leads across the Balkan Peninsula. It became Germany's essential object not to have this road blocked. For this as for other reasons we were obliged to strengthen the position of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. And for this reason Russian enmity against everything German increased, especially within the last year before the war.

Germany had to shoulder this opposition, for if she wanted to found, hold fast, and develop her new sphere of influence in the Orient she must expect to encounter opposition. This was the situation with the arrival of the Bosnian crisis in 1908-09, which came off peacefully enough while the German Empire placed its entire weight back of its Austro-Hungarian allies. Russia had not yet recovered from its east Asiatic defeat and was therefore not able to carry on a big war.

Under the direction of Russia and England the Balkan war of 1912 started. This war was to destroy Turkey, rear a Slav wall against Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, and thus pronounce the death sentence upon the German advance in the Orient, upon the Bagdad railroad, and upon all that pertained thereto. But in Turkey energetic and patriotic men began a reorganization which had quick and surprising results. The great war has brought splendid evidence of the capability of our Turkish allies. In vain have the Russians, the English, and the French attempted to get Constantinople by way of the Black Sea and Gallipoli. When Bulgaria ranged herself with the German-Austrian-Turkish allies, and Serbia was brought to her knees, Germany for the first time could look along an uninterrupted roadway connecting Berlin and Constantinople. Today, while the war is raging, regular Balkan trains are passing between the capital of the German Empire and that of Turkey.

A connection of this kind, secured on its own initiative, was the factor that was missing in the German situation in the Orient before the war began. At no time had Emperor William, with his tried desire for peace, even remotely thought of the possibility of forcing a way for the German Empire along this route with the sword. The Kaiser counted much more on the peaceful traffic of the nations and hoped in time to see the same conditions prevail in the Balkan Peninsula. But those envious of the German Empire would not have it so. All of them, not Russia alone, were determined to prevent by force the civilizing, strengthening, German economic policy that was benefiting Turkey. Germany, therefore, was compelled against her will to use her sword in order to open a way for her trade, industry, and culture; and this was not relished by the others, because they were bent on conquering and robbing there.

Emperor William knew that the outlet for Germany's industry lay toward the East, and that the road thither was over Austria-Hungary and the Balkan Peninsula. But what peaceful efforts during a quarter of a century have not been able to accomplish, the war has done. And it is again worth noticing that Germany and her allies did not of their own choice cut a road to Constantinople, but were compelled to do so by circumstances. The question whether the present status in that region is likely to prevail later may be answered in the affirmative, because of the fact that a wise and far-seeing policy has been inaugurated by the Quadruple Alliance.

The naval policy of the Kaiser has been realized only in part, but his solicitude for the fleet and for the Orient supplement each other. The one cannot supplant the other. Germany in the future dare not turn from the water and confine herself to economic expansion in the Near East, and from there to Asia and Africa. It is not a question of a free sea or an unconfined Orient. Both are necessary. A free hand in the Orient for Germany would not prevent England from disputing a free sea with us. Nor would a free sea guarantee to Germany a free Orient. To understand what the German Emperor has in mind we must consider the questions as connected entities. Both issues are not yet fully developed, but the Germans have their goals before them, and have the power to attain their desires when ready. With the realization of these two objects the name of Emperor William II. will be linked to the history of Germany and the world.

Sketches From the War Zone

By Richard Harding Davis

Mr. Davis was a veteran war correspondent before the present war began, and since then he has wandered over the whole zone of battles from Ypres to Saloniki, recording the things seen in a series of vivid and deeply human word pictures. In this issue CURRENT HISTORY presents some of his most recent sketches of war aspects in France and England.

Verdun's Traps and Mazes

SIX weeks ago, when I was in Verdun, the Germans, from a distance of twenty miles, had dropped shells into Nancy and threatened to send more. That gave Nancy a news interest which Verdun lacked. So I was intolerant of Verdun and anxious to hasten on to Nancy.

Today Nancy and her three shells are forgotten, and to all the world the place of greatest interest is Verdun. Verdun has been Roman, Austrian, and not until 1648 did she become a part of France. This is the fourth time she has been attacked: By the Prussians in 1792, when she at once surrendered; again by the Germans in 1870, when, after a gallant defense of three weeks, she surrendered, and in October of 1914.

She then was more menaced than attacked. It was the Crown Prince and General von Strantz with seven army corps who threatened her. General Sarrail, now commanding the allied forces in Saloniki, with three army corps and reinforced by part of an army corps from Toul, directed the defense. The attack was made upon Fort Troyon, about twenty miles south of Verdun. The fort was destroyed, but the Germans were repulsed. Four days later, Sept. 24, the real attack was made fifteen miles south of Troyon, on the village of St. Mihiel. The object of von Strantz was to break through the Verdun-Toul line, to inclose Sarrail from the south and at Revigny link arms with the Crown Prince. They then would have had the army of Sarrail surrounded.

For several days it looked as though von Strantz would succeed, but, though outnumbered, Sarrail's line held, and he forced von Strantz to "dig in" at St. Mihiel. The salient of St. Mihiel still exists. It is like a dagger that failed to reach the heart but remains stuck in the flesh. On either side the French surround it. In January, from the first line of trenches to the north, I could look across the salient held by the Germans and see, on the other side of them, 800 yards away and facing us, the French trenches to the southwest.

The attack of von Strantz having failed, a week later, on Oct. 3, the Crown Prince attacked through the Forest of the Argonne between Varennes and Verdun. But this assault also was repulsed by Sarrail, who captured Varennes and with his left joined up with the Fourth Army of General Langle. The line as then formed by that victory remained much as it is today.

The present attack is directed neither to the north nor south of Verdun, but straight at the forts of the city. These forts form but a part of the defenses. For twenty miles in front of Verdun have been spread trenches and barb wire. In turn, these are covered by artillery positions in the woods and on every height. Even were a fort destroyed, to occupy it the enemy must pass over a terrain every foot of which is under fire. As the defense of Verdun has been arranged, each of the forts is but a rallying point, a base. The actual fighting, the combat that will decide the struggle, will take place in the open.

Last month I was invited to one of the Verdun forts. It now lies in the very path of the drive, and to describe it would be improper. But the approaches to the fort are now what every German knows. They were more impressive even than the fort. The "glacis" of the fort stretched for a mile, and as we walked in the direction of the German trenches there was not a moment when from every side French guns could not have blown us into fragments. They were mounted on the spurs of the hills, sunk in pits, ambushed in the thick pine woods. Every step forward was made cautiously between trenches, or through mazes of barb wire and iron hurdles with bayonet-like spikes. Even walking leisurely you had to watch your step. Pits opened suddenly at your feet, and strands of barbed wire caught at your clothing. Whichever way you looked trenches flanked you. They were dug at every angle and were not further than fifty yards apart.

On one side, a half mile distant, was a hill heavily wooded. At regular intervals the trees had been cut down and uprooted and, like a woodroad, a cleared place showed. These were the nests of the "seventy-fives." They could sweep the approaches to the fort as a fire hose flushes a gutter. That a human being should be ordered to advance against such pitfalls and obstructions, and under the fire from the trenches and batteries, seemed sheer murder. Not even a cat with nine lives could survive.

The German papers tell that before this great drive upon Verdun was launched the German Emperor reproduced the attack in miniature. The whereabouts and approaches to the positions they were to take were explained to the men. Their officers were rehearsed in the part each was to play. But no rehearsal would teach a man to avoid the pitfalls that surround Verdun. The open places are as treacherous as quicksands, the forests that seem to offer him shelter are a succession of traps. And if he captures one fort he but brings himself under the fire of two others.

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In the Forests of the Vosges

WHEN speaking of their 500 miles of front, the French General Staff divides it into twelve sectors. The names of these do not appear on maps. They are family names and titles, not of certain places, but of districts with imaginary boundaries. These nicknames seem to thrive best in countries where the same race of people have lived for many centuries. With us, it is usually when we speak of mountains, as "in the Rockies," "in the Adirondacks," that under one name we merge rivers, valleys, and villages. To know the French names for the twelve official fronts may help in deciphering the communiqués. They are these:

Flanders, the first sector, stretches from the North Sea to beyond Ypres; the Artois sector surrounds Arras; the centre of Picardie is Amiens; Santerre follows the valley of the Oise; Soissonais is the sector that extends from Soissons on the Aisne to the Champagne sector, which begins with Rheims and extends southwest to include Chalons; Argonne is the forest of Argonne; the Hautes de Meuse, the district around Verdun; Woevre lies between the Heights of the Meuse and the River Moselle; then come Lorraine, the Vosges, all hills and forests, and last, Alsace, the territory won back from the enemy.

Of these twelve fronts, I was on ten. The remaining two I missed through leaving France to visit the French fronts in Serbia and Saloniki. According to which front you are on, the trench is of mud, clay, chalk, sandbags, or cement; it is ambushed in gardens and orchards, it winds through flooded mud flats, is hidden behind the ruins of wrecked villages, and paved and reinforced with the stones and bricks from the smashed houses.

Of all the trenches the most curious were those of the Vosges. They were the most curious because, to use the last word one associates with trenches, they are the most beautiful.

We started for the trenches of the Vosges from a certain place close to the German border. It was so close that in the inn a rifle bullet from across the border had bored a hole in the café mirror.

The car climbed steadily. The swollen rivers flowed far below us, and then disappeared, and the slopes that fell away on one side of the road and rose on the other became smothered under giant pines. Above us they reached to the clouds, below us swept grandly across great valleys. There was no sign of human habitation, not even the hut of a charcoal burner. Except for the road we might have been the first explorers of a primeval forest. We seemed as far removed from the France of cities, cultivated acres, stone bridges, and châteaux as Rip Van Winkle lost in the Catskills. The silence was the silence of the ocean.

We halted at what might have been a lumberman's camp. There were cabins of huge green logs with the moss still fresh and clinging, and smoke poured from mud chimneys. In the air was an enchanting odor of balsam and boiling coffee. It needed only a man in a Mackinaw coat with an axe to persuade us we had motored from a French village ten hundred years old into a perfectly new trading post on the Saskatchewan.

But from the lumber camp the Colonel appeared, and with him in the lead we started up a hill as sheer as a church roof. The freshly cut path reached upward in short zigzag lengths. Its outer edge was shored with the trunks of the trees cut down to make way for it. They were fastened with stakes, and against rain and snow helped to hold it in place. The soil, as the path showed, was of a pink stone. It cuts easily and is the stone from which cathedrals have been built. That suggests that to an ambitious young sapling it offers little nutriment, but the pines, at least, seem to thrive on it. For centuries they have thrived on it. They towered over us to the height of eight stories. The ground beneath was hidden by the most exquisite moss, and moss climbed far up the tree trunks and covered the branches. They looked as though, to guard them from the cold, they had been swathed in green velvet. Except for the pink path we were in a world of green—green moss, green ferns, green tree trunks, green shadows. The little light that reached from above was like that which filters through the glass plates of an aquarium.

It was very beautiful, but was it war? We might have been in the Adirondacks, in the private camp of one of our men of millions. You expect to see the fire warden's red poster warning you to stamp out the ashes and to be careful where you throw matches. Then the path dived into a trench with pink walls, and, over head, arches of green branches rising higher and higher until they interlocked and shut out the sky. The trench led to a barrier of logs as round as a flour barrel, the openings plugged with moss and the whole hidden in fresh pine boughs. It reminded you of those open barricades used in boar hunting, and behind which the German Emperor awaits the onslaught of thoroughly terrified pigs.

Like a bird nest it clung to the side of the hill, and, across a valley, looked at a sister hill a quarter of a mile away.

"On that hill," said the Colonel, "on a level with us, are the Germans."

Had he told me that among the pine trees across the valley Santa Claus manufactured his toys and stabled his reindeer, I would have believed him. Had humpbacked dwarfs with beards peeped from behind the velvet tree trunks and doffed red nightcaps, had we discovered fairies dancing on the moss carpet, the surprised ones would have been, not we, but the fairies.

In this enchanted forest to talk of Germans and war was ridiculous. We were speaking in ordinary tones, but in the stillness of the woods our voices carried, and from just below us a dog barked.

"Do you allow the men to bring dogs into the trenches?" I asked. "Don't they give away your position?"

"That is not one of our dogs," said the Colonel. "That is a German sentry dog. He has heard us talking."

"But that dog is not across that

valley," I objected. "He's on this hill. He's not 200 yards below us."

"But, yes, certainly," said the Colonel. Of the man on duty behind the log barrier he asked:

"How near are they?"

"Two hundred yards," said the soldier. The soldier grinned and, leaning over the top log, pointed directly beneath us.

It was as though we were on the roof of a house looking over the edge at some one on the front steps. I stared down through the giant pine trees towering like masts, mysterious, motionless, silent with the silence of centuries. Through the interlacing boughs I saw only shifting shadows or, where a shaft of sunlight fell upon the moss, a flash of vivid green. Unable to believe, I shook my head. Even the Boche watchdog, now thoroughly annoyed, did not convince me. As though reading my doubts, an officer beckoned, and we stepped outside the breastworks and into an intricate cat's cradle of barbed wire. It was lashed to heavy stakes and wound around the tree trunks, and, had the officer not led the way, it would have been impossible for me to get either in or out. At intervals, like clothes on a line, on the wires were strung empty tin cans, pans and pots, and glass bottles. To attempt to cross the entanglement would have made a noise like a peddler's cart bumping over cobbles.

We came to the edge of the barb wire, and what looked like part of a tree trunk turned into a man-sized bird's nest. The sentry in the nest had his back to us and was peering intently down through the branches of the tree tops. He remained so long motionless that I thought he was not aware of our approach. But he had heard us. Only it was no part of his orders to make abrupt movements. With infinite caution, with the most considerate slowness, he turned, scowled, and waved us back. It was the care with which he made even so slight a gesture that persuaded me the Germans were as close as the Colonel had said. My curiosity concerning them was satisfied. The sentry did not need to wave me back. I was already on my way.

At the post of observation I saw a dog kennel.

"There are watchdogs on our side, also," I said.

"Yes," the officer assented doubtfully. "The idea is that their hearing is better than that of the men, and in case of night attacks they will warn us. But during the day they get so excited barking at the Boche dogs that when darkness comes, and we need them, they are worn out and fast asleep."

We continued our walk through the forest and wherever we went found men at work repairing the path and pushing the barb wire and trenches nearer the enemy. In some places they worked with great caution hidden by the ferns and dragging behind them the coils of wire; sometimes they were able to work openly, and the forest resounded with the blows of axes and the crash of a falling tree. But an axe in a forest does not suggest war, and the scene was still one of peace and beauty.

For miles the men had lined the path with borders of moss six inches wide and with strips of bark had decorated the huts and shelters. Across the tiny ravines they had thrown what in seed catalogues are called "rustic" bridges. As we walked in single file between these carefully laid borders of moss and past the shelters that suggested only a gamekeeper's lodge, we might have been on a walking tour in the Alps. You expected at every turn to come upon a châlet like a Swiss clock and a patient cow and a young woman in a velvet bodice who would offer you warm milk.

Instead, from overhead, there burst suddenly the barking of shrapnel and, through an opening in the tree tops, we saw a French biplane pursued by German shells. It was late in the afternoon, but the sun was still shining and, entirely out of her turn, the moon also was shining. In the blue sky she hung like a silver shield, and toward her, it seemed almost to her level, rose the biplane.

She also was all silver. She shone and glistened. Like a great bird, she flung out tilting wings. The sun kissed them and turned them into flashing mirrors. Behind her the German shells burst in white puffs of smoke, feathery, delicate, as innocent-looking as the tips of ostrich plumes. The biplane ran before them and seemed to play with them as children race up the beach laughing at the pursuing waves. The biplane darted left, darted right, climbed unseen aerial trails, tobogganed down vast imaginary mountains, or, as a gull skims the crests of the waves, dived into a cloud and appeared again, her wings dripping, glistening and radiant. As she turned and winged her way back to France you felt no fear for her. She seemed beyond the power of man to harm, something supreme, superhuman. A sister to the sun and moon, the princess royal of the air.

After you have been in the trenches it seems so selfish to be feasting and drinking that you have no appetite for dinner.

But for the defenders of the forests of the Vosges you cannot feel selfish. Visits to their trenches did not take away my appetite. They increased it. The air they breathe tastes like brut champagne, and gases cannot reach them. They sleep on pillows of pine boughs. They look out only on what in nature is most beautiful. And their surgeon told me there was not a single man on the sick list. That does not mean there are no killed or wounded. For even in the enchanted forest there is no enchantment strong enough to ward off the death that approaches crawling on the velvet moss or hurtling through the tree tops.

War has no knowledge of sectors. It is just as hateful in the Vosges as in Flanders, only in Vosges it masks its hideousness with what is beautiful. In Flanders death hides in a trench of mud like an open grave. In the Forest of the Vosges it lurks in a nest of moss, fern, and clean, sweet-smelling pine.

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How Soldiers Blinded in Battle Find New Hope

Richard Harding Davis also is the author of this interesting account of what is being done in France by the Committee for Men Blinded in Battle, an organization whose animating spirit is Miss Winifred Holt of New York, founder of The Lighthouse, where the blind are taught useful work which makes them independent and self-supporting. The similar work done in England by C. Arthur Pearson is no less remarkable.

THESE days the streets of Paris are filled with soldiers each of whom has given to France some part of his physical self. That his country may endure, that she may continue to enjoy and teach liberty, he has seen his arm or his leg, or both, blown off, or cut off. But when on the boulevards you meet him walking with crutches or with an empty sleeve pinned beneath his Cross of War, and he thinks your glance is one of pity, he resents it. He holds his head more stiffly erect. He seems to say, "I know how greatly you envy me!"

And who would dispute him? Long after the war is ended, so long as he lives, men and women of France will honor him, and in their eyes he will read their thanks. But there is one soldier who cannot read their thanks, who is spared the sight of their pity. He is the one who has made all but the supreme sacrifice. He is the one who is blind. He sits in perpetual darkness. You can remember certain nights that seemed to stretch to doomsday, when sleep was withheld and you tossed and lashed upon the pillow, praying for the dawn. Imagine a night of such torture dragged out over many years. With the dreadful knowledge that the dawn will never come. Imagine Paris with her bridges, palaces, parks, with the Seine, the Tuileries, the boulevards, the glittering shop windows conveyed to you only through noise. Only through the shrieks of motor horns and the shuffling of feet.

The men who have been blinded in battle have lost more than sight. They have been robbed of their independence. They feel they are a burden. It is not only the physical loss they suffer, but the thought that no longer are they of use, that they are a care, that in the scheme of things—even in their own little circles of family and friends—there is for them no place. It is not unfair to the poilu to say that the officer who is blinded suffers more than the private. As a rule, he is more highly strung, more widely educated; he has seen more; his experience of the world is broader; he has more to lose. Before the war he may have been a lawyer, doctor, man of of many affairs. For him it is harder than, for example, the peasant to accept a future of unending blackness spent in plaiting straw or weaving rag carpets. Under such conditions life no longer tempts him. Instead, death tempts him, and the pistol seems very near at hand.

It was to save men of the officer class from despair and from suicide, to make them know that for them there still was a life of usefulness, work, and accomplishment, that there was organized in France the Committee for Men Blinded in Battle. The idea was to bring back to officers who had lost their sight, courage, hope, and a sense of independence, to give them work not merely mechanical but more in keeping with their education and intelligence. The President of France is patron of the society, and on its committees in Paris and New York are many distinguished names. The French Government has promised a house near Paris where the blind soldiers may be educated. When I saw them they were in temporary quarters in the Hotel de Crillon, lent to them by the proprietor. They had been gathered from hospitals in different parts of France by Miss Winifred Holt, who for years has been working for the blind in her Lighthouse in New York. She is assisted in the work in Paris by Mrs. Peter Cooper Hewitt. The officers were brought to the Crillon by French ladies, whose duty it was to guide them through the streets. Some of them also were their instructors, and in order to teach them to read and write with their fingers had themselves learned the Braille alphabet. This requires weeks of very close and patient study. And no nurse's uniform goes with it. But the reward was great.

It was evident in the alert and eager interest of the men who, perhaps, only a week before had wished to "curse God, and die." But since then hope had returned to each of them, and he had found a door open, and a new life.

And he was facing it with the same or with even a greater courage than that with which he had led his men into the battle that blinded him. Some of the officers were modeling in clay, others were learning typewriting, one with a drawing board was studying to be an architect, others were pressing their finger tips over the raised letters of the Braille alphabet. Opposite each officer, on the other side of the table, sat a woman he could not see. She might be young and beautiful, as many of them were. She might be white-haired and a great lady bearing an ancient title, from the faubourg across the bridges, but he heard only a voice.

The voice encouraged his progress, or corrected his mistakes, and a hand, detached and descending from nowhere, guided his hand, gently, as one guides the fingers of a child. The officer was again a child. In life for the second time he was beginning with A, B, and C. The officer was tall, handsome and deeply sunburned. In his uniform of a chasseur d'Afrique he was a splendid figure. On his chest were the medals of the campaigns in Morocco and Algiers, and the crimson ribbon of the Legion of Honor. The officer placed his forefinger on a card covered with raised hieroglyphics.

"N," he announced.

"No," the voice answered him.

"M?" His tone did not carry conviction.

"You are guessing," accused the voice. The officer was greatly confused.

"No, no, mademoiselle!" he protested. "Truly, I thought it was an 'M.'"

He laughed guiltily. The laugh shook you. You saw all that he could never see; inside the room the great ladies and latest American Countesses, eager to help, forgetful of self, full of wonderful, womanly sympathy, and outside, the Place de la Concorde, the gardens of the Tuileries, the trees of the Champs Elysées, the sun setting behind the gilded dome of the Invalides. All these were lost to him, and yet as he sat in the darkness, because he could not tell an N from an M, he laughed, and laughed happily. From where did he draw his strength and courage? Was it the instinct for life that makes a drowning man fight against an ocean? Was it his training as an officer of the Grande Armée? Was it that spirit of the French that is the one thing no German knows, and no German can ever break? Or was it the sound of a woman's voice and the touch of a woman's hand? If the reader wants to contribute something to help teach a new profession to these gentlemen, who in the fight for civilization have contributed their eyesight, write to the Secretary of the committee, Mrs. Peter Cooper Hewitt, Hotel Ritz, Paris.

What is going forward at the Crillon for blind French officers is being carried on in London at St. Dunstan's, Regent's Park, for blind Tommies. At this school the classes are much larger than are those in Paris, the pupils more numerous, and they live and sleep on the premises. The premises are very beautiful. They consist of seventeen acres of gardens, lawns, trees, a lake, and a stream on which you can row and swim, situated in Regent's Park and almost in the heart of London. In the days when London was further away the villa of St. Dunstan's belonged to the eccentric Marquis of Hertford, the wicked Lord Steyne of Thackeray's "Vanity Fair." It was a country estate. Now the city has closed in around it, but it is still a country estate, with ceilings by the Brothers Adam, portraits by Romney, sideboards by Sheraton, and on the lawn sheep. To keep sheep in London is as expensive as to keep racehorses, and to own a country estate in London can be afforded only by Americans. The estate next to St. Dunstan's is owned by an American lady. I used to play lawn tennis there with her husband. Had it not been for the horns of the taxicabs we might have been a hundred miles from the nearest railroad. Instead, we were so close to Baker Street that one false step would have landed us in Mme. Tussaud's. When the war broke out the husband ceased hammering tennis balls and hammered German ships of war. He sank several—and is now waiting impatiently outside of Wilhelmshaven for more.

St. Dunstan's also is owned by an American, Otto Kahn, the banker. In peace times, in the Winter months, Mr. Kahn makes it possible for the people of New York to listen to good music at the Metropolitan Opera House. When war came, at his country place in London he made it next to possible for the blind to see. He gave the key of the estate to C. Arthur Pearson. He also gave him permission in altering St. Dunstan's to meet the needs of the blind to go as far as he liked.

When I first knew Arthur Pearson he and Lord Northcliffe were making rival collections of newspapers and magazines. They collected them as other people collect postal cards and cigar bands. Pearson was then, as he is now, a man of the most remarkable executive ability, of keen intelligence, of untiring nervous energy. That was ten years ago. He knew then that he was going blind. And when the darkness came he accepted the burden; not only his own, but he took upon his shoulders the burden of all the blind in England. He organized the National Institute for those who could not see. He gave them of his energy, which has not diminished; he gave them of his fortune, which, happily for them, has not diminished; he gave them his time, his intelligence. If you ask what the time of a blind man is worth, go to St. Dunstan's and you will find out. You will see a home and school for blind men, run by a blind man. The same efficiency, knowledge of detail, intolerance of idleness, the same generous appreciation of the work of others, that he put into running The Express and Standard, he now exerts at St. Dunstan's. It has Pearson written all over it just as a mile away there is a building covered with the name of Selfridge, and a cathedral with the name of Christopher Wren. When I visited him in his room at St. Dunstan's he was standing with his back to the open fire dictating to a stenographer. He called to me cheerily, caught my hand, and showed me where I was to sit. All the time he was looking straight at me and firing questions.

"When did you leave Saloniki? How many troops have we landed? Our positions are very strong, aren't they?"

I found the seventeen acres of St. Dunstan's so arranged that no blind man could possibly lose his way. In the house, over the carpets, were stretched strips of matting. So long as a man kept his feet on matting he knew he was on the right path to the door. Outside the doors hand rails guided him to the workshops, schoolrooms, exercising grounds, and kitchen gardens. Just before he reached any of these places a brass knob on the hand rail warned him to go slow. Were he walking on the great stone terrace and his foot scraped against a board he knew he was within a yard of a flight of steps. Wherever you went you found men at work, learning a trade, or, having learned one, intent in the joy of creating something. To help them there are nearly sixty ladies, who have mastered the Braille system and come daily to teach it. There are many other volunteers, who take the men on walks around Regent's Park and who talk and read to them. Everywhere was activity. Everywhere some one was helping some one; the blind teaching the blind; those who had been a week at St. Dunstan's doing the honors to those just arrived. The place spoke only of hard work, mutual help, and cheerfulness. When first you arrived you thought you had over the others a certain advantage, but when you saw the work the blind men were turning out, which they could not see and which you knew with both your eyes you never could have turned out, you felt apologetic. There were cabinets, for instance, measured to the twentieth of an inch, and men who were studying to be masseurs who, only by touch, could distinguish all the bones in the body. There was Miss Woods, a blind stenographer. I dictated a sentence to her, and as fast as I spoke she took it down on a machine in the Braille alphabet. It appeared in raised figures on a strip of paper like those that carry stock quotations. Then, reading the sentence with her fingers, she pounded it on an ordinary typewriter. Her work was faultless.

What impressed you was the number of the workers who, over their task, sang or whistled. None of them paid any attention to what the others were whistling. Each acted as though he were shut off in a world of his own. The spirits of the Tommies were unquenchable.

Brown Five was one of those privates who are worth more to a company than the Sergeant Major. He was a comedian. He looked like John Bunny, and when he laughed he shook all over, and you had to laugh with him, even though you were conscious that Brown Five had no eyes and no hands. But was he conscious of that? Apparently not. Was he disheartened? No! Some one snatched his cigarette; and with the stumps of his arms he promptly beat two innocent comrades over the head. When the lady guide interfered and admitted it was she who had robbed him, Brown Five roared in delight.

"I bashed 'em!" he cried. "Her took it, but I bashed the two of 'em!"

A private of the Munsters was weaving a net, and, as though he were quite alone, singing, in a fine baritone, "Tipperary." If you want to hear real close harmony, you must listen to Southern darkies; and if you want to get the sweetness and melancholy out of an Irish chant, an Irishman must sing it. I thought I had heard "Tipperary" before several times, and that it was a march. But I found I had not heard it before, and that it is not a march, but a lament and a love song. The soldier did not know we were listening, and while his fingers wove the meshes of the net, his voice rose in tones of the most moving sweetness. He did not know that he was facing a window, he did not know that he was staring straight out upon the City of London. But we knew and when in his rare baritone and rare brogue he whispered rather than sang the lines:

Good-bye, Piccadilly—
Farewell, Leicester Square,
It's a long, long way to Tipperary

—all of his unseen audience hastily fled.

There was also Private Watts, who was mending shoes. When the week before Lord Kitchener visited St. Dunstan's Watts had joked with him. I congratulated him on his courage.

"What was your joke?" I inquired.

"He asked me when I was a prisoner with the Germans how they fed me, and I said: 'Oh, they gave me five beefsteaks a day.'"

"That was a good joke," I said. "Did Kitchener think so?"

The man had been laughing, pleased and proud. Now the blank eyes turned wistfully to my companion.

"Did his Lordship smile?" he asked.

These blind French officers and English Tommies are teaching a great lesson. They are teaching men who are whining over the loss of money, health, or a job, to be ashamed. It is not we who are keeping them, but they who are helping us. They are showing us how to face disaster and setting us an example of real courage. And those who do not profit by it are more blind than they.

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Wartime Changes in England

In another of his interesting articles Richard Harding Davis gives a rapid sketch of the changes which the war has wrought in England:

A YEAR ago the only women in London in uniform were the nurses. Now, so many are in uniform that to one visitor they presented the most surprising change the war has brought to London. Those who live in London, to whom the change has come gradually, are probably hardly aware how significant it is. Few people, certainly few men, guessed that so many positions that before the war were open only to men could be filled quite as acceptably by women. Only the comic papers guessed it. All that they ever mocked at, all the suffragettes and "equal rights" women ever hoped for seems to have come true. Even women policemen. True, they do not take the place of the real, immortal London bobby, neither do the "special constables," but if a young girl is out late at night with her young man in khaki, she is held up by a policewoman and sent home. And her young man in khaki dare not resist.

In Paris, when the place of a man who had been mobilized was taken by his wife, sister, or daughter, no one was surprised. French women have for years worked in partnership with men to a degree unknown in England. They helped as bookkeepers, shopkeepers; in the restaurants they always handled the money; in the theatres the ushers and box openers were women; the Government tobacco shops were run by women. That French women were capable, efficient, hard working was as trite a saying as that the Japanese are a wonderful little people. So when the men went to the front and the women carried on their work, they were only proving a proverb.

But in England careers for women, outside those of governess, typist, barmaid, or show girl, which entailed marrying a Marquis, were as few as votes. The war has changed that. It gave woman her chance, and she jumped at it. "When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again" he will find he must look for a man's job and that men's jobs no longer are sinecures. In his absence women have found out, and, what is more important, the employers have found out, that to open a carriage door and hold an umbrella over a customer is not necessarily a man's job. The man will have to look for a position his sister cannot fill, and, judging from the present aspect of London, those positions are rapidly disappearing.

That in the ornamental jobs, those that are relics of feudalism and snobbery, women should supplant men is not surprising. To wear gold lace, and touch your hat, and whistle for a taxicab, if the whistle is a mechanical one, is no difficult task. It never was absolutely necessary that a butler and two men should divide the labor of serving one cup of coffee, one lump of sugar, and one cigarette. A healthy young woman might manage all three tasks and not faint. So the innovation of female butlers and footmen is not important. But many of the jobs now held in London by women are those which require strength, skill, and endurance. Pulling on the steel rope of an elevator and closing the steel gates for eight hours a day requires strength and endurance; and yet in all the big department stores the lifts are worked by girls. Women also drive the vans, and dragging on the brake of a brewery wagon and curbing two draft horses is a very different matter from steering one of the cars that made peace hateful. Not that there are no women chauffeurs. They are everywhere. You see them driving lorries, business cars, private cars, taxicabs, ambulances.

In men's caps and uniforms of green, gray, brown or black, and covered to the waist with a robe, you mistake them for boys. The other day I saw a motor truck clearing a way for itself down Piccadilly. It was filled with over two dozen Tommies, and driven recklessly by a girl in khaki of not more than eighteen years. How many indoor positions have been taken over by women one can only guess.

They look very businesslike and smart in their uniforms, and whatever their work is they are intent upon it. As a rule, when a woman attempts a man's work she is conscious. She is more concerned with the fact that she is holding down a man's job than with the job. Whether she is a lady lawyer, lady doctor, or lady journalist, she always is surprised to find herself where she is. The girls and women you see in uniform by the thousands in London seem to have overcome that weakness. They are performing a man's work, and their interest is centred in the work, not in the fact that a woman has made a success of it. If after this women in England want the vote and the men won't give it to them, the men will have a hard time explaining why.

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Lord Rosebery's Only Fear

In an address to the Edinburgh Volunteer Corps the Earl of Rosebery declared that there was not a man, and scarcely a woman, in the British Nation who would spare any exertion to bring the war to a triumphant result, adding:

There is only one thing which I sometimes fear. It is that, when successes begin, there may be some weak-minded cry in this country for a premature peace. I hope that no man of you will lend any support to such a false and misleading policy. A premature peace means a short peace, and a war that will be even worse than this to follow. Therefore, let all of us unite in the resolve that while no exertion shall be wanting on our part to bring the war to a triumphant conclusion and the Prussian bloodthirsty tyrants to their knees, yet, on the other hand, not a finger will be raised to accelerate peace before it is justly due.

Germany's Peace Conditions

An interesting and important discussion of Germany's peace conditions occurred in the Reichstag recently, precipitated by the leader of the Socialist Deputies, Herr Scheidemann. It reveals in particularity the attitude of the influential minority of the German Nation on the question of peace.—[EDITOR CURRENT HISTORY.]

What the Socialists Desire

By Philipp Scheidemann

Chairman German Socialist Party and Ex-Vice President of the Reichstag



FOR more than sixteen months past we have been witnessing a struggle such as the world has never seen, and such as — I hope — it will never see again. Our deepest gratitude is due to our troops, who have endured unheard-of sufferings and privations, and whose bravery is beyond all praise. The accounts which we have read of heroic fights during the last sixteen months are without a parallel in history.

From day to day the sea of blood has increased in volume, and the number of victims has swelled; the suffering and distress in all those countries which are participating in this terrible war has been constantly augmented. Is it therefore surprising that in all countries the question should be put: How much longer? After mature reflection I do not hesitate to say that all nations would rejoice if the war could be brought to an end as quickly as possible.

Were it otherwise we should have to despair of humanity. The idea that any nation could possibly desire a continuation of the murderous struggle is positively appalling. For me there is no doubt whatever; every nation is longing for peace.

But—to quote Lord Courtney's words—the responsible statesmen do not yet know how to find a way out of the *impasse.*

For us Socialists it is self-evident that we should unceasingly raise our voices in favor of peace. If we did not do so, we should forfeit our claim to be the International Peace Party. All of us who are participating in what is certainly the most colossal tragedy recorded by human history must be fully conscious of the heavy responsibility incumbent on us. For my own part, I am conscious of the burden. I am well aware that a single word misunderstood or misinterpreted can produce fatal consequences — can bring about a result diametrically opposed to the one which I wish to attain. But the fear of misinterpretation has caused too many to push discretion to excess. I know many men, whose courage is unquestionable, who do not speak about peace because they fear that to do so might be considered a sign of weakness. Even within the Socialist parties themselves, people are often hypnotized by the magical words: "A sign of weakness." I admit this candidly in order that I may not be reproached with ignoring the fact. I will quote an example of very recent date: The British Minister of Education, Arthur Henderson, who is a Socialist, said at the end of November to Professor Backström that the time had not yet come to discuss peace or to agitate for peace. He did not share the opinion of those who demand that the British Government should step forward and formulate its peace conditions, "since all talk about peace will be interpreted by the other side as a sign of weakness."

I am also reckoning with this. Nevertheless I venture to speak about peace.

On Aug. 4, 1914, the German Nation stood up to the last man in defense of the Fatherland. When the declaration of the Social Democratic Party was read to you, it was received by the whole House with loud and long-continued cheering. We said in this declaration:

> In the event of a victory of Russian despotism, which is besmirched with the blood of the best elements of the Russian people, a great deal, if not everything, will be at stake for the German Nation and for its future liberty. It is necessary to avert this danger and to insure the safety and the independence of our own country. We shall consequently fulfill that which we have always promised: in the hour of danger we shall not desert our country.

But we also said further on in the same declaration:

> We demand that, as soon as the object of insuring the safety of the empire shall have been realized, and as soon as our adversaries shall be inclined to make peace, the war be brought to an end by means of a peace which shall render friendly relations with our neighbors possible.

This declaration thus contained at the same time an express recognition of the duty of defending the Fatherland and a definition of the position adopted by us regarding the object of the war. To what we then said, we still adhere today. * * *

That nation can and should be the first to speak of peace whose military position and economic strength permit it, in the consciousness of its power, to remain supremely indifferent to all those misrepresentations which would fain make people believe that its readiness to conclude peace is nothing but a sign of weakness. Such being the case, we Germans can speak about peace, and must therefore do so.

We have not forgotten the wild plans of destruction and dismemberment drawn up in the countries at war with us. But as honorable men, we will also admit that plans of conquest have likewise been drawn up in Germany, the realization of which no man of mature political judgment in the empire can dream of for a moment. Had it been possible to discuss such plans publicly, the discussion would have shown that the German people will have nothing to do with them. Our party immediately lodged a protest with those in authority against all plans of conquest. These plans have again and again been utilized abroad in order to prove the absolute necessity of continuing the war.

The annexation of territories inhabited by alien races is incompatible with the right of every people to settle its own destiny. Who will seriously contest, moreover, that such annexations would but weaken the inner unity and strength of the German national State? They would permanently damage our foreign relations. Their absolutely certain consequence would be to create an ever-present danger of war, a danger which would increase every year, placing an ever heavier burden of armaments on our shoulders. We shall therefore resolutely oppose all those who would transform this war into a war of conquest.

But we protest just as energetically against all the plans of conquest drawn up by our enemies against the German Empire and its allies.

Until now we have heard the statesmen of the countries at war with us constantly reiterating that there can be no question of peace until German militarism has been crushed and Alsace-Lorraine given back to France. To this affirmation I would reply, calmly and resolutely: Our enemies have a very different conception of the "militarism," which they wish to destroy, than we.

They wish to exterminate our armies in which our sons and brothers are fighting.

That which we call militarism, and which we ourselves combat, is a question to be decided upon within the German frontiers; just as French militarism and English navalism constitute questions which must be solved on the other side of the Vosges and of the Channel.

We reject the idea of an incorporation

of Alsace-Lorraine with France, no matter in what form it is to be realized.

Gentlemen, I trust you will not blame me if I only mention cursorily the numerous disagreeable utterances, the echo of which has recently reached us from France, England, and Russia. I am aware that the English Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, recently proclaimed anew his adhesion to his former program: the destruction of German militarism. I am aware that the French Prime Minister, M. Briand, recently said the same thing, besides enunciating other aims. But what has not already been said in the course of the present war? I am the advocate of a speedy peace, and therefore I will only mention those utterances which reveal a similar longing for peace.

You know what efforts have been made on behalf of peace by Ramsay Macdonald in England.

Mr. Trevelyan has spoken in the House of Commons in favor of peace. In the House of Lords, Lord Ribblesdale has sought for a *via media* at the end of which the belligerents might find peace. On Nov. 8 Lord Loreburn spoke in the House of Lords concerning the unsatisfactory position of England, and, according to the report furnished by Wolff, continued as follows:

> The situation has no parallel in the annals of history. Every great nation in the war has been led to believe that the war was forced upon it. * * * All of them believe they are in the right and that they have only to hold on in order to win. The losses, which are already estimated at 15,000,000 killed or disabled for life, and the many thousands of millions of war debt, will alter the whole face of civilization.
>
> It is no exaggeration to say that if this war goes on indefinitely, revolution and anarchy may well follow. Great portions of the Continent of Europe will be little better than a wilderness peopled by old men and women and children. I would say that any one must be strangely constructed who does not grasp at any honorable opportunity to prevent what would be the most frightful calamity that has ever befallen the human race. This is what is meant by the war of attrition. These are thoughts from which there is no escape.

In the same sitting of the House of Lords, Lord Courtney expressed views to the following effect:

> Whether they looked at home or abroad, their old civilization, which they had built up through long generations, was almost destroyed. * * * The war had operated to diminish the standard of their civilization, to take away the guarantees of liberty and to diminish the trustworthiness of law. It was not surprising that one should begin to ask whether any escape was possible from this rake's progress on which they had entered, and whether they must go on to witness a continually extending panorama of ruin. If the only alternative were that they should be brought under the authority of another power, he would bow in silence. They must be free or die. But he believed there was an alternative. The passion of national independence was glorious and well worthy of any sacrifice, but the passion of national independence must be reconciled if civilization was to continue, with the possibility of international friendship. The consummation of the tragedy was that precisely what they said and believed was believed and said in Germany, with the same sincerity and the same conviction. If that was so, he was led again to the conclusion that there must be some way out of the *impasse*.

Gentlemen, Lord Courtney—who was a professor of international law—has frankly admitted that it is both reasonable and timely to discuss the question of peace negotiations. We Socialists have done this for many months past. In the Italian Chamber the Socialist Deputy Treves demanded a peace which shall not imply the exhaustion of the belligerent States, a peace without annexations, a peace which shall respect the rights and liberties of the nations. He ventured to demand this in face of the Italian Government, which did not recoil from entering upon the most immoral of all wars of aggression despite the fact that the entire world had for several months watched the universal butchery with horror. The Deputy M. Lucci blamed the Italian Government especially for having signed the London Agreement, which provides that none of the Entente Powers may conclude peace separately.

" We want peace "—this is very clearly to be read in these speeches delivered in the Italian Chamber. Within the last few days Count Andrassy cried out in the Hungarian Chamber: " What a stroke of good fortune it would be could we but succeed in making peace now! " Only the day before yesterday, Count Karolyi said in the Hungarian Parliament that it would be nonsense to consider that the desire for peace constituted a sign of weakness.

The Kölnische Volkszeitung recently published a report that the desire for peace in France had increased immensely since the hopes based on General Joffre's offensive had been disappointed. Let me quote a few sentences from a letter from the French front, which M. Romain Rolland published in the Semaine Littéraire:

> Everything which I have seen and heard confirms my impression that there is not a single soldier who does not heartily detest the war.
>
> The most ardent desire of the poilu is to return home and never to begin again.
>
> I can guarantee that the soldiers of today will constitute the most reliable pacifists in the future.
>
> All these men, whom the war has brought together, have only one wish: namely, that it may never occur again, that their sons may never know its horrors. Solely for this reason do they intend to hold out till the end despite their fatigue.

Gentlemen, the whole world is yearning for peace; yet we are told that we should not speak about peace, for this would be a sign of weakness. Just like all the others whom I have mentioned, Lord Courtney was reasonable enough to pay no attention to this objection. He spoke about the *impasse*, out of which a way must be found. Unfortunately there have also been so-called politicians in Germany who replied to Lord Courtney's speech with savage war cries. Such jingoes flourish in every country. The warlike enthusiasm of these dangerous braggadocios increases in the same proportion as their incapacity for field service. We are just as little entitled to interpret Lord Courtney's speech as a sign of weakness as foreigners would be to interpret in this way the speech which I am now making. What I am saying today about peace I said almost a year ago at large public meetings, as a Socialist whose duty it is to work for peace. Many thousands of people to whom I spoke in Nürnberg, in Frankfurt, in Solingen, entirely agreed with me when I protested against the twaddle of the annexationists and declared: " We did not enter upon this struggle in order to conquer new lands, but in order to protect our national independence, for such independence is the condition *sine qua non* of the development of a nation's civilization."

This is not my private opinion, but the opinion of the entire Social Democratic Party. I know the arguments by means of which it is sought to maintain, or to kindle anew, the warlike enthusiasm of our enemies. I know that in France and in England prophets have not ceased foretelling the forthcoming collapse of Germany.

With a monotony which has become tedious it has been pointed out, first of all, that we shall soon not have enough men to continue the war; and, secondly, that the lack of war materials and food supplies will soon force us to our knees.

The one assertion is as false as the other.

That numbers do not count for everything in modern warfare has been demonstrated clearly enough by Marshal Hindenburg in the case of the Russian steam roller. In all European countries, including the neutral States, the consequences of the war are bad enough. Europe is systematically ruining herself in the present war, whereas the United States of America is doing a lucrative business. If only people would begin to understand this, not only in Germany, but also in England and in France!

How about the starving out of the German Nation? The British Government hoped to be able to force Germany to her knees with a degree of rapidity proportionate to the measure in which it was possible to prevent the importation of foodstuffs. But the plan of starving out the whole nation has come to naught and could not but do so. True, we lack various things. We have been obliged to accustom ourselves to certain measures, such as the bread cards; and we will have to accustom ourselves later on to meat cards, fat cards, and butter cards, the introduction of all of which has been demanded by the Social Democratic Party itself. A short time ago over 20,000,000 living pigs were counted in Germany. We have reaped 55,000,000 tons of potatoes. As less than 15,000,000 tons are sufficient to feed our population, nearly three-quarters of the total harvest can be employed as fodder and for industrial purposes.

No, Germany cannot be starved out. Since the Danube route has also been opened, our adversaries should understand that they miscalculated. If expressions of dissatisfaction have been heard—expressions which have been much distorted and exploited abroad—this is because the authorities did not intervene quickly and effectively enough in order to check the dishonest manoeuvres of unscrupulous producers and speculators.

The hopes set by our enemies on our economic collapse are unfounded. In referring, at the beginning of my speech, to the map of the war I showed that their hopes of a military collapse are equally unfounded. It is nothing less than criminal when the statesmen and politicians of those countries which are waging war against us continually seek to make their compatriots believe that the military situation can yet be modified considerably to our disadvantage. But whatever they may say, they are unable to change hard facts. It is these facts which permit us, nay oblige us, to talk now about peace.

Is there a single person in the whole country who would not be glad if we could put an end to the terrible struggle? How delighted would not only the workingmen, but especially the tradespeople, the business men, and the peasants be if only we could obtain peace—a peace which shall guarantee our economic development and our political independence! And do you not also believe that the mothers, wives, and children of the soldiers who are fighting against us desire the end of the butchery just as ardently as do the mothers, wives, and children of our own soldiers? If, in the belligerent States, the press could but write freely concerning the aims of the war and the desire for peace, this desire would assert itself in all countries with elementary violence.

It is evident that, today also, the Social Democratic Party persists in demanding the abolition of the state of siege, and consequently the abolition of the censorship. I have, moreover, been empowered by the Austro-German Social Democratic Party to declare here in its name that the Austrian Social Democrats are in entire agreement with us alike as regards the fulfillment of the duty of national defense and the desire for peace.

The Socialists in every country have invariably opposed the imperialist policy pursued by all the great powers. We knew that such a policy—setting aside every other consideration—was liable to bring about the most appalling of catastrophies. Right up to the day before the outbreak of hostilities we worked with all our might against war. The Socialists in the other countries were, like ourselves, unfortunately too weak to prevent it. When war broke out it was self-evident that we should defend our country, its independence, and its civilization. I need only recall the example of East Prussia, in order to show how great was the Russian danger. But an immediate danger no longer threatens our frontiers. It is therefore our duty to ask the Imperial Chancellor if he is in a position to state the conditions under which he would be prepared to enter into peace negotiations.

The Imperial Chancellor knows that the German Nation entered the war unanimously and without a single dissentient voice in order to defend its homes. But he cannot but be aware of the fact that the nation is not disposed to continue the war for a single day longer than is absolutely necessary. For our country and its independence the nation was prepared to risk everything. But the nation will not risk the life of one single soldier in order to serve the egotistical interests of capitalism.

Allow me to quote the words of the Speech from the Throne on Aug. 4, 1914: "We are not animated by the desire of conquest, but only by the inflexible resolution to maintain the position, &c." These words should be remembered by every one, and especially by those who have the heaviest responsibility to bear. If the Imperial Government should be afforded the possibility of concluding a peace which will guarantee the political independence and the integrity of the empire, and which will assure to the German Nation the liberty of its economic development, then we demand that the Imperial Government conclude peace. If the Imperial Government is afforded the possibility of entering upon peace negotiations on such conditions as these, then it must seize the opportunity in the interest of human civilization. We will then stand by the Government and devote our entire strength to keep in check those who would be opposed to such a peace.

If, at the beginning of the war, millions of us rallied enthusiastically to our country's call, we did not do so with the intention of imposing the will of Germany on the world—as our enemies have so often falsely accused us of doing. No, we rallied around the flag in order to prevent the independence, the unity and the national position of the German Nation from being destroyed by an immense hostile coalition. A peaceful and reasonable nation such as the German may, in moments of great excitement, be dominated by a feeling of indignation, but it does not revel in thoughts of vengeance and extermination. It seeks to acquire the position in the world to which it is entitled next to the other nations, but not above them.

Gentlemen, I have spoken candidly. I have been able to say openly that we desire peace, because the German Nation is sufficiently strong, and because it is resolved to continue the fight in defense of home and country should its enemies not wish for peace.

The Imperial Chancellor knows that the whole world is waiting in breathless expectation his reply to our interpellation. I trust that he will find the redeeming words, and that he will express his readiness to enter into peace negotiations.

Attitude of the German Government

By Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, Imperial Chancellor

In the course of an extended reply to Herr Scheidemann's interpellation the Imperial Chancellor said:

THE English slogan has been adopted by all the allies. M. Sazonoff and M. Viviani, and now M. Briand, have declared repeatedly and emphatically that they would not lay down their arms before Prussian or German militarism was beaten down. Besides, each ally has his pet demands: The English Colonial Minister, in carrying out the principle of nationalities, wants Alsace to be returned to France, but Poland to that nationality to which she belongs. Let me observe by the way that the English Colonial Minister is obviously unaware that the mother tongue of more than 87 per cent. out of 1,900,000 people who dwell in Alsace-Lorraine is German and of less than 11 per cent. French. It is not quite clear whether he holds that by virtue of her nationality Poland belongs to Russia. Moreover, it will be interesting to learn from England what is to become, say, of India and Egypt in carrying out the principle of nationality. Besides the restoration of Belgium and Serbia, M. Briand wants to have Alsace-Lorraine under all circumstances. As regards M. Sazonoff's military objects he has very distinctly pointed to Constantinople.

Those military objects of the hostile Governments are not adapted to the actual military situation. But I would offend those in power in the enemy countries if I were to consider their demands as bluff, and not to take them seriously. The situation is perfectly clear. Under the protection of their respective Governments, the nations have been deceived from the first day about the real state of things. By the systematic forgery and circulation of all sorts of lies an inextinguishable hatred against us has been sown among the nations. Now it is seen that all that falsehood and hatred does not win victories. Our enemies have suffered an abundance of military and diplomatic defeats, and have sacrificed hecatombs of lives. They can no longer conceal the fact that we have advanced far into hostile territory both east and west, that we have opened the road to the Southeast and hold precious dead pledges. But the Catonian cry that Germany is to be crushed must be maintained. It has become such a fixed idea with them that they can no longer rid themselves of that thought. Therefore, other hundreds of thousands must be driven to the slaughter block.

One day when history will weigh the guilt of having started this most monstrous of all wars and of protracting it, the appalling mischief will be realized which ignorance and hypocrisy have caused. As long as the statesmen in power in the enemy countries combine guilt and ignorance, and their views sway the hostile nations, any offer of peace on our part would be folly, and would protract rather than shorten the war. The masks must be dropped first. A war of annihilation is still being waged against us. We have to reckon with that fact. We cannot make any headway or reach our goal with theories and expressions of peace. If our enemies come with proposals of peace which are compatible with the dignity and safety of Germany we are at all times ready to discuss them. In the full consciousness of the military successes which we have achieved we do not hold ourselves responsible for the continuation of the misery which afflicts Europe and the world. Nobody shall be able to say that we wished to protract the war needlessly because we wanted to conquer other dead pledges.

On one point our enemies must be clear: The longer and more bitter the war they wage against us the larger will the necessary guarantees have to be. If our enemies want to raise a barrier between Germany and the rest of the world for all future time, they must not be surprised that we arrange our future accordingly. Neither in the East nor West must our enemies of today dispose of any sally-ports through which they can threaten us again and more seriously than before. It is well known that France only granted loans to Russia on the condition that Russia complete the construction of the Polish fortresses and railroads to be used against us. It is also known that England and France regarded Belgium as the territory for drawing up their troops. To protect ourselves against all that we must secure for ourselves a political, military, and economic development. What is requisite for that purpose must be achieved, and I think there is nobody in the German Fatherland who does not wish to attain such a goal. As regards the means to that end we must reserve for ourselves full freedom in our decisions.

A Social Democratic View

By Deputy Landsberg

THE re-establishment of communications between Berlin and Constantinople has buried certain hopes which were among the chief causes of the present war. Gentlemen, it is not an accident that the wish for peace should now find expression here and there. Not only in Germany does the impression prevail that the psychological moment has now arrived to approach the idea of peace. In the English House of Lords brave men, who did not fear unpopularity, have given voice to the desire for peace prevailing among the nations; and within the last few days we have all read the speech of the Pope to the Consistory—a speech manifestly inspired by a noble ideal. We canot conceal the fact that the continuation of the war implies an immense danger for civilization, and that this danger increases with the prolongation and extension of the war. How could it possibly be otherwise in view of the wholesale destruction of all those factors on which civilization is built up, viz., human life, health, and wealth?

I will not dwell upon the economic consequences of the war. These consequences may all be reduced to a very simple formula: The disunited States of Europe are making room for the United States of America.

* * * No statesman in any of the countries at war with us can henceforth refuse to enter into peace negotiations under the pretext that the desire for peace could be interpreted as a sign of weakness. For today the spokesman of the German Empire has expressed his willingness to conclude an honorable peace.

We may consequently be permitted to entertain the hope—although the latter is as yet but vague and shadowy—that the hour of redemption for the belligerent nations is drawing near.

Should this hope be disappointed because our enemies do not want peace, because they still continue to proclaim that they intend to destroy Germany's military strength and to annex German territory, then will our enemies have to convince themselves that our cry for peace has not been dictated by concern regarding the outcome of the war. They will, in fact, find that our strength has increased.

Gentlemen, if it be possible at all to increase the courage and the tenacity of our soldiers, to whom we all owe so immense a debt of gratitude, and whose very meagre salaries will—as I hope—be considerably improved within the next few days by the Reichstag, as a small token of its gratitude, then will the increase of those qualities be due to the knowledge that all their further sufferings are to be attributed solely to the fault of our enemies.

I will only make one further remark, not to cause offense, but in order to prevent any misunderstandings. I would like to emphasize once more something that was already said by my friend Scheidemann. A short time ago it was said in the French Chamber that France has no intention of enriching herself at the expense of German territory, and that she only intends, as a matter of course, to take back Alsace-Lorraine. Gentlemen, I wish to declare that we cannot possibly admit a discussion of this question. One of the tasks of German home policy must be to destroy entirely all hopes of the possibility of a reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine. Whoever raises a knife to cut portions from the body of the German people will find—no matter where he may place it—a nation united in self-defense and that will strike the knife from his hand.

Wartime Humor in Italy

[From L'Asino, Rome]

Greece—A nation situated between Scylla and Charybdis.

Bulgaria—A colony of the German Empire by the grace of St. Mark and the will of King Ferdinand.

Cemetery—A place where the dead are buried, now called a trench.

Cavalry—A former section of the army, now abolished because of the new methods of war.

Diplomacy—An old woman who needs cannon to lean on when walking.

Newspaper—What is left of the news by the censor.

Scissors—A tool that cuts in order to unite public opinion.

Censor—A man who carves while holding his head in one sack and his sense in another.

Paris and German Zeppelins

By Stephane Pichon

Former French Minister of Foreign Affairs

[By Special Arrangement of CURRENT HISTORY with The London Chronicle.]

PARIS is the last city in the world upon which such deeds of barbarism as those committed by the German aeronauts are capable of creating an impression of fear or discouragement. The capital of France, celebrated for the sweetness and pleasantness of its mode of life, for the delights that it offers to its visitors and inhabitants, for the luxury and elegance, somewhat frivolous perhaps, for which it has a universal reputation, is just as renowned for its bravery and intrepidity in the hour of danger. Its history is full of memories, which Berlin might well envy it, were Berlin susceptible of any other ideal than that of the barracks and the beer saloon, and were any comparison possible between the savages on the banks of the Spree and the civilized folk to whom they are offering the furious and repulsive spectacle of their contortions.

Paris will suffer the sacrifice of its innocent lives; the old folk, women, and children who have been assassinated in its streets and swallowed up in the ruins of destroyed houses; it will bear grief for the dead and will be saddened by the spectacle of woe; but otherwise its life will not be disturbed; once it has paid its debt of recognition to the unfortunates who have succumbed, it will busy itself as best it can with repairing the wrong it has suffered, and it will continue to entertain toward its authors the sentiments that they deserve—horror at their crimes, contempt for their motives, an irrevocable determination to make them expiate to the full their unparalleled wrongs against humanity.

What sort of mind and soul can belong to such as think that by disemboweling a few victims by their bombs and reducing a few buildings to dust they are going to terrorize a country? Can there be folk so dull and stupid as to nurse such illusions? I do not know which to wonder at most—the moral monstrosity or the simple-wittedness of a people—for in this evil affair it is the whole German people that indorses the responsibility—that can dream of subjecting the world by deeds so infamous and yet so puerile.

Observe, too, that it is all the outcome of long and premeditated preparation; like the submarines that were definitely intended to send liners with their passengers and crews to the bottom, the Zeppelins have not been built in a day nor was their objective decided upon in a week. The plan that is now being carried out before our eyes was conceived long ago; long ago the means for carrying that plan were put on the stocks. Germany's warfare against England in particular was to be waged with submarines, submersibles, and dirigibles (of that I have irrefutable proofs in my personal possession;) and Admiral Tirpitz and his comrade, Count von Zeppelin, were consciously and professedly the organizers of this new form of destruction to be used against the United Kingdom.

As for us Frenchmen, it was understood that we were to be overwhelmed under the weight of Germany's land army, equipped with an artillery against which resistance would be impossible; it was equally arranged that our towns and villages should be blackmailed, looted, and razed to the ground; their inhabitants treated like noxious animals; it was understood that in no war, not even the Thirty Years' War, were human laws and conventions to be so completely set aside. Similarly, it was arranged that the war should be conducted against Great Britain by craft that could escape the sovereign might of her watching fleet; which would sink her merchant ships and torpedo her big

GENERAL PETAIN

The French Commander Who, Under Joffre, Bore the Brunt of the Defense of Verdun

(Photo © Underwood & Underwood)

GABRIEL HANOTAUX
Former Foreign Minister of France and a Member of the French Academy

fighting units, and thus isolate her coasts and cut off her supplies; and by dirigible airships that would bombard London and the Britsh ports, factories, and arsenals. Everything was prepared to that purpose.

It is not for me to tell my English friends what has happened to this campaign of submarines and submersibles. They have taken that affair in hand, and are themselves engaged in settling the account. On the "credit" side are certain abominable crimes that have revolted the whole world. But on the other is complete failure and loss. The whole business is now dead, sunk beneath the sea, just as are the craft and their assassin officers whose duty it was to put the entries in the ledger, but who have footed the bill in grim earnest.

As for the Zeppelins, the system was worked out to perfection. Enormous airships were built, and their equipment of bombs and explosives was as "colossal" as everything that emanates from the Teuton imagination. Mishaps, of course, there were, but the German inventors resolutely set themselves to profit thereby. They have just made one serious trial of their system; they will make others if they are able. But I have hopes that in their future attempts they will encounter greater obstacles.

After all, it is but the raging, helpless, and desperate form that the losers of the Marne, the Aisne, and the Yser are giving to the continuation of the war. Unable to shift our troops or pierce our lines, they are trying to intimidate us by the slaughter of our women and children and the bombardment of our towns by their heavy guns when they are within range, or by Zeppelin bombs. All waste of effort! The more they attack us in this mean and ignominious fashion of fighting, the harder will they make our hearts and the more inflexible our purpose. The more vengeful and desperate they reveal themselves, the greater will be the evidence they afford us of the certainty of our victory. Here, far below the Zeppelins, which we regard solely as the forerunners of their defeat, we kneel in profound respect before the corpses of our dead, whom we glorify and whom we will avenge.

Financing the European War

By Ugo Tombesi

Professor in the University of Urbino, Italy

Following is the substance of a valuable study of war finances which appeared in a recent issue of Nuova Antologia, the leading Italian review:

AT the beginning of the war France went through a veritable financial crisis. For the fiscal year 1913-14 the general budget reached the sum of 5,190,000,000 francs; but the increase of expenses, due especially to the growing demands of the Government, was so great as to conceal within it a decided step backward. Nor were the military budgets sufficient to maintain a foreign policy equal to the necessities of the moment. By the law of July 15, 1914, passed two weeks before the beginning of the conflict, the Minister of War was authorized to spend 389,000,000 francs in four years for new constructions and armament rendered necessary by the Barthou law for the three-year term of military service, (Aug. 7, 1913,) and the Minister of Marine was credited with 1,175,000,000 francs for the same period.

Moreover, the 3½ per cent. loan of 800,000,000 francs voted on July 7, and issued at 91, had not given good results; the Treasury was scarcely benefited by it. So that on July 31, 1914, France did not find herself in a financial condition to sustain a great war, and once the hurricane was let loose there was no other way than to have recourse to the Bank of France, which, with almost five billions of reserves in metal, was the granite base of the national finances.

In fact, the decree of Aug. 6, 1914, raised the circulation of notes of the Bank of France from six to twelve billions, and that of the Bank of Algeria from 300 to 400 millions, and withdrew from the two institutions the necessity of replacing their own notes with specie. Besides, the agreement decided on since November, 1911, was approved; by virtue of this the advance payments of the said banks to the Government reached 3,000,000,000 francs, of which 2,900,000,000 were to be furnished by the Bank of France and 100,000,000 by the Bank of Algeria.

Recourse was also made to the emission of "bons du Trésor," (Treasury notes,) which were extraordinary for a sum which reached—according to the decree of Dec. 26—2,500,000,000, and which bore interest varying from 1 per cent. to 5 per cent., according to the date of expiration. And by the decree of Sept. 13, 1914, "bons de la Défense Nationale" were created at 4 and 5 per cent. without limit, and expiring in three months to ten years. Through these two mediums the Treasury, reserving to itself a possible later right of "consolidation," drew from the national savings, beginning with October, about twelve billions, while from the Bank of France it got, in various payments, almost seven billions.

Now, if the French people responded with admirable promptness to the appeals of the Treasury, it cannot be affirmed that the Government had taken all the necessary precautions to keep up financial strength in the event of war; thus Minister Ribot noted, in the report he presented to Parliament in December, 1914, that "such unpreparedness was a new proof that France did not want war," agreeing perfectly with Lévy, who wrote for the most important review in Paris, the following February, that "French lack of foresight in this regard contrasted strangely with the conduct of the German Emperor, who, at the time of the Agadir incident, asked the financiers of Berlin whether they were ready for a war, and, on their replying in the negative, invited them to prepare themselves."

And the financial preparation of Germany followed her military preparation step by step. In 1913 the expenditure of 775,919,000 marks was anticipated in the ordinary part of the war budget of the empire, and in the navy budget, 197,396,300 marks. And, outside of the ordinary needs, the most recent military laws rendered necessary an unusual contribution of a billion, which the Government procured through a special inheritance tax. So that in the German budget the military expenses amounted in the fiscal year 1913-14 to almost 2,000,000,000 marks, (1,848,939,139.) And not that alone. For some time it had been decided to issue 120,000,000 in "Treasury notes" to raise the war treasure, preserved in the Tower of Spandau, from 129,000,000 to 240,000,000 marks, and to authorize the Reichsbank to issue, if the occasion arose, banknotes to the sum of 720,000,000 marks with the above-mentioned sum as a base—the money to be placed to the account of the military administration. Thus, with the supplementary reserve of 120,000,000 marks in metal, the resources ready for war were 840,000,000 marks. The man who conceived such provisioning was Professor Rieser of the University of Berlin, the head of the special bureau, unique in Europe, created for financial preparation for war.

But in the first days of mobilization Germany also had to have recourse to its principal issuing agent, the Reichsbank, to the extent that the credit of the Bank with the Government rose rapidly to 2,300,000,000 marks, as we may infer from the situation of the bank in October, 1914.

The other belligerents did not escape the necessity of making similar provisions. With the beginning of war operations, the British Government had to issue quickly, through the Bank of England, a paper currency of its own. With the act of Aug. 16, 1914, the Treasury put in circulation "currency notes" for 750,000,000 lire ($150,000,000) convertible into gold and at the same time "Treasury notes" for £91,000,000. However, following a praiseworthy tradition, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd George, after the first moment of uncertainty was passed, caused provisions to be voted by Parliament adequate to the gravity of the situation, and to be applied not alone to future expenses of the war, but also to systematizing the engagements that the Government had made from the beginning with the Bank of England, so as to leave the Bank free in its functions as "custodian of the mechanism of exchange and guardian of the country's wealth of gold."

Of Austria-Hungary very little is known, for the Austro-Hungarian Bank did not publish its situation after the first day of the war.

And Italy? She had come out of the Libyan war with a heavy debit against the Treasury, which, also through the military preparations during the first six months of neutrality, amounted on Dec. 31, 1914, to 2,000,000,000 lire, (1,948,659,-497.74,) and on June 30, 1915, had risen to 2,835,000,000. To diminish this debt there was issued a loan of a billion at 4½ per cent. during the first part of 1915, as we all know, the sale price at issue being 97; later on there was provided a prudent and gradual expansion of the monetary circulation, with temporary issues of notes and special current accounts, not to mention new issues of Treasury notes—ordinary and for five years.

When war on Austria-Hungary was declared the Treasury had the right to turn anew to the issuing institutions for 200,000,000 lire outside of the advance payments already granted, and also (temporary decree beginning Oct. 21) to provide for the fiscal year 1915-16 by an issue of Treasury notes for the sum of 300,000,000, for the payment of purchases and provisions needed by the administration of the army and navy.

Later the same Minister was authorized to issue special notes due in twelve months, to be marketed outside of Italy in foreign money, to pay foreign furnishers of goods, and thus lessen the disadvantages caused by disturbed exchange rates.

* * *

To diminish the issue of paper the greater powers appealed for internal credit. Germany, in the second half of September, 1914, that is to say, a month and a half after the outbreak of the conflict, launched her first war loan. And we should observe here that for a long time before the war everything was arranged in advance to the extent even that it was established that the individual States composing the empire were not to issue long-term obligations in case of war, but simply notes for short periods. Prussia, for example, issued Treasury notes for 1,500,000,000 marks, which were in large part discounted by the loan banks, and this was after having been paid the 600,000,000 of the loan issued in February, 1914, and though it could count, in case of need, on the reserve fund of the State railways; Württemberg, from April to July, 1915, issued Treasury notes for 50,000,000, the Grand Duchy of Hessen for 38,000,000, and Saxony for 200,000,000.

During the first months of the war the British Government issued, as we have seen, special Treasury notes; but in order not to immobilize bankers' capital in such investments Lloyd George confronted the financial problem in all its aspects and courageously outlined its solution. In the financial statement of Nov. 17, 1914, he calculated how the fiscal year April 1, 1914, to March 31, 1915, including eight months of war, had given a loss of £340,000,000; therefore, without much hesitation, he proposed to increase taxes by £15,500,000, to suspend the sinking fund of the public debt for £2,750,000, and to issue a great loan of £350,000,000.

The 3½ per cent. loan, issued at 95, is to be repaid at par, not earlier than May 1, 1925, and not later than March 1, 1928. Subscriptions of less than £100 were excluded; this was to avoid the withdrawal of small sums from savings banks and other institutions of credit. Recourse was not made, as in Germany, to loan banks; but the Bank of England declared itself ready for a period of three years to make advance payments on the titles issued up to the price of subscription as a limit, in other words, up to 95, and to the interest at 1 per cent. lower than the official discount charge. The loan was subscribed in just three days in the shape of immediately disposable sums, without disturbing the normal business of the Bank and the nation's economic condition.

" The expenses of the European war," affirmed the Minister of Finance of the German Empire at the Reichstag on Aug. 20, 1915, " reach about 300,000,000 marks a day, that is to say, 100,000,000,000 a year in round numbers. It is the greatest destruction, the greatest displacement of values, that the history of the world records." If, as the latest events lead us to think, the war should pass through its second year before the dawn of peace, the expense would reach 200,000,000,000, that is to say, more than double what was incurred through the twenty-five principal wars of the last century.

But the German Minister alluded only to the expenses of the mobilization and maintaining of the armies, for if we take into account also those which must be met for the restoration of armaments, of fortifications and ships, for the reconstruction of the bridges and railroads that have been destroyed, if we calculate the value of the lives lost and the capital corresponding to pensions for invalids and the families of the dead soldiers, the above-mentioned figures would attain heights never reached before.

" It does not seem at all exaggerated," notes Eggenschwyler, " to foresee a German and French budget double what it has been in latter years. Merely in subsidies to the families of the men under the colors France is spending 160,000,000 a month, (as against 68,000,000 in the Autumn,) and Germany more than double that amount. And the indemnities and subsidies to the families of the dead and wounded cannot be much less after fifteen or sixteen months of war, apart from matters pertaining to the indirect victims of the war. If, then, the war should be prolonged for another Winter (which is certain) it does not seem exaggerated to foresee for each of the future budgets 2,000,000,000 for the service of the debts contracted, two for aid and indemnities, 500,000,000 for the reconstruction of the fixed capital destroyed, and 500,000,000 loss of fiscal returns. Thus doubling the fiscal burdens of the Governments means evidently more than doubling the pressure of taxes, since the present destruction of peoples, riches, initiative, &c., cannot remain without influence on the material of taxation. It does not seem at all improbable that fiscal burdens will be increased 100 per cent."

The absorption of wealth will, then, be so great that even the richest States, those furnished with an abundance of gold, will with difficulty reconquer the position they had in July, 1914, and if any others thought to enrich themselves at the expense of the conquered peoples they would be indulging the maddest of illusions, either for the reason that all will come out of the struggle financially and economically exhausted, or because history teaches that the vanquished sometimes draw from their own energies greater results than the victors.

Three Great World Powers

H. G. Wells ventured the following prophecy in a recent article in Cassell's Magazine:

Whatever appearances of separate sovereignties are kept up after the war, the practical outcome of the struggle is quite likely to be this—that there will be only three great world powers left—the anti-German allies, the allied Central Europeans, the Pan-Americans. * * * And these new powers will be in certain respects unlike any existing European " States." None of the three powers will be small or homogeneous enough to serve dynastic ambitions, embody a national or racial kultur, or fall into the grip of any group of financial enterprises. They will be more comprehensive, less romantic, and more businesslike altogether.

How the War Will Be Viewed by History and Art

By Gabriel Hanotaux

Member of the French Academy and Former Cabinet Minister.

[Part of an Extraordinary Address Delivered at the Sorbonne.]

HISTORY, in exhibiting the deeds of the past, sanctions and judges them. Art, more remote from reality, has perhaps still more resources. Art holds on its knees and nourishes with its milk the dream, ceaselessly reborn, of future generations. * * *

Let me recall to you that magnificent page of Tolstoy, in which the whole problem of war—the religious scruple of war—rises before the human soul while the wounded hero is lying on the battlefield of Austerlitz and looking up at the sky: " But what has happened to me? I no longer have hold of myself. My legs give way under me!" He falls on his back. He re-opens his eyes in the hope of learning the result of the struggle, and whether the cannon were saved or captured. But he no longer sees anything except a deep, vast sky, in which gray clouds float dimly. " What calm! What peace!" he says to himself; " and it was not thus when I was running, when we were running and shouting; it was not thus when the two frightened figures were fighting for the ramrod—it was not thus that the clouds floated in the boundless sky. That limitless depth—why have I never noticed it before? How glad I am to have seen it at last! Yes, everything is empty, all is deception, except that! And God be praised for this rest, this calm!"

He is in the battle, he is suffering, and he finds in the heavens an unspeakable repose!

There comes an hour when the greatest events, the most violent, even the present war, like that of Thucydides and that of Tolstoy, fall into comparison with the infinite and measure themselves against the Eternal. The mission of history and art is to make a first attempt in that direction, a first adumbration of that judgment.

What will they say of the present war? Let us try to place ourselves, so to speak, in the far vista of the future.

They will say that Europe had been living for forty years in entire peace, and was enjoying once more that refined rest which Talleyrand called " the sweetness of living." A kind of international spirit was springing up out of the need of the nations for mutual respect. The most powerful of the Emperors, the Czar of Russia, had called together the nations at The Hague Conference; the most powerful of the Republics, the United States, was leading the choir of peace-loving peoples, and, though there were great injustices to repair throughout the world, the best and wisest were inclined to think that immanent justice would find its hour in a fraternal meeting of the soothed nations.

What a " Pastoral Symphony " beginning for the war tragedy!

Perhaps the rudest task of art and history will be that of making the world realize, by sounds at once delicate and deafening, by notes both soft and vibrant, this singular situation of nations living divided and hostile in peace.

Suddenly the storm breaks. One will has unchained it. In what lines will the Milton of the future characterize that figure and his infernal cohorts: " In a moment, through the darkness, appear 10,000 banners that rise in the air with their colors snapping in the wind. With these banners rises a vast forest of lances; and the thronged helmets and bucklers press forward in a dense line of immeasurable depth. * * *."

[The author completes the picture from " Paradise Lost," including Satan.]

I think the future, in studying the present war, will be especially astonished at the power of military masses. What are the armies of Xerxes and Darius, of the Hundred Years' War or the Thirty Years' War, when compared with that which divides the world into two parts, the more numerous of which, in spite of itself, is in a state of hostility? And how will the future characterize the emotion of that great anthill which rises and falls in ceaseless agitation on the flanks of the round earth, as if not an inch of that earth were to be left unmarked with blood? The masses collide and are thrown one upon another, tirelessly, interminably. The Marseillaise and the Wacht am Rhein strike each other in the clouds; an implacable fury animates men's hearts; on the earth and on the water are daring sallies and mad flights, alternate ebbs and floods as of sea tides; an immense massacre, not a bush without its corpse, not a furrow without its tomb. The cemeteries stretch away toward infinity with their white crosses, as if the skeletons themselves had knelt in prayer. Eight millions of dead weigh upon a single conscience. What Milton, what Victor Hugo, what Thucydides can tell the story of the incredible crime?

It is a war of masses, but it is also a war of machines. Here is a new stroke for the imagination—the smashing gesture of metal striking from afar the tender flesh of men. War is no longer the coming together of the courageous, body to body, eye to eye, breast to breast; it has become a sort of anonymous smashing of crowds who do not know each other by means of engines that fall on them. All the elements lend their powers to the arm of Death. Zeppelins, aeroplanes, Taubes, submarines, floating mines, torpedoes automatically steered—these new enemies of man crowd the air, the earth, and the sea. Automobiles and trains roar, carrying the masses from carnage to carnage; the word flies and carries the cruel orders over the slender wire; without wires, the telegraph still speaks.

Iron is not only sword, lance, rifle, cannon, shell, shrapnel bullets; it stretches itself, stiffens itself, bristles into points and barbs. It arrests heroism, and subjects the will of the bravest to its paltry snare. A great fear hovers over the waters and in the air. An implacable science has found at the bottom of its crucibles the most unforeseen and cowardly of exploits; the air is poisoned, and human breath—which is life—is hunted down by a murderous cloud; children going to school through the streets of Rheims wear the sad mask on their faces.

It is the war of metal and of fire, and it is the war of atrocities. We are carried back to the invasions of the barbarians. As to this fact, I wonder not only how history will recount it, but whether history will believe it. The state of soul of the future must be judged according to its way of interpreting this bleeding landscape. On this issue will depend the verdict as to whether man is inherently good or evil.

Let us trust the future. History and art will find terms to qualify the great lie and the great recoil. But a Dante or a Shakespeare will be needed to paint the disgust of the human race. For the blot is indelible. It is humanity itself that is Lady Macbeth if it does not wash this blood from its hands.

Some one has told me that when the chief of armies, von Kluck, arrived in one of the French towns nearest to Paris, believing himself assured then of victory, he took all the French people who had found refuge in the village where he was staying and ranged them along the staircase; then, holding a rifle in one hand and a revolver in the other, (I affirm that things happened just as I tell them,) he walked back and forth, cursing and swearing, he the glorious conqueror, with his helmet on his head, before these free citizens, who were also confident of victory on their side, and shouted in their faces: "Yes, yes, we've got you; your France is conquered, and your Paris will be destroyed! We will not leave one stone on top of another. Your monuments, your Arch of Triumph, your Notre Dame, your Louvre, your palaces, your houses, we will destroy all, burn all. There will be only the bare earth and the ravens left to raise their broods. We do not hate Paris, but we hate France, and we, the 'barbarians,' will show you that we are indeed barbarians." Those who heard and repeated this to me declared: "We have seen Attila!"

How will history tell it? How will art express it? In what prodigious foreshortening will they show the Cathedral of Rheims stretching its two towers up out of the flames like supplicating arms, the University of Louvain flaming like a funeral pyre, the belfry of Arras pointing its finger to heaven, the most beautiful churches ruined like the humblest homes, the earth honeycombed with the furrows of murder, populations carried away into slavery, destroyed methodically, scientifically; men and women thrown before the guns, children shot at the breast, all the drunken orgies, bestialities, and horrors heaped up together, and all by official order, with the deliberate idea that systematic terror is an instrument of victory and a means of domination? The counter-order itself proves the order. The soldier cannot believe himself so wicked, and he cries, while performing the crime commanded: "I am not a barbarian!"

We feel, we affirm that the most powerful and tragic accents of history will be of one accord in condemning without excuse what this war has revealed to us. The fiercest tones of the perpetrators will be drowned. And "the voice heard in Rama," and the lamentations of the Hebrew captives at Babylon, and the desperate cries of the Greeks confined in the quarries, and the griefs which all the martyrs of virtue, faith, and piety have inscribed in the great book of human suffering, these touching appeals to divine justice will be but a prelude compared to the clamor which all the sorrows of today will raise toward the Eternal.

Punishment equal to such crimes there is none. The arm of God would grow weary trying to administer it.

At least let history and art unite their thought and sharpen their sense of the true and just in order to recount these things as they were, and to draw from them the lesson—that material interests, gross enjoyments, violent ambitions are the evil counselors of the human race. These pretended experts are madmen; these pretended geniuses are lunatics; these pretended calculators count falsely. The peoples will know whither their leaders have led them. A terrible and constant vengeance will hover over the chiefs and their descendants forever. The blind populace will suffer for its blindness and turn upon itself in disgust.

On the other hand, the great figures, the noble figures of the future, those who will be extolled in sublime songs, are King Albert, who came to sit so nobly at the fireside of a friendly nation; the French soldier, who, like his chiefs, never despaired, clinging to the soil of his country until he had driven from it the hordes so strongly prepared and organized; Miss Edith Cavell, who would not betray those who had trusted themselves to her; the shipwrecked ones of the Lusitania and Ancona, swimming in the waves a moment to curse the murderers of neutrals, of peaceful travelers, of women and children; Cardinal Mercier, a man in the image of the Bishops of the fourth and fifth centuries, who held their own against invasions; those executed priests, those soiled daughters; to sum it all up in a word, these are the beauty of a world dishonored, disfigured, blasted.

For the great martyr is Humanity. They have forced it to lapse backward twenty centuries, until it doubts even itself. At the present moment it still drags itself under their spittle and under their whip, marching toward the Calvary whence it will be reborn to life only in the hour when the victory of the Just, the Right, and the Beautiful shall have purified it of so many crimes, assuring its luminous and definitive transfiguration!

Sir Edward Grey and His Problems

By Sydney Brooks

IN the world of diplomacy Sir Edward Grey is an outstanding figure, but he is a statesman about whom contemporary opinion can and does conspicuously err. The difficulty is not the man's personal character, but his relation to events. In the very interesting article by Sydney Brooks, published below by arrangement with THE NEW YORK TIMES, we have an Englishman's estimate which does full justice to Sir Edward Grey's honesty and straightforwardness, and does not ignore the absence of qualifications which most people would consider essential to a Foreign Secretary. It has often been remarked in England that Sir Edward Grey has had more wholehearted support from Conservatives than from Liberals. He certainly did not reverse or modify the policy of his predecessor, Lord Lansdowne, and Liberals have, therefore, accused him of making no attempt to apply Liberal ideas to the conduct of foreign relations. He has been blamed for permitting the British Foreign Office to become subservient to the designs of the Russian autocracy; and, as evidence of this, it is pointed out that in 1906, for the first time since 1854, the Russian Government was given access to the London money market and was thereby enabled to reduce to impotence parliamentary government in its first hopeful beginnings. Again, Sir Edward Grey has been accused of permitting Russia to strangle Persian democracy. His first acquaintance with foreign affairs was made as Under Secretary to Lord Rosebery, and, like Lord Rosebery, he belonged to the Liberal Imperialist group. Because of this experience, he was chosen for the position he now holds when Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman formed his Ministry at the end of 1905. From that time onward, despite Liberal protests, the discussion of foreign affairs in the House of Commons was silenced by Sir Edward Grey as much as possible. How much truth there is in the criticism that he was merely a puppet at the Foreign Office and that Great Britain's international policy was really the work of King Edward and a group of royal favorites, permanent officials, and financiers, can be discovered only by the light of facts which are not yet, nor likely for some time to be, available to the investigator. A considerable section of English opinion believes that a perfectly honest and well-intentioned statesman has been the unconscious instrument of a power greater than himself.—[Editor CURRENT HISTORY.]

SYDNEY BROOKS ANALYZES THE CHARACTER OF SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE FOLLOWING DISCERNING ARTICLE:

It is over ten years since Sir Edward Grey became the British Foreign Secretary. During the whole of that period he has been always a prominent and sometimes the outstanding figure of European diplomacy.

The years during which he has been charged with the conduct of British foreign policy have been years of almost incessant crisis and commotion. They have pretty thoroughly tested him, and, if for the moment we leave the last eighteen months out of account, the universal judgment of friend and foe would be that he has stood the test well. He entered Downing Street just when the Franco-German feud over Morocco was in its opening stages. The British Liberals, after a long exclusion from office, had returned to power in overwhelming force. There was much curiosity, there was no little anxiety, to see what course they would elect to steer. Like the American Democrats in 1912, they had a past to live down. There stood in their way, first, a reputation for factiousness and empiricism in their handling of domestic affairs, and, secondly, a reputation for flighty sentimentality and incompetence in the sphere of foreign policy.

Moreover, since they were last in office, two great changes had been effected in England's external relations. Great Britain had abandoned her old policy of isolation. She had formed an alliance with Japan. She had concluded a diplomatic agreement and had struck up a warm, popular friendship with France. She was being drawn—every one could see it—into the whirlpool of Continental politics. How would the Liberals regard these two developments? All their traditions were those of peace and of an abstinence from foreign adventures and commitments. They had no ambition whatever to make England cut an active figure abroad. They had every ambition to concentrate on the task of social and industrial reform at home.

It was a critical moment. But the crisis was resolved when, after some hesitation, Sir Edward Grey became Foreign Secretary. His acceptance of the post was an even greater relief to the nation than to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman himself. Abroad, among the friends of England, it had an instantaneous and reassuring effect. Among the enemies of England, or among those who stood to forfeit by a change in British policy, and who would have welcomed the presence in Downing Street of a Minister governed by the Gladstonian spirit, its effect was not less immediate, and, in a different way, not less complimentary. If Great Britain and her friends and allies felt that a danger had been avoided, other powers were no less conscious of an opportunity snatched away. Germany had prayed for an English Bryan. She found instead an English Root.

Sir Edward, with that straightforwardness which is the very essence of his nature, lost no time in showing his hand. He publicly on behalf of the new Government accepted all the engagements entered into by his predecessor. With equal promptitude he took a definite line on the Franco-German dispute over Morocco and unhesitatingly backed France for all he was worth. It was a course of action that on at least three separate occasions before the final rupture of 1914 involved the risk of war with Germany. But Sir Edward did not shrink from it. He held that Great Britain was bound to support the Third Republic with all the diplomatic, and, if necessary, all the material, power at her command; and after some tense moments the issue abundantly justified his prescience and pluck.

I mean by that that he succeeded in eliminating the Morocco question as a European casus belli, that he convinced France of the value and sincerity of British support, and that he proved to Germany that Great Britain could neither be bluffed nor bullied into betraying a friend. Until that point had been reached, until the Wilhelmstrasse thoroughly understood that France and England meant to stand together, and that Anglo-French friendship was a solid fact, there could be no approach to what Sir Edward always desired and always worked for—an Aglo-German understanding. We all know now how persistent were the efforts he made to this end and how Germany thwarted them all by insisting on the impossible condition that Great Britain should remain neutral in whatever war Germany chose to provoke. But I do believe that in 1913 Anglo-German relations had taken a definite turn for the better, that a friendlier atmosphere was being generated, and that the ultimate and inevitable collision might have been postponed for a few years, perhaps for a whole decade, longer but for that spark in the Balkans which fired the magazine.

Sir Edward Grey had dealt with, and one by one had removed, all the causes of an Anglo-German conflict that it was within his power to control. He always, I should say, foresaw the possibility of such a conflict. He would have been blind indeed if he had not. But he never sought it; he took every precaution against it; when it came it was thrust upon him, and upon the whole British people, by Germany's own deliberate action. Even today, when we have taken the full measure of Germany's schemes and preparations, no Englishman would blame Sir Edward for having striven his utmost to bring about an Anglo-German accommodation. They would be much more likely to blame him for not having realized earlier the futility of all such efforts, and for not having roused the country to the nature of the crisis that was maturing and to the necessity of getting ready for it.

As things have turned out, the war in some ways could not have come at a more opportune moment for England. It is even possible that at the bar of history, where there is more false swearing and where more misleading verdicts are returned than in any court on earth, Sir Edward may have difficulty in escaping from the charge of having precipitated it at the very hour when his diplomatic skill had placed England in an exceptionally strong position for meeting its onset. It will then assuredly be brought up against him that it was he who effected the Anglo-Russian understanding. So he did, and no finer achievement stands to his credit. Think what Anglo-Russian relations had been before Sir Edward Grey, eight or nine years ago, took them in hand. There had been neither sanity in them, nor consistency, nor stability, for over half a century. A seemingly incurable suspiciousness separated the two powers.

Many suggestions for their improvement had been made, but nothing had come of them. Lord Salisbury had informed his countrymen that to regard antagonism between England and Russia as something fundamental and inevitable was "the superstition of an antiquated diplomacy"; but nothing had been done to translate that utterance into terms of policy. Englishmen had gone on repeating that they backed the wrong horse in 1855 and 1878, but their statesmen had not drawn from the admission any practical conclusions. They had declared again and again that there was "room for both England and Russia in Asia," but they had not attempted to attach any specific meaning to the words. Anglo-Russian relations, in short, had been marked by a dangerous and drifting inconclusiveness.

Sir Edward Grey made up his mind to end a deadlock that did neither country any good. He saw that the extreme cordiality and intimacy of Anglo-French relations required as their natural and logical corollary the formation of an equally close friendship with the ally of France. He saw, too, that it was not a British interest, but its very reverse, that Russia should be unable to make her due weight felt in the European balance of power. He saw, also, that only if England and Russia came together would Japan and Russia really and sincerely accept the Peace of Portsmouth as the basis of their Far Eastern relations. And above all he saw that London and St. Petersburg were parted by an unhappy state of mind and obsolete prejudices rather than by any concrete antagonism of interests, and that questions might arise which would once again awaken their mutual and inveterate suspiciousness. Therefore, he sought an agreement with Russia.

He sat down and seriously examined and compared the respective interests of the two countries, and he did so in a spirit of conciliatory frankness that very soon bore fruit. The value of the understanding that he effected was abundantly proved when Persia lapsed into anarchy without disturbing, without even ruffling the surface of, Anglo-Russian relations. Its value was still more abundantly demonstrated when the outbreak of the war found England and Russia no longer at odds, but bound by a sober and tested friendship that ripened at once into a firm alliance. Sir Edward pursued an agreement with Russia for its own sake and on its own merits. It has brought him in a return he did not foresee. Does anything, I wonder, change faster than the face of international politics? Less than fifteen years ago England and France were scowling at one another from Newfoundland to Madagascar with every symptom of the most rancorous hatred. Less than eight years ago England and Russia had between them the barrier of their insensate past. Today all three countries are united in an alliance that will bear—I say it deliberately—any and every strain.

The hour, however, when Sir Edward stood highest in the well-nigh unanimous opinion of Europe was during and immediately after the Balkan wars of 1912. Four or five times at least Europe stood on the very brink of the struggle that has since broken out. The Serbian question, the Rumanian question, the Albanian question, and the Montenegrin question, each in turn proved crucially provocative. Yet the major peace was never once broken, and for its maintenance the chief credit was rightly awarded to Sir Edward. None of the diplomatists with whom he co-operated or against whom he fought showed himself so fertile in resource, so persistent in suggestion, and so persuasively calm and moderate in his choice of language as the British Foreign Secretary. He spoke but rarely, but whenever he did speak his words were direct, conciliatory, and stamped with the spirit and authority of a man who took above all else the European view.

Throughout those tangled months he took the lead in keeping the great powers together. It was he who suggested the Ambassadorial conference that proved for the time being the salvation of Europe. He was helped, of course, by the palpably disinterested position which Great Britain then occupied. But he made the fullest use of all his advantages. He worked early and late; his good sense and the implicit confidence he always inspired in his veracity and integrity straightened out many a hazardous situation; and I have heard from more than one Ambassador that his skill as President of the conferences which so materially helped to harmonize the differences between the great powers, the modesty of his bearing, and the practical character of the expedients he put forward, revealed him to his brother diplomats for the first time as a really great man. Certainly no British Foreign Secretary has held a more commanding position in the councils and the popular judgment of Europe since Palmerston's death than Grey held during the first six months of 1913.

In those terrible days that preceded the bursting of the flood that is now devastating Europe Sir Edward tried once more the tactics that had brought him success a little more than a year before. They failed. They failed for the very simple reason that Germany, or the ruling military clique in Germany, had decided that the hour had struck, and would, therefore, yield nothing and agree to nothing. The record shows with how sanguine a pertinacity Sir Edward strove for peace, trying one door after another, making one suggestion after another, even going so far as to intimate that he would withdraw his support from France and Russia if they declined to accept any reasonable solution which Germany herself might put forward. It was all in vain. The issue had been pre-determined in Potsdam.

But Sir Edward's efforts were not on that account wasted. They enlisted the absolute approval of the British Nation. They enabled him to repudiate with splendid scorn the unspeakable proposal that we should barter away the French Colonial Empire and the independence of Belgium in return for a German promise that after the war the European status quo would be restored. And they also gave him a double power when he had finally to draw the line beyond which he would not retreat. It seems an old story now, but let no one forget that what overwhelmingly rallied the British Nation was the appeal of the King of the Belgians to its pledged word.

Undoubtedly the impression exists, and undoubtedly appearances seem to justify it, that Sir Edward's subsequent diplomacy has been lass fortunate than were his opening moves. I do not know whether in such a matter it is always safe to judge merely by results. Not until we are informed as to all the intricate cross-currents of all the Balkan States and can tell with some precision how far they were affected by military events elsewhere, shall we be able to say whether Sir Edward misread a situation that should have been clear to him and let slip opportunities that he ought to have grasped. To disentangle from what unquestionably looks like the general failure of the allied dealings with the Balkans that portion of the responsibility which may properly be laid at the door of the British Foreign Secretary is a task for which I freely confess I have not the necessary knowledge or equipment or audacity. I can only envy those who possess today, or think they possess, all that is required for a final judgment on these excessively complicated transactions, the inner history of which may possibly be divulged to our great-grandchildren.

At the same time it is quite conceivable to one who knows him that Sir Edward should really have been less effective in seeking a desired end than in staving off an undesired one. It is a common criticism in England that "Grey is too much of a gentleman" for the rough and tumble of Balkan politics. He is certainly a gentleman and a very great one; but the notion that his diplomacy would have been more successful if he had imitated the quite unprincipled expediencies of the Wilhelmstrasse is a fallacy of the most sinister kind.

The trouble, I should say, is not to be sought in his habitually candid rectitude of conduct, but rather in a certain rigidity of mind and temperament. He is not a flexible man. He has no great powers of imagination or adaptability. That gift of dramatic sympathy which enables a man to comprehend the spirit and conditions of a country which is personally unknown to him is not among his attributes. Mr. Balfour has it; Lord Rosebery has it; but I do not think that Sir Edward can lay claim to it. And as it happens he is not a traveled man. He has hardly ever, in fact, been out of England. In other words he knows little of other countries and other peoples at first hand; and his nature and intellect are not of the kind to supplement the inevitable deficiencies of all second-hand reports.

Possibly if one were to describe Sir Edward as the most English Englishman in England it might help Americans to a clearer comprehension of the man. He has almost all the excellencies and some of the limitations that go with the title. To meet him is to feel yourself in the presence of an English gentleman of absolutely the finest type, one whose dignity is so natural that it never occurs to him to wonder whether he is dignified, one from whose lithe frame and Roman Emperorish features there radiates an instantaneous impression of entire cleanness and squareness of thought and life and conduct. It is inconceivable that he should ever do or contemplate anything mean or petty or underhand—one minute in his company disposes of the notion forever. He is one of the most transparently honest men I have ever come across. So much one sees at a glance, and the conviction is renewed whenever and wherever one encounters him. Along with it one is not less conscious of an atmosphere of quiet reserve, and, as it were, impersonal authority—that outer shell which most Englishmen of his class wear as naturally as they wear their coats and which in his case, as in many others, conceals a fund of warm and human jollity.

He looks the patrician, but he is not, if to be a patrician carries with it any suggestion of haughtiness or disdain or icy immobility. His face is in some ways his misfortune. No man could be quite so statesmanlike as Sir Edward Grey looks. That powerful forehead, the broad space between the eyes, the highly executive nose, the firmness of the lips and chin, do partially belie him. They convey an idea of greater strength and decisiveness than perhaps he really commands. He is a man of genuine modesty and self-continence whose aim is always to get through the day's work with the least amount of talk and fuss; and I am not sure that his utter incapacity for advertisement and his revulsion from anything that even looks like theatricality are not partly based on diffidence, on a consciousness that he is not really a great man, still less a brilliant one, and that there are several qualifications for his stupendous office with which he might well be more amply endowed.

The Crushing of Germany*

By Lord Rosebery

NO one can predict what will be the condition of things after this hateful war is concluded, but one at any rate is certain that there will be vast new avenues of trade opened, of which our people should be prepared by forethought and preparation long beforehand to take the fullest advantage. The trade of the Central Empires will, I suspect, be for many years to come so restricted as to be insignificant; but, on the other hand, there are enormous openings among our allies and within our own empire which we should most sedulously cultivate; and more than that, there are neutral States, of course, with whom we should always wish to be on the best possible terms and establish the best possible commercial relations.

At the rate at which we are spending money today, however the war may end, it will leave us gravely crippled, half paralyzed financially for long years to come, and our enemies, I hope, utterly ruined. For unless Prussian Germany is utterly ruined nothing has been gained by this war, and there is no hope for Christianity or true civilization for long generations to come.

The point I wish to urge upon you is this, that we shall be exhausted, we shall be victorious but almost bleeding to death, because at the rate of sixteen hundred millions a year of expenditure it is quite obvious that we must be saddled with a debt such as the world has never seen, and with taxation which I trust the world is not likely to see again.

Well, in those circumstances, can you expect any material help from the Government? I think that would be vain. And there are two points on which, I think, we should be prepared to disregard preconceived notions. One to which I alluded in Edinburgh last year is the question of tariffs, as to which we shall have to reconsider, I suspect, many of our previous formulas by which we cannot be hampered in the prosecution of a successful foreign trade. The other is this, as you are aware: The Foreign Office has always had the greatest antipathy to their Consul agents engaging in promoting commerce of particular firms in foreign countries. I think the laissez aller policy will have to be abandoned, and we shall have to sanction the interference of our Consular agents to promote our commerce in foreign countries.

There was a Minister the other day in melancholy chorus, like Poe's raven over the door, that seemed to intimate that all the Government had done had been too late. I do not by any means say that, but I think they entered the field of thrift rather late in the day, and I am not sure that when they did enter it they entered it in the right way. The first point for Parliament and the Government when it enjoins thrift is to set the example. Parliament, I understand, has cut off its supply of quill pens, and restricted itself in some minor articles of stationery. But if by that economy we are expected to counterbalance five or six millions a day we are a more sanguine nation than is generally supposed.

Well, then, they appointed the Retrenchment Committee. I cannot give the date of its appointment, but I know its first report, which was not a very considerable or impressive effort, appeared in the middle of September. After that we heard that it did not meet for two or three months owing to the occupations of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was Chairman of the committee, and who therefore could not preside. Well, that is rather too leisurely a method of proceeding for a Retrenchment Committee when we are spending six millions a day.

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*An address delivered before the Rotary Club, an organization of the leading men of Edinburgh, Scotland.

One other feature has to be introduced. The predominant partner—by which, of course, I mean Ireland—has deliberately shut itself out as a field of operations for the Retrenchment Committee, which is a little disheartening to that body, because it is notorious the best field for economy in the United Kingdom is Ireland, with its numerous boards and highly paid officials. There is the real field for economy, but from that the Retrenchment Committee is debarred, so, I suppose, it will have to scrape a few flints in poor old Scotland to make its savings here.

One other thing I wanted to say. I do insist upon this—that on the part of every individual among us some private economy, at any rate, may be promoted, and it is our duty, our bounden duty, to find out where any public economy may be promoted. There are all sorts of stories going about the enormous waste of our war expenditures. War expenditures must necessarily be wasteful, but there is a figure beyond which it need not go. I can allude to one point because there is a correspondence about it in Punch this week. I mean the purchase of horses. That was a scandal in the Boer war. It has, I believe, been a scandal in this—that horses that have been purchased for the full price of £50 or more have been obliged to be scrapped when they came to the regiment as lame, unsound, and useless. The horses would furnish a chapter not without admonition in the history of the war; and in other quarters we hear about other such wastage.

We have the right to expect that the utmost vigilance should be exercised with regard to this vast expenditure, and that the taxpayers, who do not grudge these heavy taxes so long as they know that they are usefully spent, should have a guarantee that they are indeed usefully spent.

But, after all, there is only one subject which is in all our minds, which blackens every day from morning to evening, which occupies all our thoughts in business or in pleasure, and that is the great war in which we are engaged. I do not think the present war aspect is particularly encouraging from what I may call the pins point of view, which is the pins fixed in the map which shows the advance or retreat of our troops. We see Germany in occupation of a great part of France, of Belgium, and of Russia, and there has been no real advance, no substantial advance, to repel them.

Our diplomacy has certainly not, judging by the fruits, been particularly successful. But I may say that diplomacy in this war and on most other occasions depends in the last resort on force, and where diplomacy may have been exercised successfully, perhaps when the Russians were advancing, it was not possible for it to make any great triumph when the Russians were retreating. However, the history of our diplomacy we shall never know till after the war, but I, for one, at any rate, have full confidence that all that could have been done was done by Sir Edward Grey, and if the results have not justified our expectations, at any rate he was not to blame.

Then, again, with regard to our armies, I think there is one thing we are apt to lose sight of, which is that no party to this war, with the exception of perhaps Austria, of which I do not know much—no party with regard to this war was prepared for a war of this size and ramifications except Prussia. Russia was not prepared, France was not prepared—I mean for a war of this scope—and certainly Great Britain was not prepared, because she never is prepared. It is not the fault of the Ministry; it is the fault of the nation. We will not prepare for exigencies of this kind, and, therefore, we must always begin with a great arrear to make up.

Just think what we were expected to do at the beginning of the war. We were expected to land 150,000 men in Flanders and keep the seas with our fleets; and now we have kept the seas with our fleets and we have raised millions of men employed in Mesopotamia, East Africa, and especially in France and the Balkans. Well, that was never expected. No one was prepared for a war of this kind, and so we have to make up the arrears of preparation when we are absolutely fighting for our lives.

But then, I think, there is another point which those who look at the pins on the map gloomily should remember. It is that we are too apt to look at our own deficiencies, and do not sufficiently regard the disabilities of our enemy.

I think it is quite clear from all reports of the varying numbers of the millions of men that she has lost, that Prussia must be approaching a stage nearly of exhaustion. What seems to me the central fact of the war is this. You will remember the old torture when a man was placed between two planks, and they were gradually drawn tighter until he was squeezed to death. That seems to me the approaching position of Germany. She has an impregnable wall of French and British on one flank, and on the other an approaching torrent of innumerable Russians. Between those planks she must, I think, at no long date be crushed, and whether we are doing as well in Mesopotamia or not, or whether we are doing as well at Saloniki as we might, is a matter of comparatively little moment in relation to the enormous importance of crushing Prussia at the centre.

We shall have, I dare say, many dark days yet to pass through, and whatever happens; however long the war may be, the year 1914 will mark the blackest in the whole history of mankind, perhaps. Yet we are certain by the mere endurance which has always marked our national enterprises, we are certain to win.

The Woman's Part

By BEATRICE BARRY.

So it has come at last, you say—the call?
I did not know,
Nor can I realize the truth, at all;
But when you go,
No hand but mine yon gleaming sword shall take
Down from its place,
That you may wield it well, for honor's sake,
A little space.

A little space, perhaps; yet it may be,
Since God is good,
That He will send my soldier back to me—
(Ah, that He would!)
But in the meanwhile, soldier-lover, see
How keen this blade!
Strike deep, lest Justice, Truth, and Liberty
Shall stand betrayed.

I am for peace—and fain, love, would I lie
In your dear arms,
Knowing myself, while happy moments fly,
Safe from all harms;
I am for peace—but when a tyrant hand
Shall lift to smite
And menace our belovéd native land
With evil might,

Then I can say farewell, and watch you go
To do your part,
Cheered by my Godspeed; for no tears shall flow,
(Lie still, my heart!)
And be our parting one of endless length,
Or briefer while—
Were it our last kiss—God would give me strength,
Dear Heart, to smile.

The Situation for the Allies

By Herbert H. Asquith

Prime Minister of Great Britain

In the course of his address at the opening of Parliament Feb. 15, 1916, Mr. Asquith presented this serious survey of the military and financial situation:

DURING the last three months I think the most outstanding feature of the general European situation has been the growingly intimate relations, co-ordination, and concentration of unity of directions and control among the allied powers. That change, or development as I should prefer to call it, applies to diplomacy just as much as it does to strategy. The distinguished Prime Minister of France, M. Briand, did us the honor to pay us a visit earlier in the year. He has since been to Rome, where he met, as might be expected, with a most cordial reception, and these two visits are to be followed, I hope at an early date, by a general conference of the allied powers in Paris, at which both the political and strategic aspects of the war will be reviewed.

Here at home the Government has thought the commencement of the new year a fitting occasion for taking a complete stock of our own resources in men, in munitions, in our industrial resources, and in our financial capacity, both actual and prospective. That survey has been undertaken by us with the object of our being able in the coming months to contribute our maximum effort to the common cause. In some ways our responsibilities here are more varied and more complex than any of our allies. In the first place, look at the position and functions of our navy. Over an area vast and almost immeasurable in extent we have to meet and keep in being against all possible sources and wastage the most powerful and at the same time the most diverse fleet, or combination of fleets, which has ever sailed on the ocean.

WORK OF THE NAVY

The work of the navy during this war has been to a very large extent silent, inconspicuous, and unobtrusive, and there have been few of the daring and spectacular adventures which light up the naval annals of the past. Our navy during that time has performed, is performing, and will continue to perform with unexampled efficiency and success our supreme and capital duties which the war cast upon it. In the first place the defense of our own shores against the possibility of invasion. Next the complete neutralization of the aggressive power of the hostile fleet which has never tried conclusions with us. Thirdly, the clearance of the high seas from the menace which in the early days of the war was of the most serious and formidable character to the free influx of necessary goods both for ourselves and for our allies. And lastly, the vigilant and continuous stoppage of enemy supplies and enemy trade, which is one of the most important factors in the final successful prosecution of the war. I think we may say without undue complaisancy or boasting that the navy in performing these functions under vastly altered and in many ways more trying conditions than have ever prevailed at any time in the past has shown itself worthy of the best traditions of a great service. This is a function which is almost peculiarly our own.

ARMY TEN TIMES LARGER

I come back to the army. In the actual theatres of war, where fighting is going on, without counting those who are for the time being in these islands for home defense, for reserves, for training, and for the necessary expansion in the future, in the fighting areas we have at this moment ten times our original expeditionary force. I am not including India or the garrisoning of Gibraltar or Malta or anything of that sort. I am speaking of the actual theatres of war, and I am speaking of troops sent from this coun-

SIR EDWARD GREY
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
(From a New Drawing by Arthur Garratt)

MISS WINIFRED HOLT
Founder of the "Lighthouse," New York, Now Working in France for Men Blinded in Battle
(Photo by Mishkin, New York)

try. That, Sir, has been done in the course of eighteen months. We started in this war as a naval and not a military power. We were content, with the common consent of our statesmen and of our experts, to provide, as we did provide, for a moderate-sized military force. The resources and patriotism of the country during those eighteen months have enabled us to multiply our forces by the unexampled figure I have named. I do not think there is a more remarkable achievement in the history of the world. I am not using language of boasting; I want the House to realize what are our own special responsibilities in this matter.

FINANCING THE ALLIES

In the face of this tremendous and unexampled drain on the manhood of the nation, we have not only to pay our own way—a serious matter in itself—but we have to take a leading part, from which we do not in the least shrink, and which we perform with the utmost alacrity and enthusiasm, in providing a certain part of the sinews of war for our Dominions and our allies. We cannot afford in the interests of the common cause to impoverish or to unduly curtail our own productive power. It is as much to their interest as it is to ours that we should see to that. Let me remind the House, when I speak of financing the Dominions and our allies, that it is not a question of supplying gold; it is a question of supplying the necessaries of war—food, munitions, coal, and other commodities and materials, and, what is equally important and equally essential in all our interests, the services of our shipping to convey all these things in the quantities, at the times, and to the places where they are most needed for our common purpose. That is a gigantic, and, as I have said, an unprecedented task.

I do not say it has always been perfectly performed. I have never pretended for a moment in the earlier or even the later stages of the war that there has been an absence of mistakes or miscalculations. There have been mistakes and miscalculations on the side of the enemy. Both of us have had to deal with a situation that no one could have foreseen. The best means of accomplishing this entirely new and, as I have said, unexampled task could only be arrived at by time and by experience. I do not say that the problem has yet been completely solved, but, at any rate, we have, during the last few months, taken long steps and even strides in the direction of its solution.

GIGANTIC NEW CREDITS

Lastly, speaking of these special responsibilities of ours, there is the question of finance. It will be my duty next week to ask the House to accord to the Government a new and, I am afraid, a very large vote of credit. That will be a more appropriate opportunity than this for giving at any rate a provisional forecast of the financial situation, but our outstanding liabilities on the first of January of this year had reached a figure quite without precedent in the financial history of this, or, I believe, of any other country, a figure so gigantic that when in the course of time those obligations come to be liquidated they will impose a sensible, and, indeed, a serious strain upon the resources of this country for a generation to come. But the war goes on. I think when I last asked the House, in November, to grant the Government a vote of credit I said that our daily liability for the cost of the war would probably amount to, although I hoped it would not exceed, £5,000,000. That forecast has been very nearly if not quite realized. I need not say that the expenditure shows no prospect whatever of being reduced. It is a figure which, if you multiply it by seven days per week or thirty days per month, and still more if you multiply by 365 days a year, staggers the imagination.

When we are trying to get a perspective, as we ought to do, in their true relative proportions of the various interdependent and related duties which the war casts upon us, this is one which must bulk at least as largely as any other. How is that burden if it is to go on—and it must go on, because we are not going to pause or flag in the prosecution of what we regard to be a supreme duty and responsibility—how is that burden to be met? As the House knows, I am no pessimist; I never have been since the beginning of the war, and if I ever had been I should not be one today. I have no more doubt in the triumph than I have in the justice and righteousness of our cause. But we must face these things seriously and get our people to face them.

STILL HEAVIER TAXATION

How is this burden going to be met? There are two ways, and two ways only, in which it can be met. The first is by large additions to taxation, and those I believe the House will find before they are many weeks older that my right honorable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will have the courage to propose. But no additions you can possibly make to the taxation of the country unless they were of a suicidal and Utopian kind could possibly fill this huge and ever-widening chasm. The only other way in which the gap can be bridged is by the maintenance of our credit, which is the most valuable asset not only of this country but of our allies. How is that credit to be maintained? We must keep up as far as our military and other requirements allow—for the two things must be balanced one against the other—we must keep up our productive activities and our export trade. Even more important—I am only repeating what has been said before, but I repeat it with the added emphasis of growing experience—we must cut down our unnecessary imports and our consumption of luxuries; we must try to reduce not only in our Government departments — although there, I agree, the necessity is all-important—but in every department, public and local, and in our private life we must reduce expenditure to its lowest possible limit.

CALLS FOR SACRIFICES

It is easy to preach these doctrines, but it is not so easy to practice them, but the first duty that is laid on the conscience of every patriotic citizen, for himself and for those whom he can influence, is to practice the most rigid economy and to cut down every form of superfluous expenditure to the narrowest limits. It is only in those ways, by submitting to the burden—and a very heavy burden it will be—of unprecedented taxation, by the curtailment of imports and of expenditure on non-necessary things, and by the maintenance at the highest possible level of our productive activity and of our export trade—it is only in those ways that we can possibly sustain the unexampled burden which has been cast on our shoulders. But we can sustain it. The strain will be great, but in my opinion not a greater strain than we can bear.

We can render no greater service to the cause of our allies, which is also our own cause, than by co-ordinating and proportioning our contributions of men, financial assistance, and actual endurance, and, if need be, even of privation, both as a community and as individuals. By the combination of all we shall, I believe, if we only persist, earn for ourselves and for history the judgment that in perhaps the greatest crisis to which, both as a nation and as individuals, we have ever been exposed, we have done what in us lay to maintain the liberties of Europe and to provide for the future of civilization.

Review of Military Events

By Lord Kitchener

British Secretary of State for War

At the opening of Parliament on Feb. 15 General Kitchener gave the following official review of what the Allies had done in the preceding months:

THE Austro-German attack on Russia, which was proceeding when I last addressed your lordships on the progress of the war, having been brought to a standstill in September, the German Staff at once commenced to organize a campaign against Serbia. The object of this was to extend their influence over the Balkans and to establish a railway connection between themselves and their ally, Turkey, on whom the presence of our forces in Gallipoli was having a decided effect, causing great deficiency in both men and munitions, the latter of which they looked to Germany to supply. The French and ourselves were at this time bringing considerable pressure to bear on the western front. The operations culminated in the battles at Loos, in Champagne, as well as about Arras. Our offensive in these areas inflicted very heavy losses on the Germans and resulted in the capture of important positions by the allied troops. The German counterattacks failed to recover the ground which the enemy had been compelled to yield.

IN THE BALKANS

Owing to this continuous offensive action on the western front, considerable German forces were withdrawn from the Russian frontier, where the pressure was sensibly relaxed, enabling Russia to obtain certain successes and to hold the enemy in check. In order, however, to carry out the German agreement with Bulgaria, under which King Ferdinand pledged his country to abandon her neutrality and to co-operate with the Central Powers in an onslaught on her neighbor, Serbia, the preconcerted movement against Serbia was proceeded with. In these operations the Austro-German forces which crossed the Danube on Oct. 7 took a minor part, by holding the defending Serbian forces south of Belgrade, while the Bulgarians attacked them on their flank.

To support Serbia, and to enable Greece to send troops to the assistance of her Allies under the convention which existed between the two Balkan States, the French and ourselves, on the invitation of the Greek Prime Minister, sent troops to Saloniki, and entered the field against the Bulgarians in South Macedonia. The inadequate harbor accommodation and the bad railway communications through Greece and Serbia hampered the advance of our troops very considerably, and it was not until Oct. 25 that a French force came into contact with the Bulgarians in the Strumnitza Valley. It was evident that the Serbian Army was not in a position to offer effective resistance to attack by superior forces in front and flank, and could not but be driven back upon Montenegro and Albania. The Austro-Germans and Bulgarians thus succeeded in securing the way for direct communication between the Central Powers and Constantinople, which was, no doubt, their principal objective in these operations. I may add, however, that under the auspices of the French, large numbers of the Serbian Army are being reorganized and reconstituted as a fighting force in the island of Corfu.

THE WESTERN FRONT

In France and Flanders, since the capture of Loos and the forward movement in Champagne, the allied lines have remained practically unchanged. Throughout the Winter the morale of the French Army has been maintained at the same high level which marked it at the inception of the war, and it may certainly be said that the fighting qualities of our neighboring ally were never greater or more highly developed than at present. Although the Indian Division has been withdrawn from France and Flanders for service elsewhere, our forces in that theatre have been materially increased by no less than eight divisions of the new army, and thus reinforced our troops, through the Winter months, have been constantly carrying out active operations which have given no rest or respite to the enemy in front of them.

The activities of the Italian Army were conspicuous in October and November during the advance on the Isonzo, nor have their efforts since been relaxed, although the positions occupied by the enemy are so strong as to bar for the present the development of the forward movement which the splendid courage of the Italian troops is sure eventually to push home. I had an opportunity last Autumn myself of seeing the indomitable resourcefulness of the Italian Army operating in a terrain presenting the greatest difficulty.

Notwithstanding the heavy blows and consequent losses which Russia suffered during the Summer of 1915, and which would probably have overwhelmed any less tenacious and courageous people, her army has been thoroughly reorganized and re-equipped, her armaments have increased, and the spirit which pervades her forces is as high as at the outset of the campaign. The active co-operation of the Russian people in the manufacture of munitions of war exhibits very clearly the reality of their patriotism, and their determination to carry this life-and-death struggle, whatever its length, to a victorious conclusion.

IN THE NEAR EAST

The Austro-Germans having cleared the path to Constantinople of all obstructions, the political situation in the Near East was thereby greatly affected. The Turkish Army, reinforced by German supplies, was able to organize a movement of troops either against Egypt or to strengthen their forces in Mesopotamia, and at the same time were able to bring a far more powerful artillery attack to bear on our positions in Gallipoli. It was therefore decided to withdraw our troops from the peninsula to reinforce Saloniki and Egypt. During the last week of December our positions at Anzac and Suvla were successfully evacuated with practically no loss. This military achievement has already been the subject of eulogy in both houses of Parliament, and was only surpassed by the later strategic withdrawal from Cape Helles. Although when on the spot I had formed the opinion that this withdrawal could be accomplished with less loss than had been originally anticipated, the method of its execution by the competent naval and military officers in charge exceeded my most sanguine expectation. The Franco-British forces operating in Macedonia were gradually concentrated in a strongly intrenched position surrounding the town of Saloniki. Its line of defense was completed and occupied before the end of the year, and, in order to emphasize the principle of unity among the Allies, the supreme command of the forces at Saloniki, both British and French, was placed in the hands of the French Commander in Chief, General Sarrail.

It will be remembered that during last Winter an abortive attempt on the Suez Canal was easily brushed aside by a small British force operating in that neighborhood. But as a more serious attempt has been threatened by the Turks to invade Egypt from the east adequate preparations have been made to defend the canal. The Turco-German influence with the religious chief of the Senussi, on the western flank of Egypt, has succeeded in inducing the Arabs of Cyrenaica and Tripoli to assume a hostile attitude toward us in Egypt. The first attempts made by the tribes have resulted in complete failure and disaster to them, and though the movement in the western desert still causes a certain feeling of unrest the admirable loyalty of the people of Egypt forms an effective barrier to any penetration by these raiders into the cultivated areas.

ON THE TIGRIS

In Mesopotamia our forces at the end of September, advancing up the River Tigris, defeated the Turks at Kut-el-Amara, and, pushing after various minor engagements, were at the beginning of

November in a position threatening the City of Bagdad. The Turkish forces thus driven back had, however, received considerable reinforcements, and at the action of Ctesiphon, on Nov. 22, showed themselves to be in such strength as to outnumber our expeditionary force. A retirement from our advanced position, therefore, became necessary, and this was carried out under General Townshend's direction as far as Kut-el-Amara, a strategical point which he decided to hold until the arrival of fresh troops which were being pushed up the river under the command of General Aylmer.

General Aylmer and his forces drove back small parties of Turkish troops, and reached a point twenty-three miles below Kut-el-Amara, where the Turks had intrenched themselves. The Turkish position was attacked on Jan. 27, but proved too strong to be forced, and General Aylmer, who has been joined by General Lake, is now awaiting further reinforcements before renewing his forward movement to effect a junction with General Townshend's forces. The behavior of the British and Indian troops in Mesopotamia has been one of the traditions of our army, and the operations which have been hampered by the worst possible weather will, it is hoped, before long reach a satisfactory stage. General Townshend has sufficient supplies at his disposal to maintain his force for a considerable period. The operations in Mesopotamia, which have hitherto been controlled from India, will now come under the direction of the War Office.

CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA

In East Africa several small engagements have enabled us to extend our positions, and the Union Government, after their victorious campaign in Southwest Africa, having offered troops for service in that country, General Smith-Dorrien was appointed to command the increased forces which it was proposed to employ there. Unhappily his health has prevented his retaining the command, which I am glad to say has been accepted by General Smuts, in whom we can have the utmost confidence in view of his varied military experience.

In Cameroon the combined operations undertaken by the French and British troops have brought that country entirely under the control of the Allies. In January Jaunde was occupied and the German garrisons were either captured or driven out of their colony. All resistance having now ceased and the enemy's levies having laid down their arms, the campaign in Cameroon may be regarded as virtually concluded. It is greatly to the credit of General Dobell and General Aymerich, commanding the French forces, and the troops under their command that this difficult country has been satisfactorily cleared of the enemy.

At the end of the year an important change occurred in the highest command of the British forces in the field. Sir John French, on whose shoulders had rested the heavy burden of seventeen months' ceaseless activity in the field, having relinquished, at his own request, his post in France, was invited to assume command of the forces employed in this country, and to co-ordinate duties of first-rate importance which require the direction of a central authority. The country will feel that by his invaluable services he has placed us all under an obligation, and will rejoice at the honor conferred by the King which makes him a member of this House. Sir Douglas Haig has been intrusted with the task of conducting the operations of the British troops in the western theatre of war, and his brilliant record and high soldierly reputation are sufficient warrant for the confidence in his success which his countrymen and our allies feel in him.

THE GROUP SYSTEM

I cannot omit to mention the important measure that has recently passed your Lordships' House enabling the country to call on the services of all single men of military age. We have now some experience of the working of the vountary group system, and we realize how seriously the numbers immediately obtainable are affected by exemptions. I would pay a tribute to the conscientious work of the advisory committees and tribunals which have been set up to deal with appeals, and I am not without hope that when these appeals have been decided the anticipated numbers of men will be obtained. Time alone will show what increase the results of appeal will give us, but I trust on a future occasion to be in a position to reassure your Lordships as to the chances of our obtaining the numbers required. I would, however, seize this opportunity of again urging on employers of labor that they should do their very best to release young men to service in the army and replace them with older men, with women, and with men who for physical reasons have been invalided out of the army

In the future as in the past we shall have our dangers, our difficulties, and our anxieties in this great struggle, throughout which the splendid state of our troops at the front and the calm determination of the people at home to support them to the utmost of their ability will enable us to look forward with complete confidence to a victorious issue which shall insure peace for this and many succeeding generations.

"Germany Hid a Stone in Her Bosom"

By S. D. Sazonoff

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs

IF Prussian militarism is destroyed, if that evil thing which has darkened all our lives for so many years is finally destroyed, as I most firmly believe it will be destroyed, then I think some measure of disarmament may be possible. It should be quite possible, for with England and Russia friends the rest of the world is safe. The peace of the world and the happiness of humanity are bound up with the friendship of England and Russia, and I believe this friendship will be eternal.

When the Germans, by the mouth of their Emperor and by the mouth of their Imperial Chancellor, in July, 1914, said Russia was crossing the frontier to attack them, they said what they knew was a lie. They wanted an excuse, and they deliberately lied. For more than forty years, years which kept the whole of Europe in a condition of feverish unrest, the Prussians have been preparing for this war. They have sat at our frontier with a stone in their bosom, as we say in one of our Russian proverbs. They have been waiting to throw that stone. Their one object in all these long years has been to strike Russia down, and they had not got honesty enough to say so. They must pretend they were attacked. Bah! They are not even good criminals!

How can any one like such a nation? Their arrogance—that insufferable arrogance of the German—has the world ever seen anything like it? It is an offense to all mankind. And they speak of culture! They dare to disdain Russia on the grounds of culture—Russia, who has given to the world two of the very greatest masters of literature—Pushkin and Dostoevsky!

We know that while England holds the sea Germany, who is the enemy of the human race, cannot win the war. I have said again and again in committees of the Duma, in the Imperial Council, and to my sovereign that England and Russia together can secure the peace of the whole world, and I am sure of it. It is my supreme political conviction that England's hold of the sea is the greatest fact of the war. We know that fact in Russia, and we are perfectly satisfied.

Ah! they have guilty consciences over there in Germany. They have burned cities, towns, and villages; they have destroyed houses and laid waste the land;

they have driven vast numbers of people into exile. Ah! how merciless they have been, how cruel, how brutal, how ferocious! And they do not want the same thing to happen to them. But as for the idea that we shall not enter their territory, that is for our Generals to decide. After a great victory it may be possible and it may be right for us to invade Germany. If so, we shall certainly do it. Do you suppose that after a great victory on their side they would hesitate to enter Moscow or Petrograd? They have announced that they are only fighting to destroy the Russian armies, but if they think we and our allies are fighting to destroy the German Nation then I do not mind saying they are wrong. How can you destroy a nation of 80,000,000 people?

Our purpose is to destroy once and for all the greatest danger which ever menaced the human race. We shall fight on and shall never cease fighting until that menace is destroyed, and we cannot rest with a victory which would permit that menace to lift its head again. Our victory must be absolute. We must be free to live without continual fear of war. Things must be so settled by this war that the nations will feel themselves safe, and until German militarism is destroyed to its roots no nation can feel itself safe. Let the German people know—I have not the least objection to this—that if they themselves like to destroy their militarism absolutely then the war will come to an end; but as for us, we shall never stop for one moment until we are satisfied that the curse of Prussianism is lifted from the human race.

England, France, and Russia are responsible now for the future of Europe, which means the future of civilization, the fate of the world. We can and we shall destroy Prussianism. It may take a long time. We are prepared for that; there will be no inconclusive peace, no peace with a risk attached to it. Prussianism, which is a deadly poison, must be flung clean out of the human body. We dare not leave it there to work once more for the destruction of nations.

Russia desires with her whole heart and soul the peace of the world. It was the Emperor of Russia who proposed disarmament in the hope of saving mankind from this very catastrophe, and it was Germany who deliberately frustrated that noble intention. Well, let us hope that after this war is over we may find ourselves nearer to that noble ideal of my sovereign. Russians do not want war. They are fighting now to end war, and with England and Russia victorious in this war the peace of the world will be assured. I have no firmer faith than that.

M. Sazonoff on Russia's Foreign Relations

An Official Survey

At the recent opening of the Duma the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs gave the following summary of the situation:

THE catastrophe which has overtaken the Serbian Army has placed Montenegro in a very difficult position, and has subjected the country to a very heavy trial. However, the position which has arisen in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula cannot, of course, under any circumstances, be permanent. The hard situation in which Serbia and Montenegro find themselves is temporary. The fate of these two kingdoms is closely knit with the fate of the Allies; their fate, therefore, and with it the whole Balkan question, will be decided at the end of the war in conformity with the victory of that righteous cause which the Allies are defending.

Naturally, while speaking of the Balkan kingdoms, I cannot refrain from touching on Greece. Whether Greece will preserve a benevolent or a non-benevolent neutrality, is another question; but in any case Greece will remain neutral; and it only remains to hope that nothing will induce her to break with the Allies.

As regards our relations with Rumania

—these relations are altogether satisfactory and maintain their hitherto friendly character. The trepidation which took possession of Rumanian public opinion, because of the unfriendly attitude of the Central Empires, which threatened Bucharest, has not quite ceased. The Central Empires, as heretofore, are making every possible effort to sway Rumania finally to their side. But Rumania has a very clear understanding of the true value of the Austro-Hungarian proposals and knows that she cannot in any case expect the realization of her national ideals from solidarity with the Teutonic bloc. Therefore, although the Austro-Germans continue to carry on the same agitation as before in Rumania, this agitation, so far as can be seen, is already producing less effect in the country.

In spite of all the efforts of our enemies to destroy our friendly relations with Sweden, these friendly relations continue to develop and to grow stronger. Our friendship with Sweden is based not only on mutual sympathy, but also on a true understanding of the community of our interests and profits. Yet it must not be forgotten that the same Chauvinist elements exist everywhere. Whatever may be said in Sweden with regard to Russia, I can state categorically that, should Sweden ever be compelled to defend herself against the attack of an enemy, that enemy will not be Russia. The excitement which has arisen in Sweden in connection with the measures which England has taken concerning contraband at sea, and the misunderstandings which have arisen on this basis will, we must hope, be dissipated. It must not be forgotten that, though England, in the given circumstances, is compelled to protect her vital interests, yet, at the same time, she is filled with the determination to do everything that is possible to comply with the interests of neutral powers.

The activities and interests of the Allies in the struggle which they are carrying on show themselves to be now, what they have been hitherto, bound together in solidarity. But in order to bring them into still closer harmony and to unite their activities, the Allies have established two councils at Paris—a military and a political council. Both councils have already produced a series of favorable results. Since every co-operation which may create a still closer approach among the Allies and increase their understanding of each other appears desirable, the realization of the project of a visit of representatives of our legislative body to England is the more desirable. The representatives of the Russian people will have the opportunity to convince themselves by ocular demonstration as to how much England has done for the common purpose, and to secure victory. How considerable are the sacrifices made hitherto by England may be seen, if need be, from the fact that England has, up to the present, lost 25,000 officers and 600,000 men.

The friendship between Russia and Japan continues to grow ever stronger and stronger, as well on the basis of community of commercial interests as on the ground of a complete absence of causes of political divergence of interest.

The solidarity of the operations of the Allies has been made manifest in the Far East, among other things, by the fact that the Allies united in friendly representations to the Chinese Government concerning the untimeliness of the establishment of a monarchical form of government. It may be remarked in passing that, although the Chinese Government did not inform any one of the impending change of system, Austria hastened to announce in Peking her recognition of the new order of things.

I shall not dwell at length on the efforts of Germany to bring about a separate peace. All these efforts were left by us unanswered, and this we shall continue to do. The thought of a separate peace is, in the actual situation of affairs, tantamount to the bankruptcy of the nation. That we should run into bankruptcy or consent to it is, of course, unthinkable. To the question, how long the war is likely to continue, I answer thus: A war protracted for many years, Germany cannot endure, and therefore it is a mistake to say that the war may last for several years yet. The war will probably come to an end this year—perhaps in November.

Recruiting in Canada

By Major General Sam Hughes

Canadian Minister of Militia and Defense

General Hughes, the military idol of Canada, recently told an interviewer of the remarkable activities of the Dominion under his direction:

ONE night there was a story of three aeroplanes coming across the United States border and heading straight for Ottawa. The scare that night was so great that all the lights in the House of Parliament were extinguished so that the airmen could not find the capital.

But our danger is not here. The menace to Canada and all the rest of the civilized world is on the battlefields in Europe and our real work throughout this Dominion is to prepare to do our full share of the work over there. And that work is to smash Prussia and restore human liberty.

So far, I think, Canada has done her share and will keep right on to the finish. We are recruiting at the rate of a thousand men a day. We have sent 125,000 men overseas already and have 125,000 more ready to send as fast as we can find ships to take them. That is the chief difficulty of our problem in Canada, getting the transportation for the men who are prepared and equipped to go. Of the 125,000 who have gone to England 60,000 are now in the trenches, and they are doing splendid work. There are no better troops than the Canadians in the war. Our losses so far have been approximately 10,000.

The entire Dominion is divided into ten militia districts. That is not a war measure, but a part of our old machinery for recruiting that has been in force for many years, and it has been adequate in the emergency of war. We had 75,000 men in our regular militia before the war, but the law prohibited the Government from sending that body of men, as such, out of the country, so we began the organization of the overseas expeditionary force, and the regular militiamen, for the most part, went from the stay-at-home troops over into the new forces, giving us an excellent nucleus for the fighting organization. This plan enabled us to equip and send across the Atlantic 33,000 men in six weeks after the war began. Since then we have sent nearly 100,000 more.

It has not been necessary to open new recruiting stations. The preliminary work of getting the men is carried on in each of the ten districts by the regimental or battalion organization of each province, and the response is so loyal and spontaneous that, as I have already told you, the new men are enlisting at the rate of a thousand a day for the entire Dominion. We have some difficulty in the problem of housing them till we can get them aboard ship. All the available armories are in use as barracks; we have been obliged to hire a good many buildings, and in some cases we are billeting the recruits in homes, which is an awkward thing to do. If we could only get the boats we could have a constant stream of well trained men going from Canada to where they would do the most good. Of course the bulk of them are infantry, but every arm of the service is represented in the Canada expedition.

[General Hughes shares the opinion of the rest of official Canada, as expressed by Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister, and by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the opposition leader, that the war is only in its early stages, that England has been obliged to devote the first two years of hostilities to getting ready.]

" This recruiting is going to continue until we have defeated Germany and crushed Prussia. There are in Canada 1,600,000 men of fighting age—that is, between 18 and 45—and they will all go if they are needed.

In factory towns, where manufacturing plants are running overtime and calling for help in the work of getting out war munitions, we do not expect to get as many men as we do in the rural districts or in nonmanufacturing communities. But there is nothing to complain about, and we cannot say that this or that element in the population is hanging back. The rich and the poor, the French and the English Canadians, and even the Indians, are all coming out to help Canada and the rest of civilization. Many of the employers of labor in the country are giving their men leave of absence, with pay, to serve in the overseas forces, and nearly every woman and child in the Dominion is doing something for the welfare of the men who are fighting or for the support of the families left at home.

What Canada is doing is rasing a trained democratic army. Both of the adjectives I have just used, trained and democratic, are of the utmost importance in understanding this situation. Our strength, up to a million and three-quarters of men, if necessary, will be in a volunteer army of citizens, every man trained in modern methods of warfare. And the lesson of all history is that the democratic army, after it gets its bearings, always defeats the standing army of professionals. One third of the army that won the battle of Waterloo was made up of farmers. We have farmers, fishermen, lumbermen, hunters, Indians, thousands of keen athletic young fellows from the cities and big student delegations from the universities—all the elements needed for the army that wins.

That is the sort of an army that Canada and every other country should always have potentially, war or no war. I certainly do not believe in any form of compulsory service, but I do believe in universal, voluntary training for all boys and young men by means of the cadet system in the schools. The youngsters should begin to get such training when they are 12 years old and keep it up till they are 18. I would advocate this if there were never to be another war. It would make good men out of the bad ones and better men out of the good ones.

[General Hughes's advocacy of the democratic army and the training of all the men of a nation for it is based on the knowledge of his own experiences and the traditions of his family. His great-great-grandfather, with two sons, was killed at Waterloo, and another son was wounded there. His own son and two of his brothers are officers in the Canadian army now in Europe, and his own life has been a blend of literary activities in times of peace and of fighting whenever England or Canada has had any little trouble to attend to. For example, he has been Lecturer in English Literature and History in Toronto Collegiate Institute and for twelve years he was proprietor and editor of a newspaper. On the other hand, he fought so well in South Africa that he attained high rank in the British Army, and he has had various military experiences in minor uprisings. Then, to keep the balance between the civil and military parts of his career, he has been a member of the Canadian Parliament since 1892. In 1911 he became Minister of Militia in Sir Robert Borden's Cabinet.]

British Merchant Marine Losses

According to W. S. Abell, Chief Surveyor to Lloyd's Register, London, who delivered a lecture on the subject before the Greenock Philosophical Society in February, out of 4,400 steamships entered in the war risks insurance associations, 172 had been lost by perils of war. The value of the ships lost was £6,250,000, and the value of cargo lost £7,250,000. The percentage of loss on the total value of 4,400 steamships came to about 4 per cent., and on the total value of cargoes one-half of 1 per cent. The greater proportion of these losses was, of course, inflicted by submarines.

Changes in the American Spirit

By Siegfried Dyck of Halle

While our readers will instantly note certain points where this keen-minded German writer goes astray in his analysis of American national psychology, the interest of his conclusions is undeniable. Incidentally the article is valuable as a revelation of German hopes regarding the coming Presidential campaign in the United States. It appeared originally in the Frankfurter Zeitung.—Editor CURRENT HISTORY.

WE should not identify the people of the great American Republic with the Government at Washington and hold them responsible in their entirety for the unfriendly attitude of the United States toward the Central Powers. The person who wishes to form a correct estimate of the conduct of the United States should not overlook the fact that the Government of a nation always is the representative of the strongest elements of power in the composition of the State. In looking for these elements of power we must recollect that a country developed from colonies, like the United States, in the nature of things presents a very different physiognomy from that of a national State. An effort has been made to reduce the position of Wilson, Lansing, and the American press to the following formula: "The hostile attitude of the American Government and of the American press is due to the influence of the speculators in war material." This formula is, however, only a half truth.

During the different periods of the development of the United States very distinct currents of thought have been in the ascendency, the majority of which still influence the policy of the nation. At the time of the British domination, when the necessity for independence arose in England's North American colonies, the urge toward liberty ruled the minds of the rising colonial race. And this urge, the ideals of which were based on a fanciful picture of the old Roman Republic as conceived by the fighters for freedom, received a fresh impulse from those immigrants from the Old World who, in order to escape political persecution, abandoned their homes and sought in the new and great Republic the freedom denied them by their fatherlands.

Germany, too, in the days when the spirit of Metternich suppressed every manifestation of freedom in the German States, and during the period of reaction following 1848, when the agitators for a united and greater Germany were thrown into prison and threatened with death, repulsed and made homeless many able men who then sought a new home in the land beyond the sea. Thus the spirit which founded the United States was preserved through generations and became deeply rooted, especially as the new immigrants belonged to an energetic element that soon made itself felt in the life of its new home.

The generation of the old settlers and of the earlier immigrants had not been driven from home because of the difficulty of obtaining sustenance. Even when they brought but little of this world's goods with them, they found a sparsely settled country in which their activity soon enabled them to earn their living, and which soon guaranteed them a comfortable existence, without compelling them to regard the accumulation of money as the main thing in life. In later years, as the development of transportation continued to land ever-increasing streams of human beings on the shores of the young colonial country, the descendants of these early seekers of liberty constituted an aristocracy of vested wealth and preserved the tradition of the ideals of freedom of their forefathers. They also clung to the picture of the enslavement of free souls that their ancestors had brought with them from their old homes. France had sent them men inspired with the spirit of the Revolution to aid in the great battle for independence. All they knew about Germany was that it sighed under the despotism of its Princes and officials and that German Princes—like the one from Hesse-Cassel—even sold their citizens to foreign lands for cannon fodder.

These ideas became fixed and were nourished and strengthened by some embittered men who made the alleged, or perhaps real, injustice they had suffered in Germany the basis for much generalization. This was the main reason why the sons of the patriotic Germans of the colonial aristocracy became Americans who occupied an attitude of suspicion and even of hostility toward the new Germany that was born in 1870. They did not know it and, influened by their prejudices, they did not take the trouble to become acquainted with it.

Already in the sixties, and to a still greater degree after 1870, a new stream of immigration completely changed the physiognomy of the people. Instead of the seekers of liberty, Europe, as a result of the material cheapening of transportation, sent to the United States many persons leading a precarious existence who, because of the economic conditions then prevailing, found no opportunity in their own fatherlands either to earn their bread or to improve their material standing. Now it was no longer the idealists, the individualists seeking freedom of action, who formed the majority of the immigrants, but it was a body of men, hardened by the struggle for their daily bread and determined to advance the interests of themselves and their children at any cost. The gold fever of the sixties and seventies contributed toward impressing this characteristic more strongly upon the stream of immigrants. The struggle for existence which these new and strange immigrants found forced upon them in the eastern part of the United States, already more thickly settled and equipped with vested property rights, ruled their every thought. Whoever lost in this struggle was irretrievably ruined. And so the lust for gain rose to the boiling point and was communicated to that part of the existing population which had not yet obtained economic security.

It was inevitable that from this condition there should develop and spread that overvaluation of material wealth which is embodied in the variety of Yankeedom to whom nothing is more sacred, or of greater value and weight, than money. Of course the members of the aristocracy descended from the early settlers, secure in the possession of comfortable fortunes, have not allowed themselves to be swallowed up entirely by this movement. They have understood how still to maintain a certain influence over the Government, which at one time they furnished with its best statesmen. It is self-evident, however, that such a transformation in the mind of the people could not fail to affect the Government, so that the latter, from a representative of liberal-minded individualism, has become, in the main, a representative of materialism and egoism, as personified in the trusts and great industrial corporations.

Both of these phases of development essentially affect the relations of the United States with Germany today. President Wilson depends principally upon the North Americans' acquisitiveness and upon the groups of big capitalists, but he is also supported, on what they consider idealistic grounds, by the members of the old aristocracy, who cannot rid themselves of the idea of an illiberal Germany, and who believe they are fighting for the old idea of individual liberty by taking a stand against her.

We must not underestimate the power of the prejudices of the colonial aristocracy, to which Wilson is attaching himself all the closer now that a new opposition has arisen that seriously endangers his candidacy for the Presidency. This new current of thought, which already had attained considerable strength before the war, was the result of a change in the economic position of the great mass of the people. The agglomeration of huge fortunes has put an entirely different face upon the industrial situation. Whereas formerly working for wages was almost always a mere transitory stage, and nearly everybody, even the poorest, had the possibility of attaining an independent existence and entering into the competition for the accumulation of wealth, nowadays it is only in the rarest cases that members of great social strata succeed in freeing themselves from their subjection to big capitalism. This has led to more definite divisions among the people and to a sharp contrast between the interests of workingmen, employes, and little business men, and those of big business.

Such a state of affairs, which has now prevailed for a couple of decades and which practically precludes success in a competitive struggle, has lowered the exaggerated estimate placed on material things in the former circles. When a person is no longer able to obtain riches himself he is likely to become more critical in valuing them. The workingmen, employes, and small business men are happy when they succeed in making their existence comparatively secure, and as they see that big capitalism ruthlessly exploits them and then throws them on the junk heap, being aided in the process by the lawmaking machinery, the interest of these classes in political life and other questions not so closely connected with business is awakened.

Under the influence of this current of thought the later generations of German immigrants have not lost touch with the old fatherland as did the immigrants of the first two epochs, the political refugees and the fortune hunters. They read German newspapers, have business relations with the old country, exchange letters with their relatives at home, are acquainted with Germany and feel themselves to be Germans, even in their new home. Therefore, in a great part of the broad masses of the people, (the younger German-Americans and the Irish,) together with the opposition to a Government controlled by big capitalists and anti-German sentiments, is to be found a warm sympathy for imperiled Germany.

This is the beginning of a fresh transformation in the soul of the American people and of an increase in the significance of the German spirit in the United States. Even in cases where this sympathy is not the result of the ties of blood or friendship, or of common opposition to England, self-interest will induce the greater part of the propertiless classes to become opponents of the Wilson policy. The uncertainty of employment due to the cessation of activity in a great number of industries depending upon German trade connections, the increased cost of living resulting from the stimulated exportation of meat and grain, the fact that by far the greater part of the enormous profits of the trade in munitions of war only goes to swell the wealth of the millionaires; all this, combined with the support of the financially powerful cotton interests and of the American textile industry that cannot get along without German dyestuffs, is working to create a strong opposition to the Wilson policy in the mass of the American people. Bryan, no doubt, recognized the change in sentiment and for that reason let Wilson drop.

Whether the new current of thought is strong enough to carry its point only time can tell. That it has already become a power is demonstrated by the deliberations in the House and the Senate, and the recent slight change of position on the part of Wilson. He is looking for solid support in the face of this new force. He believed he had found it in the group of war speculators surrounding Morgan and in the old anti-German colonial families who, besides the millionaires, still set the fashion, especially as the leading newspapers of the West, with few exceptions, unconditionally defended the financial interests of the war speculators, in the meantime draping themselves with the mantle of the old friends of freedom. But as the press cannot continue in permanent opposition to the great mass of its readers, it is hardly to be doubted that there will be a sudden change there, too, as soon as the movement becomes strong enough. Thus a new struggle for power has begun in America, the result of which is sure to be of great importance in connection with our relations with the United States after the war, even if it is not noted before the close of hostilities. Consequently, we have every reason to be interested in this development.

A Bugle Call to Duty

By Leonid Andreyev

Foremost Russian Dramatist

PEOPLE are asking one another these days: "Will this be the last war, or is the world condemned to experience again in the future the horrors of bloodshed and slaughter of millions?" The answer seems to be this: If people in the future will be as they were before the war, war with its horrors will visit them just as it has visited us. As the flood for the contemporaries of Noah was a severe punishment for their crimes and vices, so the present war is but a terrible retribution for the weakness and flabbiness of the past.

Who wanted the war? All the participants in it say: "We did not want it." But how could that which no one wanted happen? If we admit that a score or a hundred persons planned and sought the war, how can we admit that this score or hundred maniacs swept all humanity to the field of carnage? And this is precisely what happened. Nobody except the small group of maniacs wanted or wants the war, and nevertheless it is raging like a hurricane, carrying to death and destruction ever new portions of mankind.

And this could happen only because the intelligent will to live and create in the men of yesterday was weaker than the elemental desire in them to destroy and kill. No illness can develop in a body that is strong, overflowing with life. When people really will to live and create, they live and create. When they cease willing it, they die. A slight cold is sufficient to bring such weaklings to their graves, for this is what they seek. And the people of yesterday sought their own graves. Well, they found them. They sank low, they grew petty; from the temples and spacious halls they went to narrow cages. They preferred the artificial fires of the night life to the flame of creative genius. They could not dominate the fountains of life, and they have dimmed the glow of the human soul.

The ancients said: "Do whatever you do." While it may be useful for a sick person to attempt to discover the cause of his sickness, there is a still greater task before him—to prevail over the sickness. If we were weak yesterday and could not avert the war, let us be strong today and continue the struggle, as behooves one who is strong. Not with the sword but with the will we shall attain victory.

There are many, of course, not at the front, who complain against the fatigue of a prolonged war, who turn their faces away from the war news in the papers, who seek dissipation in normal entertainments. This is bad; it is the voice of weakness, the echo of the blind and deaf yesterday, when before the eyes of humanity the mad sacrifice to Moloch was being erected. And they, the men of yesterday, thought it a toy and dreamed of careers for their children. And where are their children now?

Weak in peace, we got the war. Strong in war, we shall win a firm peace, based on our power of will and not on accident and the wish of a Wilhelm. One must not say: "Let the war end, and then I will labor and create a brighter future." This is wrong. It is the voice of weakness and cowardice. It is the treacherous murmur of an illness, persuading the body not to struggle against death, for there is rest in death. No, we must be restless, we must be feverish, we must be strong now, at this very moment; we must continue to the end the work before us. Let us enter the triumphal arch of tomorrow as powerful masters, then the day will be clear and bright, and our will shall dominate it. To get there through the hole of a rickety peace means that tomorrow will dominate us, as the miserable and negligible yesterday did. It means that tomorrow we shall still remain the slaves of accident and faithlessness.

Those who turn away from the war,

expecting a bright future, err bitterly; they are weak, and there is no future for them. They have overlooked the coming of the war, so extensively prepared under their eyes; they will also overlook peace, whose approach the thundering mouths of the cannon are already announcing. Let us devote our minds, our wills, our passions, to the war and to victory. Wielding the destinies of war, we shall also wield those of peace. Taught by suffering, strong in its determination, humanity will create a real, permanent peace, and not a state of passivity, barbarously styled "armed peace," which the weak and condemned to death people of the gloomy Europe of yesterday accepted as normal.

Now the children are paying for the sins of their fathers. The children are made responsible for their weak, petty, wretched, thoughtless, spiritless fathers, who traded in cannon as in common merchandise, whose hands dug the graves for their children, and who trod the paths that led their sons there. Happily, not all of them will be killed. Many will remain alive and return home. It is necessary that these martyrs, who escape slaughter, should not experience at home a torture more bitter than death, the torture and shame of defeat. How would we justify ourselves? With what eyes would we face them? How would we counterbalance that feeling of profound and blind revenge, painful despair, characteristic of one who fought bravely and met his defeat because of faults committed not by him.

Let us be strong and upright. Let us give all the love we have, all the care and attention we possess, to our soldiers. Let us not allow the war to become our master, but let us dominate the war, bridle the evil elements let loose, subjugate their fury to the yoke of mind and will.

Then the daybreak of which the cocks are crowing already will be fair and bright, and the sun of a lasting peace in the human world will rise upon the land of the strong.

"It Will Take Europe at Least Fifty Years to Recover"

Guglielmo Ferrero, the Italian historian, said in an interview at Milan:

The relations between Italy and France since the beginning of the war have been cemented into a friendship that I believe will be permanent. These relations prior to the war were not good owing to the Triple Alliance treaty, which, though its context is still secret, I believe was broken by the Central Powers when they entered upon a war of aggression and conquest without consulting us, thus treating Italy as a vassal State.

To my mind there is no doubt that the Quadruple Entente will win. The only question is: To what extent will Germany and Austria drag down the rest of Europe in their fall? It will take Europe at least fifty years to recover.

The material loss is a small matter. The institutions of Europe, like a badly constructed building, are crumbling under the effects of the war. There will be after the war a terrible conflict of ideas. In this conflict our generation will be sacrificed.

France will come out of the war the greatest European nation, for she has astonished the world by the magnitude of her efforts against her powerful enemy, compared with which the efforts of the rest of the Quadruple Entente are insignificant.

Magazinists of the World on the War

Condensed From Leading Reviews

In the excerpts printed in this department of CURRENT HISTORY will be found examples of the current thought of all the warring countries, as represented by many of their leading writers and most influential periodicals.

Peace or Desperate War

By Maximilian Harden

In an extraordinary article in Die Zukunft Herr Harden says:

SIX months ago the Germans could be content with defense, holding and using what they had conquered, and saying to the enemy: "We will not budge until you compel us to repel you." Now it is too late. * * * Can we wait until the enemy has spied out every feature of our system of war economics, and until at last there creeps upon us the state of want which at present is mere lies? It cannot be denied that our third harvest would be more difficult than the second, that it would be difficult to make good our supplies—not indeed of men, but of important raw materials—and that our expenditure of money would increase immoderately. After three blockade years others would occupy the places in the chief markets from which it seemed impossible that German trade could be expelled. Dare we wait? The enemy's longing for delay gives us the answer. No.

[Herr Harden thinks Germany should address her enemies as follows:]

A limitation of armaments, adapted to the new graduations of power, is thinkable, for a nation which has got the indispensable breathing-space need not wear so much armor as if it still had to win this breathing-space against the swords of other armed nations. Conceivable also is a War Debts Association, which would be a firm support of the will for peace. Do you want to escape from the fog of lies into clear air, and to leave the crumbling pomps and vanities of palaces already undermined for the clean halls of honorable community in labor, which in a generation might wipe out a part of the damage done yesterday and today? You will find us not unreasonable. Are the survivors to feel that the war, in spite of all its horrors, has brought the white races of Europe forward, and so erected a permanent monument to the fallen, or are your people still to be swindled with the pretense that the strong and stubbornly efficient Germans must be so thrown down that they cannot rise up again in any near future? There is still time—a short time—for agreement.

We are not to be caught in pincers between a miserable peace and exhaustion by a long war—with the consolation that a long war will devastate the world, enemies as well as friends. We will not wait upon your pleasure. If there must be death, we will determine the hour. No neutral State could expect us to think of its advantage and its comfort rather than of the security of our life. If the dispute with the United States can be covered over with any respectable formula there need be no splitting of hairs; after a settlement the Anglo-American dispute about the right to export and about the making of cotton contraband would soon become hot.

But if Britain is yearning for proof that we cannot wound her in the heart with submarines and air craft, and if she will not discuss peace until this has been proved, the United States must reconcile itself to the conviction that no further hesitations will cripple our submarine war, and that no stars and no stripes will protect a ship in the war zone. * * * We are not tired and not afraid, and nineteen months have not paled our resolution. A worthy and moderate peace is welcome, but the enfeebling of Germany's power to strike—never!

It is a lie that Germany wants to wipe out her enemies, and that, if she cannot harvest the spoils tomorrow, she will the day after tomorrow arm for a new robber campaign. It is a lie that this Germany can be banished from Europe's future. She will never beg for peace. Gladly, however, will she greet the dawn which frees her from her terrible task, and permits the return to quiet creative work and the preparation of worthy and free common life.

Saving the Life of Poland

By Henryk Sienkiewicz

The famous Polish author of "Quo Vadis?" now living in Switzerland, is devoting all his time to relief work for his suffering compatriots. To an interviewer he said recently:

HAVE you any idea of the misery that has been inflicted on the Polish people by the operations of war? Has Europe any adequate conception of the state of affairs in the territory now occupied by the various armies? Woes upon woes have fallen upon Poland. The war swept like a destructive machine over the land; the whole country is devastated; the fields are neglected, having nobody to work in them; all the available cattle have been requisitioned by the passage of the three belligerent armies; food of all kinds is scarce and prices are high; worst of all, there is no milk for the Polish infants, who are dying off in thousands from sheer lack of nourishment of the proper kind; in blunt words, these little children are dying of starvation. Here indeed, is one of the most poignant if not the supreme tragedy of the whole war.

Actively as we are working to meet the necessities of the hour, it must not be supposed that we have forgotten the great cause of Polish independence. There is no doubt in our minds that this war will bring about, at last, after all these long years of suffering, the self-government of Poland. It is, indeed, one of the most urgent needs of Europe that the Poles should be allowed to develop on their own national lines under a Polish Government.

We number some twenty-five millions. We are the most typical Slavic race; we are the most Slavic of the Slav peoples. We have the most ancient civilization. Our university, founded by Casimir the Great in 1364, was the first of the Slav universities of Europe. For centuries we were the bulwark of civilization in the East. Our literature is grand; our history is glorious; our aspirations as a nation are noble and justified. There is much talk now of small nationalities. Much sympathy has been accorded to the Serbians, and rightly so.

But the natural right of the Poles to independence is the same, and on greater grounds, in view of the extent of their territory and the number of their inhabitants.

It is with very great regret that I and my friends have read the suggestion that the food which we collect for our own people really goes to the Germans. I can state definitely that there is no possibility of this happening. The name of the President of the Relief Committee for the Victims of War in Poland, my friend, M. Antoine Osuchowski, is in itself a sufficient guarantee that there is no misapplication of funds or material collected for the Poles. The President of our committee in Warsaw is Prince Lubomirski.

Just as relief is conveyed to the Belgians who have remained in their own country, so it is extended to Poles in the territory occupied by German armies. It is as unjust to describe our efforts as pro-German as it would be to apply this description to the relief of the Belgians in the occupied parts of Belgium. It is true that relief has been distributed in Vienna, Gratz, Innsbruck, and other Austrian towns, but exclusively to Polish refugees in those places. Many of our people fled from the zone of war to the towns of the interior, where their misery is also very acute. Shall we refuse to succor them because they happen to be in Austrian towns?

It is, above all, necessary to save the life of Poland and the self-existence of the Polish Nation. No one can foresee what the future will bring. Our sympathies will always be on the side of those who come forward in the name of freedom and of the rights which belong to every nation. But at present, so long as our committee is not dissolved, its main object is the saving of the national life of Poland. This is the cause of my having, as President of the committee, refused to engage with many correspondents in conversation on purely political subjects.

Poland's Future: Russian or German?

By Gregory Mason

Mr. Mason reviews the situation of the Poles in The Outlook, New York, for Feb. 2, tells of the irreconcilable factions into which they are themselves divided, and concludes:

IF Polish history means anything, it means that long-continued Polish independence is impossible. The big kingdom of Boleslaus fell apart because Poles could not live together amicably. * * * The real Polish question today is whether Poland is to exist under the protection of Russia or Germany; or, rather, the first question is whether Poland is to be reunited under one Government or whether it is to continue divided, and, if it is to be united, the question then arises, Under what auspices, Russian or German? For the two great powers that have quarreled over Poland in the past, like two wolves quarreling over a sheep, cannot both be separated from the future fortunes of Poland, and it is better for the sheep to be given entirely to one wolf (to continue a somewhat unpleasant metaphor) than to be torn between the two. The worst enemies of Poland are those impractical Poles who cry for the immediate, absolute independence of Poland, for this angers both Germany and Russia, and the sheep can throw off the grip of one wolf only with the help of the other, and alone can free itself from neither.

Between Russia and Germany, Russia is the natural guardian for Poland to select. With the views on this question of the distinguished Russian Pole above quoted probably most impartial observers will agree, with the exception of his denunciation of Russia's civilization as barbarous, a tirade in which some inherited racial animosities came to the surface. Despite the bitterness of the past, Poland is more indebted to Russia than to Germany, and the future of the Poles is more bound up with the future of their fellow-Slavs than with the future of the alien Teutons.

A buffer State Poland has been and a buffer State she will continue to be. But her lot will be happier if she is a Slav bulwark linked to Russia, used by Russia against Germanic onslaughts, but reinforced and protected by Russia, than if she is given a feeble independence and left to fear attacks both from east and west.

Moreover, Russia is the nation to whose greatest interest it is to reunite Poland, and there is a fair chance that if the Allies are victorious Poland will be reunited under Russian protection. But even now, with German armies holding Poland, there is little chance that Germany can keep what she now has, for she must use some of it as a quid pro quo for the freedom of the seas that only England can give her.

Need of a Lasting Peace

By Jules Clemenceau

Referring to the outburst of joy in Berlin at the time of the killing of many women and children in France and England by Zeppelins, M. Clemenceau said in his Paris journal, L'Homme Enchainé:

I AM not committing the wretched error of wishing to found the future on eternal hatred which could only prepare for a more or less risky renewal of extreme violence. In the ages that our children will not see there will be forgetfulness, for if the joy of memory is short lived the happiest gift of man in the tumult of life is probably the tranquilizing ease of amnesia. But we who are paying for incredible faults of character and ideas by holocausts such as the world had never before seen — we whose strength, which was not always sufficient, will be lessened precisely at the moment when the greatest effort of French reconstruction will be demanded of us—we should be betraying our dead, or glorious wounded, and our history if we allowed ourselves to drop from the grand effort we have made to win to the supreme cowardice of forgetfulness.

It will not be with us, as it was with the Germans in 1870, to raise the hue and cry after the stricken beast. We shall respect ourselves by respecting the conquered, even though they are irreparably dishonored by their unparalleled excesses and terrible atrocities. We could not, without being false to our own natures and without incurring the eternal reproaches of our descendants, basely betray the cause for which they have poured out their noble blood by recoiling before the duty of taking all necessary precautions in order that the establishment of a durable peace should at least be assured us.

Germany will not be suppressed tomorrow. She will wish to recuperate, and no one can blame her. Her resources in bold initiative and methodical oranization will not be less powerful than before. Not having been able to destroy us in war she will renew her attempt at peaceful absorption. The peace therefore must be ours and not hers—for ourselves, who have human law to preserve, in the establishment of a new Europe, and for her that can only be regenerated by returning under our auspices to the civilized condition that one day, I hope at any rate, she will be ashamed of having repudiated. Simple-minded politicians are apt to say that this war will be the last. I will not profess a folly that might perhaps have appealed to me at a time when I did not test my ideas by reference to facts. I would merely state that the coming peace will be the more solid and the better in so far as our victory is the more complete.

M. Milenko Vesnitch: Spokesman of Serbia

According to the Revue Hebdomadaire, M. Milenko Vesnitch, Serbia's Minister to France, said in the course of a recent oration at the Sorbonne:

HOW are we to explain the interest which France has always felt toward us unless by some spiritual force stronger than all political combinations. * * * That which separates us from the Germans and brings us close to each other is the fine feeling of human solidarity, of Christian compassion. There is no human wretchedness—no matter in what corner of the world—that has not found an echo in your noble hearts. You have had compassion for the victims of all atrocities, whether they were called Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian; you have fought for the liberties of all peoples. But no German has ever had a noble feeling for the sufferings of other nations! * * * There is not in the world a nation, small or great, which owes its liberty or its independence to Germany. And this cannot be otherwise; for, even under the standards of Bonaparte France fought for fraternity, for equality, for the liberty of all.

But Germany has never fought except from motives of egotism exclusively German. This is why there may be moments in history in which other peoples will fear Germany, but never an instant when any other nation will love her.

Economic Demobilization in Germany

By Dr. Jacob Riesser

As President of the Hansa-Bund Dr. Riesser speaks for the great German shipping interests and for many other influential business men. His article emphasizing the need of Government aid in the battle for trade after the war originally appeared in The Cologne Gazette.

THE most essential problems of economic demobilization must be established at once in the order of their organic relation and prepared for without a moment's delay. This is the more necessary because there is no doubt that in Great Britain and the Entente countries far-reaching and systematic provisions, particularly regarding the supplying of raw material and the obtaining of cargo room, for the period immediately following the restoration of peace, already have been worked out and partly put into effect.

Naturally the question of what measures are to be taken is by no means limited to these two problems. On the contrary, there are a great number of just as important matters which should be investigated and prepared for at once. Among these are the measures which will be necessary in those first days of peace to prevent the disturbing of the market for mortgages, securities and building loans, and the setting in of a shortage of dwellings, with an accompanying sudden rise in rents; to insure, as far as possible, the organization of the labor market in that initial period; to enable the German shipping companies immediately to advance the interests of German exporters; to support the German export trade through the development or extension of the existing war credit banks or through export credit banks and transportation insurance companies to be created especially for this purpose, and to support German exchange, certain action toward which happily has been taken already, at least so far as may be possible at that time in the face of the lack of German overseas exports.

Over many of these pertinent questions there will be hardly any serious differences of opinion. For instance, it will be almost universally admitted that the broad powers given to the Federal Council, (Bundesrat,) under Paragraph III. of the Law of August 4, 1914, regarding the authorizing of the Federal Council to take action in the economic field, will have to remain in force for some time after the end of the war; also that for a certain length of time the same course must be adopted in the matter of redeeming our banknotes in gold and in connection with a considerable number of necessary war laws, which, like those concerning the control of business and the court orders delaying the payment of debts, have been enacted for the purpose of preventing a financial crisis. Of course these laws will have to be appropriately altered and extended. Also a great many of the organizations and institutions created during the war will have to be continued in existence for some time, and there is no doubt that new organs and institutions will be necessary in order to facilitate the economic demobilization and to prevent economic crises.

There is not the slightest doubt that the matter of supplying raw material cannot be left to the tender mercies of the unregulated and feverish competition sure to set in from all sides as soon as peace is restored. At that time the stocks of raw material will be pretty well cleaned out, not only in Germany but in all the warring countries. Therefore, an exaggerated demand on the one hand and a mighty increase in production on the other is to be expected. As a consequence of this extraordinary rises in prices will be inevitable, especially as the sellers naturally will be slow at first in making offers.

Coincident with the scarcity of raw material will come a shortage of cargo room which will entail a very material rise in freight rates at sea. Therefore we shall have to deal with the decline in exchange, with fresh hindrances and higher prices in obtaining raw material, with lack of cargo room, and with an increase in freight rates. Consequently we are facing dangers that may grow to immense proportions unless timely and effective precautions are taken which aim to prevent a free-for-all competitive struggle, a struggle which, under the circumstances mentioned, might become particularly serious.

In the nature of things, in this case as well as that of all the other questions touched upon, it is impossible publicly to discuss here the details of the measures to be adopted, but it may be pointed out that purchasing syndicates, (trusts,) which at the same time would have the task of providing cargo room, should be organized. The combining of all these individual syndicates into a single great organization, which, as such, would have to make allowances for every point of view, probably would be desirable. The organization of purchasing syndicates as mentioned for the large industrial groups is hardly to be avoided, as the conditions are quite distinct in the different industries.

It is not to be supposed, however, that these arrangements could be put into operation without the co-operation of the State, particularly as Government compulsion will be indispensable in putting through many of the necessary measures and may be needed to bring individuals into the organization. But during this time immediately following the restoration of peace, to which period the whole arrangement must be limited, we must reverse the basic principle which prevails now, in time of war. While during the war the Government organizations, with the co-operation of industry, have laid down the rules to be followed, in time of peace the rule must be: industrial organization, with the co-operation of the State. All this should be planned, however, with a view to bringing about the disappearance of the tendency toward State socialism, which is here apparent, although in a diluted form, as soon as possible after the great difficulties of the transition period from war to peace shall have been overcome. The institution of such purchasing syndicates probably would avoid the necessity for putting into effect the proposal to prevent, in a limited degree at least, the flooding of the market with goods and raw material of all sorts in the first few years after the war by means of legislation and tariff measures, a proposal which, in view of the expected measures of reprisal, is perhaps not without drawbacks.

The question whether we should take steps to protect German ships or the ships of our allies from unfair competition by hostile States, or concerns, or companies working in their interests, during the first years of peace, and how soon such measures are to be adopted, is worthy of serious consideration. The conduct of England and her allies in this sphere of action makes it seem impossible for us to avoid taking a hand in the matter swiftly and in combination with our allies wherever possible. In connection with the above proposals, especially in the matter of purchasing syndicates, the possibility of their being put into effect in conjunction with our allies, particularly Austria-Hungary, will have to be weighed. This is a question that will be of importance to the raw material combine, perhaps already during the transition months and certainly in the period following.

Immediate action is necessary along all these lines, as every day spent in hesitation may be the one that will bring us to the rear in the worldwide competitive struggle that will follow the ending of the war.

Land for German Soldiers

By Ludwig Eschwege

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WHAT is the most important gain to us in this war? It is that millions of our countrymen have "found" their Fatherland, so to speak. In the course of a long peace, what with the numerous economic changes that have taken place, the name Germany had in many instances become nothing more than a geographical term. Today, aside from a few inconsequential fanatics, there is no one to deny that it is the Fatherland, and the Fatherland alone, which gives him his peaceful vocation and the enjoyment to be derived from such labor. Now, is this realization of national obligation only an exalted feeling resulting from the war, or may we expect it to last? This is a big question, the satisfactory answer to which may determine whether the terrible sacrifices of this war have not been made in vain.

In many circles the question has been raised as to what should be done when the millions of German soldiers return from the war on the conclusion of peace. There is no denying that the rapid transit service instituted from the larger cities with the use of electric motive power constitutes one of the chief agencies for the urban population to get into the country. But the greatest obstacle is the speculation in land which raises prices to abnormal proportions. Now, the coming peace period must see to it that there shall be a different situation from that which obtained among us in the seventies, when the returning heroes from the victorious war were rewarded by a stupendous rise in house rents. Adolf Wagner, the noted economist, is authority for the statement in his celebrated work on national economy that this abnormal rise in rentals worked more effectively in a certain political direction than all the speeches of Most and Bebel.

Let the seventies be a lesson to us! The native soil, which has contributed so liberally to the prosecution of the war, should not again be subjected to that which will enrich the few at the expense of the many who must live in rented quarters. We know today that the fundamental basis of national existence is the soil under our feet, and that this must be brought within the jurisdiction of a law and Government that will protect against misuse where it is a question of homes for the masses.

It remained for this world war to teach us that it is necessary to make ourselves independent of other countries in the matter of food stuffs. This can only be possible by increasing the small land holdings. If the lessons of this war are not to be forgotten we must be sure to continue the cultivation of every spot, as is now being done through stern necessity.

The general committee in Berlin for the securing of homesteads to returning soldiers has gone to work with a will and secured the co-operation of every city of consequence. The purpose is, then, to conduct such a campaign at home that every soldier will have his reward in some piece of land that he may call his own. When word went forth to the men in the trenches that such a movement was on foot it created a tremendous enthusiasm among them. Many of the former workers in factory and shop, who during the long months in the field have acquainted themselves with the benefit of living in the open, look longingly to the time when a free existence may be had in the home environment.

No matter how great the victory in the field against the enemy, this winning of homesteads on native soil will prove a conquest of such surpassing importance that the coming peace years will find in this national gain a new evidence of patriotic co-operation.

Political Lessons of the War

By Professor I. Hashagen

Professor Hashagen, a noted Bonn University scholar, analyzes the political causes of the war in the Illustrirte Zeitung of Leipsic in a long article of which this is the kernel:

THE political history of the war, the history of the regrouping of the interested parties during the war, may be summed up in the fact that while in the beginning the conflict stood between two powers on the one side and three on the other, it has now come to a contest between a Quadruple Alliance and a Quadruple Entente.

This superficial observation alone is enough to shed new light on the political history of the war, and to make clear many heretofore obscure points during the preceding seven years, when diplomacy concerned itself with the preservation of peace. At once we shall perceive some characteristic differences between the new coalitions. To start with, the Quadruple Alliance—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria—has been suffering less from internal difficulties than the Quadruple Entente. The relationship of Germany and Austria-Hungary has stood the test of time. The rapprochement toward Turkey took solid form, and while the latter country and Bulgaria shortly before had been enemies, the various questions at issue were settled to the satisfaction of both.

The history of the forming of the Quadruple Entente reads less pleasantly. Italy's treachery toward its former partners throws a shadow on the Entente transactions, for Italy is the only power in the world which in such manner has transferred its interests and allegiance from one political group to another. This is a phase of the newer political history which is without precedent and opens up vast speculations.

Italy aside, the inner political history of the Quadruple Entente becomes much more confusing than that of its opponent. It will not hold together because of direct need thereof. Its existence depends on an identical desire for conquest. Certainly, the Entente is much more widely apart as regards individual national interests, and, while Germany takes the lead in all that governs the attitude of the Quadruple Alliance, it has not shown the tyrannical sway that characterizes England's position in the Entente group. An illustration is furnished by France's attitude during the Morocco crisis in 1909, and that of Russia in the crisis of 1911.

Even before the war the Entente group was taking shape. As a matter of fact, today the Entente should be considered as composed of five parties with Japan a partner as early as 1902, when it formed its agreement with England. We may even say that neutral America plays a rôle here, for since the beginning of the present century friendship for England has influenced American world politics to a noticeable degree.

The history of the two groupings finds clarification through the war. The three great international crises during the seven preceding years were the Bosnian affair of 1908-09, the Morocco crisis of 1911, and the Balkan crisis in 1912-13. Each of these came very close to causing an eruption in the international situation. Now we know that they were the political preludes to what was to follow in the Summer of 1914.

For more than a generation the Near

Eastern question has exercised a preponderating influence over the political issues of the world. It is now known for a fact that the great mischief of the Balkan question lies not with Constantinople, but with Belgrade, Kragujewatz, and Nish. It has remained for the world war to show to what a degree the Balkans have been a disturbing centre. The experience obtained in the period from 1908 to 1911 does not appear to have taught the Entente anything except that crude diplomatic methods, such as those practiced on the Central Powers, lead nowhere. New tactics were then employed. There followed what may be termed the veiled tactical defensive, the purpose of which was to appease the Central Powers in order later to give the Entente the chance to overpower us.

But the war has opened our eyes to the true situation. The great war, with all its misery and destruction, has proved a rich source of politico-historical wisdom.

M. Painlevé, Minister of War Inventions

By Charles Nordmann

A contributor to the Revue des Deux Mondes says of the new French Cabinet Minister in charge of the technical problems of the war:

A FEELING of lightness of heart, a joyful hope stirs the hearts of all the servants of French science, be they illustrious or lowly, when they remember that the new Ministry of Inventions Important for National Defense is intrusted to M. Paul Painlevé. * * *

It was at the beginning of August, 1914, that M. Painlevé, whose ardent proselytism had done so much for several years in technical matters touching the navy, aviation, and explosives, obtained from the War Ministry the decree instituting the Superior Commission of Inventions Touching the National Defense.

The idea that the war would soon be over was in part the cause of our slowness in beginning to supply the front with heavy artillery and munitions, and the prolonged neglect of our workshop and our technical services. "Let us not fall again," as M. Painlevé himself has said, "into the same mistake which has already cost us so dear. Already at the outbreak of the war we were told that it was too late to improvise. It is not enough today to deplore the delays caused by this systematic error in judgment. It is a question of not repeating it." * * *

The technical sections of the Ministry of Inventions are composed in all of thirty members. They number eight, whose titles will sufficiently indicate their varied activities: (1) Ballistics and armament; (2) mechanics; (3) physics, electricity, wireless telegraphy; (4) hygienics, medicine; (5) chemistry; (6) navy; (7) trench warfare; and (8) aeronautics.

Speaking of the researches in mathematical analysis of him who was, sixteen years ago, and still is, the youngest member of the Institute, our great Henri Poincaré has said: "When I saw M. Painlevé undertaking his series of works, I wanted to cry out to him: 'Stop! You are entering a road which ends before an impassable wall.' The path which our young colleague followed has indeed brought him to the wall which I foresaw; but, by an admirable and prodigious effort, he has succeeded in getting over it. He has achieved one of the finest triumphs of French science."

Today, a new wall, formed over there by the engines and breasts of the Boches, invites the assault of his ardent and comprehensive spirit. "This admirable soldier of truth," as M. Louis Barthou recently called him, will know how to find there a yet finer triumph for the science of France.

German Inventiveness in War Time

By Heinrich Goehring

Recent inventions due to Germany's isolation are thus described in Ueber Land und Meer:

THE tremendous war of the present has proved a mighty stimulus to the inventive spirit of Germany. The old saying that necessity is the mother of invention has found the most practical application in the Fatherland. It is especially the case in Germany owing to our isolation from world communication. Our entire economic life has been compelled to undergo a chance. Many Gordian knots, which in ordinary circumstances would have been unsolvable, in this hour of need have been cut in twain instantly. And the solution has been a manifold blessing.

Of particular value is an entire series of discoveries in the domain of coal consumption, especially anthracite, which Germany possesses in such quantities. In former days the various gases coming from the coke ovens have been permitted to escape through the chimneys. But now, not only is the vicinity of these establishments of a much purer atmosphere than before, but the by-products from coal, including tar oil, anilin, naphtalin, &c., are of the utmost usefulness. In the matter of the coke ovens we have even gone so far as to utilize the surplus heat, which formerly was wasted, by conducting it through pipes and using it in baths, as in the case of the public institution at Tuebingen.

The utilization of coal tars for dyestuff manufacture has for some time helped to make Germany's position in the world of chemistry unique. We know now how dependent other nations have been on our chemicals. But while our specialties have long acclaimed us leaders in the domain of tar product industrialism, the coming of the war brought along such new discoveries as we had not conceived possible.

In the matter of nutritive articles a recent addition of the utmost value is a feed for horses which consists of sugar, animal blood, and a coal tar derivative. Sugar, as a matter of fact, is playing an increasingly important rôle in our entire economics since the beginning of the war. In the production of alcohol and of yeast, for the conservation of meat products, in tanneries, sugar combined with certain of these coal tar by-products has become one of the great essentials.

An interesting medical discovery has been made by Dr. F. Hammer, who in the Munich Medical Weekly explains that by subjecting sawdust to a roasting process he has obtained an excellent antiseptic for healing wounds.

The extraordinary demand for benzine in the army caused laboratory investigators to expend their energies in finding suitable substitutes. In some instances the principle of the Diesel motor has been followed, and by the employment of new machines an enormous saving in fuel has been obtained. The utilization of offal has also yielded an excellent fuel substitute.

When it comes to replacing metals formerly considered indispensable for specific purposes, our inventors have been particularly happy in their substitutes. German electro-technical science has proved itself superior. Copper, tin, zinc, nickel, antimony, each of which metals has been used in great quantities since the war, may not be replaced fully by other products, but ingenuity has been able to find articles that could take the place even of some of these.

Iron and steel, so plentiful in Germany, are now widely used where formerly copper alloys were considered necessary. This discovery is expected to prove of far-reaching benefit even when peace prevails. Bronze, an alloy derived from copper, tin, and zinc, is now replaced by steel in the manufacture of armament and wherever the ammunition makers required copper alloys.

The substitution of pa [illegible] of has been one of [illegible] of [illegible] rubber might easily have become a serious question for our electrical industries, but, happily, that crisis has been passed successfully. At the head of the more recent experiments stands the noted chemist in Leipsic, Dr. Wilhelm Ostwald, whose theories regarding rubber substitutes have been found to be entirely practical. Dr. Ostwald declares that certain limes, rich in glycerine, and to which are added tar oil and bichromates, will produce a most excellent substitute for gum. Further experimentations are being carried on along that line.

Fireproof wood is another invention that has proved its worth during this abnormal war period. The wood is soaked in certain chemicals and even though exposed to 1,000 degrees of heat it is unaffected.

In substitutes for foodstuffs our chemists have perhaps shown their greatest solicitude and ingenuity. Chemical-synthetic discovery in the matter of substituting fats still has its limitation, and again it is sugar that is expected to play a leading part in finding something that shall reduce Germany's shortage of food articles to a minimum.

Wheat, rye, and potato flour are now being used in the textile industries where before grease was necessary. The soap industry, however, is now forbidden to use potato flour because substitutes have been found for making soaps. As for the textile works, here flour paste is used for smoothing the yarn during the weaving process, to stiffen the materials, and in other ways.

Talcum has become one of the most useful of all the soft minerals. This substance lends itself admirably to uses where flour had formerly been employed in polishing rice, beans, coffee. Talcum is used as a preventive against explosions in mines, where the pulverized mineral is mixed with the coal dust.

In the manufacture of optical instruments a wonderful advance is noted. Carl Zeiss of Jena, in collaboration with the chemist Otto Schott and Ernst Abbe, professor of physics, through the discovery of a new glass product, has brought the science of optics to a stage of unheard-of proportions. Dr. Donnath has invented a signal mirror which is invaluable to military aviators.

War Painting and War Photography

By W. Scheuermann

A novel phase of German war activity is described in an article which is here condensed from the Hamburger Nachrichten:

At the beginning of the war our Great General Staff organized the work of war painting almost simultaneously with that of the war news service. A number of well-known German painters were accepted for the service and distributed among the different army groups on the western front. There they have had an opportunity to become thoroughly familiar with the life of the soldiers and of the staffs, to study the landscapes and the districts, the positions and battlefields, and, so far as chance permitted, to observe decisive events at as close range as possible.

With a liberality not equaled by any of the enemy army authorities, our General Staff has allowed the war painters to move about at will in the military districts, to get as near to the front as possible and to enter the most advanced trenches whenever practicable.

Through the relief of some and the consequent addition of others, the number of German war painters on the western front has become considerable, and all with whom I have become acquainted have been able, by dint of hard work under conditions that were frequently difficult, to reap a rich harvest in drawings and sketches in colors. Little exhibitions that I have had a chance to see at the different army headquarters have surprised me by their variety and abundance of materials. Upon the whole, I have found the war painters whom I have met at the front filled with tireless industry and convinced of the necessity of availing themselves of every minute at their disposal to study subjects which are only to be seen during these great times. Later they can work up the material collected, either in their homes or during the longer pauses in hostilities, in the temporary studios constructed by the war painters in their quarters.

Besides the work of the real war painters, we must not overlook the documentary value for the future of the sketches made by the fighting members of the army, some gifted amateurs, some noted professional painters.

Where the work of the painter is not sufficient, the completion of the war records will be made possible by photography. It is self-evident that in no other war have as many pictures been taken as in this one. In this important field, too, the Great General Staff has kept everything in good working order from the beginning. A number of war photographers were distributed along the front, many of whom have been replaced by able members of the profession from home. Photographs are also taken by members of the aerial division, of the surveying sections and of other branches of the service designated for this work. Most of the war correspondents have carried cameras with them along the entire front and used them diligently. And, finally, many pictures are being taken in the camps and advanced positions. Many a man who never had thought about learning the art before has sent home for a little black box and gone out to try his luck.

Photography at the seat of war is subjected to a very wise censorship which prevents any harm being done, a danger much greater than many in their innocence suppose. But in spite of the necessary precaution, the limitation of photography is never carried out through bureaucratic orders, and many a warrior will, after his return home, be able to depict his experiences in a series of pictures that will be of the greatest value as a souvenir to him and his family.

In some of the men's shelters, with the shells falling all around them, regular dark rooms have been installed and a rushing business is being done in turning out picture postcards to send home. The necessary chemicals are obtained through the military postal service and, for the most part, there is no lack of time, darkness or—water.

Armor for Modern Soldiers

By Dr. Ing. Selter

The fact that a modernized form of armor is being used in the present war is thus commented upon by Dr. Selter in the Technische Rundschau, Berlin:

WHEN we read about the French soldiers being supplied with steel helmets and the use of masks provided with slits for the eyes; when we hear of breastplates held in position by a leathern strap around the neck, then may we well think ourselves back in the Middle Ages.

From time immemorial warriors employed bodily protections against enemy attacks. The earliest measures were by utilizing plants and fibres. Then came skins of animals; later, metal was used. History is responsible for the statement that in the year 710 B. C. Assyrian warriors used head and breastplates made from buffalo skins and studded with metal scales.

It is interesting to examine to what extent ingenuity has been at work in Germany and elsewhere during the last decade in regard to bodily armor. We must differentiate between armor that outwardly looks like ordinary garments or uniforms, armor that is carried over the clothing, and, finally, shields. The first kind is not of any considerable importance today, owing to the penetrative qualities of the modern rifle bullet. Still, in the discussion of the subject, it is worth considering. Asbestos has been used rather effectively in the manufacture of such an outfit, and experiments have shown that it is proof against revolver shots. A similar revolver-proof covering is that based on the invention of the Berlin tailor, Dove, who, at the close of the last century, produced something that at the time attracted universal attention in military circles.

The so-called Schaumann armor uniform is made of thin steel plates of an elastic nature, back of which is another plate, in the composition of which aluminium is employed, and which is not elastic. The purpose is to break the force of the bullet in the first instance. Another invention deals with a uniform made up of metal rings and points with a view to deflecting the bullet.

The most common means for bodily protection today is the breastplate. Some of these plates are intended merely to protect the heart or the lungs. The intention is to carry them in pockets under the military uniforms. It has been argued, however, with considerable justification, that in certain respects this intended protection may itself prove deadly to the soldier, since, if struck at an angle, it may add to the injury of the bearer.

The use of protective shields on rifles has been much discussed. On the whole, it is a question whether any real benefits accrue from any of these methods, as to a great extent they hinder the movements of the soldier on the offensive; but the present war will at least demonstrate to what a degree modern military operations can depend on agencies that come down to us from an epoch when entirely different conditions obtained in warfare.

German Birth Rate in War Time

A Russian View

In a general study of conditions in Germany during the war a writer in the Petrograd Vyestnik Evropy (the Herald of Europe) gives the following very interesting account of the effect of the war on the birth rate of Germany:

IF we do not count foreigners and defectives, there were in Germany on Jan. 1, 1915, including the army and fleet, 16,500,000 men and 17,000,000 women between the ages of 17 and 60. Not all of them belong to the producing classes. Among the number of those working for wages, and in service of every kind, including domestic service and the staffs of factories, and also those occupied in home industries, there were, between the ages of 17 and 60, 11,500,000 men, or 70 per cent. of the entire male population of those ages, and almost 5,000,000 women. The number of all those working for wages and in service is 13,435,000 men and 5,840,000 women, counting those below the age of 17 and above the age of 60.

The diversion to the army of an immense number of men naturally lowered the marriage rate. In Berlin in April, 1915, there were celebrated only 1,747 marriages, as against 2,996 in April, 1914. At the very beginning the war led to an extraordinary increase in the number of marriages. In August, 1914, 5,793 couples were married in Berlin, as against 1,309 couples in August of the preceding year. But the increase was for the most part only apparent: many of those going to the war found it expedient to contract official marriages with their "unofficial wives" in order to secure for the latter the allowance from the Treasury which, at the beginning of the war, was paid only to official wives; later the Council of the Empire published a series of decrees in accordance with which the allowances were paid not only to the "unofficial wives" themselves but also to the illegitimate children of the "unofficial wives," even in cases when they were the offspring of unofficial husbands who did not go to the war. Thereafter marriages decreased. In the last four months of 1914 5,835 couples were married in

Berlin, as against 8,265 in the same months of the preceding year.

The same thing happened throughout the whole empire. The excess of births over deaths in 1902 for the whole of Germany amounted to 12.7 per 1,000 inhabitants; the births amounted to 29.1 and the deaths to 16.4 per 1,000. Parallel with the decrease in the death rate in Germany during the last fifteen years, the birth rate has decreased even more rapidly. In Prussia, for example, in the years from 1901 to 1913 the death rate for each 1,000 population fell from 21.7 to 15.8, while the birth rate fell from 37.4 to 29. The excess of births over deaths thus fell from 15.7 to 13.2. Thus the growth of the population began to slacken even before the war.

Since the beginning of the war the diminution of the birth rate by two-thirds, as a consequence of the transfer to the army of two-thirds of the marriageable men, would in itself mean an absolute diminution of almost 1,000,000 of the population in two years. To this must be added another 1,500,000—those who during the two years were killed or died of their wounds, according to the average of the first half year. This would mean a diminution of the population of Germany during two years of war to an extent that would require the normal increase of five years to make good. But in the years following the war the birth rate will be diminished by at least one-sixth if we take into account the numbers of men killed and incapacitated. Russia, on the other hand, during these same seven years will increase by 20,000,000, and German scientists compute that within a generation 300,000,000 Russians will face 90,000,000 Germans. The difference then will be 210,000,000, instead of 110,000,000, as at present, and the fate of Germany will be decided.

Corking Up the Kiel Canal

By Rear Admiral Degouy

After a lucid exposition of the whole naval problem of the North Sea and the Baltic, Admiral Degouy develops in La Revue de Paris a striking plan, the first step of which is the bottling up of the German High Seas Fleet in the Kiel Canal:

A VERY interesting point: Several railway lines, four of which are important, and roads which require bridges, cross the Kiel Canal. We need not mention foot bridges and ferries for the ordinary roads. Now, as the German engineers themselves admit, the necessary engineering works, executed in a hurry and on ground far from solid, give only very insufficient grounds for security. Some of these works remain as they were before the broadening of the canal, (1912-14;) certain bridgeheads have subsided because of the removal of the lateral supports to which they owed their former stability. They admit in particular that the lack of stability of the Levensau Bridge constitutes a permanent menace to the navigation of the canal. In any case, and in a general way, the greater number of the railway and road bridges, being uncovered, could easily be destroyed by an aerial fleet. (These data are taken from the Russian Bourse Gazette, March 30, 1915.)

Nor is this all; even the banks of the canal are, for a certain distance, so loosely built, because of the character of the sandy, clayey soil, which is further very damp, that landslides take place, and that it is necessary to interrupt or slacken the circulation as well in the canal itself as on the railway bridges which cross it. The same insecurity exists in the region of the lakes and the wide marshes east of Rendsburg. Infiltrations undermine the banks, too hurriedly executed when the canal was widened. * * *

It is, therefore, not doubtful, and we have seen that this was the opinion of an eminent engineer a year ago, that a well-studied, well-combined attack of an aerial fleet on the German ship canal could produce the most interesting results. Not only would this waterway be obstructed for several days with wreckage of broken metal bridges and fallen piers; the canal itself could be destroyed at several points, and the disaster would be the greater because the lack of interior locks would not permit the localization of the effects, so far as the height of the water level is concerned. * * *

Especially regarding the basis of operations of the squadrons of aeroplanes which might attack the canal we must be reticent. However, an attentive examination of the coast of Schleswig will make sufficiently clear to my readers what I cannot tell them. How could one fail to see that a vigorous blow by the English fleet could bring into our power, whenever we wish, isolated points at which it would be easy, after having rendered them impregnable, to organize an immense aviation field with all its dependent services? The distance of this base from the central section of the canal should hardly exceed 100 to 110 kilometers, (62 to 68 miles.) This condition is perfectly realizable.

Japanese Menace to America

By George Bronson Rea

In a pamphlet entitled "Japan's Place in the Sun," compiled from authoritative Japanese sources, Mr. Rea sums up the argument thus:

"THE United States is a nation anxious for peace at any price; she is a woman's country, and women love peace," are the words of Kazan Kayahara, the Maximilian Harden of Japan, in a recent number of The Third Empire, his own magazine, translated and reprinted in The Far East of Oct. 16, 1915, the last issue of the paper to arrive in America.

Remembering the existence of the super-censorship imposed by the Japanese Foreign Office last September to prevent the publication of any article, comment, or news which may injure the relations of Japan with foreign nations; remembering the recent publication of a Japanese Bernhardi book in this country, which has called forth the unanimous condemnation of the leaders of Japanese thought as "the irresponsible utterances of a penny-a-liner, hack newspaper writer in Japan," let me close this series of articles with one more extract from The Far East of Oct. 24, 1914:

"'Tsugi-no Issen' ('The War to Come') is the title of a popular Japanese book published in Tokio early last Summer, since when several editions have been issued. The author's name is not given, but it is now generally known that he is a commander of the imperial navy with a reputation for literary work. The sale of the book was forbidden for some time by the Government authorities for reasons quite obvious, though it was later permitted to be published with revision here and there. The following preface tells of the object of the writer in presenting the Japanese with a book which is somewhat sensational:

"'Is a war between Japan and America inevitable? That is the great question for the world to solve in the first half of the twentieth century, and for Japan a question of the utmost significance. * * * I have witnessed the cruelty and misery of war with my own eyes, and again have read the far-reaching effects of war in the annals of past battles. I am not a whit behind others in the ardent desire for peace. But if the arrogance of the Americans toward the Japanese continues as in the near past, and if the deficiency of Japan's national defense is left as it is today, how can we expect the waves of the Pacific to remain calm and tranquil for many years to come?

"'Let us direct our attention to the sea only, and then no storm from Siberia is to be feared. Even if Japan remains in her island empire, what shall we do with the yearly increase of half a million of our population? Japan is now in a dilemma. Have you, my dear reader, an iron will and determination?'"

No comment is necessary on the above. This is the utterance of an official of the Japanese Navy, and the book was passed by the censors and permitted circulation.

Let us not forget that the German von Bernhardi derived his source of inspiration from the Japanese. Germany has drawn the sword to perform her mission in the world. Against whom is Japan sharpening the sword to enforce her concept of her divine mission?

A Monroe Doctrine for Europe

By Maurice Révai

Former Austro-Hungarian Deputy

The Revue de Hongroie, Budapest, publishes this anti-English plan as a portion of a book by Maurice Révai on the same subject:

THE only way to prevent another war such as the present is to rid Europe of the bacillus of the disease, to deprive the country which has caused almost all wars of the ability to interfere in the affairs of Europe. We have shown what an insuperable barrier there is between England and the peoples of the Continent from the political, social, and ethical viewpoints; that geographical situation, climatic factors, and historic traditions render change on this score absolutely impossible by preventing the English and the peoples of the Continent from having ideas in common on any subject whatsoever; that our interests differ totally from theirs, that our way of understanding life and our national aspirations are quite other than those of the English, and that, if the peoples of the Continent are capable of understanding and judging with equity the insular position of the English, the English are absolutely incapable of penetrating into the being of another people, of understanding and sympathizing with it.

Since a solidarity of interests between the English people and those of the Continent cannot be imagined, it is very necessary that the latter recognize among themselves at least their common interests in opposition to England, that the Continent is a world in itself in which England has no place, that England has unduly played a continental rôle until now, that England exercises an illegitimate influence on the destinies of Europe, that this unnatural situation ought to be brought to an end, and that it is necessary that England cease to be a continental power. In place of the old political system another ought to be substituted, and that will be the application to Europe of the Monroe Doctrine.

We desire to live at peace with England, and that is why we should apply in Europe the Monroe Doctrine and firmly declare, as do the Americans, that we wish to be "practically sovereigns on this continent." A Monroe Doctrine for Europe will start from the principle that England is an insular country outside this continent, that her conditions of existence are quite different, and that the possession of an immense colonial empire imposes on her tasks other than ours. England herself has recognized this truth, since she has always considered herself as not part of Europe, when it used to be a question of the European balance of power. She constantly kept apart from every grouping of the powers.

A Europeon Monroe Doctrine will solve the greatest problem of the world war. Europe will be delivered from England's maritime hegemony and will thus gain freedom of navigation for all peoples. The first consequence will be that England will have to evacuate those portions of the European continent which she now occupies, to abandon Malta, Cyprus, Gibraltar, the isles of Lemnos and Tenedos, which she has, according to her custom, "provisionally" occupied during the war. If the Central Empires succeed in liberating Egypt and with it the Suez Canal, then after the restitution of this country to its legitimate masters and the evacuation of the three naval bases above mentioned, the Mediterranean can be considered freed, and the freedom of the seas guaranteed in these parts to all peoples.

The Suez Canal is the Achilles heel of the British Empire of today. It is the gate by which England communicates with India, her finest colony. From the standpoint of the commercial independence of the Continent it is of great importance that this base of her naval power should be taken from England and placed under the suzerainty of a State capable of guaranteeing the neutrality of the canal and the free passage of the ships of all nations.

The conquest of the freedom of the seas is not specially a German scheme, but is in the interest of the whole of humanity. If we can hold her in check at Suez, England, for whom the canal is a vital interest, will no longer be able to close the Atlantic to us. The essential thing in this war is not to take territories more or less extensive, but to deliver the world from English tyranny. The Monroe Doctrine for Europe being in the interest of all the European States, it can become in the hands of the Central Empires not only a condition but also an instrument of peace. By its application England would not be represented at the congress or conference of powers desirous of peace. If the victorious group negotiates a separate peace with a State of the other group, the idea of a conference will naturally not be urged and in that case England will be negotiated with separately. But if a conference is decided on at which all the States interested would be represented, England ought none the less to be excluded in conformity with the new Monroe Doctrine, which does not permit England to take part in the discussion of political questions that concern only the continent. Besides, the participation of England at such a conference would compromise its success. A peace negotiated with the help of the diplomats and peace apostles of the United Kingdom would be a lame peace.

To exclude England will be the first blow at English pride. This is all the more necessary since the statement of Mr. Bonar Law, the British Colonial Secretary, that in consideration of the services rendered by the "Dominions" during the war, it had been decided to give them a voice when the question of making peace arose. The "Dominions" are the British colonies that have their own government. England thus wants Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa to decide the destinies of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, and the other European States. It is indeed kind of Mr. Bonar Law not to have invited to the conference the Malays, Zulus, Somalis, Kanakas, and Papuans, who do not enjoy self-government. To keep England out of the peace negotiations is to make certain of success, for her allies of today will recognize at the end of the war, if they have not so far become aware of it, that England is much more dangerous as a friend and ally than as an enemy.



GEORGE BAKHMETEFF
Russian Ambassador at Washington, Formerly Master of the Czar's Court at Petrograd
(Photo by Press Illustrating Co.)



MME. BAKHMETEFF
Wife of the Russian Ambassador, Formerly Miss Mary Beale of Washington
(Photo by Press Illustrating Co.)

Human Documents of the War Fronts

Behind the dry official reports of military events is a vast fund of emotional human interest. It is the aim of this department of CURRENT HISTORY to give each month the best available glimpses of this side of the war, as found in private letters, personal experiences, and thrilling episodes of courage, humor, or pathos.

How They Died for France

By a French Piou-Piou

Following is a French soldier's story of a terrible charge from which two battalions came back only eighty-six strong. Its moving and vivid qualities entitle it to rank with the best literature that has yet come from any battle front:

FOR nearly seventy hours the bombardment was raging. Shells of all calibres, showered by the French artillery, were falling like hail, causing the German trenches with their subterranean shelters, barbed wire netting, machine guns, and trench guns, to fly in the air with torn limbs and shapeless pieces of metal, concrete, and wood.

It was frightful. We ourselves, crouched in our holes, were literally stupefied by this terrible noise.

It was the prelude to the general attack. At 6 o'clock in the morning that day the rumor spread in the companies that it was for the afternoon.

The same night a profoundly tragic scene was witnessed in the shelter of the Colonel of our regiment. Here it is, as it was related to me by the secretary officer of the Colonel, who was present.

He had assembled around him the eight commanders of the companies which had to prepare for the assault, and, map in hand, explained the plan to them and told them what headquarters expected of them.

"The attack will take place in the form of a conversion movement to the left, toward A, of which the positions of B will be the pivot. Our rôle consists of taking B and holding on to it at all costs for the whole of the day. We must not reckon on any reinforcements. The regiment must draw and maintain there the main body of the German forces. On our tenacity depends the success of the attack. * * *"

He said these things with as much calm and simplicity as though he were making an ordinary, commonplace statement. The officers acquiesced. Prey now to a visible emotion, the Colonel concluded: "Gentlemen, this evening many of us will be no more; let us shake hands." What a clasping there was!

The assault was fixed for 2 o'clock. At 1:40 the eight companies were assembled ready for departure. The bombardment was more intense still, it seemed.

A thick cloud of smoke and dust covered the enemy line, a cloud which, brought down upon us by the wind, took us by the throat. The silent, nervous men, with beating hearts, were electrified with anguish and impatience.

At 1:50 the order runs from section to section: "Fix bayonets." Our Lieutenant is upright, sabre in hand, and consults from time to time his watch, which he is wearing on his left wrist.

1:54. A murmur, "Attention!" Two o'clock! The bombardment stops suddenly. An inappreciably brief instant of absolute silence.

Then a sound of bugles—the charge, "En avant!" With a single bound the men jump over the parapet and run with all their strength under the rain of bullets, in line as on the field of manoeuvres, the Colonel at the head with sword upraised.

There was a distance of about 150 meters to cover before reaching the German trenches. After going 100 meters, one lay down to regain breath; how long, I could not say; perhaps a second, perhaps five minutes.

The blood is afire, the mind intoxicated by the sound of the trumpet, the epic sound of French heroism, the sound of the Grenadiers of Austerlitz and of Friedland, of the veterans of Saint-Privat and Patay.

The men are ready to suffer everything. The great sacrifice is joyously agreed to. I have seen them plunge down to death, a smile on the lips.

The artillery has resumed its part in the concert. It lengthens its fire now and executes beyond B a barrier fire.

Relieved, the Lieutenant thunders: "Forward, with the bayonet!"

He goes down, shot in the throat. A Sergeant assumes command: "Follow me, boys, I am going to show you how to die!" He also falls. But the charge is continued.

The Germans fire no more, but when we arrive at twenty-five meters from their lines the sinister crackling of the machine guns begins. The élan is stopped by their squalls. The men fall, fifteen, twenty at a time. Already a bending makes itself felt. Some sections show a recoil.

The Colonel has given an order. Frantic, the bugles render the "Marseillaise," and the soldiers recover themselves; with a single voice they strike up the hymn. Wounded rise again, the chant extends, prevails, becomes the whole immense charge, covers the feelings of the dying, the cries of the mutilated, the noise of the cannon and the machine guns. It is the sublime Voice of France!

The regiments bound forward. In an irresistible rush we pass, sweeping the first line, then the second. The maddened Germans throw down their arms at once. B is taken.

Now organization is necessary, for the enemy is going to counterattack. In haste, iron wire is put up, loopholes are pierced in the sides of walls still upright, for the village is nothing more than ruins; machine guns placed in position—in half an hour all is ready. Only just in time.

In close formation the Germans advance. Our fire mows them down pitilessly. With remarkable stoicism, it must be acknowledged, they continue to advance, striding over their dead.

The "75s," warned by signal, fire into a heap of their shells, and the hurricane disperses them.

Four times they come back, increased tenfold in number, four times we have to resort to the bayonet to free ourselves, and four times they are repulsed.

But at 5:30 it is necessary to begin to retreat. * * *

We fought for every by-street, every stone. Hand-to-hand fighting was compulsory. Killing went on relentlessly.

At 7 o'clock the Germans had retaken B. Night had now quite fallen. Then, considering his mission accomplished, the Colonel gave the order to retreat. He had to be brought away by force, for he wished to be killed there. Out of the two battalions only eighty-six men and one officer remained.

By crawling, we managed to reach our original trenches once more, the enemy not daring to pursue us.

As our old first line was held by the third battalion, we were able to go down to rest immediately. In the communication trench, when passing his shelter, we saw the Colonel, sunk down on a stone, his head in his hands and his shoulders shaken by heavy sobbing.

"My soldiers, my poor children!" he was saying. Never, never, shall I forget my Colonel seated in the shade and crying for his regiment.

The next day, in a barn at C, the eighty-six survivors were reunited, listening to the results of the offensive—the enemy routed, four kilometers of trenches carried, three army corps annihilated, 121 guns captured.

And they, the martyrs, forgetting the sufferings of yesterday, forgetting the dead and wounded, thinking only of immortal France, straightened up again more strongly when hearing the news of their victory.

Winging His Seventh Flier

By K. Richter

The following account by a German officer of an air battle on the western front, resulting in the defeat of an English flier by Lieutenant Bölcke, a noted German aviator, originally appeared in the Frankfurter Zeitung.

WE are visited by aviators every day, whether the sky is clear or overcast. Many times four or five Englishmen and Frenchmen hover over us at once. To be sure, these hostile acrobats of the air have become somewhat more cautious than they were last Summer. At that time they appeared above our trenches without ceremony, flew over our artillery and reserve positions and then, with devilish audacity and apparently scornful confidence, sailed back along the old road through the clouds in the midst of a hail of shrapnel.

Today they hardly come as far as our trenches—they very seldom get past them, except when they break through in squadrons—before they find themselves in the midst of clouds of inflammable shells hurled by our anti-air craft guns. The flier who fails to beat a hasty retreat must be prepared to meet the same fate as did our friend in an English biplane a week ago when his engine stopped just over our trenches and, amid the enthusiastic hand clapping and cheering of the audience, he had to make the prettiest glide of his life and land in the wrong army camp. And then what a volley of oaths and bullets came from the trenches in front of us. "Farewell, my dear, farewell!"

Recently, however, we had quite a different treat — recently, when Bölcke brought down his seventh within our lines. At first there was a period of intense suspense in our trenches as the spectacle suddenly began to be unfolded high above our heads—and then, after a few minutes, came a proud, rattling shout of joy.

For quite a long time an Englishman had been making circles before our eyes—calmly and deliberately. Our artillery shelled him soundly. He simply flew higher and continued to cut circles far above our heads almost unmolested, sometimes sailing to a great distance and sometimes coming directly over our trenches. He appeared to be on a very important errand. My men on duty clenched their fists in impotent wrath. "The dog ——." Shooting would do no good. And so it went for some time.

Then suddenly from the rear a harsh, deep, singing and buzzing cuts the air. Everybody hears it and searches for the source. It sounds like a German flier. But he is not yet visible. Only the buzz of an approaching motor is heard in the clouds in the direction of the Englishman. More than a hundred eyes scan the horizon. There! Far away and high among the clouds is a small, black, humming bird—a German battle aeroplane. Its course is laid directly for the hostile biplane and it flies like an arrow shot with a clear eye and steady hand. My men crawl out of the shelters. I adjust my field glasses. A lump rises in our throats as if we are awaiting something new and wonderful.

So far the other does not seem to have noticed or recognized the black flier that already is poised like a hawk directly above him. There is a moment of breathless expectancy—no, not one moment alone, as the one above feels so sure of his prey that he coolly sharpens his claws. We look for a catastrophe at any minute. How will he attack him up there, a mile high?

All at once there is a mighty swoop through the air, like the drop of a bird of prey, and in no time the black flier is immediately over the Englishman and the air is filled with the furious crackling of a machine gun, followed by the rapid ta-ta-ta of two or three more, all operated at the highest speed, just as during a charge. The Englishman drops a little, makes a circle, and tries to escape toward the rear. The other circles and attacks him in front, and again we hear the exciting ta-ta-ta! Now the Englishmen tries to slip from under his opponent, but the German makes a circle and the effort fails. Then the enemy describes a greater circle and attempts to rise above the German. The latter ascends in sharp half circles and again swoops down upon the biplane, driving it toward the German trenches.

Will the Englishman yield so soon? Scattered shouts of joy are already heard in our ranks. Suddenly he drops a hundred yards and more through the air and makes a skillful loop toward the rear. Our warrior of the air swoops after him, tackles him once more, and again we hear the wild, defiant rattle of the machine guns over our heads. Now they are quite close to our trenches. The French infantry and artillery begin firing, in a last desperate hope. Neither of them is touched. Sticking close above and behind him the German drives the Englishman along, some 600 yards over our heads, and then just above the housetops of St. A. Once more we hear a distant ta-ta-ta! a little slower and more scattered, and then, as they drop, both disappear from our view.

A great thrill of pure joy runs through our ranks. Who was he? Who was our man?

Scarcely five minutes pass before the telephone brings up this news: Lieutenant Bölcke has just brought down his seventh flier.

General Joffre at Close Range

By H. G. Cardozo

Special Correspondent of The London Daily Mail

I CHANCED to see General Joffre the other day as he stepped out of his motor car on his return from a long tour of the eastern front with President Poincaré, and was struck by his vigorous appearance, the firmness and elasticity of his stride, and his general look of robust good health. He was wearing the traditional undress uniform of a French General—black dolman, with black brandebourgs, red trousers, with a large black stripe on either leg, soft leather high boots, and a red képi with golden oak leaves. On his sleeve were three stars indicating his rank. Had he wished it a marshal's baton might have figured there, but General Joffre modestly prefers to wait till the end of the war for honors.

The Generalissimo is now in his sixty-sixth year, and far from seeming to feel the tremendous strain, both mental and physical, which he has undergone during the last eighteen months, and under which many other Generals, allied and enemy, have broken down, he has taken on more work. At the beginning of the war he was in command of the French armies in France and Belgium, and since the end of last year he has had to grapple with problems of Balkan strategy, as well as having been placed in supreme command of all the French armies in the field at home and abroad.

General Joffre probably owes his wonderful good health, which enables him to withstand the constant mental fatigue and responsibility of commanding some four and a half million men, to his frugal and temperate life and frequent exercise. Hardly a day passes without the Generalissimo going for a long tour of personal inspection of the trenches and front line positions, entailing the covering of many miles on foot. His stride is so steady and uniform that he nearly always tires out his staff officers before he is himself ready to re-enter his motor car and return to his headquarters.

General Joffre lives in a small villa in a quiet street in a country town. His orderly has instructions always to call the General at 5 o'clock in the morning, but he generally finds his master awake. Breakfast, coffee and roll, is quickly dismissed, and then General Joffre is ready for work. The early morning passes quickly in listening to and reading reports and signing the countless documents which have to pass through his hands.

At 11:30 he has luncheon, which is his principal meal, and to which he does ample justice. The French Commander in Chief drinks but little wine and never touches spirits in any shape or form. Neither does he smoke. The afternoon is generally devoted to a drive in a motor car and a long walk, and almost invariably General Joffre is back at his quarters for dinner at 6:45 and in his office hard at work again at 8:30. "Lights out" is at 11, and General Joffre then goes to bed.

I have spoken to many staff officers who have lived with the Generalissimo during these two Winter campaigns, and all of them have been struck with his wonderful rapidity at grasping essential details and dealing with the mass of work which awaits him every day. He is not at all the traditional Frenchman, as most Englishmen picture him. Tall and stout, but with the legs of an athlete, "le père Joffre," as he is known by his men, hardly ever makes a gesture and never raises his voice.

As one officer told me, he possesses a most wonderful control over his nerves, and in the gravest circumstances he has always shown the greatest calm. The night before the battle of the Marne, on which hung the destinies of France, an officer who arrived at headquarters with an urgent message found the Generalissimo fast asleep in his bed.

Another anecdote which I have been told about General Joffre shows that he has activity and staying power remarkable in a man of his age. He was making a tour of inspection of the front in Champagne some time after the offensive of last Autumn in the company of several staff officers and a distinguished neutral Military Attaché. At one point it was necessary to climb for four or five hundred yards up a steep hill to an observation post. Recent rains had washed the path away and mud and gravel made the foothold very difficult.

General Joffre, with a small ash stick in his right hand, set out at the head of the officers, most of whom were from twenty to fifteen years his junior. He set such a pace that it became something like a race for the top. The Generalissimo did not seem to notice that he was outdistancing the others, and when he reached the top he found he was alone, with the neutral attaché some sixty yards behind him, tired and out of breath.

Foraging at the Front

By a British Subaltern

A GOOD deal of time at the front is spent beyond the reach of the mess van, and it is then that the young officer must learn to look out for himself. I remember very well when we first arrived in France—"we" being Mulligan, myself, and a draft. We were quartered for the first ten days at a big base camp by the sea where there were no messing facilities for officers whatsoever. The men had their rations issued to them daily, so many biscuits, so much jam, cheese, and uncooked or tinned meat as the case might be, and we had our share given to us. We each had a claspknife, a cup, and a plate, and our first meals were distinctly "picnicky." The claspknife had to be used for everything, and so had the plate. After a day or two we got things more into shape and collected a small stock of extra utensils—cups, spoons, forks, and more plates.

We also discovered a small baker's shop in a village where we could buy bread, and a farmer with eggs and milk to sell. By the end of the week we could have given a dinner party. But then Mulligan was an exceptional forager. He had an eye like a hawk for little shops in villages where one would never have expected them, and a way with the French farmers which extracted from the good men things they might not otherwise have cared to part with. This happy knack of picking up anything that was going he carried with him from the base camp to the firing line. No matter how cold or wet the night or how desolate and dinnerless the prospect, if Mulligan was near there was always something to be had.

I shall never forget one night just after we had got up to Flanders from the Aisne. The division was feeling forward toward the Germans, who were known to be holding a line somewhere ahead and reputed to be coming down in fresh strength from Antwerp. Those were busy times, and neither sleep nor food had much place in them. My platoon had got pushed out ahead of the firing line and were holding a hedge some way in advance. As night was coming on I sent back for further instructions and received orders to intrench and stay where I was for the night. When I sent back the orderly with an acknowledgment of the message I told him to see if he could find Mulligan and ask him to send up something for me to eat. For some reason or another I had not drawn my rations when the men drew theirs and I was feeling very hungry.

The orderly came back later and slipped a paper package into my hands "with Mr. Mulligan's compliments," and also pulled from his overcoat pocket two bottles, saying "and Mr. Mulligan said there was some wine and coffee for you, Sir." I opened the package, which contained half a loaf of bread, a beautifully cooked piece of cold mutton, a scroll of salt, and a wedge of cheese. The wine was a good sample of the vin ordinaire of the country and the coffee was steaming hot. Imagine the joy of getting suddenly such a meal in such surroundings. The platoon Sergeant and myself set to on it with a will. I asked Mulligan afterward where he had got all the provisions from.

He said that he had got the mutton off a carter's wife, the bottle of wine from the farmer's cellar, (he used to carry about 1,200 francs in a belt around his waist, for which we had laughed at him heartily till our own smaller sums, which we had thought adequate to take with us, began to give out,) and saved the cheese from his day's rations.

The Flaming Fokker

By a French Marine Fusilier

As we were taking our coffee a violent explosion shook the air. I thought at first that a shell had fallen near us, but the battalion commander, who would not budge for all the "420s" in the world, merely said, as he pointed seaward, "The British monitors." He recognized them by their voice. And I had been yearning to see them in action. Clearly visible to the naked eye, massive, like fortresses, surrounded by their light mobile squadron of torpedo boat destroyers, they were there sitting—I mean the word—in front of us, on the line of the horizon, from which their enormous guns were bombarding Westende and the German defenses of the coast.

One sees the flash of the guns long before the sound reaches one like thunder. Boche artillery does not reply at once. But beneath the gray waters perhaps Zeebrugge submarines are already at work. And behind Lombaertzyde the Fokkers are rising for an aerial attack. Over the sea, under the sea, and in the air there is the same danger. And it is the same day by day.

Last week two German aeroplanes darted down on to a cargo boat aground in front of Zeepanne. Our torpedo boats replied to them. Too far away to join in action, some Fusiliers Marins, under the orders of an officer, anxiously followed from the beach near by the incidents of the struggle. Their officer had given them the "Stand at ease."

Suddenly one of the Boche aeroplanes staggered, struck to the heart, its reservoir in flames. The Fusiliers cheered with delight. "Fix bayonets," rang out the command. The officer drew his sword to salute the men who were about to die. While the enemy aeroplane in a long trail of purple fell vertically into the sea the order came: "Present!"

A Belgian Woman's Ordeal

By Mme. Carton de Wiart

Wife of the Former Belgian Minister of Justice

Mme. Carton de Wiart, whose arrest and imprisonment by the Germans was widely commented upon, recently told her experiences to a Paris newspaper:

I WAS immediately given over to the examining Magistrate, if that title can be applied to the military bungler who made me endure about twenty hours of cross-examination. What an examination it was! Every paper found in my house was the object of a hundred questions. They meant to prove that I was in direct relations with the Entente armies, and that, consequently, I was sending them information regarding the exact situation of the German armies in Belgium.

This singular Magistrate determined to implicate me in the imaginary plot against the life of von Bissing, had the cellars of the Ministry searched again and again, and wished to know how long ago the furnace had been constructed. Think of it! That furnace might conceal a tunnel through which assassins could slip in and be near the Governor General. It was droll.

The examination took a grotesque turn. This thought of Talleyrand: "It is easy to militarize a civilian; it is impossible to civilize a military man," had been discovered in a little notebook found in my home. The examining Magistrate saw in that phrase an allusion to a pretended organization of free-shooters imputed to the Belgian Government.

"What is Talleyrand?" he demanded of me.

"A Minister."

"Ah! A Minister. What Minister?"

"A French Minister."

"So, Madame, you admit that you have had communication with a French Minister?"

"I admit nothing at all. I am answering the question."

"Of what department is this Minister?"

"Why, of Foreign Affairs."

"Ah, ah!" my Judge triumphs, "you are joking; the French Minister of Foreign Affairs is Delcassé."

"I did not say he was the present Minister."

"He is a former Minister?"

"Very much so—a Minister of the King of France."

"Madame, you are mocking German justice!"

[Condemned to three and a half months in prison, she was then deported to Germany.]

They drove me from my country, as they thought, forever. My departure was fixed for the next day. The lively protestation which I represented in Brussels was going to disappear. I demanded the right to take with me my young children and one of my domestics. I was met with a pitiless refusal. I demanded that my children should be brought to me before my departure; I wished to embrace them. An absolute refusal. I confess that my courage melted before such cruelty, and, when I was alone, I broke into sobs. * * *

In Berlin I lived four days in the Hotel Metropole, on the Friedrichstrasse, scarcely a prisoner, simply watched. I had to present myself twice a day to the Commissary of Police, but, beyond that obligation, I could go and come freely in Berlin from 8 in the morning to 7 in the evening. It is probable that policemen followed me step by step, but I did not notice them. It was a transitory situation which could not last.

My decree of condemnation arrived,

and two detectives in plain clothes searched me and took me to the Moabit Prison, where I was immediately put into the common régime, the separate cell régime. I would not have wished anything else, for, I repeat it, the slightest favor from those people would have taken the heart out of me. That is so true that when M. Polo de Barnabé, the Spanish Minister, intervened in the name of King Alfonso XIII. to lighten my sentence, I informed him of my declaration to the War Council.

During a visit to me in prison he told me that the German Government had attacked that reply of mine in its first diplomatic note: "Mme. Carton de Wiart has confessed her fault. By refusing to have recourse to the clemency of the Kaiser she acknowledged that her punishment was in due proportion to the infractions she had committed." That is how those people interpreted the patriotic sentiments of a woman!

I refused even to turn over a cent a day to my jailers for a régime of luxury. Thus, day for day, I did my three months and a half in prison, exactly like the German women who were expiating crimes at Moabit, going to mass with them in the same drugget prison clothes.

[At the end of her imprisonment Mme. Carton de Wiart was banished from German territory and later found her children at Havre.]

Raiding on the Black Sea

By a Russian Marine

Russia's destructive work among Turkish shipping, and the hard life of the sailors who accomplished it, are revealed in a letter to the Russkoe Slovo, ("Russian Word,") the most interesting parts of which have been translated for CURRENT HISTORY.

THE results of our torpedo boat raids along the eastern coast of Turkish Anatolia are already known from the telegrams; more than 200 Turkish transports were sunk by us in that corner of the Black Sea, and about half of these ships carried freight. This raid, which we made when our turn came, our torpedo boats accomplished under extremely trying circumstances.

Generally speaking, the present Winter is not spoiling us soldiers with too much good weather; it is a long time since there have been so many storms. We had to forget, all our cheerful ideas about the warm Anatolian sun. At this time last year, to sail along the Turkish shores of the Black Sea was sheer delight. After our Crimean frosts and icy winds and rain, our sailors felt as if they had come to a seaside resort. With the experience of last year in their minds, our sailors, when, on leaving the home waters, they ran into a fierce storm, consoled themselves with the thought that on the Anatolian coast everything would be all right. * * *

No one who has not himself sailed on a torpedo boat can imagine what happens on board one of them in a storm. A cruise in a ship of the line seems a mere joke in comparison with a trip on a torpedo boat. On deck you don't know where to catch hold; water, wet, damp, cold, everywhere. Then you see that the water does not reach the torpedo apparatus. Here, on the platform, you can find a place that is not particularly risky and, even more important, there is something to hold on to.

The crew make their way about the deck in "rushes," choosing a convenient moment. If science does not recognize a "ninth wave," still there are certain waves, perhaps the "tenth" or the "eleventh," or some other number, between which are spaces of comparative calm; the boat pitches less; you don't feel as if you were going to turn a somersault. The sailors take advantage of these moments of quiet. Waiting in a cramped corner, where there is something to hold on to, through the worst pitching of the boat—as much as fifty degrees to either side—the sailors carefully make their way to the next stopping place. The ways are narrow, and if you lose your balance as the boat pitches it is pretty hard to keep hold of the thin handrail. You feel disinclined to leave your favorite corner beside the torpedo apparatus; here, at any rate, you feel yourself comparatively safe. But the wave comes, sweeps along the deck, and finds you out even there. Your legs are soaked up to the knees. You feel cold in the wind. You must change and get on your wading boots.

You make your way below, down the light trap ladder. Everything all around you is creaking. Every cabin is signaling by the knocks of various objects; glass is rattling; water is gurgling somewhere close at hand. Down the half dark passageway the sailors of the watch below are sleeping in their clothes on the warm hatchways in different attitudes.

Almost crawling, catching at door handles, you make your way to your own cabin and tumble hopelessly on your bunk; to change your clothes looks almost impossible. Your trunk has traveled under your writing table, and it groans and wabbles crazily there. You try to get at it, but the deck suddenly sinks away beneath your feet and you try to turn a somersault. Water keeps spurting from the wash basin, the pitcher skids about the floor, splashing water all over the cabin.

They have had dinner, juggling with the plates; the orderlies in the buffet have carried on a valiant fight with the dishes. * * * At night you dreamed you were traveling in a cart along a frightful mountain road. The cart kept upsetting you into a ravine. * * * About 4 in the morning you had to get up, because your head ached unendurably from banging against the cot. In the companion cabin, just as if nothing was happening, the officers' pets were sleeping on the divan, two dogs which were "fulfilling the function of poodles," as the officers jestingly say of them; for their actual race defies definition. Below decks the boat is a desert, because most of the officers and nearly all the crew spend the night on deck. Pretty hard luck! * * *

One is struck, at first, with the good and even friendly relations that exist, on a torpedo boat, between the officers and the crew and the directness of their relations with each other. All form a single family. Of course, you feel that there are older and younger members, but all are one family.

Under the lee of the Turkish coast the wind at first lulled; then it suddenly came on to blow again from the opposite direction, with the same mad gusts. The old and new rollers met in unimaginable confusion. The air was full of spray; rain was falling, mingled with wet snow. The shores were hid in the mist. In order to make an examination of the coast the torpedo boats had to poke their noses into every crevice.

As the reports of the General Staff described, our torpedo boats examined every nook along the Anatolian coast, from the frontier of the Russian Caucasus to Sinope; that is, a distance of about 500 versts, (330 miles.) The movement of Turkish ships throughout this whole region almost ceased. You see, in one year the Turks lost more than 4,000 sailing ships sunk by our sailors.

You no longer meet big flotillas of sailing ships — the system which the Germans at one time industriously practiced, on the calculation that where there were large numbers of ships some at any rate might count on getting safely away. But this system only increased the number of our trophies.

The Turks say that there is now no possibility of sending large flotillas of sailing ships to sea. There is no place to build them in. Most of the docks have been destroyed by our bombardments, set on fire on the stocks by our shells. According to the information of the Turks there is no longer any organized movement of ships anywhere on the Black Sea. All supplies for the Turkish Army in the Caucasus go by road, through the interior of the country.

And, in fact, many of the cargoes of the ships we captured astonished you by their insignificance—bread and nuts, which are now given to the soldiers as rations. Yet close to the shore of the Black Sea lies the exceedingly rich district of Samsun, which alone could feed an army with tastes more exacting than those of the Turkish Ashers. And on the majority of the sailing ships there were no cargoes at all, while supplies for the crews were extremely limited. On such supplies as we found the crew could only exist in a state of semi-starvation.

The Turks complained that every one along the coast was equally destitute. Unheard-of high prices reduced to a minimum even the demands of the rich. Sugar, for example, is a luxury which very many cannot allow themselves even on holidays. Sugar has long reached the price of a ruble a pound, but under present conditions it is not always obtainable even at that price.

And here it must be remarked that before the war Anatolia was distinguished by its extremely patriarchal conditions; the cost of living was very low, and the population did not need much money.

Because of the foggy weather our torpedo boats kept in close to the banks, so that the panic which spread through the villages could be observed, the inhabitants running off to the mountains. Such details generally escape observation altogether because of distance. But even under these circumstances it was not possible to discover even a sign of industrial life. In one place, it is true, we noticed three wharves, where sailing ships of wood were being built. We immediately destroyed these wharves and burned the ships. But only a year ago the whole coast of Anatolia was almost a continuous wharf. Not a convenient creek, but you saw the ribs of ships a-building sticking up.

In the absence of convenient roads on land, the sea was everything for this coast. Without the sea, without sea communication, the Sanjaks and Vilayets of Anatolia (the smaller and larger districts) are almost deprived of all communication with each other.

They tell us, for instance, that in Sinope mail is no longer received, and it looks like the truth.

In Samsun our torpedo boats bombarded some port fortifications and, among other things, burned the Custom House. At Inieh we came on several sailing ships loading, the crews of which quickly fled inland. These sailing ships we, of course, destroyed. Two piers at which they were loading were likewise destroyed. At Fatiș a large brickyard was discovered, evidently established by Germans. This brickyard was also destroyed.

After this first survey of the coast the torpedo boats made a second search. The sea was found to be almost deserted. Our torpedo boats destroyed two Turkish motor boats. The sailing boats we met could be counted by units.

Along the coast hung the same impenetrable fog; a pitiable picture of a rich country ruined by war. The desolation was redoubled by fog and storm. Nature seemed to be weeping over the greatness that had disappeared.

Leaving behind the now inhospitable shore of picturesque Anatolia, the torpedo boats ran into a fierce storm, with icy rain and sleet. * * *

MARINE.

Dogs of War That Save the Wounded

Story of the "Sanitätshunde"

ONE of the many novel features of the great war is the work of the 2,500 trained dogs that are doing hospital service in the German Army. These "sanitätshunde," as they are called, are sent out after a battle to search for wounded soldiers left on the field. They are taught to distinguish between the dead and the wounded, and, according to the official reports printed in the North German Gazette, they have not been taught to avoid the enemy wounded, as it is charged the Belgian Red Cross dogs have been trained.

At a recent meeting of the German Society for Hospital Dogs held in the Hotel Bristol in Berlin, the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, the head of the society, described how the service had been begun with eight dogs shortly after the outbreak of the war and estimated that up to date at least 8,000 wounded men had been picked up on the battlefield through the aid of the war dogs. Since this meeting it has been announced that convalescent soldiers at Jena have built a special hospital in which wounded war dogs are being treated. Among the official bodies represented at the Berlin gathering were the War Ministers of Prussia and Württemberg, the field hospital service on the eastern front, the General Quartermaster's Department, the Prussian and Saxon Ministers of the Interior, and the Berlin Police Department.

The official reports on the dogs' activities said in part:

"Early in the morning six dogs were sent out with the stretcher bearers on a search for wounded men. The nature of the battlefield made the finding of the wounded particularly difficult, as it was in part swamps and woods and in part hilly fields of stubble, covered with bundles of grain, and here the dogs did excellent service. They located many wounded men in the shocks of corn and brought helmets, caps, and handkerchiefs to show the result of their search.

"Toward the end of the work a dog brought to his guide a piece of the cloth cover of a canteen which he had found on a wounded soldier who was lying under his cloak and a piece of tent, motionless and apparently abandoned as dead by his comrades. At first the guide could find no signs of life and passed on. But the dog insisted upon again leading him to where the wounded man lay, and, after a long examination, it turned out that the soldier was not dead after all.

Following the battle at D. six dog trainers were ordered to search the field abandoned by the Russians. After a long trip, one of the dogs brought back a piece of a Russian infantryman's blouse and led his guide to the ruins of a Russian fortification from which projected a man's foot and a piece of an army coat. The guide found a man, completely covered with mud and seemingly lifeless, as he lay quite still and did not heed the shouts of his would-be rescuer. The guide then started to leave the spot, but the dog would not abandon his find and barked and scratched so vigorously that the guide finally cleared away all the rubbish and dug out an unconscious but far from dead Russian."

The dogs are trained to take along some sort of an object to show that they have found a wounded man, but in many cases there is nothing on the soldier which they can tear loose. This problem the dogs have solved for themselves by digging up a piece of sod or biting off a twig and bringing these evidences of their discovery to their guides.

Sometimes the fallen soldiers of the hostile armies fail to recognize the peaceful missions of the "sanitätshunde" and try to drive them away, as is shown by the following excerpt from the report of a commander of a field hospital company:

"All the Germans had been picked up, but there were still a great many wounded Russians scattered over the field, most of them hidden in the long grasses. The dogs began their work with the greatest assurance, but it was soon noticed that the Russians struck at them with their caps, haversacks, canteens, and other objects and, in some cases, even tried to kick the dogs. Consequently, before the day was over three of our dogs refused to approach the wounded Russians. That day, with the aid of the dogs, we saved twenty-one wounded Russians."

In closing its account of the work of the "sanitätshunde," the North German Gazette gives the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Holland as its authority for the charge that the Belgian hospital dogs are trained not to aid wounded Germans, and quotes as follows from a pamphlet issued by the Dutch society on the use of dogs in the war:

"Close to one of the trenches Dic

noticed a man in a sitting position, a man whom Dic had learned to hate from the very first hour of his training, and at whose sight he growled wrathfully. Hadn't such men clad in gray abused him in his former school? Hadn't they always spoken roughly to him and refused to give him food or water, even taking these things away when they had been plainly put there for his use? And hadn't the man who wore blue, with red stripes, always been good to him? He did not know that all this had been done to teach him to aid only Belgians. Dic had also learned to avoid the 'pickelhauben,' the German helmets which could be used to give dogs such hard blows."

Letters From the Wife of a Russian General

CURRENT HISTORY *presents herewith a second installment of these interesting letters, written to an American friend by the wife of a Russian General ("Alexei") whose real name, when revealed after the war, will be found to figure in some of the most important operations on the Russian front. The writer's brother, "Rostia," holds the rank of Adjutant General.*

I.

I RECEIVED the only letter we have had from you for the whole Winter—the registered one. I am grateful that this, at least, has reached me. Shall I send you your money, or shall we wait till the end of the war? Perhaps we shall live to see that great joy! Many people say it will be over by July. But in my eyes we are still very far from the end. Alexei also writes that it is useless to expect the end soon.

Rostia spent several days with us, which was a great delight. The week before Easter Jakoff, the cook whom you know, came here for provisions. We sent him back to Alexei's camp, supplied with Easter bread and cakes. Here we have arranged everything beautifully in the hospitals and orphanages and have sent a freight car full of Easter gifts to Alexei's army. Every mail now brings us postcards from the soldiers, with their thanks. Some of them are so amusing and touching.

As to our losses in the north, everyone's opinion is that the traitor Myassoyedoff was hanged too promptly and too secretly. He should have been put in a cage with chains, and dragged all over Russia to see if he would dare to look us in the eyes! * * * That would be a punishment worthy of a Russian officer and a gentleman! It is unjust. They hang in the same way any poor little Jew, driven by hunger to play the spy for the other side. Oh, how horrible it all is! * * *

I inclose some pretty postcards: Alexei's latest portrait; the view from our windows; and some of the Easter cards which the Empress sent us to distribute in her name in the hospitals. Poor Sonya Witte is desolate over Sergei Julitch's death. She is constantly ill. There have been wild rumors that Sergei Julitch poisoned himself because his Matilda was mixed up in the Myassoyedoff business. What nonsense! So many lies are current on this theme. I am weary. * * *

II.

* * * We are in Moscow once more. I must get some rest and some medical treatment. If God grants, I shall presently take up my work again. Throughout the country we are all full of courage and certain of ultimate victory. Wilhelm is Anti-Christ on a small scale; such as he can and must be conquered. During the last few months we have been in Odessa and Kieff, working very hard. Rostia and Alexei, Jr, paid us a visit. But as to Alexei, Sr., he has been working over his maps for fourteen months now without a break. Sukhomlin is his Chief of Staff—the husband of the lady who showed Charlie the fort at Ivangorod; she herself is dead. Her son was killed. Our dear Captain Ilyashenko has also been killed. But never mind; we shall win back everything and render Ger-

many powerless, however many may be the traitors, individuals, or whole nations like Bulgaria. The dark powers must be conquered. If only we can avoid haste; in this, all Russia agrees. There is a small group of intriguers, thirsting for untimely peace, but they are not strong enough to outweigh the whole of Russia.

In V. I had several hospitals on my hands. I organized three orphanages; then various aids for the wounded and their families. To this work there is no end. In November I shall go back there for a while; I shall work until I die. But, merciful Heaven, never in my life did I imagine that the world contained so many scoundrels!

What is Charlie working at? I cannot imagine him not being useful to human beings—human beings, I mean, not devils in human shape.

Fedya is head of a shrapnel factory; his son Kolya is one of his apprentices.

If you in America could only see one of our soldiers asphyxiated by poison gas, as we see hundreds, you would understand that this crime cannot be forgotten or forgiven. Everything within me shudders at the mere remembrance of many and many, blind, fighting for breath, their skins black though they are still alive!—"a cultured, highly developed nation!"

If I am still alive when peace comes I shall refuse to shake hands with any German. Nothing will force me within a yard of one of them. They are monsters, children of the Evil One.

I write so seldom * * * I cannot write—I have no time.

III.

* * * I wrote to you sending our new address in Moscow. Did you get my letter? It is a long time since we heard from you. Lena is with me. Rostia is with Alexei. Things are going much better at the front now. A few months and they will improve still more. Throughout the land there are many knaves and fools who, consciously or unconsciously, work as German agents. But no matter; everything will come out right.

I only wish we all had more strength. Here I find a great deal to do; and in V. our work is still unfinished. I am going there one of these days. I shall also go to Odessa.

Alexei has no end of decorations, but most attractive of all is the one which he has received from the Kuban Cossacks. They have conferred on him the title of "Honorary Old Man," and the Emperor has given him the right to wear the Kuban army uniform. In his letters Alexei calls me "Honorary Old Woman."

Rostia we have seen several times, but as to Alexei, we have not set eyes on him since he went away with his army on July 27, 1914. I am sending you his two latest portraits which they have sent us from the front. Lina, Boris's daughter, took the photo of Rostia; it's a pity it has come out so dark, as the likeness is very good.

Well, and how are you two getting on? Is your America waiting for the Kaiser to attack her also; leaving to our coalition the struggle against this brother of Anti-Christ? Never fear, with God's help we shall scramble through our troubles. But shall I be able to avoid a certain satisfaction when the ferocious beast, enraged by failure, rushes against the countries which, even at this late hour, are still playing the game of friendship with him? Through cowardice? Or through hypocrisy? If only we had attacked them together the thing would have been over long ago.

Lena has been ailing ever since we came to Moscow; she cannot live away from the South. I write you our new address once more, below; the mails are in a terrible condition. I hope there will be a word from you by Christmas. Greeting to Charlie. We both embrace you. Keep well, and may God guard you. I am grown old and so like mother. Charlie was right when he first foretold it.

IV.

* * * I have just received your letter, which has taken a month in coming. This gives me the hope that you will receive this, if not for Christmas, at least before the new year, which I trust by God's grace will be a happier year than this. Yet, so far, there has been nothing too unfortunate, either for Russia or for us as individuals. With my

whole soul I trust that the worst is over. I send you a small group photo in which you will recognize both Alexei and Rostia. Rostia has been with Alexei all the time, since the very beginning of the war. I also send two recent snapshops of Alexei—very good likenesses—the best portraits he has ever had taken, though they were taken in the midst of this terrible campaign.

I quite agree with you that our chief trouble is vain babble and exaggerated fears. You cannot imagine how angry I get with people. Side by side with the greatest heroism there is so much that is common and mean that it is simply astonishing; just the same thing among ourselves as in France and England. We have to live through it all, till Satan is conquered, in the guise of the Germans—and of our own knaves and fools. But God will help us. There is so much work for us all, that at times I feel ready to kneel down in reverent respect for all that is being accomplished around us. And, as you say, for the sake of what is so good in people, we should, as far as possible, not take notice of what is bad.

In spiritual strength and faith Alexei is greater than any one could have imagined before the war. Both in society and among the masses he is trusted and respected, and the Emperor is endlessly good to him. But envy and intrigues are rife. When I spoke to him about this in my letter he answered:

"I never sought popularity, and do not seek it now. What need have I of it? I attend to the small part allotted to me of the great task, so far as I understand it; but personally, for myself, I seek and wish for nothing. I only pray the Lord that the sum of all our efforts may enable us to break our wicked and cruel foes, and to drive them back beyond our frontier. As to all personal schemes and plottings, I will have nothing to do with them, thrusting them away as filth with the whole force of my soul. I hold that a war which sets flowing human blood is a sacrament in the name of our country and our monarch; and this sacrificial offering must be approached and performed with clean hands, clean thoughts, and a clean conscience; everything base and personal must be rejected as sinful and unworthy. And I offer myself also as a sacrifice to my country, so long as I am needed; but I seek nothing, and have absolutely no other object. I am already an old man and it is time for me to reject every feeling of self-love, and all other unworthiness. In order to carry out my arduous duty in war time, I must be inexorably severe, even cruel; this is inevitable, without it no victory could be won. I have no fear of the faithless people you write of: I seek neither glory nor money. And, under these conditions, it is not easy to injure me. No matter who he may be I shall destroy any one who can injure our cause—but not myself. All attempts to harm me personally I shall ignore. So do not take things to heart on my account. All will be according to the will of God. * * *"

If Charlie is interested to know what foreigners say of his brother-in-law, here are a few words:

"Le Général —— est un des plus populaires généraux de la Russie. Il n'est pas grand, mais bien proportionné. Il porte une tête tres fine et de temps en temps un peu narquoise. Il est extremement gai, vif, fort travailleur, a un age qui est celui des chefs d'une armée, et a l'oeil partout. Hospitalier, homme du monde, moqueur, la parole facile, sévère contre les abus, encourageant pour les jeunes talents. S'il n'était pas tellement bon Russe, on aimerait à dire qu'il représente un type tres français, et tres gentilhomme, qu'il est, d'ailleurs!"

Translation: General —— is one of the most popular of the Russian Generals. He is not tall, but well proportioned. His head is very finely formed, his expression very keen and penetrating. He is exceedingly gay, vivacious, a great worker, at the age of the heads of armies, and he watches everything. Hospitable, a man of the world, with a touch of irony, a ready talker, severe in the case of abuses, ready to encourage rising talents. If he were not such a good Russian one would like to say that he represents a very French type, and very aristocratic, which, indeed, he is.

I feel like crying and laughing when I read opinions like this. Looking thus from the outside one might think that Alexei had no nerves at all. Even during the retreat from the Carpathians their ammunition exhausted, after all those glorious victories, I read in the newspapers: "General —— is as energetic and calm as usual. * * *"

God grant him strength to bear all this to the end, for the sake of our monarch and of Russia. But I cannot help fearing that even an iron will must be worn down, and my heart bleeds to think what he has borne these eighteen months.

What shall I tell you about Lena and myself? For fourteen months we worked to the point of exhaustion; now, since we have been settled for a while in Moscow, we have had a little rest. But one of these days we shall begin work again. I had thought of sending you some photos of myself surrounded by the orphans of my asylum and in hospitals, in the midst of crippled soldiers, nurses and doctors, but they are all so large that it is difficult to mail them. One of these days I shall have some printed on postcards, but so far I have not had time.

Rostia has been here on leave several times. Every one has had leave except Alexei. He has never had either rest or quiet for nearly two years now, but he is convinced, and Rostia also, that all will be well—and sooner than might be expected, judging by present circumstances. God grant that they may be right. We send you kisses, Lena and I; to Charlie also, with all our hearts. May the Heavenly Power help us all.

NADYA.

Twenty Soldiers Captured by a Girl

An Episode in Russia

The Petrograd correspondent of The London Telegraph vouches for this remarkable story:

AMONG a party of Letts who have succeeded in escaping from a village in Courland, now occupied by the Germans, is a girl of seventeen, who has been rewarded, for a great deed of bravery, with the St. George's Cross.

A small German detachment marched on to the farm owned by this girl's father. Sentries were left outside to keep watch on a hill quite close, while the rest entered the house and prepared to have a good time. The young German Lieutenant turned to the girl, with the order to get wine at any cost, as their supply had run short. She was told that unless she fulfilled the order the house would be set on fire and she herself subjected to violence.

There were two barrels of heavy old liquor, made of spirits and berries, in the cellar, and a bright idea struck the girl. Before giving them the cordial she dropped into it some powder, made of bluebells, which brings on heavy drowsiness. The first barrel was soon emptied, and the demand came for more. The second barrel contained a double portion of the power, and the Germans soon began to roll on to the floor, one after another.

Seeing her enemies helpless around the barrel, she filled a bowl with the liquor, took it out to the sentries, who stood freezing in the cold, and gave it them to drink, incidentally mentioning that she was fulfilling the officer's orders. The bowl was soon emptied. She then returned to the house and carefully disarmed the soldiers, who, sunk in heavy slumber, lay about in different attitudes, and hid their weapons deep in the cellar. Meantime her father was fastening with ropes the limbs of the insensible Germans.

Having accomplished her task with the prisoners, the girl proceeded to find her way out to the Russian positions. Following forest paths and making her way through swamps, she finally reached a Siberian outpost.

"I have disarmed and tied up twenty German soldiers and one officer; hasten, and take them prisoners," were the excited words with which the girl addressed the head officer of the Siberian Rifles. The soldiers were amazed at the audacity of the young Lett, and could hardly believe her story. However, she persuaded them to follow her, and when they reached the farm they found the Germans still fast locked in sleep. Several pails of ice-cold water flung in the faces of the sleepers roused them to the grim realities of their situation. To their bewilderment, they found that they were no longer soldiers of the German Army, but prisoners of the Russians.

The girl was brought into the presence of the commanding General, who thanked her for her heroic deed, and promised to make a report of it to the higher military authorities. This was done, and as a reward for her services she received the much-coveted decoration which signifies valor in the Russian Army.

Hard Struggle of Middle-Class Germans

By Field Marshal von Hindenburg

Commander in Chief of German Forces in the East

A significant letter from General von Hindenburg to the Imperial Chancellor and other Ministers of State appeared in January in a newspaper issued by the Tenth Army, and has since been republished in other German papers—with the Government's sanction. Here is the full text of it:

A RETIRED County Court official named Finhold has written to me from Bensberg begging me to support the efforts he is making to alleviate the anxiety of the men in the field concerning their families, who are having such a hard struggle at home. Finhold's endeavors are in the interest mainly of the industrial middle class, the small shopkeepers, artisans, and tradesmen who in times of peace make a good income, but are now in danger of losing all their property and of being reduced after the war to indigent day laborers.

Numerous requests for help and support received by the soldiers in the field from those depending on them prove to me that Herr Finhold has laid bare a real wound. It is one of the results of German economic development that the small business man in particular is compelled, almost without exception, to have recourse to loans. In view of the conditions of payment and of the markets produced by the war the wife and family have the utmost difficulty in keeping the trade or business of the husband or father going. This difficulty and constant anxiety exert a paralyzing effect on the man in the trenches, and all the more as he sees no prospect of help or improvement either now or after the conclusion of peace.

It is of the utmost importance for the economic strength, and thus for the future of our country, that in such cases as these definite relief should be provided. The empire must avert the danger of a large proportion of its able and economically independent sons returning home from the war impoverished or falling at once into the hands of their creditors, which would mean their economic ruin, with their wives and children.

The army leader who has the welfare of his soldiers sincerely at heart cannot ignore such difficulties and needs. I consider it, therefore, to be my duty to draw attention to the dangers described above, and to the necessity for providing relief by means of legislation. The sense of duty and the death-disdaining courage which inspire our soldiers demand an equitable return from those at home, and especially in this domain.

The nerve-strength of the individual man, which is the fundamental condition not only for holding out, but also for the decisive victory, cannot be maintained unless the man feels certain that those he has left at home have an assured existence, and that he can hope to continue



HENRYK SIENKIEWICZ
Polish Author of "Quo Vadis?" Who Is Laboring Day and Night for His Suffering Countrymen
(Photo from Bain News Service)

PRINCE SAID HALIM PASHA

Turkish Grand Vizier, to Whom the Kaiser Recently Gave the Black Order of Nobility his trade or business successfully after the war.

The great changes in the economic life of the nation, which are even now taking place, and which will be much more pronounced after the war, must have people who are economically sound and capable of development to deal with them.

The Charge That Captured Hill 70

By Lieutenant A. M. Tuck

Seventh King's Own Scottish Borderers

Lieutenant Tuck, an American who is serving in the British Army, and who was wounded in the battle of last September near Loos, wrote the following vivid account of his experiences. He is a son of Pinckney Tuck, Judge of the International Court of Egypt, and was studying at Oxford when the war broke out, trying to complete a course for the Bachelor of Arts degree, which has since been given him by Dartmouth College.

WE did not take our places in the trenches until about midnight of the 24th. The rest of that night was spent in dealing out the next morning's rations and in filling the new machine-gun magazines which we had just drawn from the ordnance. All through the night there was a steady drizzle, and then a hopeless gray dawn broke upon us, every one wet through by this time and feeling like anything but an attack. The scanty breakfast was quickly served out and consumed. For this great attack the breakfast included an ounce and a half of rum for each man. This allowance of rum varies both as to its frequency of issue and amount, and is usually put in the men's tea, to keep them from hoarding it up and making an occasion of its consumption at the end of the month. That morning it was given to us neat, and well we needed it. At 5:40 we started our gas, and huge gusts of this yellowish-green vapor started drifting toward the enemy trenches. Our battalion had the honor of leading the attack on Hill 70, and we were to be the first out of the trenches.

No sooner had our gas started than a veritable hail of German machine-gun fire could be heard on the parapet of our trench. By this time the Germans could no longer see our trenches, but, having previously fixed their guns on our trench parapets, their fire was only too accurate. At the same time their guns started bursting shrapnel over us with equal accuracy. Words of mine could never describe the noise and din of all this firing. All we knew was that at the end of forty minutes we were to leave our trenches and start our attack. Our watches had been synchronized the night before with those of the engineers who were controlling the gas.

Then orders started coming down the trenches. " Fix bayonets! " was the first order, and this was hastily and willingly complied with. Then the cry came down, " Remember the Twenty-fifth! " for this was the number of our regiment as it was known in the old days. The next order came, " Put on gas helmets," and then we knew that only a few minutes separated us from the comparative safety of our trench and the veritable sheet of lead outside. The air by this time reeked of a sickening sweet smell of high explosive and shrapnel shells, and the atmosphere was even more clouded by the faint smoke of these. It had been prearranged that as we left our trenches automatically our artillery was to lift its curtain of fire from the German first-line trenches to their second, and as we advanced to their third, and so on, time limits being given for these movements. As the fortieth minute ticked itself into eternity orders were given, and the men climbed up on the fire steps and over the parapet. We threw our heavy tripods over the parapet, passing the guns and magazines after them, and straightened out our line so as to resemble the formation of the infantry as much as possible.

I had not advanced more than forty

yards when a shell burst over us, the concussion of which as well as the fragments knocked men all around me to the ground. At the same time that I fell I felt a blow in my hand and chest. What followed directly after this is very hazy in my mind, and what concerns the advance of the regiment has been told me since. I found later that I had been shot through the right hand and had a flesh wound in the left breast. I got up working more as a machine than myself before I stumbled and fell again thirty yards further on. One machine gun team only went on, and I learned later that this team was knocked out two minutes afterward. I remember vaguely crawling into a shell hole, and from there being helped into the head of a sap by a stretcher bearer. These saps are short trenches that run out from the main trench at right angles and are used as listening posts. Here a stretcher bearer gave me a first field dressing, and later I found my way to Quality Street, which was the name given to a very small mining village which was being used as a small base for the attack of these two brigades.

Here was a scene which no one who saw it could ever forget. The great majority of the men here had already been brought back from the two brigades in front, most of the men being kilted, as the brigade on our right was the Highland Brigade. The street was covered with men lying on the pavements or just sitting wherever they found room; other men lying on the coal trucks, whose upper framework had been so changed as to hold three stretchers. Here dressings were being applied to the more serious cases. The street literally ran red with hot fresh blood, and although half a dozen shells would have wiped out the lot the enemy were too busy with our advancing infantry to bother about this place. And so we were passed on in motor ambulances to various casualty clearing stations, until we reached one about five miles behind the lines. Here we remained all afternoon until the large motor ambulance convoy started that night for Lapuygnoir. Here we were put in Red Cross train, consisting of twenty-eight carriages of sitting and lying cases, and we started our trip down country.

It was at Versailles that we first learned the price the regiment had paid. The official casualties in officers out of the twenty who went to the attack were fourteen killed or died of wounds, five wounded. Only one came through untouched. Yesterday I went to the funeral of our Colonel, who had died of his wounds in the same hospital at Versailles. A very gallant soldier, who had returned to his regiment after having been retired four years, and had been given the command of this new battalion. Out of 1,000 peace-loving citizens in a few months he had made a perfect fighting machine. After I fell I remember seeing lines of khaki advancing toward the German trenches, which were then invisible on account of the gas, and later I realized how great had been the work of our Colonel and how successful it had all proved. He was buried with full military honors, accompanied by 200 Cuirassiers and a small detachment of English troops from the hospital. I have learned that one of our pipers has been recommended for the V. C. His gallantry consisted of walking up and down the parapet after the hail of bullets had started and piping his men to the attack.

In a few days I return to the base, from which place I will be sent up to what is left of the regiment, which is now refitting behind the line. New drafts of officers and men are arriving shortly. The casualties in the ranks we do not know officially as yet, but they must number well over 500 men out of 1,000, as the casualties in the brigade, consisting of four battalions, were 2,000 out of 3,500. The officer casualties in the brigade number 72 out of 80. And this was the price a battalion paid for leading a brigade, and a brigade paid for leading an attack which resulted in the capture of Hill 70 and the village of Loos.

The Coming Victory

By a French Army Captain

This thoughtful and clear visioned article, written in the trenches, is translated from L'Illustration, the leading French illustrated monthly.

THE victory of the Marne, though we greeted it with joy, did not arouse in our ranks the complete feeling of safety which it created behind the lines. We knew what it had cost. We knew what it represented. But we did not believe that it marked the term of our efforts.

We had learned to know our adversary, his resources, his ruses and his method. We felt that he was wounded. We felt ourselves armed to crush him in the time to come. But that that time was near, we did not believe.

And because we did not believe it, because in the intoxication of our advance, we retained the exact perception of the real and the possible, because all, leaders and soldiers, were unwilling to deceive ourselves a second time—because of this, and because of this alone, we remain after eighteen months able to endure what, in this war, is worse than death, worse than the mud, worse than want and vermin—waiting, immobility, weariness.

Ask a neutral who has seen us fight what he most admired; he will say it is our dash, our daring, our power of shock. But one who has fought will answer, No. The profound strength of our army is its capacity to endure, without complaining, almost without suffering, the gloomy passage of the days. It is terrible and magnificent to come forth from the trench when the hour of attack sounds. It is still more terrible and magnificent to endure to remain in it, without attacking, for months and years.

The loophole through which you watch a corner of the Boche sector, marked by sacks of earth in rags; the shooting bench, on which you sit in the mud while your comrade keeps watch; the connecting trench, full of ice-cold water, in which your feet freeze; the muddy shelter, with the damp smell of rotting straw; the set tasks, the digging of earthworks, the transport of grenades and soup; then cantonment, reviews, inspections, the duties of barrack life, with the likelihood of death at the end, this is our lot, officers and soldiers. And this lot we accept, and shall accept, as long as it is necessary. For in this acceptance, spontaneous, general, reflected upon, we think, men and leaders, that the secret of our victory lies.

People write to us. They ask us questions. They say: "Are you going to attack? Will you pierce through?" That is not our business. We shall pierce their lines if we can. But afterward there will be other trenches, and yet others, and there will be other battles. The essential thing for us is not to attack, to conquer at one point, even to pierce through on a point of several miles; it is to hold out. Our principal duty, our sovereign virtue, is to hold on. In holding out we shall gain the victory.

The soldier of the end of 1915 and the beginning of 1916 has his ideas concerning the war. They are simple and modest.

After months of experience we do not flatter ourselves that we can without difficulty gain against the Boche, a result which we believe the Boche incapable of gaining against us. So long as the armies which face each other, with normal effectives on a depth that daily increases, continue to occupy the trenches which they hold at present, we do not believe in the possibility of carrying by assault a fortress whose centre can constantly change its position.

We know that, wherever we wish, we can gain successes, as in Champagne and Artois. We do not believe that our enemy can carry off like successes, because, for several months now, we see him ever less and less on the offensive. But when we have said this, it is not from such successes that we expect the victory that every one of us is certain of.

Let those behind the battle line who argue about our soldiers have the goodness to believe me; our moral force, which they praise, is fed on more substantial motives. We are sure of success for one reason alone; because we are sure of our patience and sure also that, between the Boches and ourselves, it is we, and we alone, whom patience can save.

We did not need to read Bernhardi and the military philosophers from beyond the Rhine to know that, against the coalition of four great powers, Germany could win only by rapid successes. To teach us, the facts have sufficed, and the comparison of the successive attacks which we have met.

The Boche who will leap forth against our trench tomorrow, who will, perhaps, capture a little bit of it, without being able to push further forward, is no longer the Boche of Charleroi or Ypres. He fights well. But he is careful of himself. He just fulfills his duty as a combatant. He has no longer anything of the furious waves which, in the first four months, we saw break over us in foam.

He knows that the great gains which justify great sacrifices are henceforth forbidden to him. He attacks on a small scale, never at two points at once, absorbed by an effort which is always mobile—the Argonne in Winter, the Yser in the Spring, Poland in Summer, Serbia in Autumn.

Where are the "rushes" of the past which, from Belfort to Mons, seized us by the throats? We remember. We look and compare. They have changed our Boche for us. He was coming to devour everything. But he ended by only biting. Now, he does not even bite any more.

A pessimist would say he is biting elsewhere. Was it in order to conquer Serbia that he declared war against us? Is it by conquering Serbia that he will smash England, France, and Russia?

This is the matured reasoning we have come to, through our active experience. This reasoning has been born in us along the thread of the days while we have looked through our loopholes and while we have read the daily reports, the emptiness of which fills us with satisfaction because it confirms our view.

The Germans have missed their goal. They will not gain it in the third year of the war. They missed it at a time when the French Army lacked many indispensable things, when the British Army was little more than an outline sketch. They will not gain it now, when the French Army, fully supplied, when the British Army, grown more than a hundredfold, and the Russian Army, always inexhaustible, and henceforth sure of being armed, shall unite their efforts, supported by Italy, which at the outset was neutral.

The inequality of effectives will one day turn the balance. When? We do not know. But since we are patient, that matters little. And this is why we believe that the patience which possesses us all will bring our victory.

Let people not hurry us, and let them not be in a hurry themselves. We are men in earnest, who are staking our lives. If the war had only been going on for three months, we should hesitate more perhaps before expressing our opinions. After eighteen months have passed in effort and suffering, we have the right to give our view, and our view is this:

Since the passage of time increases the inequality of forces to our advantage, let us allow it to pass, and let us strike only blows which are certain; I mean, let us strike only when it is certain that we can deliver a deathblow. Until then, we undertake, we soldiers, to bear our cross; let the civilians bear theirs.

We have yet another desire; it is that, while waiting for the decisive assault, our men should kill along our front as many Boches as possible, and that beyond the battle lines our side should increase as much as possible the difficulties of the Boche behind the fighting line.

For the first object, we hope that the progress of our artillery, the increase in our shell production, the reinforcement of our aviation corps, the judicious use of really asphyxiating gases, the scientific development of the material of war, will give us in the coming months better means of action than in the months that are past. There is not a soldier in our ranks who, while rendering justice to the results already gained, does not feel that we can do more, and, since we can, then we ought to do more.

For the second object, we should be glad to know that all measures are taken, if not to starve Germany, which is difficult, at least to close to her certain sources of supply from neutral nations, from our allies, even from ourselves. The less she receives during the months of waiting imposed by the necessity of striking surely and striking hard, the less she will be capable of resisting our pressure and prolonging her resistance. Here also we believe that more can be done in the future than has been done in the past, and, since more is possible, more ought to be done.

To increase our offensive power, to put our allies in a position to utilize to the full the resources in men which they possess and which are superior to ours, to keep our units up to the mark, to maintain our stores in their present state, which is excellent, such are the wishes of leaders and soldiers who have formed their ideas in the sanguinary school of reality.

I have written this in my shelter. The enemy is quiet. The sector is calm. I have made two rounds. Every one is at his post. If there should be an attack our machine guns are ready to mow it down. As always, I am full of admiration for the complete devotion of these brave men, calm under fire, cheerful amid the mud, always mindful of discipline, who obey us with their hearts, as we command them with our hearts, and whose spokesman I have tried to make myself.

In reading over these rapid notes I feel that I have put in them what we are all thinking—a modest pack made up of our experiences in Lorraine and Belgium, in Champagne and Artois, the sum of our long reflections, ripened far from our families, in the seriousness which solitude brings. CAPTAIN X.

"In Three Months London Would Have Fallen"

David Lloyd George, British Minister of Munitions, recently made this striking statement to a reporter:

If the military class in Germany should win we should see a Germany of triumphant warriors, seeking whom they could devour, looking out for fresh spheres—or shall I say fresh hemi-spheres?—to conquer. If we overthrow German militarism now it is because our command of the sea has given us time to organize, and so make good our unpreparedness. You have only to imagine what would have happened if the command of the sea had not been ours, or if it had been wrested from us. We could have been overrun as easily as the Balkan Peninsula. Within three months—three months, mind—of the declaration of war, London would have fallen as quickly as Belgrade. France would have made a gallant resistance; so would Russia; but the armies on the northeastern frontier of France could have been turned by descents on her south and west coasts. If Germany were to win this war Europe would be helpless. Let us never forget that indisputable fact. Russia and France would not be permitted to build up great armies to defend their frontiers; and, of course, the command of the sea would be taken from Great Britain. I cannot help wondering if the Monroe Doctrine would fare better than the British Fleet.

What Changes Will the War Bring?

Views of Famous Publicists

The great German offensive at Verdun and the probability of an early attack by the Allies on the same front give a special timeliness to the prophecies printed below. They are condensed from interviews in leading Paris journals, notably Le Matin and Je Sais Tout.

The Great Teutonic Plan

By Professor Masaryk

Former Czech Deputy in the Austrian Reichsrat, now a Professor in King's College, London

M. Masaryk is the soul of a movement that aims to re-establish the independence of Bohemia. When asked how such an aim could fit in with the greater objects for which the Entente Allies are fighting, he said:

THE most urgent task, naturally, is to expel the enemy from the territory he occupies, but it is indispensable that we should first have formulated a plan of what Europe should be like after the victory of the Allies. This plan will make it possible to render Germany harmless after she is beaten, and, even at the present stage of the war, it will give us the means of combating her.

The true German objective is to create, under the aegis of Berlin, a powerful confederation of States in Central Europe. It is expressed today in the Berlin-Bagdad formula, a creation of General von Moltke. As, before 1870, Prussia brought about the economic union of the German States in advance of their political union, so today it is under color of an economic association that the grand Teutonic plan is making its appearance. I will tell you its ultimate object:

It is to put 97,000,000 *Austro-Hungarians, Turks, and Balkanites under German domination.*

After Sadowa in 1866 Bismarck understood that it would be better for his purposes to keep Austria intact and in submission rather than to mutilate it and make it an enemy. That idea has been fruitful. Leading Austrians realize today that their country can exist only by leaning upon Germany. The real Austria — Austria without Germany — has been beaten in this war by Russia and by Serbia. In saving Austria, Germany has organized it as one of its own provinces. To strengthen Austria is, strictly speaking, to work for the King of Prussia. To weaken Austria is to weaken Germany. To destroy Austria is to strike Germany to the heart, ruining its plan for Central Europe and cutting its famous Berlin-Bagdad line.

To say that Austria-Hungary is a guarantee of peace is folly. It was that empire which sowed the seeds of the present war on the day when, with the aid of Bismarck, it occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina and decided to play the rôle of German vanguard in the Balkans. To destroy Austria does not mean to destroy the nations that compose it. It is only the dynasty of the Hapsburgs, the slave of Germany, which it is necessary to banish, and, if it appears useful that the Austrian nations should remain confederated, let them be so, but under the aegis of the Entente Allies.

The fear is sometimes expressed that if Germany's Drang nach Osten is suppressed, it will create a Drang nach Westen; that is to say, in place of the pressure toward the Orient there will be a pressure toward the Occident. This is an error. Deprived of the support of Austria and Turkey, Germany is too weak to threaten the Western Powers.

Believe me, the vulnerable point of Germany is Austria-Hungary.

If, at the end of the war, the Entente powers shall have declared categorically that all the Austrian Slavs are to be free, and the Hapsburg monarchy destroyed, Austria-Hungary, instead of being a source of strength to Germany, will prove to have been a heavy burden, and the whole orientation of subsequent events will have been modified.

I am well aware that certain political leaders imagine that some day Austria-Hungary will rise up against Germany. It is a fatal illusion. The Pan-Germanic current has triumphed as completely at Budapest as at Vienna. On the other hand, if, in place of being completely divided up, Austria lost merely the Polish and Ruthenian provinces to the profit of Russia, and the Adriatic regions to the profit of Italy, the Germans and Magyars, who would then be 20,000,000 against 10,000,000 Czechs and Slovaks, would tyrannize over us completely. I say this in reply to the illusions of some of my compatriots who imagine that in an Austria which has been simply diminished we could hold our place.

There is one last objection advanced by those who believe the partition of Austria-Hungary would be harmful: it is that Germany would take over the Germans of Austria. My answer is that in that case the German Empire would be increased by 7,000,000 inhabitants, whereas by maintaining the Hapsburg monarchy you would be allowing the Kaiser to extend his sway over 51,000,000 new subjects.

In brief, the great Teutonic plan of the future, which menaces the existence of all the Allies, is the plan to make Germany mistress of Central Europe. I believe that the liberation of Central Europe ought to be the final object of the war. The normal organization of the nations which compose it is a work of creation that should be under the direction of France. We have long recognized your sympathy for Bohemia, and we expect from you—from your moral prestige, which increases every day—powerful and efficient aid. The new Europe will owe its birth to a positive and creative policy. A purely negative policy will not suffice to bring it into being.

You should strike at the defect in the enemy's armor by taking away the instruments which he wishes to use for purposes of world domination. The ruin of the Hapsburg monarchy is the surest means for reducing the German dreams to nothingness—by reducing Germany itself to the limits of its own power.

A Limping Peace Impossible

By Alfred Capus

Member of the French Academy and Editor of Le Figaro

I FEEL sure that the war cannot long preserve its present form. Massacres will cease before armies are disbanded, and if the war should last many months battles will become less and less frequent. We have already witnessed two kinds of war—at first, action in movement; later, after the Marne, action in immobility, that is, without great military movements. One can imagine a third kind—inaction in immobility, armies standing face to face, without disarming, while tedious negotiations are spun out, and Germany at bay discusses in despair the hard conditions of peace imposed on her by us.

During this time there will be reactions, collisions, reflecting the fits of German indignation at our demands; the roped beast will struggle, but the days of great slaughters will be over. This intermediary state between war and peace may drag along indefinitely. Shots will be fired from time to time, there will be " seasons " for fighting.

When it is said that a nation will fight to the last man you must bear in mind that this is a figure of speech; the greater the armies the greater the number of men that represent the last man. Germany will not wait until she is crushed to earth before treating with the Allies; it will be enough for her to realize her unavoidable, inevitable insufficiency for achieving victory. Then will be the moment for considering peace.

For my part, I can contemplate nothing but a decisive peace. Some speak of a "limping" peace; I deem that impossible. The German character is adverse to it; either the Germans will get all they want or they will be forced to grant what we want. A limping peace would be one allowing them the hope of better terms after one more effort. It is exactly compatible with their disciplined and stubborn nature to essay this extra effort before thinking of peace; therefore they will not sue.

That a nation may be brought to actual ruin seems to me a mere illusion. Some words are abused. Whatever gold will have been spent will certainly be tucked away somewhere; wherever it may be, it will be valueless until put in circulation, so that it will have to be ferreted out by active barter.

Moreover, there is current a very false idea as to the circulation of money. Europeans are prone to believe that all Americans are multi-millionaires; the truth of the matter is that there are a certain number of millions that come and go and are always the same. There is no difference in other parts of the world; this movement of millions back and forth will be re-established by force of circumstances. Each country will turn its products into money. Of course, it will be necessary to work.

I was talking the other day on this subject with a rich Englishman. "How can you suppose," he was saying, "that there could ever be commercial rivalry between you and us? I must sell you 200 tons of coal in order to buy a dress for my wife in the Rue de la Paix!"

Let us, then, buy coal and sell dresses, and we shall soon recover from a difficult situation, and so will other lands. All we have to fear is that, instead of turning to commerce, art, and literature, instead of developing our industries and devoting ourselves to the enriching of the individual and the nation, we may turn in a body to playing politics. That, I think, may be a possible and dire result of victory; it would be the best way of paralyzing ourselves.

France Gaining a New Status

By Emile Boutroux

Member of the French Academy and Noted Philosophical Writer

TO fix even approximately the date of peace presupposes the gift of foreseeing the unforeseeable; it belongs to the domain of prophecy. But it seems the part of wisdom, nevertheless, to predict that the war will be a long one. Marvelous as has been the task accomplished by us, unquestioned as is our tenacity, incessant as is our progress, we cannot say that the goal of our efforts is drawing near. All of us must persevere to the end; the patience of the entire nation must be boundless. It must convince itself, following the maxim of Caesar, that nothing is done if all is not done. Active sympathy and actual aid are coming, and doubtless will come more and more to the Allies and hasten their victory. Without doubt a greater industrial mobilization will contribute to bring about the decision, but we must gird ourselves with unshakable moral force to meet what lies before us.

When peace comes France will resume her place among the nations. She will fully resume her standing in the eyes of the world. We must acknowledge that she had not entirely recovered politically from 1870. There was much vaunting of her literary and artistic superiority in order that her shortcomings in other things might more easily be glossed over—an ingenious method of relegating her to the past.

By the treaty of Frankfort, Germany sought to crush us as a political power. Peace will re-establish the balance. But it must not be said there will be a veritable rebirth of France, as has been too often the case, for this is unjust to the past and incorrect in relation to the present. The men of yesterday were immediately found to be equal to the task of today. France will resume her place because she will be better known and appreciated.

No matter what happens, I think the German mode of thought is destined to lose in influence; it has shown too clearly to what horrors it tended. I cannot say what transformations it will undergo. It is a historical law that something like an intellectual transformation takes place between belligerents, but it is not always from victor to vanquished.

It is to be presumed, at all events, that Germany, having returned to her senses, will shake off the contempt which she has shown since 1870 for everything not German, and try to become again what she should never have ceased being —a nation among nations. Thus, her qualities may develop usefully for all because they will tend to become reconciled to the qualities peculiar to other nations. Specialization is undoubtedly good and indispensable, but it must not abolish humanity.

Only a Long War Can Bring Peace

By Emile Verhaeren

Famous Belgian Poet, Driven from His Home by German Invasion

PUBLIC opinion should have looked upon the present war as a long and costly one. People in France have not learned to consider it thus, owing to the character of the French, who are too prone to deceive themselves. When I was told that this or that French General prophesied a speedy end of the struggle, I not only could not believe that such an oracular remark had been made, but I was astonished at its being believed.

You are just beginning. Listen well to what I say. You got into the fight very late, and you have had to make up for lost time. That was your work in this first year of war; now you are equal to the work ahead. The wonderful part of it is that you have been able to maintain yourselves as you have, considering how much less prepared you were than the enemy.

Germany went into the fight equipped with everything; she reached the fields of battle in her full strength. All was calculated, there was no negligence to overcome. Some time before the war I was in Germany, and I was struck by the feeling of security reigning there; the entire land was ready for the fight and never doubted of victory. This atmosphere had been created. It was the result of an identical twist given the minds of all. I repeat: You at first had to catch up with an adversary who had a long start, but now he has lost this start and you will soon be able to outstrip him.

From the very first day Germany showed, so to speak, a completed façade, while yours, on the other hand, was full of holes which you had to stop up one by one. The breaches now visible in your building are holes that need stopping up; those on the German building are newly made breaches. You are completing your building; theirs is beginning to crumble. There can be no doubt as to the fissures.

But I do not think the fight will cease on either side for lack of combatants; you must have long wars, Napoleonic wars, in order to have a peace resulting from exhaustion of men. But there is moral, financial, economic exhaustion, of which Austria and Germany already show signs.

As an instance of their weakening,

I will bring to your attention only one thing: the checking of their campaign of propaganda in neutral countries. This campaign, prepared long ago, was one of the manifestations of their war organization; yet, despite a maximum of preparation, it did not succeed any more than did the German military campaign, under like conditions, on the different battle fronts. There is a striking discrepancy between the results achieved and the methodical efforts made; it is like a machine using up all its power for a very small product.

The Allies, on the other hand, may expect to increase their strength, and, by a natural progression, to redouble their efforts until definitive success is reached. At some time—and I do not think it is far away—we shall be superior in everything: numbers, material, morale, diplomacy. This will enable us to beat down the enemy everywhere.

To the question, "Will vanquished Germany undergo a transformation?" M. Verhaeren replied:

Frankly, I do not think the German soul is very susceptible of improvement; it is the only one in Europe of which this can be said. In a book which I have just published, "Bleeding Belgium," I have devoted a chapter to uncivilizable Germany; it is to these pages of my book that I attach some value. There is nothing less supple, less free, than the Germanic soul; there is nothing more refractory to moral beauty. If you wish my sentiments regarding this, read over this passage in my book:

"We have today the sad but immovable conviction that the true Germany was only by accident the Germany of Goethe, Beethoven, Heine; on the contrary, it was almost always the Germany of implacable landgraves and bloody mercenaries. Thousands of years ago she loosed her hordes on Europe. She is doing the same thing now. That is her sinister and terrible function.

"But do not let us be deceived again in future; she is the dangerous nation, because she is the uncivilized nation. Her castles, her fields, and her barracks have continued to be the unexhausted and perhaps inexhaustible reservoir of human ferocity."

More Manliness in Literature

By Vicente Blasco-Ibañez

Celebrated Spanish Novelist

I THINK that the war will last at least until 1917. I have always thought that it would be long, because I have never doubted that it would end in the right way. A short war? Why, that would be a disastrous war. The Germans might have won quickly, but French victory will be a work of patience and energy. The victories of justice, the victories that command respect, are always won only at such a price.

We must show perseverance, but despite all the difficulties in our path, I have the most absolute confidence in the final victory. On that I have an almost feminine intuition; for me, French victory is a clear vision.

And my reason confirms my sentiments. Germany held all the good cards at the beginning of the campaign, and your playing at that time was not brilliant. Now the German play cannot improve, while yours will improve constantly until at last you take in every trick.

It will be a hard task. The future holds in store for you alternating hours of discouragement and confidence. We have not yet seen the end of moral fluctuation and public opinion will have still further ups and downs.

But what matters this if all is to result in a joyous triumph? The enemy must be struck down at any cost.

There is a Spanish story which is apropos here: Two men had gone to law, and neither wished to back down. It was an important matter, and both were resolved to use up all the tricks of the law. They went from court to court until finally their money ran out.

Judgment was given at last but the two litigants were in a sorry plight. The vanguished was stark naked; the victor had nothing left but his shirt.

Well, you will have your shirt left at the end of the war, provided you are willing to lose all the rest!

Men? You have them and will have more. Russia and England are deep reservoirs of humanity. Munitions? When the factories of England, joining hands with your own, turn all their attention to war, you will lack nothing. Money? Oh, you can always find money somewhere in the world when evil is to be wrought with it. For fighting and pounding and blackmailing sheets there is alwas plenty of it.

Look at South America! There the masses go in rags beneath the burning rays of the sun, yet magnificent cannon and spiked helmets and sometimes even splendid and ruinously costly battleships glisten under this same sun that scorches their naked bodies. Finance never fails him who wishes to destroy!

If Germany counts on French supineness—and I think she does—she is wrong. Abroad one is often asked: "Do you think France will hold out?" This attitude of doubt is fostered in neutral lands by Germany—we must admit that her propaganda is most carefully organized, and much might be done along this line for the French cause! But I prefer not to harp on this point.

Let us speak rather of the great results which we must expect from this war; let us speak of the genius of the Latin race, which will burst into flower when you have dictated the terms of peace.

I hope that, in literature, your young people may be influenced less by the nebulous works of the north, that they may turn again to clearness and simplicity. The warrior's life will, of course, make them more manly, more vigorous. In their thoughts and their style we shall find again traces of the same energy shown by them in the trenches; they will be strong and independent. French literature lacked a certain incisiveness, ruggedness, brutality, that is now being given to it. And we shall soon see Latin genius, powerful and clear, reconquer first place in the world.

Do not think I meant that it should impose itself. The great mistake made by Germany was just that—she tried to suffocate the world beneath German culture. We live in a day of rapid communication, when minds receive the most diversified impressions and fashion themselves on most complex models. For that reason one can neither expect nor desire that one element should destroy all the others; there must be inevitable mixtures.

But as for us Latins, what we have learned of foreign ways of thought has come to us through France. France is an intellectual vehicle of the first order, and will be so all the more certainly after victory. Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Hegel, are accessible to us in Spain only through translations made by your writers.

To the question whether he meant the French themselves were partly responsible for the prevalence of German ideas in France, M. Blasco-Ibañez answered:

Perhaps. But still you don't know what an active propaganda they have instituted in my country. They may not have many partisans, but they make a tremendous lot of noise. In newspapers, on the streets, one hears nothing talked about but Germany, always Germany, still more Germany. And the multitude, always docile, catches up the cry. Their publicity is excellently managed, and in these times of ours great nations can no more do without publicity than great department stores.

Russia's Economic Strength

By Prince Eugene Troubetzkoy

Russian Diplomat and Distinguished Publicist

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY from the Russian Word, Moscow.]

ALL outward appearances in Russia support the pessimism prevailing among the many observers of our national life. Pessimism has become a cheap medium of looking wise, and optimism is considered with us a sign of naïveté and superficiality. Nevertheless, I venture to come out in defense of optimism, for that is the state of mind of the real, inner Russia.

At the first glance the arguments of the pessimists may appear to have been founded on solid ground. In the Fall, for instance, it looked as if Russia were on the brink of ruin. Our great defeats demonstrated our technical backwardness and our internal chaos. Deep differences between the Government and the people, a disorganized front, the prohibition of patriotic demonstrations, and the resultant lack of public interest in the outcome of the struggle; the irresistible flood of refugees, the sharp crisis in the cities in food supplies, coupled with the wild orgies indulged in by those who got suddenly rich at the expense of the impoverished population; the domination of the dark forces, the approaching danger of starvation, plus all that which is known to everybody but is not allowed in print, [Prince Troubetzkoy refers to the panic in Petrograd at the approach of the Germans and to the sinister intrigues in the Court,] all this led to gloomy forebodings, and the pessimist declared that Russia was perishing.

Yet, instead of perishing, Russia went through one of those paradoxical experiences of which only Russia is capable. Some profound, elemental, incomprehensible, and unknown power stopped the enemy's progress. Instead of following up and completely routing our army, wherein lay his only salvation, he nervously turned aside—to the Balkans.

The pessimistic predictions did not come true. A revolution did not blaze up. Russia did not disintegrate, did not perish, but instead went soon on the offensive, and is now pushing the enemy to the frontier. The meaning of this offensive is materially enhanced by the unmistakable moral victory won by us since last Autumn. I am speaking of the lowering of our enemy's peace demands, which certainly shows his weakening. Scarcely had our troops made an effort at an offensive in Galicia when Germany began to give up some of her annexation plans. The peace "feelers" in the neutral press indicate that Wilhelm is willing to forget the annexation of Belgium, Serbia, and Poland. The latter is at present being spoken of as an independent "buffer" State.

Where is to be found the explanation for Germany's concessions? No one asked her for them. If the Teutons could break Russia there would be no talk of concessions on their side, and they would cease sending out their now almost regular peace "feelers." It is clear that they must have realized the tremendous power of resistance we possess. But how can one reconcile this elemental strength with those ominous signs of decomposition found in Russia by the superficial observer?

Apparently those fateful signs of ruin, which deceive the pessimist, lie on the surface of the national life, and do not express the state of affairs in the very heart of our nation. Along with the Russia which strikes our eye first and fills its field of vision, there is another, truer, better Russia, which has so far escaped attention and has been little appreciated.

It is not difficult to understand such an optical illusion. Russia, to a very high degree, is a rural, agrarian nation, while the observer sees but the urban Russia. The daily ills and maladies of our urban life have thus been attributed to our national system. They are considered as critical and dangerous maladies in our entire organism, while all these signs of "decomposition" come solely from the surface, not having even touched the kernel of our existence—the village.

The fate of Russia, after all, is not in the hands of the city, but of the village. And our village during this war has been in many respects an amazing contrast to our city. Almost all the social maladies from which contemporary Russia is suffering are not rural but urban phenomena. This contrast is especially strong in the economic realm. While our cities, on account of the rise in prices, are suffering from poverty, our villages are getting richer, in spite of the war and high prices.

This growth in the prosperity of our rural population in times of a world war is a remarkable, astounding paradox. About two years ago such a thing would have been thought impossible, but now it is a fact on which all observers of our rural life agree. The farmers, land owners, and all others who reside in the country or come in close contact with its life concur in the opinion that our village is prospering now, as never before, for three reasons. First, because of the prohibition of alcohol; second, because the wives of the reservists receive sufficient support from the Government; third, because the peasantry is earning high wages.

The most eloquent proof of the prosperity of our villages is the added billion rubles in our savings banks since the beginning of the war. The ban on alcohol amply accounts for this billion. But the monetary billion should be multiplied several times in order to get the nation's prosperity, for prohibition has raised the productivity of the country many times.

We are observing a phenomenon unique in the history of the world. In war times, it has been an axiom, the productivity of a nation is diminished. All enterprises by a Government at war are intended for destructive and not constructive ends. In Russia you find the reverse, you witness a colossal increase in the nation's power of productivity. If to the billion incident to the prohibition of alcohol be added the total of the monthly allowances paid out to the wives of the soldiers, and if the fact that the wage of the laborer is now from one and a half to two times as high everywhere as before the war be taken into consideration, the prosperity of our villages is fully accounted for.

I had numerous occasions to inquire of peasants if they needed any help, and every time I received an astonishing reply. In spite of the habit of the Russian peasant to complain always, I was told that there was no acute need now, that the wives of the soldiers need nothing, and the more children they have the better off they are, as they get larger allowances, which cannot be spent on alcohol. In some cases I heard of paupers and down-and-outs who became prosperous. Not long ago an ex-drunkard was pointed out to me with this remark: "You see his boots? Well, it is the first time in his life that he has been shod." The man, smiling blissfully, confirmed the compliment. Generally, the village is now more and better shod than ever before, and this in spite of the fact that shoes cost more than double the price paid before the war.

The high prices have hardly caused any hardships in our villages. The fact that it is very difficult to hire laborers from the peasantry and that many landowners suffer from lack of hands is significant. It is not a question of higher wages, but of the impossibility to procure labor for *any* price, not because there is no labor supply, but because the peasant is prosperous where he is.

In light of the conditions instanced, ome things that were considered maladies turn out to be in reality signs of our economic strength, which fills all the nooks and corners of our village life. Not long ago we were all alarmed by the disappearance of silver from circulation, now replaced by paper certificates. A peasant thus explained to me the whole affair: "Why should not the silver disappear? You, the lords, have hidden all the gold. Well, we hid all the silver we could get. You will hardly find a woman in a village that has not secreted her savings in silver, say, forty or fifty rubles." To verify these savings is, of course, impossible, but the fact that they exist with the parallel growth in the savings bank deposits is truly significant. It shows that there is the surplus to save. From a social worker engaged in fighting high prices I hear that the rise on everything is to a great extent due to the increased demands of the village. It is indeed very logical that those who save will not suffer any want. A large part of the products before manufactured for our urban population is being drawn off by our villagers.

There are many similar facts corroborating these statements. And all these facts, taken together, answer the question: "What was that elemental power which arrested the German invasion?" It was the power of the Russian village, against which the Napoleonic hordes were once wrecked. Urban Germany would have many advantages over us in a short struggle in which technical superiority decided the issue. If the war had been a short one we could not have won. But it is all different now, when it has become a war of exhaustion. No machinery in the world can create the basic forces necessary for winning this war. And here we have the advantage over our opponent. In the economic circumstances of our village life we can continue the war indefinitely. Our foe can do no such thing, and that is why instead of continuing the invasion of Russia he turned to the Balkans in quest of human and food supplies. But Bulgaria and Turkey could spare none of the former and very little of the latter.

Our chances for victory are very good. Whatever the advantage of the enemy over us in efficiency of organization and management, whatever the degree of disorder in our country, in this prolonged war the decisive factor will be the power of resistance based on numbers and on the prosperity and spirit of the population.

We have the material power necessary to exhaust Germany. Have we the moral power to sustain the heroic patience necessary for it? The question can have but one answer. If the most important material advantage is with us, we could be conquered only because of cowardice and lack of spirit. In other words, we could be beaten if we voluntarily agreed to become Germany's vassal. But the masses of the Russian people have enough courage to defend their country and independence, and that courage will grow into an invincible force with the growing realization that our material reserves are inexhaustible.

The prosperity of our villages is not merely a material gain; it is the result of a great moral and spiritual victory—our victory over alcohol. This victory would never have been won without that powerful spiritual upheaval which seized the country in the beginning of the war. There must be courage in a people that could do such an unprecedented miracle in the days of a world conflagration as to raise the condition and increase the prosperity of millions of human beings. Russia begins to understand her powers and have faith in herself. This faith will lead her to victory.

Latest German Bread Cards



Nicht übertragbar

Brotkarte

Berlin und Nachbarorte

Nicht übertragbar

Gilt nur für die 49. Woche vom 24. bis 30. Januar 1916

Rückseite beachten!

Nicht übertragbar

Brotkarte

Berlin und Nachbarorte

Nicht übertragbar

Gilt nur für die 50. Woche vom [illegible] Jan. bis [illegible] Febr. 1916

Rückseite beachten!

Four million of these bread cards are used each week in Berlin alone. The two here reproduced show that the allowance of bread was reduced Feb. 1 by 50 grams, or about 2 ounces.

Italian Prisoners in Austria

By Cardinal Scapinelli

Following a request by Pope Benedict XV. the Papal Nuncio at Vienna, Cardinal Scapinelli, made a tour of investigation through the prison camp at Mauthausen, a little village on the banks of the Danube, and reported on the conditions obtaining among the Italians confined there. This report, which appeared in the Osservatore Romano of Feb. 8, has been characterized as over-rosy by the anti-clerical press, which goes into details regarding the Cardinal's pro-Austrian sentiments, but many of the leading newspapers of Italy have expressed their faith in the sincerity and accuracy of Mgr. Scapinelli's impressions.

IN the centre of a broad plain at Mauthausen is spread out the big city of barracks, covering more than twenty-four square kilometers, the Italians' quarters on the right and those of the Serbians on the left. The barracks are well built and well arranged, being separated by wide streets and large squares for strolls and athletic games. They are heated and are illuminated by electric light. The rules of hygiene are strictly observed. There are buildings for disinfection, baths and quarantine quarters where the men just arrived from the battlefield are obliged to spend a few weeks. The houses for the officers resemble elegant little villas, each with a veranda or porch where, during bad weather, their occupants may divert themselves and breathe fresh air.

A big barrack church, which will be very imposing when finished, is being constructed. In the meantime there are several large buildings in which the Holy Sacrifice is celebrated on holy days, and three chapels devoted to the care of the Holy Sacrament. The religious services leave nothing to be desired. The curate in charge of the camp is from Tyrol, has a good command of Italian, is earnest and zealous, and is assisted by two Italian priests who are prisoners of war, one of whom is a Capuchin friar. Mgr. Vicario Castrense at once intervened on behalf of these priests, induced the Ministry of War to grant them special treatment, authorized them to celebrate the holy mass, and now he has furnished them with every facility necessary to enable them to exercise their holy offices for the benefit of their countrymen. I asked, and quickly obtained, permission for them to wear the garb of chaplains instead of the regular military uniform. They have permission freely to visit every part of the camp and to call upon the prisoners, especially in cases of illness. Another priest is interned in the special hospital for infectious diseases. There are also ten members of the lay clergy among the prisoners, some of them deacons, and I have warmly recommended them to the care of the pastor and the two Italian priests.

Not only healthy prisoners are confined at Mauthausen at present. There are special quarters which receive not only those who become ill in the concentration camp, but also a number of wounded men brought there because there is no room for them in the hospitals near the front. I visited the well-cared for cemetery, in the centre of which is found a chapel, and where fifty-three Italians who have died here since last May are buried. Then I went to see the various hospitals, including one devoted to the Serbians. I found that the care of the sick left nothing to be wished for. The Colonel in command shows a loving interest in the poor sick and wounded men. The Austrian doctors are assisted by Italian medical men among the prisoners who have full freedom of the entire camp. The rooms are light and well ventilated and heated. The food for the sick is prepared in special kitchens. I talked with all the sick and wounded men, one at a time, and when I asked them if they were well treated and if they needed anything, they all declared they were contented and gave special praise to the head doctor, who cares for them like a father.

Later I visited many of the soldiers'

quarters and talked with a number of the men freely and without witnesses. Occasionally one of them complained about the insufficiency of the rations. I sampled the food and found it of good quality. The quantity is the normal allowance for soldiers. I looked over the bill of fare for the week and found that they had meat every day at noon, except on Tuesdays and Fridays, days on which the sale of meat is forbidden throughout the entire empire, and then they have fish. In addition to the 150 grams (about a third of a pound) of meat, they receive 350 grams of vegetables, potatoes, cornmeal, rice, &c., besides soup. In the morning they have tea or broth and at night they have soup with a portion of vegetables, potatoes, cornmeal, beans, &c. There is enough bread, and it is of the same quality as that used by everybody in Austria. The only basis for the complaint regarding the insufficiency of the rations may be found by considering the age of the men and the fine, pure air which descends upon the camp from the snow-capped mountains round about. Every week each soldier gets a package of tobacco and paper to make cigarettes. In every division of the camp are little shops where, at prices fixed by the commander, eatables, wines, and other things that may be wanted are sold.

Some of the prisoners, especially those from the south, said they suffered from the cold during the night and asked for more covering. It must be admitted, however, that the barracks are well roofed, have windows with double sashes, and are heated sufficiently.

Then I saw the vast barrack theatre where a small orchestra, made up entirely of Italians, and with instruments mostly obtained from the camp's curate, played a few pieces in honor of the visitors.

The officers have nothing to ask or wish for. In fact, their houses are excellent, well heated, very clean, and furnished with a certain degree of elegance. From the rank of Captain up, each one has a room for himself. The other officers are quartered two in a room. Their table is directly under their own control. They are paid the allowance corresponding to their rank, the minimum being 4 crowns a day, (about 80 cents at the normal rate of exchange.) The officers are allowed to take strolls outside the limits of the camp once or twice a week.

I talked with Della Porta, Lombardi, San Felice, and Ronca, all of whom are in excellent health. Colonel Riveri, while complaining of the treatment accorded him during the first days of his imprisonment before he came to Mauthausen, sincerely praised the Colonel and the other Austrian officers of the camp for the gentlemanly manner in which they treated the Italian officers. He complained about the shortage of milk for the sick men, but I reminded him that the scarcity of milk was only due to the lack of cattle, a great part of which had been butchered for the army, and to the difficulties of transportation, the lines being used for military purposes. Riveri also complained that there had been cases of prisoners having been personally maltreated by the Austrian soldiers guarding the camp. Colonel Dini, who was present, replied that if there had been some abuses he had punished the guilty men severely, and besides he was always ready to lend a willing ear to any well-founded complaints that might be made to him in the matter.

I believe I am able to affirm that upon the whole the treatment of the prisoners is good and that the Government is doing everything possible on its part to avoid any occasion for complaints. In regard to the shortages noted, it is necessary to remember that Austria has an immense number of prisoners in her charge in different places, and that her care of them is naturally affected by the hardships that are the sad consequences of the terrible war ravaging Europe. For my part I did not fail to direct the attention of the commander to the complaints and desires that I had heard during my visits and chats with the officers and soldiers, and he assured me that so far as he was concerned they would receive full consideration. As the Minister of War had already declared to Mgr. Bjelik that he would be glad to listen to my recommendations in the matter in order to do something to please the Holy Father, I hope that he will not fail to do what he can in favor of the Italian prisoners.

Italian Prisoners in Russia

By Renzo Laroo

Petrograd Correspondent of the Corriere della Sera

[NOTE.—Thousands of Italians lived in Austrian territory and were compelled to serve in the Austrian Army. This accounts for the curious fact that Russia holds many prisoners who belong by language and nationality to one of her own allies.]

HOW many Austrian prisoners of Italian nationality are there in Russia? Many have asked this question, here in Petrograd and elsewhere, but so far it has been impossible to obtain the exact figures. There are certainly several thousands of these prisoners and their number increases in proportion as the search for them is extended. Letters, notices, and other data keep coming in from the most distant regions of this huge empire. The soldiers captured from Austria and Germany have been gradually distributed throughout all the provinces as they have been sent on from the front.

Italian prisoners are to be found today in large numbers in Kirsanof and Orlof in European Russia, and in Omsk in Siberia. There are about 1,300 of them, including fifty-eight officers, at Kirsanof, 929 in Orlof, and eighty-four in Omsk. They have not always been in these places. Nearly all of them have made long trips, regular pilgrimages, while being shifted from one locality to another. There are groups, for example, that at first were sent to Turkestan, then to Siberia, then to Kirsanof, then to Orlof, and finally back to Kirsanof again. Thus they have traveled something over 5,000 miles. It would be difficult to figure out the reason for these changes. The main fact is that whenever the prisoners settle down in any one place they declare that they are not at all uncomfortable. Those who lived in Siberia were especially contented. Enormous stretches of ground, unlimited horizons, and almost entire freedom! The soldiers were distributed among the cabins of the peasants and with the middle-class families, and they worked and earned a few rubles.

It was in Siberia that a group of officers and soldiers conceived the idea of organizing an association of those who wanted to leave for Italy to go to the front and fight against Austria. The association, which is called Cernagora, is composed of young men animated by a high military spirit and an undying hatred of the House of Hapsburg. From Siberia the first members have carried on a lively propaganda in the various centres to which they have been scattered. Today they form a band of considerable size, there being 300 of them in Kirsanof alone. These latter have an Italian flag which they fling joyously to the breeze whenever they see a group of Austrians or Austrophiles. The Austrians take revenge by deriding the names of Italy and Savoia, and by menacingly displaying a piece of rope. But our boys have plenty of good humor, and, moreover, when the occasion presents itself, they are able to give a good demonstration of skill with their fists. One member of the Cernagora has sent us the following beautiful, although rather sad, note:

> The news of the beginning of the war for our redemption came to us like the voice of Providence. At last the hour had struck for our liberation from the heavy yoke of the oppressor. We responded with enthusiasm to the Russian invitation to go and fight against Austria, happy in the thought of being able to lend the power of our arms toward the realization of the common ideal. From day to day we have been flattering ourselves with the hope of being able to begin the march on Trent and Trieste, via Rome. But up to the present our hopes have not been realized.

Somewhat later, when the Russian

proposal to make Italy a present of the Austrian prisoners of Italian nationality was rendered impossible of execution because of the events in the Balkans, which blocked the only easy way of communication, a plan was thought out for the repatriation of the officers, at least. Then a person who had the opportunity of being in touch with these officers reminded them of the position in which the soldiers would be left, without leaders or guides, and, above all, without doctors to care for them, as the only medical men admitted to the camps are those found among the prisoners themselves.

"I do not dare express any wish," said he to the officers selected for the journey. "I haven't the courage to ask that any of you renounce the joy of returning to liberty; I am simply making these observations."

Five officers stepped out of the group and said: "We will stay."

Of course no one should imagine that the prisoners are enjoying an enchanting sojourn. But, in order to give the Italians special privileges, as compared with the Austrians and Germans, the Russian Government consented to a plan of segregation and sent one of our officials to make an official inspection of the concentration camps and thus facilitate the work of selection. Commander Gazzurelli, our Consul General at Moscow, visited many localities, and the results of his trips were quickly apparent. In Kirsanof some 300 men had been living for two months in a damp cellar. One soldier was ill with typhus, another was suffering from erysipelas, and a third was affected with tuberculosis. This promiscuity was becoming deadly. Our Consul saw to it at once that these deplorable conditions were remedied and the 300 men quartered elsewhere, in a decent and healthful place. Another result of his visit was the careful separation of the genuine Italians from the traitors and Austrophiles who had identified themselves with the former, either in order to enjoy the special privileges or to carry on the work of spying, even in prison. Many Austrian officers, devoted to their Government, have been busy trying to spread false news among the soldiers, alleging, for example, that the City of Venice has been destroyed and the entire province occupied. By means of all kinds of intimidation they seek to suffocate the noble Italian spirit, and there is no doubt that in some places they have obtained some results. In Omsk, in Siberia, out of 800 prisoners of uncertain nationality only eighty-four came out frankly for Italy.

Our men have obtained the right to have separate kitchens. The squad commanders sally forth every morning to buy the day's rations and the cooks do their best to try to make the food seem as Italian as possible.

And the men have organized an Italian orchestra. Just think of it, an Italian orchestra in Siberia! And it seems to have made a hit already, because the little orchestra is in great demand in all the houses in the neighborhood when there are festivities, and the Russian officers are eager to hear Italian songs. Now the little orchestra is anxious to grow and to take on a more regular appearance, as it is about to play in a theatre. It already consists of six violins, a flute, two guitars, and a contrabass, but it appears these are not enough, so the director defined his needs to us as follows:

"As this is an ensemble much too small to appear before the public, it is very necessary to increase the number of our instruments in order to maintain our prestige, consequently I take the liberty to ask you to help us obtain a trombone, a viol, and an oboe."

* * *

Mail Service in the World War

By O. Grosse

Special Director of German Mails in War Time

Herr Grosse, who has been intrusted with special supervision of the reorganized postal service during the war, writes in the Grosse Zeit, published at Berlin and Vienna:

AT no time is there so much said and written about the mail service of a country as when war breaks out. The moment the troops begin to move toward the frontiers uncountable pens at home get busy for the purpose of dispatching letters with the first field post. And no sooner are these letters consigned to the letter boxes at home than the writers begin to count the days and hours when answers may be forthcoming.

But the answers are long in coming. Uncertainty then takes possession of the letter writer. Why, comes the question, can the mail service not do its duty when it is evident that the railroads themselves are promptly caring for the transportation of the troops? Then we hear how the "organization of the post has broken down."

Nobody knows better than those immediately charged with the work in hand how unjustifiable such a charge is. It must be recalled that in peace times the normal mail requires a closely woven service, whose parts fit into each other. Before the war the main arteries of the German mail service made use of 21,000 daily railroad trains. These were supplemented by 17,000 posts for the country roads. But mobilization naturally changed this over night. The passenger and freight schedules ceased to be. The entire apparatus of transportation went to service of the army.

It is now 200 years since the first Prussian field post became effective—during the war of King Frederick Wilhelm I. against Sweden. The present-day system is patterned in many ways on what was found serviceable during those campaigns. But it was not until the war of 1864 that such far-reaching efforts were made to handle quickly the accumulating mail matter. The divisional work of today is so regulated as to afford the quickest possible dispatch, both in coming and going. How to have the letter reach the individual, who may be in one place today and quite another place tomorrow, is one of the hourly problems before the postal officials.

The system obtaining in the Austro-Hungarian army is quite similar to the German. Russia primarily considers the postal service in the field a matter for the military and not the general public. The French field post has for many years been a sort of stepchild of the "grande nation." When, after the battle of Sedan, Stephan inquired of the French prisoners as to their field post, he received the answer that since their departure from home they had had no letters. They added that this fact was in large measure responsible for the dejection and apathy of the troops.

During the first months of the world war the greatest irregularity prevailed in the French Post Office in respect to the sending of letters to the soldiers in the field. If one is to believe the Temps, which has no reason to make wrong statements in the matter, letters became heaped up at home, and it had even got to the point where mail was left unassorted for want of enough men to do the work. In January, 1915, Clemenceau took occasion to take the French Senate to task for permitting such bungling. The conditions even compelled relatives of soldiers to insert important personal items in the newspapers in the hope that these might come to the attention of their sons and brothers in the field.

In contradiction of the Temps exposure, the Matin would have the French public believe that the nation's field-post service was equal to the German. However, the facts in the case must be allowed to speak for themselves.

The British postal service in France offers certain peculiar difficulties, due mainly to the fact that extra postage is required. The intricacies of this system have led to many complications. The many-hued postcard of the French, showing grouped flags of the Entente powers, has also been a factor in complicating matters since the entrance of the Italians in the war.

The handling the of war prisoners' mail is a problem in itself. The World Postal Union at Rome in 1906 laid the foundation for the first systematic handling of this correspondence, although The Hague Conference in 1899 had made preliminary reports to the same effect. Up to that time the German Post Office Department had been the only one to arrange for the sending of letters and money to the 400,000 French prisoners in Germany during the war of 1870-71. No postage was exacted of the prisoners for sending letters home. Today similar privileges are accorded war prisoners throughout the world.

The cessation of mail service between enemy countries since the beginning of the war has done not a little toward further complicating the work of the Post Office Department at home. The fact that the neutral countries are exposed to inconveniences resulting from the stopping of mail and transportation service between enemy nations naturally does not improve the situation. We Germans have reason to know that England's interest for the neutrals stops whenever there is cause to think that Germany might be benefited in the slightest measure. The neutrals, for their part, ought to be convinced by this time that what is England's pleasure in the premises has caused them untold trouble in respect to the mails to and from countries with which these neutrals are doing business. It is to be hoped that when peace once more returns precautions will be taken not to permit England such highhandedness as makes every neutral nation its victim in the domain of postal operations.

A Speech by Cardinal Mercier

The Vingtième Siècle, a Belgian newspaper appearing at Havre, recently published a speech delivered at Ghent by Cardinal Mercier, in which he said:

My brethren, yet another word: I am anxious to tell you how proud we are of you. Not a day passes without my receiving from abroad, from friends of all nations, letters of condolence, which almost always end with these words: "Poor Belgium!" and I reply: "No, no, not poor Belgium, but great Belgium, incomparable Belgium, heroic Belgium." On the map of the world she is only a tiny point which many foreigners would never have looked at without a magnifying glass; but today there is not a nation in the world which does not pay homage to this Belgium.

How great and beautiful she is! if they saw her as we see her with our eyes, they would know that after a year of suffering there is not yet a single Belgian who weeps or murmurs! I have not yet met a workman without work, a woman without resources, a mother in tears, a wife in mourning who murmurs! They bow beneath the hand of Providence.

It is what disconcerts the men who have been among us for a year. There is "one year" since they have been living among us, and they do not know us yet! They are stupefied! On the one hand, no one murmurs, we all respect and will continue to respect their regulations. But, on the other hand, not one heart has given itself to them.

We have one King! one King only, and we will always have only one King.

The Berlin-Constantinople Express

By Dr. Ludwig Stein

As special correspondent of the Vossische Zeitung, Dr. Stein traveled on the first through train from Berlin to Constantinople. His account of the trip is, in part, as follows:

BETWEEN Budapest and Semlin we easily made up the little time we had lost, so the train was able to draw up at the platform in Belgrade with true Prussian punctuality. This was at 6:45 in the morning, and with the brilliant sun and the clear sky we could see the former capital of Serbia from the station at Semlin. The ruins of the great railway bridge lay on both banks of the Save—it had been blown up the day after the declaration of war. The famous pontoon bridge which the German engineers had erected in its place is a wonderful monument to the rapid strategic technique of our army. Belgrade was just waking up as we approached, and when we arrived at the station I could hardly believe my eyes. I had expected to see every sign of ravage and ruin, but I found instead a completely new station which had never felt the effects of a shell. Here again our military sense of order had rebuilt in a few weeks the buildings which the guns had destroyed, so that one was forced to say that the inevitable victory must surely fall to those who have proved their abilities both in destruction and in restoration.

In Semlin and in Belgrade, as well, we saw large numbers of Russian prisoners who looked at the new train as if it had been some fabulous animal—doubtless not knowing that this latest journey meant a stab at the heart of territory which Russia had been longing for ever since the time of Peter the Great. Thanks to the bravery of our gallant soldiers, we could now travel through a single geographical stretch of territory from Hamburg to Constantinople. A cruel awakening, symbolized by this very "Balkan train" we are traveling in, follows Russia's century-old dream. The dream has been fulfilled, but negatively. The dream has become a reality, not for the Russians, but for us.

The ravages of war are more in evidence when we leave the station at Belgrade. Of the dwelling houses in the neighborhood, only heaps of stones remain. The suburbs, too, have suffered, and I noticed whole streets in which every house had suffered from shellfire. But in comparison with the suburbs, one of the railway officials at the station assured me the town of Belgrade itself was not much injured. The people had returned to their occupations for the most part, and more or less normal life was now in evidence.

Outside Belgrade the country presented a desolate appearance, much of it being under water. Soon after we had passed the Avala Hill, which cost us hecatombs of men, we came to the plains, and here there was a distinct improvement. The fields were cultivated, and the villages seemed to be as peaceful as if nothing whatever had happened to the Serbian dynasty. The houses had not suffered much; but there were few men to be seen—mostly women and children and Russian prisoners working under supervision. Our troops leave the local inhabitants to themselves, and order has been restored.

The Morava Valley was not gained without hard-fought battles, but there are no signs of strife now. All traces of the war have been removed, and normal life has been resumed. Here again, however, men are scarce, and the work is being done by the women. We are now at Jagodina, where the wild strawberries ripen early in May; the mild climate of the place made it a favorite resort of wealthy Belgrade merchants. So mild, indeed, was the climate in the middle of December last, as a German General told me, that the troops were able to bathe in the Morava River.

The restaurant car was put on at Nish,

and thence the journey to Sofia was rapid. The nearer we approached the Bulgarian capital the fewer sights of war did we see. The roads were better, the villages more active, the aspect of the inhabitants more contented. A warm welcome awaited us at Sofia, and now we are off to Constantinople.

The Bagdad Railway

Its Present Status

Some particulars regarding the Bagdad Railway given recently by the Hamburger Fremdenblatt are especially interesting in view of the Russian advance in Asia Minor. Following is a summary of the article:

WORK on those portions of the line which were being constructed before the war began has been completed. Between Aleppo and Bagdad two sections of the line have been completely finished and are now in use, viz., the section from Mostemie to Ras-el-Ain, (about 186 miles,) and the section from Samarra, (about eighty-eight miles.) Between these sections lies the stretch of line from Ras-el-Ain to Mossul, and hence to Samarra, about 366 miles long. In view of the difficulty at present of getting labor and material, it is not likely that work on this section can be begun until after the war.

Between Aleppo and Konia (and thence to Constantinople) the tunnels on the line which is to run through the Amanus and the Taurus ranges have not been finished. The Amanus line, however, has been connected with the Baghtshe Tunnel (about two miles long) since June 1, 1915, and the work is being so rapidly proceeded with that on Feb. 1, 1916, the stretch of railway from Islahie to Mamure may be opened as a branch line, and it is expected that it will be in full working order by Oct. 1 next as the main line. After that it will only be necessary to complete the Taurus section of the line to link up the Syrian railway systems with Constantinople. There are, however, a number of tunnels to be constructed in this area, and their total length will probably be about eight or nine miles. This work can hardly be completed for two years, and in the meantime the road is used in the places where the railway will run by and by.

The total length of the Bagdad Railway from Haidar Pasha (opposite Constantinople) to Konia, and thence to Bagdad, is 2,435 kilometers, (about 1,510 miles,) made up as follows:

	Kilometers.
Haidar Pasha—Eski Shehir	313
Eski Shehir—Karahissar	162
Karahissar—Konia	262
Konia—Kara Pounar	293
Kara Pounar—Adana	77
Adana—Islahie	153
Islahie—Aleppo	142
Mosternie, (Aleppo)—Mossul	633
Mossul—Bagdad	400
Total	*2,435

*Equals 1,510 miles.

Of this total mileage 1,083 miles are already in use, and when the Amanus branch is opened on Feb. 1 this figure will be increased to 1,117 miles, leaving only a comparatively small distance still to be covered. The rolling stock in use is of the best quality, and is worthy of its German manufacturers.

The Future of Serbia

By Pavle Popovic

Professor of Literature, Belgrade University

[By Special Arrangement of CURRENT HISTORY with The London Morning Post.]

EXHAUSTED as she was by the Balkan wars, it was much against her will that Serbia entered upon the world war, and she would never have done so had she not trusted in the support of the great powers of the Entente. It was with great satisfaction that she saw—an occurrence without precedent in her history—Russia, France, and, above all, England, the three countries she most loved and admired, undertaking to defend her. The depression that weighed upon Serbia during the first days of mobilization gave way to an outburst of joy when the news came that England herself stood by her side, and I myself saw the Serbian soldiers, on hearing it, throw their caps high into the air, wild with delight.

Yet Serbia realized that, in spite of this valuable help, she must undergo a fearful ordeal. Well she knew that in this long, cruel war—a veritable war of giants—her slender forces could not endure as long as those of her powerful allies. When a poor man is by chance obliged to live at the same rate as others who are richer, his resources soon give way. The feeble convalescent cannot hope to accomplish the feats of endurance that are well within the power of the strong and healthy whom he meets upon his road.

Serbia was conscious that it was herself, and not her allies, who would suffer the greatest misfortunes. But she was resigned. Alone, she twice expelled the aggressor from her country, and for a long time she stood firm. Bleeding from her wounds, wearied by her immense efforts, she saw fresh danger threatening her and asked for help. But no help came. On the contrary, she was asked to cede Macedonia. It is difficult to realize what Macedonia meant to her and the immense sacrifice its cession entailed, but she saw clearly what the outcome of the war would be, were it to be complicated by another Balkan campaign; so she made the needful sacrifice. When Bulgaria mobilized, Serbia sought permission to attack Bulgaria immediately—from a military point of view this was the only possible thing to do—but the permission was refused.

It was then that Serbia prepared to die. Over and over again the enemy offered peace, but she refused it. She chose the path of honor rather than that of interest. In the words of the poet, she was " pale in her suffering, yet faithful and without reproach." Like Abraham of old, she was ready to sacrifice her sons, only because the Voice from on high had commanded it. And the sacrifice was made, no angel appearing at the moment when the sword flashed in the air. All this happened to Serbia quietly, and she made no protest, no accusation against any one. And today she has the same faith in her allies that she had before. But now that the sacrifice is made what will be the reward? What will be the future of Serbia? In the month of December, 1914, the Serbian Government declared that its program consisted in the deliverance from the Austrian yoke of all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, so that they should be united with Serbia and Montenegro into one State.

This program is, indeed, that of all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Every one who is acquainted, however little, with the recent history and actual conditions of the Southern Slavs must recognize it as a matter of fact. Serbia's program was always to deliver her brothers groaning beneath the foreign yoke and to unite them to her in one single State. The wise Prince Michael made it the principal object of his policy, with the enthusiastic approval of all Serbian and Southern Slav people outside Serbia. The Croats, since their national awakening, soon recognized that they were the same nation as the Serbs, speaking the same language and having the same aspirations of deliverance and union. The great Croatian patriot Bishop Strossmayer was the very incarnation of the noble idea of the Serbo-Croatian unity. The Slovenes at last, in a similar manner becoming conscious of their nationality, adhered also to the same idea, fully recognizing that their national existence, too, depended on it. Moreover, the common sufferings of the last few years closely united the dispersed members of the same family and strengthened the faith in the national unity and the confidence in the leading rôle of Serbia.

What is, then, more natural and more just than the program of the Serbian Government? Is not the latter alone the spokesman of the whole Southern Slav race? And when other nations have been helped to realize their political union, why not allow Serbia to achieve the same purpose?

I wish especially to emphasize that England, too, has every interest in assisting my country in her aspirations. England has not realized till now the importance of Serbia. She needed the whole Serbian tragedy to be enacted before her eyes for her to comprehend that, at the decisive moment, Serbia alone of all the Balkan States is ready to fight at her side, no matter what the cost. Serbia must needs drain the cup of poison to its dregs for this country to understand that it is she who holds the gate of Britain's Eastern Empire. For she is indeed the holder of that gate, and it was not till she had fallen that England began to see that Egypt was threatened from that quarter. It has been said that the first German guns fired across the Danube were aimed not at Serbia but at Egypt, and the saying is the bare truth.

No one knows what will be the extent of victory. If the Allies enter Berlin as conquerors they can dismember Germany at their leisure. If, however, they merely expel the foe from the countries he is now occupying, their greatest object will be to prevent Germany from being a permanent danger to them. And wherein lies this danger, for England especially? It is one that threatens the British Eastern possessions and them alone. Germany is forcing open the gateway to the East that she may threaten the British Empire. Let her, then, close that gate with strong steel bars, and as for Serbia, who holds the key, make her so strong that she can successfully resist any German aggression in the future. In doing that England will be performing an act of justice. She will also be saving her prestige, which has been badly shaken in the Balkans, where it was hoped she would have acted with greater energy. She will also safeguard her vast interests. By creating a strong Southern Slav State she will strengthen, firstly, the military power of Serbia, and secondly, by the same stroke, will deprive the enemy of an equal amount of power, for today Austria compels to fight for her those who tomorrow will be citizens of Serbia.

What, however, is disconcerting is when we see that in England there is still some misplaced feeling for the Bulgarians, which is quite the reverse of all right political understanding. Bulgaria is the enemy of the Allies just as much as Germany, Austria, and Turkey. She is their foe exactly in the same way.

An enemy such as that must be punished. While Serbia bars the road to the east against the Germans, Bulgaria throws it open. All that Serbia strives to do for England Bulgaria destroys. Bulgaria is England's only inveterate enemy in the Balkans, as Serbia is her only faithful friend. And as England's paramount interest is to close the gateway to the east, it is likewise her interest not only to strengthen Serbia but also to weaken Bulgaria. Never again commit the error of demanding Macedonia for Bulgaria, but force Bulgaria to restore to Serbia all that of which she has so treacherously robbed her. It is England's duty to make Bulgaria powerless to work evil on England and on the Allies. If she cannot be sure of entering Berlin, she can be absolutely sure of entering Sofia and crushing Bulgaria. This also must be the first objective of the Allies' armies.

Important War Books in Press

This department is devoted mainly to significant extracts from advance sheets of books relating to the great European war or to world affairs that are directly affected by the war. Some of the volumes are still in press, though they will appear this month. The object is to give in advance the same sort of information that may be had later by turning over the pages in a bookstall.

A Book From the Trenches

THE FIRST HUNDRED THOUSAND. By Ian Hay. Frontispiece in colors. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. $1.50.

IAN HAY, widely known as a breezy novelist, comes before the public in this book under his real name and new title, Captain Ian Hay Beith. Immediately upon the outbreak of the war he enlisted and joined a Highland regiment, becoming one of the first hundred thousand of General Kitchener's army in France. He is still in the trenches, and "for some mysterious reason" was recently recommended for the military cross. His experiences as a raw recruit and as a seasoned soldier make a unique war book, a verbal moving picture of the whole "licking into shape" process through which other hundreds of thousands of British civilians are still passing today.

Captain Beith writes with the light, bright, humorous touch of a cheery novelist, and at the same time he makes one breathe the very air of the drill ground and of the battle-swept trenches. Though the names he uses are fictitious, the men are real and become familiar friends of the reader long before the climax in the fighting near Loos is reached. From the humors of the awkward squad to the cool courage of the battlefield the book is a delightful revelation of the British or Scottish Tommy as he is in real life.

One of the more dramatic battle episodes must serve here as a sample of Captain Beith's graphic pages:

> Still the enemy advanced. His shrapnel was bursting overhead; bullets were whistling from nowhere, for the attack in force was now being pressed home in earnest.
>
> The deserted trench upon our left ran right through the cottages, and this restricted our view. No hostile bombers could be seen; it was evident that they had done their bit and handed the conduct of affairs to others. Behind the shelter of the cottages the German infantry were making a safe détour, and were bound, unless something unexpected happened, to get round behind us.
>
> "They'll be firing from our rear in a minute," said Kemp between his teeth. "Lochgair, order your platoon to face about and be ready to fire over the parados."
>
> Young Lochgair's method of executing this command was characteristically thorough. He climbed in leisurely fashion upon the parados; and standing there, with all his six-foot-three in full view, issued his orders.
>
> "Face this way, boys! Keep your eyes on that group of buildings just behind the empty trench, in below the Fosse. You'll get some target practice presently. Don't go and forget that you are the straightest-shooting platoon in the company. There they are"—he pointed with his stick—"lots of them—coming through that gap in the wall! Now, then, rapid fire, and let them have it! Oh, well done, boys! Good shooting! Very good! Very good ind—"
>
> He stopped suddenly, swayed, and toppled back into the trench. Major Kemp caught him in his arms, and laid him gently upon the chalky floor. There was nothing more to be done. Young Lochgair had given his platoon their target, and the platoon were now firing steadily upon the same. He closed his eyes and sighed like a tired child.
>
> "Carry on, Major!" he murmured faintly. "I'm all right."
>
> So died the simple-hearted, valiant enthusiast whom we had christened Othello.

One cannot close Captain Beith's humorous-pathetic book without hoping that he may be spared to tell the further doings of the remnant of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders who survived those first fifteen months.

The Russian Soldier at Close Range

DAY BY DAY WITH THE RUSSIAN ARMY. By Bernard Pares. With Maps. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

BERNARD PARES, who in peace times is Professor of Russian History in the University of Liverpool, has long had close connection with Russia. At the outbreak of the war he joined the Red Cross work in that country and was made by his own Government official British observer of the Russian armies in the field. His book contains his diary from the time of his departure from England in August, 1914, his observations in Petrograd and Moscow, and at the front in Poland and Galicia. Much of the time he was with the Third Army in Galicia, at the main curve in the Russian front, where the German and Austrian forces joined hands. Of the general atmosphere of the army he remarks:

> It was a delight to be with these splendid men. I never saw anything base all the while that I was with the army. There was no drunkenness; every one was at his best, and it was the simplest and noblest atmosphere in which I have ever lived.

Of the attitude of the Russian peasants toward the war, he says:

> When the news of war came, the peasants, who were harvesting, went straight off to the recruiting depot and thence to the church, where all who were starting took the communion; there was no shouting, no drinking, though the abstinence edict had not then been issued; and every man who was called up, except one who was away on a visit, was in his place at the railway station that same evening. In other parts the peasants went around and collected money for the soldiers' families, and even in small villages quite large sums were given. The abstinence edict answered to a desire that had been expressed very generally among the peasants for some years. It was thoroughly enforced, both in the country and in the towns. In the country the savings banks at once began steadily to fill, and the peasants, who would speak very naïvely of their former drunkenness, hoped that the edict would be permanent. * * * In all this time I saw only one drunken man.

At the Galician front he had much conversation with Russian staff officers, and his account of the army operations reflects the viewpoint of general staff headquarters. He thus describes the methods of the German army as it forced the Russian army back:

> The German method is to mass superior artillery against a point selected and to cover the area in question with a wholesale and continuous cannonade. The big German shells, which the Russian soldiers call the "black death," burst almost simultaneously at about fifty yards from each other, making the intervening spaces practically untenable. * * * It is the wholesale character of these cannonades that makes their success, for there is nowhere to which the defenders can escape. The whole process is, of course, extremely expensive. When a considerable part of the Russian front has thus been annihilated and when the defenders are, therefore, either out of action or in retreat, the enemy's infantry is poured into the empty space and in such masses that it spreads also to left and right, pushing back the neighboring Russian troops. * * * The German hammer, zigzagging backward and forward, travels along our front, striking further and further on at one point or another, until the whole front has been forced back. The temper of this corps, as of practically all the others, is in no sense the temper of a beaten army. The losses have been severe; but with anything like the artillery equipment of the enemy, both officers and men are confident that they would be going forward.

Mr. Pares was allowed to question the prisoners and had much conversation with both Austrian and Prussian men and officers. He mentions some members of the Prussian Guard as speaking with small respect of the Austrians, while the Austrian soldiers he often found discontented with the war and willing for it to stop upon almost any conditions. The Austrian Slavs, when captured, showed more sympathy for the Russian than for the Austrian cause, while the Slavonic troops were often, under German direction, moved from one point to another to keep them away from the infection of

Russian sympathy, which otherwise often caused them to desert and go over to the other side. Some twenty pages are filled with the diary of a captured Austrian officer, which indicates a remarkable inferiority of spirit in the Austrian army.

A Memorable War Novel

WHERE THE PATH BREAKS. By Captain Charles D. Crespigny. New York: The Century Company. $1.30.

OPENING in a German hospital in Brussels, where an English officer has been practically brought back from the dead by a skillful German surgeon, this novel of war and of love moves through scenes in the hospital, a German prison camp, in the steerage of an Atlantic liner, in New York, and thence to the Pacific Coast, where finally it ends in happiness. The scenes descriptive and reminiscent of war experience are very graphic, but the book differs from most war novels in the profound spiritual significance that informs the whole story. Its theme is the power of love, the human love of man for woman that is also so fine and unselfish and noble that it becomes almost Christlike in its expression and its influence upon his life.

The opening paragraph, in which Captain Denin returns to life again, after eight months of unconsciousness, gives an idea of the author's ability to put into words fugitive sensations and strange experiences:

> In dim twilight a spark of life glittered, glinted like a bit of mica catching the sun, on a vast face of a gray cliff above a dead gray sea. There was nothing else in the world but the vastness and the grayness of the cliff and the sea, till the spark felt the faint thrill of warmth which gave to it the knowledge of its own life. "I am alive," the whisper stirred, far down in the depths of consciousness. Next the question came, "What am I?"

For a long time he cannot remember who he is, but at last his whole past comes back to him when he sees his picture in an old London paper with the story of his life and the account of his death on the field of battle, together with the picture of the girl he had married an hour or two before his regiment had marched away. A little later he learns that she has married again, believing him dead. Feeling sure that her welfare and happiness demand that he should not make himself known, he does not reveal his identity, but takes another name. Finally he escapes from the German prison camp and makes his way in the steerage to New York. Possessed with the idea that if he will put into words the belief that has come to him as the result of his sensations and dreams in the mid-world between life and death—"where the path breaks"—he can make it a message of helpfulness to the woman he loves, he writes a book in story form, "The War Wedding," which achieves immediate success because of its philosophy of war and suffering, life and death. It is the tale of a soldier marrying just before going to the war, but:

> The story did not end with the ending of the soldier's life. The part before his death was no more than a prelude. The real story was of the power of love upon the spirit of a man after his passing, and his wish that the adored woman left behind might know the vital influence of a few hours' happiness in shaping a soul to face eternity.

The book is read by his wife, who gets from it consolation and reassurance, but of a different kind from that which he had expected it would give her. In deep trouble and unhappiness she writes to the author of the book and a long correspondence develops between them, in which he carries out still further the philosophy of his novel. He writes to her also of the vision he had brought back from that land of dreams as to the causes of the war and its function in the evolution of civilization:

> Those young soldiers I tried to write about, who had thrown off their bodies, and even their enmities, with the rags and dirt and blood they left on the battlefield—they were listening to the great music, and hearing in it the call to some

> special mission which only they were fitted to fulfill, going to it in the Summer of their youth, before they had grown tired of anything. I do believe that was more than a dream of mine; that this torrent of splendid youth, this vast crowd of ardent souls suddenly rushed from one plane to another, has some wonderful work to do, which can be done only by souls who go out with the wine of courage on their lips.

This is unquestionably one of the best novels thus far inspired by the war.

Word Pictures of Northern France

BY MOTOR TO THE FIRING LINE. An Artist's Notes and Sketches with the Armies of Northern France, (June-July, 1915.) By Walter Hale. Illustrated by the author with line drawings and halftones from photographs. New York: The Century Company. $1.50.

WALTER HALE has written his own impressions of a journey he made for the purpose of illustrating a book by Owen Johnson, the result being a volume somewhat different from most eyewitness books of the war. It views the wreckage of the battle zone and the scenes of the trenches and the firing lines with the observing eye of the artist, trained to see the value of details and their use in making a truthful picture. He sees the region, also, through the artist's conviction of the sinfulness of destruction. His descriptions, of which this of Arras is an example, have something of the quality of his pictures:

> Arras was like a city of the dead; it gave one something of the sensation of walking through the ghostly cairns of Pompeii or St. Pierre, Martinique. It was like a giant catacomb, and the lowering clouds of yellow smoke hanging like a pall overhead, the deserted streets, the empty shells of houses, the growl of artillery, and the occasional violent detonation when an explosive bomb landed increased the uncanny feeling of death and disaster. In spite of the intermittent crackle of gunfire we unconsciously lowered our voices. A leaning chimney, all that remained of the one-time residence of some prosperous merchant, toppled over as we looked at it.

Mr. Hale thinks that after the war is over the long strip of France which has been so stubbornly contested by the opposing battle lines will be a favorite motoring ground for visits to battlefields, cities, towns that have won a sacred place in human esteem, and he devotes a good many pages to description of the region as it is now and the outlining of such a trip from end to end of the present battle line:

> It is a land where no man may live, a land swept day and night by heavy shells, searched by rifle fire, hand grenades or contact bombs and torn up from beneath by subterranean mines. It is a region desolate of trees, of vegetation. Though it runs through what once were forests and fields, there is nothing in the grizzly landscape to faintly suggest forests and fields except for occasional tree stumps hacked off close to the ground. Though it runs through villages, the villages have been swept away—the houses are mere shells—broken walls, heaps of dusty powdered stone and chimneys rising unsteadily out of the ruins. Though it skirts wooded slopes, their outlines are serrated as though by some titanic mining operation. Though it crosses winding rivers, the stone-arched bridges that span them have been destroyed. It needs only the presence of the solitary boatman to ferry one across their blackened waters — the shell-torn bands on either side might easily be that desolate land of empty spaces across the Styx.
>
> Vineyards and old *manoirs* have been beaten down beneath a hailstorm of metal. In place of tilled gardens are furrows plowed by shells, in place of long green meadows are uneven surfaces—craters, shell pits, sharpened stakes and broken rock. At times the earth disgorges boot legs, knapsacks, spiked helmets, rusty rifles or discolored underwear. It is a region where nature has been crushed, a modern visualization of Dante's Inferno.

Dr. Jordan on Peace Plans

WAYS TO LASTING PEACE. By David Starr Jordan. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. $1.

WITH some additions and revisions to bring the matter up to date, Dr. Jordan's book contains the address delivered by him as President of the World's Peace Congress, held on Oct. 10, in connection with the Panama-Pacific Exposition. He summarizes and to a certain extent discusses the most important of the various propositions which have been put forward since the beginning of the great war for the securing of lasting peace when that conflict shall end. Among these are several peace manifestoes, the resolutions of half a dozen congresses, the efforts and plans of the women of the leading countries of the world, the individual plans and arguments set forth by a score of persons of America and Europe, and one long chapter analyzing the plans and propositions of a great number of organizations and individuals in several countries who seek to end war by bringing it under democratic control. There is a full statement of the purposes of the League to Enforce Peace, of which William Howard Taft is President.

In a final chapter on "World Federation," Dr. Jordan briefly discusses its possibilities and its probable efficacy:

> The abuse of nationalism has carried Europe backward financially and socially for a generation, biologically for a century. It has put the whole system of nationalism on trial. It has forced the world to look forward to the next era, that of federation. Complete federation with autonomy must sooner or later follow nationalism, even as partial race federation (nationalism) succeeded the anarchy of feudalism. Such a change will not take place instantly, nor without opposition. But the progress of the federated states of our union, each of which, retaining autonomy or local self-government, has given up its armies, its tariffs, and its special citizenship for the common good, indicates the route which civilized government must traverse. As surely as feudalism gave place to nationalism, as certainly as day follows night, so must nationalism merge into federation in the movement of civilization.

Would Abandon Both Oceans

THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE. A Study in American Foreign Policy. By Roland G. Usher. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. $1.75.

PROFESSOR USHER'S "Pan-Germanism" and "Pan-Americanism" have attracted much attention within the last few years. In this new book he endeavors to analyze the country's problems of the present and the future in the light less of our present needs than of what will be the needs of our posterity two or three generations hence. His title indicates the purpose of forecasting the "challenge," the demand, that those generations have the right to make of Americans of the present day, and of setting forth what we must do in order to meet their expectation that our national heritage shall be passed on into their hands at its best and most secure estate. He thinks that our foreign and domestic policies should be shaped toward that far end rather than bent solely to the meeting of our immediate needs.

But immediate and decisive measures are necessary, says Professor Usher, if we hope to make sure of the continued safety of our country. Our present dangers are so great and our means of meeting them so inadequate that we must surrender much, he thinks, in order to conserve the rest:

> Our economic disabilities and our present lack of administrative and industrial correlation dictate the abandonment of the Atlantic to Great Britain, of the Pacific to Japan, and the partial renunciation of the Monroe Doctrine. That force

> which we cannot at present exert we must supply by an alliance with the sea power in the hands of Great Britain which will insure us present protection against the aggressive schemes of all other European States and the force necessary to advance and protect the lives and property of American citizens outside the United States.

Having surrendered the Monroe Doctrine so far as South America is concerned, given up the Philippines and Hawaii to Japan, and concluded an alliance with Great Britain which would enable us to protect ourselves with her fleet, Professor Usher thinks that we should devote ourselves to the tasks of making ourselves economically independent and of solidifying the nation and infusing it with a truly national spirit. "In last analysis," he says, "the future depends upon the brain and heart of this nation." Our democracy has justified itself in securing the welfare of the individual, but "it has yet to demonstrate its ability to think in terms of the community, of the nation, and of the world."

Peace Through Buffer States

L'ORGANISME DES ETATS-TAMPONS GARDIENS DE LA PAIX (Essai d'une proposition de paix.) Par M. D. Horowitz. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

THE gist of the proposals contained in this closely reasoned essay (in the French language) is that the idea of the buffer State should be extended by organizing the neutral States of Europe into an international police which would be primarily concerned with eliminating mistrust from the relations of the great powers. The author believes that the outbreak of war was due not to the aggressive nationalism of the various belligerents, but to the flaming up of smoldering suspicions. The psychological diagnosis of the condition that led to war is the best part of the essay, which is distinguished by its strict impartiality and its scientific method.

The author is no sentimental pacifist. He does not expect that national animosities will cease with the signing of peace. Suspicion and mistrust will still be potent forces, still likely to act as ferments in the numerous political, colonial, and economic problems of the near future. To find a basis of lasting peace it is necessary to get at the facts, which fall into two categories, according as they are part of the minimum or the maximum program of the different powers:

> The minimum program is the truly national program, on which the great majority of the nation is fully in accord, which the authorities proclaim officially, and which resides in international relations *in normal times.* It is based on the maintenance of the *status quo,* national security, territorial integrity, and freedom of economic expansion. The maximum program is preached by reactionaries, ultra-nationalists, militarists, and in the hotbeds of the most retrograde finance, but is in normal times repudiated by responsible opinion and kept out of international discussions. It is the minimum program that determines the facts, deeds, and intentions of the powers; but when times become abnormal once war is begun, things take a new turn. The maximum program of the different nations was not the cause of the war, but is rather the consequence. The minimum program was not of a nature to bring about or even tend toward war if a morbid international factor had not entered into the discussion.

The States that it is proposed should act as keepers of the peace are fifteen in all: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and Rumania, and three yet to be created, Lorraine, Poland, and Palestine, the last a Jewish State as buffer between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain's Egyptian dependency. These fifteen States would have an international armed force, which would preserve all the nations from every bellicose tentative and do away with the instability and insecurity in the relations of the great powers.

QUERIES AND ANSWERS OF THE MONTH

BY ARRANGEMENT WITH THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LOANS TO GERMANY'S ALLIES

H. R.—Has Germany assisted her allies, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria, with loans?

A WAR loan to Turkey was reported on Nov. 21, 1914, of $50,000,000. Jan. 31, 1915, it was reported that Germany had sent Turkey, in gold, sums amounting to about $15,000,000. A loan of $125,000,000 to Austria was reported July 10, 1915, and in October, 1915, a dispatch from Rome stated that Germany had lent the Bulgars $12,500,000 for the families of reservists, to allay dissatisfaction among the Bulgarian troops. Information in this country as to the finances of the Central Powers is not very full, and there may have been other loans which are not on record here.

THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM

T. M. H.—I have heard, or read, that the United States signed a treaty some time in the thirties to stand by the neutrality of Belgium. If such a treaty was signed can you tell me where and when?

THE United States has never been a signatory to any treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. The treaty of 1839, providing that Belgium should form "an independent State of perpetual neutrality," was signed by Prussia, France, England, Austria, and Russia, as guarantors of a treaty concluded on the same day between the King of the Belgians and the King of the Netherlands. A similar treaty had been signed by the powers in 1831. What the United States signed was The Hague Convention declaring the territory of all neutral powers inviolable.

THE DIFFERENCE

S. J. S.—In a recent issue you state in reply to a question that the United States has never signed any treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, but that the United States was signatory to The Hague Convention declaring the territory of all neutral powers inviolable. Will you please explain the difference in meaning between these two?

BRIEFLY, the difference between these two statements is the difference between the treaty of 1839, whereby the neighboring powers stood guarantors for the specific neutrality of the Kingdom of Belgium, and the general provisions respecting the rights and duties of all neutral powers in case of war on land, as drawn up by the nations at The Hague Conference of 1907. On April 19, 1839, a treaty was concluded between the King of the Belgians and the King of the Netherlands which contained the following sentence: "Belgium forms an independent State of perpetual neutrality." Of this treaty Prussia, France, England, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors. This is the famous "Treaty of 1839," by which the powers bound themselves to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and Belgium on her part was forbidden in case of war to take the part of any of the belligerents. This treaty, as you see, was not a laying down of general laws, but a specific guarantee of the neutrality, in perpetuity, of one specific country. With this treaty the United States had nothing to do. In 1907, at the Second Hague Conference, the nations drew up the "Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land." This convention opens with the general provision that "The territory of neutral powers is inviolable." It proceeds to define such neutrality, calling upon neutral nations to defend their neutrality against violation; but it is not a guarantee of the neutrality of Belgium or of any other specified country, nor does it bind any of its signatories to fight in defense of the neutrality of another power.

THE BRYAN PEACE TREATIES

S. J. S.—Has the United States signed a treaty with any country agreeing not to declare war without giving one year's notice to that effect?

YOU doubtless refer to what are known as the Bryan Peace Treaties, providing for the arbitration of all possible difficulties that may arise between the United States and the other signatory powers. These treaties agree, in all cases of dispute between the signatory nations, to refer the discussion to a commission of inquiry, and not to go to war within a year. They have been signed by France, Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Russia, Greece, China, Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Persia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Panama, Dominican Republic, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Ecuador.

GREECE AND BELGIUM

S. S.—Is there any parallel between the landing of troops by the Allies in Greece and that of the Germans in Belgium? Was a treaty disregarded by the Allies, as in the case of the Germans with Belgium?

S. V. G.—What was the difference between the invasion of Belgium by the Germans and the occupation of Greek territory by the Allies? Was the latter also a violation of neutrality, or had the Allies some other rights or permission for occupation?

THE situation in regard to the Allies in Greece and the occupation of Saloniki is entirely different from the German invasion of Belgium. At the close of the second Balkan war Greece made a treaty with Serbia, under which Serbia acquired certain leasehold rights in Saloniki. In pursuance of these rights the Allies, in Serbia's behalf, applied to the Greek Minister, Venizelos, and were given permission to use that port. Some of the things they have since done have not been strictly in accordance with this treaty, but the Allies certainly had a special right of occupation, granted first by the treaty, and second by the expressed consent of the Greek Prime Minister. The cases of Greece and Belgium are, therefore, not parallel.

ANTWERP

M. J. S.—How was Antwerp defended?

ANTWERP was defended by two chains of strong forts (an inner and an outer circle) and by ramparts. The Belgian Army also made use of an armored train, aeroplanes, and miles of electrified barbed wire.

LEMBERG

M. K.—What was the date of the siege and occupation of Lemberg by the Russians? What is the strategic value of the possession of Lemberg?

THE Russians "began to draw nets around Lemberg" Aug. 29, 1914; they defeated the Austrian forces before Lemberg Aug. 31, and seized the fortified positions around the town Sept. 2. The Russian Army occupied Lemberg Sept. 5, 1914. The Austrians recaptured it in June, 1915, entering the city on June 22.

The importance of the possession of Lemberg is, first, that no campaign against Galicia can be pushed forward by this town while untaken, as an army could not leave such a heavily fortified place in its rear as it moved forward. In the second place, it is a very important railroad centre, as all railroads entering Galicia from the east, all entering from Bukowina, and all from Southern Poland centre here.

FIRST "AIR RAIDS" IN THE WAR

E. S.—Please tell me the date and place of the first air raid in the present war. I remember hearing in Switzerland of an attack made on Frankfort-am-Main about the 8th of August. Was there any prior to this?

THE first report of airships of which we have any record of in this war was from Berlin under date of Aug. 2, 1914, stating merely that "hostile craft" had been seen in the Rhine provinces; another dispatch said that airships had been near Naumburg, in Bavaria. On Aug. 3 a report was published to the effect that a French aviator had dropped bombs on Nuremberg, and that German troops had shot down a French aeroplane near Wesel; also that a French aviator had wrecked a German airship at Longwy. Further reports in the next few days were of German airships seen over Belgium Aug. 4; a duel between Belgian and German aviators Aug. 6; the destruction of a Russian aeroplane by Austrians Aug. 6. We have no record of "air raids" between that date and Aug. 14, nor have we a record of an attack on Frankfort.

JEWISH ARMY OFFICER

W. B. LEWIS.—Will you kindly let me know whether at the present time there are any Jewish Generals in either the French or German Armies, and which army—French or German—has the greater number of Jewish officers?

THERE is at least one Jewish General in the French Army. There may be more, but that cannot at this time be positively stated. In the American Jewish Year Book for 1916 there is a reference to the fact that the Jewish General Jules Heyman had been made a Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor. There is no record at the present time of any Jewish General in the German Army. It is impossible to state which army has the greater number of Jewish officers; but it was very difficult for a Jew to become an officer in the German Army before the war broke out, and this difficulty did not exist to any appreciable extent for French Jews. On the other hand, it may be noted that the Jews of France comprise only one-fourth of 1 per cent. of the total population, whereas in Germany they make up almost 1 per cent. You, of course, understand that during the progress of the war it is impossible to obtain detailed, exact, and up-to-date information from time to time as to the possible changes in the existing personnel of the fighting armies.

THE HOHENZOLLERN FAMILY

H. H.—Is not the reigning house of Germany—that is, the house of Hohenzollern—a cadet or younger branch of the original house? Is not the wife of King Manuel of Portugal of an older and higher branch than the reigning German house?

THE Almanach de Gotha sets down the "non-reigning" branch of the house of Hohenzollern as "probably the older," and adds that both lines are "probably descended from the two sons of the marriage of Count Frederick of Zollern with Sophie, daughter of the last Burgrave of the house of the Counts of Raabs," in 1911. The Almanach further states that the founder of the reigning German house of Hohenzollern was Conrad, Count of Zollern, Burgrave of Nürnberg, 1208-1261; and that the founder of the non-reigning branch of the Hohenzollern Princes was Frederick, Count of Zollern and Burgrave of Nürnberg, 1205-1251.

RELIGION OF ROYAL FAMILIES

G. M. STEWART.—What is the religion of the Hohenzollerns, Hapsburgs, and the other royal families of Europe?

THE reigning house of Hohenzollern (the family of the German Emperor) is Protestant Evangelical; the non-reigning house of Hohenzollern is Roman Catholic. The reigning line of Hapsburg-Lorraine in Austria-Hungary is Roman Catholic. The royal family of England is Protestant, the Anglican Church being the established church in that country. The Spanish Bourbons and the Italian House of Savoy are Roman Catholic, the reigning houses of the Scandinavian countries Lutheran, the Netherlands house of Nassau members of the Reformed Church. The Russian Romanoffs and the reigning house of Serbia belong to the Orthodox Eastern Church, and the royal family of Greece is listed in the Almanach de Gotha as "Greek Orthodox."

ENGLISH DIPLOMATIC NOTES

M. R.—Please tell me whether, in replying to one of our notes protesting against the restriction by England of our commerce, England said that changed conditions changed the application of international law, or words to that effect?

IN the British note of July 23, 1915, answering the American communication of March 30, Sir Edward Grey made use of the following sentences:

"It seems, accordingly, that if it be recognized that a blockade is in certain cases the appropriate method of intercepting the trade of an enemy country, and if the blockade can only become effective by extending it to enemy commerce passing through neutral ports, such an extension is defensible and in accordance with principles which have met with general acceptance.

"To the contention that such action is not directly supported by written authority, it may be replied that it is the business of writers on international law to formulate existing rules rather than to offer suggestions for their adaptation to altered circumstances. * * *

"What is really important in the general interest is that adaptations of the old rules should not be made unless they are consistent with the general principles upon which an admitted belligerent right is based."

GERMANY'S WAR DEBT

H. R.—The war debt of Germany is, in round figures, about $8,915,000,000.

NEUTRAL NATIONS AND BELGIUM

L. M.—No neutral nation protested against the invasion of Belgium.

THE BRITISH WAR MINISTRY

R. S. GOODWIN.—The British Coalition Cabinet, as composed at present, is as follows: Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, Herbert Henry Asquith; Lord Privy Seal, Earl Curzon; Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey; Lord High Chancellor, Lord Buckmaster; First President of the Council, Marquess of Crewe; Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald McKenna; Home Secretary, Herbert L. Samuel; Colonial Secretary, Andrew Bonar Law; Secretary for War, Earl Kitchener of Khartoum; Minister of Munitions, David Lloyd George; Secretary for India, Austen Chamberlain; Secretary for Scotland, Thomas McKinnon Wood; First Lord of the Admiralty, Arthur James Balfour; President Board of Trade, Walter Runciman; President Local Government Board, Walter Long; President Board of Education, Arthur Henderson; Chancellor Duchy of Lancaster, Herbert L. Samuel; Postmaster General, Joseph A. Pease; Lord Chancellor for Ireland, Ignatius John O'Brien; President Board of Agriculture and Fish, Earl of Selbourne; First Commissioner of Works, Lewis Harcourt; Minister of War Trade, Lord Robert Cecil.

This also answers the question of B. P. on the same subject.

THE NATIONS' FIGHTING FORCES

E. F. KOHN.—The forces of the belligerents at the outbreak of war were approximately as follows: Germany—Peace strength, 870,000; reserves, 4,530,000; total war strength, 5,400,000. France—Peace strength, 790,000; reserves, 4,516,507; total war strength, 5,300,000. Russia — Peace strength, 1,384,000; reserves, 4,016,000; total war strength, 5,400,000. Austria-Hungary—Peace strength, 436,035; reserves, 3,163,965; total war strength, 3,600,000. Italy—Peace strength, 306,000; reserves, 2,994,200; total war strength, 3,380,200. Great Britain—Peace strength, 138,497; reserves, 2,743,986; total war strength, 3,000,000. Japan—Peace strength, 250,000; reserves, 1,250,000; total war strength, 1,500,000. Belgium — Peace strength, 58,033; reserves, 291,967; total war strength, 350,000. Bulgaria—Peace strength, 66,583; reserves, 433,417; total war strength, 500,000. Serbia — Peace strength, 38,316; reserves, 317,139; total war strength, 355,455. Turkey — Peace strength, 210,000; reserves, 890,000; total war strength, 1,100,000. Montenegro—Peace strength, 35,000; no reserves. These figures do not include the estimates of unorganized forces based on the figures of the population, nor do they include the colonial armies of the nations possessing such troops.

THE FRENCH COALITION CABINET

B. P.—The French War Ministry, the first Coalition Cabinet of France, is composed as follows: Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aristide Briand; General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jules Cambon; Vice President of Cabinet and Minister of State, Charles de Freycinet; Minister of War, General J. S. Gallieni; Minister of Justice, Rene Viviani; Minister of the Interior, Louis L. Malvy; Minister of Marine, Rear Admiral Lacaze; Minister of Finance, Alexandre Ribot; Minister of Public Instruction and Inventions Concerning National Defense, Professor Paul Painleve; Minister of Public Works, Marcel Sembat; Minister of Commerce, Etienne Clementel; Minister of the Colonies, Gaston Doumergue; Minister of Labor, Albert Metin; Ministers Without Portfolio, Emile Combes, Leon Bourgeois, Denys Cochin, Jules Guesde; Under Secretary of State, War, Munitions, Albert Thomas; Under Secretary of State for Subsistence, Joseph Thierry; Under Secretary of State for Sanitary Service, Justin Godart; Under Secretary of State for Marine, Louis Nail; Under Secretary of State for the Fine Arts, Albert Dalimier.

THE FORD PEACE PARTY

PAUL F. FRAHBITO.—A "historical sketch" of the Ford peace party, such as you ask, begins with the hiring of the Scandinavian liner Oscar II. by Henry Ford on Nov. 24, 1915, and Mr. Ford's announcement of his intention to end the war and "get those boys out of the trenches by Christmas." The "peace ship" sailed from New York Dec. 4, and three days later twenty other members of the peace party sailed on the Frederick VII. The ship was held up by the British at Kirkwall Dec. 15. The peace party arrived at Christiansand Dec. 18. On Dec. 21 it was reported here that Ford was ill in Norway following a dispute of the peace delegates over their "platform," and that Sweden had barred a public peace meeting. The "peace plan" was vetoed by Norway on Dec. 22. On Dec. 24 the statement was published here that Ford was about to return to the United States, and on that same day he sailed, leaving the sum of $270,000 with the committee for the party's use. On Dec. 27 the party, without Ford, reached Stockholm, where they were welcomed, but a statement was received to the effect that no meetings would be allowed in Denmark. A meeting was held in Stockholm, however, on the 28th of December, and on the 30th the Mayor of Stockholm extended the time for the return of the delegates if they were unable to reach The Hague. In Copenhagen, which the party reached Dec. 31, no public meetings for the discussion of the war were allowed, and the party's "propaganda" had to be confined to receptions and the like. Ford himself arrived in New York on Jan. 2. After some uncertainty as to whether or not they would be allowed to pass through German territory, that matter was settled, and the party left for The Hague Jan. 7, arriving there the next day, and passing easily across German boundaries on their way to the Dutch frontier. A meeting was held at The Hague Jan. 13, and as delegates to the Permanent Peace Board the party elected William Jennings Bryan, Henry Ford, Jane Addams, Dr. George F. Aked, and Mrs. Joseph Fels. The peace party was disbanded Jan. 14, and most of the members sailed for home the next day.

"PACIFIST" AND "PACIFICIST"

ROBERT L. SMITH calls our attention to the fact that, while neither "pacifist" nor "pacificist" appears in the Century Dictionary proper, the latest supplement to the dictionary lists the latter word. "J. F. C." writes that in a recent small edition of the Standard Dictionary, known as the "Desk Standard Dictionary," the word "pacifist," which is not in the large Standard Dictionary itself, appears.

THE DARDANELLES

MISS M. V. F.—The present name of Dardanelles was given to the ancient Hellespont from the two castles that protect the narrowest part of the strait, and that themselves preserve the name of the famous City of Dardanus in the ancient Troad. The name of "Dardanelles" is briefly referred to as having been derived from the name of the City of Dardanus, but the Encyclopaedia Britannica states that it is the twin castles for which the strait is actually named.

"FACIAL SURGERY" IN THE WAR

C. D. RICHARDS.—The department of plastic facial surgery of the American Ambulance in Paris, concerning which you inquire, has been established to treat wounds of the face and jaw and in so far as possible to do away with the mutilations and distortions that would result if such wounds were merely allowed to heal. The department is under the management of Drs. Hayes and Davenport. The French Government has lately given the hospital the use of between three and four hundred beds for these facial patients. Briefly, the surgeons may be said to "rebuild" the faces and jaws of the mutilated soldiers.

THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS

[English Cartoon]

Getting His Back Up



—*From The Westminster Gazette.*

Apropos of the Washington-Berlin Submarine Controversy.

[German Cartoon]

The Guard on the Austrian Alps



—© *Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.*

"With Him Intrust Your Loved Tyrol."

[American Cartoon]

Notes



—*From The New York Times.*

U. S.: "I'd rather hear you playing notes than have you writing them."

[French Cartoon]

At Potsdam



—© *Le Rire, Paris.*

GERMANY: "What! Has your Majesty come for our Kaiser?"

DEATH: "The idea! Suppress my best provider? I am not so stupid. I have come only to get his orders."

[Australian Cartoon]

The Uninvited Guests



—From The Sydney Bulletin.

A No-Fat Feast in a German Home.

[Italian Cartoon]

The Russian Surprise



—*L'Asino, Rome.*

CHORUS OF THREE: "Imagine! We thought it a small toy!"

[German Cartoon]

The Progress of Culture



The Highwayman of Olden Times



—© *Kladderadatsch, Berlin.*

—and the Highwayman of Today.

[German Cartoon]

Torturing Greece



—© *Jugend, Munich.*

JOHN BULL: “ Give up your neutrality, or I’ll break all your bones! ”

[Dutch Cartoon]

Holland and Bluebeard



—*De Nieuwe Amsterdammer.*

"You'll come and join me soon, my pretty—and what a future you'll have!"

[English Cartoon]

"Reported Missing"

A Cartoon That Cost $1,000 in Fines



—From The Bystander, London.

The sensitiveness of official opinion in England is indicated by the fines amounting to $1,000 imposed upon the publishers, editor, and cartoonist of The Bystander for printing this picture. The court held that it was prejudicial to discipline and recruiting.

[German Cartoon]

The Entente Joy Ride

—© *Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.*

Making Rapid Progress—Into the Valley.

[Canadian Cartoon]

Defeat of German Credit



—*From The Montreal Star.*

A victory which may finish the war more quickly than the gun.

A Herod Window



—*From The Westminster Gazette.*

Designed à la Kultur.

A Modern Plague



—© *Jugend, Munich.*

The Serbian "invasion" in Corfu.

[German Cartoon]

How London Sees at Night



—© *Fliegende Blaetter, Berlin.*

With the Aid of the Policeman's Electric Lamp.

[English Cartoon]

Shortage of Copper in Germany

—*From The Bystander, London.*

German Soldier: "If you please, Herr Major, I have here a man who has refused to give up his wife's saucepan for the Glory of the Empire."

[French Cartoon]

Count Zeppelin



—*Pele Mele, Paris.*

German Air Pilot: "No hospitals, no cathedrals here—pass on!"

[German Cartoon]

The Traitor



—© *Ulk, Berlin.*

Judas Iscariot: "Here, take my halter, Salandra!"

[American Cartoon]

There's Many a Slip



—*From The New York Sun.*

For Instance: The Möwe.

[German Cartoon]

British Protection From Torpedoes



—© *Jugend, Munich.*

" Is everything on board? "
" No, Captain, the usual three Americans are not yet on board."

[American Cartoon]

The Sower


VERDUN
EVANS
—AFTER THE PICTURE BY MILLET

—*From The Baltimore American.*

As ye sow, so shall ye reap.

[German Cartoon]

The Great Housecleaning



—© *Fliegende Blaetter, Berlin.*

GERMANIA: "This new brush will clean out the furthest corner."

[American Cartoon]

The Sea of Debt



—From The San Francisco Chronicle.

No Rescue in Sight.

[Dutch Cartoon]

Our Lady of Antwerp



—By Louis Raemaekers, Noted Dutch Cartoonist.

The Sorrows of Belgium.

[German Cartoon]

The Sacrifice



—© *Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.*

To the chasm's edge, O Beast, thou brought
Fair Greece, her protests set at naught;
But " dies irae, dies illa,"
Thy doom now cometh, John Gorilla!

Progress of the War

Recording Campaigns on All Fronts and Collateral Events From February 12 Up to and Including March 12, 1916

CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE

Feb. 12—French hold Champagne gains; Germans fall back before French fire at Het Sas and Steenstraete.

Feb. 13-15—Heavy fighting for Hill 140 in Artois region; Germans gain in the Champagne region between Tahure and Somme-Py.

Feb. 15-20—Germans repulse the British around Ypres.

Feb. 21—Heavy artillery fire begun near Verdun.

Feb. 23—Fierce German offensive eight miles northeast of Verdun, on twenty-five-mile front; Germans pierce line two miles.

Feb. 24—Germans take Samogneux, six miles from Verdun.

Feb. 25-28—Fighting around Fort Douaumont, which is finally silenced by the Germans, who also take Champneuville and Côte de Talou.

Feb. 29—Germans take several villages in the Woevre.

March 2—Germans resume attack on Verdun; British recapture 800 yards of trenches on the Ypres-Comines Canal.

March 3—Germans take village of Douaumont; French seize dominating hill.

March 6—Town of Forges captured by the Germans.

March 8—French check Germans west of Verdun and retake most of the Corbeaux wood.

March 11—Germans gain foothold in the town of Vaux.

March 12—Germans shell Fort Vaux; French offensive west of the Meuse fails.

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN EUROPE

Feb. 12—Germans take hill in Tsebroff region from the Russians.

Feb. 16—Russians repulse German attacks on Garbounovka.

Feb. 18—Germans repulsed on the Dvina River between Jacobstadt and Dvinsk.

Feb. 22—Russians win skirmishes near Dvinsk and occupy craters in Buczacz region of Galicia.

March 2—Germans bombard villages in Lake Kanger district.

March 3-12—Indecisive fighting on all fronts; Russians report victory in many small skirmishes.

BALKAN CAMPAIGN

Feb. 12—Italians assail heights held by the Austrians northeast of Durazzo; French cross the Vardar River northwest of Saloniki and hold both banks.

Feb. 16—Austrian and Bulgarian forces have effected a junction and are fighting Essad Pasha's forces defending Durazzo.

Feb. 20—Austro-Hungarians advance near Bazar-Szak, northeast of Durazzo and occupy Berat, northeast of Avlona.

Feb. 25—Durazzo evacuated by Italians; Austrians capture much booty.

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

Feb. 12—Austrians victorious in artillery combat near Plezzo.

Feb. 16—Italians repel attacks in the Tofano and Rombon zones.

Feb. 18—Austrians shell Crosano and Borgo.

Feb. 20—Italians shell Uggowitz, in the Sugana Valley.

Feb. 22—Italians conquer zone of Collo and towns of Ranchi and Rocegno in the Sugana Valley.

March 1—Positions near Marmolada captured by Italians.

March 12—Italians shell Gorizia and Doberdo Heights.

ASIA MINOR AND EGYPT

Feb. 12—British defeated by Turkish volunteers near Korna, 150 miles south of Kut-el-Amara; Russians win another victory near Khynysskala in the Caucasus and occupy town of Khopy.

Feb. 14—Russians capture an Erzerum fort.

Feb. 15—Another Erzerum fort surrenders to the Russians, making nine now in their hands.

Feb. 16—Russians capture Erzerum with eighteen forts.

Feb. 19—Russians occupy Mush and Ablat, south of Erzerum, and capture fleeing Turks.

Feb. 21—Turks evacuate Bitlis, leaving the entire district of Lake Van in the hands of the Russians.

Feb. 22—Turks begin evacuation of Trebizond.

Feb. 25—Russians occupy Bidesurka Pass and Sakhae Pass in Persia; Turks retreat toward Kermanshah.

Feb. 29—Turks are evacuating Trebizond and neighboring towns on the Black Sea coast.

March 3—Russians capture Bitlis, southeast of Erzerum.

March 4—Russians occupy Bijur, in Persia.

March 8—Russians seize port of Rizeh on the Black Sea and shell Trebizond.

March 12 — Russians in Persia occupy Karind.

AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

Feb. 12—British repulsed in attack on Salaita Hill.

Feb. 18—German garrison at Mora yields; Allies' conquest of Kamerun complete.

AERIAL RECORD

Austrian aeroplanes raided Ravenna and neighboring towns in Italy on Feb. 13, killing 15 persons and wounding many. The hospital and basilica of Sant' Apollinare were damaged. On the following day 6 more people were killed in a raid on Milan. In Schio, on the 15th, 6 more persons were killed and many wounded. On the 21st the province of Brescia was raided. Four lives were lost.

On the western front the Germans made air attacks on Revigny. A Zeppelin was brought down by the French near Brabant-le-Roi. The French dropped bombs on Mülhausen and on a German munitions factory at Pagny-sur-Moselle.

On Feb. 20 a German seaplane raided the Kent and Suffolk coasts of England. Two men and a boy were killed at Lowestoft. The southeast coast was raided on March 1, and a baby was killed. Zeppelins raided the northeast coast on March 5, killing 12 persons and injuring 33.

NAVAL RECORD

The German raider Möwe returned to Wilhelmshaven after a raid in which fifteen merchantmen were sunk or seized. She had 199 prisoners and $250,000 in gold on board.

The S. S. Maloja was sunk by a mine off Dover and more than 40 persons were drowned or killed. The tanker Empress of Fort William struck another mine while going to the rescue and was blown up.

Six Turkish munition ships were sunk by an allied submarine in the Bosporus.

In the Mediterranean the French Auxiliary cruiser La Provence was sunk by a submarine, with nearly 4,000 men on board, of whom only 870 were saved.

The French S. S. Louisiane was torpedoed and sunk in the English Channel.

The Norwegian S. S. Silius, with seven Americans in the crew, was torpedoed and sunk in Havre Roads. One American was injured.

MISCELLANEOUS

Japan made a strong protest to Germany and Austria against the sinking of the Yasaku Maru.

Italy, by a royal proclamation, broke off all trade relations with Germany on Feb. 12. The Italian Government requisitioned thirty-four German ships interned in Italian ports.

Portugal precipitated a crisis with Germany by seizing thirty-six Austrian and German ships in the Tagus River. This was regarded as the culmination of a series of breaches of neutrality and on March 9 Germany issued a declaration of war.

Austria sent an unsatisfactory reply to a protest from the United States Government on the sinking of the Standard Oil tanker, Petrolite.

Germany sent a new note to the United States in the Lusitania case, agreeing to "recognize" instead of "assume" liability for the sinking, but the settlement of the controversy was held up by the threat of the Teutonic allies to sink armed merchant ships without warning. Following this threat, and the notification of neutral countries, Sweden warned her subjects to keep off armed ships, but President Wilson held that the rights of American citizens should not be abridged. A crisis followed in the American Congress, which ended in a victory for the Administration. On March 8 Germany sent a note to the United States Government charging England with forcing her into submarine warfare and offering to observe international law prevailing before the war if England would do likewise.



VERDUN: THE OLD MILL AND THE BISHOPRIC
Quiet Town in the Centre of the French Fortress, Objective of the World's Greatest Battle

NEAR THE FRONT AT VERDUN

General Joffre and General Petain in Action--in the Foreground-After a Conference

PERIOD XX.

Statements of the German Chancellor and the British Premier—An International Bandit Hunt in Mexico—Exploits of England's Navy—The World's Greatest Battle—A Harvest of Death—Germany's Fourth War Loan—Status of the Merchant Ship—French Cruisers in war Time—Why Italy Entered the War—The Gallant Fight of the Clan MacTavish.

WORLD EVENTS OF THE MONTH

A Diplomatic Crisis

MOST important of all the war developments of the month—for the United States, at least—has been the increasingly acute strain in our diplomatic relations with Germany, due to the submarine issue. At this writing (April 19) President Wilson has called a joint session of both houses of Congress in order to make a frank statement of the critical situation and of the contents of the decisive note which he is about to send to Germany. After reciting the long list of cases in which rights of neutrals and pledges to the United States have been violated by German submarines the President's note will practically compel the German Government to choose between two divergent courses: It must either modify its present submarine methods or suffer a break in its friendly relations with the United States. At the present moment a break seems imminent. The President's speech, the note, and the other official documents in the case will be published in full in the June issue of CURRENT HISTORY.

* * *

Submarine Offenses

THE imperiling of American lives on the Channel steamer Sussex is only one item in the long series of illegal and inhumane acts of German submarines against the most fundamental rights of neutrals. President Wilson has taken his stand upon the issue in this broader sense, laying down the principles of international law and humanity whose further infringement will be regarded by America as an unfriendly act entailing severance of diplomatic relations.

As this means a radical change in the whole conduct of submarine warfare, and as the submarine is Germany's most effective arm against British sea power, the point is one which the Germans will be loath to concede. Yet the breaking of diplomatic relations with the United States would be no slight matter. At the present time our nation happens to be the most wealthy and prosperous in the world, and the millions of Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians living here possess their share of this wealth, and are sending large sums to their relatives in Europe. If we should break off diplomatic relations with the Central Powers this stream of wealth would cease to flow, and millions of Teutons, especially Austro-Hungarians, would be among the first to suffer. This is why the newspapers of Budapest have long been voicing the fear that German ruthlessness would estrange America, and have been warning their own Government not to drift into Germany's desperate state of mind. The possible effect upon German-American trade after the war also is an item which even Germany cannot well afford to leave unconsidered.

* * *

The Fall of Trebizond

THE capture of Trebizond, the most important Turkish city on the Black Sea, marks another important step in Russia's historic campaign in Asia Minor. After a sanguinary battle at Kara Dere on April 14 the Grand Duke's troops broke through the fierce resistance of the Turks and, with the co-operation of the Russian Black Sea fleet, fought their way three days later into the fortified city of Trebizond. With this strongest point on the Anatolian coast in Russian hands, the menace to the back door of Constantinople becomes more imminent.

* * *

War Council in Paris

NEVER perhaps have deliberations so important been so carefully guarded from the public as those of the war conference of the Entente allies in Paris on March 27 and 28. The thirty-seven persons who took part included the chief Ministers of all the eight allied nations except Russia, and even Russia was represented by her Ambassador to France. Premier Briand of France presided, and among the more influential members were General Joffre, Premier Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Kitchener, General Roques, and General Castelnau; Premier Salandra of Italy, with Baron Sonnino, Signor Tittoni, and General Cadorna; M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador to France; Mr. Matsui, Japanese Ambassador to France, besides the official representatives of Serbia, Belgium, and Portugal.

History tells of many great congresses and war councils, but a conference of eight allied States, five of them great powers, in the supreme phase of a world war is a new thing; and new also are the spirit and purpose of the meeting in Paris. It was in essence a business meeting for co-ordinating all the means to victory, including the formulation of a plan for a punitive fiscal system to be used against Germany both during and after the war. It is not improbable that hundreds, if not thousands, of books written in the coming decades will hark back to the Paris Conference for the shaping of their themes.

* * *

Cementing Entente Unity

ALL that the world is allowed at present to know of what the Entente leaders at Paris decided to do in the way of a common military and economic policy is contained in the brief resolutions given below. The main significance of this utterance, unanimously adopted, is its proof of unity. The resolutions are as follows:

1. The representatives of the allied Governments assembled in Paris on the 27th and 28th of March, 1916, affirm the entire community of views and solidarity of the Allies. They confirm all the measures taken to realize unity of action and unity of front. By this they mean at once military unity of action, as assured by the agreement concluded between the General Staffs, economic unity of action, the organization of which has been settled by the present conference; and diplomatic unity of action, which is guaranteed by their unshakable determination to pursue the struggle to the victory of their common cause.

2. The allied Governments decide to put into practice in the economic domain their solidarity of views and interests. They charge the Economic Conference, which will be shortly held in Paris, to propose to them measures adapted to realize this solidarity.

3. With a view to strengthening, co-ordinating, and unifying the economic action to be exercised in order to prevent supplies from reaching the enemy, the conference decides to establish in Paris a permanent committee upon which all the Allies will be represented.

4. The conference decides:

(a) To continue the organization begun in London of a Central Bureau of Freights.

(b) To take common action with the shortest possible delay with a view to discovering the practical methods to be employed for equitably distributing between the allied nations the burdens resulting from maritime transport and for putting a stop to the rise in freights.

* * *

Per Capita Cost of War

THE official publication of the French Army contains an important computation showing that the present annual per capita cost of the war to the Powers named is as follows:

Country.	Population.	Total annual cost.	Amount per head.
Turkey	20,000,000	£40,000,000	£1.92
Italy.	34,685,653	120,000,000	3,68
France	39,601,599	800,000,000	20.4
England ...	44,177,000	1,240,000,000	27.88
Austria	51,390,000	560,000,000	10.72
Germany ..	66,835,000	1,500,000,000	22.4
Russia	131,230,500	740,000,000	5.68

The cost per annum to run the Government of the United States in 1915 was, in round numbers, $725,000,000. Estimating our population at 100,000,000, this is $7.25 per capita per annum. Therefore, the war at present is costing England alone nearly twenty times as much as the total expense of the United States Government per annum. In fact, we are conducting Government for 100,000,000 people for less than *one-fiftieth* of what the war is costing each person in England, France, and Germany.

* * *

INSURANCE AGAINST BOMBS

THE British Government now sells regular insurance to its citizens against property damage caused by Zeppelins and aeroplanes; also against the falling fragments of shells sent into the sky by anti-aircraft guns. Against aircraft alone the rate on private dwellings and their contents is 2s. per £100; on all other buildings and their rents, 3s.; on farming stocks, live and dead, 3s.; on contents of shops, factories, &c., 5s.; on merchandise in transit or in public warehouses, timber in the open, oil tanks and the like, 7s. 6d. Insurance against both aircraft and bombardment costs about 50 per cent. more. Premiums are the same for every part of the United Kingdom, and the Government insurance can be obtained through the ordinary fire insurance companies or at the War Risks Insurance Office in London.

* * *

WAR DECREASES CRIME

OFFICIAL reports for England and Wales in 1915 show an increase of 3.9 per 1,000 in the marriage rate, but a decrease of 3.6 per 1,000 in the birth rate. The death rate showed an increase of 0.7 per 1,000 in 1915. While the war reduces the birth rate, it also decreases crime. The report of the English Commission of Prisons for 1915 shows that twenty prisons were closed or are in process of closure, eleven having been closed entirely. Between the years 1904-5 and 1913-14 total convictions decreased from 586 per 100,000 population to 369; in the year ended March, 1915, it dropped to 281 per 100,000; the year 1915-16 will show a much further drop. The English prison estimates for 1916 are $500,000, or 12 per cent. below the previous estimate. The decrease in crime is ascribed to (1) the drafting into the army of a considerable section of the population from which the criminals usually come, (2) the increased and new demands for remunerative labor, and (3) the restriction of the liquor traffic.

* * *

CHANGES OF LEADERSHIP

WITHIN a period of eighteen days France, Russia, and Italy have changed their War Ministers. In France General Gallieni, who won fame as military Governor of Paris during the Marne battle, retired, and his portfolio was intrusted to General Charles Roques. In Italy General Zupeli resigned, King Victor Emmanuel appointing General Paolo Morrone to succeed him. In Russia General Polivanoff was dismissed by the Czar, and General Shuvaieff placed at the post of Minister of War. Another notable change took place in Russia with the retirement of General N. I. Ivanoff from command of the Russia armies in Galicia and Volhynia—sometimes known as the southern front in contrast to the northern front commanded by the recently appointed General Kuropatkin. The chief command of the southern front is now in the hands of General A. A. Brusiloff, a brilliant leader, who was responsible for the initial Russian successes in Galicia, and whose knowledge of the terrain of the Volhynian and Bessarabian fronts is said to be as complete as von Hindenburg's knowledge of his "lakes." It would appear from these nearly simultaneous changes in the high military administration that the long-awaited allied offensive is approaching.

* * *

WOMEN AND WAR

THE industrial revolution wrought in Europe by the entrance of women into occupations heretofore closed against them is rapidly developing. The situation in England was treated in April CURRENT HISTORY; the situation in Germany and France is treated elsewhere in this issue. Women workers in Berlin are estimated at 900,000, of whom 300,000 are skilled, and are represented in all industries. Women are doing laborers' work at Berlin as shovelers and diggers on the new subway construction there, and have replaced the men as street cleaners; they serve as conductors on trams and trains, as chauffeuses on taxis, as mail carriers, messengers, &c. In London the number of women mail carriers has been increased from 500 to 1,000. In France they are serving in all capacities, the latest employment being that of garrisons in the place of soldiers of the auxiliary service. The French drafts of the 1888 military class will be limited, so that professional men may continue to attend to their duties, and this will give employment to the widows, mothers, and sisters of soldiers killed.

* * *

Unprecedented Losses

A COMPARISON of official figures of our civil war with casualty reports of the German armies demonstrates the sanguinary character of the present war. Americans generally assume that we fought the bloodiest war in history: that fratricidal strife arouses the fiercest passions and, anyway, "that Americans shoot straighter and kill quicker than any other race." But they are entirely wrong.

The official figures of German losses in the present war show that their fatalities on the field were more than double our own during the civil war. In other words, they either dared twice as much, or the French, English, Russians, and Belgians shot twice as straight as Americans.

The British Official Press Bureau reports the German casualties during February, 1916, at 35,198, of whom 10,211 were killed or died either of wounds or sickness; 2,017 missing, 5,217 severely wounded, 1,340 prisoners, 11,865 slightly wounded. The German casualties during March, including the slaughter at Verdun and the sanguinary struggles in the eastern theatre, are estimated at 175,000. This estimate, added to the previous reports, swells the German losses since the beginning of the war—including all German nationalities: Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons, and Württembergers, but excluding naval and colonial casualties—to the grand total of 2,842,372, of which number about 660,000 were killed and died of wounds, 40,000 died of sickness, 120,000 are prisoners, 220,000 are missing, 365,000 are severely wounded, 265,000 wounded, about 1,050,000 slightly wounded, 140,000 wounded remaining with units. The number killed in action, estimating one-half the missing as killed, is over 25 per cent. of the total.

The total casualties among United States troops in the four years of the civil war were 877,165, including 212,608 captured, 16,431 paroled on the field, 199,720 died of disease, 40,154 died in Confederate prisons or killed by accident, murder, and other causes, also 199,105 reported as deserters in the four years. Of this total 67,058 were killed in battle and 43,012 died of wounds, being a total of 110,070, or less than 12½ per cent., a little less than one-half the total German fatalities on the field.

* * *

"Conscientious Objectors"

UNDER the British Conscription act, which applies to unmarried men, exemption from military service may be claimed if the applicant can show that he has a "conscientious objection" to fighting. To judge from the reports of proceedings before the tribunals set up to hear the claims of "conscientious objectors," the law is more honored in the breach than in the observance. Members of certain religious bodies, such as the Society of Friends, have been granted absolute exemption; but men who are only humanitarians, pacifists, and anti-war Socialists without belonging to similar religious denominations have been treated with extreme severity by the tribunals.

Here are a few examples: At the Oldbury Tribunal a "conscientious objector" was told that all he possessed was cowardice and insolence. At Port Talbot a member of the tribunal defined a conscientious objector as "a man trying to save his own skin." Another applicant was told that he was a traitor and "only fit to be on the point of a German bayonet." At Huddersfield two Socialists were granted exemption from noncombatant services only, absolute exemption being refused because they would "hinder recruiting if left." At the Shaw Tribunal a conscientious objector was told: "You are exploiting God to save your own skin. It is nothing but deliberate and rank blasphemy. You are nothing but a shivering mass of unwholesome fat." At Birmingham an applicant said, "It is against Christ's commands to go and fight," whereupon the military representative exclaimed, "Filled up with the madness of insane views!" The great majority of conscientious objectors make no distinction between combatant and noncombatant military duties. This was the stated intention of the Government when the Conscription act was passed, but the tribunals have, with few exceptions, imposed noncombatant service on conscientious objectors even where applicants have made it abundantly clear that this fails to meet their objection to participation in the war. The Government has apparently decided to ignore the law.

* * * *

BRITAIN'S NEW BLOCKADE

A NEW British Order in Council, issued March 30, undertakes to tighten the blockade against Germany by abolishing the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband and applying the doctrine of continuous voyage to both alike. In the words of Lord Robert Cecil, Minister of War Trade: "In future everything passing through British waters on the way to Germany, whether listed as absolute or conditional contraband, is subject to seizure." This applies to cargoes bound from one neutral port to another and to all international mails, which are now being seized and taken to London to be searched for articles whose ultimate destination is believed to be Germany.

The new policy not only ignores Article 19 of the Declaration of London, which provides that "whatever may be the ultimate destination of a vessel or of her cargo, she cannot be captured for breach of blockade if, at the moment, she is on her way to a nonblockaded port," but it also arbitrarily annuls Article 35, which provides that the doctrine of continuous voyage is not applicable to conditional contraband. As the new decree is made retroactive, and as the original Order in Council of Oct. 29, 1914, had definitely ratified Article 35, the change entails unexpected hardships upon American shippers and places a new and serious handicap upon the trade of all neutral nations.

In a recent interview Lord Robert Cecil undertook to justify his Government's new sea policy on the ground that the former distinction between absolute and conditional contraband has vanished since the German Government has taken over the control of all important commodities and is using them for military and civil purposes combined. The degree of patience with which the American shipper will endure this new exercise of British sea power will depend largely upon the still greater extent to which he disapproves of German war methods.

* * *

A PROTEST AND THE REPLY

THE United States Government at once filed a protest through Ambassador Page against the removal of mails from neutral ships, and especially against their detention and delay. The protest added that the American Government was inclined to consider parcel post shipments as subject to the same treatment as goods sent by freight or express.

To this communication the Entente Allies made a joint reply, on April 3, through the British Ambassador at Washington, asserting their right to search general mail, but making no mention of the matter of delay and interference. The main point insisted upon was that the "inviolability" guaranteed to mails by The Hague Convention No. 11 cannot be regarded as curtailing in any degree "the right of the allied Governments to visit and, if need be, stop and seize the goods which are deposited falsely in the covers, envelopes, or letters contained in mail sacks." It could not be applied, in short, to merchandise sent by parcel post. In the words of the official reply:

> Such parcels can in no circumstances be considered as letters, correspondence, or dispatches, and it is clear that nothing can save them from the exercise of the rights

of police control, visit, and eventual seizure which belong to the belligerents on the high seas in regard to all cargoes. Among other numerous examples, it will be sufficient to quote 1,302 parcel post packages containing 437,510 kilograms of rubber for Hamburg * * * or, again, 69 parcels containing 400 revolvers for Germany via Amsterdam.

The comment of London newspapers upon the American protest is that last year Germany sank twelve mail-carrying liners without warning, sending to the bottom not only parcels, but letters, which The Hague Convention declared inviolable; yet not a single neutral Government protested. "Why should Germany be allowed to steal a horse"—thus runs the British comment—"and we be criticised for looking over the hedge?"

Interpretations of World Events

Verdun and French Defensive Tactics

FOR more than two months the battle of Verdun has raged almost ceaselessly day and night. It is conceded that Germany has concentrated picked troops and heavy guns in quantities never before seen in war. Yet, apart from the first withdrawal of General Petain's army from outlying positions to its definite lines of defense, the two months' fighting has not given the attacking forces a gain of two miles. It is instantly evident that, much as has been written, and eloquently written, concerning the great battle, the essential thing has not been written yet, has not been disclosed at all—the secret, that is, of France's defensive tactics.

The problem is this: Germany masses on a single spot the fire of numberless guns, from her 77s to the great 12-inch mortars with their huge charges of high explosives, and continues this fire on a single spot, whether near Vaux or close to Douaumont or on the front of le Mort Homme. It would seem that such a deluge of fire and death must not only annihilate the defenders in the trenches, but must even tear up the earth to many feet in depth, and something like this seems to be the case.

Then the bombarded area is soaked with chlorine gas and strong fuming ammonia, deadly to lungs and eyes alike, and, after this tremendous preparation, the German legions charge in heavy columns with extraordinary energy.

What happens? Has the preparation in fact disorganized or annihilated the French defense? Not a bit. Immediately the oncoming Teutons are met with the famous "curtain of fire," largely a dense hail of bullets from shrapnel, timed to explode a score of yards or more before their faces; and, if a remnant succeeds in getting past, they are met by furious bayonet charges; where the assailants manage to seize a bit of trench they are quickly counterattacked and generally driven out again. Thus it comes that two months of furious assault have not given two miles of advantage.

The mystery, then, is this: First, where were the famous French 75s while the German preparation was going on? Next, from what skillfully hidden points were the French mitrailleuses, that is, machine guns or pompoms, able to pour a deadly hail upon the charging Germans? And, thirdly, where did General Petain hide the men who made the gallant countercharges? The events at Liége, Namur, and Maubeuge demonstrated that the old-time forts of steel cupolas and reinforced concrete were worse than useless against the big Skoda mortars; Antwerp reinforced the same lesson; and the steel forts about Verdun seem to have been practically abandoned, as at Vaux. The unanswered question is, What have the French discovered to take their place? Here is an intellectual victory that may make possible a real decision on the field of battle, for it seems certain that the attacking Germans are losing at least three men for each one lost by the French. From the beginning General Joffre has been very economical with his men, and the result is beginning to tell, and will tell every day now with increasing force. The question is, How is General Joffre able to do this and yet not lose ground?

Germany's Submarine Blockade

LEAVING aside all questions of international law and the rights of non-combatants and neutrals, it is evident that the present epidemic of submarine attacks bears a very close resemblance to what took place a year ago, when the first great series of attacks took place. At first, every day brought news of the sinking of liners, whether passenger ships or merchant vessels. Then little by little the successful attacks began to dwindle, until they practically ceased. It was learned afterward that the reason was that the allied fleets had discovered the countermove which seems to have been not so much a use of steel fishing-nets as a systematic pursuit of the submarines, based on certain principles. One of these was that even while beneath the surface the submarine makes a kind of wake or track, visible from above by aeroplane observers; another was the fact that, just as a whale must come up to breathe, so the submarine, when the energy of her electric storage batteries is used up, must come to the surface to recharge them again by the use of dynamos, driven by gasoline engines. Assume that the electric energy will carry the submarine a dozen miles. If a submarine is observed to submerge at a given spot, it becomes certain that, whale-like, she must come up again somewhere on the circumference of a circle with a twelve-mile radius, and fast torpedo boats, scouting along the rim of this circle, have a fair chance to pick her up and sink her. And it seems that in this way great numbers of German submarines were in fact sunk, while others, perhaps, were enmeshed in the somewhat problematical steel nets. So it happened that there was a long lull in submarine warfare. During this lull, German inventors seem to have perfected a new submarine which probably has very much larger electric storage capacity, and so are able to run much longer distances without coming up to "breathe." Therefore the torpedo boats can no longer pick them up and sink them, so the work of destruction of which we have, during the last two months, been witnesses, goes on. Yet every move has its countermove, and it is only a question of weeks until the Allies divine the counterstroke to the new German submarine, when we shall once more have a lull in the sinking of ships, another "interval" in submarine warfare. In war the important thing to remember is that for every attack there is an adequate defense, if it can only be found out.

From Trebizond to Bagdad

IT will be remembered that Xenophon and the Ten Thousand emerged from their long march among the Armenian mountains at Trebizond; here it was that, greeting the sea, they cried out: "Thalassa! Thalassa!" Do we equally remember that they had come almost direct from Bagdad, up the Tigris Valley, then across the headwaters of the Euphrates, and so, by the very road which the Russian forces are now following, from Erzerum to the sea? So that, in order to obtain an accurate chart of their route, the Russian forces have only to read the later chapters of the Anabasis backward and to translate parasangs into versts.

The importance of Trebizond to the Russians is obvious. They already have several considerable groups of men operating in the general area covered by Xenophon's army, and ought to have more. But to keep these troops supplied, whether by the Caspian Sea, Enseli, and Teheran, or by the route through Kars and over the high passes of the Caucasus, is extremely difficult. The one easy road is the old caravan line from Trebizond to Erzerum and thence down the Tigris Valley to Bagdad. This necessity is the key to the various scattered operations of the Russian forces, from within a few miles east of Trebizond, where Russian forces are approaching the Turkish seaport along the shore of the Black Sea from the Russian Caucasus, or in the direction of Erzingian, or as far south as Bitlis. All these points are on the caravan road, and the

Turks are seeking, with new forces sent up from Constantinople, to destroy the open line of communication, which Russia, for exactly the same strategic reasons, is working to maintain and defend. We may expect that, once the Russian troops enter the open valley of the Tigris, their advance will be rapid, synchronizing with the descent of General Baratoff's forces, doubtless greatly strengthened, from the foothills of the Persian boundary mountain chain.

Kuropatkin's Strategy on the Dwina

GENERAL KUROPATKIN, acting under the inspiration of General Alexeieff and the Russian General Staff, has probably had two objectives in his recent aggressive action along the lower Dwina, from Dwinsk to Riga. The most obvious has been to draw eastward as many German troops as possible, who might otherwise be available against Verdun; just as, in August, 1914, General Samsonoff and General Rennenkampf were sent to Prussia, and did in fact succeed in drawing eastward two army corps that had been destined for the attack on Paris. But General Kuropatkin evidently had another and more immediate object. The Dwina flows along a low, flat valley, which, when the snows melt in Spring, is almost always inundated to a considerable width, this flooded area being precisely the zone of the eastern battle front. On either side, at some little distance from the river, the land rises into what may almost be called plateaus. On the western plateau the Germans held positions of considerable importance, and Kuropatkin's objective seems to have been to get a firm footing on the rim of this German-held plateau, so that he might, when the floods ebb, begin an advance movement from that point, thus very effectively forestalling any German offensive by Field Marshal von Hindenburg, his opponent. The German purpose was exactly opposite—to get to the eastern, Russian side of the flat river valley before the floods came down, and so to be in a position to begin a new advance movement, which may have, at least as its theoretical goal, the capture of Petrograd; but it is doubtful that Hindenburg at present seriously believes in any such move as that.

The Serbian Army Re-enters the War

WHEN French warships recently occupied the island of Corfu, on the west coast of Greece toward Albania, they had two objects in view. The first and more immediately pressing was to smoke out the bases for submarines which the Teutonic powers had established in the little frequented bays of the island, and from which had proceeded some of the sensational submarine raids on ships passing through the Mediterranean. The second and more considerable aim was to provide a base for the recuperation and refitting of the Serbian Army, or that part of it which, having eluded its Bulgarian and Teutonic adversaries, had fought its way through the hostile Albanian hills and had embarked, under cover of Italian forces, at Durazzo and Valona. These troops, probably more than 120,000 in number, are now once more fit to enter the field. There arises the problem of transporting them to Saloniki. To carry them by water all the way would be to invite attacks by Teutonic and Turkish submarines, several of which are believed to be lurking among the bays of the Morea, receiving supplies from the Teutophile friends of Queen Sophia. Therefore the Allies have, it would appear, determined to carry them by ship only as far as Patras, on the south shore of the Gulf of Corinth, and thence by rail to Athens, to be re-embarked at Piraeus and at the terminus of the railroad at the extremity of the peninsula of Attica. This determination places Greece in a difficult position, between the formidable, if distant, threats of the Central Empires and the immediate pressure of the Entente Powers, who are on the spot, and who command every Greek port with their warships. Premier Skouloudis energetically protests, but the Entente Powers have a threefold answer: first, that his Government has a defective standing on the basis of the Greek Constitution, and does not really represent the will of the Greek Nation; second, that the treaty which created modern Greece provides for intervention by Russia, France, and England, when, in their judgment, it becomes necessary; and, third, that the failure of Greece to keep her treaty pledge to Serbia makes it morally incumbent on Greece to do all in her power to repair the consequent damage to Serbian interests; and this would without doubt include giving all possible aid to the recuperated and renewed Serbian Army. The addition of 120,000 Serbians will seemingly raise the total of Entente forces at Saloniki to not less than 350,000 men.

The Italian Battle Front

THE Italians and Austrians continue to hammer each other across the valleys of the Trentino and Sugana, and along the gray, barren edge of the Carso uplands, a wilderness of treeless limestone where hardly anything grows but a few stunted tufts of heath. In itself the Carso is quite worthless; its only value is that it is the front door of Trieste, or perhaps one should say the outer wall, which must be passed before Trieste, with its 150,000 Italian inhabitants, can be reached. A large part of the coveted Trentino is hardly more inviting than the Carso; so much so that the greatest of all Italians, Dante, chose a characteristic piece of Trentino landscape as a simile for the seventh circle of Hell: The place to which we came, he writes in the Twelfth Canto, in order to descend the bank, was Alpine, and such, from what was there besides, that every eye would shun it. As is the ruin, which struck the Adige in its flank, on this (southern) side Trent, caused by earthquake or by defective prop, for, from the summit of the mountain whence it moved to the plain, the rock is shattered so that it might give some passage. It is this wilderness of shattered rock in the tongue of the Trentino that forms the most hotly contested territory on the Italian line. The Italians seem to be making headway, though at an almost inappreciable rate; and, though they entered the war just a year ago, on May 22, they have as yet reached none of their three chief objectives: Trent, Gorizia, Trieste, though none of the three lies many miles beyond the Italian frontier. The nature of the ground may account in part for the slowness of this advance; the immense strength of modern defensive warfare may account for another part; but undoubtedly the conservative strategy of General Count Cadorna is the dominating cause.

The Indian Moslems and the Holy War

IT will be remembered that about the time Turkey became involved in the war a telegram was published as having been sent from Kaiser Wilhelm to the Crown Prince announcing with evident satisfaction that the supreme Moslem authorities at Constantinople had given their sanction to the declaration of a Holy War against Russia, England, and France "as oppressors of the Moslems." At one time it looked as though the aspirations implied by this message might be carried out. There was a mutiny at Singapore in which Moslem troops were implicated; there were outbreaks in the Italian Tripolitana and among the Senoussi tribesmen on the western border of Egypt; there was at least a threat against the Suez Canal, from the direction of Beersheba, and there was, or seemed to be, the possibility of a pro-German uprising in Persia. The advance of the Russians from the Caspian has dissipated this last possibility; the Suez Canal is no longer even threatened; the Senoussi have given their submission. Finally, from India, from Sultan Mohammed Aga Khan, who is the spiritual head of the many million Moslems in India, comes a declaration which shows that the hopes of a holy war, as it seems to have been expected in Germany, were never anything more than a myth. The conviction on which these hopes rested never had any reality. The spiritual potentate of India proclaims that the attempts by German gold to stir up religious ill-feeling among the Indian Moslems have been perfectly fruitless. The Indian Mohammedan troops cheerfully fight their Turkish co-religionists in Mesopotamia or Gallipoli "just as fellow-Christians kill each other in France." There is, perhaps, just a touch of satire in that; but there is entire sincerity and truth in the statement that India, as a whole, understands and appreciates the benefits of English rule.

The Air Raid on Constantinople

WHILE the Russians are making steady if slow headway in a campaign which must lead them ultimately to the back door of Constantinople, the forces of Britain and France are beginning a more active movement directed toward the front door, and their airmen are already dropping bombs on the roof of Constantine's city. On the evening of Friday, April 14, a daring English airman, Flight Commander J. R. W. Smyth-Pigott, led a raid of three naval aeroplanes, which dropped bombs on the Zeitunlik powder mills, in the northern outskirts of Pera, the suburb immediately north of the Golden Horn. The flight, going and coming, amounted to 300 milles, the record for a raid of this kind; the previous record, from Nancy to Stuttgart and return, 240 miles, being held by a Fenchman. The base of this new raid forms an interesting subject for conjecture. Obviously, it was not Saloniki, which is 300 miles from Constantinople, or 600 for the round trip. Nor is there any land base in possession of the Entente Allies within 150 miles of Stamboul. The nearest is Imbros, which is nearly 170 miles from the Golden Horn. It will follow, therefore, if the figures quoted are correct, that the three attacking aeroplanes set out from and returned to a sea-base, an Entente warship, anchored somewhere on the Gulf of Saros, between the Gallipoli Peninsula and the southern coast of Bulgaria. This would give the 300 miles exactly.

This is not the only point of the Turkish war area in which the Entente aeroplanes have been very active. All through the first week of April there were air contests along the strongly defended line before Saloniki, and on April 12 and 13 Entente aeroplanes, twenty-three in number, rained down bombs on the Teutonic base at Guevgheli and bombarded the Bulgarian camp at Bogoroditsa. The Bulgaro-Teutonic forces were also active in the air, probably foreshadowing more serious fighting in that region.

The Russian Forces in Persia

AFTER moving with astonishing rapidity the Russian forces in Persia seem to have come to a halt; the predicted descent on Bagdad hangs fire. It was at the end of last October that a Russian force, numbering in all not more than 24,000 men, was landed by transports at Enseli on the southern (Persian) shore of the Caspian Sea. Enseli is only eighty miles from the nearest port in the Russian Caucasus, or some half dozen hours by steamship. It is also close to Resht, which is connected by good and accessible roads with Teheran, the Persian capital. This Russian force advanced by rapid marches to Kasbin, which is about half way by road from Resht to Teheran. At that time the German envoy, Prince Henry of Reuss, had the Shah under his thumb and was persuading his Majesty to fly from Teheran and the approaching Russians. When the Russian advance guard of 4,000 reached Yeng-Iman, fifty miles from the Persian capital, Prince Henry began to pack, and when the first thousand Russians entered Herej, twenty-five miles from Teheran, on Nov. 14, Prince Henry departed, leaving the Shah behind. General Baratoff, the Russian commander of this expeditionary force, had thus only 24,000 men, hardly more than one division, to start with; with these he effectively occupied half a dozen Persian cities, of which Teheran, Hamadan, Sultanabad, and Kermanshah are the most important. It follows that he has only some 12,000 men free for the descent from the frontier mountain terraces of Persia upon the plain of the Tigris and Bagdad, and 12,000 men are not enough. The cause of the Russian delay is thus made clear—more men, more munitions must first be sent from the Caucasus to Enseli and Resht, and thence, over caravan roads, to the front, beyond Kermanshah. And this takes time.

BERNARD SHAW ON IRELAND AND GERMANY

The two articles printed below are Mr. Shaw's first important contribution to the literature of the war since his famous essay, "Common Sense About the War," which appeared in the first issue of CURRENT HISTORY. The present articles are published here by arrangement with THE NEW YORK TIMES.

Irish Nonsense About Ireland

By George Bernard Shaw

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THERE has come into my hands, from a quarter it was not meant to reach, a certain address "To the Men and Women of the Irish Race in America," which is so typical of the stuff which gives its title to this article that I feel moved, in the interests of my unfortunate countrymen in Ireland, to offer America a piece of my mind concerning it. As an Irishman, I have been familiar with Irish patriotic rhetoric all my life. Personally, I have no use for it, because I always wanted to get things done and not to let myself go for the satisfaction of my temper and the encouragement of my already excessive national self-conceit. I have seen it going out of fashion with the greatest relief.



When something like an Irish national theatre was established in Abbey Street, Dublin, and a genuine Irish drama began to germinate, I enjoyed the new Irish plays because the heroes always brought down the house by declaring that they were sick of Ireland, by expressing an almost savage boredom at the expense of the old patriots who were usually the fools of the piece when they were not the villains, and, generally, by damning the romantic Old Ireland up hill and down dale in the most exhilarating fashion. And though this might easily have become as tiresome and insincere a trick as the most obsolete claptrap of the stage Irishmen who, obliged to confess that they have never been in Ireland, call themselves American Gaels, yet it was for the moment a notable step in advance; and it has finally straightened itself out in such admirable essays on modern Ireland as that recently put forward by a genuine Irishman of genius, St. John Ervine, in the guise of a biography of Sir Edward Carson, to whom about half a dozen lines are allotted in the course of the substantial little volume.

The first comment provoked by the appeal "to the men and women of the Irish race in America" is that, though it is dated 1916, there is no internal evidence that it was not written in 1860, (as indeed most of it was,) except the inevitable allusions to the present war. In point of learning nothing and forgetting nothing these fellow-patriots of mine leave the Bourbons nowhere. Their belief that the Irish race not only takes with it to America the ideas of Athlone, but invincibly maintains in its new home not only its Irish nationality but its Irish ignorance, its Irish parochial narrowness, its Irish sectarianism, and its Irish conviction that the Irish are the salt of the earth and that all other races are comparatively barbarous, degraded, sordid, irreligious, ungenerous, tyrannical, and treacherous, and that this inferiority is essentially and disgustingly marked in the case of "the English race," shines ridiculously through every paragraph in their manifesto.

Ireland is to be freed from the horrible contamination of association with England by complete political separation from her. "Ireland looks forward with hope and confidence to the complete breakdown of British misrule in Ireland as the certain outcome of the present war." "Success for England would mean only additional heavy burdens for Ireland and a renewal of strength to her age-long oppressor and tyrant." Finally, there is an appeal to America to maintain the principles of—among other illustrious Americans—Abraham Lincoln! As Lincoln is the most famous Unionist known to history, the Separatist patriots could hardly have made a more unfortunate selection of a name to conjure with.

Now, as against all this, I venture to ask the Americans of Irish race, and even those Americans who have to blush for less glorious origins, to keep a firm grip of the following facts:

It is now half a century since the most populous and productive States of North America, compared to the least of which Ireland is only a cabbage garden, and a barren one at that, renounced all idea of independence and isolation and fought for compulsory combination with all the other States across the whole continent more desperately than the many Irish soldiers engaged in the conflict had ever fought for separation. During that half century no small nation has been able to maintain its independence single-handed; it has had to depend either on express guarantees from the great powers (that is, the combinations) or on the intense jealousy between those powers.

In the present war the attack of a huge army of men of different races, speaking half a dozen different languages and estranged by memories of fierce feuds and persecutions and tyrannies, but combined under the leadership of the Central Empires, made short work of national pride, of the spirit of independence, and of bitter memories of old hostilities in England, France, and Russia. These three ancient enemies, any of whom could have swallowed Ireland more easily than Ireland could swallow her own Blasket Islands, had to pocket their nationalism and defend themselves by a combination of the British fleet, the French Army, and the Russian steam roller. And even when these immense combinations were in the field one of them was glad to buy the help of moribund Turkey and immature little Bulgaria, and the other to offer Italy, in defiance of all nationalist principles, a lodgment in Dalmatia if she would come to the rescue.

In the face of these towering facts that blot out the heavens with smoke and pile the earth of Europe with dead I invite America to contemplate the spectacle of a few manifesto-writing stalwarts from the decimated population of a tiny green island at the back of Godspeed, claiming its national right to confront the world with its own army, its own fleet, its own tariff, and its own language, which not 5 per cent. of its population could speak or read or write even if they wanted to. Unless the American climate has the power of totally destroying the intelligence of the Irish race its members will see that if Ireland were cut loose from the British fleet and army tomorrow she would have to make a present of herself the day after to the United States, or France, or Germany, or any big power that would condescend to accept her: England for preference.

Now let me not be supposed to have any lack of sympathy for the very natural desire of the Irish, expressed by "the clarion voice of the Bishop of Limerick," to keep out of this war if possible. If I were an Irish Bishop I should certainly tell my flock to till their fields and serve God in peace instead of slaughtering Germans who also ought to be tilling their fields and serving God in peace. If I were the Pope I should order every combatant in Europe, Asia Minor, and Africa to lay down his arms instantly on pain of excommunication. I should offer the Kaiser his choice between coming to Canossa and going to hell; and I should not hold out the least hope to the President of the French Republic or the Kings of England and Italy that they had any greater claim in the eye of heaven to a verdict of justifiable homicide than the Kaiser.

But does any sane Irishman hope to persuade an American, of Irish or other race, that the French people were any less desirous to keep out of the trenches than the Irish? Is the Catholic of Bavaria any less entangled in the net of war than the Catholic of Connaught? On the contrary, he is entangled much more; for he is not, like the Connaught Catholic, exempt from conscription. The English volunteer is a volunteer no longer: he is a pressed man; and if he has rushed to the colors more eagerly than the Irishman it is because the industrial slavery he endured was so much worse than any that the Irish peasant suffers, and the places he lives in so much uglier and more revolting to human instincts than the poorest Irish cabins that still survive the activities of the Irish Local Government Board, that the billet in St. Albans or on Salisbury Plain, and the trip to Flanders were an adventure as welcome to him as the separation allowance was to his wife, and—sometimes—the separation itself to both of them.

But you cannot knock into the head of the machine-made Irish patriot that either the grievances or the virtues of Ireland are to be found in other countries as well. There have been occasions on which English trade unionists have sent money to help French, Belgian, and other foreign workers in their strife for a living wage. Irish patriots send nothing but demands for unlimited sympathy, unlimited admiration, and unlimited Post Office orders. The money that Ireland has accepted from America without shame, and without perceptible gratitude, both in domestic remittances and political subscriptions, is incalculable.

We are the champion mendicants of the world; and when we at last provoke the inevitable hint that Ireland, like other countries, is expected to be at least self-supporting, not to say self-respecting, we shall rise up and denounce our benefactors as the parricidal exterminators of the Irish race. We have never seen the other side of any Irish question; to this day the protective duties by which England ruined our manufactures are denounced as an act of pure malignity, and the old notice "No Irish need apply" as an explosion of racial hatred, although every other working class in the west of Europe is educated enough to know that men willing, as we Irish are, to take the jobs of other men at wages against which a pig would revolt, are the enemies, not merely of the English, but of the human race.

And now we are told—as if it were something to be proud of—that "the heart of Ireland is not changed." It does not occur to the gentlemen who have made this announcement, which is fortunately not true, that in that case the sooner it is changed the better. "Deprived as Ireland is by the Defence of the Realm act of the right to express any national opinion" is the beginning of their depressing declaration. Pray, is England any the less deprived of the rights of her people by this reckless act? Has anything happened in Ireland since the war began, whether in suppressions of papers, arbitrary arrests, excessive sentences without trial, even secret executions, that can be compared for a moment to the abuses of the act that have occurred in England? And can such abuses be restrained in any other way in either country than by the peoples of the two countries making common cause against them instead of, as this silly document does, accusing "the English" of guile, calumny, falsehood, cant, and what not, taunting them with the very defeats the English papers try to minimize by such headlines as "Heroic Stand by the Dublin Fusiliers." The cry that "England's Difficulty Is Ireland's Opportunity" is raised in the old senseless spiteful way as a recommendation to stab England in the back when she is fighting some one else and to kick her when she is down, instead of in the intelligent and large-minded modern way which sees in England's difficulty the opportunity of showing her what a friendly alliance with Ireland can do for her in return for the indispensable things it can do for Ireland.

In short, the war is a convincing demonstration of the futility of the notion that the Irish and English peoples are natural enemies. They are, on the contrary, natural allies. The whole case for Home Rule stands on that truth, and the case against it, on the contrary falsehood. If we are natural enemies England must either hold us down or be herself held down by us. If we are natural allies there is no more ground for denying self-government to us than to Australia. There is, of course, what the Germans call the Class War always with us; but that is a bond of union between the workers of all nations and not a division. If the two countries were separate, the first care of Irish statesmen would be to fasten as many tentacles as possible on Great Britain by pooling the wider public services of the two countries, especially the military and naval services, which would crush Ireland today if they were a separate establishment. That is why it is part of the Home Rule bargain that the English Army and Fleet shall also be the Irish Army and Fleet. There may come a time when international law may be so well established that a small nation may be as safe by itself as a small man already is in the streets of a civilized capital. But that time can come only through renunciation of all the poisonous international hatreds of which the Irish hatred of England is a relic. There may even come a time when some development of the arts of self-defense, which already enable ten properly equipped and trained men to hold their own against a thousand savages, may enable ten wise men to hold their own against a thousand fools. But that time has not come yet; and if it ever does it will be a bad job for the Irish patriot if he is still parroting his dreary litany to St. Patrick and Robert Emmet and the Manchester martyrs to be delivered from the wicked English.

As matters now stand this war is just as much Ireland's business as England's or France's. A mere victory for British navalism over Prussian militarism might be as great a misfortune as a victory for Prussian militarism over British navalism. But a victory of Western democracy and republicanism over Hohenzollernism and Hapsburgocracy, or a stalemate with the Prussian and Austrian legions held up hopeless by French and Irish republican soldiers, even shoulder to shoulder with Britons who think that they never, never, never will be slaves because they have never been anything else, would be a triumph for the principles that have made the United States the most important political combination in the world, and, through the United States, made the home rule movement possible in Ireland.

I am under no illusions as to the extent to which modern nominal democracy and republicanism are still leavened by the old tyrannies and the old intolerances. I have declared in season and out that the task before us is not so much the sweeping out of the last monarchs, as the herculean labor of making democracy democratic and republicanism republican. It was by devoting my political life to the solution of that problem that I learned to see mere romantic nationalism in its essential obsolescence and triviality. There is such a thing as Irish freedom, just as there is such a thing as Cork butter. But it was by studying foreign butter and tracing its excellence to its source in foreign co-operation that Sir Horace Plunkett and George Russell, the only two noted Irishmen who have done anything fundamental for Ireland in my time, have kept Cork butter sweet. And it is from England and America that the Irish will have to learn what freedom really means.

Ireland as a nation cannot keep out of the present conflict except on the plea of utter insignificance. It has yet to be seen whether America will succeed in keeping out of it. Be that as it may, the

Irishman who suggests that the right side for any Western democratic nation to take is the Prussian side must find some better argument than that the Prussian side happens to be the anti-English side. I hope in a second article to make it clear to the Germans of America (since I can hardly reach the Germans of Germany) why it is that I do not take their side in this war, though they have taken my side very handsomely in my long conflict with Philistinism and barbarism. But if, as I have shown, the choice of sides does not now depend on national considerations, still less does it depend on personal ones. My present purpose is to show that the Irishmen who can see only Ireland and England, and see even them only as parties to a feud, can give no counsel worth attending to in this business.

Ireland, without the least regard to its squabble with England, must group itself in a combination of which the real centre is Western republicanism and democratic internationalism. The present appeal against this combination to America would be stupid even if Ireland's interest and traditions were those of Frederick the Great. But, as Irish patriotism is by tradition republican, the appeal is quite beyond patience. The Irish patriot may demand in desperation whether he is to fight shoulder to shoulder with the English Unionists and Russian autocrats against the enemies of his "age-long oppressors"; but the reply is inexorably Yes. Adversity makes us acquainted with strange bedfellows. The Czar, when this war came upon him, must have exclaimed to M. Sazonoff, "Good Heavens! do you mean to tell me that I, an absolute Emperor and a Romanoff, am to fight against my imperial cousins the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns, who stand with me as the representatives of the principle of monarchy in Europe, on the side of this rabble of French and Irish republicans, this gang of Serbian regicides, this brace of Kings who are so completely in the hands of Parliaments of middle-class lawyers that their own subjects call them india rubber stamps!" If the Czar has to swallow that, even an Irish patriot must not be surprised at not having it all his own way. He must therefore console himself by considering that, in the words of a deservedly celebrated Irish dramatic poet,

> Fate drives us all to find our chiefest good
> In what we can, and not in what we would.

The German Case Against Germany

By George Bernard Shaw

(Copyright, 1916, by George Bernard Shaw.)

IT is often rashly assumed that the Germans in America are not only Germans but pro-Germans. Now it would be much safer to assume that if they were pro-Germans they would not be in America but in their Fatherland. It is only the Irishman whose enthusiasm for his birthplace increases as the square of his distance from it. Germany is a very accessible country, and there is nothing to prevent a man who likes it and can speak the language from transferring himself from America to Germany. If, under these circumstances, he chooses to remain in America it is reasonable to conclude that he prefers American institutions, and will take the republican side against the imperial side when the two come into conflict.

But war has the effect of throwing men back into their primitive phases, and the reasoner who in peace may prefer the President to the Kaiser, may in war time find himself exulting in a victorious charge of the Prussian Guard upon the republican troops of France. Even as a reasoner he may think the Prussian system, though irksome to him personally, a capital thing for other people. Or he may think that, good or bad, it is going to win. Or he may think that, bad as it is, it is better than the Russian system. Or he may think that the English do not deserve to win, because they are Philistines and jobbers and muddlers, while the Germans stand for ideas and for order. Or he may think that practically good local government is more important than theoretically good central government, and may therefore support the Germans on the ground that their local government is superior to anything of the kind in England or the United States. Or he may be exasperated by British command of the sea, with its glorious unconsciousness that any right-minded American shipowner or skipper could possibly object to be held up and mulcted in harbor dues when he is going peacefully about his legitimate affairs. There are, in short, dozens of considerations which may induce a German immigrant to overcome his dislike of Germany and become a pro-German.

I therefore venture to state the case against Germany as it might appeal to a German escaped from Germany, and even to a German still in the bondage of the Prussian system. I am fortunate enough to be able to do so without having to disclaim the electioneering and recruiting case put forward by the British Government, having made the Kaiser a handsome present of it before the war was four months old. I was very violently abused for doing so; but those who abused me have since gone to such frantic lengths in denouncing the conduct of the war that my little criticisms and candors now read more like an apology for the British Cabinet and the British General Staff than an attack on them.

We hear no more about the sacredness of treaties; the cathedral of Rheims is not spoken of since we came within an ace of bombarding the Acropolis to force Greece to relax her neutrality; we made it as clear that we would, if necessary, batter our way into Saloniki as the Germans did that they would batter their way to Antwerp; we were glad that the Greeks had learned the lesson of German frightfulness too well to dare more than a formal protest; we have denounced American neutrality and Bulgarian intervention in the same breath; we have republished with loud boastings and "I told you sos" our own propaganda of war against Germany after exhausting every vituperative epithet at my expense because I ventured to say that as far as shaking the mailed fist went it was a case of six of one and half a dozen of the other; we have superseded the commanding officers who were the Caesars and Napoleons of the beginning of the war, and broken up the Government which we were all to support as a united nation until the hour of victory; we have declared and proved that we were prepared to the last rope in the navy and the last button on the tunics of our promised expeditionary force for the fight which we swore had taken us utterly by surprise in a pastoral dream of peace; in short, there is not a rag left of the official case whose collapse I foresaw and whose exposure I anticipated, while the real case against Germany stands exactly as I stated it, and is now the only case that any one dares to plead on the side of the Allies.

It seems, then, that our striking of moral attitudes was a mistake, and that in unceremoniously upsetting the attitudinizers I was performing a public service, easy enough to any one with some foresight, some self-possession, some student's knowledge of war, and some understanding of human nature. I neither expected nor received any gratitude from those I upset; but the outcry of pro-German raised against me at least enables me to address myself to the Germans without being suspected of classing them as genetically inferior to the English, the French, the Italians, and the Bulgarians.

Like all who have seen Germany with their own eyes, who are deeply interested in science and art, and who are constitutionally impatient of anarchy, muddle, and disorder, I rate German civilization far above British civilization at many points; and I quite understand why many Englishmen who know Germany, and whose social opin-

THE PLAIN OF WOEVRE
Scene of Fighting Southeast of Verdun, Where the Hills Rise From the Beautiful Woevre Countryside
(Photo © Underwood & Underwood)



A TYPICAL REGIMENTAL AID POST

The Wounded Man Has Been Carried Through a Long Tunnel From the Firing Line to This First-Aid Shelter

(From a French Official Photograph)

ions are *echt* Junker opinions, hail this war as a means of forcing England to adopt the Prussian system, which they worship as no German, with his practical experience of it, can worship it. Such enthusiasms are not expressed in the newspapers, and do not prevent those who hold them from taking the most energetic part in the war; but they are quite freely expressed in private discussions of political ideals. Their exponents are under no illusion as to this being a war of Virtue against Villainy; they know it to be a case of diamond cut diamond, and their only fear is that the Prussian diamond may prove the harder. And I do not know a single person, and indeed doubt whether there exists west of the Carpathians a single native person who believes that the overthrow of German civilization by Russian or Turkish Serbian civilization would be a step forward in social evolution.

What, then, is the case against Germany?

It is, briefly, that all its organization, all its education, all its respect for ideas, all its carefully nourished culture, have somehow failed to secure for it either a government fit to be trusted with the tremendous mechanical power its organization has produced, or even a military and naval staff either representative of high German civilization or capable of effectively controlling its own officers.

What is the explanation of this and of other similar German paradoxes? I have admitted that German local government is very superior to English local government. Its organization, its foresight, its public spirit, all due to its skillful combination of educated well-to-do municipal statesmanship with the primitive criticism of the poorer common vestryman, who knows where the shoe pinches, put us to shame. But the infant mortality of Germany is higher than that of England. That is the damning answer to the claims of the German professors for the superiority of German kultur. And it is so in other departments. The German system of training and selecting men seems far more thorough than ours; but the result is not convincing; the men who secure the commanding posts are not those born to command.

The truth is that a corrupt Government in control of a highly organized system is much more dangerous than a corrupt government muddling along with hardly any system. Now the German Government is frankly and hopelessly corrupt because it puts the power and reputation of a family, and of the class of which that family is the head, before every other consideration. It desires the good of the people provided that the good be wrought by the Hohenzollerns, and includes maintenance of the Hohenzollerns on the throne as the supreme good. It desires the efficiency of the army provided that the army be officered by the Junker class, and is primarily efficient as a servile retinue for that class. But the points reserved defeat the end to be gained. You may have the best organized and equipped, the cheapest, and the most numerous universities in the world; but if a professor of history can be ordered, on pain of dismissal, to write a treatise proving that it was the Kaiser's grandfather and not Bismarck who achieved the unity of Germany and outwitted and defeated Denmark, Austria, and France, the students of that university will not be instructed; they will be infatuated.

If the University of Berlin appoints the ablest mathematician it can find to its chair of mathematics, and the Kaiser drives him out because he is also a Social-Democrat, which means no more in Germany than that he holds opinions which are a matter of course to every American, not only the mathematical school of Berlin University, but every other school in it, will become second rate, owing to the impossibility of finding eminence in the liberal arts combined in the same person with idolatry of crowns and uniforms. If promotion is denied in the army to the officer who at the annual manoeuvres either actually defeats the forces of the Kaiser or Crown Prince, or expresses the professional opinion that their tactics would in real warfare have involved the annihilation of an army corps, then there will be no Napoleons or Lees in high command when real war breaks out. If officers are not only allowed to strike their men, but when a terrified young soldier attempts to escape by flight on discovering that he has accidentally omitted a salute may actually murder him on the spot without any heavier penalty than a few months quite agreeable confinement in a fortress, with the prospect of receiving complimentary messages and a shortening of the sentence from the Kaiser, it is impossible that even the company officers should not be demoralized. If dueling, not of the harmless French sort, but often of the most murderous, is practically forced on officers and on men of their rank by the court, and by a social boycott in which the women of the family are compelled to take part either as the victims or the executioners, no routine of schooling or endowment of art can possibly produce a real modern culture comparable to that of England or America.

Now, to the American, to the Britisher, to the Irishman, to the French Republican, all this is not merely barbarism; it is paranoiac insanity. It has developed not from the needs of human society, but from the fact that at a certain stage of social integration the institution of standing armies gave monarchs the power to play at soldiers with living men instead of leaden figures, and that a craze for such play was a symptom of the mental unsoundness of Peter the Great and Frederick the Great's father. It is merely the comparatively presentable end of a neurosis which cannot even be mentioned at the unpresentable end. When you reach the point at which an omission to salute an officer is treated as an offense which all but justifies murder, while at the same time practices which in republican and democratic countries are regarded as too evil to discuss are officially tolerated and even encouraged, your culture has evidently taken a wrong turning, and must be headed back into the main human road with such violence as may be necessary.

Now, nobody who is arguing the matter with intellectual conscientiousness and competent knowledge will pretend that these political and moral perversities are any more acceptable to a normal German than to a normal Englishman or American. Nor will he deny that they are as rampant in England and France as the more democratic constitutions and consciences of those countries allow them to be. But that is just the difference. Both England and France, like the United States, have paid the price of a revolution to get rid of the *Roi Soleil* system, or at least to bring the artificial sun god so completely under parliamentary control that English Mr. Asquith is unable to conceive how impotent the Reichstag is, and in the House of Commons speaks of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg addressing "his fellow-Deputies," as if the German Chancellor were an elected person. The Germans offered this price in 1848, but did not carry the transaction through; and the constitutional position of the Kaiser is accordingly nearer to that of Louis XIV. and Charles I. (or even Richard III.) than of George V. or President Poincaré.

Why do the Germans stand it? Certainly not out of love for Prussia and the Hohenzollerns; Prussia and its royal family are no more sentimentally popular in the other kingdoms of the German Empire than Dublin Castle is in the County Cork. Yet German unity is unassailable: the English publicists who think that the cohesion of the German kingdoms is as feeble as it was when Thackeray ridiculed the Court of Pumpernickel, and that the revived Holy Roman Empire will fall to pieces at the dictation of the Allies, are mistaken. The German support of Prussia is a recent support based on the practical experience of the individual German that under Prussian leadership the Germans, once the butts of Europe, have become the most feared and respected people in the world; that German commerce has made strides that have left even England gasping; and that wherever the German goes he finds employment more easily than the native because it is assumed that he is a more competent man. Above all, he believes in Prussian military efficiency as the centre and model of all the rest; so that not even the German Social-Democrats have ever opposed compulsory military service, though every year in the Reichstag they have had to expose a sickening list of abuses of military discipline.

Now, I submit to the Germans that this war has proved that the Prussian system and the Hohenzollern idolatry do not make for either military efficiency or the diplomatic efficiency without which the control of a big military machine is as dangerous as a loaded pistol in the hands of a child or a fool. Let me illustrate my position by a few examples:

Take the case of the idiot who sank the Lusitania. His exploit would have paid the Allies very handsomely if they had bribed him with $20,000,000 to do what he did gratuitously out of sheer folly. Indeed, had the Germans disclaimed the deed and maintained that the torpedo was a British one, launched by Mr. Churchill's order for the sake of prejudicing the cause of Germany with the United States, it would have been hard to discredit so plausible a story. But it is the weakness of class despotism that its credit and its strategy are at the mercy of the most foolish of its recognized members and agents, because it must never admit that it is fallible at any point. Whatever avalanche of objurgation poor Admiral von Tirpitz may have hurled down on the submarine commander in private, to have disowned him in public, or even have withheld from him the rewards of conspicuous service, would not only have implied that the wonderful Prussian machine is not really controllable, but that a Prussian commander can be a blunderer of the first stupidity. It is no use for the Hohenzollern to be infallible if he cannot convey his infallibility, as it were, by laying on of hands to all his delegates. Once admit that a Prussian officer can err and he drops at once to the prosaic level of General Joffre, the son of a cooper, and General Robertson, promoted from the ranks. The bigger his blunder the more necessary to proclaim it a masterstroke. And as the silliest Junker officer has brains enough to discover that, no matter what he does, he will be backed up, provided it is too sensational to be concealed, he does sensational things, which, even if successful, would gain from General Joffre the order of the boot.

Take again the monstrous diplomatic blunder which has put Germany so hopelessly in the wrong and hemmed her in with formidable enemies on every side. In 1870, when the European atmosphere was still overwhelmingly Liberal, and Barbarossa and Frederick the Great and the Holy Roman Empire were romantic dreams of the past even to the King of Prussia, Bismarck not only conquered France, but contrived to do it in so correct a fashion that it was quite impossible for England or any other power to come to the rescue of France without gross indecency. People say now that we should have thrown in our lot with France in 1870, but how could we? France had wantonly broken the peace of Europe by suddenly raising the frantic cry of "à Berlin," and attacking her neighbor without a pretense of having any ends to serve but those of the Bonaparte dynasty. Germany was victorious and had the sympathy of the world as well; and Bismarck said that the German Lieutenant was the wonder of the world. It was on the strength of that victory and sympathy that the present Kaiser, having got rid of Bismarck, substituted for his shrewd realism the idolatrous romance of Hohenzollernism, with the result that the wonderful German Lieutenant began to figure at Zabern and elsewhere as a very common sort of blackguard; and in spite of the warnings of Bernhardi, the Kaiser landed the Central Empires in a ruinous war by repeating, not the success of Bismarck, but the blunder of Napoleon.

He could, as events have since proved, have beaten Russia in a square fight with her if he had waited for her attack; and if France had then struck him in the back—an outrage to which it would have been hard to reconcile French public opinion—at least England, America, and Italy must have remained neutral and sympathetic. At worst he would have had to fight two first-rate powers, yet he contrived not only to bring four into the field against him but played his hand with America, which contained some trumps which I must not point out to him, in an insane fashion, which not only makes it impossible for the United States to take his part but may yet lead to their joining the Allies, in spite of the ingrained British junkerism of Sir Edward Grey, who should long ago have offered President Wilson guarantees against the danger that is most likely to make America hesitate.

Now all this blundering is not military efficiency, but quite the opposite. The Prussian Junkers, like all stupid people who are not rich, are very industrious, very exact, very determined to do their best; and when they come in conflict with British Junker stupidity, which, being much too rich, has neither industry nor method, they shine as organizers. But what is the use of that without republican common sense behind it? It was perfectly correct to shoot Miss Cavell; she had committed what is by military law a capital offense, and a flagrant instance of it at that; and she seems to have had her case carefully tried and her complicity proved. But would any commandant with the brains of a rabbit have outraged neutral popular sentiment by having her shot, instead of locking her up until the end of the war, after passing a formal sentence of imprisonment for life?

Take the whole case of Belgium. Every one who knows anything of war admits that when a country is invaded, and an army finds itself amid a people to whom the killing of an invader is not only no crime but an act of patriotism, nothing but a reign of terror can protect it. It has always been so: Roberts in Afghanistan and South Africa was no more able to avoid it than the conquerors of Louvain. But would any commanders responsible to democracy, or any General Staff not so intoxicated with idolatry as to imagine that Western public opinion could be imposed on by the rhodomontade of Timour the Tartar, have advertised this horrible necessity as the Prussian officers did? Were the pompous noodles whose proclamations that men who refused to touch their hats to German subalterns must be treated as mad dogs are treated in any sense efficient? Really efficient officers might have burned Brussels and Antwerp to the ground and killed every soul in them with less obloquy than these Junker officers incurred for Germany by burning a few streets in Louvain.

There are places in Flanders of which not one stone has been left on another; but nobody has been made indignant about it. I raise no question of morality; war suspends morality except as a political element that must be considered when the belligerents are surrounded by a precarious neutrality that may at any moment become an active hostility. But efficiency, which is the supreme military consideration, includes a very vigilant and direct regard for the factor of morality, and a careful study of the narrow limits within which reprisals do less harm than good. And it seems to me a mere flying in the face of notorious facts to maintain that Hohenzollernism has produced this vital kind of efficiency in a greater degree than the French republican system.

Prussian efficiency is the efficiency of organized mechanical destructiveness, of big battalions and recklessness of their lives, of high explosives and recklessness of their effects, of blind duty and unreasoning idolatry of King and country, and of the industry that leaves men too tired to think and too confident of having earned gratitude to notice that they may not have deserved it. But you have no lack of this sort of efficiency in the French Army; and you will have no lack of it in the American Army when America has an army without sacrificing the more vital sort to it. In fact, you will have more of it than the Prussians have; for the more democratic your army is the more ruthlessly are officers "turned down" for inefficiency. If the Crown Prince were simply a French or American citizen soldier, he would have incentives to efficiency that do not exist for him at present.

I must not labor the point further. I submit that there is no case for the alleged superlative military efficiency of the Prussian system, and a very strong one against it. I submit that it is necessarily an anti-German system because it is an anti-human system. I submit that, while the pretensions of German culture and civilization are respectable and to a great extent sound, the pretensions of the Hohenzollern family and of the Junker caste are humbug, and that by putting the humbug before the civilization the civilization has been imperiled and must finally become itself a humbug.

I am perfectly aware that monarchical principles are more completely realized by the Government of Germany than republican principles are by the Governments of France and America, and that the Kaiser might with some justification ask me whether I believe that there is really more humbug about his divine right than about political liberty, equality, and fraternity as they are now practiced. I can reply only that it is possible to make France, America, and even England, into real republics, but that it is eternally impossible to make every male Hohenzollern in the direct line a god, or even to guarantee that he would be capable of rising above the rank of a private or managing a whelk stall successfully if he were plain Pitou or Jack or Jonathan.

When the republics of the earth rise up and their Presidents take counsel together the Kings will have to go; that much would be plain even if the question were only one of common humanity, for I know nothing, short of Chinese monster-making, so cruel as bringing up a child to be a King. And I conclude that as the Germans of America must agree with me or they would not be in America, they are, by just so much as they are cleverer than a mere benighted American or Britisher, more eager than we are to see the downfall of what we loosely call Prussian militarism, though it is really only a lazy, romantic, and rather sheepish idolatry of a not very strong-headed family who would never dream of being better than their neighbors if they had not been perversely brought up to that sort of somnambulism.

From a Waiting Ambulance

By MAGDA SINDICI

We saw three guns, one day, 'twixt ditch and field—
Do you remember?—
Gray-throated hounds, leashed to the will of man,
Borrowed from hell that they might bark at hell.
Far off,
There was a sly, curved water-line that gleamed
Between dull banks of sodden earth,
As the drawn crescent of a watching eye might gleam
Between dropped lids.
Gray-throated hounds, too strained to pant, that knew
They must not quiver
And must not run and snatch—or miss—their prey,
Each emptied body leaped as each lean flank
In turn
Flung out its loud, bright, heart—straight, terrible
And lightning-swift to burst and kill.
One flame, one roar—and silence! Many miles away,
A little smoke!
Our own breasts, too, held no more hearts, but just
An empty knocking. * * *
"A foe or two the less—more blind, raw souls
Hurled back, face downward, to the God of Truth!"
And then,
Because our thoughts were such as mock at words,
We watched a pen-stroke on the sky—
A man-made bird, tense-winged, above the Templar's Tower
Of Nieuport Ville!

The German Chancellor's Address

Germany's Position Stated

DR. VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG, German Imperial Chancellor, addressed the Reichstag on April 5 in the longest speech that he has delivered since the war began. He began with a review of military events, denied that the strength of the Central Powers was becoming exhausted and declared that the attempt to starve Germany was a failure. Passing to the subject of British interference with neutral trade, he continued:

"The American note of Nov. 5, 1915, gave an exact description of British violations of the nations' laws, but as far as I know it has not been answered up to this day.

"No fair-minded neutral, no matter whether he favors us or not, can doubt our right to defend ourselves against this war of starvation, which is contrary to international law. No one can ask us to permit our arms of defense to be wrested from our hands. We use them, and must use them. We respect legitimate rights of neutral trade and commerce, but we have a right to expect that this will be appreciated, and that our right and our duty be recognized—to use all means against this policy of starvation, which is a jeering insult not only to all laws of nations, but also to the plainest duties of humanity."

Amid profound silence the Chancellor turned to the Polish problem and to that of nationalities in general, saying:

"Neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary intended to touch the Polish question, but the fate of battles brought them in contact with it. Now this problem stands before the world and needs to be solved. Germany and Austria-Hungary must and will solve it. History will not admit that after such earthquakes things will ever become what they were before.

"After the war there must be a new Belgium.

"Formerly Poland was left in the hands of the tchinovnik, [Russian police agent.] Even members of the Russian Duma have frankly admitted that he ought not to return to the place where Germans, Austrians, and Poles have honestly labored in the interests of this unfortunate land.

"Mr. Asquith also mentions the principle of nationality. If he puts himself in the position of this unconquered and unconquerable adversary, can he really suppose that Germany will ever of her own free will deliver into the hands of reactionary Russia the nations between the Baltic and the Volhynian swamps who have been freed by her and by her allies—no matter whether they are Poles or Lithuanians or Livonians of the Baltic?"

Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg protested against the report that Germany now or in the future contemplated aggression against the United States.

"The latest offspring of the calumniating campaign directed against us," he said, "is a report that after the end of this war we shall rush against the American Continent and that we shall attempt to conquer Canada.

"This is the silliest of all the imputations invented against us. Equally silly are the reports that we contemplate the acquisition of any territory on American soil, as in Brazil, or in any American country whatsoever.

"We fight for our existence and for our future. For Germany, and not for space in a foreign country, are Germany's sons bleeding and dying on the battlefield. Every one among us knows this, and it makes our hearts and nerves so strong. This moral force strengthens our will in order not only to weather the storm but also to achieve final victory. * * *

"Let us suppose I suggest to Mr. Asquith to sit down with me at a table and examine the possibilities of peace, and Mr. Asquith begins with a claim of definitive and complete destruction of

Prussia's military power. The conversation would be ended before it began. To these peace conditions only one answer would be left, and this answer our sword must give.

"If our adversaries want to continue the slaughter of human beings and the devastation of Europe, theirs will be the guilt, and we shall have to stand it as men."

The Chancellor introduced a personal touch in the following passage:

"When I was last at headquarters I stood with the Emperor at a place to which I had accompanied him one year previously. The Emperor remembered this, and, deeply moved, pointed out the enormous changes that had taken place since that time. Then the Russians were on the ridge of the Carpathians. At Gorlice we had just begun to break through the enemy's lines, and Hindenburg's powerful offensive had just been started. Now we are deep in Russia.

"The British and French at that time had attacked Gallipoli, and were hoping to arouse the Balkans against us. Now the Bulgarians stand firmly on our side. Then we were engaged in the defensive Champagne battle, and now at the Emperor's word the cannon resound in the Verdun battle. Deep gratitude to God, to the army, and to the nation filled the Emperor's heart.

"Our enemies wish to destroy united, free Germany," the Chancellor went on. "They desire that Germany shall be again as weak as during past centuries, a prey of all lusts of domination of her neighbors and the scapegoat of Europe, beaten back forever in the dominion of economic evolution, even after the war. That is what our enemies mean when they speak of definitive destruction of Prussia's military power.

"And what is our intention? The sense and aim of this war is for us the creation of a Germany so firmly united, so strongly protected that no one ever will feel the temptation to annihilate us; that every one in the world will concede to us the right of free exercise of our peaceful endeavors. This Germany, and not the destruction of other races, is what we wish. Our aim is the lasting rescue of the European Continent, which is now shaken to its very foundation."

PEACE CONDITIONS

Referring to the conditions which he wished to see prevail at the end of the war, the Chancellor said:

"This new Europe in many respects cannot resemble the past. The blood which has been shed will never be repaid, and the wealth which has been destroyed can only slowly be replaced. But, whatever else this Europe may be, it must be for the nations that inhabit it a land of peaceful labor. The peace which shall end this war shall be a lasting peace. It must not bear the germ of new wars, but must provide for a peaceful arrangement of European questions."

The Chancellor declared that England wished to see military operations ended, but hoped then to continue the commercial war with redoubled violence, adding:

"First the British endeavor to destroy our military and then our economic policy. Everywhere there is a brutal lust of destruction and of annihilation and domination, to cripple a nation of 70,000,000 people."

As to colonial questions, he quoted Bismarck to the effect that the fate of colonies was decided on the Continent. He asserted that Germany's enemies were now actively engaged in inventing new formulas in order to maintain the spell of illusion, hatred, and deception which bound them.

"Of all the nations in the war," he continued, "only Germany has been threatened by her enemies and by their responsible spokesmen with annihilation, with partition of her realm, with destruction of her essential political and economic forces, no matter whether they call them Prussianism, or militarism, or barbarism. The forces which before the war bound together the anti-German coalition were lust of conquest, lust of revenge, and jealousy against German competition in the world's markets. During the war they have remained powerful with the Governments of our enemies in spite of all defeats.

"This is still the object and aim of the war alike in St. Petersburg, (Petrograd,) Paris, and London.

"To this we oppose that Germany in this war had only one aim, namely, to defend herself, to maintain her existence, to hold her enemies back from the German frontiers, and whenever their lust of destruction had shown itself to drive them back as quickly as possible.

"We did not want this war. We felt no desire to change our frontiers when the war began against our will. We threatened no nation with annihilation of her existence or with destruction of her national life."

The Chancellor pointed out the roots of Germany's present strength, saying:

"And what gives us this force to conquer and overcome the difficulties caused by the interruption of our overseas trade, and, on the front, numerically superior enemies? Who can readily believe that greed of land inspires our columns at Verdun and makes them accomplish every day new deeds of heroism? Or shall a nation which gave to the world so many valued intellectual and useful gifts, which during forty-four years loved peace more than all the others—shall this nation overnight be transformed into barbarians and Huns?

"No, gentlemen, these are the inventions of the evil conscience of those who are guilty of the war and are now fearing for their power and influence in their own countries."

With respect to the intentions of Germany in the case of Belgium the speaker said:

"We must create real guarantees that Belgium never shall be a Franco-British vassal; never shall be used as a military or economic fortification against Germany. Also in this respect things cannot be what they were before. Also here Germany cannot sacrifice the oppressed Flemish race, but must assure them sound evolution which corresponds to their rich natural gifts, which is based on their mother tongue and follows their national character.

"We want neighbors that do not form coalitions against us, but with whom we collaborate and who collaborate with us to our mutual advantage. Remembrance of the war will still echo in the sadly tried Belgian country, but we shall never allow that this will be a new source of wars—shall not allow it in our mutual interests. * * *

"The spirit of union shall lead us, as it shall lead our children and grandchildren, through the struggles of their fathers, toward a future of strength and liberty."

The British Premier's Reply

MR. ASQUITH, the British Premier, made a direct reply to the German Chancellor's address. The occasion was a Government reception given on April 10 to visiting French Senators and Deputies in London, and the Premier's speech was, in part, as follows:

"What the Chancellor means by his readiness to enter negotiations is that the initiation should come from us and the decision rest with him. We must assume the attitude of the defeated to a victorious adversary. But we are not defeated, and we are not going to be defeated, and the Allies are solemnly bound not to seek or accept a separate peace.

"The terms upon which we are prepared to conclude peace are the accomplishment of the purposes for which we took up our arms—namely, to prevent Germany from establishing a military menace and domination over her neighbors, as her invasion of Belgium proves that she intended at whatever cost."

Reiterating that the Allies were prepared for peace only on the terms of his declaration of November, 1914, Mr. Asquith proceeded:

"The Chancellor first misquotes my language, then proceeds to distort its obvious meaning and intention. Great Britain and France entered the war not to strangle Germany or wipe her off the map of Europe, not to destroy or mutilate her national life, certainly not to interfere with—to use the Chancellor's language—the free exericse of her peaceful endeavors.

"As a result of the war, we intend to establish the principle that international problems must be handled by free negotiation on equal terms between free peoples and that this settlement shall no longer be hampered or swayed by the overmastering dictation of a Government controlled by a military caste. That is what I mean by the destruction of the military domination of Prussia—nothing more, but nothing less.

"We are in this struggle the champions not only of treaty rights, but of the independent status and free development of weaker countries. In the circumstances cynicism could hardly go further than in the Chancellor's claim that it is for Germany—of all powers—to insist, when peace comes, upon 'giving various races a chance of free evolution along the lines of their mother tongue and national individuality.' This principle is to be applied, I suppose, on approved Prussian lines, both to Poland and Belgium.

"The attempt to Germanize Poland has been for the last twenty years at once the strenuous purpose and colossal failure of Prussian domestic policy. Nobody knows this better than the Chancellor, for he has been one of its principal instruments.

"The wholesale strikes of Polish children against the attempts to force the employment of the German language, the barbarous floggings inflicted upon them, the arrest and imprisonment of their mothers," continued the Premier, "form a black chapter even in the annals of Prussian Kultur. It is with this record that the Chancellor sheds tears over the fate of what he calls the long-suppressed Flemish race. I wonder what the Flemish race itself thinks of the prospect the Chancellor opens out to it.

"The Chancellor says that after the war there must be a new Belgium, which must not be a Franco-English vassal, but between whose people and the Germans, who burned their churches, pillaged their towns, trampled their liberties, there is to be in the future 'the collaboration of neighbors.'

"My answer is a very simple one. The Allies desire and are determined to see once again the old Belgium. She must not be allowed to suffer permanently from the wanton, wicked invasion of her freedom, and that which has been broken down must be repaired and restored."

Declaring that he would not waste words upon the Imperial Chancellor's "lame and half-hearted attempt to justify the wholesale use of the submarine for the destruction of lives and property," the Premier said:

"The Allies are prepared to justify the legality of all the measures they have taken as covered by the principles and spirit of international law applied to the developments of modern war. These have been carried out with the strictest regard to humanity, and we are not aware of a single instance of a neutral life having been lost by reason of the Allies' blockade."

Remarking that the German blockade of Great Britain had developed long before the British Order in Council of March, 1915, as shown by the sinking of the Dutch steamer Maria and the American sailing vessel W. P. Frye, and Germany's declaration of a submarine blockade of the United Kingdom on Feb. 4, 1915, Mr. Asquith said:

"It was not until March 11 that we announced those measures against German trade which the Chancellor now suggests were the cause of the German submarine policy. I need not dwell upon the flagrant violation which has attended its execution, of the elementary rules and practices of international law, and of the common dictates and obligations of humanity. Up to this moment it is being ruthlessly carried out, as well against neutrals as belligerents."

* * *

Germany's Peace Terms

By Ernst Haeckel

Professor Haeckel of the University of Jena, the noted scientist and author of "The Riddle of the Universe," has written a new book entitled "Eternity: World-War Thoughts," which is shortly to be published in an English translation made by Thomas Seltzer, and from which the following excerpts are taken. After speaking of the efforts of German leaders to establish peace relations with England in recent years, Professor Haeckel continues:

THIS had given rise to the hope, particularly within the last forty years, since the rebirth of the German Empire and the subduing of France, that the alliance of the two Germanistic sister nations would not only accrue to the mutual benefit and well-being of themselves, but would also be a guarantee of world peace, which is desired by all nations. Germany's army as the strongest power on land, England's navy as the strongest power on sea, could, when united, bring the gift of permanent peace and progress to the whole civilized world, especially since the United States of America, in which the English and German elements are to a large extent commingled, would have joined this great Eastern and Western alliance.

This beautiful dream has now vanished, thanks to the deep-rooted, brutal national egoism of the English. And, unfortunately, there is no hope that it will be revived for a long time to come. For the consequences of this war, "the greatest crime in all history," recklessly brought upon the world by England, are so horrible, the wounds it is inflicting upon civilized humanity are so deep that a real reconciliation between Germany, who has been attacked, and her treacherous, murderous English brother is not to be thought of for some time. At least the present generation of Continental Europe will not be able to extend the hand of reconciliation to England, the present generation that for the past eighteen months has been witnessing daily Great Britain's barbarous and infamous methods of warfare—the unparalleled mass murder she has been practicing, the shameless mendacity and hypocrisy of English politics, her outrageous treatment of prisoners and wounded. Before friendship between the two nations can be restored a new generation must come which shall see the reestablishment of humane conduct and tolerance, the re-establishment of the rights of the individual and the rights of nations now being trampled upon by the Allies. * * *

Few people doubt that at the conclusion of peace the map of Europe will undergo vast changes and that the political boundary lines will be considerably shifted. But how, where, and when peace will be concluded, how the prodigiously complicated political problems of this world-war will be solved no man can at present foretell. This much is certain, however: It is the almost universal desire of the German people, a desire, too, which has been repeatedly expressed in authoritative quarters of the Imperial Government, that, setting aside all false sentimentality, we should, neverless, steadfastly persevere until we have achieved an enduring success. The peace we hope for must be enduring and must rest upon such a basis as to take away forever from our jealous neighbors and malicious enemies the disposition to attack us.

We cannot, of course, presume to lay down special terms of peace. But we may, as many have done before, outline in a general way the most important points to be considered when the time comes for making peace. We now hold firmly in our hands as valuable security considerable territory—Belgium and the North of France in the west, Poland and the Baltic Provinces in the east. These rich countries were formerly German possessions. Antwerp must remain our stronghold on the North Sea and Riga on the Baltic Sea. The alliance we have succeeded in making with the Orient is extremely important for us at the present time, (Berlin, Constantinople, the Bagdad Railway, and so on.) At all events, when the treaty of peace is concluded we must demand a considerable extension of the German Empire.

In making this demand our motive is neither the greed nor the lust for gold that dominates England, who rules the world, nor the vain national pride of France, with its mania for glory; nor the childish megalomania of Rome-crazed Italy; nor the insatiable hankering for territorial expansion of semi-barbarous Russia. It is simply this, that the German Empire, being overpopulated, has urgent need to extend and strengthen its frontiers, which were most unfavorable for it before the war. It needs this, first, in order to secure itself against future attacks of our stronger neighbors; and, second, in order not to lose the large numbers of German citizens who emigrate yearly from the narrow confines of the Fatherland to serve as "cultural manure" for other countries. The new provinces which we are going to annex are energetic and reckless, but with cautious and intelligent treatment they can be Germanized, or at least be made accessible to German culture, education, and civilization. This important task is not new for Germany. In former centuries it succeeded in accomplishing it over a large extent of territory.

This all-embracing world war has taught us many important lessons. One of them, which is of special importance, is the growing conviction that the German Empire as a world power needs extensive colonies. Two hundred and fifty years ago the Great Elector was farsighted enough to recognize this political necessity, and the great founder of the new German Empire, Prince Bismarck, has translated it into action in our time, in face of persistent opposition from many short-sighted politicians. Of the various proposals recently made for the extension of the colonies which we have already acquired, the one that holds out the best promise is the foundation of a great German colonial empire in middle Africa. With the possession of Belgium and its excellent port of Antwerp we shall also acquire the Congo State, with its extensive area and wealth of resources.

In adding the Congo to our colonies in the eastern and western part of middle Africa, which as a result of the expenditure of tremendous efforts on our part have already reached a high degree of prosperity, we shall have a vast region, the exploitation of which by the energy, industry, knowledge, and intelligence of German colonists promises a most profitable field for us for centuries to come. England must not be permitted to carry out her magnificent scheme to establish a worldwide empire on land as well as on sea by building direct lines of communication from the Cape to Cairo and from the Niger to Irawadi. Egypt, which England grabbed more than thirty years ago from the Turks, its rightful owners, must be returned to them. So also must the Suez Canal, which is to be placed under international administration. Great Britain must be driven out of Africa altogether. Cape Colony and the glorious island of Ceylon must be given back to Holland, to whom they formerly belonged.

It should be one of the important aims of the rejuvenated and enlarged German Empire to remain always on the best friendly footing with Holland, Switzerland, and Scandinavia, neutral countries well disposed to Germany. There is great hope that by the introduction of German culture and education the Ottoman Empire will enter on an era of modern reform, especially since the former religious fanaticism of the Turks has to a large extent disappeared in the better educated circles. Asia Minor, one of the most glorious countries of the world, which twenty-five hundred years ago enjoyed the highest Greek culture; the adjoining regions of the Euphrates, and Syria and Palestine can rise again to a high state of fruitful prosperity in regenerated Turkey, aided by the cultural work of Germany, and also Greece.

The re-establishment of free navigation on the ocean and of a secure legal status in the relations between the seafaring nations must be regarded by us as one of the most important conditions of peace, in which all civilized nations of the world are equally interested. But this can be achieved only by destroying, or else rendering harmless, Great Britain's rule of the seas. England's maritime tyranny has indeed existed for centuries. Disregarding the legitimate claims of other nations, England in her selfish greed and desire for domination has sought to weaken or destroy the sea power of all the nations that came in competition with her. She has unscrupulously attacked and destroyed the fleets of France and Spain, of Italy and Greece, Holland and Denmark, of all the nations in whom she discerned dangerous competitors to her trade on the sea coasts of the whole world. In her powerful colonies, surpassing all others in area and wealth, she has for years claimed unconditional rule over their shores and ports, islands and fortifications.

Never has this been so directly and vividly illustrated as in the present world war. From the very beginning, England, through her maritime supremacy and the secure footing she had in all parts of the world, has isolated Germany and cut her off from all other countries by destroying her cable communications. It is only in this way that we can explain the extraordinary effect of the huge campaign of lies, the success our enemies had in calumniating us and making us hated by the neutral nations. And yet Great Britain's maritime tyranny is just as much of a menace to these neutral nations as to us, and to France, Italy, and all the other allies of England as well. Under certain circumstances the British pirate state will deal with them as it has dealt with us. It will prohibit their competition in the world trade and make free navigation at sea impossible for them. But the wide sea area which covers nearly two-thirds of the surface of the earth must be the common possession of all humanity; it must never be allowed to become the private property of the seafaring nation. When the English Ministers in recent years publicly claimed this monopoly and at the same time proudly and confidently threatened that Great Britain would remain forever the one absolute ruler of the seas, they only presented new evidence of the blindness of British megalomania.

Considering the magnificent strides that the idea of evolution has made in the course of the last half century in all branches of human knowledge, we feel reasonably confident that it will also succeed in leading suffering mankind out of the chaos of the present insane world war up to a higher stage of civilization and happiness.

We may confidently hope that the present world war, a much more stupendous revolution than the French Revolution, for all the violence it has brought to our conceptions of human love and national rights, will nevertheless result in a new era of higher cultural progress. This progress will first manifest itself more in externals, in a grand shifting of international relations, both political and economical. But permanently the inward reforms will be of greater importance. These will spring from an enlarged knowledge of international civilization and an understanding of the various national characters. Justifiable national egoisms combined with international altruism will learn more and more to follow the precepts of the Golden Rule.

While the external readjustment of Europe and the relations of Germany to the other States is still to a large extent hidden in the midst of the future, the most important aims of its inward reforms can already be clearly discerned in the light of the future. Standing on the high watch tower of pure reason and surveying the world in general, I am moved to express the desire that the recognized principles of purified morality which civilized men have for a long time striven to follow in their narrow personal relations to each other should also become the norm within the State, guiding the conduct of the different social classes toward each other, and also the international relations between the different

States. The most important of all these ethical principles is the old, old Golden Rule.

In conclusion, the general question naturally arises, "What results will accrue to the whole civilized world from this unparalleled conflict of the nations? What noble fruits will spring from the ghastly battlefields of Europe fertilized with the blood of millions of human beings? What permanent good will develop out of this titanic struggle for existence, in which the mightiest nations of civilization have been engaged for the last eighteen months in an attempt to annihilate each other?" Our answer to this great question is neither so pessimistic that we fear the extinction of our hardly acquired civilization, nor is it so optimistic that we look forward to an approaching golden era of sheer happiness and peace. Proceeding from the realistic point of view of our monistic natural philosophy, we recognize in the present world catastrophe rather one of those turning points in the history of mankind at which, under the combined weight of prodigious progress and incisive chance, there will arise out of the ruins of the "good old times" new forms of national life.

Royal Toasts at Schönbrunn

The toasts printed below were given by the rulers of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria on the occasion of their meeting in the Schönbrunn Palace, in the outskirts of Vienna, on Feb. 14.

EMPEROR FRANZ JOSEF

IT is with genuine joy that I heartily welcome your Majesty as a friend and true ally. My peoples join me in greeting in your Majesty the victorious supreme fighting commander of the heroic Bulgarian Army and the illustrious bearer of the friendship sealed with blood spilled in common, which binds our empires all the closer together, because it is based not merely upon a community of interests, but also upon a mutual trust and feeling of sympathy and appreciation. May the blessing of the Almighty continue to rest on our banners and may the beautiful land, which honors your Majesty as its wise ruler, receive a powerful uplift from the mighty struggles of these days and march on toward a happy future, permanent and secure. Filled with this hope, I raise my glass to your Majesty's health. Long live his Majesty, the King of Bulgaria!

KING FERDINAND

Your Majesty, in a most affecting manner, has been pleased to welcome me to dear Vienna, and this fills my heart with genuine joy. My visit today to Schönbrunn is the more pleasing to me as it affords me an opportunity personally to express my thanks to your Majesty for conferring upon me the rank of an Imperial and Royal Field Marshal. This distinction honors and delights me in the highest degree as Commander in Chief of the army defending Bulgaria, and I shall look upon it as a precious token of fatherly kindness, as an expression of the sentiment of loyal allies, and as a recognition of the superb victories won together on the battlefield. I am proud and happy to be enabled by this new military order of the highest rank to enter into still closer relations with your Majesty's army, which is so dear to me, and with which I have always felt myself most intimately united. May the blessing of the Almighty rest on the Austro-Hungarian flag and on the flags of our allies in these serious times, when we are fighting a hydra-headed enemy for our existence and for the freedom of the world, until the attainment of a lasting and honorable peace, which shall recompense us for our enormous sacrifices and shall lead us all toward a happy and prosperous future. With a thankful heart I raise my glass and drink to the precious health of your Majesty, my illustrious ally and paternal friend. Long live your Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, Emperor Franz Josef I.!

German Submarine Issue

America's Lusitania Problem Complicated by the Sussex and Other Disasters

SINCE the original Lusitania negotiations between the United States and Germany were interrupted in February the issue has gone through several phases, each more acute than its predecessor. The first check to the negotiations came with the announcement of the Teutonic powers that after March 1 they would sink armed merchant ships of enemy nations without warning, no matter who was on board. The United States Government justly regarded this as an invalidation of German pledges already given.

After a pause in the early weeks of March the German submarine campaign against both neutral and enemy merchant ships became more violent than ever. Vessels were sunk without regard to whether they were armed or not, and often without warning. The resignation of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz brought no change in this respect. The policy of sinking all vessels trading with England found strong support in the Reichstag.

This new phase of the war brought our relations with Germany to a critical stage, which suddenly became more grave through the destruction of the French passenger steamer Sussex in the English Channel on March 24, with the loss of nearly fifty lives. The vessel was unarmed and received absolutely no warning. The whole forward end was blown off by a terrible explosion, which killed and injured many passengers and members of the crew; the after part of the vessel continued to float, thus saving hundreds of lives by a chance with which the attacking party had nothing to do. There were twenty-five Americans on board. Professor Mark Baldwin of Baltimore, whose daughter was injured, cabled to President Wilson:

"A woman traveling where her right was, carrying an American passport, stricken on the Sussex, hovering between life and death, demands that reparation for assault upon American life and liberty be exacted."

Immediately upon learning of the Sussex disaster President Wilson and his Cabinet seriously considered the question as to whether the time had not come to compel an understanding or a break in our diplomatic relations with Germany. It was decided to broaden the issue to include other merchant vessels recently sunk without warning, and to base any action upon the nature of the German Government's answer. Secretary Lansing cabled to Ambassador Gerard to make direct inquiry of the Berlin authorities concerning responsibility for destruction of the Sussex and other designated vessels.

Among neutral nations the Sussex incident caused the most painful impression experienced since the sinking of the Lusitania. To many minds, however, there seemed to be a reasonable doubt as to whether the Channel liner might not have been the victim of a floating mine rather than of a submarine torpedo deliberately aimed at it. For two weeks the inquiries of Ambassador Gerard produced no official results, though he received emphatic verbal assurances that no German submarine was responsible for the act. Meanwhile Ambassadors Page at London and Sharp at Paris obtained affidavits made by American survivors, who stated that they had seen the wake of a torpedo. The testimony of eyewitnesses generally was to the same effect. Fragments of the explosive apparatus which had destroyed the Sussex were identified as parts of a German torpedo rather than of a mine, and some of these, with the affidavits, were forwarded to Washington as evidence.

On March 30 the French General Staff made public an official report on the subject, written by Admiral Grasset after due investigation. CURRENT HISTORY prints this report in full below—also the text of Germany's formal note of April 10, which is in direct conflict with the main body of testimony. The German Government admits having sunk a vessel in the English Channel at almost the exact time and place in question, but submits drawings made by the submarine commander to show that it was not the Sussex. The evidence is weak and the German note itself is generally regarded as the strongest proof that the Sussex was sunk by a German submarine. In any event, it demonstrates that German submarine warfare has not changed materially since the sinking of the Lusitania a year ago.

At the present writing (April 18) the reply of the United States Government has not been made public, but it is understood to be a firm demand for more humane methods of warfare, on pain of severed diplomatic relations between the two countries.

French Official Report on the Sussex

By Rear Admiral A. Grasset

Assistant Chief of the French General Staff

Boulogne, March 30, 1916.

IN conformity with your instructions I proceeded to Boulogne, where I conducted an inquiry relative to the attack on the Sussex. On March 24 the Sussex, belonging to the State Railway Company, and running the regular service between England and France, left Folkestone at 1:25 P. M. for Dieppe. This boat carried about 325 passengers of all nationalities, a great number of these being women and children, as well as the Indian mails. This approximate figure is given by the Captain; according to the company there were 303 passengers. The officer in control of the tickets was severely wounded and taken to Dover; he is not in a fit state to furnish particulars. She was not possessed of any armament. The crew consisted of fifty-three men.

From the start the speed was set at 16 knots; after having passed at a mile distance from Dungeness, the Captain headed south 3 degrees east; the weather was very fine, the sea almost calm; most of the passengers were on deck. Suddenly, without the slightest warning, the Captain, who was on the bridge, saw before the port beam, some 150 meters away, the track of a torpedo.

It was now 2:50 P. M., the time of the disaster being exactly registered by the stopping of the clocks on board the vessel. The second officer and deck officer, who were on the bridge, also distinctly saw the torpedo. With great presence of mind the Captain ordered the helm hard aport, and stopped the starboard engine, in order to avoid the torpedo by turning to starboard. These two orders were executed immediately, as is proved by the statements of the engineers.

The ship was beginning to swing off, when, eight seconds after the torpedo had been seen, a terriffic explosion took place, throwing up an enormous column of water. (Calculating from the distance at which the torpedo had first been seen and the time which passed before the explosion, the speed of the torpedo must have been thirty-six knots, the normal speed of a torpedo.)

The ship was cut in two opposite the bridge; the after part, thanks to the solidity of the bulkheads, continued to float. On deck several passengers who happened to be on the port side saw the torpedo when quite close to the ship, one of them even telling his neighbor to "look at that great fish swimming toward the ship."

Everybody who happened to be in the bows disappeared with that portion of the ship which was engulfed, among others the passengers on the fore deck and in the first cabin saloon. The men of the crew who were in the forecastle, the lookout in the bows, and the lookout in the crowsnest on the foremast also disappeared.

The Captain, who had been knocked down by the column of water resulting from the explosion, ordered the crew to go to their emergency stations. The firemen and engineers went to their stations after having stopped the port engine and closed the draught plates of the furnaces. At the same time the wireless operator tried to send out distress signals, but without success, the antennae having fallen with the foremast.

The crew proceeded to their stations to launch the lifeboats and rafts, (there were lifeboats, capable of carrying 184 persons; 22 rafts, capable of carrying 264 persons, and, in addition, 816 lifebelts; it appears from depositions made that these lifebelts were on the spar deck and that a number of them were in bad condition,) but the crowding on deck at the time made it very difficult to move about.

A number of pieces of the torpedo were found on board the Sussex. Some of them have been handed over to the American delegation which had proceeded to Boulogne; the others will be forwarded to the Ministry of Marine by the maritime authorities.

The submarine which torpedoed the Sussex could not be ignorant of the fact that she was attacking the mail packet of the regular cross-Channel service between England and France; not only are the outlines of these boats well known to all sailors, but the course of the Sussex and the time of her crossing were clearly indicative of her service. It is, therefore, obviously a premeditated attack on an unarmed merchant ship, carried out without the slightest warning.

One last fact shows up still more clearly the premeditated and implacable character of the submarine's operations. A boat was dispatched at 8 P. M. to the Colbart Lightship to announce the catastrophe. This boat arrived at the lightship at 11:45 P. M.; her crew were picked up by a British torpedo boat destroyer at 3 o'clock in the morning.

During the transshipment a torpedo was fired at the destroyer and passed a few meters astern of her. This fact has been confirmed by the British Admiralty. Judging by the course covered by this boat, the lightship must have been at most six or seven miles from the Sussex. It follows that the submarine must have remained in the neighborhood of the Sussex in order to torpedo any ship which might come to the rescue of her victim. GRASSET.

Germany's Note on Submarine Activities

Berlin, April 10, 1916.

THE undersigned has the honor to inform your Excellency, Ambassador Gerard, in response to communications of the 29th and 30th ultimo and the 3d instant regarding the steamers Sussex, Manchester Engineer, Englishman, Berwindvale, and Eagle Point, that the mentioned cases, in accordance with our notes of the 30th and 31st ultimo and the 4th and 5th instant, have been subjected to careful investigation by the Admiral Staff of the navy, which has led to the following results:

First—The English Steamer Berwindvale.—A steamer, which was possibly the Berwindvale, was encountered on the evening of March 16 in sight of Bull Rock Light, on the Irish coast, by a German submarine. The steamer, as soon as she noticed the submarine, which was running unsubmerged, turned and steamed away. She was ordered to halt by a warning shot. She paid no attention, however, to this warning, but extinguished all lights and attempted to escape. The vessel was then fired upon until halted, and without further orders lowered several boats. After the crew entered the boats and received enough time to row away the ship was sunk. The name of this steamer was not established; it cannot be stated with assurance, even with the help of the details which were furnished by the American Embassy, that the above described inci-

NIGHT PATROL IN THE DOLOMITES

Austro-Hungarian Guards on Duty Among the Peaks of the Tyrolean Alps Near the Italian Border

(*By arrangement with Illustrirte Zeitung, Berlin;* © 1916)

GORIZIA UNDER BOMBARDMENT
Austrian Stronghold in the Alps, Into Which Italian Shells Are Hurled From a Neighboring Peak
(By arrangement with Illustrirte Zeitung, Berlin; © 1916)

dent concerns the steamer Berwindvale. Since, however, the steamer sunk was a tank steamer like the Berwindvale, the identity of the ship may be assumed. In this case, however, the statement made that the Berwindvale was torpedoed without warning would conflict with the fact.

Second—The British Steamer Englishman.—This steamer on March 24 was called upon to halt by a German submarine, through two warning shots, about twenty sea miles west of Islay, (Hebrides.) The vessel proceeded, however, without heeding the warning, and was therefore forced by the submarine by artillery fire to halt after an extended chase, whereupon she lowered boats without further orders.

After the German commandant had convinced himself that the crew had taken to the boats and rowed from the ship he sank the steamer.

Third—The British Steamer Manchester Engineer.—It is impossible to establish through the investigation up to the present whether the attack on this steamer, which, according to the given description, occurred on March 27, in the latitude of Waterford, is attributable to a German submarine. The statement regarding the time and place of the incident gives no sufficient basis for investigation. It would therefore be desirable to have more exact statements of the place, time, and attendant circumstances of the attack reported by the American Government, in order that the investigation might thereupon be brought to a conclusion.

Fourth—The British Steamer Eagle Point.—This steamer in the forenoon of March 28 was called upon to halt by a German submarine through signal and shot about 100—not 130—sea miles from the southwest coast of Ireland, but proceeded. She was thereupon fired upon until halted, and without further orders lowered two boats, in which the crew took their places. After the commandant convinced himself that the boats, which had hoisted sails, had got clear of the steamer, he sank the steamer.

At the time of the sinking a north-northwest wind of the strength of two, not "a storm wind," and a light swell, not "a heavy sea," as stated in the given description, prevailed. The boats, therefore, had every prospect of being picked up very quickly because the place of the sinking lay on a much-used steamer path.

If the crew of the steamer used only two small boats for saving themselves the responsibility falls upon themselves, since there were still upon the steamer, as the submarine could establish, at least four big collapsible boats.

Fifth—The French Steamer Sussex.—Ascertainment of the fact whether the Channel steamer Sussex was damaged by a German submarine was rendered extremely difficult because no exact details of time, place, and attendant circumstances of the sinking were known, and also because it was impossible to obtain a picture of the ship before April 6. Consequently the investigation had to be extended to all actions undertaken on the day in question—March 24—in the Channel in the general region between Folkestone and Dieppe.

In that region on March 24 a long, black craft without a flag, having a gray funnel, small gray forward works, and two high masts, was encountered about the middle of the English Channel by a German submarine. The German commander reached the definite conclusion that it was a war vessel, and, indeed, a mine layer of the recently built English Arabis class. He was led to that conviction by the following facts: First, by the plain, unbroken deck of the ship; second, the form of the stern, sloping downward and backward like a war vessel; third, she was painted like a war vessel; fourth, the high speed developed, about eighteen knots; fifth, the circumstance that the vessel did not keep a course northward of the light buoys between Dungeness and Beachy Head, which, according to the frequent and unvarying observations of German submarines, is about the course of commercial vessels, but kept in the middle of the Channel, on a course about in the direction of Le Havre.

Consequently, he attacked the vessel at 3:55 in the afternoon, Middle European time, one and one-half sea miles southeast of Bull Rock (Bullock?) Bank, the submarine being submerged. The torpedo struck and caused such a violent explosion in the forward part of the ship that the entire forward part was torn away to the bridge.

The particularly violent explosion warrants the certain conclusion that great amounts of munitions were aboard.

The German commander made a sketch of the vessel attacked by him, two drawings of which are inclosed. The picture of the steamer Sussex, two copies of which are also inclosed, is reproduced photographically from the English paper The Daily Graphic of the 27th ultimo.

A comparison of the sketch and the picture shows that the craft attacked is not identical with the Sussex. The difference in the position of the stack and shape of the stern is particularly striking.

No other attack whatever by German submarines at the time in question for the Sussex upon the route between Folkestone and Dieppe occurred. The German Government must therefore assume that the injury to the Sussex is attributable to another cause than an attack by a German submarine.

For an explanation of the case the fact may perhaps be serviceable that no less than twenty-six English mines were exploded by shots by German naval forces in the Channel on the 1st and 2d of April alone. The entire sea in that vicinity is, in fact, endangered by floating mines and by torpedoes that have not sunk. Off the English coast it is further endangered in an increasing degree through German mines which have been laid against enemy naval forces.

Should the American Government have at its disposal further material for a conclusion upon the case of the Sussex, the German Government would ask that it be communicated, in order to subject this material also to an investigation.

In the event that differences of opinion should develop hereby between the two Governments, the German Government now declares itself ready to have the facts of the case established through mixed commissions of investigation, in accordance with the third title of The Hague agreement for the peaceful settlement of international conflicts, Nov. 18, 1907.

The undersigned, while requesting that you communicate the above to the Government of the United States, takes occasion to renew to the Ambassador the assurance of his distinguished esteem.

JAGOW.

A Thousand Merchant Vessels Sunk Since the War Began

ADMIRAL SIR CYPRIAN BRIDGE of the British Navy, in a report on merchant shipping losses, has compiled a list of vessels sunk from the beginning of the war to March 23, 1916, approximately twenty months. The list totals 980, all vessels of considerable size except 254 trawlers or fishing boats.

In order to bring the statement still nearer to date, CURRENT HISTORY has compiled the figures of additional merchant ships sunk between March 23 and April 16. In that period 51 steamers of belligerent nations have been sent to the bottom, 25 of neutral nations, and 31 sailing vessels of belligerents—a total of 107. Adding these to the original 980, the grand total to April 16 is 1,087 commercial ships destroyed thus far, 221 of them being neutral.

These figures are in substantial accord with those of Senator Nelson of Minnesota, who submitted to the Senate on March 30 a list of 203 neutral vessels sunk by the Germans. He gave the names of 97 Norwegian, 50 Swedish, 28 Danish, and 28 Dutch vessels sent to the bottom. He added that 136 were sunk by German submarines, 66 by German mines, and one by a German warship.

Admiral Bridge's figures, tabulated by nationality, are as follows:

LOSSES TO BELLIGERENTS.

STEAMERS.

Nationality.	Number.	Tonnage.
British	379	1,320,000
French	41	140,000
Belgian.	10	30,000
Russian	27	42,000
Italian	21	70,000
Japanese	3	19,000
Total	481	1,621,000

SAILING VESSELS.

Nationality.	Number.	Tonnage.
British	31	19,000
French	12	18,000
Russian	8	7,000
Italian	6	3,000
Total	57	47,000

Trawlers—British, 237; French, 7; Belgian, 2.

LOSSES TO NEUTRALS.

STEAMERS.

Nationality.	Number.	Tonnage.
Norway	50	96,000
Denmark	18	33,000
Holland	22	74,000
Sweden.	33	42,000
United States	6	16,000
Greece	11	22,000
Spain	4	9,000
Persia	1	750
Portugal.	1	625
Total	146	293,375

SAILING VESSELS.

Nationality.	Number.	Tonnage.
Norway	22	20,000
Denmark	10	1,600
Sweden	7	2,000
Holland	2	225
United States	1	176
Total	42	24,001

Trawlers—Denmark, 1; Holland, 7.

The loss to British steam shipping, says the report, is less than 4 per cent. of the total number of vessels under the British flag and slightly over 6 per cent. of their total tonnage. The French loss in steamers is about 7 per cent. of the total French tonnage, while the Russian loss is 5 per cent., and the Italian 4½ per cent.

In further comment Admiral Bridge details the amount of merchant shipping built in France and Great Britain since the beginning of the war, and shows that the war losses have virtually been made good thereby.

"In 1915," says the report, "after more than a year of the war, the steam shipping of Great Britain increased 88 vessels and 344,000 tons. France at the end of 1915 was only short nine steamers and 12,500 tons of the previous year's total. Italy and Russia both show an increase in tonnage.

"It is, therefore, clear that the present shortage of tonnage is due not to the action of submarines, but to the great requirements of the military and naval forces. The latest published statement of these show that they are demanding 3,100 merchant vessels."

German White Book on Armed Merchantmen

THE German Government has issued a White Book on Armed Merchantmen, containing "facsimiles of the secret orders of the British Admiralty." The main text consists of the "Memorandum of the Imperial German Government on the Treatment of Armed Merchantmen," which was published in the April number of CURRENT HISTORY along with a brief summary of the numerous "annexes" or "exhibits" with which that document was fortified. The full text of these exhibits is now available in the White Book in question.

Four pages are occupied by a "List of Cases in Which Enemy Merchantmen Have Fired on German or Austro-Hungarian Submarines," beginning with one on April 11, 1915, and ending with that of the British steamer Melanie on Jan. 17, 1916, in the Mediterranean. The items of most general interest, however, are the reprints of confidential British instructions to gunners on armed merchantmen. The fifth exhibit reads as follows:

Confidential. **Exhibit 5.**

Instructions for Guidance in the Use, Care, and Maintenance of Armament in Defensively Armed Merchant Ships.

General.

1. Ratings embarked as gun's crew will sign the ship's articles at the rate of pay communicated.

2. They are to obey the orders of the master and officers of the ship. If they think it necessary to make a complaint against any order they are to obey the order and make their complaint in writing, asking that it may be forwarded to the proper authorities.

3. The ratings are not required for duties

unconnected with the armament except in case of emergency, but they are to assist at all times in the welfare of the ship and look after the cleanliness of their berths.

4. They are to keep watch and watch at sea, and also when the ship is anchored in any place liable to attack by submarines.

5. They will receive their pay through the master of the ship. They will not mess with the crew, but in one of the officers' messes as the master may decide.

6. Uniform is not to be worn in neutral ports.

7. A brief report is to be rendered by the senior rating on the 1st of each month, countersigned by the master, and sent to:—

The Director of Trade Division,
Admiralty, Whitehall, S. W.

After ten other paragraphs devoted to technical instructions on "Drill and Maintenance of Gun," the instructions conclude with these directions for action in presence of a hostile submarine:

ACTION

The master is responsible for handling the ship and for opening and ceasing fire. He has been furnished with instructions which will enable him to do this to the best advantage. The duty of the gun's crew is to fight the gun under the general direction of the master, who will communicate to them so much of the instructions as he may consider necessary to enable them to fight the gun to the best advantage.

In action the following instructions should be carried out:—

(1) When in submarine waters, everything should be in a state of readiness, but the gun should not be kept actually loaded.

(2) When the enemy is engaged:—

(*a*) The point of aim should be the centre of the water line.

(*b*) It is to be remembered that "over" shots are useless. A short shot by causing a splash confuses the enemy. It may ricochet into the enemy. If the shell bursts on striking the water—as it usually does—some fragments are likely to hit the enemy. To get the best result, at least half of the shots fired should fall short.

(3) The master will probably keep the submarine astern so that little deflection will be necessary.

(4.) It is not advisable to open fire at a range greater than 800 yards, unless the enemy has already opened fire, for the following reasons:—

(*a*) The ammunition supply is limited.

(*b*) Accurate shooting under probable existing conditions cannot be expected at greater ranges.

(5) When in action and a miss-fire occurs with a percussion tube, the following procedure is to be adopted:—

(*a*) The B.M. Lever is to be tapped to insure it is closed.

(*b*) The striker is to be re-cocked.

If the gun does not then fire:—The striker is to be taken out to insure that the point is not broken. If unbroken the breech is to be opened and the cartridge is to be thrown overboard, it having been ascertained that the percussion tube has been inserted.

The gun is then to be reloaded.

The ninth and tenth exhibits are instructions to British shipmasters whose vessels carry guns for defense. Both are the same, except that the tenth is later and fuller. It reads thus:

Confidential. **No. 291.**

CONFIDENTIAL. **No. 291.**

In No Circumstances Is This Paper to be Allowed to Fall Into the Hands of the Enemy.

This paper is for the master's personal information. It is not to be copied, and when not actually in use is to be kept in safety in a place where it can be destroyed at a moment's notice.

Such portions as call for immediate action may be communicated verbally to the officers concerned. April, 1915.

Instructions Regarding Submarines Applicable to Vessels Carrying a Defensive Armament.

1. Defensively armed vessels should follow generally the instructions for ordinary merchant ships.

2. In submarine waters guns should be kept in instant readiness.

3. If a submarine is obviously pursuing a ship by day, and it is evident to the master that she has hostile intentions, the ship pursued should open fire in self-defense, notwithstanding the submarine may not have committed a definite hostile act, such as firing a gun or torpedo.

4. In view of the great difficulty in distinguishing a friend from an enemy at night, fire should not be opened after dark unless it is absolutely certain that the vessel fired at is hostile.

5. Before opening fire, the British colors must be hoisted.

It is essential that fire should not be opened under neutral colors.

6. If a defensively armed vessel is pursued by a submarine the master has two alternatives:

(*a*) To open fire at long range immediately it is certain that the submarine is really in pursuit.

(*b*) To retain fire until the submarine has closed to a range, say 800 yards, at which fire is likely to be effective.

In view of the very great difficulty of distinguishing between friendly and hostile submarines at long range (one British submarine has already been fired at by a merchant vessel which erroneously supposed herself to be pursued by the submarine) it is strongly recommended that course (b) should be adopted by all defensively armed ships.

7. A submarine's flag is no guide to her nationality, as German submarines frequently fly British colors.

8. Vessels carrying a defensive armament and proceeding to neutral ports must not be painted in neutral colors or wear a neutral flag.

9. It is recommended that in neutral ports, particularly those of Spain, the armament should be concealed as far as possible. A canvas cover is recommended for this purpose.

The eleventh exhibit is a secret memorandum to masters of transports carrying troops, and the twelfth and last is a brief typewritten memorandum to British merchant vessels in the Mediterranean, (dated June, 1915,) giving directions as to how to avoid attack by submarines.

British Enemy Trading Acts

THE British Government, in reply to an inquiry by the American Government regarding the extension of restrictions to trade with enemies of Great Britain, has stated that the law will be so interpreted as not to affect American commerce. The American inquiry was made through Ambassador Page on Jan. 19, 1916, by Secretary of State Lansing in the following note:

Department has given consideration to Enemy Trading act, approved Dec. 23 last, the apparent object of which is to prevent any person doing business in the United Kingdom from trading with the enemies of Great Britain or persons having enemy association in any other part of the world, and the department has reached the conclusion that this act is pregnant with possibilities of undue interference with American trade, if in fact such interference is not now being practiced.

As it is an opinion generally held in this country, in which this Government shares, that the act has been framed without a proper regard for the right of persons domiciled in the United States, whether they be American citizens or subjects of countries at war with Great Britain, to carry on trade with persons in belligerent countries, and that the exercise of this right may be subject to denial or abridgment in the course of the enforcement of the act, the Government of the United States is constrained to express to his Majesty's Government the grave apprehensions which are entertained on this subject by this Government, by the Congress, and by traders domiciled in the United States. It is therefore necessary to bring these views to the attention of Sir Edward Grey, and to present to him a formal reservation, on the part of this Government, of the right to protest against the application of this act, in so far as it affects the trade of the United States, and to contest the legality or rightfulness of imposing restrictions upon the freedom of American trade in this manner.

On April 15, 1916, the following official reply by Great Britain, addressed to Ambassador Page and dated Feb. 16, 1916, was made public:

Your Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 26th ultimo relative to the possible effects of the trading with the enemy (extension of powers) act, 1915, on United States commerce.

The act was framed with the object of bringing British trade with the enemy regulations into greater harmony with those adopted by the French Government since the commencement of the war by applying in some degree the test of nationality in the determination of enemy character in addition to the old test of domicile, which experience has shown cannot provide a sufficient basis under modern commercial conditions for measures intended to deprive the enemy of all assistance, direct or indirect, from national resources.

His Majesty's Government realized, however, that the application of this principle to its fullest extent, while entirely legitimate and in accordance with the practice of other countries, might, if applied at the present time to commercial activities as widespread as those of British subjects, involve avoidable inconvenience and loss to innocent traders.

They were careful, therefore, in devising the necessary legislation not only to avoid any definition which would impose enemy status upon all persons of enemy nationality and associations, but also to take powers of discrimination which would enable them to apply the purely commercial restrictions contemplated only in regard to those persons from whom it was necessary in British interests to withhold the facilities afforded by British resources.

His Majesty's Government have therefore abstained from a course of action admittedly within their rights as belligerents, which is not only the existing practice of the French Government, but in strict accordance with the doctrine openly avowed by many other States to be the basis upon which their trading with the enemy regulations would be founded in the event of war, and have confined themselves to passing a piece of purely domestic legislation empowering them to restrict the activities and trade of persons under British jurisdiction in such a manner and to such an extent as may seem to them to be necessary in the national interest.

His Majesty's Government readily admit the right of persons of any nationality resident in the United States to engage in legitimate commercial transactions with any other persons. They cannot admit, however, that this right can in any way limit the right of other Governments to restrict the commercial activities of their nationals in any manner which may seem desirable to them by the imposition of prohibitions and penalties which are operative solely upon persons under their jurisdiction.

In claiming this right, which appears to them to be inherent in sovereignty and national independence, his Majesty's Government desires to assure the United States Government that they will exercise it with every possible care to avoid injury to neutral commerce, and they venture to think that the voluntary limitation of their powers by the terms of the trading with the enemy (extension of powers) act, 1915, is evidence of their desire and intention to act with the greatest possible consideration for neutral interests.

For the Secretary of State,

L. WORTHINGTON EVANS.

Punitive Expedition Into Mexico

An International Bandit Hunt

WHEN Francisco Villa and his 1,500 followers crossed the border into New Mexico at dawn on March 9 and assassinated eighteen persons in the town of Columbus he accomplished what he had long been attempting to bring about—an invasion of Mexico by American troops, in the hope that a clash with Carranza's forces might follow. Before President Wilson ordered the punitive expedition in pursuit of Villa, however, he came to a diplomatic understanding with General Carranza, the head of the de facto Government of Mexico, to the end that the criminals should be punished through the friendly co-operation of both Governments.

At first General Carranza had issued a proclamation to the effect that he would never consent to see American soldiers on Mexican soil unless Mexican troops should have the reciprocal privilege of crossing into American territory under similar circumstances. On March 13 President Wilson forwarded a formal answer, conceding this point and adding:

> The Government of the United States understands that, in view of its agreement to this reciprocal arrangement proposed by the de facto Government, the arrangement is now complete and in force, and the reciprocal privileges thereunder may accordingly be exercised by either Government without further interchange of views.

The expedition was organized at Columbus under direction of Major General Frederick Funston. It was placed under command of Brigadier General John J. Pershing, and a total force of 5,000 or more, consisting of cavalry, field artillery, and infantry, crossed into Mexico in two columns on March 15.

Congress voted an emergency fund of $8,611,502 for the expedition and for the 20,000 new troops added to the regular army.

South through the desert wastes of Northern Chihuahua the soldiers followed the trail of the bandits by forced marches that tried their endurance. Aeroplanes and automobiles played a valuable part in the operations. For 500 miles, over deserts and mountains, the outlaws were pursued relentlessly into their own chosen retreats in the Sierra Madre range. General Carranza's forces collaborated to some extent, but the use of the railways was refused, except for the transport of certain supplies, and the American troops were requested not to enter towns for fear of trouble.

In his flight southward Villa attacked the Carranza garrison of 170 men at Guerrero on March 27, killing most of them, but suffering heavy losses himself, and apparently receiving a serious wound in the leg. The remainder of the band, numbering 500, were surprised



SCENE OF AMERICAN EXPEDITION'S PURSUIT OF VILLA IN MEXICO.

by Colonel George A. Dodd and his troopers of the Seventh Cavalry in a neighboring retreat on the 29th, and then followed the most dramatic encounter in the whole expedition. Though the Americans had covered fifty-five miles in a rough and practically roadless country in seventeen hours, and then fought five hours more, they completely routed the outlaws in spite of superior numbers. The bare facts were related by General Pershing in the following dispatch:

> San Geronimo Ranch, March 30, 1916.
>
> Dodd struck Villa's command, consisting of 500, 6 o'clock, March 29, at Guerrero. Villa, who is suffering from a broken leg and lame hip, was not present. Number Villa's dead known to be thirty, probably others carried away dead. Dodd captured two machine guns, large number horses, saddles, and arms. Our casualties, four enlisted men wounded, none seriously.
>
> Attack was surprise, the Villa troops being driven in a ten-mile running fight and retreated to mountains northeast of railroad, where they separated into small bands. * * * Large number Carranzista prisoners, who were being held for execution, were liberated during the fight. In order to reach Guerrero, Dodd marched fifty-five miles in seventeen hours and carried on fight for five hours. * * *
>
> Eliseo Hernandez, who commanded Villa's troops, was killed in fight. With Villa permanently disabled, Lopez wounded, and Hernandez dead, the blow administered is a serious one to Villa's band. PERSHING.

For the next week the bandit's trail became uncertain, until it was picked up again far to the south by an aviator scout. Villa was reported to be carried in a litter, with a guard of 100 picked men, while another force of 400 followers served as a rear guard. He was heading for his old headquarters at Parral. By a swift advance the American cavalry—the Seventh, Tenth, and Thirteenth Regiments—were soon in close pursuit, but not close enough to keep him from disappearing—apparently into Parral. When American troops entered that town the first serious clash occurred. The soldiers were attacked by a civilian mob and later had to fight a pitched battle with Carranza troops. The official report of the affair, dated April 15, says:

> Frank Tompkins's column, Troop K, Thirteenth Cavalry, and Troop M, Thirteenth Cavalry, entered Parral 11 A. M., 12th instant. Proceeding was cordially received by higher civil and military authorities. Military Commander General Lozano accompanied Major Frank Tompkins on way to camp.
>
> In the outskirts of the town groups of native troops and civilians, following, jeered, threw stones, and fired on column. Major Frank Tompkins took defensive position north of railroad, but was soon flanked by native troops and forced to further retire.
>
> About 300 Carranza troops joined in pursuit, and Major Frank Tompkins continued to withdraw to avoid further complications until he reached Santa Cruz, eight miles from Parral. Fighting ceased about fifteen miles from town. Major Frank Tompkins deserves great praise for his forbearance. General Lozano attempted to control his men when fight first began, but failed to.
>
> Colonel Brown, with Major Charles Young, Tenth Cavalry, squadron of Tenth Cavalry, eight miles away when notified, and joined Major Frank Tompkins 7 P. M. Reported privately forty Mexicans killed, all soldiers, including one Major. One civilian wounded. Americans killed, two; wounded, six; missing, one.
>
> Major R. L. Howze, Eleventh Cavalry, arrived Parral yesterday from San Berja and Ballesea, having had several skirmishes with Villa men. One man killed, two wounded.
>
> FUNSTON.

General Carranza, while expressing regret for the occurrence, complained in a long note to the American Government that the expedition had gone further into Mexico than it should, and was operating without an adequate basis of international agreement. He asked for the recall of the American troops on the ground that Villa's bandits had been scattered. At the present writing (April 18) the Americans are continuing their pursuit. Villa himself is reported, on very doubtful authority, to have died of his wounds. Carranza's note is regarded at Washington as an invitation to discuss withdrawal, and as deserving a reasonable answer. At the same time the military officers in Mexico charge treachery in the attack at Parral, and the situation is admitted to contain possibilities of serious misunderstanding.

In view of General Carranza's new attitude it may be of interest to place on record the original War Department order under which General Funston is acting:

> You will promptly organize an adequate force of military troops under the command of Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing, and will direct him to proceed promptly across the border in pursuit of the Mexican band which attacked the town of Columbus, N. M., and the troops there on the morning of March 9. These troops will be withdrawn to American territory as soon as the de facto Government of Mexico is able to relieve them of this work. In any event, the work of these troops will be regarded as finished as soon as Villa's band or bands are known to be broken up.

It can fairly be said that Villa's marauding band is "broken up," for the present at least.

What Britain's Navy Has Done

By Arthur J. Balfour

First Lord of the Admiralty

All the more significant portions of Mr. Balfour's naval address in Parliament on March 7, which called forth the historic attack by his predecessor, Winston Churchill, are here published in full.

MY business is to give to the House, as far as it is consistent with the public interest so to do, a general impression of the course which the Admiralty have pursued and are pursuing to enable us to carry effectively the vast responsibility which rests on the British fleet, a responsibility which extends far beyond the need of defending our shores, or even protecting our commerce, and is in no sense of less extent than the needs of the whole great alliance which is now carrying on war against the Central Powers of Europe. Our fleet is now an international fleet. We are carrying out international duties and many nations depend on us.



ARTHUR J. BALFOUR

A CONTINUOUS POLICY

The policy of the Admiralty in its present form is directly continuous with that of our predecessors. I have heard suggestions that when the present board came into office there was a sudden stoppage of naval shipbuilding, that the new board were content to rest upon the labors of their predecessors, that it was supposed that all that had to be done was done, and that we could reap where they had sown. There never was a more singular misstatement of facts. Who have set themselves to work to disseminate such fictions — to feed them, to water them, to cultivate them, to spread them—I do not know, but whoever they may be let me here say quite distinctly there is absolutely no truth in that suggestion, and that so far as activities in the direction of adding to our naval force are concerned we have pursued to the utmost of our ability the broad general lines marked out for us by the distinguished board which went before us.

GERMAN CRUISERS

The greatest responsibility thrown on my right honorable friend (Colonel Winston Churchill) was that of dealing with the German cruisers who were preying upon our commerce in various parts of the world. That was a very difficult, a very anxious, a very laborious task, and it was carried out with complete success. At this moment there is no

German cruiser—I do not speak of a German raider like the Möwe—belonging to the German fleet which is in a position to menace British commerce on any of the oceans of the world.

About a year ago, early in 1915, which is about the time when the last navy estimates were presented to the House, a wholly new set of problems began to rise into paramount importance. In the early days of the war the sea had to be kept open for the transport of the expeditionary force to France. The task of carrying 160,000 men and supplying them with stores and ammunition, although it would have seemed a very difficult and laborious task to our forefathers, is absolutely insignificant compared with the task which we have taken upon ourselves in an ever-increasing magnitude since the operations in the Mediterranean began. In addition to the enormously augmented supplies of men we have sent to France we have had to maintain and transport the army in Gallipoli, the large force connected with Egypt, and the large force connected with Saloniki. We had not merely to transport them but to supply them and to feed them.

TRANSPORT OPERATIONS

In addition to that, the blockade of Germany and the blockade of Turkey were tasks which were thrown upon the British fleet. The increasing importance of the northern ports of Russia were day by day being forced upon our notice, and, last but not least, the appearance of the submarine in the Mediterranean as well as in home waters added greatly to our responsibilities and anxieties. If you take the distance between Archangel, in the north, and Alexandria, in the eastern base of the Mediterranean, you will find that distance to be about 5,000 miles, and that 5,000 miles had in a large part to be guarded solely by the British fleets and in another part had to be guarded by British fleets combined with those of our allies, but in a manner which necessarily threw an immense strain upon the British fleet.

I find that about 4,000,000 combatants have been transported under the guardianship of the British fleet, one million horses and other animals for transport, 2,500,000 tons of stores, and in addition 22,000,000 gallons of oil for us and for our allies.

The presence not of German cruisers but of German submarines threw an enormous task upon the British Navy which could hardly be foreseen, still less provided against, in the first days of the war. If you had laid this before some professor of the theory of warfare or some student of military and naval history, I do not believe he would for a moment have admitted the possibility—in the face of the special difficulties with which we have got to deal—of maintaining these enormous armies in Egypt, the Dardanelles, Saloniki, to say nothing of Mesopotamia or of the colonial operations in East Africa or in the Cameroons—of carrying out such an operation as that without suffering immense losses, even if the operations could be carried out at all, even with the resources of the greatest naval power in the world.

I think we may look back with satisfaction upon the manner in which this vast task has been carried through. It is novel in character and unexampled in magnitude. The dangers to be met with were relatively new dangers, they had never been experienced in practice, and on the whole I think everybody who has been connected with these transactions in the Admiralty and in the navy has reason to be pleased—I do not say to be satisfied—with the result.

ADMIRALTY NOT CONTENT

The Admiralty have never been content with the weapon of which they found themselves possessed, and they have never relaxed their desire to increase the strength of that weapon. They have never been content to rest on the work which they or their predecessors have done to increase the value of that mighty maritime weapon on which the liberties of the world now more than ever depend. We rightly boast of the prodigious efforts which the nation has made to create out of the expeditionary force a vast national army, and certainly it was a most notable performance. But let us not forget that the navy has also enormously expanded since the outbreak of hostilities. It is a very fair measure of the growth of the navy to say that the personnel required by the navy has, broadly speaking, doubled since the war began. In the navy estimates of 1914 the number of men voted was about 140,000 with reserves. Including the naval division we have now about 300,000 men, and we have taken power to raise the total number to 350,000. That is an enormous growth. As regards the tonnage of the navy, including auxiliary cruisers and all ships under the white ensign actually used as ships of war, the increase is well over a million tons since the war broke out.

NAVAL AIR SERVICE

Let me deal now with the air service of the navy. That service entirely owed its origin to my right honorable and gallant friend (Colonel Churchill). Long before the use of aircraft had been proved by experience, my right honorable and gallant friend foresaw the important part that it was going to play in the naval warfare of the future, and he set himself to work to lay deep the foundations of a Naval Air Service. Since August, 1914, the strength of the Naval Air Service has increased tenfold. That necessarily has involved some alterations of organization. Among other things we found that the means of educating airmen were inadequate. With the sanction of the Treasury the Admiralty purchased some months ago a large tract of land very suitably situated for all the purposes of training in flying. The Admiralty have also secured the services of Commodore Payne, who has done admirable work in connection with the army, and I have no doubt that under his supervision with the facilities that are being placed at his disposal an immense growth in education in air matters will result.

The work of the Naval Air Service is largely different from that of the army, and consequently the training for the two services must be different. For instance, no army airman is ever required to use a seaplane or to distinguish the various types of ships, enemy or friendly, which have to be discriminated if an airman is to be a good scout over the sea.

QUESTION OF ZEPPELINS

There is one branch of the air service which the army have deliberately handed over to the exclusive patronage of the navy—I mean the lighter than air craft. Here also there has been a great development since the war began. It was decided, rightly or wrongly, in years gone by—I think myself wrongly, though I certainly do not blame the people who came to the decision—that it was not worth our while to deal with the complicated and costly question of Zeppelins. I do not believe any prophet now living can say with confidence what the future relation between the Zeppelin and the heavier than air machine is going to be. Both are improving, but perhaps the improvement in the heavier than air machine is more rapid and more certain. It may conceivably be that in ten years people will regard the Zeppelin as an antiquated instrument, and say you ought entirely to rely upon the magnitude of power of your heavier than air machines. On that I make no forecast. All I say is that at this moment it is extremely desirable that we should have lighter than air machines from the naval point of view in order to supplement the efforts of our fleet by machines for scouting, which in many respects and in favorable weather are far more effective than the swiftest destroyer or the most powerful cruiser. Therefore, we have been, and are, doing our best to develop the lighter than air machine. The difficulty we have found—I am not talking of the Zeppelin now, but of the non-rigid types—is not so much in constructing the instrument as in housing it. In the present condition of labor throughout the country the length of time taken to build an adequate shed and shelter for these instruments is what is really checking their use. The kite balloon also has been handed over entirely by the army to the Admiralty. It has undergone great and growing developments, and I am personally persuaded that we shall find more and more use for it at sea.

SHIPBUILDING ACTIVITIES

I come now to the question of ships. At no time in our history has so great an amount of the shipbuilding capacity of the country been used for the production of ships of war as during the nineteen months which have elapsed since hostilities broke out. You may almost say that during most of these nineteen months very little was built in our shipbuilding yards for the merchant service. The building resources of the shipbuilding yards, both those devoted habitually to ships of war and those devoted habitually to merchant ships, have been used to the utmost of their capacity for what in one sense or another are ships that are absolutely necessary for naval purposes. There never has been a time when so many ships have been turned out or when the speed of turning them out has been equaled. The whole process of making ships of war has been speeded up, and never has it run at such a speed as it is running at the present time. Never has there been a greater desire on the part of the Admiralty to vary the types of ships, not merely according to tradition, habit, or usage, but what appear to be the new and pressing necessities of the moment. The new necessities have to be provided for as rapidly as possible. They have been, and are being, provided for as rapidly as possible. Quite early in the war the necessity of building smaller craft and increasing the number of our destroyers, light cruisers, and so on was foreseen by the Admiralty. They set to work at once, and that policy, begun many months ago, has continued without rest or intermission ever since.

STRONGER THAN EVER

The shipbuilding resources of the country are not only being used to an absolutely unexampled extent in making ships of war, but also in carrying out the necessary repairs for the fleet. The result of all this effort is that, with one exception, the fleet is far stronger than it was when war broke out. That exception is armored cruisers. We have lost some armored cruisers and we have not replaced them. But in armored cruisers our superiority is enormous and uncontested. In every other branch of ships of war, in dreadnought battleships, in dreadnought cruisers, in light cruisers, in flotilla leaders, in destroyers, in sloops, and in the vast and growing class of patrol boats there has been a most notable augmentation since the beginning of the war, and that augmentation has suffered, and is suffering, no check.

What I said about ships I may say about guns. The number of guns has greatly grown, and the ammunition for these guns has greatly grown both absolutely and relatively to the guns it has to serve. In all warlike stores necessary to the success of naval operations we are much better off now than at the beginning of the war. The House may fairly ask me whether with all this vast growth I or my professional advisers are satisfied. The answer to that is in the negative. The very fact that we are pressing on building shows that we are not content, and that there are still deficiencies in certain kinds of ships which the Board of Admiralty are anxious to fill up, and are filling up as rapidly as possible.

TRIBUTE TO THE FLEET

The Grand Fleet has not as yet had great opportunities, in conformity with the organization of which it forms a part, of showing in the face of the enemy what it really is.

We have had more opportunities of judging of what I may call the independent work of officers and men—the submarine in the Sea of Marmora or in the Baltic—the mine-sweeper—the armed trawler. I am afraid I cannot do justice to all that I feel about the work of these men—necessarily it is little known to the public. They do not work in the presence of great bodies of men, to admire and applaud them for their gallantry. Small crews in stormy seas suddenly face to face with unexpected peril, they never seem to me to fail. No danger, no difficulty, is too great for them. The debt of this country to them is almost incalculable.

[After paying a tribute to the courage of the Captains and crews of ordinary merchant ships, and to the Admirals in command of the British Navy, Mr. Balfour continued:]

"TEUTONIC SWAGGER"

I think I have sketched the general naval position. What conclusion ought to be drawn? There is a kind of Teutonic swagger which I would not go within a thousand miles of imitating—and I hope nothing I have said or propose to say will approach anything in the nature of overconfidence. I do not quite understand the German point of view. I see by the ordinary sources of information that Berlin has been beflagged for two or three days to celebrate the return of the Möwe. The Möwe is a tramp steamer, disguised and armed, which eluded our patrol going out. She sank a certain number of unarmed merchant ships and succeeded in getting back. I have no doubt both the Captain and the crew of the Möwe showed seamanlike qualities and enterprise, but I am not sure whether we ought not to congratulate ourselves that, if the return of the Möwe, after these triumphs, is the subject on which the capital of a great empire is to beflag itself for some days, we may not draw the conclusion that the German standard of achievements at the present moment is not a very high one.

SUB-ACID PESSIMISM

I do not wish to place upon faint indications of this kind any too confident notion as to our superiority, but I do not think that there is the smallest justification for a certain kind of sub-acid pessimism which now and then has reached my ears from various unexpected quarters. I acknowledge, of course, that new methods of warfare make certain naval operations more or less incalculable. I grant, fully grant, that the utmost foresight, the utmost care, the most anxious prevision, will not preclude the occurrence of accidents and disasters now and then. I further grant that the discovery, or let me say the fuller recognition, by our allies of the absolutely essential part which the British fleet is playing in the present military operation, is a recognition that must increase our own anxiety as to the efficiency of that fleet.

No longer, as the world now understands, does the British fleet exist merely to protect British shores, or even British commerce—the world has begun to recognize that it is on the basis of the British fleet that the whole of the alliance depends and all military successes are founded, and the very fact that that prodigious responsibility rests upon the navy, and in the main upon the British Navy, cannot but increase the natural anxiety which anybody connected with that service would be inclined to feel.

But when I reflect that in August, 1914, we rightly felt, in the words of my right honorable friend (Colonel Churchill): "We can count upon a fleet of sufficient superiority for all our needs, with a good margin of safety in vital matters"; when I reflect that that was true in 1914, as it certainly was; when I reflect that in every department of naval strength the growth since then under my right honorable friend, and under the board which succeeded him, has been absolutely prodigious; when I reflect that its organization has been great in the essentials of material strength, and also that every evidence we can get from such actions as have already taken place shows that the men of the fleet, from the highest to the lowest, are competent to carry out their duties—it seems to me, that the sub-acid pessimism has but little justification.

MR. CHURCHILL'S ATTACK

[Colonel Winston Spencer Churchill followed Mr. Balfour with a "sub-acid" speech in which he charged the present Admiralty administration with "a lack of driving force and mental energy which cannot be allowed to continue, and which must be rectified while time remains and before evil results." He closed by urging Mr. Balfour to recall Lord Fisher to the position of First Sea Lord, in place of the present incumbent, Sir Henry Jackson. The next day Mr. Balfour made an indignant reply, in which he took up each charge, made some of his own, and declared with reference to his predecessor's demand for Lord Fisher: "I should regard myself as contemptible beyond the power of expression if I were to yield an inch to a demand of such a kind made in such a way." The general verdict of the British press regarding this sensational episode was that Colonel Churchill's attack had a political motive which miscarried.]

War Events From Two Viewpoints

In order that no phase of the truth may be overlooked, CURRENT HISTORY offers two expert interpretations of the military events of the month, one written from the German, the other from the American, point of view.

[A GERMAN INTERPRETATION]

After Verdun—Peace!

WRITTEN FOR CURRENT HISTORY

By H. H. von Mellenthin

Foreign Editor New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung

THE military situation in the great war is still being guided and governed by the happenings before Verdun. The operations in the vicinity of this great fortified camp, the French defensive stronghold, which at the time of its erection was also intended as a powerful base for an offensive movement, are exerting a distinct influence upon the entire gigantic battle front, stretching from the waters of the English Channel to the immediate neighborhood of the Swiss mountains.

Already whole armies have had to be shifted in various sectors of this front. To enable the French to bring reinforcements to the Verdun district the English have extended their front, which heretofore, reaching from Dixmude to a point north of Arras, had a width of only thirty-one miles, to the district northwest of Soissons. This is the sector where the German battle front reaches the point which is nearest to Paris. Not only the military but also the political situation has been greatly influenced by the happenings around Verdun. The thunder of the guns has found an echo in the deliberations of the Paris "super-conference," in which the Entente was to be welded into a political, economical, and military unity.

The objective of the German attack against Verdun is of a military as well as of a political nature. It is known today that the German operations do not represent merely an attempt to advance, that they are not a local offensive, but that they represent an entire campaign. True enough, as far as the direct objective, the taking of the great fortress and the crumpling up of the enemy's forces, is concerned, this campaign is complete in itself. But according to the intentions and the plans of the German General Staff this campaign is to be brought into the closest connection with the future development of the military conditions along the entire western front.

Once Verdun has fallen Germany's enemies will be compelled to undertake a regrouping of their fighting forces along the entire battle line. The French will be forced to take back their whole Aisne front. The possession of Verdun is intended to enable the Germans to press forward in France from an easterly direction—with Paris as goal of the movement. Then the part of the German front nearest to Paris this day—west-northwest of Soissons, at the bend of the line near Noyon—will become the pivot point from which this entire section of the German battle front will be pushed forward toward the French capital.

Yet the fall of Verdun shall not only open the way to Paris, but also to the possibility of concluding peace. That is the great political perspective discernible through the powder smoke. Recently a neutral correspondent has furnished a graphic description of the fighting before Verdun. "The background for these gigantic operations," he said in concluding his report, "is formed by the burning Verdun." Over all the horrible



THE BATTLE OF VERDUN: THE TWO LINES SHOW GERMANY'S GAINS IN TWO MONTHS' FIGHTING.

frightfulness of these gigantic operations and over the burning Verdun will reappear the bow which is stretched above the clouds as a sign of the covenant, that "neither shall all flesh be cut off any more by the waters of a flood; neither shall there be any more flood to destroy the earth." * * *

The tactics employed in the battle against Verdun may well serve as an explanation for the slow and systematic advance of the German forces. The speed of the German forward movement is governed, first of all, by the resistance encountered on nearing the fortress, and, secondly, by the careful preservation of the human fighting material. The entire battling ground is one enormous fortress. Only step by step can this ground be taken. The French, after including a number of extremely strong works into the belt of outer fortifications, had considered this girdle impregnable. But the experience gathered at Liége, Namur, Maubeuge, Antwerp, and many other places, which heretofore had also been considered unconquerable, has put the defense of Verdun upon an entirely different basis. A modern fortress must now be defended from the outer field, as is the case at Verdun. That is what is putting such enormous obstacles in the way of the German advance.

Favored by topographical conditions, augmented by the introduction of the most modern achievements in the art of fortifying, and further supplemented by the experiences gathered in the early stages of this war, the entire district of Verdun is comparable to one defensive stronghold of gigantic size. Furthermore, the French have also developed into magnificent "stickers." Formerly the writers of French military history were praising the élan of the French troops when attacking, while their failures were attributed to lack of endurance. But the resisting power, even of the single man, has reached a remarkably high degree in the course of this war. By their valor and bravery, shown when attacking as well as defending, the French troops have added a new page of honor to the history of the French Army. This is readily conceded by their adversary.

The strategy directing the forward

movement in the face of such obstacles always remains the same. To begin with, the enemy's defensive positions are destroyed by artillery; then comes the onslaught by infantry, followed by an intermission. These tactical precautions explain the comparative lightness of the German losses, which have also been commented upon by neutrals. Neither do we hear any more from the enemy's quarters that the intermissions between storming attacks and the lulls in the artillery fire are signs of "exhaustion" or of "lessening of the attacking power." The military expert of a German newspaper has likened the German storming attacks, executed at intervals, with a chain of tidal waves. Still more characteristic is the comparison drawn by an American observer at the front. "Like a glacier," he says, "the German forward movement is creeping toward Verdun."

Since on Monday, Feb. 21, the Germans delivered their first blow against Consenvoye Woods, three distinct stages of the Verdun campaign have developed. The first of these came to a close when the Germans took Fort Douaumont. The second stage was taken up with the forward movement from an easterly direction, from the Woevre toward Vaux. Then it became necessary to protect the German positions east of the Meuse against flanking fire. This necessity led to the operations west of the river. As soon as the right flank of the German centre was protected, the operations in the district west of the Meuse were further extended. The actions for the possession of the Verdun-Paris Railroad commenced. These operations are still under way. All supplies for Verdun must be transported over this railroad, which is also the only line of retreat.

After the Germans had taken the "Le Mort Homme" position, consisting of Hill 265 and Hill 295, and after they had taken possession of Haucourt as well as of the Bois de Malancourt and the Bois d'Avocourt, a French wedge, with Bethincourt at its point, was protruding into the German position west of the Meuse. As long as this salient remained in French hands, it was impossible to continue the operations against the railroad. The salient had to be crushed in. This was done when, under the pressure of the German onslaught, the French evacuated Bethincourt, and the Germans occupied "Termit Hill," north-northwest of Avocourt, as well as the outer ridge of Hill 304. At the time of this writing this height is the keystone of the entire French position west of the Meuse. It controls all the surrounding territory as far south as the Verdun-Paris Railroad. Therefore this position is even more important than "Le Mort Homme."

The Germans must now concentrate their efforts upon the erection of their front against the railroad along the line Avocourt-Esnes-Chattancourt. Only five miles separate this railroad from Avocourt. Hill 304 is situated so far north from the line Avocourt-Esnes that the heavy German guns can be mounted there without exposing them to any danger whatsoever from surprise attacks. That means, in other words, the control over the railroad itself. Nevertheless, we shall have to expect bitter fighting before Hill 304 will be in German hands. The French will do all in their power to defend this height, knowing that its possession would give the Germans an enormous advantage. Then only will the western bank of the Meuse be cleared of its defenders. The German battle line west of the Meuse will then be extended to the eastern fighting area as far as the high plateau of Douaumont. The third stage of the Verdun campaign will have come to its close, and the fourth stage will commence, namely, the concentric attack from the north, the west, and the east against the girdle of forts and the great fortress itself.

The following events of consequence have occurred before Verdun since March 15:

March 21.—Avocourt Woods taken.
March 31.—Malancourt captured.
April 1.—The Germans gain a footing in a part of the village Vaux
April 8.—Two strong French supporting points south of Haucourt and "Termit Hill" taken by the Germans.

ACCOUTREMENT OF A TWENTIETH CENTURY SOLDIER



French Bomb Throwers Now Use Shields



To Protect the Eyes From the Sun and the User From Shell Fragments

(Photos © Underwood & Underwood)



Using the Crapouillot, a Home-made Bomb-thrower



Grenadiers Whose Grenades Are Shaped Like Incandescent Lights

(Medem Photo Service)

ACCOUTREMENT OF A TWENTIETH CENTURY SOLDIER



Artillerymen With Masks and Goggles to Protect Them Against Poisonous Gases



British Soldier in Trench Outfit, With Gas Helmet; the Sheepskin Is for Warmth



Infantryman and His Trench Equipment, With Dog From Red Cross Corps



"Cleaner of the Trenches," Who Cares for Enemy Wounded in Captured Positions

(*Medem Photo Service*)

April 9.—The French evacuate the salient of their front with Bethincourt at the northern point.

* * * * * * *

The roaring of the guns before Verdun is stirring up the recollections of many centuries. All conquerors that have invaded France have chosen this route, and all those that had met with defeat have limped home the same way. The cathedral of the city is a relic of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Verdun at that time was still a free city of the German Empire. Not until the ignominious Westphalian peace of the year 1648, that great blot on German history, did it become, together with Toul and Metz, for a long time a part of France. Strassburg followed thirty-seven years later, taken by base robbery under Louis XIV.

The ignominy of the Westphalian peace is wiped out. The "Metze" of the empire is girded with the maidenly steel belt of German cannon. From Master Erwin's Strassburg minster is waving the symbol of the new German Empire. The German Nation in arms is fighting before Verdun against the traditions of the politics of Louis XIV.

In the other sectors of the western front no great changes in the military situation have occurred within the last thirty days. The mine and crater fighting on the British front near St. Elois, Hulluch, and Souchez is of purely local character. We hear nothing any more of the predicted great offensive of the Allies. The question has been raised why the British did not try to benefit by the tying up of great German forces before Verdun through an attempt against the German lines in Flanders and in Northern France. The answer has already been given by stating the fact that the English were compelled to lengthen their line in order to free French fighting forces for the defense of their eastern stronghold.

Also, the expected long-distance effect of the Russian offensive, intended as a countermove against the pressure exerted by the Germans before Verdun, has not materialized. In the Bukowina and on the Bessarabian front quiet reigns again. Czernowitz, which was to fall "within the next few days," is still firm in the hands of the Austrians, while on the extreme northern part of the eastern battle front the Russian offensive has been drowned in blood before von Hindenburg's "machine-gun front."

The melting of the snow has turned the entire region of the Dvina into an impassable swamp. Now we are able to understand why von Hindenburg, instead of pushing forward to the lowlands on the right bank of the Dvina, has erected his strong positions on higher ground. The unmerciful sacrificing of fresh troops by the Russians and the spasmodic attacks by the Italians were absolutely barren of results. Neither did the intended counterpressure against the forward movement of the German troops toward the key of the entire French defensive line by an onslaught en masse in other theatres of war materialize. The Italians are aware of the fact that they themselves would be buried under the ruins of the conquered fortress of Verdun. In Rome already fear is felt that Germany, should Verdun fall, would declare war on Italy. Then the hosts of the Austro-Hungarian troops would descend upon the plains, and the Germans would press forward through the Riviera. Cadorna would be compelled to withdraw his entire fighting forces to the line of the River Po, the old border between Italy and the Dual Monarchy. Therefore the last, desperate attempt.

In this struggle of nations it has been tried time and again to exert long-distance pressure, but only in one single instance was such an effort crowned with success, and at a very important moment at that. That was when, at the very beginning of the war, the Russian invasion of Eastern Prussia brought to a halt the entire German forward movement toward Paris. But neither Russia nor Italy has felt such an effect to its own advantage. The fate of the Russians has decreed that they must bleed to death. And Italy's tragedy is that she must stand and fall alone.

Entirely independent of the military developments on the various European battlegrounds, the Russian campaign in the Caucasus and the British campaign in Mesopotamia have shaped themselves within the last four weeks. After the fall of Erzerum the roads to Bagdad were supposed to be open to the Russians. Like an avalanche they were supposed to roll forward from Armenia and, at the same time, through Persia. They felt sure of Trebizond, and even saw themselves already before the gates of Bagdad. And yet we know today that their advance had come to a halt long ago.

Petrograd even reports that south of Urumiah Lake, i. e., not far from the Russo-Persian border, the Russians are fighting against strong Kurdish forces, supported by regular Turkish infantry. The Russians were to succor the British forces surrounded at Kut-el-Amara. Yet their aim is not Mesopotamia, but the Persian Gulf. They are anxious to gain an approach to the open sea. This approach is at the same time the gate to India—a gate which had heretofore been so carefully shut and guarded by the British. The position of the latter in Mesopotamia is becoming more and more critical, and already the feeling of alarm is spreading over the whole of England. * * *

This is the military situation as it has developed within the past four weeks on all the theatres of war. The heavy guns are still booming before Verdun and on many other fields of battle. The war goes on. But war is always the continuation of certain politics by other means. Never is war a purpose in itself. The peaceful means of overcoming the differences which have led to the effort of solution by force will finally also bring the struggle to a close. Already voices are heard and opinions expressed which are emphasizing the possibility of a settlement. Through the clouds of hate and through the smoke of the burning ruins of Verdun will appear the bow of revelation which stretches over all humanity.

The military facts are pointing toward the fall of the stronghold. But whatever further development the military situation on this field of battle, crossed by many conquerors and reddened by the blood of the conquered, may bring: After Verdun—peace!

[AN AMERICAN INTERPRETATION]

The Month's Military Developments

From March 15 to April 15, 1916

By J. B. W. Gardiner

Formerly Lieutenant Eleventh United States Cavalry

THROUGHOUT the last month the battle of Verdun has occupied public attention, to the exclusion of all other military operations. As a matter of fact, in none of the other fields has there been any operation of importance. The belligerents in other fields stand as if stupefied before the wonder of the Verdun fighting, apparently to wait until that battle is over before launching anything of their own. There have been other isolated actions in the month—the Russian offensive that started along the Dvina from Riga to Lake Noroc, the minor engagements between the British and the Turks along the Tigris. These merit passing notice in an account of the month's happenings, but the one great feature of the month's operations must remain the battle in France.

East of the Meuse, in the vicinity of Douaumont and Vaux, attacks have been of almost daily occurrence. Sometimes only the artillery was used, at others the infantry was sent in after the artillery preparation was considered complete. The most determined attack on this side of the river, and, in fact, the only attack which the Germans really tried to drive home, was begun on April 1, and was directed primarily at the village of Vaux.

Vaux is a town of a single street, which lies wholly within a deep ravine, the ravine being flanked on the north by the plateau of Douaumont and on the south by Hill 325, on which is situated the old works known as Fort Vaux. The value of the town lies only in the ridges which inclose it on the north and south. If these two edges of the ravine were taken, the Germans would obtain a foothold on the heights of the Meuse from which they could fight their way up to a position that would completely flank the line of the eastern defenses of Verdun. They succeeded in taking the village on April 1 and in pushing part way up the slopes of the southern edge of the ravine, but on the following day the French began one of the few extensive counterattacks they have so far indulged in, and, with the exception of a small strip of woods to the northwest, retook all that they had lost. The battle in this section ended, therefore, practically on the ground where it had begun. This unimportant strip of woods represents the total German gain east of the river in the month's fighting.

At this stage it may be well to analyze the conditions that made such a successful resistance on the part of the French possible, after the rather rapid retirement they were forced to make in the earlier days of the battle. It is almost entirely a matter of terrain. I might interpolate here, in order to explain what might seem an inexcusable lack of continuity, that the battle on the east of the Meuse and that on the west must be regarded as in reality two battles entirely apart, though with the same objective. The reason is that, owing to the peculiar course of the river and the nature of the terrain, real co-operation between the forces on the two sides of the river is not possible.

The line originally held by the French on the east bank was not suited to, nor was it ever intended to be, a real line of defense. The country is irregular, broken up by a number of disconnected hills of varying height. All these crests were held by the French as advanced posts, but the connecting links extending across the intermediate valleys were tactically weak. It was recognized at the outset that this line of advanced posts could serve only to delay the advance and to inflict punishment. They were admirably suited to this latter function. To attack any one of them, it was necessary for the Germans to advance not only from the north, but from the east and the west as well, in order to get up the slope. The eastern and western slopes were almost without exception exposed to the fire of batteries of light artillery located on other heights in the rear, so that, in addition to the frontal fire that the advancing troops had to face as a matter of course, they were also subjected to a cross-fire from the artillery located at other points.

The first step of the Germans was naturally to strike the line where it was weakest, that is, between the hillcrests, and bend it back, thus creating salients in the French line, which they attacked in turn. It was in these attacks against the points in the French line which jutted out to the north that the German casualty list received its greatest additions. It was in these also that the French lost the greater proportion of their prisoners, for the troops in these points held on as long as they could inflict loss on the Germans, and in many instances were cut off from the main line by the crashing in of the sides of the angle.

The French fell back as the pressure became too severe, until they reached the present line, which is really the main French line of defense in this part of the field. It consists of a continuous chain or line of hills, practically unbroken, from Vacherauville, just north of Pepper Hill, through the plateau of Douaumont, across Hill 325 at the fortress of Vaux to Eix. This is the line they have held, in spite of all that the German artillery and the masses of German infantry could do to drive them out. The line is, as far as we can judge, just as solid and as unshaken as it was when it was first reached by the French in their retirement.

On the western side of the river the

Germans have been more successful. The offensive began on March 23, with concentrated attacks at two points—in the woods of Malancourt against the heights of Haucourt, and south of Bethincourt toward Le Mort Homme. At both places they succeeded in driving ahead a little over a mile, making deep indentations in the French line, although the centre between the points of attack, which was along the highway between Malancourt and Bethincourt, held fast. The "U" thus created in the French line gave the Germans an advantage they were not slow in taking up. Striking at the base, just east of Malancourt they soon had the town practically surrounded and forced its evacuation, taking at the same time the heights of Haucourt, somewhat to the south. This brought them to the southern edge of the woods of Avocourt, from which, however, they were unable to debouch.

This success marked the first break in the line west of the river, which the French had held for over a year. The object was of course to dominate and cut the Paris-Verdun Railroad, the principal road on which the French depend for supplies and ammunition. Should this road be cut, or even put under concentrated and continuous artillery fire, making its operation impossible, the burden thus thrown on the line feeding Verdum from the south would be so great that the entire transportation system—upon which every large battle is dependent—would break down. The French line would have to fall back just as surely as if its main position were occupied by the opposing forces.

The French line between Malancourt and Bethincourt being thus threatened and its position being strategically unsound in that the brook of Forges was in its immediate rear, a retirement was made to the southern side of the brook, so that the German attack would have to come to the French across it. This sharpened the angle in the line at Bethincourt and made the German attack against the eastern side of the angle, which attack came a few days later, an inevitable success, the French falling back to the foot of Le Mort Homme.

Some few days later the Germans began the heaviest attack that they have attempted since the early days of the battle. The French estimate of the number of troops used was three army corps, about 120,000 men. The attack was directed first against the line from Haucourt to Bethincourt and gradually spread to the east bank of the river—to Douaumont and Vaux. It registered a complete failure. Everywhere the French lines held fast.

I have gone thus into detail because no effort of the Germans since the first days of the war has been pushed against such resistance as at Verdun, and the German persistence in spite of small unimportant gains and enormous losses tells plainly as if in words what I have claimed since the beginning of the battle—that, regardless of cost, irrespective of comparative values, Verdun must be taken or the entire German cause experience a serious setback. As was stated last month, any fortified place can be taken if the attacking commander is willing to pay the price. Verdun is no exception to this statement. The question that many are asking today is, Has Germany the price?

On the west bank of the Meuse the Germans still have about four miles to go before reaching the main French line of resistance, the Ridge of Charny. Their gain in a month of terrific fighting and heavy losses has been but about a mile. On the east bank they reached the main defensive line a month ago, and during the last month have gained nothing. What their losses have been is not known, but they have been exceedingly heavy, reaching probably 200,000 men. This is not an exorbitant estimate when it is realized that the French offensive in the Champagne last September, while only of three days' duration, fully equaled that number. How many more men must be sacrificed to achieve the German object no one can say.

It begins to look as if the Germans are in a trap of their own making. They have practically advertised to the world that they propose to take Verdun. They have massed for this purpose the most powerful engines of war the world has seen, and more of them than have ever been concentrated at one place. The most supreme effort that an army has ever made has been and is being made. The combination of the German heavy artillery and the masses of infantry, admittedly the best infantry in the world, has been considered by Germany's allies and by neutrals to be irresistible if driven against one position. Without a loss in prestige that will echo from the Persian Gulf to the western battle front Germany cannot acknowledge defeat. It is as if she held a heavily charged electric wire. It burns through to the bone, but she cannot let go.

The tragedy of it all is that Germany has not the stake that she had when the battle began. Whatever she might have gained had the issue of battle gone her way in the first two or three weeks has largely been dissipated by the additional length of time that has been spent and that must still be spent before Verdun can be taken. The world has seen the strength of the French defensive. It has seen the time and the expenditure of men and of shell necessary to force the defensive line. From this the world will judge of the impossibility of Germany's winning the war on the western front. She may have the price to pay for a single fortified position or area such as Verdun; but Verdun is only one of many, and before any of these have really fallen the entire district between the French line and Paris can be and will be converted into a fortified area. Germany has not the price to pay for a succession of these districts. This is no longer conjecture, but is proved conclusively.

Germany's only chance on the western front is, therefore, to adopt a wearing-down process. This is possible, however, only when you have much greater resources than your opponent in men, money, and shell. In this case the shoe is on the other foot. Germany's enemies have these things, and theirs has been the war of attrition. On this front, therefore, German victory is impossible. Germany can look forward only to deadlock or defeat. This is the inescapable deduction from the Verdun fighting.

There has been little other fighting during the month. The heavy snows in the mountain districts of Mesopotamia have been melting and turning small mountain streams into rivers. This condition has kept the Russians who defeated the Turks at Erzerum from following up their success. There have been no reports, therefore, of any fighting in this district. Further south on the Tigris, where the Turks and the British have been facing each other for a long time, both sides have initiated minor offensives and both sides claim victories. There has, however, been nothing to change the general situation.

The offensive in European Russia began as if the Russians intended a very extensive and determined movement. It soon lapsed, however, and that front settled down into the inactivity that has marked it since late last Fall. It is highly improbable, in any event, that any great effort will be made in this section. The Russian offense in Armenia, if it can be carried through successfully, is fraught with consequences much more important to the Allies than anything that could be done in Russia.

There has been one event, however, that may be considered a distinct victory for the Teutons. That is the commercial treaty which has been consummated between Rumania and Germany, under the terms of which all surplus food materials that Rumania produces are to be sold to Germany. This is a defeat for allied diplomacy, and to some extent a defeat for the allied arms. Whatever intentions Rumania may have had with respect to participation in the war, it is certain now that it will at least be a long time before she goes in on the side of the Entente. She will not go with the Teutons. To attempt it would surely cause the downfall of any Ministry and a probable revolution. But with this new treaty in public view Rumania at war will not be seen for some time, if ever.

Verdun: The World's Greatest Battle

Described by Eyewitnesses

[Map of Verdun on Page 253]

At the end of two months' titanic battling for Verdun the Germans hold a few more outlying positions, but the main hills and central fortress remain firmly in the hands of their French defenders. The German gains have been chiefly in the northwest sector, west of the Meuse, where three or four square miles of a French salient, including the fortified villages of Malancourt, Bethincourt, and Haucourt, have been taken at great cost. But the major position on Hill 304 and its northeastern spur, Dead Man's Hill, remains with the French; and when it is remembered that all the advances were merely preliminary to an attack on Hill 304, the second month's fighting is seen to be as indecisive as the first. The same is true of the fierce encounters east of Verdun, on the Douaumont-Vaux line, where many thousands of German and French lives have again been sacrificed. The great German offensive, so far as adequate results are concerned, continues to be a failure.

In French official circles it is estimated that 150,000 Germans have fallen in infantry attacks alone, and that 50,000 more went down under shell fire. This is undoubtedly an overestimate, as are the similar figures of French losses as seen through German eyes; but both are near enough to the truth to make Verdun the greatest battle in history.

It is still too early to attempt even a general historical sketch of the conflict. It will be more useful at this juncture to place on record some of the most vivid and stirring descriptions by eyewitnesses. And first it may be well to get a panoramic view of the whole battleground as seen by a British correspondent with the French Army on March 26.

AN INVISIBLE ARMY

"Throughout the vast amphitheatre," he writes, "twenty miles wide and ten miles deep, not a single human being was visible aside from the little group of officers around me. Over there to the northwest lies the broad dark bank of Malancourt woods, which we know to be a busy hive of Bavarian and Württemberg grenadiers, sharpshooters, flame-squirters, and gunners. Beyond them on the horizon the queer cone of Montfaucon, long the Crown Prince's headquarters, is plainly visible. Passing eastward, the two French bulwarks of Hill 304 and Dead Man's Hill block the view northward. Then across the wide and still flooded valley of the Meuse we scan a higher and more deeply indented plateau directly north of Verdun.

"Through fieldglasses we can follow every rise and fall of these forever famous slopes—the long shoulder of Talou in the bend of the river and behind in the Caures woods, where the first avalanche fell, the Poivre-Louvemont block, which runs back northeastward, and then to our right the Haudromont woods, Douaumont Plateau, and Vaux woods of bloody memories, and in the whole panorama there is not visible a single human being. In the hollow behind us lies the ancient City of Verdun under a cloud of purple smoke that tells the old tale of Teutonic vengeance.

"Overhead several aeroplanes are soaring, and westward I can count five of the anchored observation balloons called sausages. Before us a network of communication trenches climbs up the open slopes, and, although invisible, we know it continues through coppices and forest patches toward the summits where geyser-like eruptions of earth mark the main stress of the artillery duel. The crest of Douaumont, in particular, is continually shattered into a crown of cloud and around it the succession of gun flashes might be mistaken for heliograph signals were it not for the accompanying muffled roar of explosions.

"It is what they call a calm day on the front, but the sunshine deceives us when it gilds this scene into a semblance of peace. Before and around and behind us, hidden away underground and in less elaborate cover, half a million men armed with every deadly device modern science can suggest lie in wait, each host watching for any sign of weakness on the part of the other. The preparations for a tomorrow, wrapped in mystery save to a few chiefs themselves, never for a moment cease.

"Under its empty and smiling surface the bastion of Verdun is a vast human anthill seething with multifarious labor. The war has gone underground again in this sector, and that is the mark that the French victory is definitive."

A BATTLE SYMPHONY

A glimpse from the German front is given by an American, who wrote under date of March 29:

"The important village of Esnes, lying south of Hill 304, is already suffering under the hail of German shells. There is something awe-inspiring, even stupefying, about this battle, raging from Fort de Belleville to Hill 304, particularly when one remembers that this is only one of three sectors of the battle for Verdun.

"The unequivocal emptiness and loneliness of vast battlefields give you a creepy sensation as of phantom armies fighting. Their presence, as I gazed today, was betrayed only by frequent fitful flashes of flame like fireflies on a Summer night. One could see miles of these fireflies, despite the bright sunlight, each marking the mouth of a gun. They made one realize more vividly than figures possibly could how thickly the iron girdle tightening about Verdun is studded with German batteries. Not a man, horse, wagon, or motor could be seen moving about that fire-swept zone bounded by the rival artilleries.

"The only human touch was a giant yellow Cyclop's eye, blinking at us—a German heliograph in action. Turning about, we saw its mate winking back, but the theme of its luminous dialogue was not for publication.

"Even more fascinating than the unique birdseye view of the Verdun panorama was the grandeur of the battle symphony, surpassing anything ever heard before on any front. A deep, low, and unchanging basic leitmotif was played by the distant guns from as far away as the Argonne at the right and from Douaumont and the east and south fronts of Verdun to the left. Varying melodies, rising and falling in pitch, intensity, and volume, were played by the nearby guns."

FIGHT AT AVOCOURT

That same night a writer on the French side witnessed the silent gathering of forces to defend Avocourt Wood, and between dawn and noon of the 30th the fierce engagement in which the German attack was defeated. Mark how his words bring the stirring picture before the mind's eye:

"At midnight the concentration is completed and the reserves are in their appointed places. Is the cannonade fiercer or less fierce? I cannot say. The noise is so deafening that I have lost the power of judging its intensity. I cannot even distinguish the explosion of the shells that fall near the listening post where we are sheltered. Only when they burst, the post and the earth around it shudder like a ship at full speed. Their explosion is but a minor note in the hurricane of sound. The French artillery is 'preparing' Avocourt Wood, where the German infantry is massed in force.

"The searchlights throw patch after patch of trees into bright relief, like the swiftly changing scenes of a cinematograph. Through binoculars one has a frightful vision. Not a yard of ground fails to receive the shock of a projectile. The solid earth bubbles before my eyes. Trees split and spring into the air. It is a surface earthquake with nothing spared, nothing stable. The Germans have abandoned the outlying brushwood and are huddled in the inmost recesses of the woods, but the French artillery pursues them pitilessly.

"Nearly 300 yards from the rim of brushwood the defenders—Prussians and Bavarians—have constructed a kind of redoubt which they expect to be the rock on which all attacks will break. The searchlights reveal their fortress; it is a wall of earth and tree trunks and seems half buried in the ground. Now and again in the patches of brightness one sees tiny shadows running, falling, rolling over or flitting from trunk to trunk, like frightened night creatures surprised by sudden daylight. It is the soldiers of the Kaiser trying vainly to escape from the rain of death.

"Dawn breaks, and the searchlight beams vanish as the first grayness of morning rolls away night's curtain from the battlefield. We shiver in our blockhouse; is it cold, or nervousness? The officers around me say the moment has come. It is an agony of expectation; the attack is about to break.

"A shrill ringing startles every one. The Captain springs to the telephone, listens for an instant, and then cries: 'All goes well!' in a firm voice. He hangs up the receiver, murmuring, 'They're off.'

"Our guns still thunder, but they have lengthened their range, and the line of smoke blobs opposite leaps forward toward the horizon. Suddenly the mitrailleuses set up a rattle right in front of us. They are firing from our front line trenches in a concave around the eastern corner of Avocourt Wood.

"Some one grabs my arms and points northward. Down the slopes of Hill 304 a multitude of nimble figures are rushing westward. Their numbers increase; armed warriors spring from the ground, as in the old Greek legend. 'Our men,' says the officer beside me. It is the soldiers of France at the charge.

"For a while they are sheltered from the German fire by a swelling billow of ground. They mount its crest and pour headlong downward. Now the pace is slower; they advance singly or in scattered groups—crawling, leaping, running, each man taking advantage of every atom of cover. The leaders have reached the first trench that lies across the path; but, see! they pass it without hesitating, as though it were a tiny brook.

"I learned afterward that a hundred tree trunks had been arranged like bridges all along the trench.

"Now the whole mass is across, and we can see what cunning brain has planned the attack. For the charging men go straight forward like runners between strings, leaving open lanes along which their comrades can still fire upon the defenders.

"At last the edge of the woods is reached, and the rattle of the mitrailleuses ceases. It is hand-to-hand now in that chaos of storm-tossed earth and tortured trees. Rifles are useless there; it is work for bayonet or revolver, for butt and club, or even for fists and teeth. Corpses are everywhere; the men fall over them at each step—some to rise no more—until the bodies form veritable heaps, among which the living fight and wrestle."

MOUNTAINS OF SHELLS

Turning again to the German front, we have Cyril Brown's description of the "relay race from the munition factories of Germany to Verdun," and the enormous piles of shells that he saw on March 30:

"On the way to the front," he writes, "I passed a continuous procession of ammunition trains, some rolling through Germany, others crawling over the border into France. I saw some of them later unloading their deadly freight at little shot-to-pieces way stations on strategic branch lines, well within the range of the French guns, apparently in the faith that the superior German artillery would keep down the fire of the French batteries.

"Hundreds and hundreds of field laborers are straining every nerve and muscle to unload the dangerous merchandise quickly and pile it up into vast mounds, in comparison with which the great quantities of Russian ammunition found by the Germans in Kovno and Novo-Georgievsk seemed like ant hills. Other gangs, stimulated by officers, are reloading ammunition into toy cars, pulled by toy engines. There are a dozen diverging branches of mobile narrow-gauge field railways, coiling snakelike among the batteries. Some of these toy trains puff deep into the fire zone and leave their loads of ammunition at advanced points where there will be battery positions next week, perhaps.

"Hitched to the miniature ammunition

trains are half a dozen little cars, loaded with sections of tracks, all bolted to tiny crossties which simply need to be laid and fastened together. Thus with an eye to the future the Germans are unremittingly pushing their narrow-gauge tracks ever closer toward Verdun, forming a close meshed network of ammunition railways.

" Soldiers are engaged in the occupation of road building, for next to the millions and millions of shells good roads are the most vital prerequisite to a successful attack on Verdun, and the fact that miles of good roads with beds of crushed stone must be built before the heavy guns can be brought up any closer, accounts in part for the slow rate of German progress."

CAPTURE OF MALANCOURT

On March 31 the French troops retired from the heaps of blood-stained ruins that had once been the pretty village of Malancourt. The Germans had taken the position after three days' fighting, and they had paid the price in full. Attack after attack broke down under the pitiless fire of the French 75s. One such attempt, just after dawn, is described by a special correspondent on the French side in this stirring narrative:

" At dawn we reached a poste de commandement, dug deep in a hillside for shelter. It faces westward, and before us in a fiery semicircle is the battle front from Bethincourt to Avocourt, with Malancourt as its half-way storm centre. The bombardment is at its height, and the whole scene is shrouded in scores of gray and black smoke clouds, slowly drifting aside in the cold morning breeze to disclose the details of the French and German positions.

" Due north of our shelter looms the dark mass of Hill 304, the trench-scarred flank of which vomits a deluge of lead across at the woods of Malancourt and Montfaucon, where the Germans lie hidden.

" These woods cover all the western landscape, but they are only woods in name. Through glasses one sees a chaos of storm-tossed ground rent into hills and hummocks like a frozen jumble of waves, with shattered tree stumps rising here and there like jagged teeth.

" So furious is the French cannonade that the ground seems fluid, the continually changing form melting into new craters and hummocks. * * *

" The advancing Germans roll down the hill in gray-green patches, no longer in dense blocks—even their iron discipline cannot face that suicide. Now a scarce 300 yards separate them from the smoking ruins of their goal. But, see! the groups are diminishing, melting like snowballs under the French fire, and the hillside behind them is strewed with green dots like corn grains strewn upon a carpet. It is hard to realize that these grains are men like ourselves, killed in their country's service.

" The French troops are invisible, but their resistance is magnificent, despite the storm of shells that beats upon them. For the German snowballs have stopped rolling and have melted into hundreds of single spots, some crawling painfully backward.

" 'Failed again,' says my Captain, and as if his words were a signal, a ripple of cheering runs along the French trenches, from the edges of which the mitrailleuses, buried to their muzzles, still continue to spit death against all that is left of the German regiments."

HERO DEEDS AT CAILLETTE

The fiercest struggle on the sector between Douaumont and Vaux was that which raged around Caillette Wood in the early days of April. Eyewitnesses describe it as one of the most thrilling episodes in the whole great series of battles. The importance of the position lay in the fact that if the Germans could keep it they could force the French to abandon the entire ridge. The heroic deeds on both sides in the French recapture of this ground are narrated by a staff correspondent in the following remarkable story, under date of April 4:

" The Germans had taken Caillette on Sunday morning, April 2, after twelve hours' bombardment, which seemed even to beat the Verdun record for intensity. The French curtain fire had checked their further advance, and a savage countercharge in the early afternoon had gained for the defenders a corpse-strewn welter of splintered trees and shell-shattered ground that had been the southern corner of the wood. Further charges had broken against a massive barricade, the value of which as a defense paid good interest on the expenditure of German lives which its construction demanded.

"A wonderful work had been accomplished that Sunday forenoon in the livid, Londonlike fog and twilight produced by the lowering clouds and battle smoke. While the German assault columns in the van fought the French hand to hand, picked corps of workers behind them formed an amazing human chain from the woods to the east over the shoulder of the centre of the Douaumont slope to the crossroads of a network of communication trenches, 600 yards in the rear.

"Four deep was this chain, and along its line of nearly 3,000 men passed an unending stream of wooden billets, sandbags, chevaux-de-frise, steel shelters, and light mitrailleuses, in a word, all the material for defensive fortifications, like buckets at a country fire.

"Despite the hurricane of French artillery fire, the German commander had adopted the only possible means of rapid transport over the shell-torn ground, covered with débris, over which neither horse nor cart could go. Every moment counted. Unless barriers rose swiftly the French counterattacks, already massing, would sweep the assailants back into the wood.

"Cover was disdained. The workers stood at full height, and the chain stretched openly across the hollows and hillocks, a fair target for the French gunners. The latter missed no chance. Again and again great rents were torn in the line by the bursting melinite, but as coolly as at manoeuvres the iron-disciplined soldiers of Germany sprang forward from shelters to take the places of the fallen, and the work went apace.

"Gradually another line doubled the chain of the workers, as the upheaved corpses formed a continuous embankment, each additional dead man giving greater protection to his comrades, until the barrier began to form shape along the diameter of the wood. There others were digging and burying logs deep into the earth, installing shelters and mitrailleuses, or feverishly building fortifications.

"At last the work was ended at fearful cost, but as the vanguard sullenly withdrew behind it, from the whole length burst a havoc of flame upon the advancing Frenchmen. Vainly the latter dashed forward. They could not pass, and as the evening fell the barrier still held, covering the German working parties, burrowing like moles in the maze of trenches and boyaux.

"So solid was the barricade, padded with sand bags and earthworks, that the artilley fire fell practically unavailing, and the French General realized that the barrier must be breached by explosives as in Napoleon's battles.

BREAKING THE BARRIER

"It was 8 o'clock and already pitch dark in that blighted atmosphere as a special blasting corps, as devoted as the German chain workers, crept forward toward the German position. The rest of the French waited, sheltered in the ravine east of Douaumont, until an explosion should signal the assault.

"In Indian file, to give the least possible sign of their presence to the hostile sentinels, the blasting corps advanced in a long line, at first with comparative rapidity, only stiffening into the grotesque rigidity of simulated death when the searchlights played upon them, and resuming progress when the beam shifted; then as they approached the barrier they moved slowly and more slowly.

"When they arrived within fifty yards the movement of the crawling men became imperceptible; the German starshells and sentinels surpassed the searchlights in vigilance.

"The blasting corps lay at full length, just like hundreds of other motionless forms about them, but all were working busily. With a short trowel each file leader scuffled the earth from under the body, taking care not to raise his arms, and gradually making a shallow trench deep enough to hide him. The others followed his example until the whole line had sunk below the surface. Then the leader began scooping gently forward while his followers deepened the furrow already made.

"Thus literally, inch by inch, the files stole forward, sheltered in a narrow ditch from the gusts of German mitrailleuse fire that constantly swept the terrain. Here and there the sentinels' eye caught a suspicious movement and an incautiously raised head sank down, pierced by a bullet. But the stealthily mole-like advance continued.

"Hours passed. It was nearly dawn when the remnant of the blasting corps reached the barricade at last, and hurriedly put their explosives in position. Back they wriggled breathlessly. An over-hasty movement meant death, yet they must needs hurry lest the imminent explosions overwhelm them.

"Suddenly there comes a roar that dwarfs the cannonade, and along the barrier fountains of fire rise skyward, hurling a rain of fragments upon what was left of the blasting party.

"The barricade was breached, but 75 per cent. of the devoted corps had given their lives to do it.

"As the survivors lay exhausted, the attackers charged over them, cheering. In the mêlée that followed there was no room to shoot or wield the rifle.

"Some of the French fought with unfixed bayonets like the stabbing swords of the Roman legions. Others had knives or clubs. All were battle-frenzied, as only Frenchmen can be.

"The Germans broke, and as the first rays of dawn streaked the sky, only a small northern section of the wood was still in their hands. There a similar barrier stopped progress, and it was evident that the night's work must be repeated. But the hearts of the French soldiers were leaping with victory as they dug furiously to consolidate the ground they had gained, strewn with German bodies as thick as leaves.

"Over 6,000 Germans were counted in a section a quarter of a mile square, and the conquerors saw why their cannonade had been so ineffective. The enemy had piled a second barrier of corpses close behind the first, so that the soft human flesh would act as a buffer to neutralize the force of the shells."

CLIMAX OF THIS PHASE

After the withdrawal of the French from Bethincourt on April 10 the Germans made a powerful but vain attempt to break the new line and get possession of Dead Man's Hill. It was the climax of that phase of the struggle, and has been followed by a lull.

Speaking of this attack, a French officer estimates that nearly 100,000 German soldiers were flung in solid columns at the west-of-the-Meuse salient. He continues:

"We figure that the attempt to rush this important position (their object was to capture Le Mort Homme, in order to render untenable the key sector of Pepper Hill and Douaumont) cost the Germans fully 30,000 men, of whom an unusualy high proportion were killed, owing to their inability to succor any save the slightly wounded—you know the fate of an injured man abandoned between trenches.

"Perhaps now the enemy will realize that he has reached a stalemate, for the abrupt breakdown of yesterday's attempt against Vaux and Douaumont proves once more it is impossible to advance there while we hold Le Mort Homme, and the latter must seem to be impregnable.

"Unless our estimates are mistaken, yesterday marked the final great shock of the Verdun battle. The Germans may try again, (we hope they will,) but I, for one, will be surprised. Surely even German discipline must soon revolt against such useless slaughter."

British and German War Finances

Views of Experts

EDGAR CRAMMOND, Secretary of the Liverpool Stock Exchange, recently told the London Chamber of Commerce why he considered England's financial situation infinitely stronger than Germany's. Germany had begun the war with a gold reserve of $465,000,000, the whole amount required to finance her army and navy during mobilization, while the coined gold actually in the country at the outbreak of the war was estimated at $1,000,000,000. Yet at the beginning of March, 1916, said Mr. Crammond, the total amount of gold held by the Reichsbank amounted to less than $625,000,000, and there were in circulation about $4,625,000,000 notes, all based ultimately upon this gold. Germany had found it impossible, he said, to finance twenty months' war without increasing the circulation of paper money over $3,500,000,000, while Great Britain, though she had entered the war without the slightest financial preparation, had only found it necessary to increase her paper circulation by $500,000,000.

The National City Bank of New York stated the German financial situation in different terms, however, in its circular of April 1. "The gold reserve of the Reichsbank," it said, "is about 39 per cent. of its note circulation and 30 per cent. against notes and deposits. The note circulation is about $400,000,000 above a year ago, and loans about the same." The same authority also said:

"The German Government has closed the books on its fourth loan, and subscriptions are officially stated to be in excess of 10,600,000,000 marks, or about $2,600,000,000. The third loan, brought out last Fall, realized about $3,000,000,000, and the Secretary of the Treasury announces that the total subscriptions for all the war loans aggregate 36,300,000,000 marks, or about $9,000,000,000. In presenting his annual budget, with certain proposals for new taxes, to the Reichstag, a few days ago, he stated that the war expenditures in December exceeded 2,000,000,000 marks, about $500,000,000, but had since been running lower, and now were scarcely greater than a year ago. He estimated that the new taxes would bring in 10,000,000 marks monthly."

Mr. Crammond regarded the financial outlook of Germany as desperate. At the oubreak of the war the German mercantile marine consisted of 5,459,296 tons. Of this, at the beginning of this year, 1,276,590 was either detained in the United Kingdom or allied ports, or had been captured or sunk, and the rest (with the exception of an insignificant number of steamers running in the Baltic) had been rusting for eighteen months in German and neutral harbors. And the position of Germany's investments abroad was nearly as deplorable as that of her shipping. Out of a total of $5,850,000,000 more than half, namely, $3,350,000,000, was unrealizable, and would probably be worthless for many years after the conclusion of peace. About $1,250,000,000 had been sold, while the investments in the German colonies, $700,000,000, were worthless, owing to the loss of her colonies. The $500,000,000 owned in the United Kingdom would be applied toward payment of the moneys ($350,000,000) owing by German subjects to British subjects. Germany's colonies had gone, her shipping industry was ruined, the best of her foreign investments had been sold and the remainder might prove worthless, the good-will of her foreign trade in allied countries was valueless, and the decline in the exchange value of the mark and the failures which were taking place among the banks pointed to the approach of the greatest financial débâcle that the world had seen. Such is one British expert's view of the enemy's finances.

The British financial situation is stated thus by the American bank already quoted from:

"There has been no large British

internal loans since last June and the proceeds of that were exhausted some months ago. Since then the Treasury has been supplying its needs by the sale of five-year Exchequer bonds and Treasury bills running three, six, nine, and twelve months, the bills being the main resource. The amount of these outstanding March 1 was a little above $2,000,000,000. The British fiscal year ends March 31, and the total Government expenditures for the year just closed, including the civil establishment and loans to allies, is nearly if not quite $8,000,000,000, but of this approximately $2,000,000,000 was advanced to the country's colonies and allies.

"The revenues of the British Government under the war taxes are very large. The peace revenues were about $1,000,000,000 per year, but for the year just closed the total income from taxation has been about $1,700,000,000, and for the coming year it is expected to reach $2,200,000,000, not counting new taxes which may be levied. The excess profits tax has scarcely begun to show results, and the proceeds of this may carry the income above all estimates.

"The cessation of gold exports to the United States has enabled the Bank of England to gain about $20,000,000 of gold since Jan. 1, and at approximately $275,000,000 the stock is only about $6,000,000 below what it was a year ago, notwithstanding the large exports to the United States and elsewhere during that time. The great production of gold within the British Empire serves it well at this time. The closing of the diamond mines in Africa has given a larger supply of labor to the gold mines, and the African production is now at the rate of about $200,000,000 per year. The Canadian production rose last year to $18,000,000 and the total output in the British possessions is close to $300,000,000. The Bank of England reserve is now about 28 per cent., and the reserve against the Exchequer notes about the same. Its public and private loans are considerably less than a year ago, owing to the large payments upon premoratorium paper."

Germany's Fourth War Loan

An Extraordinary Appeal

Following is a translation of the appeal in which the German Government implores and commands the German public to subscribe for the new war bonds. The words printed in capitals are in large type in the original text:

THE FOURTH WAR LOAN SHOULD BE SUBSCRIBED TO

EVERYBODY CAN AND ALL SHOULD AND MUST PAY!

THE incomparable self-sacrifice and heroism of our fathers and brothers have long ago stemmed the tide of the enemy, who invaded our Fatherland and threatened to destroy it; and in their wonderful series of victories in west and east and south they have thrown them back into enemy country, and an iron dam—a living wall of bodies, unconquerable, not to be beaten—protects our lives and possessions. The enemy's delusion as to our numbers has faded away, their counting on their overwhelming numbers, their designs, so secretly, so finely woven—all have most pitably melted away! They are now weighed down by fears for the security of their own possessions! In vain their evil and devilish plan to starve us to death with wife and child! In vain, frustrated by Providence's gracious bounty, and by the German people's united, firm, and self-sacrificing will to conquer. Long ago the wall (ring) of famine was pierced.

And yet the enemy will not acknowledge their lost cause as doomed. They are now counting on the ultimate failure of our financial resources, they count on our bankruptcy; that our purses will at last have to show empty pockets; that is the thought to which they hang on in spite of their failures and defeats on all the various fronts, still deceiving the world with the high-sounding phrases of their confidence in victory. They have had to throw billions into the pockets of neutrals in return for munitions, have had to secure accomplices to their crimes with untold sums. We have, through the victory of our arms, secured allies and at the same time have retained our money within our country. Unshaken, with full strength, our economic machine works on! Whatever our people have loaned to the State flows back in constant circulation into the pockets of all classes of society. We have not become impoverished through the war.

Now is the time to subscribe to the fourth war loan!

What is its purpose? It is meant to provide those dear to us, who are out in the field, with all they may require, to steel their heart, their mind, their forces! To provide the leaders of our armies with the necessary war material, that nothing should be found wanting which may insure victory.

But greater is its purpose—far greater! Do you wish a poor response to revive the enemy's hopes, to stiffen their backs, and at the same time to retard the victory of our men in gray—to increase and prolong their efforts, dangers, and sacrifices? No!

ITS OBJECT IS TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY!

To cause his last pillars of hope to fall! To show him that the longer the war lasts the more milliards we shall produce. To prove to the enemy and all the world with colossal figures that German money-power based on German industry, German organization, and joyous self-sacrifice will always be forthcoming, and can never fail. It is now for us, who have remained at home, to wage a gigantic money battle, and gain a gigantic victory, whose crushing blow shall break down the enemy's last stand, shall tear to shreds his web of lies, and shall force him to at last understand and admit the hard truth—an unconquerable Germany.

Think of all the money that is still being frittered away! Is it our wish to live well, is it possible for us to enjoy while thousands and thousands out there are wanting, fighting, dying—for us?

Out with the silver bullets, out with all the money which is being devoted not to "life," but to living! The Fatherland claims it in this its most fateful hour!

And we are not even asked to sacrifice it—merely to withdraw it for the time being and to loan it to the country for our own good, and at the same time for personal and considerable profit.

ALL MUST PAY, EVEN THE SMALLEST. ALL CAN PAY!

One hundred-mark bonds are the smallest denomination. But even for those who may not be able to raise such a sum, in many places special facilities have been provided. Where such arrangements have not yet been made the good example set elsewhere should be followed. Schools, specially appointed receiving offices and representative individuals, co-operative organizations and savings banks—they all should arrange to receive payments of smaller amounts, collect them, and invest the totals in war loan. By such means the individual subscriber will still enjoy the benefits of the high interest return. In the same way thrift clubs, of which a good number exist already, can do their share. Associations of all kinds can form thrift clubs from among their membership; card clubs and mothers' meetings—and there are many in most places—which are in the habit of collecting a few hundred marks for some common object, such as excursions, holiday trips, &c., from small subscriptions, card winnings, or similar sources, can now invest them in war loan. It will always be possible to find some universally acceptable method of insuring that each participant shall at the proper moment regain his share of interest and capital. People should not argue that these are trifling matters. At the time of the third war loan throughout the whole empire 246,000 pupils of the high schools raised 31,000,000 marks. In certain districts, where the efforts have been particularly active, surprising results have been obtained. In a small district of Silesia 140,000 and nearly 179,000 marks, respectively, were subscribed through schools toward the second and third war loans. The same high proportion throughout all Germany would result in a truly amazing amount.

Many "littles" have always and everywhere resulted in "much." And now they will result in one stupendous "Much" if one and all will do their full duty. Let every one be alive to his responsibility. No one should pay merely for the sake of being able to say he has done so. Let all voluntarily and joyfully impose upon themselves some sacrifice. The hardships which we have to bear are mere trifles compared to the sacrifices our heroes in the field are making for our sakes each day and every hour; but they are nothing—absolutely nothing—in comparison with the misery from which we have been spared only through the intelligence and energy of our leaders and the courage and blood of our brothers.

The magnitude of the goal does not permit of almsgiving, of easy-going games, sport for charitable purposes; it demands, on the contrary, a conscious, active renunciation, the fullest straining of our utmost power to give.

Through hunger and want the German people have become great. Once more they will be ready to deny themselves what is needed for the country's victory and greatness.

In these days every German has been ordained a witness to, and at the same time a potent factor in, a great era. What we are enduring and fighting for today will be a blessing for hundreds of future generations—what we leave undone their doom. Hundredfold is the responsibility which rests on each of us.

Throughout the German Empire, from the Alps to the sea, in town and country, the whole German Nation is now preparing throughout all classes and all ages for this giant's battle, is silently gathering all its forces, ready to strike the colossal blow. That it may fall with Teuton precision and Teuton force, dealing destruction and annihilation like a thunderbolt—such is the call to all.

This, the fourth war loan, may become our loan of victory.

He who pays all he can afford helps toward victory and peace. Whoever does not give all that he can prolongs the war.

Lord Bryce on War and Progress

These typical sentences are from Lord Bryce's Huxley lecture at Birmingham, delivered on March 10:

On a review of the whole matter war will not be found to have quickened, but to have greatly retarded, the upward march of man. What then have been the causes to which progress has been due? Partly, no doubt, to competition, but chiefly to thought. Thought is not helped by war. It is the races that know how to think rather than the far more numerous races hat know only how to fight, that have led the world. Invention and scientific inquiry have given us improvements in the arts of life and that knowledge of nature which has brought wealth and comfort.

A study of history will enable us to dismiss with an easy conscience the theory of Treitschke that war is a medicine which Providence must be expected constantly to offer to the human race for its own good. And we may properly address ourselves at the end of a war undertaken to vindicate the eternal principles of right against the spirit of militarism and aggression, to the task of trying to help forward the progress of mankind, not through the strifes and hatreds of the peoples, but rather by their friendly co-operation in the healing and enlightening works of peace.

The Full Meaning of Our Position in the Lusitania Case

WRITTEN FOR CURRENT HISTORY

By Paul van Dyke

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TWO questions in regard to the present war have been much debated. The first is why the opposed ambitions, interests, and jealousies of eleven European nations and their extra European allies resulted at this time in war, when similar crises of these passions had previously been passed through peacefully. The second is, has Germany's conduct of the war been in accord with the law of war and the spirit of it which is the growing sentiment of humanity?

In regard to both of these questions there is quite a considerable body of evidence in regard to facts. But the evidence bearing on the first question differs in a general way from the evidence bearing upon the second question. Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy have printed over 800 diplomatic documents relating to the outbreak of the war. The evidence furnished by this mass of material is, of course, not complete. Probably no one of the Governments concerned has printed all the documents in its possession relating to the question. Practically the entire correspondence between Austria and Germany is still unpublished. Perhaps within twenty or thirty years the publication of memoirs may throw additional light upon the occasion of this war just as the writings and speeches of Bismarck before his death threw additional light upon the occasion of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. On some points these documents are more or less opposed to each other. But they agree in enough points to furnish a reasonable mass of data to serve as a basis of discussion.

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When we come to the second question, however, the case is different. Documents have been published by the French, Belgian, English, and German Governments which are in irreconcilable contradiction to each other. For instance, the Bryce report concludes on the basis of the evidence which it has collected "that there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate massacres of the civil population; * * * that in the conduct of the war generally, innocent civilians—both men and women—were murdered in large numbers," &c. The

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NOTE.—*Professor van Dyke in this thesis seeks to present the conception by German military authorities of the relations of Humanitarian Considerations to War as deduced from their own regulations and documents. Professor van Dyke has held the Chair of Modern European History in Princeton University since 1898. He is the author of "Renaissance Portraits" and other volumes.*

German report on the conduct of the war in Belgium concludes on the basis of evidence collected by their commission that "the stories of refugees strung together by the Belgian Commission bear in themselves the marks of untrustworthiness, if not of malignant distortion"; that "these complaints against the German Army are, therefore, nothing else than the basest slanders, which, without further discussion, are deprived of all force by the first-hand evidence laid before the reader in the accompanying documents"; that "the Imperial German Government believes that by the publication of this original material it has made evident in the most convincing manner that the behavior of the German troops with regard to the Belgian civil population was imperatively called for by the guerrilla warfare which they waged against all international law, and forced by the necessity of war."

This contradiction exists not only in the conclusions of these reports but also in parts of the detailed evidence on which these conclusions are based. For instance, the Bryce report calls what took place on Aug. 20 in the little city of Andenne "a massacre of the inhabitants" who were "slaughtered for over two hours in the afternoon and intermittently during the night by the German Army."

The German report calls the affair of Andenne on Aug. 20 a "street fight" provoked by the "inhumanities" of the inhabitants, who treacherously poured out "from all sides a hail of fire upon the unprotected troops in an incomparably devilish piece of business."

The Bryce report supports its conclusion in regard to what happened at Andenne on the 20th of August by the depositions of three Belgians who were present. The German Commission supports its conclusion by the report of the General in command of the troops, confirmed by the affidavits of one of his Majors and a non-commissioned officer and the report of a Lieutenant sent to investigate the occurrence by the Military Governor of the province some four months later. He examined eleven burghers of the town, who all denied that they were able to give any good information about the facts of the case. Most of them said they had been hidden in their cellars during the whole affair.

Now here we have a sharp contradiction of facts which, according to the existing evidence, can hardly be authoritatively resolved. If it were possible to call into a neutral court a score of the surviving leading citizens of Andenne and a score of the soldiers and officers of the troops concerned, with full liberty to cross-examine them, we should probably be able to decide how the case of Andenne bears upon the statement of the German Government that the action of the German troops in Belgium was forced upon them by the guerrilla warfare waged by the Belgian civil population and compelled by the necessities of war.

The case of Andenne has of course been deliberately chosen, because it is a prerogative instance, a marked example of contradiction. But it is an exaggerated instance which plainly suggests the difficulties that affect this discussion. The facts to be discussed are not agreed upon by both sides and therefore the discussion has constantly tended to resolve itself into mutual recriminations of slander and falsehood.

The writer of this article, being desirous of discussing the second of the questions suggested by this war, wishes to exclude from the discussion all questions of disputed facts. He proposes, therefore, to use no facts except those set forth in documents written by Germans. He hopes in this way to make the issue so plain that every reader may decide without the smallest room for doubt what the doctrine of the German military authorities is and decide for himself whether that doctrine and the practice arising from it does or does not coincide with his ideas.

The question is not, as is sometimes asserted, a vague and unreal one concerning matters of no interest except to theorists who conduct abstract discussions in regard to things as they might be, or as they ought to be. It concerns things which the military authorities of the United States, and, indeed, the military authorities of the civilized world, have officially accepted as realities. The existence of the laws of war and the spirit of humanity underlying them is officially asserted by the United States in the Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field:

> Military necessity as understood by modern civilized nations consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war. * * * As martial law is executed by military force, it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity—virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men for the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.

This position of the United States has been explicitly indorsed by every one of the belligerents in the present war by their signatures in 1907 to " The Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land."

The discussion here proposed is not only about realities, but it is one about which every intelligent American citizen is in duty bound to make up his mind. Because, unless he understands the doctrine of the German military authorities concerning the relation of military necessity to the laws of war and to the spirit of humanity, he does not really understand the position taken by his own Government, which has brought us to the verge of breaking off relations with Germany.

That doctrine is set forth in " The Usages of War on Land," issued by the Great General Staff of the German Army:

" A war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against the combatants of the enemy State and the positions they occupy. But it will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual and material resources of the latter. Humanitarian claims, such as the protection of men and their goods, can only be taken into consideration in so far as the nature and objects of the war permit.

" Consequently ' the argument of war ' permits every belligerent State to have recourse to all means which enable it to attain the object of the war; still, practice has taught the advisability of allowing in one's own interest the introduction of a limitation in the use of certain methods of war and the total renunciation of the use of others. Chivalrous feelings, Christian thought, higher civilization, and by no means least of all the recognition of one's own advantage have led to a voluntary and self-imposed limitation the necessity of which is today tacitly recognized by all States and their armies. * * *

" In the modern usages of war one can no longer regard merely the traditional inheritance of the ancient etiquette of the profession of arms and the professional outlook accompanying it, but there is also the deposit of the currents of thought which agitate our time. But since the tendency of thought of the last century was dominated chiefly by humanitarian considerations which not infrequently degenerated into sentimentality and flabby emotion, there have not been wanting attempts to influence the development of the usages of war in a way which was in fundamental contradiction with the nature of war and its objects. Attempts of this kind will also not be wanting in the future; the more so as these agitations have found a kind of moral recognition in some provisions of the Geneva Convention and the Brussels and Hague Conferences.

" Moreover, the officer is a child of his time; he is subject to the intellectual tendencies which influence his own nation; the more educated he is, the more this will be the case. The danger that, in this way, he will arrive at false views about the essential character of war must not be lost sight of. The danger can only be met by a thorough study of war itself. By steeping himself in military history an officer will be able to guard himself against excessive humanitarian notions; it will teach him that certain severities are indispensable to war, nay, more, that the only true humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them. It will also teach him how the rules of belligerent intercourse in war have developed, how in the course of time they have solidified into general usages of war, and, finally, it will teach him whether the governing usages of war are justified or not, whether they are to be modified, whether they are to be observed."

Of such modifications of the usages of war the German War-book suggests an example in the following citation of its statement in regard to hostages:

" Their provision has been less usual in recent wars, as a result of which some professors of the law of nations have wrongly decided that the taking of hostages has disappeared from the practice of civilized nations. * * *

" A new application of hostage right was practiced by the German Staff in the war of 1870 when it compelled leading citizens from French towns and villages to accompany trains and locomotives in order to protect the railway communications which were threatened by the people. Since the lives of peaceable inhabitants were, without any fault on their part, thereby exposed to grave danger, every writer outside Germany has stigmatized this measure as contrary to the law of nations and as unjustified toward the inhabitants of the country."

The book then proceeds to give reasons for justifying this procedure, " which was also recognized on the German side as harsh and cruel," and concludes: " To protect one's self against attacks and injuries from the inhabitants and to employ ruthlessly the necessary means of defense and intimidation, is obviously not only a right, but indeed a duty of the staff of the army."

The way in which this general doctrine of the relation of the necessities of war to the spirit of humanity in its special application to the case of hostages, was actually used by German commanders in Belgium, is sufficiently indicated by the following citations from the report of the German Commission which has already been quoted:

Staff Physician Dr. Petrenz deposes under oath that at 10 o'clock in the evening of Aug. 23 he approached Les Rivages, a suburb of Dinant. On the banks of the Maas between the water and a garden wall he saw on the left of the pontoon bridge a heap of executed civilians. " I don't know who shot them, but I was told that they were executed by the 101st Regiment." There were some dead women among them. " I also found in the heap a 10-year-old girl wounded " and buried under the heap " a little girl of about 5, unwounded."

The report to which this and eighty-six other depositions were attached explains how that heap of dead men, women, and children came to be there.

When the 101st Grenadier Regiment reached Les Rivages in the late afternoon of Aug. 23 they found everything quiet, (" the village seemed dead,") and it remained so. (" Meantime in Les Rivages all was quiet.") " The commander of the 101st Grenadiers took out of the nearest houses a good number of persons to serve as hostages in case of hostile action on the part of the population." " It was made clear to them that they must answer with their lives for the safety of the troops." The men were placed against a garden wall to the left of the place of crossing the river. The women and children who had come out of the houses with them were put away somewhat down-stream. The building of the pontoon bridge went on. " When it was built out into the stream some forty meters, fire was suddenly opened on the pioneers from the houses of Les Rivages and the rocky cliffs beyond." In consequence of this, " the male hostages assembled along the garden wall were shot." That was where the heap of dead men, women, and children that Dr. Petrenz saw came from.

The comment of the Governmental report on this recital of facts is as follows: " The tactical object of the Twelfth Corps was the rapid crossing of the Maas and the clearing of the enemy from its left bank. The rapid overcoming of the opposition to attaining this end was a necessity of war and to be reached by every possible means. * * * Therefore, the shooting of hostages carried out in several places was in accord with right."

That this was no isolated case but the fixed and deliberate policy of the German Army appears from the following extract from a proclamation posted in the City of Rheims on the 12th of September, 1914. I quote and translate passages from a photographic facsimile: "In order to secure sufficiently the safety of the troops and the calm of the population of Rheims the persons named below have been seized as hostages by the Commander of the German Army. These hostages will be hanged at the least attempt at disorder. On the other hand, if the city keeps itself absolutely calm and tranquil, the hostages and inhabitants will be taken under the protection of the German Army." There followed a list of names such as the Mayor of the city, the Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, President of the Co-operative Society, and about eighty others.

The policy adopted by the German Army authorities of executing hostages who could not have been guilty of hostile acts, appears again in the following extracts from a proclamation of Baron von der Goltz which was posted at Brussels on the 5th of October, 1914. "In future the localities nearest to the place where destruction of railroads and of telegraphic lines has taken place (it makes no difference whether they were guilty of the acts or not) will be punished without pity. For that purpose hostages have been taken from all the localities near the railroads which are threatened by such attacks, and at the first attempt to destroy the lines of the railroad, telegraph lines, or the lines of the telephones, they will be immediately shot."

That this and similar threats were no empty words is shown by the following extract from the pamphlet in which Professor Bedier has reprinted facsimiles of leaves from the diaries taken from a number of dead or captured German soldiers. In the diary of a soldier of the Thirty-second Infantry of Reserves appears this paragraph:

"Third of September. Creil. Somebody has blown up the iron bridge. For this reason the streets were burned by us and some civilians shot."

When these acts in violation of the rules of The Hague Convention, (signed by Germany,) which forbids the inflicting of collective punishment, whether of money or other sort, upon communities for the deeds of individuals, began to rouse violent protests, the Commanding General of the Seventh Army Corps issued in the beginning of September the following proclamation:

"I learn that a newspaper has declared that the severe measures of our military commanders against reprehensible franc-tireur operations in Belgium were dictated by a feeling of revenge and desire for retaliation. This article, against which I have taken the measures demanded by my duty, gives me occasion to address an explanatory word to the inhabitants in the district occupied by the Seventh Army Corps. The secret, treacherous attacks which have been made by a hostile population in many places against our brave troops and which still persist in places, make it the absolute duty of our commanders to proceed against such atrocious crimes with ruthless and iron severity. To show weakness here would be to betray our own army. Not a hair of the peaceful inhabitants of the country will be touched. The discipline of our troops, known to the whole world, is a guarantee for this. They fight as soldiers against soldiers in honorable battle. If, however, the brave sons of our people who go out to the field to meet hardship and death for the Fatherland, if wounded surgeons and others who care for the wounded are miserably murdered by a misled, mad populace; if the safety of the army is threatened by the attacks of guerrillas from the rear, it becomes a law of self-preservation and a sacred duty of the military commanders to proceed against these crimes immediately with the most extreme measures. The innocent must then suffer with the guilty. The commanders of our army have in repeated proclamations made it plain that human lives cannot be regarded in suppressing such shameful crimes. That some houses, even villages and whole cities have to be destroyed in this process, is certainly to be regretted, but it must not give occasion for unjustifiable mental perturbation. These houses, villages, and cities cannot be worth so much to us as the life of a single soldier. This is self-evident and hardly needs to be said. To show compassion here would be a sinful weakness; the blood of the innocent is upon the heads of the inciters of these shameful attacks. There can be no talk of revenge and retaliation such as was contained in the newspaper article of which I have spoken—an article which I fail to understand. Our commanders, to repeat it once more, are simply doing their duty and they will continue to do this duty until the glorious end of the war. They will protect our soldiers from murderers in the most ruthless manner and at any cost. Whoever talks here of barbarism speaks wantonly. The iron performance of one's duty is a proof of the highest culture, and the population of the hostile countries cannot but learn this from our army."

What this meant in actual practice is illustrated again by a leaf from another diary of a German soldier:

"In the same way we destroyed eight houses with their inhabitants. In one of them two men with their wives and an eighteen-year-old girl were run through with bayonets. The young girl made me feel sorry because she looked at me with such an innocent look."

Doubtless the men who have issued these proclamations, though I like to think not all the men who have been obliged to obey them, would indorse the words of Major Gen. Von Ditfurth in the Hamburger Nachrichten:

"It is incompatible with the dignity of the German Empire and with the proud traditions of the Prussian Army to defend our courageous soldiers from the accusations hurled against them in foreign and neutral countries. We owe no explanation to any one. There is nothing for us to justify and nothing to explain away. Every act, of whatever nature, committed by our troops for the purpose of discouraging, defeating, and destroying our enemies is a brave act and a good deed and is fully justified.

"There is no reason whatever why we should trouble ourselves about the notions concerning us in other countries. Certainly we should not worry about the opinions and feelings held in neutral countries. Germany stands as the supreme arbiter of her own methods, which, in the time of war, must be dictated to the world."

This position has since been officially indorsed by the German Government in its Baralong note. Great Britain proposed to refer to a court composed of American naval officers the charge that the British gunboat Baralong had shot the crew of a German submarine swimming from their sunken boat, together with the similar charge that the officers of a German destroyer had shot the crew of an English submarine swimming from their boat on fire and aground on the Danish coast. Rejecting this proposal, the German note said: "The German Government * * * takes the standpoint that charges against members of the German forces must be investigated by its own competent authorities and that the persons accused be given every surety of an unprejudiced verdict with just punishment if necessary."

Let us add to the report on Dinant two other instances of investigation by German military authorities of charges against their officers. Noncommissioned Officer Kleint of the First Company of the 154th Regiment of Infantry wrote to the Tageblatt of the little town of Javer, in Silesia, a letter describing a recent battle in which he shows that he and his comrades acted with the approval of the "company leader" and with a perfect good conscience about the righteousness of their action. I translate some extracts from it, taken from a facsimile of the newspaper. It tells how at the beginning of an attack the German soldiers suffered severely without knowing where the balls came from. Finally they discovered that a number of French sharpshooters had climbed up into trees. It goes on:

"We shot them down from the trees like squirrels, and we received them warmly with blows of musket butts and of bayonets. They had no more need of doctors. We weren't fighting any more loyal enemies, but perfidious brigands. We passed through the thickets in leaps. We arrived at a little hollow in the ground. The red pantaloons lay there, dead or wounded, in crowds. We smashed or stabbed the wounded because we know that those scoundrels when we have passed fire at us in the back. There lies, stretched out his full length, a Frenchman, his face against the earth, but he is only pretending to be dead. A kick of the foot of a stout rifleman shows him that we are there. Turning, he demands quarter (using a brutal phrase better left out) * * * but we pin him to the ground with a bayonet. Beside me I hear some singular sounds—they are the blows of the butt of his gun which a soldier of the 154th brings down vigorously upon the bald head of a Frenchman. Very wisely he employs for this work a French gun for fear of breaking his own. The men of sensitive feelings do the kindness to the French wounded to end them with a ball, but the others hit and stick as best they can. Our adversaries fought bravely; they were choice troops which we had had before us. They had let us approach up to thirty, and even up to ten yards—too close. Knapsacks and arms thrown away in heaps proved that they wanted to run, but at the sight of the gray phantoms fear paralyzed their feet, and on the narrow paths which they took the German balls brought to them the order to halt. At the door of their shelters of branches there they were lying groaning and whimpering for quarter. But whether they are lightly or seriously wounded the brave fusileers save their country the expensive care which she would have been compelled to give to many enemies."

In order to assure his friends at home that he was telling the truth the writer of this tale of battle had gotten his officer to put at the end of his communication these words: "The above statements are confirmed. De Niem, Lieutenant and Company Leader." And over the signatures of a noncommissioned officer and a commissioned officer of the German Army this account was published by a German newspaper under this headline: "A Day of Honor for Our Regiment."

The reply to the publication of this facsimile of a copy of the Javer Tageblatt makes it evident that there was an official investigation of this case. The writer says "the investigation brought out the fact that our troops in that action stood in a particularly difficult position, and the sworn utterance of the writer of this article shrinks to the following statement: "Wounded Frenchmen fired on us from behind. They were then made harmless. Aside from this I did not see firing by our people on Frenchmen no longer able to fight. I did see a turned over Frenchman that pretended to be dead who held his gun in his hand under him."

Three things are noticeable about this result of a German military investigation as reported by a German writer and put forward to the world as satisfactory:

(1) Under-officer Kleint confesses that he falsely bragged that his regiment had killed all the enemies wounded; (2) his sworn deposition is ambiguous in its correction of his first newspaper account so far as concerns most of the wounded he said at first were massacred. He swears he "did not see firing by our people" (geschossen worden ist) on helpless Frenchmen. He had written in his newspaper article that only men with sensitive souls shot the French wounded. He said the bulk of them were killed by butts and bayonets. Was he cross-examined on this point? (3) a commissioned officer of the German Army certified the correctness of this account of the actions of his men and authorized its publication in a newspaper. Were the writer, the indorser, and the publisher of this article under the title "A Day of Honor for Our Regiment" put on trial for an offense against the honor of the German Army? The official reply gives no sign of any indignation in the matter.

Let us take still another case of investigation by the German military authorities of the relation to the exigencies of warfare of the principle that the "only true humanity very often lies in the ruthless application of certain severities incident to war." Professor Bedier in the work already quoted cites the deposition of a French Captain of the 288th Regiment of Infantry. The reader is asked not to jump to the conclusion that I am abandoning my purpose to use none but

German testimony about German principles and deeds because I quote this French deposition. I quote it only in order to show the German comment upon it which follows. The deposition of the French officer reads:

"The evening of the 22d I learned of the presence in the woods — at 150 meters to the north of the square formed by the meeting of the great trench of Calonne with the road of Vaux-les-Palameix to Saint Remy—of the corpses of French soldiers shot by the Germans. I went there and I saw about thirty soldiers jammed together in a little space, for the most part lying flat, some of them, however, on their knees, and all having the same wound—that is, a shot from a rifle in the ear. A single one, very severely wounded in the lower part of his body, was able to speak and told me that the Germans, before leaving, had ordered them to lie down and then had killed them by a ball in the head, that he himself, wounded, had obtained quarter by saying that he was the father of three little children. The skulls of all these unfortunates had been smashed to pieces and scattered around. Rifles with their stocks broken off were scattered around here and there and the blood had spouted over the thicket to such an extent that in leaving the wood the forward part of my coat was all spotted with it. It was really a slaughter house."

The facts given by the French Captain demanded an investigation by the German military authorities, for their manual says: "That prisoners should be killed only in the event of extreme necessity * * * is today universally admitted." Here is the result of the investigation given in the official reply to Mr. Bedier:

"You print the report of a French Captain. According to that report German soldiers ordered about thirty Frenchmen to lie down and then put them to death by a shot behind the ear. That is indeed a horrible story!

"Therefore, this case was examined by our military authorities. What was the result of the examination? A German regiment advanced in a charge along the road Saint Remy-Mouilly. It had opposed to it an entire division of the enemy. It could not hold its position on the place of assembly which was heavily shelled by the enemy's artillery. Therefore, retreat was ordered. A Lieutenant was, after the completion of a reconnoissance, in danger of being cut off with his section from the already retiring regiment. The thirty or forty Frenchmen were prisoners. They had lain down on the ground, as our own men had done, to protect themselves from the heavy fire, and as some of them stood up again they were ordered to stay flat because their red trousers, visible at a great distance, offered a good mark, so that our men were put in danger even from German fire. In order not to delay rejoining the regiment our soldiers were obliged to run one by one across the forks of the road which was swept by the enemy's artillery. When the French prisoners were ordered to stand up and follow, they refused to do it. To leave them behind would have been questionable because they could have secured for themselves weapons from the fallen men who were lying around, and, as has often happened, could shoot upon our retreating men from behind, and besides could betray to the advancing and powerful enemy what weak forces we had on our side. In this position of military necessity the Lieutenant determined to order a defensive fire upon the recalcitrant prisoners, and he succeeded in spite of the dangerous circumstances in bringing his section back to the regiment with only the loss of a single man. *If all the prisoners had the same death wound close behind the ear, that was only chance.*"

Of course the men who formed this conclusion and the men who publish it as satisfactory overlook three things: (1) The fact that the sworn testimony which it was supposed to investigate asserted that the guns near the dead men were found broken off at the stocks and therefore unusable; (2) that the chances of such a defensive fire as is here described killing all of these men stone dead except one who had been severely wounded and who was untouched by the defensive fire are about a thousand to one; (3) that the chances of all these men killed by this defensive fire, being killed by precisely the same wound close behind the ear, are about a million to one, unless this "defensive fire" means the blowing out of each man's brains one by one.

Further examples of action toward prisoners and wounded are recorded in the following leaves published in facsimile from the diaries of German soldiers. Under-officer Göttsche of the Eighty-fifth Regiment of Infantry of the Ninth Army Corps wrote as follows:

"Oct. 6, 1914. We would have liked to capture the fort at once, but we had to take up quarters in the village of Kessel. The Captain called us to him and said, 'In the fort that is to be taken, there are probably Englishmen. I don't want to see, however, a single English prisoner in my company.' A general bravo of agreement was the answer."

A leaf from the journal of the soldier Fahlenstein of the Thirty-fourth Fusileers of the Second Army Corps records:

"Aug. 28. The Frenchmen lay in heaps of eight or ten wounded or dead, one on top of the other. Those who were still able to walk were made prisoners and taken away with us. Those who were severely wounded, with a wound in the head or in the lungs, and couldn't stand on their feet, received another ball which put an end to their life. We were given orders to do this."

I do not know whether there has been any investigation of the conduct of these last two officers or not, but the results put forward in the Dinant report and the investigations of the affairs of the Remy-Mouilly Road and the Javer Tageblatt letter suggest with great plainness that German officers inspired by a proclamation like that quoted near the beginning of this article would not feel that their superiors would be too rigid in defining the limit set by what our Instructions call the "principles of justice, honor, and humanity," and what the German War Book calls "certain severities indispensable to war in whose ruthless application very often lies the only true humanity."

One other illustration of the practical application by German officers of the theory of the German General Staff about the relation of the only true humanity to the nature of war and its objects. An Over-lieutenant of Bavarian infantry wrote a letter signed by his name which was published in the Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten on Oct. 7, 1914. This letter describes the occupation of the town of Saint Dié by the German Army in the end of August. I condense and then quote entire from a facsimile reproduction. He entered Saint Dié at the head of some fifty men. Marching through the empty streets he suddenly came around a corner to find the red trousers behind the barricades, and nine of his men went down at the first volley. Some forty survivors took refuge in the corner house, the Café de l'Univers, which was at once invested by Alpine chasseurs and French infantry. Let him describe what follows:

"In this situation, entirely cut off from our brigade, we were holding out for what might have been two hours, when there burst suddenly through an open window—the window sill is very low—two elegantly dressed women waving white cloths in their hands and throwing themselves at my feet. The situation seemed to me—I hope I shall be forgiven the expression—exceedingly dramatic. One of the ladies speaks German—that is, she stammers out some scattered words that I manage to put together. Her mother and sister are taken prisoner by the Germans. She herself must find the Mayor of Saint Dié and bring him back. If she doesn't, both will be shot as hostages. The General had given them a half hour. While they are on this search they get under our artillery and infantry fire and have fled to our house over the corpses of our men. I had them taken down into the bomb-proof wine cellar—quieting assurances—I will speak later myself with the General, &c. Besides this, I knew some time ago that the Mayor with all his other officials had skipped out.

"But we have arrested three civilians, and suddenly a good idea comes to me.

They are placed on chairs, and a spot in the middle of the street, where they must sit on these chairs, is pointed out to them. Wringing of hands and supplications on one side, some blows of rifle butts on the other side. One becomes gradually awfully severe. Then they take their places sitting outside in the street. How many prayers they sobbed out I do not know, but their hands were the entire time folded together in a convulsive way.

"I feel sorry for them, but the expedient is of immediate use.

"The fire from the houses dies down at once. We are able now to seize the house that lay opposite, becoming in consequence the masters of the chief street. Anything that shows itself after this on the street is shot down. The artillery also has meantime worked very effectively, and as in the neighborhood of 7 o'clock the brigade rushes forward in the charge in order to set us free, I can make the announcement 'Saint Dié is free from opponents.'

"As I later found out, the flank reserve regiment which broke into Saint Dié from the north had very similar experiences to those which we had. Their four civilians whom they also put in the same way in the street were, however, shot by the Frenchmen. I saw them myself lying near the hospital in the middle of the street.

"Let me give another episode from this day which proves what a spirit rules among our soldiers even in such a critical situation. The very moment in which no one of us would have given a rush for his life, our trumpeter stepped forward—he is the very type of a Bavarian reserve soldier—in his hand a glass of beer. 'Will you have some beer, Herr Lieutenant?' He had in perfect calmness and quiet climbed behind the buffet, tapped a little cask of beer, and was offering everybody a glass, also to many for whom this would be the last drink. Yes, yes, life moves in contraries, especially in war."

Now, the doctrine in regard to the relation of the usages and necessities of war to the spirit of humanity thus defined and illustrated is opposed both to the theory and the practice of the army of the United States.

The writer repudiates at the outset the idea that he is making this remark in any Pharisaic spirit. It does not enter into his mind to claim that cruel things have never been done by men wearing the uniform of the United States. He is discussing at the present moment an intellectual proposition and trying to make plain to every one of his readers the unquestionable fact that there does exist in the minds of the German General Staff a doctrine and that there has been deduced from it by some German officers a practice which differs radically from the doctrine and the practice of the officers of the army of the United States. He is not pleading any brief for his own nation, and if the reader will have patience to follow this article to the end he will see that he is not transgressing the maxim of Burke and drawing any indictment against the German Nation. He is simply endeavoring to point out the fact that this difference in doctrine and practice does exist.

As a matter of fact no American officer would dare to print in any American newspaper letters of the character which have been cited. As a matter of fact, an American officer giving such orders as have been recorded in the cited diaries of German soldiers or permitting such actions as those whose recital in the Javer Tageblatt was indorsed for newspaper publication by a German Lieutenant would be confronted by Article 71 of our Instructions for Armies in the Field:

"Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an enemy wholly disabled or kills such an enemy or orders or encourages soldiers to do so, shall suffer death if duly convicted whether he belongs to the army of the United States or is an enemy captured after having committed this misdeed."

As a matter of fact, the report of a military commission recording and approving things similar to those recorded and approved in the report of the military commission on the occurrences at Dinant would, if any one dared to publish it, be overwhelmingly repudiated by

American public opinion, and the men who were responsible for the shooting of hostages it approves would undoubtedly be court-martialed.

In order to see how true this is let us look, in the light of the foregoing German recitals of the theory and practices of the German military authorities, at some more items of the theory in regard to the nature and objects of war put forward by our military authorities in the Instructions for Armies in the Field:

> 28. Retaliation (reprisals) will therefore never be resorted to as a measure of mere revenge, but only as a means of protective retribution, and, moreover, cautiously and unavoidably; that is to say, retaliation shall only be resorted to after careful inquiry into the real occurrence and the character of the misdeeds which may demand retribution.
>
> 54. A hostage is a person accepted as a pledge for the fulfillment of an agreement concluded between belligerents during the war or in consequence of the war. Hostages are rare in the present age.
>
> 55. If a hostage is accepted he is treated like a prisoner of war according to rank and condition, as circumstances may admit.
>
> 56. A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional inflicting of any suffering or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any other barbarity. [This is all that is said about hostages.]

Now let us look at the practice of the officers of the United States. On April 22, 1914, the following proclamation was posted in the City of Vera Cruz, Mexico:

> It has become necessary for the naval forces of the United States of America now at Vera Cruz to land and to assume military control of the customs wharves of Vera Cruz. Your co-operation is requested to preserve order and to prevent loss of life. * * * It is enjoined upon all inhabitants and property owners to prevent firing by individuals from the shelter of the houses upon United States forces or upon any one else. Such firing by irregulars, not members of an organized military force, is contrary to the laws of war. If it persists again it will call for severe measures. R. S. FLETCHER,
>
> Rear Admiral of the United States.

The occupation of Vera Cruz cost our forces, according to the report of the Admiral, seventeen killed, three fatally wounded, two seriously wounded, and a large number of less seriously wounded. The sniping by nonuniformed citizens of which this proclamation speaks had already been going on for twenty-four hours. It continued for twenty-four hours later, and our chief casualties were due to this kind of irregular warfare. Our naval guns shelled the houses from which the firing took place, and our forces proceeded in each individual case to kill or capture those who were in them. But the idea of a general destruction and burning of the City of Vera Cruz, or the idea of arresting as was done at Rheims the Mayor and eighty leading citizens to be hung or shot if this irregular warfare did not stop was never for one moment entertained by any of the American officers. Nor did it occur to any American officer at Vera Cruz to seat four civilians on chairs in the street to protect his men from crossfire in street fighting.

So far as this last idea is concerned, it must be noted in this connection that the article in answer to Professor Bedier's pamphlet (an article which, according to its own statement, had the co-operation of the German military authorities) said that it was a pity Professor Bedier had not reproduced in facsimile more than a single column of the newspaper letter of the Bavarian Over-lieutenant because "so long as the context is lacking it is not possible to know whether the affair was a matter of regular or irregular warfare. In a war of francs-tireurs it might be useful and perfectly legitimate to place in the street some civilians upon whom their friends and neighbors would not dare to fire, while in regular warfare it would be a crime." So that, under the circumstances at Vera Cruz, any American officer who in order to protect his own men had seated the Mayor or any Mexican civilians in the streets to be shot by their own countrymen would have the indorsement of the German military authorities. (Two things may be added: First, Mr. Bedier, thus challenged, reproduced in facsimile all of the article in question, from which it appeared that the German writer described himself as fighting French infantry and Alpine Chasseurs; and, secondly, if the officer who wrote this account of his actions and the actions of his superior and brother officers has been court-martialed for an affair which has become a matter of the widest international discussion, I have failed to see any announcement of it.)

This being the official doctrine of the United States and the practice of its officers in regard to hostages and retaliation (reprisal) it is to be expected that the doctrine of the German General Staff in regard to "the only true humanity" illustrated by the above-cited practices of some German officers should, when it met the American Government face to face, be repudiated by it. It did meet us face to face. It is more exact to say that it was fairly flung into our teeth by the deliberate application of it to our own citizens after our most solemn warnings not to apply it to our citizens.

The way that came about is as follows: On Feb. 4 Germany announced to the nations of the world that she intended to sink, without scruple for the lives of their crew and passengers, every enemy merchant ship which was found in the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland; and she further warned all neutral ships to steer clear of those waters, because it might be impossible to distinguish them from enemy ships. She said she was forced to do this as a retaliation for England's violations of international law upon the water, by abolishing the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, by seizing German property and German subjects of military age on neutral ships, and by declaring the waters of the North Sea to be the seat of war, thus rendering all navigation on the waters between Scotland and Norway exceedingly dangerous, "so that they have in a way established a blockade of neutral coasts and ports, which is contrary to the elementary principles of international law": measures "to reduce the German people by famine." We replied by warning the German Government in the most explicit terms not to destroy any merchant vessel of the United States and not to cause the death of American citizens.

On the 7th of May, under direct orders, deliberately given by the military authorities, a German submarine sank the Lusitania with over a thousand passengers on board, drowning a large number of men, women, and children, among them more than a hundred Americans. We immediately contended that this act was "unlawful, inhumane, and a violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity." We refused to accept the palliations put forward by Germany for the deed and we based our protest on very distinct grounds. We said we were "contending for something much greater than any rights of property or privileges of commerce. The Government of the United States is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity. * * * It is upon this principle of humanity as well as upon the law founded upon the principle that the United States must stand."

In taking our stand upon this principle of humanity the United States was also standing by two things: First, her own position, expressed originally more than fifty years ago in the following articles of the "Instructions to Armies in the Field":

> Article IV. It is incumbent upon those who administer martial law to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity—virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men.
>
> Article XXVIII. Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation (reprisal) removes the belligerents further and further from the mitigating rules of regular war and by rapid steps leads them nearer to the internecine wars of savages.

Second, the United States was standing upon a principle approved also by Germany, through her signature to The Hague Convention in 1907, and also by all the belligerents in this war through their signatures to that convention:

> The high contracting parties clearly do not intend that an unforeseen case should in the absence of a written undertaking be left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders.
>
> Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued the high contracting parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized people from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.

The question as to whether the sinking of the Lusitania was or was not a violation of the principle that "unjust or inconsiderate retaliation leads the belligerents by rapid steps nearer to the internecine wars of savages," (American "Instructions,") the question whether the sinking of the Lusitania was or was not "against the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience," is a question every man must decide for himself. The facts of the case are not in dispute.

But in doing his duty as a citizen by forming his own opinion as to whether the stand taken last July by the Government of the Republic on "the high and sacred rights of humanity" was right or wrong, it is proper for every American to take into account what lies behind the Lusitania case.

For it is evident that, in the Lusitania case, this nation was confronted, to reverse the famous saying of President Cleveland, "not with a situation alone, but with a theory"—a theory of the German military authorities which the writer has placed plainly before the reader in their own words and their own practices described by themselves.

That this is the theory of the German military authorities is unavoidably plain both from what they have said and what they have done. But the writer does not believe that this theory is the theory of the German people. In holding this opinion he takes into account certain things which ought to be assumed by any intelligent and sympathetic observer. It is just as true today as it was in the days of Lincoln that "you cannot swap horses when you are crossing a stream." The German people, fighting as they are with heroic courage for their Fatherland, are not in the mood to listen to any criticism of their military authorities who are commanding that tremendous struggle. They will naturally regard all such criticisms as deliberate and malignant slanders by their enemies based on perjured testimony or exaggerated facts. They do not scrutinize the reports of their military authorities nor the utterances of highly placed professors of international law who assure them that the sinking of the Lusitania was legal and humane.

But it is possible to get the judgment of a large portion of the German people upon this same theory and its application, not in time of war but in time of peace, when they were able to look at it, to understand it and to criticise it themselves, because it was not then part of their national defense in a great crisis, nor the object of the unlimited attacks of those whom they had good reason to regard as their very bitter enemies.

Precisely the same attitude which underlies the utterances and acts in time of war on the part of the German military authorities which this article has described in German words, underlies the famous Zabern incident which occurred shortly before the outbreak of the war. Both proceed from a certain abnormal caste consciousness, a certain exaltation of all military persons above all civil persons, a certain deification of armed forces as the incarnation of the greatest human qualities and the highest potential of patriotism, which makes the gains of war seem like the smile of God.

In December, 1913, there was great difficulty between the garrison of the Alsatian town of Zabern and the inhabitants. In the course of this difficulty a certain Lieutenant of the regiment in garrison wounded severely with his sabre a lame schoolmaster who had made to him what he considered an insulting remark. The Lieutenant and his two superior officers—for he claimed to have acted in the spirit of orders given to them in regard to their attitude toward the civil population—were court-martialed, but ultimately acquitted by the military authorities.

The affair created an extraordinary excitement in Germany. The leading papers, with few exceptions, condemned the action of the Government, which supported the military authority.

The Berliner Tageblatt reported on Dec. 4, 1913: "The Bavarian press of all party tendencies is full of indignation over the attitude of the Chancellor."

The Kölnische Zeitung of Dec. 4, said: "We come to the attitude of the Chancellor and we see with great regret that the military view has found support in him. * * * All Germany listened today to hear from Berlin, out of the mouth of the Government, a reassuring reply to the fundamental question whether there was in the State or the empire a power outside the realm of law which can break down the rights and liberties of citizens and can daringly assume to treat the laws which are the common foundations of our political joint life as if they had no existence for it."

The Vorwaerts said: "This decisive utterance of Colonel von Reuter (it would be a good thing if some civilian blood flowed in Alsace) is typical of his mediaeval ideas of justice. * * * In his opinion neither law nor order, but only military force, exists. The commands of a military autocrat outweigh in his esteem the dictates of conscience and law."

One of the well-known German comic journals published a cartoon representing a boy and his father looking at some toy soldiers with the background of a Christmas tree:

> Boy—Civil is the opposite of military, is it not, father?
>
> Father—Yes, my son, and civilization is the opposite of militarism.

But the action of the representative assembly of Germany was even more significant. When General von Falkenhayn, defending the army before the Reichstag, said "the incident had been maliciously exaggerated by a press given to agitation," "a great roar of dissent and indignation arose from the house. General von Falkenhayn stood as still as a statue for five minutes while the President tried to quiet the pandemonium by ringing the bell."

After his speech and that of von Bethmann Hollweg, the present Chancellor, the Reichstag passed 293 to 54, with forty-nine absent and one blank ballot, a vote of lack of confidence, which would have brought about the fall of a responsible Ministry.

This attitude of the German people at the close of 1913 in repudiating the spirit shown by her military authorities in the affair of Zabern causes the writer to cling to the pious hope that some day Germany will be able to see that her military authorities are using her armies now in the spirit of the Zabern affair, with all the terrible enlargements and exaggerations resulting from the change from a state of peace to a state of war. When Germany has rejected in war, as she did in peace, this theory and its resulting practice, which is in itself entirely alien to the true genius and character of the ancient German people, and has returned "to her old good sense and her old good humor," she will again take her place among the sisterhood of nations—a sisterhood all of whose members will be purified by terrible suffering borne with heroic self-sacrifice—and continue those great contributions she has made in the past to the spiritual treasures of mankind.

Awaiting that time, the American Republic owes it to herself, to the world, and to the German people to stand by her own principles and the principles of humanity, and to assert them without compromise against any attempt in the past or the future, on the part of the German military authorities, to apply to our citizens their principle that "excessive humanitarian notions should not limit the only true humanity, which very often lies in a ruthless application of certain severities indispensable to war." For this Republic to do anything else would be to eat her own words, stain her own honor, and turn her back on the "high and sacred principles of humanity" as whose champion she rode forward last July into the lists of the world.

The passage of the resolution proposed in Congress ordering Americans off belligerent ships would have been as shocking a repudiation of duty as can be found in any nation's history. As the President wrote to Senator Stone: "To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the violations of the rights of man everywhere. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesman, even among the turmoil of war, for the law and the right."

In these words the President drew the line on a vital question. Every citizen who understands the facts and approves of the principles here suggested, even though he may have been inclined in the past to criticise the action of the State Department in the Lusitania case as lacking in energy, ought to rally to that line against an opposition which appeals to the motley support of pseudo-Americans, of honestly mistaken pacifists, of a vast mass of people who can be misled about the situation or remain indifferent to it, only because they do not understand the facts in the case.

My England

By WILLIAM WINTER

My England! Not my native land,
But dear to me as if she were,—
How often have I longed to stand
With those brave hearts who fight for her!

Bereft by Fortune, worn with Age,
My life is all I have to give,
But freely would that life engage
For those who die that she may live.

Mother of Freedom! Pledged to Right!
From Honor's path she would not stray,
But, sternly faithful, used her might
To lead mankind the nobler way.

Her task was hard, her burden great,
But 'round the world her edict ran
That reared and ruled a Sovereign State,
Securely, on the Rights of Man.

No vandal foot should tread her land,
No despot hold her realm in awe;
The humblest peasant should command
The shelter of her righteous law.

In vain her lion port was braved!
Her pennant streamed o'er ev'ry sea,
And wheresoe'er her ensign waved
All fetters fell and Man was free.

Today be all her faults forgot,—
The errors of her nascent prime,
Or wily politician's plot,
Or blunder that was almost crime.

Today, when desperate tyrants strain,—
By Greed, and Fear, and Hate combined,—
To blast her power and rend her reign,
She fights the fight of all mankind:

She fights for us,—for this fair clime,
Our home belov'd, where freemen dwell,
Columbia, grandest born of Time,
That Teuton malice burns to quell.

My England! should the hope be crost
In which she taught the world to strive,
Then all of Virtue would be lost
And naught of Manhood left alive.

But 'tis not in the Book of Doom
That Justice, Honor, Truth, should fail,
That earth be made a living tomb,
And only brutal Wrong prevail.

It cannot be the human race,
Long struggling up to Freedom's sun,
Is destined to the abject place
Of vassal to the murd'rous Hun!

In ev'ry land that knows the ills
Of Bondage, and has borne its aches,
The deathless pulse of Freedom thrills
And Reason's noble rage awakes.

See splendid Italy advance,
And grimly issuing from his lair,
To grasp the hand of glorious France,
Stalk forth th' intrepid Russian bear!

My England!—patient, valiant, true!—
Nor foes without, nor frauds within
Will shake her purpose to subdue
The cohorts of embattled sin;

The swinish horde, the gilded beasts,
In whom no touch of ruth survives,
Who ravish women, murder priests,
And strew the sea with infant lives;

The Lords of War, who kill and maim,
Exultant, while their people groan,
Steeping themselves in crime and shame,
To keep a despot on his throne;—

That pigmy, to whose 'wildered brain
Himself an Attila appears,
Who takes the name of God in vain,
And drowns the earth in blood and tears!

My England, *strike!* Droop not, nor pause,
Till triumph on your banners shine!
Then take a grateful world's applause,—
Millions of hearts that beat like mine.

The Status of a Merchant Ship

Its Relation to War, and Its Right to Arm for Defense

WRITTEN FOR CURRENT HISTORY

By Charlemagne Tower

Former American Ambassador to Germany

THE conflict which is now absorbing the attention of the whole world has not only involved the physical strength and the energies of the great powers of Europe who are actually facing each other in the field, but the bitterness of hostility toward each other leads them into disagreements as to their conception of abstract right and wrong in human intercourse and the application of the principles of law, which, in times of peace, most people had believed to be substantially fixed and determined.

So, claims of legal right which had been long lost sight of or forgotten have been revived and are discussed at present with such acrimonious differences of opinion, as well as with great controversial ingenuity, that it is difficult at times for a neutral international lawyer to reach a conclusion which is just in principle and fair to everybody concerned.

CHARLEMAGNE TOWER

Changed conditions and new methods of warfare alter the circumstances of the cases that present themselves now. We have trouble in applying the accepted rules of the past, based upon conditions which formerly controlled human action, to a set of modern circumstances influenced or directly affected by the presence of elements that in former times did not exist. The warfare of aeroplanes and Zeppelin balloons and the use of asphyxiating gases raise many new questions on land; while the invention and wide employment of submarine boats have introduced entirely new problems at sea, and have renewed everywhere the discussion of older ones, as to the relations of merchant ships to the state of war—how they are affected by it and what part, if any, they may take in actual war, either as auxiliary cruisers or simply as armed merchantmen pursuing their usual course in the carrying trade of the countries to which they belong.

There are rules of international law, however, which govern these cases, and

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NOTE.—*Hon. Charlemagne Tower, who discusses the Armed Liner Question, has authority and wide experience to give his views weight. He is a native of Philadelphia and his record as diplomat and publicist has given him a commanding position in the intellectual circles of that city. He entered the Diplomatic Service in 1897, when he was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Austria-Hungary, where he remained two years; in 1899 he became Ambassador to Russia, and in 1902 was appointed Ambassador to Germany, where he remained until 1908. While in Germany, Mr. Tower was more than an official at Court; he had warm personal relations with the Kaiser, and is perhaps as familiar with the point of view of the Emperor as any one outside his official entourage.*

it is to them that we must turn if we seek to determine the rights and duties of vessels of all countries engaged in the carrying on of commerce and trade at the outbreak of war; and principally—for the purposes of the present discussion—as to the conversion of a merchant ship into a cruiser, the right of search, and the right of merchant ships to bear arms. The legal decisions upon these questions, running through a long series of years, and the agreements in regard to them, accepted by all the great maritime nations, render our understanding of the main principles tolerably clear.

The armed forces of a belligerent are, of course, his regular army and navy; that is to say, his combatants. It makes no difference in this discussion that certain persons with an army in the field are in effect noncombatants, such as doctors, nurses, chaplains, &c., who, under the regulations of The Hague, are to be treated as prisoners of war. We regard the enemy's force as his *combatant force*, whether it consists of his regular land and naval armed bodies or his militia, or such volunteer bodies as he may incorporate into his armed defense, under the rules of war as these were formulated at the Conferences at The Hague.

A merchant ship, therefore, if for any reason it ceases to be merely a commercial carrier and is armed for active hostilities during a war in which its country is engaged, must be incorporated into the regular armed force of that country and must in consequence be so recognized; and it is this which marks the very important distinction between the auxiliary cruiser of a belligerent and one of his merchantmen armed merely for defense. For, as the right of privateering by vessels carrying on hostilities under letters of marque was abandoned by the Declaration of Paris in 1856, it is not reasonable to admit at this advanced period of civilization that privateers will ever be sent out again, even by those nations which, like the United States, were not parties to, and are to that extent not legally bound by, that declaration.

But certain Governments have taken steps which have been generally accepted as legal by the writers on international law, for the formation of some sort of additional force to be made available in case of war, like the volunteer fleet of Russia, or for preparations against possible hostilities, like those of France in her arrangement with certain of her steamship companies, under which their boats must be constructed upon plans approved by the Government, must be commanded by officers of the French Navy, and be incorporated into the navy itself at the outbreak of war. So, also, Great Britain has had similar arrangements during the last thirty years with some of the great British ocean lines.

Such vessels, upon being transformed into auxiliary cruisers in accordance with the purposes for which they were constructed, are no longer to be looked upon as merchantmen, which they are not then, in fact—but they become at once a part of the armed force of the nation to which they belong, and are to be so treated by enemy ships. The subject has been deemed of such importance that it was presented to the powers for consideration at The Hague, and, in order that there might be no doubt as to the status of merchant ships of this class, a convention was adopted which prescribes the rules to be followed by the contracting powers who are parties to it.*

1. They must be placed under the direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the powers whose flag they fly.
2. They must bear the external marks which distinguish the warships of their nationality.
3. The commander must be in the service of the State and duly commissioned. His name must appear in the list of officers of the fighting fleet.
4. The crew must be subject to military discipline.
5. Such ships must observe the laws and customs of war.
6. A belligerent who converts a merchant ship into a warship must announce such conversion as soon as possible in the list of warships.

It is interesting to note in this connection that the parties to this convention of The Hague were unable to agree upon, and did not determine, the question as to where the conversion of a merchant ship in this manner should take place, whether

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*Convention relating to the conversion of merchant ships into warships. Hague Conference, 1907. VII.

RUSSIAN COMMANDER ENTERING ERZERUM

Grand Duke Nicholas Inspecting the Captured Fortress

The Grand Duke Leaving His Headquarters in Erzerum
(*Photographs by a Russian Officer*)

GENERAL KUROPATKIN
Veteran of the Russo-Japanese War, Again in Command of Russian Armies
(Photo by Press Illustrating Service)

upon the high seas, as had been the case with certain Russian ships which had come out through the Dardanelles, had passed the Suez Canal as merchant vessels, and afterward, having hoisted the Russian flag of war, began to visit and search neutral ships, in 1904, during the war between Russia and Japan; or whether the conversion must take place in some port. They declared formally, therefore, as part of the Convention VII., that, as the contracting powers had not been able to come to an agreement upon the question whether the conversion of a merchantship into a warship may take place upon the high seas, it is understood that the question of the place where such conversion is effected remains outside the scope of their agreement. So far, therefore, it is not settled.

The convention was signed and ratified by the belligerents of the present war, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, and Great Britain, who are in consequence bound by its provisions in so far as any question arising out of it may affect them. But we in America did not agree with them, nor did the United States either sign or adhere to the convention. Though we recognized our own responsibilities and we were no strangers to the subject in any sense, for armed cruisers were familiar to us in our civil war, and we had accepted in our claims against Great Britain, as the result of the activities of the Alabama, the obligation of the famous " Three Rules " of the Treaty of Washington of 1871. There was no fear that we should now overlook the duties which we ourselves had impressed upon the representatives of another power in the proceedings which took place before the Geneva Tribunal: To use due diligence to prevent the fitting out or equipping within our jurisdiction of any vessel which we have reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or carry on war against a power with which we are at peace; to prevent the departure for such purposes of any vessel having been adapted in whole or in part to warlike use within our jurisdiction; neither to permit either belligerent to make use of our ports or waters as the base of operations against the other; nor to fail in due diligence to prevent within our own jurisdiction any violation of those rules.

But Great Britain appears to have been solicitous upon this point and sensitive as to her national rights, even beyond what she might under the circumstances have felt it necessary to be in our case; for, almost upon the declaration of war, the Chargé d'Affaires of the British Embassy in Washington addressed to the Secretary of State of the United States, with some haste perhaps, a communication in which he said, after reciting the " Three Rules," that these rules may be said to have acquired the force of generally recognized rules of international law, and the first of them is reproduced almost textually in Article VIII. of The Hague Convention, Nov. 13, 1907, concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in case of Maritime Warfare, the principles of which have been agreed to by practically every maritime State. He declared that it was known, however, that Germany, with whom Great Britain was at war, favors the policy of converting her merchant vessels into armed ships on the high seas, and that it was probable, therefore, that attempts would be made to equip and dispatch merchantmen for such conversion from the ports of the United States.

" It is probable," he said, " that, even if the final completion of the measures to fit out merchantmen to act as cruisers may have to be effected on the high seas, most of the preliminary arrangements will have been made before the vessels leave port, so that the warlike purpose to which they are to be put after leaving neutral waters must be more or less manifest before their departure.

" In calling your attention to the above-mentioned ' Rules of the Treaty of Washington ' and The Hague Convention, I have the honor to state that his Majesty's Government will accordingly hold the United States responsible for any damages to British trade or shipping, or injury to British interests generally, which may be caused by such vessels having been equipped at, or departing from, United States ports."

To this official statement the Secretary of State replied on the 19th of August, 1914, with becoming dignity. After giving proper consideration to the meaning of the words, "due diligence," as they were interpreted both in the Geneva Award of 1872 and at the Second Hague Conference, he made the following declaration of American policy in the case before him:

"As your communication apparently lays great stress upon the expression 'due diligence,' contained in the Treaty of Washington, it is believed material to the present occasion to quote the following definition of it, contained in the Geneva Award of 1872:

> "The 'due diligence' referred to in the first and third of the said rules ought to be exercised by neutral Governments in exact proportion to the risks to which either of the belligerents may be exposed, from a failure to fulfill the obligations of neutrality on their part.

"The expression 'due diligence' was contained in the draft submitted by the British delegation to the Second Hague Conference, upon which Article VII. was based. Article VIII., as finally adopted, is as follows:

> "A neutral Government is bound to employ the means at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel within its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, against a power with which that Government is at peace. It is also bound to display the same vigilance to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, which had been adapted entirely or partly within the said jurisdiction for use in war.

"It seems obvious that by neither the terms nor the interpretation of the provisions of the treaties on this point is the United States bound to assume the attitude of an insurer. Consequently the United States disclaims as a correct statement of its responsibility the assertion in your note that: 'His Majesty's Government will accordingly hold the United States responsible for any damages to British trade or shipping, or injury to British interests generally, which may be caused by such vessels having been equipped at, or departing from, United States ports.'

"The United States has always looked upon the Three Rules of Washington as declaratory of international law, and as a necessary and natural consequence of the doctrine of neutrality, proclaimed and enforced by the United States since the wars of the French Revolution, to which Great Britain was a party. The Three Rules can, in the opinion of this Government, only be considered as a starting point of the doctrine of that degree of diligence which a neutral should observe in the sense that its recognition by Great Britain in an important international controversy called marked attention to an existing doctrine, and furnished an incentive to its incorporation and definition in The Hague Convention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Case of Maritime Warfare.

"The United States, since the earliest days of its existence, has been as solicitous of its neutral duties as of its neutral rights, and without further consideration of your communication at this time I request you to state to your Government that there is no reason to anticipate that the United States will be less mindful of its duties or its rights as a neutral in the present case than it has been in the past."

The status of a converted merchant ship is clearly enough defined, therefore, and settled. But with the merchantman armed in time of war merely for defense, there are difficulties not easy to overcome; because, even if all nations agreed in giving such a vessel the right to arm for defense, the introduction of submarine warfare appears to have made very uncertain what we are to call "defense," while the chief maritime belligerents in the present war disagree fundamentally with each other. Germany declares outright that merchant ships have no right under the rules of international law to arm themselves at all, but that in all cases an armed ship is a warship; and there is apparently no way at present to compose this difference of opinion, for the hostility between them in regard to this point is as bitter as that of the war itself.

The subject is further complicated by the right of visitation and search which no one denies as applicable in time of war. If a merchantman resists visitation and search he becomes a belligerent; if he is armed for the purpose he takes the part of a warship; as, indeed, he may do, for there is no law to prevent him from defending himself against the enemy's cruisers if he decides to do so and is able to do it. Though, of course, he is to be treated in that case as an armed ship of war.

It is at this point that the sharpest line of difference appears in the present contest, for, while the allied belligerents hold fast to their right of arming for defense against the enemy's attack, the British regard the mere approach of a submarine boat as "an attack"; while the German naval authorities declare that British merchant ships are armed for the express purpose of destroying enemy submarines.

We have, as an instance of this, two specific cases reported by the naval correspondent of The London Times, who writes (The Times, Feb. 10, 1916): "The P. & O. steamer Kashgar, when off Malta on her way to India, saw a submarine's periscope and fired at it, obliging the boat to dive. It reappeared on the opposite side of the liner, and was again fired at, if not hit, when the submarine dived and was seen no more. A French ship, the Plata, owned by the Transports Maritimes, sighted, on Jan. 27, a submarine half a mile away. Fire was opened from the stern of the steamer, and the hostile craft, believed to be struck in a vital part, soon dived and made off."

From the purely legal point of view the question presents itself as to whether this is the use of arms merely for defense; it illustrates as clearly as possible one of the new difficulties and contentions that have been introduced into naval warfare by the invention of the submarine boat. The approach of a submarine is undoubtedly a *menace;* is it in effect an "attack"?

Merchant ships have had authority from time immemorial in England and America to arm themselves for defense,* which in the old days of privateers and pirates was unquestionably not only a wise precaution but in fact a measure that every careful and prudent shipowner had the right to take, was bound to take, for the protection of his property. Chief Justice Marshall said in regard to it in 1815:†

"A belligerent has a perfect right to arm in his own defense. And a neutral has a perfect right to transport his goods in a belligerent vessel."

And we have a note of the Department of State, written in 1877, showing that the United States Government has always continued to support the right of a merchant ship to arm for defense.‡ Mr. Fish set forth the views of this Government as follows, in communicating with Mr. Morrill: "In answer to your request for an expression of opinion in regard to Mr. Ogden's question, whether a vessel which he is said to be fitting out for a trading voyage to the South Sea Islands can carry two guns and other arms for protection and defense against the natives, I am not aware of any treaty provision which would prevent a vessel trading amid the groups of islands of the South Sea from carrying a couple of guns and arms for the purpose of necessary protection of the vessel against violence on the part of lawless, partially civilized communities, or of the piratical crews which are represented occasionally to frequent those waters, providing always that the vessel carrying such guns and arms itself be on a lawful voyage and be engaged in none other than peaceful commerce, and that such guns and arms be intended, and be used, solely for the purpose of defense and of self-protection."

The American view of the subject, as indeed that of Great Britain also, has remained consistently the same—that merchant ships may arm themselves *for defense*, but for defense only—and the importance of it had almost slipped from men's minds in the course of the peaceful sailing of the seas during recent years, when it was presented anew with a demand for a restatement of the principles that govern it at the outbreak of the present war.

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*The London Times editorially quotes "Robinson Crusoe" on this point, Feb. 12, 1916.

†The Nereide, Cranch's Reports, Vol. IX.

‡Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. II., par. 326.

A memorandum from the British Embassy in Washington, dated Sept. 9, 1914, reached the Department of State, containing the statement that the German Government had openly entered upon the policy of arming merchant ships as commerce destroyers and that they claimed the right even to carry out the process of arming and equipping such merchant ships in neutral harbors or on the high seas. In consequence of which the British Admiralty had been compelled, in accordance with the practice followed in the great wars of history, to arm a certain number of British merchant ships for self-defense only. The statement declared further that the practice of arming ships in self-defense is very old and has been ordered by royal proclamation in England from early in the seventeenth century, calling attention also to the right of a merchant ship of a belligerent to carry arms and resist capture as clearly and definitely laid down in modern times, the right of resistance of merchant vessels being recognized by the United States Naval War Code, by the Italian Code for Mercantile Marine, and by the Russian Prize Regulations.

The British Ambassador added also in the course of his communication: "A merchant vessel armed purely for self-defense is therefore entitled under international law to enjoy the status of a peaceful trading ship in neutral ports, and his Majesty's Government do not ask for better treatment for British merchant ships in this respect than might be accorded to those of other powers. They consider that only those merchant ships which are intended for use as cruisers should be treated as ships of war and that the question whether a particular ship carrying armament is intended for offensive or defensive action must be decided by the simple criterion whether she is engaged in *ordinary commerce and embarking cargo and passengers in the ordinary way.* These facts being so, there is no rule in international law that would justify such vessel, even if armed, being treated otherwise than as a peaceful trader."

This is substantially the view of our own Government. It was called upon to decide whether a merchant ship arriving in our ports and bearing arms should be held as an armed ship in the legal sense and treated as a ship of war, or whether it should be allowed to sail again and proceed upon its ordinary errand as in time of peace. Mr. Lansing stated the rule of the United States unequivocally in the identical note which he addressed to the British, French, German, and Japanese Ambassadors, on Sept. 19, 1914. He declared in it, at the outset: "A merchant vessel of belligerent nationality may carry an armament and ammunition for the sole purpose of defense without acquiring the character of a ship of war."

In regard to the proof of the character of such a ship, the Secretary went further, and laid down in detail the regulations by which the ship's character and status are to be determined and under which she may come into and sail out of the territorial waters of the United States. These regulations have an importance of their own, especially at this juncture, and are worth setting out in full. They are as follows:

The presence of an armament and ammunition on board a merchant vessel creates a presumption that the armament is for offensive purposes, but the owners or agents may overcome this presumption by evidence showing that the vessel carries armament solely for defense.

Evidence necessary to establish the fact that the armament is solely for defense and will not be used offensively, whether the armament be mounted or stowed below, must be presented in each case independently at an official investigation. The result of the investigation must show conclusively that the armament is not intended for, and will not be used in, offensive operations.

Indications that the armament will not be used offensively are:

1. That the calibre of the guns carried does not exceed six inches.

2. That the guns and small arms carried are few in number.

3. That no guns are mounted on the forward part of the vessel.

4. That the quantity of ammunition carried is small.

5. That the vessel is manned by its usual crew, and the officers are the same as those on board before war was declared.

6. That the vessel intends to, and actually does, clear for a port lying in its usual trade route, or a port indicating its purpose to

continue in the same trade in which it was engaged when war was declared.

7. That the vessel takes on board fuel and supplies sufficient only to carry it to its port of destination, or the same quantity substantially which it has been accustomed to take for a voyage before war was declared.

8. That the cargo of the vessel consists of articles of commerce unsuited for the use of a ship of war in operation against an enemy.

9. That the vessel carries passengers who are, as a whole, unfitted to enter the military or naval service of the belligerent whose flag the vessel flies, or of any of its allies, and particularly if the passenger list includes women and children.

10. That the speed of the ship is slow.

Our point of view in this matter is definitely fixed, therefore, and we still maintain in America our traditional interpretation of the law of nations, in accord with the British Admiralty decisions in the same connection—that a merchant ship may arm itself for defense in the pursuit of its usual course of commercial navigation on the high seas.

But, in the conflict of opinion that exists at present between the belligerents in Europe, especially between Great Britain and Germany, which causes not only such widespread destruction of property at sea but carries with it frightful loss of human life, we have nothing left beyond the important rule that a merchantman can only defend himself; he must not attack even his enemy.

If we look to the most recent authorities in Great Britain we find this point insisted upon. Professor Oppenheim says, for instance, in his "Treatise on International Law," that: "Any merchantman of a belligerent attacking a public or private vessel of the enemy would be considered and treated as a pirate, and the members of its crew would be liable to be treated as war criminals." And while he adds that, if attacked by an enemy vessel, a merchantman is competent to deliver a counterattack and may pursue and even seize the enemy ship, he continues: "As a rule, attacks on merchantmen will be made by cannonade only, as the attacking vessel aims at seizing her on account of her value. But in case the attacked vessel not only takes to flight, but defends herself by a counterattack, all modes of attack are lawful against her, just as she herself is justified in applying all modes of attack by way of defense."*

If the parties concerned could agree in principle at least, the situation would be a sufficiently bad one in their attitude of today; but as it is, they differ more widely than ever before. The German Government replied to the memoranda of the Department of State in Washington on the 15th of October, 1914, that the equipment of British marchant vessels with artillery is for the purpose of making armed resistance to German cruisers. Resistance of this sort, it declares, is contrary to international law, because in a military sense a merchant vessel is not permitted to defend itself against a warship.

A year and a half of war have served but to enlarge the differences between these two nations and to increase, if possible, the hostile spirit with which each looks upon the actions of the other as the successive encounters take place on the high seas between their respective ships, under circumstances unprecedented until the arrival of the submarine boat in the present war, and, in fact, unforeseen and unprovided for by the precepts of international law in former times.

The German Government issued an official statement on the 10th of February, 1916, (published in the North German Gazette,) announcing that German naval officers have reported many cases where British merchant vessels have attacked German war vessels without waiting to be attacked by them, and even, upon several occasions, under the use of false colors. And it repeated the assertion heretofore made that the German naval authorities consider that any warlike activity on the part of enemy merchant vessels is contrary to international law.

The same statement made public a copy of the secret orders of the British Admiralty, captured with a British merchant ship, (the steamer Woodfield,) containing instructions that "it is not advisable to open fire at a greater distance than 800 yards, unless the enemy has opened fire previously," and that, "when a submarine is observed by day following a ship, and it appears that its intentions are hostile, the ship shall open fire for defense, even if the submarine has not committed any decisively hostile act, as, for instance, by firing a gun or a torpedo. Therefore, the mere appearance of a submarine in the wake of a merchant vessel is sufficient motive for an armed attack."

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*Oppenheim, Int. Law: London, 1912. Vol. II. Sections 85, 181, 254.

On the other hand, and in reply, the German Government, taking this declaration as a challenge, concluded its statement by announcing that "in view of the foregoing, enemy merchantmen carrying guns are not entitled to be regarded as peaceful merchantmen. The German naval forces will, in the interest of neutrals, receive orders to treat such vessels as belligerents."

And Great Britain has in the meantime left no cause for doubt or uncertainty as to its intentions in this regard; for the Admiralty has now made public its orders to armed merchantmen, in an official statement issued within the last few weeks, (March 2, 1916,) in which it is specifically declared that, as experience has shown that hostile submarines and aircraft have frequently attacked merchant vessels without warning, "it is important that craft of this description should not be allowed to approach to short range, at which a torpedo or bomb launched without notice would almost certainly be effective. British and allied submarines and aircraft have orders not to approach merchant vessels. Consequently, it may be presumed that any submarine or aircraft which deliberately approaches or pursues a merchant vessel does so with hostile intention. In such cases fire may be opened in self-defense in order to prevent the hostile craft from closing to a range at which resistance to a sudden attack with bomb or torpedo would be impossible." That is the situation as we find it today.

It would be idle to speculate as to what the outcome will be, or to pass one's time in making efforts to fit the length and breadth of international law into dimensions that are completely out of our measurement. International law is law, in any event, only so far as its precepts are recognized and accepted by the powers which acknowledge its mandate and submit to its authority; and a great deal will have to be done, after the close of this war, in order to bring the nations of the world together again in accord upon new principles of agreement that must be enacted and adopted then. The whole question of submarine warfare will have most likely to be adjusted, as no doubt it will be, upon the evident necessities of the case and in view of the experience of the present time. But we can hardly expect it to be possible to reach such a determination now in the heat of the conflict which it foments and sustains.

The approach of an enemy's armed craft near enough to be effective is now determined to be an "attack," and it is to be feared that neither side will study very carefully to ascertain and apply the old rules of international law about defense and attack in the intense moment that marks the sudden coming together of an armed merchantman and a submarine boat. Our rules have apparently broken down, and with them has gone the sense of security that we may have had heretofore in regard to the merchant ships of a belligerent armed for defense on the high seas.



The Attitude of the American Government Toward the Belligerents

[Written for Current History]

By Edmund von Mach, Ph. D.

THE European policy of President Wilson's Administration seems to have been this: " The interests of the United States of America demand that we do not enter the war, and the sympathies of our people, as read by President Wilson, demand that we give help to the Allies to the limit of a liberal interpretation of the law, which beyond that we are bound to uphold."

Every diplomatic action taken by the President during the European war squares with this and with no other hypothesis, except that advanced by his enemies, who claim that he has had no policy at all. That his enemies are wrong is proved by even a slight acquaintance with the President.

Mr. Wilson's motives have little to do with the discussion of his policy, and may be assumed to have been as sincere and patriotic as those of his opponents. Nor should it be forgotten that President Wilson has had a more difficult position to fill than any President, not excluding Washington and Lincoln.

If the above is a fair statement of Mr. Wilson's policy, it must be acknowledged that this policy is based on principles of statecraft similar to those which all the great nations of the world have followed in the past; for they have almost invariably shaped their courses by self-interest and personal sympathy. Few of them, however, have had the same freedom of action in following these principles as the United States has had, because it has never before been a question of maintaining terms of amity with the only remaining first-class neutral power. Generally speaking, however, President Wilson's policy has fallen no whit below the moral standard set by the European nations.

Mr. Wilson's policy has, on the other hand, not risen above this standard. All the nobler principles to which the American people had prided themselves to have risen during the past generations, and to which American statesmen, preachers, teachers, and writers had given voice, and which had in part been accepted in international legislative halls, have been swept aside.

High-sounding phrases, such as humanity, the rights of neutrals, the freedom of the seas, and justice, have not deceived the American people, who have interpreted every act of the Wilson Administration as dictated by the two principles—self-interest and personal sympathy. Instead of uniting the American people on a platform of progress and "America for mankind," the President has divided the American people, and completely satisfied neither the sympathizers of the Allies nor those of the Central Powers.

The " law " which Mr. Wilson declares himself eager to uphold is no law at all in the proper sense of the word, for it has to do with nothing but the variously interpreted principles that in the past have guided the intercourse of nations.

The President forgets that what was deemed just centuries ago may today, under altered conditions, no longer serve the cause of justice. It is ridiculous to have our ancestors of five, ten, or more generations ago prescribe for us what is just, when we have long discarded their advice in most other realms, especially in those of religion and medicine.

To guard against the arbitrary interpretation of what constitutes " just principles," and to make allowances for the growing sense of justice, the various nations of the world used to make treaties, the one with the others, to define these principles. At last, in 1856, they gathered at a congress in Paris and adopted the so-called Declaration of Paris, in which neutral property except contraband was declared sacrosanct, and the rights of neutral commerce in times of war were guaranteed. The Conventions of the First and Second Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907 marked another step in advance, and the Declaration of London of 1909 codified international law in so far as it had to do with naval warfare, and represented the principles of international relationship which the peoples of the twentieth century deemed just. When the war began President Wilson asked both belligerents whether they would abide by the Declaration of London. Both had signed it, but neither had ratified it. Germany declared her willingness to abide by the Declaration of London if England did. England declined.

Before the war Sir Edward Grey had declared in Parliament that he considered Great Britain bound by the Declaration because the duly accredited plenipotentiaries of the Government had signed it. His opponents thereupon demanded that not only the Declaration of London, but also that of Paris, be "openly denounced and repudiated; for until it (the Declaration of Paris) is repudiated it must be held as binding. Its falsity and the want of previous authority and subsequent sanction are not sufficient to be simply disregarded in time of war. They are more than sufficient to invite its denunciation and repudiation in time of peace." (T. Gibson Bowles, M. P., The Declaration of Paris, p. 210.)

Neither the Declaration of Paris nor the Declaration of London was "openly denounced and repudiated" by Great Britain in time of peace. On the contrary, the Government in Parliament declared itself bound by them. When the war began, however, Great Britain "simply disregarded them," and President Wilson granted her the moral right to do so, although her own statesmen had said this could not be done honorably.

The Hague Conventions were likewise permitted to be swept aside on technicalities, which brought "international law" back to what it was before the Declaration of Paris in 1856. President Wilson might have said: "By the common consent of nations certain principles of international relationship have been accepted as comporting to the advanced conception among them of what is just. The United States in its dealings with the belligerents will follow these principles, for the American people stand for justice and progress." Instead he said: "If Great Britain refuses to accept these principles, we cannot force her, and if she desires to revert to a lower standard, which she believes is more advantageous for her, we shall do the same."

Without consulting Congress, without taking broad advice, guided by the principles of national self-interest and sympathy, as he saw them, President Wilson turned back the hands of time, swept aside the advance made since 1856, and committed America, the land of freedom and progress, to a standard which more than fifty years ago had appeared antiquated, unjust, illiberal, and uncertain.

In 1856, before the Declaration of Paris, two incompatible doctrines had fought for recognition in "international law." One, the "American idea," as it was subsequently called in The Hague Conferences, claimed that in case of war the rights of neutrals are paramount. The other, the European, or since it had been gradually forced on the nations by the strongest, Great Britain, the "British idea," claimed that in war the necessities of the belligerents take precedence over all other "rights."

According to temperament and training, the legal writers of the several countries had taken now this, now that, point of view. The result was dangerous confusion, which was chiefly instrumental in inducing the great nations to draw up the Declaration of Paris. For, they said, "maritime law, in time of war, has long been the subject of deplorable disputes," and "the uncertainty of the law and of the duties in such a matter gives rise to differences of opinion between neutrals and belligerents which may occasion serious difficulties, and even conflicts."

It is this maritime law, so uncertain of interpretation that it was acknowledged to be apt to lead to "deplorable disputes," which President Wilson has been willing to accept as his guide. When one reads his references to the "well established principles of international law" or similar phrases, showing that he believes in the existence of a definite law subject to only one interpretation, one cannot help but doubt the sincerity of his legal advisers, for no man in his position would deliberately utter such falsehoods.

The same is true of the President's decision concerning the exportation of munitions of war. He claims that the exportation is permitted by international law and that an embargo would be an unneutral act, nor does he admit the possibility of a contrary interpretation of "international law."

One of the chief arguments, however, which the British opponents of the Declaration of London advanced was this—that it permitted the exportation of munitions of war from neutral countries. Their leader, T. Gibson Bowles, M. P., in his book, "Sea Law and Sea Power," says:

> Great Britain has always denied that neutrals have or could have any right to supply either one or both belligerents that assistance in war which is provided by furnishing either with such means of resistance or offense as are called "contraband." She has always declared the law of nations to be—as, in fact, it is—that for a friend of both belligerents to place in the hands of one of them arms against the other is an abandonment of the neutrality which forbids such an assistance to either.

And to make his point still clearer he asks whether the advocates of the principles that neutrals may export arms "would apply to individuals the same principle as to nations—whether, seeing two men locked in a deadly struggle, they would sympathetically consider and actively support a friend of both who should furtively hand a knife to one of them."

How is it possible for President Wilson, in the face of such statements by British authorities, to claim that his reading of international law as permitting the exportation of arms is the only correct one, unless again his legal advisers have kept from him the knowledge of all interpretations contrary to his own?

All these errors the President would have avoided if he had left to Congress the shaping of the principles which our foreign policy should follow. He is charged with conducting the diplomatic negotiations with foreign countries. But since Congress alone has the right to declare war, Congress alone should determine the policies which should guide our relations with foreign countries.

In the circle of his friends in Washington Mr. Wilson is spoken of as the ruler of America, and in his Manhattan Club speech in New York he actually claimed for himself and his Government the allegiance of all true Americans, forgetful of the fact that the Americans are a sovereign people owing allegiance to no man. They are free citizens and subjects of no one, their only allegiance being to the Constitution and the principles on which the nation was founded—humanity, freedom, justice, and good-will toward all.

Poorly instructed by his legal advisers, unwilling to consult Congress, and erroneously deeming himself the ruler of America, President Wilson has not even been able to follow with invariable honor the policy of national self-interest and sympathy on which he himself determined as his guide in his dealings with the European belligerents.

Much as this is to be regretted, the fact that he determined on this policy at all is the tragedy of the time. Possibly those are right who believe that the victory of the Allies means the triumph of freedom. Possibly the others are right who, like Jefferson, consider "the Government of England as totally without morality, insolent beyond bearing, inflated with vanity and ambition, aiming at the exclusive domination of the seas, lost in corruption and deep-rooted hatred toward us, hostile to liberty, wherever it endeavors to show its head, and the eternal disturber of the peace of the world." And according to their views the ones or the others may have desired, or still wish, that the material weight of the United States bring victory to one side or the other, and may have been satisfied, or still be satisfied, with any policy calculated to do this.

The time of passion, however, will

pass, and then a sense of mortification will possess all true Americans. In the past, in every crisis of history, the United States of America has stood for the highest ideals in morality and justice. It was left for President Wilson, with the tacit consent of Congress and the thoughtless approval of partisans, to disregard these highest ideals and willingly to descend to the lower and uncertain standards of generations ago. Instead of having regard for the advance of mankind, into which service America had been dedicated for well-nigh a century and a half, President Wilson has had regard for the special interests of the country as he saw them and for what he believed were the sympathies of the majority of the people.

The result has been material prosperity and the desire to fall in step with the nations of Europe and to emulate their ideals. The one precious thing which used to distinguish the United States of America from all other nations and which attracted people from everywhere has been lost, or at least been temporarily overshadowed. Good-will toward all peoples has been succeeded by suspicion of and ill-will toward most of them. The conviction that the moral force of right must triumph in the world has given way to the belief that the country must arm to fight other nations.

Nations are like individuals, and no man can shape his course and excuse his actions by lower standards than those he knows are highest without slipping from the level his previous efforts had enabled him to attain.

The American Nation, with its face set toward the sun of progress, had proudly advanced since the days of Washington. When the storms of passion broke and a prophet was needed to remind the people of their destiny, President Wilson turned back for them the hands of time, and for the potage of national self-interest and personal sympathy sold their birthright of good-will toward all.

Predicts the Triumph of Militarism

General von Reichenau of the German Army believes that the war will impose the yoke of militarism on every nation—that the very wealth which renders vast armaments possible also creates the necessity for them. In a recent address he said:

We may therefore look forward to an increase of armaments such as has never been seen before. Already in the course of the war every one of the warring parties has increased its armaments to the utmost, permanently, it may be assumed, and not alone for a gradual increase of military strength during the war. In any event, the lessons of this war are too drastic and terribly earnest ever to be forgotten, and not to make the wish imperative that they should be justified in the future. Therefore, everything that can add to our military strength has the highest possible value in the national sense. And for that reason will the system of militarism that is best suited to national defense stride triumphantly over the civilized lands of the earth in fulfillment of its world mission. * * * The nation that allows itself to be guided by the strong hand of a military organization that is equal to its needs chooses the right path, and woe to it if it throws away this staff.

America Up Against the Wall

By Gabriel Hanotaux

Member of the French Academy and Former Prime Minister

At the time of President Wilson's recent victory in Congress on the armed liner issue, M. Hanotaux wrote for the Paris Figaro the noteworthy article herewith translated. It shows the deep interest with which every move of the United States is watched abroad, and is an illuminating example of how our situation is regarded by French publicists.

IN the cataclysm which German ambition has let loose upon the earth the nations most exposed to danger are not those which are fighting. They at least are going forth to the struggle; they are giving the enemy of the human race terrible blows, which sometimes make him measure his length on the ground. Even as conqueror, he would respect them; vanquished, he will submit to their law.

No, those who run the greatest risk, whichever way destiny may decide the struggle, are the countries which think themselves safe, and which desire to enjoy in peace the misfortunes of others; and in the first rank of these are the American republics. They are enriching themselves, it is said, upon the universal ruin. In appearance, yes; but they are impoverishing themselves in reality. They may add up their great dividends —the final total will be liquidation. For nations, like individuals, must set down in the first line of their ledgers the honor and respect which they inspire in others.

All the leaders of North American opinion now understand this. A well-turned phrase of one of them sums up the whole crisis: "It's a matter of finding out whether the capital of the United States is Washington or Berlin." President Wilson, seizing with authority upon the opening just presented, has lunged at the German-American party and forced it to answer this clearly posed question: "Can an American citizen go to Europe in safety, or can he not? If a steamer has on board a few guns for defense, is this sufficient to rob the American flag of its protective power?"

President Wilson is still clearer. He adds: "Are we to be governed henceforth by German money, by an industrious use of foreign capital?" For here is the double peril which the energetic action of the President has unveiled: Inside the country, if the victory should be gained by the party whose aggressions the President, supported by both Republicans and Democrats, is resolved to check, the United States would no longer be anything but a German colony; it would have surrendered without fighting.

There are then, henceforth, two parties in North America—a party of subservience to Germany and a party of American independence. President Wilson, though a Democrat, is frankly with the old Americans, as is Roosevelt, the protagonist of the Republican Party. Inside its borders, at least, America will know how to guard jealously her independence and her liberty.

But mark how, outside, another peril, no less grave, approaches and grows. America is just coming to understand that if the split in public sentiment were to grow, the resulting weakness would condemn the nation almost infallibly to war—to that war which the pacifists are doing everything to avoid.

For this becomes more and more evident: North America is regarded by Germany as an enemy. The fact is a natural consequence of the international situation. All that is needed to unchain the murderous anger of imperialism is that the conduct of the American Government should be worthy and just. Imperialism will no longer tolerate obstacles of any kind in the universe.

Travelers returning from Germany agree in stating that Americans in that country are no less under suspicion than Englishmen. Our committees know that

American citizens connected with charitable bodies have been driven incontinently out of Serbia and Montenegro, because it was not desired that any impartial or pitying eye should be present at the systematic and methodical strangulation of a race. Let us not speak of the attempts against American industries, against notable persons such as Mr. Morgan, against travelers sailing on Entente or neutral steamships. Everywhere this underhand hostility shows itself.

And what would happen if the rampart of Entente armies and fleets did not protect the great republic beyond the sea? The Germans boast of having built submarines capable of crossing "the great width of the ocean" over and back, without landing. Is this for the purpose of molesting navigation in European waters, in the Channel, or in the Mediterranean? Certainly not; it has to do with quite a different enterprise. Its object is to make the United States tremble and to humble American pride, while American competition can still be carried on against the nations which are fighting for universal freedom. President Wilson seems to have let it be understood that the only way to bring about an early peace was to throw the weight of America's will into the balance. This is what the German Government is trying by every means to hinder. It has not forgotten the decisive intervention of President Roosevelt in the Russo-Japanese conflict.

Yes, America can do much, but she can do it only in her own spirit, the spirit of liberty. Can we imagine her becoming an instrument of militarist tyranny? The conclusion presses, and the decision must be made; President Wilson has caught the wind, he knows henceforth whither he is sailing. But it may be added, too, that this first gesture still engrosses him.

Since the beginning of the war I have insisted upon the fact of "impossible neutralities." Events are unrolling in such a way that they carry with them like an avalanche all that seeks to escape them. Germany has put America up against the wall, has forced her to declare herself: whosoever is not with me is against me. We are in the epoch of threats, of the refrain, "Look out for our submarines!" If America does not submit, the other consequences will follow. The die is cast! Germany, gasping under the attacks of the Allies, dares to use intimidation. Victorious, she will hurl herself upon the only remaining power still standing in her way. No sooner shall the waves of the ocean be under her control than a formidable armada will set sail for the defenseless coasts of the Western Continent.

Does American opinion still have any doubts as to this inevitable continuation of the world war? Will America voluntarily close her eyes again after having opened them? Does she, or does she not, admit a fact that is as clear as the light of day, namely, that she cannot henceforth reconcile her own principle of liberty with the principle of German imperialism? Will she not dare to take one more step and declare that, since Germany is daily showing herself to be an enemy, it is necessary to treat her as such and to act when the time comes?

Only the victory of the Allies can assure to America the security to which all free peoples aspire. President Wilson certainly understands this. It remains to be seen whether he will face the consequences, be they what they may, of the decision which he has made in his own mind. The Senate approves and encourages him. Public opinion follows and sustains him. It belongs to him now to conjure away the double peril which threatens the United States from without and from within. He has himself said: "Our interests are now confused with our honor."

A Crisis in History

By Guglielmo Ferrero

Noted Italian Historian

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY by arrangement with Le Figaro, Paris.]

If one compares the European war with the wars that preceded it, it seems an incomprehensible drama, and almost absurd in its immensity. Its origins and its development fail to correspond in any vital respect with the idea which men had formulated regarding an armed conflict among the great States of Europe.

How this gigantic war could break out is in itself an obscure and disturbing enigma. It is evident that the nation which took the initiative in this fabulous adventure was the one that had the greatest interest in conserving the peace of the world. Why then did it wish to gamble its whole fortune on one hazardous turn of the dice? For eighteen months the world has stood perplexed before this question, asking whether we must not believe in some access of collective madness, which has seized upon a whole people—a singular ending of a century's successful labors to make reason the sovereign power in history!

The development of the war has brought no fewer surprises than its origin. The most serious and expert forecasts have been brutally contradicted by facts. Men expected a violent war, but short; it was said that the resources of Europe would be used up swiftly, that industrial countries could not hold out more than three months; prophets foretold all sorts of political difficulties. * * *

In the last eighteen months the belligerent States have already gained and lost more battles than would have been needed in other days to conclude ten peace treaties; and yet the war keeps on, burning and terrible. One might say that victories and defeats no longer have the effect on the spirits of the belligerents that they had in preceding wars. The economic resistance shown has been no less astonishing than the moral resistance. One might be tempted to conclude that the state of things which seemed most abnormal to us two years ago has become almost normal in eighteen months.

But the most singular surprise of the war is the change it wrought, within the space of a few weeks, in the ideas and sentiments of nations and individuals. If the war has not yet revolutionized the map of Europe, it has completely changed Europe's state of soul. Each one of us has only to recall how he looked upon his native land, upon Europe, upon the world, life and its duties in the first half of 1914, and to compare what he thought then with what he thinks now. What a difference! And how distant seem the times that preceded the war! There is no person even slightly accustomed to reflection who has not had the feeling of having lived the first part of his life in illusion and error regarding a great many questions of capital importance, and of having been awakened brusquely to the truth by a violent shock.

How explain all these singular phenomena? Have the mysterious laws which govern the world of ideas and passions suddenly changed in Europe, overthrowing strategy and politics, manners and human made? It is hardly probable. There is a simpler way to explain all these surprises: it is to realize that the European war is not only a war in the exact sense of the word, that is to say, a simple armed conflict of several States determined by a clash of well defined political or economic interests. The European war is indeed an armed conflict of States, and, unfortunately, the bloodiest that the world has ever known. But it is, besides, something greater, more profound, and more complex: one of those grand crises in history which from time to time devastate a part of the world and modify the march of civilization; one of those crises which cut with one violent blow the Gordian knot of difficulties that have been accumulating little by little for generations, and that have become otherwise insoluble by their complexity.

The crisis has for the moment taken the form of the most immense and bloody of all wars, but its causes are much deeper and more complex, just as its consequences will be much greater and more unexpected than those of preceding wars.

These reflections may appear a little theoretical in the present circumstances, but they are less so than they seem. This crisis exacts from everybody a great spirit of sacrifice and a great patience. Anything that serves to sustain the moral force of nations, therefore, is not without its value. Now, a certain number of spirits at least can draw from reflections of this kind new energy, perseverance, serenity, and these are necessary in the terrible epoch in which we live. The European war no doubt is very long if one compares it with the great wars of the nineteenth century; but who can repine over its length or over the cruel sacrifices it imposes if he thinks of it as a great crisis of history, produced, like all great crises, by the intellectual and moral imperfections of an epoch; if he sees that Europe is expiating at this moment the errors and faults of a whole age; that we are struggling and suffering not only to re-establish peace among the great nations, but also to solve a certain number of essential problems upon which depends the destiny of our civilization?

Likewise, the future surprises of the war will find those persons better prepared who shall have comprehended the true grandeur of the events we are witnessing. The European war has been from its beginning an uninterrupted series of surprises—sometimes agreeable, sometimes disagreeable—for all the belligerents. It is very probable that the series is not ended, and that peace alone will be the last—and most agreeable—of the surprises which this crisis has in store for us. If this war has been so different from its predecessors in its development, it may resemble them quite as little in its ending. It is already evident that the word "peace," when it shall be pronounced, will have a more august significance than in the past. In wars which are simple conflicts of two or several nations for definite interests, peace signifies chiefly the end of hostilities and the solution, provisional or final, of one or several given questions. In the present case it must signify also the possibility and the commencement of an enormous labor of reorganization and reconstruction.

The Europe in which we were born has in great part crumbled away since Aug. 1, 1914. Treaties of alliance, commercial treaties, political and legal principles, the organization of industry and banking, historical traditions, social conventions, relations between States, peoples, classes—everything has been upheaved, suspended, overturned, destroyed. Peace will bring formidable problems, whose solution will relate partly to the upheavals of the war, partly to the profound causes which let loose the cataclysm. We must study these profound causes, therefore, if we wish to be prepared to cope with the tasks which the future holds in store for us.



Is Morality Disappearing in War?

By Havelock Ellis

THERE are some idealistic persons who believe that morality and war are incompatible. War is bestial, they hold, war is devilish; in its presence it is absurd, almost farcical, to talk about morality. That would be so if morality meant the code, forever unattained, of the Sermon on the Mount. But there is not only the morality of Jesus, there is the morality of Mumbo Jumbo. In other words, and limiting ourselves to the narrower range of the civilized world, there is the morality of Machiavelli and Bismarck, and the morality of St. Francis and Tolstoy.

The fact is, as we so often forget, and sometimes we do not even know, morality is fundamentally custom, the mores, as it has been called, of a people. It is a body of conduct which is in constant motion, with an exalted advance guard which few can keep up with, and a debased rear guard, once called the black-guard, a name that has since acquired an appropriate significance. But in the substantial and central sense morality means the conduct of the main body of the community. Thus understood, it is clear that in our time war still comes into contact with morality. The pioneers may be ahead; the main body is in the thick of it.

That there really is a morality of war, and that the majority of civilized people have more or less in common a certain conventional code concerning the things which may or may not be done in war, has been very clearly seen during the present conflict. This moral code is often said to be based on international regulations and understandings. It certainly on the whole coincides with them. But it is the popular moral code which is fundamental, and international law is merely an attempt to enforce that morality.

The use of expanding bullets and poison gases, the poisoning of wells, the abuse of the Red Cross and the white flag, the destruction of churches and works of art, the infliction of cruel penalties on civilians who have not taken up arms—all such methods of warfare as these shock popular morality. They are on each side usually attributed to the enemy; they are seldom avowed, and only adopted in imitation of the enemy, with hesitation and some offense to the popular conscience, as we see in the case of poison gas, which was only used by the English after long delay and which the French still deny using. The general feeling about such methods, even when involving scientific skill, is that they are "barbarous."

As a matter of fact this charge of "barbarism" against those methods of warfare which shock our moral sense must not be taken too literally. The methods of real barbarians in war are not especially "barbarous." They have sometimes committed acts of cruelty which are revolting to us today, but for the most part the excesses of barbarous warfare have been looting and burning, together with more or less raping of women, and these excesses have been so frequent within the last century, and are still today, that they may as well be called "civilized" as "barbarous."

The sack of Rome by the Goths at the beginning of the fifth century made an immense impression on the ancient world as an unparalleled outrage. St. Augustine in his "City of God," written shortly afterward, eloquently described the horrors of that time. Yet today, in the new light of our own knowledge of what war may involve, the ways of the ancient Goths seem very innocent. We are expressly told that they spared the sacred Christian places, and the chief offenses brought against them seem to be looting and burning; yet the treasure they left untouched was vast and incalculable, and we should be thankful indeed if any belligerent in the war of today inflicted as little injury on a conquered city as the Goths did on Rome.

The vague rhetoric which this invasion inspired scarcely seems to be supported by definitely recorded facts, and there can be very little doubt that the devastation wrought in many old wars exists chiefly in the writings of rhetorical chroniclers whose imaginations were excited, as we may so often see among the journalists of today, by the rumor of atrocities which have never been committed. This is not to say that no devastation and cruelty have been perpetrated in ancient wars. It seems to be generally agreed that in the famous Thirty Years' War, which the Germans fought against each other, atrocities were the order of the day. We are constantly being told, in respect of some episode or other of the war of today, that "nothing like it has been seen since the Thirty Years' War." But the writers who make this statement, with an offhand air of familiar scholarship, never by any chance bring forward the evidence for this greater atrociousness of the Thirty Years' War, and while it is not possible for any one who has never studied that war to speak positively, one is inclined to suspect that this oft-repeated allusion to the Thirty Years' War as the acme of military atrocity is merely a rhetorical flourish.

In any case we know that not so many years after the Thirty Years' War Frederick the Great, who combined supreme military gifts with freedom from scruple in policy, and was at the same time a great representative German, declared that the ordinary citizen ought never to be aware that his country is at war. Nothing could show more clearly the military ideal, however imperfectly it may sometimes have been attained, of the old European world. Atrocities, whether regarded as permissible or as inevitable, certainly occurred. But for the most part wars were the concern of the privileged upper class; they were rendered necessary by the dynastic quarrels of monarchs and were carried out by a professional class with aristocratic traditions and a more or less scrupulous regard to ancient military etiquette.

There are many stories of the sufferings of the soldiery in old times, in the midst of abundance, on account of military respect for civilian property. The legend, if legend it is, of the French officer who politely requested the English officer opposite him to "fire first" shows how something of the ancient spirit of chivalry was still regarded as the accompaniment of warfare. It was an occupation which only incidentally concerned the ordinary citizen. The English, especially, protected by the sea and always living in open undefended cities, have usually been able to preserve this indifference to the Continental wars in which their Kings have constantly been engaged, and, as we see, even in the most unprotected European countries and the most profoundly warlike, the great Frederick set forth precisely the same ideal of war.

The fact seems to be that while war is nowadays less chronic than of old, less prolonged, and less easily provoked, it is a serious fallacy to suppose that it is also less barbarous. We imagine that it must be so simply because we believe, on more or less plausible grounds, that our life generally is growing less barbarous and more civilized. But war by its very nature always means a relapse from civilization into barbarism, if not savagery. We may sympathize with the endeavor of the European soldiers of old to civilize warfare, and we may admire the remarkable extent to which they succeeded in doing so. But we cannot help feeling that their romantic and chivalrous notions of warfare were absurdly incongruous.

The world in general might have been content with that incongruity. But Germany, or more precisely Prussia, with its ancient genius for warfare, has in the present war taken the decisive step in initiating the abolition of that incongruity by placing warfare definitely on the basis of scientific barbarism. To do this is, in a sense, we must remember, not a step backward, but a step forward. It involved the recognition of the fact that war is not a game to be played for its own sake by a professional caste, in accordance with fixed rules which it

BARON VON DER GOLTZ
Field Marshal of the German Armies in Turkey

DR. THEOBALD VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG
Imperial German Chancellor, Who Stated Germany's Peace Conditions in a Recent Speech in the Reichstag

would be dishonorable to break, but a method, carried out by the whole organized manhood of the nation, of effectively attaining an end desired by the State.

If by the chivalrous method of old, which was indeed in large part still their own method in the previous Franco-German war, the Germans had resisted the temptation to violate the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium in order to rush behind the French defenses, and had battered instead at the gap of Belfort, they would have won the sympathy of the world, but they certainly would not have won the possession of the greater part of Belgium and a third part of France.

It has not alone been military instinct which has impelled Germany on the new course thus inaugurated. We see here the final outcome of a reaction against ancient Teutonic sentimentality which the insight of Goldwin Smith clearly discerned forty years ago. Humane sentiments and civilized traditions, under the molding hand of Prussian leaders of Kultur, have been slowly but firmly subordinated to a political realism which, in the military sphere, means a masterly efficiency in the aim of crushing the foe by overwhelming force combined with panic-striking "frightfulness." In this conception that only is moral which served these ends. The horror which this "frightfulness" may be expected to arouse, even among neutral nations, is, from the German point of view, a tribute of homage.

The military reputation of Germany is so great in the world, and likely to remain so, whatever the issue of the present war, that we are here faced by a grave critical issue which concerns the future of the whole world. The conduct of wars has been transformed before our very eyes. In any future war the example of Germany will be held to consecrate the new methods, and the belligerents who are not inclined to accept the supreme authority of Germany may yet be forced in their own interests to act in accordance with it.

The mitigating influence of religion over warfare has long ceased to be exercised, for the international Catholic Church no longer possesses the power to exert such influence, while the national Protestant churches are just as bellicose as their flocks. Now we see the influence of morality over warfare similarly tending to disappear. Henceforth, it seems, we have to reckon with a conception of war which accounts it a function of the supreme State, standing above morality and therefore able to wage war independently of morality. Necessity—the necessity of scientific effectiveness—becomes the sole criterion of right and wrong.

When we look back from the standpoint of knowledge which we have reached in the present war to the notions which prevailed in the past they seem to us hollow and even childish. Seventy years ago Buckle in his "History of Civilization" stated complacently that only ignorant and unintellectual nations any longer cherished ideals of war. His statement was part of the truth. It is true, for instance, that France is now the most anti-military of nations, though once the most military of all. But, we see, it is only part of the truth. The very fact, which Buckle himself pointed out, that efficiency has in modern times taken the place of morality in the conduct of affairs, offers a new foundation for war when war is urged on scientific principles for the purpose of rendering effective the claims of States policy. Today we see that it is not sufficient for a nation to cultivate knowledge and become intellectual, in the expectation that war will automatically go out of fashion. It is quite possible to become very scientific, most relentlessly intellectual, and on that foundation to build up ideals of warfare much more barbarous than those of Assyria.

The conclusion seems to be that we are today entering on an era in which war will not only flourish as vigorously as in the past, although not in so chronic a form, but with an altogether new ferocity and ruthlessness, with a vastly increased power of destruction, and on a scale of extent and intensity involving an injury to civilization and humanity which no wars of the past ever perpetrated. Moreover, this state of things imposes on the nations which have hitherto, by their temper, their position, or their small size, regarded themselves as nationally neutral, a new burden of armament in order to insure that neutrality. It has been proclaimed on both sides that this war is a war to destroy militarism. But the disappearance of a militarism that is only destroyed by a greater militarism offers no guarantee at all for any triumph of civilization or humanity.

What, then, are we to do? It seems clear that we have to recognize that our intellectual leaders of old, who declared that to insure the disappearance of war we have but to sit still and fold our hands while we watch the beneficent growth of science and intellect, were grievously mistaken. War is still one of the active factors of modern life, though by no means the only factor which it is in our power to grasp and direct. By our energetic effort the world can be molded. It is the concern of all of us, and especially of those nations which are strong enough and enlightened enough to take a leading part in human affairs, to work toward the initiation and the organization of this immense effort. In so far as the great war of today acts as a spur to such effort it will not have been an unmixed calamity.

America Gives $1,200,000 to Red Cross Work

A Red Cross bulletin states that more than 1,000,000 wounded men had been cared for by the French Red Cross and allied organizations in that country up to the middle of March. According to a French report, there are now 500,000 beds in the French war hospitals, and the cost of the maintenance of these hospitals is estimated at about $200,000 daily.

It is estimated that American contributions to French Red Cross expenses have reached a total of more than $1,200,000 and that altogether since the outbreak of the war approximately $16,000,000 has been spent in France in relief work by the three branches of the National Red Cross of France. The expense of the French organization is now estimated at about $1,000,000 a month, the organization having in its charge more than 1,500 hospitals with a total bed capacity of about 118,000 patients.

"A great deal has been done," another bulletin states, "by American agencies, under the guidance of the Red Cross, in behalf of the Serbians since the beginning of the great war. First, with American hospital units they were aided in caring for their wounded; next, by means of a large force of sanitarians and much paraphernalia a raging typhus epidemic, which killed upward of 150,000 persons, was checked and finally suppressed; and now, with their country entirely in the possession of a foe and the citizenry scattered to the four winds, the Red Cross finds itself actively engaged in ameliorating, to the extent its resources will permit, their manifold tribulations. A number of experts are devoting themselves to this task, and in it are joining hands with the American Ambassador to Italy, who is a member of the Board of Incorporators of the American Red Cross. There have been greater sacrifices by American Red Cross surgeons and nurses in the Balkans than anywhere else in the ever-extending area of the European war zone, and this because the odds that had to be overcome were almost insuperable."

The Kaiser's Harvest of Death

By Marie Corelli

THE NOTED NOVELIST'S FIRST CONTRIBUTION ON THE WAR, BY ARRANGEMENT WITH THE SUNDAY TIMES OF LONDON.

IN every great national crisis, when war or revolution brings havoc on existing civilization and works sudden and violent change in all social, political, and diplomatic relations, we are invariably able to discover one man—or at the most perhaps two or three men—primarily responsible for the general upheaval.

History is impressively explicit concerning these personages. She never fails to show us how, by some strange lack of the most ordinary foresight and common sense, they stumble when apparently on the height of success, and commit irreparable blunders which hasten their careers to a disastrous close. Such was the case with Napoleon and many other would-be Alexanders of ambition; but of all the tragic blunderers of time surely none can equal or surpass the "War Lord" of Germany. Here is a man who had the splendid chance of securing for his country and people the largest share of the commerce of Europe; it lay easily within his grasp. Yet he has let it go, like a handful of sand and shells dropped by a child at play on the seashore. To satisfy the personal cravings of a vaunting, blustering egoism for blood-and-thunder "effects" he has lost the peaceful conquest of a world!

Amazing, deplorable, and incredible folly!—when such conquest could have been gained without a blow, without the boom of a single gun, without the explosion of a single shell! It could have been attained in the only way by which any truly "civilized" nation should ever seek supremacy—through the development of industry and commerce, and the quiet assumption of the power that industry and commerce give. All that we call "progress" should fortify the stand of human resolution on this basis. It is not necessary, it is not even sane or decent that any peoples should tolerate what Carlyle describes as "the spectacle of men with clenched teeth and hell-fire eyes hacking one another's flesh, converting precious living bodies and priceless living souls into nameless masses of putrescence, useful only for turnip manure"—which is a rough but accurate picture of war deprived of all its devilish excitement and glamour.

To Kaiser Wilhelm more than to any other monarch of his line was given the glorious choice of becoming the greatest benefactor of Germany which that realm had ever known. He could have created for his people such conditions of peace, happiness, and prosperity as were almost incalculable. He stood in the broad sunshine of ripening trade—the markets of the world were open to him—fields of wealth were spreading around him on all sides, and his cheerfully working millions had but to reap the grain their industries had sown and gather in a rich and plenteous harvest. Why, then, in the name of all that is great, noble, and pitiful, has he chosen to make a harvest of death instead of life?

During the grim and ghastly struggle at Verdun we are told the Kaiser, standing "at safe distance," watched through his field glasses the fiery mowing down of his countrymen to the number of 45,000! Does any one, reading this, take the trouble to pause and consider what it means? Forty-five thousand strong, brave men in the flower of manhood, (for let us hope we are none of us so unjust as to deny our enemies their strength or their courage,) 45,000 capable human beings fit for every sort of industrial labor—the blood and bone of future generations—slaughtered like vermin; and their Emperor, their sworn defender and protector, within sight-range, looking on!

What a "Harvest Home"! Are we able to conceive the nature and temperament of a monarch who could so look on at this massacre of his subjects and not rush among them to stop the advance of their serried ranks and "massed formations," resulting in such a wanton and wicked waste of life! The crazy antics of Nero were mere child's play compared with this callous attitude of William of Hohenzollern, an attitude which even his French foes cannot maintain. For, fired with vengeance for old wrongs as they are, and bent on victorious justice, they have declared themselves "sick with slaughter."

"Such hecatombs," writes Colonel Rousset, "cannot last. Our adversary, while carrying his disregard of human life to the point of madness, cannot go on throwing his soldiers into the charnel house without thinking of tomorrow."

The losses of the Germans at Verdun have been estimated at 10,000 per day! "I dream at night," writes one French artillery officer, "of those ghastly crumpled heaps of shattered gray-green bodies! Germany's wives and mothers must curse the Kaiser in their prayers!"

Voltaire is accredited with the saying that "the only crime is stupidity." According to this dictum, one must come to consider the "All-Highest War Lord" the greatest criminal of an epoch, his stupidity being almost without parallel in history. What man, not entirely mad, seeing a world of prosperity within reach of his hand, would clench his fist and knock the whole splendid sphere away from him at one blow! The proposition seems absurd and untenable, yet it has been and continues to be the Kaiser's policy, or the policy of his Ministers and advisers; clear to all save those who remain perversely and willfully blind.

For it is not too much to say that before the war Germany was pushing quietly but surely through every branch of commerce. From triumph to triumph she moved easily onward; everywhere her ramifications were spreading like the vigorous roots of a fast-growing tree. In Great Britain she had possessed herself of many of our trades; her goods were everywhere; her cutlery, her glass, her woolens, her linens, her dyes, her silver and copper ware, her chemicals—why, even our very window frames were "Made in Germany"! She was at work in our mines and coal fields; she was ahead of us in science, in invention, in industry, and general "thoroughness."

And let us not forget that we were, or appeared to be, supinely indifferent to her inroads on all that we used to claim as our "special line" and particular property. We were, like Hamlet, "growing fat and scant of breath." We were disposed to indolence and self-indulgence, and when we saw Germans working for us, and by us, and through us, taking the very tools out of our listless hands, we were agreeably convinced that they saved us a deal of trouble. They worked so cheaply, too!—and cheapness in necessary goods appealed to us, because it gave us more to spend on racing and football. The "space for special news" in our press was not reserved (as intelligent foreigners conceived it ought to be) for serious information on world's business, but for "Football Results" or cricket, in the respective seasons of these gamesome athletics—and the very word "patriotism" was laughed out of court as "jingoism." We gave the honors of heroes to our tennis champions, and played about while the Germans worked. They worked—as many of the British refuse to work; they saved—as many of the British decline to save; they gained their ends, because by our very inertia we gave them every opportunity to do so.

Mr. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia, said in a recent speech that Germany "had abused our foolishly generous hospitality." This is not quite accurate, since we were neither so generous nor hospitable as careless and lazy. We allowed our trades to slip through our fingers—the State did nothing for native work, science, or invention—and ambitious men of hope and endeavor left the country in shoals to make fortunes in other lands, many firms establishing themselves in Germany in order to win the rewards denied them in their native home!

Germany held a more tenacious grip on every corner of the earth than we in our latter "go-as-you-please" way ever realized. All over the United States, Canada, and Australia her people have spread; you find them in India, in Persia, in Egypt, in Africa; as a matter of fact, there is no country where German influence has not been actively at work while other nations looked on. Antwerp itself was well-nigh possessed by German commerce before its military bombardment; it was already a centre of German trade and German shipping, and in many of its business houses more German was spoken than either French or Flemish. Great Britain was lagging behind in the race; and had peace been maintained for another twenty-five years Germany might easily have mastered the world; and we might have lost all leading hold on commerce.

For let us not delude ourselves on the subject of our own inertia! It is owing to the magnificent stand made for justice and right by the hero King of Belgium that we have been awakened from long apathy; had it not been for his resolute example, both France and England would have suffered far more than they are suffering now! Friend and defender of both nations, he stands out as the noblest figure in the struggle—the one who, when victory sits upon our helm, must be the first to receive that which is due to him—the restoration of his country and his throne.

And now the rivers of gold that were flowing into Germany through her trade are replaced by mountains of British, French, and German dead! The latest estimate of German losses at Verdun is 200,000! Does the Kaiser, at safe distance, still "look on"? What blessing has this monarch of a great and productive realm brought upon his people? Mourning, desolation, and irremediable misery! No triumph, no victory can atone for such a deluge of blood and tears! That capricious Personage "somewhere in Heaven," whom Wilhelm calls "Unser Gott," may possibly resent the deliberate casting away of golden opportunities on the part of his crowned earthly "familiar," to whom a peaceful world was offered, only to be kicked aside for a battered helmet and broken sword!

"Trust in thy sickle and reap!" O Emperor of a brief and bitter day! The harvest of death, not life!—the harvest of curses, not blessings! The thousands of dead men—dead in the very strength of manhood—sacrificed in a holocaust on the flaming altar of the wickedest war the world has ever seen, may have their own story to tell to "Unser Gott"; so may the bereaved and wretched women whose husbands and sons have been torn from their arms forever. May the true God help them all!—for in the unspeakable hell of iniquity around us man is well-nigh powerless; though, like every evil thing, war has its good side. It shows us with each day heroism of the finest, courage of the strongest, self-sacrifice of the noblest, existing among us all; and it has reawakened the higher spirit of England. For this we have cause to be devoutly thankful! In a certain sense it has saved us from ourselves and from the enervating love of pleasure and personal avarice which was slowly undermining our better qualities.

And even the Kaiser, "looking on" at the legions of his own subjects falling like withered leaves in a whirlwind of fire, may one day shake off his frenzied nightmare of battle, and repent—exclaiming with Judas: "I have sinned, in that I have betrayed the innocent blood!"

On a French Cruiser in War Time

By René Milan

Translated for CURRENT HISTORY from the admirably written papers published under the title "Les Vagabonds de la Guerre" in La Revue de Paris. Especially interesting is M. Milan's account of the part played by wireless telegraphy in the war.

I.

AT last, on the curve of the waves, is marked the outline of the enemy! Alas! They are only torpedo-boat destroyers! Swift and powerful destroyers, I admit, but Austria might very well have offered us an adversary of our own class. But let us be satisfied with the windfall. Too many days have been thrown away against invisible adversaries. These at least are real, living and full of ardor. They gallop toward us, torpedoes pointed; we point toward them our big guns, which cannot yet reach them; the game is equal. Like us, they have run up the battle-flag, and the Waldeck-Rousseau, driving over the waters like a thoroughbred, drags with her her cruisers and her two squadrons of torpedo boats to the adventure in which some one must die.

A few minutes pass, packed with anxious silence. The men shut up in the hidden vitals of the ship strain their ears to catch the muffled sound of the first salvo; they may be killed in a moment, if some well-pointed torpedo should touch the cruiser, but they give their whole souls of bronze to their apparatus and their machines, so that nothing may go wrong in this marvelous crisis. Through their range-finders, the gun-pointers watch the distance vanishing by a kind of miracle. Twenty thousand yards—eighteen thousand yards—fifteen thousand—fourteen thousand. Two thousand yards more, and the storm of our artillery will break over our adversary. In three parallel lines the Austrian destroyers pour forth torrents of smoke; they are in solid formation; each line glides over the blue water like a gleaming boa constrictor. Alongside of us our torpedo-boat destroyers have drawn together and are plowing up clouds of foam that sparkle like silver in the sun.

But what do we see over there? The Austrian lines open out, bend upon themselves, and their heads describe a wide curve. Is it possible? They are going away! They refuse to fight! With a raging anguish we all try to persuade ourselves that our eyes are deceiving us. It is a trick of the sunshine, a puff of wind that bends their smoke. * * * Not at all. They have completed their turning movement and show us their heels, looking like three railroad trains speeding away on rails of foam.

Oh! to have our eyes on our revenge for so many useless weeks, and to see it escape just at the limit beyond the reach of our guns! To feel that under our feet our gigantic machines, which, nevertheless, are not weakening, can no longer catch up with the prey whose legs are too long for us! To measure the distance, and to feel it growing greater, a little more each second, like an elastic that is being stretched! Fourteen thousand yards!

Fourteen thousand one hundred. Fourteen thousand two hundred. * * * Ah! we would fain command the waves, hurl a sudden hurricane into the air, churn the sea into foam and billows. Our potent keels would not slow down, but the destroyers would crash against each billow, would go slower, would exhaust their force, and our triumphant dash would overmatch their cowardice.

They flee toward the labyrinth of the Dalmatian Islands, which grow larger before us like a family of ocean monsters rising from the sea. We continue to pursue. Sixteen thousand—seventeen thousand yards. Perhaps the poltroons will be seized with remorse or indecision. But it is not so; their flight is a premeditated ruse. High up in the sky, slipping and gliding among the transparent clouds, a war plane swoops over the French warships, passes along them, and drops bombs that only our skillful dodging makes harmless; they burst opposite our ships. On the surface of the water one of the cruisers perceives the furrow of a periscope! Some lurking submarine has launched its torpedoes, perhaps; our speed has deceived it; no one is touched; we take a flying shot at the streak of foam, which instantly disappears. The submarine plunges into the depths, the aeroplane is already out of sight, and the destroyers are close to the channel of the archipelago. Eighteen thousand yards—nineteen thousand.

II.

After a few hours of unquiet dozing I arose, made a summary toilet, ate I know not what food, swallowed hastily, before going on watch. In the middle of the day I found myself on the bridge again. A bright sun was silvering the distance. The three cruisers, deployed in loose order, continued their course toward the south of the Adriatic; behind, almost invisible, the smoke of the naval forces formed a black mane on the horizon. On board, every one who was not on duty was enjoying a siesta. Every one was finding consolation in dreams for the disappointments of the day before, but a few scores of eyes were watching the very calm sea. The Ernest-Renan, a few thousand yards away, was following a parallel course.

Something very white suddenly appeared in the furrows of foam. My binocular immediately followed this wrinkle on the water; you would have said a jet of steam, slipping along just under the surface. For a few seconds I hesitated. Perhaps the fin of a porpoise swimming close to the top deceived me. The remembrance of training in peace times brought back to my memory the track of a periscope, and I hesitated no longer.

"Quick! All on the left! Raise to eight hundred meters! Declination, forty! All engines at full speed ahead! Close the bulkheads! Begin firing!"

The cruiser bounds. In the hold the men of the watch close the bulkheads. The artillery fires. The shells fall around the white, moving streak. They burst like balls of dry snow on a blue wall. All the men, awakened from their siesta, all the officers come up on deck. A few meters from our hull passes the fleecy track of a torpedo launched against us. It has missed us, but a big 194 shell, (7¾ inch,) fired from one of our turrets bursts immediately above the periscope. It plows the water and splashes it up in the air; the stem of the periscope rises, falls, rises again, falls again, as a wounded animal tries to stand and falls again. Then nothing more is seen. The blue waves show only their habitual indolence. Across the void a storm of cheers comes to us from the Ernest-Renan; they have seen the shell tearing up the water, and they are certain that the explosions have crushed in the submarine.

We are going fast, so fast that in a few seconds the cruiser is far from the place of death. The guns turn and follow it, ready to fire again, but nothing shows any more.

"Cease firing! As you were! Open the bulkheads! Resume your course! Engines at sixty revolutions!"

III.

Every Sunday, divine service is celebrated on board—a serious, simple ceremony. Around the movable altar, flags stretched make stained-glass windows of bunting; the vault of the church is formed by the low whitewashed ceiling of the space between decks; to right and left, the partitions of the cabins, the white stems of the smokestacks, form the metal walls of the shrine; the particolored tubes, steam pipes, well-polished cocks, cast red and yellow reflections; chairs for the officers, benches for the crew, are grouped to a depth of eight or ten yards. He comes who so desires. A bugle call announces services, and whoever is not on duty, either comes or stays away. While the priest is accomplishing the holy rites, you hear in the hold the breathing of the engines, the snoring of the ventilators; above your head, on deck, patter the sailors of the watch; the big Adriatic rollers slap against the hull and the quivering of the rapidly moving cruiser makes the altar tremble.

IV.

Above the horizon appear the masts, smokestacks, and hull of a ship. Whether her conscience be troubled or at rest, she knows she cannot escape our speed, and does not try to fly. At 5,000 yards her flag informs us of her nationality. English or French, she may go ahead. If she is neutral, we show her the international signal:

"Stop immediately!"

And stop she must. If she looks like going on, a blank cannon shot warns her not to play with fire. If she pretends not to understand the invitation, a shell falls just ahead of her, and lets her know we are not joking. If her screw continues to revolve a rap or two on the hull lets her know that the affair is serious. They always stop in time.

The cruiser comes to, within gun range of the suspect. In an instant one of our boats is lowered into the water, the crew seize the oars; the officer on duty, armed with a sword and a revolver, and with a big register under his arm, jumps into the boat, which pushes off.

"Captain, kindly range on deck all persons on board! Let each have his identification papers in his hand. I shall inspect them in five minutes!"

Stewardesses, stewards scatter through the cabins, which are filled with a sudden stir. In the midst of a concert of exclamations, murmurs, and laughter, feverish fingers dive into portfolios and bags. Travelers whose souls are white immediately find what is wanted; the ladies fix their hair, hastily dab a little powder on a suspicion of sunburn, and give themselves a finishing touch. The whole thing is tremendously amusing to them. Just as if it were on the stage! It would not take much to make them put on their prettiest dresses. But the officer is getting impatient, and the Captain is apologizing; one passenger cannot find his passport, which he thinks he has left in his trunk. Exactly! the story is an old one! But let this German quarry climb up, just as he is!

Finally, every one is drawn up in two or several lines—like a row of blind men holding out their trays, each one holds his passport. The men are extremely serious, almost indignant, and, behind their foreheads, you can divine silent tempests; they are on the watch for an imprudent word, in order to invoke their Consuls, their Ambassadors, and the inviolable rights of neutrals. A vain hope. The officer sharply scans them, and turns over their papers with a careful finger. Stamps and paragraphs are in order, and also the description; the passports, the certificate of nationality, do not smell of trickery. But there is no touchstone like language; a few words, a few phrases, tell many secrets to expert ears, and hesitation shows guilt where the papers show innocence.

"Be so good as to tell me where you come from. Be so good as to tell me your name and your birthday. Have you been long abroad? Be so good as to answer in your own language. What is your profession?"

You must question pointblank, in different ways, and be careful not to carry on the conversation. No discussion, an instantaneous judgment, and you pass on.

The true prizes, the genuine booty, you recognize by sure symptoms—Germanic faces, Teutonic accents, harsh or honeyed answers, stammered explanations. In vain do they disguise their names and hand us forged writings, their Germanic race leaks through all their pores. They are hurrying to foment rebellion in Egypt or Tripoli; they are on their way to the Balkans to do their work; to burrow underground in India or China. Invariably they have Swiss or Dutch passports, but their certificate of nationality, brand new, is fresh from the printing press, and reminds you of false coins, too new and shiny. Suspects! The officer goes down to their cabins. Under the matress, behind the washstand, in the folds of a counterpane, lie the incriminating papers. Enemies!

From this point, one must go on decisively, gracefully, in the French fashion. The officer halts in front of the German, addresses him by name, lays a light finger on his sleeve or shoulder, and says, without raising his voice:

"I arrest you. Follow my sailor, who will take your baggage and put you into the boat."

Cries, explosions of anger, insults must not disturb him. He must add nothing. What has been said has been said.

We have on board an ear that never sleeps; it is the wireless telegraph. The apparatus is buried in the depths of the hold; a padded cabin isolates the operators from the noise of the machinery and the cross-currents of discord. From watch to watch the telegraphers pass over the receiver to each other, and the finest murmurs never escape their vigilance.

The air vibrates in an uninterrupted concert. Coming from stations near or far, from ships wandering on the Atlantic or close at hand, calls, conversations seek out their way; the ether transmits them instantaneously. The powerful antennae of the Eiffel Tower, of Ireland, of Germany, of Italy, or of Constantinople dominate with their noisy throats the feeble whispers. With their full force, to any distance, they launch the official news of the great ordeal. If some one talks too loudly, 500 or 1,000 kilometers away, (300 to 600 miles,) they raise their tones, throw more strength into their voices, until the interrupters become silent.

A tacit agreement alternates their messages. The German does not obstruct the Frenchman, the Turk waits until Malta has finished. Madrid, talking to Berlin, rests while London speaks. For these great stations, controlled by their Governments, send out only announcements of the first importance, such as the whole world should know, and they wish neither to confuse nor to be confused. Reports from the front, happenings at sea, diplomatic or financial transactions, plans or insults, circulate in all languages, and you can be certain that the newspapers will not publish them. If by chance the reader of newspapers finds them in his daily sheet, it will be a week or a fortnight later, in a garbled, unrecognizable form.

Sailors hear every bell and every sound; while the rest of the world must be content with the meagre, delayed communications authorized by the censorship, the sailor already knows. His griefs and joys precede the griefs and joys of the anxiously waiting millions. Ireland announces a simple movement of Russian strategy, but Norddeich—the German post—clamors to all the echoes of a German victory, an advance, the capture of thousands of prisoners. Norddeich laconically explains some event at sea, but Eiffel sets his biggest sparks crackling, announcing to Moscow, to Newfoundland, to the Sudan and the Red Sea the disaster at sea that has befallen some Teutonic force. In how many days, with how many changes, will the public read these bits of news? At every hour of the day and night we receive them brutal and imperious.

No illusions are permitted to us. Our enemies do not lie too grossly in these proclamations destined for their Ambassadors, their Consuls, the innumerable agents who uphold the prestige of Germany throughout the world; it is vital for Germany that these men should receive authentic information, which they will make the most of in their bargainings. There is nothing in common between the rhapsodies of her newspapers or of the Wolff Agency and her wireless announcements. At the most, in the case of defeats, she sends out statements made carefully vague. But this very vagueness makes us prick up our ears, and within a few hours London or Paris confirms the English or French victory.

Outside the Chancelleries and Governments, there are no day-to-day records of the war except on warships. We discuss squarely over flags placed exactly where they ought to be; our forecasts, our hopes are rarely deceived. And if the obligation of secrecy did not impose silence upon us we could tell our friends many a bit of news.

But underneath the great tenors of wireless telegraphy whisper the myriads of baritones, basses, members of the chorus. Thus in the tropical forest the roaring of lions by no means hinders the dialogues of insects and rodents; this network of lower voices gives the jungle its deep life. The slender tones of talking ships fill the atmosphere of the sea with a mysterious animation. A big liner, come from tropical seas, announces her passage of such and such a frequented cape. A torpedo-boat patrolling toward Gibraltar tells Port Said about the ships which it has sighted. This torpedo-boat has not got strong enough lungs to shout to the other end of the Mediterranean; it calls Bizerta or Toulon, who answers, takes its message, and relays it forward, like a rebounding ball, to the antennae of Malta, to the masts of a French cruiser in the Ionian Sea, to the wires of a Russian ship in the Aegean, and finally it reaches Port Said. A mailboat announces its position, a squadron asks for orders, a naval attaché or an ambassador sends out information gained by spies; the Resident General of Morocco is sending wheat to Montenegro; the main guards give warning that a submarine is in sight; colliers ask to be told exactly where they are to meet certain cruisers; the whole Mediterranean taps the antennae of the Commander in Chief as a swarm of subalterns tap at the door of military headquarters.

No disorder, no discord in these gusts of whisperings. Like the musicians in a well-drilled orchestra, all these talkers speak at the minute, at the second previously fixed for their turn; chronometer in hand, the telegraph operators watch for the instant allotted to them, and immediately send forth trills of short, brief notes; whether they have finished or not at the end of their period, they stop and wait, for immediately a distant voice begins its part, and would protest violently if any one prevented its speaking. The whole extent of the Mediterranean is divided into sectors, the time is cut up into fragments, and no one is allowed to break the silence if the pre-established table bids him keep still.

Besides, the guilty parties are quickly found out. Just as the fingers of a blind man acquire surprising sensitiveness, so the operators' ears distinguish the timbre, the tone, the musical value of the chatterers whom they have never seen. For the initiated the electric radiations have a personality like human speech. Two posts, two ships have distinct voices, pronunciations. This one talks with a sputter, the other speaks with solemn slowness; the voice of one suggests a match scratched on sandpaper, another buzzes like a fly, another sings small, like the flight of mosquitos. It is a concert almost magical. In his padded cabin the operator hears and distinguishes the whirr of the cricket, the squeak of the violin, the rasped wing-cover of the beetle, the hiss of frying, which the fantastic electricity is sending forth, hundreds of leagues away. It flickers, ceases, begins again; you would say a goblin symphony in some wide wilderness, and yet the least of these vibrations is a message of war, of life and of death.

And indeed they are careful not to talk without saying anything. They all use only secret languages. This perpetual chatter contains no word, no phrase which any one can understand unless he possesses the key on which rests the safety of ships. Cipher, cipher, cipher, nothing else circulates in space.



Paris Owes $400,000,000 for Rents

ONE of the thorniest problems of the war in France is the rent question, and in the last two months it has become so acute that the Chamber of Deputies has devoted many hours of serious debate to its solution. Tenants have paid no rent since the beginning of the war, and as the months have accumulated into years the situation has become impossible. The magnitude of the question may be gauged by the fact that the rents unpaid in Paris alone since the war amount to $400,000,000.

When complete mobilization was ordered, causing a profound disturbance in the commercial, industrial, and social life of the nation, the Government issued, among other moratoria, one applying to house rents. It was intended primarily for the relief of small rent payers, especially those whose breadwinners had been called to the front. Its scope, however, proved to be much wider, and although landlords were authorized to take legal proceedings for the recovery of rent where they could prove the ability of the tenants to pay, they found in actual practice that they were helpless in any serious attempt to enforce their rights.

So long as the war seemed likely to end in three months the moratorium caused no great hardship, but as it has been prolonged from quarter to quarter the situation has grown so acute that an early solution is essential. All France was settling down to the comfortable practice of not paying rent. A good many people who were quite able to pay had taken advantage of the moratorium. Gradually there had grown up a popular conviction that at the end of the war the Government would pass some sort of law excusing tenants from the payment of at least a portion of the total rent bills. It was a dangerous belief.

First of all, M. Briand, the Premier, shattered the fond hopes of those who could, but would not, pay, by declaring publicly that all tenants in a position to do so must be made to fulfill their liabilities. Then, for the January quarter, the moratorium was timidly modified so as to compel Government and other public officials, as well as the Bank of France employes drawing regular salaries, to pay their rent.

The question is complicated by the number of different categories of tenants and landlords, and by the hopelessness of expecting the small ratepayers to be able ever to settle the arrears which the law has allowed them to accumulate. It is obvious that a soldier who has fought for his country for eighteen months or two years, during which time he and his family have deen deprived of their ordinary resources and obliged to subsist on the modest separation allowance granted by the State, cannot decently be asked to pay two years' back rent, even in installments. It is highly probable, moreover, that if such men were worried by landlords there would be serious trouble in the country.

But who is going to bear the loss? It is calculated that there are more than 700,000 families in the Department of the Seine alone (Paris and environs) whose rent is under $120 a year. This, naturally, is the principal category of tenants concerned in the proposed legislation. The Government says: "We will bear a portion of the debt if the departments and the landlords will bear their share." In other words, the landlords (of property, flats, &c., the tenants of which pay less than $120) must not expect to get the total amount of arrears due to them, but would be paid a substantial part by the State.

This arrangement seems to satisfy no one. The landlords clamor for payment in full. Their argument is that, as the State made the law which caused the loss, the State must be held responsible, and ought to indemnify completely the landlords. The tenants, vigorously supported by the Socialist Party, are opposed to all idea of the State reimbursing the landlords because, they claim, the money would have to come from the taxpayers' pockets, and thus the burden would still be borne by the tenants. Why should the fact of a man putting his money into property confer special privileges on him? No, say the Socialists, those who can pay must pay; and let the corporation of landlords make good among themselves the losses sustained by their poorer colleagues whose tenants happen to be unable to pay their rent.

The Government proposes to deal with the problem by authorizing the canceling of leases in cases of the tenant being killed or sustaining permanent injury, while the question of according rebates, exonerations, or time for the settlement of arrears would be left till after the war for decision by the proper tribunals. Tenants called to the colors, widows and heirs of victims of the war would be entitled to a reduction of the amount of rent due. Others to benefit by the measure would be small tenants killed or incapacitated by the war, tenants paying less than $200 in the Department of the Seine, or $120 in towns of more than 100,000 inhabitants, or $60 in towns of more than 5,000 inhabitants.

French Humor in War Time

A war-time feature of the Paris Matin each morning is a small humorous vignette with a bit of fictitious conversation below it.

WILHELM TALKS WITH RUMANIA

The Kaiser: "Remember that between the Danube and Bucharest there are only sixty kilometers."

Ferdinand of Rumania: "And six hundred thousand bayonets, with a few guns—don't forget that!"

A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION



Von Tirpitz: "A fine day! Three sailing ships sunk!"

Wilhelm: "A bad day! Twenty-four German steamers seized in Portugal!"

German Woman's Work in War Time

WRITTEN FOR CURRENT HISTORY

By Jean Toeplitz

ONE of the most widely circulated prints in Germany during the last year is the work of the well-known painter, C. A. Brendel. "Stilles Heldentum," ("Quiet Heroism,") as it is called, depicts a strong and vigorous woman taking up the plow where it was left by the man gone to battle. That picture is a symbol of the change which has taken place in German life; the women of the empire are today supplanting the men in the country and in town, in factory and shop, while the men are offering their lives in defense of home and hearth. In farming, of course, women began to take the place of men from the early days of the war, but in all other fields of economic life the change from male to female workers did not take place nearly so soon, nor so completely. On the contrary, in the first months of the war, female workers in manual as well as intellectual avocations were particularly hard hit by the lack of employment.

Even when, with the recovery of economic activity and the increased enlistment, unemployment as far as the males were concerned was greatly reduced, the female labor market was still slow to improve. Only during the last half year have women actually taken the place of men in a great variety of lines of activity.

In agriculture the adaptation to war conditions came easily, because in times of peace German agriculture rested to a very large extent on the shoulders of the women. The census of 1907 showed that in Germany 4,500,000 farm hands, almost one-half of the total, were women. Cattle raising, the cultivation of potatoes, cabbage, turnips, sugar beets and other vegetables requiring hoe work, have for a long time been almost exclusively in the hands of women.

How important the existence of so large a number of female workers accustomed to arduous farm work was to be for Germany few people had imagined before the war. This importance, however, was manifested in the very first days of the war, when the strongest and most capable men were taken from their harvest tasks. If the first war harvest was gathered to the last grain, if nothing of this precious possession was lost, Germany owes this to the active work of her women. And then when the time came to till the ground again, when it was necessary to get as much from the soil as it would yield, then it was again the women who doubled and tripled their energies in order to replace the missing men. At present the women, old men, and children have practically a monopoly of agricultural pursuits.

The change from male to female labor did not take place so quickly and in such a matter-of-fact way in any of the other branches of economic life. It was not until January, 1915, that a steady increase became noticeable in female industrial labor. In the beginning the men withdrawn from the labor market could be replaced by men; there was even a lack of employment until the economic life adjusted itself. But soon the demand for labor was greatly increased and the women were called upon. In the course of the first six months of the year 1915 the number of female industrial workers grew by about half a million. Yet the supply of workers in the female labor market has by no means been exhausted. Here Germany possessed a source that will not be exhausted for a long time to come.

Female labor has increased, especially in those industries which may be designated as war industries, viz., in the metal and machine industry, in electrical and in chemical industry. That the women have proved their usefulness and ability is shown by the fact that in 1915 a large ammunition factory alone employed

50,000 women, and that the manufacture of shells is today almost exclusively in the hands of women. With the exception of the finer work, which requires extreme precision, and which is attended to by skilled male workers, there is no part of the work not done by women; the making of the core of the shell, the cleaning of the cast shells, work at the lathe, at the boring and cutting machines, the filling of shells, the making of shell baskets—all is the work of women.

In addition to ammunition, almost all war supplies pass through women's hands. For example, the horseshoe industry is largely carried on by women. In the rifle factories women manufacture certain parts. Drinking cups, kitchen utensils, and bottles for use in the field are made by their busy hands. Many lines of business working normally with a preponderantly female staff—such as the textile industry, tailoring, and dressmaking—to a great extent have been converted into cog-wheels of the great war machinery, and are, where the demand for their normal products has fallen off, bending their energies to supply the army with articles akin to those which they manufacture in peace time. Here the changes are not very marked either in the employment or in the nature of the work of women.

It is noteworthy that even in the beginning of the war, when all industrial branches still showed a decrease of female labor, the metal industry, the machine industry, and the foodstuff industry experienced an increase. After a quarter of a year the mining and textile industries were added to this list, while in the electrical and chemical industry the same phenomenon could be observed only during 1915. These are, of course, all more or less directly related to the war, and the increased demand is not exclusively due to a decrease in the male workers, but also to an intensified activity of these branches in supplying the ever-growing needs of the armies.

The heavy iron industry was one of the first that was forced to engage female labor and is still their biggest employer. This is not only the case in the lighter work, but in work that would never have been assigned to women under normal conditions. The law which was issued at the beginning of the war, relaxing the restrictions in the occupation of female workers, came to the aid of this industry. The Upper Silesian foundries have made extensive use of this legislative alleviation. In many cases in these foundries women only do the work hitherto performed by juvenile male workers, who have passed on to take care of the heavy work of the men; but in others the heavy work is also done by women. One smelting concern reports the employment of fifty women in the smelting works, of twenty-five in the coke works, and of sixty in the steel and rolling plants. Another concern even reports one woman engaged as a stoker at the big engine furnaces. All this work is, of course, normally done by men, and is really so heavy as to be injurious to women if done for any great length of time.

Next in the proportional increase of female workers come the electrical, chemical, textile, and foodstuffs industries in which, though in most cases entirely new, the tasks the women have to perform are much lighter.

The manufacture of gas meters cannot be considered as actual war work. The scarcity of petroleum brought about the increased utilization of illuminating gas. That resulted in a greater demand for gas meters, for the manufacture of which there were no longer enough male workers, so women are now used in the manufacture of meters. They only make some of the parts, however; the more complicated work is still done by experienced tinsmiths.

In the wire factories female workers are now occupied in winding the wire, at the plaiting machines, and at the wire-drawing bench. In the manufacture of cast iron kitchenware women work at the molding machines. In machine factories they do the painting work and are used for transportation, formerly the work of men exclusively. They are also employed in tinning spoons and other eating utensils, in making parts of umbrellas, &c.

Outside of the large and organized factory business the investigations of the Central Employment Bureau in Berlin show that in the small trades and vocations women have also found positions.

Thus, female tinsmiths and joiners are employed; and women are working in the place of men in the saddlery and shoemaking factories, in the dressmaking business as ironers and stitchers, and in the printing business as typesetters.

The daily press reports many other cases. For example, women have taken the place of "ashmen," street sweepers, window cleaners, "cabmen," chauffeurs, "elevator men," "messenger boys," "motormen" and conductors of street cars. At the railroad stations they are in charge of the book stalls. The railroad authorities employ a large number of femals workers in the workshops to clean the cars and the lamps; they work as ticket punchers, door lockers, train announcers, even as trackworkers. Tonsorial parlors present the curious spectacle of female barbers and hair cutters, and the Tyrolian Spa, Meran, even has a female chimney sweep. The position of waitress in better-class restaurants is regarded as an entirely worthy one for women. The gas companies are employing women not only in office work, but also to inspect and fill the meters. From one village in Bavaria comes the report of female blacksmiths, three sisters taking the place of their men folk who have gone to the front. That no toil, however hard, is shunned by the women can be seen in Berlin, where, with joy in their hearts and on their faces, great numbers of them are working at the building of the new rapid transit railway.

The replacing of men by women seems to have taken place more slowly in the positions of higher business life, but here also the steady drafting of the men into the army has brought about considerable changes. Even branches of business in which there was a prejudice against the employment of women pay high salaries nowadays for efficient women. Women are being employed in banks, in the insurance business, real estate, as traveling saleswomen, as show-window decorators, &c. A new vocation created by the war is that of female secretaries of agricultural estates. The Chamber of Agriculture for the Province of Brandenburg has arranged courses for agricultural bookkeeping which are intended for employes who wish to devote themselves to agriculture, either permanently or temporarily.

In Government offices may be seen the first beginnings of replacing men with women. For instance, there are cases of female letter carriers, and at the money order and registered letter windows there are now women. In the Berlin courts female clerks are employed, and a woman has received the post of acting registrar.

In the so-called higher vocations the employment of women is also increasing. In the educational departments a much larger number of teachers had to be used, since a great percentage of the German teachers are serving in the army. One new feature which deserves special mention is that women teachers are being used in a large number of the higher boys' schools, as, for instance, at a real gymnasium in Berlin and at a gymnasium in Marienburg.

A point not appearing in any routine reports should be mentioned here, because it is so easily overlooked—the work of the women doctors. A vast number of their confrères of the male sex have either been called to the field or are active in the hospitals in the home country. That they should be replaced by female physicians in the ordinary way of business would be a natural thing. A tribute is due to the female practitioners of Berlin and other places for the reason that they offered of their own accord to take the place of their confrères gratuitously, thus saving many a father at least a part of his worry about the support of his family.

While it is impossible to obtain any exact figures on the labor movement during these exceptional times, still an approximate idea may be gained of the degree in which the women have taken the place of the men by referring to the figures published on sick insurance.

Statistics are available only for the year 1915, but any figures of the first months of the war, when all industrial pursuits were in a state of turmoil would, in the nature of things, be misleading. Only after things had settled down and economic life, though working along quite different lines, had regained a certain amount of steadiness, may figures be considered as sufficiently reliable to form something like an approximate idea of the displacement which the labor forces of the empire have undergone.

If we take the average of the figures published at different times in the year 1915 we gain the following picture of proportional monthly changes of male and female labor in the chief branches of industry:

Industries.	Men, Per Cent.	Women, Per Cent.
Metal and machinery..	+ 1.31	+ 5.72
Electrical	— 4.96	+ 9.18
Chemical	+ 4.65	+ 9.25
Textile	— 2.40	+ 0.42
Foodstuff	— 7.53	+ 3.85
Clothing	— 3.32	— 4.22
Average	— 2.04	+ 3.59

Keeping in mind that, of course, a multitude of various factors is constantly influencing the fluctuating movement of labor in these times, nevertheless, if we apply the above figures to the whole year, we arrive at the probably not very inaccurate result that in the course of 1915 male labor in the chief branches of industry decreased about 25 per cent. and that female labor increased by 43 per cent. The disparity between increase and decrease would indicate that the individual activities had been intensified by 18 per cent. through the immediate needs of war. But in this connection it must not be forgotten that experience shows that female labor is not a full equivalent of male labor and that an increase in hands does not signify a corresponding increase in production.

If we analyze the figures given above a little more closely to see how the various branches were influenced by the war, we find that as regards the degree of the decrease of male labor they rank as follows: Foodstuffs with the heaviest decrease, then electrical goods, clothing and textile products; the metal and chemical industries experienced an increase in male workers despite the war. On the other hand, as regards the increase of women workers, the order is the following: Electrical industry, chemical industry, metal and machine works, food factories; a decrease of female hands took place in the weaving and clothing industries. The order in which these branches rank as regards employment of labor gives an interesting indication of the present needs of the German Empire.

Another table is of interest because it comprises all of those insured against sickness, not confining itself to the above-mentioned branches of economic life. It is a comparison of the changes in male and female labor employment in the months of 1914 preceding the war and the corresponding months of the year 1915:

	1914.		1915.	
	Men.	Women.	Men.	Women.
January	100	100	100	100
February ...	102	115	99	100.8
March	105	119	98.8	103.4
April	108	122	97.8	105.5
May	112	126	99.1	109.4
June	113	128	97.1	110.3
July	113	128	95.7	110.6

Taking the active labor forces on Jan. 1 of the two years as represented by the index figure 100 we see that while in 1914 there was a steady increase of male and female workers, in 1915 the male workers dropped to 95.7 while the female workers increased to 110.6.

A problem which is causing a good deal of speculation among German exponents of women's rights is the one of the pay which the female worker is to receive in places where she is expected to fill the man's post. The question as to how this problem has been handled in Germany is difficult to answer in a few words, because in many cases the woman has not taken the man's place to perform an identical task. In most cases, as a matter of fact, the work the woman is called upon to do is one newly created by the war, and it therefore does not admit of an exact comparison with the work of the man and the wages he received for it. Most of the factories in times of peace did not think of making supplies for the army. There were special factories for this purpose, but these are now unable to satisfy the demand. The abundance of female workers, especially at the outbreak of the war, caused the ammunition industry to employ large numbers of these workers and this at first cut down the wages. This condition was, however, alleviated gradually. Propagandists for women's rights point out with some justice that it should not be forgotten that the female labor in the factories working for the defense of the country is now of great value, because there are not enough male workers and because the demand must be met in the country itself.

Though a general comparison between the wages of men and women for the same work is difficult to make for the above-mentioned reasons, it has been ascertained by the investigations of the trade union of the German machine-construction and metal workers that only in very few cases are the wages of the women as high as those of the men.

In the Upper Silesian foundries the wages of the women are in a ratio of 1 to 3 to those of the men, more rarely in that of 1 to 2, and they are never the same. The wages of women vary considerably even in the same place and also for the same work, ranging from 21 pfennigs (5 cents) to 35 pfennigs (9 cents) an hour.

Weekly wages vary considerably in different parts of the country. There are wages of 9 marks a week in the East. They rise in the West to 27-30 marks. They differ, of course, according to the age and ability of the worker.

In piece-work the difference in the wages of men and women is even more evident. The rates per piece of work are throughout lower for women than for men. A foundry in Mannheim pays women 2.50 marks (62 cents) per 100 bullet cores, while men receive 3.50 marks, (87 cents.) A Dresden firm pays women 65 pfennigs for 100 pieces of a certain article, whereas men receive 95 pfennigs. In a Berlin firm the rates for piece-work are from 25 to 40 per cent. lower than for the men, and in another firm in Berlin the difference is as much as 50 per cent. In short, in most cases female labor receives much lower pay than male labor.

Into the problem of pay enters one that was already touched upon above, that of the comparative efficiency of men and women as industrial workers. The question is, in other words, has woman, replacing man as a factory worker, been a success as far as her present employment in Germany is concerned?

While the problem is one of immediate interest in its relation to and effect on the question of present wages, it is not only one of passing importance, but one which touches questions of fundamental and permanent bearing on the economic structure of the empire; and it has consequently at once been taken up by those branches which have been most seriously influenced by the invasion of female labor. The metal industry has circularized its members on the question into which the problem in the first instance resolves itself, the question, namely, whether the female workers in the metal industry are able to carry out the work now intrusted to them as well as the men in regard to quantity as well as quality of the product. Of 119 answers to the question of quantity 58 were in the affirmative and 48 in the negative. In 4 cases the women are said to do more work than the men, and in 9 cases to accomplish the same amount only in part. The reasons for this are not difficult to find. In most cases the female workers perform purely mechanical work at machines which are set ready for them by men. They have, therefore, chiefly to watch the machine; here and there the women may show greater dexterity in this than the men.

In regard to the quality of the work, 83 out of 130 answers indicate that the women's work is on a par with that of the men. Thirty-six answers deny this, while 10 indicate only a partial equality, and in one case the work is said to be superior.

Answers to the circular indicate that although in the majority of cases the increase in female labor in the metal industry is due to the scarcity of male workers, the lower wages of female hands also come in as a factor. In 85 cases the lack of male workers is given as the reason for the increase in female labor, in 19 cases the lower wages, and in 15 cases both reasons. In the answers received it is frequently pointed out that unemployed able men were rejected and women employed on account of the lower wages. A large metal factory in Westphalia employs men for daily wages, whereas the women have been given the more lucrative piece-work.

In most places where there is a scarcity of male workers, and where female workers must be employed, the wives and daughters of the former employes are given first consideration. There cannot be any difference of opinion on the desirability of such an arrangement.

The only question is, what will happen after the war? This question is already being discussed from the point of view that with the return to the normal conditions there must be no bitter rivalry between male and female workers. But apart from that, will the women who entered into vocations previously the exclusive domain of man have to give up the positions they have conquered during the war when normal conditions prevail again? Many of them will, of course, desire, when the tasks enforced upon them by dire necessity are done, to revert with renewed zeal to the duties which from time immemorial have been considered as the natural province of woman. Others may wish to and may have to retain their new activity, since so many positions will not be filled again by those who held them before the war, and so many men will be required along other lines of reconstructive work that the call for female help will probably remain great for a long while to come.

Still, there are vocations which are essentially male, and will ever be so, since they are too exacting, and the continued activity of the female population in them would eventually prove hurtful to the nation. This is true of work in iron factories—the so-called heavy iron industry—and in mines. Women are not allowed to work in the latter in peace, and even in war they have only by special legislation been admitted to the overground work. The Reichstag has already discussed this matter, and the Government is in accord with the representatives that in such branches as are particularly apt to be deleterious to a woman's health the previously existing protective legislation is to be reinstated as soon as peace returns.

In the meantime the German women proceed quietly along their arduous path of "quiet heroism" and are not behind the men in their determination to bring the war to a victorious conclusion.

Helene Lange, one of Germany's standard bearers for women's rights, says:

"No German woman wants peace if by gaining it the life of her Fatherland is to be hemmed in and restricted. Not one wishes a peace which will not bring us what we must have—security for the active development of German ability, room for the flowing stream of German kultur, firm ground for all the peaceful conquest of the world which is possible for the German spirit of science, the technical arts, or social and economic organization. If the question is 'War, or a permanent check to German development—death or a German life in chains,' the answer of the German women is, without a moment's reflection, 'War and death.' Small everyday cares and everyday happiness vanish when measured by great suffering and great exaltation. All of those who have gone through our experiences feel that there is also a victory over death, that there are possessions for which life is not too high a price, and that greatness is more than happiness."



French Women as Munition Makers

A Story of Patriotism

A BRITISH commission sent to France by Lord Murray and Mr. Lloyd George to study the methods of manufacturing war munitions in that country has recently made a noteworthy report, which throws a white light upon the self-sacrificing patriotism with which the women of France are wearing out their lives in that work. "The country needs me" is the keynote of the factories as it is of the trenches, and the bulk of the work in these factories is now done by women of all classes.

One section of the British report contains a table showing the present and former occupations of France's munition makers. In one factory the forty-one women now engaged in boring are composed of fifteen housewives, one corsetière, twenty factory girls, four mechanics, and one florist. Fuses are being made in the same factory by 848 women, of whom 470 were formerly makers of breeches, seamstresses and milliners, 125 clerks, 125 housewives, and 75 factory girls, while 53 had no profession previous to their present arduous labors.

Women who were formerly dressmakers, children's nurses, weavers, tulle makers, cashiers, hairdressers, and typists also are among the thousands upon thousands of those who are now turning out the food for the weapons of France.

The average pay per day is: For laborers, 6.01 francs, (a little more than $1.20;) for machine men, 10.42 francs, (a little more than $2;) for skilled workers, 12.23 francs, (about $2.50;) for females a minimum of 3.53 francs, (a little more than 60 cents;) mean wage, 5.95, (about $1.20.)

The purpose of the commission was to study the underlying causes of the greatly increased output of munitions in France. Their main answer to the "why" of this remarkable increase is summed up in their tribute to the patriotism of the women. Technically, however, they cite three main causes—increasing intensity of production, erection of new factories and extension of existing plants; adaptation of other kinds of factories to the manufacture of munitions.

"As the war proceeded," says the mission's report in explaining these factors, "the French Nation has settled down with a determination and feeling of set purpose to the fulfillment of the task allotted to it. There is no question that the nation is at war and the dominant sentiment, not only of the men but also of the women, is to carry the war to a successful termination. Everything else is subordinated to this determination.

"Women, of whom many thousands are employed in munitions factories, work with a good-will which is most impressive; this spirit is also evident in the case of male workers."

There is no jealousy on the part of the Frenchmen, no ill-will over woman's encroachment on what once was man's own realm. On the contrary, the investigators found that the men have welcomed the assistance of the fair sex and are aiding them in every way possible. The report points out the significance of this fact, inasmuch as the introduction of women in the munitions work was aimed not only at increasing the output but also at freeing the men for military service.

Whether through well-calculated intention or not, the British mission's report conveys between the lines some striking contrasts between the never-tiring willingness on the part of all France to lighten the heavy burden of the country, no matter what the cost, and the apathetic attitude of certain classes in Great Britain in the face of the nation's call, especially during the earlier phases of war. The commission says:

"Although prior to the war the usual labor troubles were experienced, no strike has taken place since the commencement of hostilities.

"No applications for general advances in wages have been made by the work people since the commencement of the war."

To those who last Fall, before the Damocles sword of the military service bill was hung out over the heads of the masses of unwilling, witnessed the troubles and riots in the coal mines of South Wales, these statements, made under the names of a commission of highly respected and responsible British investigators, sound like rebukes whose keynote seems to be "Look at France."

French capitalists have not lagged behind the working classes in the demonstration of real, practical patriotism. "It is remarkable," says the report, "that the erection and equipment of new factories resorted to in great measure are due to private enterprise. No factories have been subsidized by the Government, nor have loans of any kind been made to the owners."

There are in the Paris district alone 1,800 small producers for machine operations. The vast majority of these are now working day and night for the Government, under sub-contract, the main contractor making no profit out of the work sub-contracted. Many small shops are manned by various members of a family and work day and night shifts.

Thus the British visitors found the day shift superintended by the father and daughter and the night shift by the mother and son. The meagre proportions and the poor equipment of this, as of thousands of other shops, the report says, were overcome "no doubt by the spirit which dominated every one employed in it."

In another case, a very small shop, the work had been superintended by the wife of the owner, who was serving in the army. The woman worked herself to death, and the husband was ordered back from the army to continue the work she had been doing.

As to the standard number of hours, it can hardly be said that there is such a thing in France today. There is a break of about two hours at noon, which enables the women to look after the meals and comfort their children at home.

In most cases the shifts change over every fortnight, and on the change the work people get twenty-four hours off. No difference is made on Saturdays, the same hours being worked as on other week days. In some cases no work is done on Sundays after noon. In most cases women work the same hours as men, allowance being made, however, for the time spent on tramway journeys, to avoid congestion.

While thus far women have worked mostly only at day time, they will, to a large extent, soon be engaged on night shifts as well. The report continues:

"The opinion in the French factories is that the output of females on small work equals and in some cases exceeds that of men, and in the case of heavier work, within certain limits, women are of practically the same value as men.

"It has to be kept in mind that physical considerations limit the range of work which may be done by women. It was noticed, however, that part of the work done by women involved greater strain than might be thought reasonable in this country."

Of the "general conclusions" cited by the commission, the following stands out as bearing out every word of the report:

"It appears to the mission that the increase of production in France is due to one cause, and one only, and that is the patriotic enthusiasm which exists there."

The French Woman's New Ideal

By Marie Bourgain

Professor in the University of France

Summary of an article contributed to Le Figaro by a widely known French writer on feminist questions.

WHAT is going to be the intellectual and moral influence of women in our country, whose young manhood has been so cruelly decimated? Whether we wish it or not, the women are becoming an economic and social factor with which the leaders and the nation will have to reckon. Silently they are in evidence in all kinds of work, in all classes of society, and in the most diverse surroundings. They do not talk; they act. What a revolution in our ways, what an economic upheaval! How will it be possible to take from women on the morrow of victory what they have gained by disinterested labor, maintained not without a kind of heroism, too? Equal pay, equal civil rights, perhaps equal political rights—how many hints already of future demands!

The publicists are excited and question one another, but the women, gripped by tragic realities, seem to have forgotten the feverish discussions of yesteryear. Hence this multitude of charitable undertakings which have risen up on every side, and in which each woman generously pours forth her affection, zeal, and energy. However great the daily burden, there are few women for whom it is enough. With their eyes on the trenches and their minds fixed on the magnificent self-sacrifice of our soldiers, the desire to emulate them becomes an inspiration to still further effort. Nor are these endeavors of the kind which, being scattered and ambitious, fail through aiming too high. The women play their part gathering together, caring for, and nourishing children, comforting mothers, and devoting themselves in the nurseries and shelters to purely feminine among other tasks. Charity? Assuredly, but much more it is the urgency of preparing against the menace of depopulation as great as the losses in the war itself.

Family anxieties about the precarious days to come will no doubt raise a new crop of girl graduates, and there will probably be more lawyers and more doctors among women. But I know from the confidences of numbers of middle-class girls that it is to the family that they are thinking of applying this ardent renewal of energy. They are already looking forward to a modest and serious existence, a return to French traditions. Life outside the cities, far from frightening them, appears to many desirable, propitious to intimacy and family comfort. They know that frivolity and luxury are not essential to happiness. They declare frankly that they have thought it out, and that they feel sure in their choice. They will have little money, but they will live in the country and bring up strong and happy children.

Hence the schools which are being opened in response to this need, schools of agriculture founded by women for women, where they can acquire the knowledge and training to become farmers and managers of estates. Whether this experiment is or is not crowned with immediate success does not matter. The idea is bold and practical, and will certainly be fruitful. It is a sign of the times. According to the initiators, the school now open is only a beginning, and they foresee quite a swarm of them spreading out through our provinces, each school adapted to the needs and resources of our diverse regions. In this way social life will be, if not transformed, at least all the better materially and morally.

It means the reappearance of one of the most beneficent figures in the life of other days—the lady who, living on her estate, exercised around her a force for enlightenment, leading a useful and regular life and contributing to the enrichment of her family and the prosperity of the country. Is it not to the honor of present-day education that our college girls, armed with degrees and eager for learning, are no more afraid of the farm than the daughters of the Duchess of Montausier, for whom Fénelon wrote his treatise on the hardships of country life? In this ideal of health and simplicity there is a type both modern and classic, the capable woman of whom we have always dreamed, presiding over the household, neither servant nor mistress, but companion and associate, courageous in the performance and serene in the accomplishment of the day's duty, guardian of the dignity and honor of the home and the dispenser of all its benefits.

War and the Duty of Motherhood

By Lily Braun

Noted German Feminist Leader

THE German Nation proved itself to be like one of the sturdy oaks of our own forests; the whirlwind lashed to the earth much that was decadent and superfluous, leaving revealed the noble outlines which bespoke strength and endurance.

With one powerful blow the war leveled all party barriers; the men who marched out to meet the enemy were men inspired by the one primitive feeling of defending their homes and their Fatherland.

And with the same blow, the war destroyed everything that was mannish in the women—destroyed their ideas of sentimental pacifism and their futile dreams of the sisterhood of woman throughout the world. The hidden force which drew 70,000 Berlin women to the Reichstag during those August days—not to indulge in a demonstration for universal suffrage but to offer their services as nurses and helpers—was only the powerful eruption of the long-smoldering womanly instinct, best expressed in the one word, Motherliness! Every woman was absorbed by the one idea of helping—but how and where?

The women of Germany had one widespreading organization, the Vaterländischer Frauenverein, but it was not until the war came and put this organization to the test that we realized its scope and efficiency. Called into existence during another dark period in the nation's history—the Wars of Liberation—it now comprises a half million members, has a capital of 30,000,000 marks, and is the mother, so to speak, of endless public welfare institutions.

Under the auspices of this organization, and that of the Woman's Auxiliary of the Red Cross Society, 25,000 women in Berlin alone were enabled to take the course of training prescribed for the so-called Helferinnen, or assistants in all phases of the relief work.

After the mobilization of the troops had been effected and we had been released from our duties at the railway stations, the question of the unemployed women was the first work to claim our attention.

Many industries in which women had been employed were suspended at first but soon recovered and adapted themselves to the exigencies of the situation. That they were able to do so with such astonishing rapidity was due to what our enemies anathematize as "Prussian Militarism." The capacity for subjecting one's self to discipline which is another name for organization, is one of the fruits of this so-called "Militarism." Two other factors were of incalculable value in assisting us to meet the new conditions, and these were the education of the masses and the Workingmen's Insurance—one creating a willingness to co-operate intelligently, and the other providing support until those thrown out of work could again be reinstated.

The outside world has been astonished

at the rapidity and smoothness with which our economic machinery got under way, and this was undeniably due in large measure to the ability of the women to take the places vacated by the men. The farmer's wife in East Prussia, who, clad in men's overalls and high boots, superintended the harvesting, is only one of thousands of similar instances where women took up the labor suddenly abandoned by the men. The war has already released hitherto undreamed-of forces among the women of the land, and tomorrow, and day after tomorrow will demand still greater sacrifices and heroism on their part. The war is not yet at an end, and the claims upon our strength and endurance are by no means exhausted. And even when the time comes when we shall be able to add the palm of peace to the flags of victory that now flutter from our windows, there will still be an infinite work for us to do, in rebuilding and reconstructing all that the war has destroyed.

Far more appalling than the destruction of material values, which years of patient endeavor and courageous effort can ultimately restore, are the irreparable losses in human life. There will be no more vital problem to be solved by the women of the world in the future than this of so readjusting the economic conditions as to make it possible for every woman to fulfill her natural duties of motherhood.

This is not a mere question of woman's personal happiness and her moral and intellectual development, but a question of the "to be" or "not to be" of a nation. The Russian General who, in the beginning of the war, based his belief in the invincibility of his country upon the fertility of the Russian woman, was fundamentally right, and had not the Russians been enfeebled by long years of moral and intellectual starvation they might have been able to ravage our land in far greater measure by the sheer force of their military masses.

Should France be defeated in this war—and France is the only country which, like Germany, is fighting for her national existence—her defeat would not only be the result of our superior military prowess, but in great measure the fault of the French women who no longer wish to bear children. For years this most striking symptom of national decadence—the retrogression of the birthrate—has manifested itself in France. This is best proved by statistics which show that in 1870 both France and Germany had a population of forty millions. In 1914 France still had only forty millions, whereas Germany's population had increased to sixty-five millions.

From the blood-soaked fields of Flanders and Poland comes the insistent cry to the women of Germany: Fulfill your duties of Motherhood!

There are women who advocate "a strike" among the mothers of the land—who declare they will bring no more children into the world to be food for powder. But such women are lacking in true citizenship, and it is as mothers and citizens that the State will claim our co-operation after the war. Let us so fulfill this two-fold duty as to prove ourselves worthy helpmates of the heroes in the fighting lines, and we shall then be able to look back upon this critical period in the nation's history, not as the "time of our great calamity," but rather as "the great time of our calamity!"

Why Rumania Is Neutral

By Dr. C. Racowsky

Intellectual Leader of Rumanian Socialists

Dr. Racowsky of Bucharest here gives his reasons for believing that Rumania will remain neutral. The Rumanian Socialists, with the exception of a small pro-Teuton faction, stand firm for nonintervention in the war. This article originally appeared in the New York Volkszeitung, the daily organ of the German-speaking Socialists in this country.

At present the press is discussing Rumania's position regarding the war. Will Rumania remain neutral, or will it enter the lists? And if it does enter the struggle, at whose disposition will it place its arms? With the reservations entailed by a lack of knowledge of diplomatic secrets, I, as a man acquainted with the situation in his own country, believe I am able to state that we shall remain neutral until the end.

Of course, our Government does not lack the desire to pursue a policy of territorial expansion. It has this desire just the same as the other Balkan Governments and displayed it during the second Balkan war in 1913. It is shown today through constant military preparations since the war began. Those who are following the news from Rumania know that the Rumanian Chambers recently voted the Government new credits to the amount of $40,000,000, which, with the former credits, exclusive of the regular budget, signifies an extraordinary expenditure of $120,000,000. That Rumania, despite all this, has not entered the war up to the present is not due to the fact that the Government did not desire intervention, but to circumstances over which it has no control.

The reasons for Rumania's neutrality are political as well as military. Since the war of 1913 our foreign policy has been decidedly favorable to the Entente. Rumania's entrance into the second Balkan war, as well as the annexation of 7,000 square kilometers of a territory so rich and productive that its loss meant a reduction by one-third of Bulgaria's productive powers, could not have taken place without an express agreement with Russia. The Rumanian Army could never have crossed the frontier without the previous assurance that the northern neighbor had repudiated the military treaty with Bulgaria in 1902 in which Russia had pledged itself to stand by Bulgaria in case of a Rumanian invasion.

The Bucharest Treaty, which was the pride of our diplomacy and of our statesmen, was the result of close cooperation between the second Balkan coalition, that is, Rumania, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro on the one side, and Russia and France on the other.

At that time the leader of the present nationalistic movement in Rumania, Filipescu, declared in an interview that Russia could freely dispose of its two army corps on the Bessarabian frontier. This statement meant that the treaty of alliance between Rumania and the Central Powers was morally ended. This shows that already on the eve of the European war the policy of Rumania was pro-Entente.

Despite the opposition of King Charles, who remained personally attached to the policy of the Central Powers, Rumania would have entered the lists on the side of Russia at the outbreak of the war if it had not been for the general belief in a decided German victory prevalent at that time.

Following the battle of the Marne and after the fall of Lemberg, when the Russian Army was in the Carpathians, the pro-intervention agitation reached its height. Both the Government and the pro-Russian opposition wanted war. Relying upon this opposition, a noisy and systematic campaign, resisted by the Socialists alone, was begun to influence public opinion and was assisted by the yellow press. The Government began negotiations and endeavored to supply itself with the necessary hospital supplies and munitions that it lacked.

Nevertheless, Rumania did not enter the war. In the first place it was unable to obtain necessary munitions. The Entente Powers had too little for themselves and consequently could not supply Rumania with any. The Central Powers, suspicious of Rumania's attitude, also failed to furnish any.

A second reason for Rumania's failure to enter the war was Russia's refusal to satisfy Rumania's territorial aspirations at that time. Our Government demanded the entire Hungarian region between the Carpathians and the Theiss, the greater part of Bukowina, including Czernowitz, and the major portion of the Banat, altogether a territory of 127,000 square kilometers. But Russia would not agree to this. It demanded for itself that part of Northern Transylvania populated by Hungarians, and moreover had the intention of giving the Banat to the Serbs, who claimed it for themselves. Russia evidently wished to control the Southern Carpathians and to come closer and closer to the border of Greater Serbia. I believe, however, that the main reason for the failure of the negotiations to result in a formal agreement regarding Rumanian intervention is to be found in the fact that Russia only attached a secondary importance to Rumania's military assistance, because it thought it could induce Bulgaria to line up on its side, and because at that time the question of persuading Italy to enter the war was the principal object of the policy of the Entente Powers.

The entrance of Italy was regarded as a decisive factor that would automatically entail the intervention of Rumania. It would seem as if the Italian diplomats knew how to strengthen this illusion of the Entente.

"Grant my demands," said Italy to its present allies, "and I promise as your reward the entrance of Rumania into the war as a natural result."

At any rate, one thing is certain. The conditions under which Italy entered the war caused a great disillusionment on our part. The official press adopted an ironical tone, but the statesmen were wild. There were cries of treason. Italy was said to have used the credit due to its close relations with Rumania merely for its own advantage without paying any attention to Rumania's desires. This is the situation that explains why Rumania did not enter the war simultaneously with Italy. After the Russian front had been broken through at Gorlice and on the Dunajec, Russia was ready to grant all the demands of the Rumanian Government, but at that time even the most outspoken pro-Russian Rumanian could not approve participation in the war, as the danger was too great and too apparent. Since that time the action of the Rumanian interventionists has seemed more like a bluff than an effort with a serious object. But people have asked why Rumania has not entered the war on the side of Germany and Austria.

Such an intervention is not impossible in itself. The fact that in Rumania cooperation with the Germans and the Hungarians would not please the people is of little importance. We may safely say that the idea of war is in general unpopular throughout the entire country, not only with the workers, but also with the bourgeois, and that only the bureaucracy, the officers and the intellectuals want war. Indeed, this does not prevent the pro-Russian Rumanians from representing the Rumanian people as ready for war and in favor of the Entente. The King and the Government would not have any great difficulty in forcing the country into the war on the side of Germany, just as the Bulgarian Government did, despite the fact that the latter had to contend with a strong opposition on the part of the political parties and the people, and was not held back even by the provocation of revolts.

Other reasons prevented a war with Russia. First was the fear of Russian revenge. Once upon a time, after the Crimean War, Rumania held Bessarabia and Russia took it back by force twenty years later. And besides, the principal argument of the Russophile party in Rumania that wants to enter the war on the side of Russia against Austria-Hungary does not consist in the fact that the Rumanians living in Russia are perhaps better treated than those who have settled in the Hapsburg monarchy, as just the opposite is true. It is a question of another motive that has nothing to do with the alleged sympathy of the Rumanian Boyars with French democracy, and that is that in the case of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary Rumania would not be menaced by a war of revenge after it succeeded in annexing Transylvania. A Rumania that tried to conquer Bessarabia through a war would resemble a child who while walking with his governess one day was rude to an adult and consequently did not dare to go upon the street alone afterward.

In order to defend itself from Russia, Rumania would simply have to join hands with Germany and Austria, because a treaty guaranteeing its independence would not be sufficient nowadays. Such treaties have lost all their value through this war. There is another reason that explains the neutrality of Rumania: Germany no longer contemplates an offensive in Russia, especially not in Bessarabia, and thus Rumania has as little military importance for Germany today as she had for Russia when the latter was winning victories. I do not believe in the probability of Rumania acting with Russia this Spring, as that would only be possible in the case of a complete change of the strategic situation in Macedonia. And such a change really has only a hypothetical value. For this reason I believe that in the course of further developments, which may be decisive for our Government, Rumania will remain neutral. Naturally, it would be going too far if we laid down this proposition as an absolute certainty. The logic that generally rules in the conduct of individuals is very frequently lacking in the decisions of Governments. But there is one thing I dare assert, and that is that the Socialist workers will do their duty in every case and will maintain their policy of neutrality under all circumstances.

The Passing of the Clan MacTavish

By K. D. M. S., Jr.

She passed as the ships of England passed
  In days of long ago!
'Twas a listing deck and leaning mast
That settled slow from the cannon's blast,
When the raider boarded her at last
  To strike his final blow!

She sank as the ships of England sank
  While yet the world was young!
For her slaughtered seamen, rank on rank,
Had died on the boat-deck's bloody plank,
And the shattered strakes beneath her drank
  The sea with thirsty tongue!

She went as the ships of England will
  When unborn worlds are old!
For her little guns, perforce, were still,
And the fireroom began to fill,
'Till the damaged engines felt the chill
  Of death within her hold!

She played the game as the English play,
  Regardless of the cost!
When the Nations answer Yea or Nay,
At the bar where Fair and Foul must weigh,
To a God of Wrath on Judgment Day,
  What man will say she lost?

International Status of the Pope

By Karl von Stengel

[Published by arrangement with the Deutsche Revue, Berlin.]

As long as the Pope was the sovereign of the Papal States there could be no question that, as the head of an independent Commonwealth, he was fully qualified to exercise all the rights and privileges of his position among the family of nations. Nevertheless, the international status of the Pontificate in reality depended less on the fact that the Pope was sovereign over a rather unimportant section of Italy than that he was ruler over a religious organization stretching throughout the whole world. In many quarters this fact stamped the Papal Office as decidedly of an international character. Since the Catholic Church during the Middle Ages developed from a purely religious body into a powerful factor in world politics, this fact lent weight to the claim for international prerogatives.

Many things marked the acceptance of the Pope's international status in the past. For instance, the Papal Nunciatures and Legations were always accorded the utmost consideration, although frequently the representatives of the head of the Church were concerned in matters dissociated from their actual missions. In the diplomatic corps they occupied foremost positions.

But a change came when the Pope lost his worldly rulership through the Italian Government's taking possession of the last of the Papal territories in September of 1870. To be sure, it was not intended to divest the Pope entirely of his international position. The international character of the Catholic Church itself was against any such procedure. Futhermore, in all countries with considerable numbers of people devoted to the Church there was a manifest desire that the Pope should become the subject of neither the Italian Nation nor any other Commonwealth, but should discharge his exalted office with the dignity of complete independence.

Shortly after Sardina in 1860 took possession of the greater part of the Papal States, and later, when in March, 1861, Cavour proclaimed Rome the capital of a united Italy, the question arose as to how the international status of the Pope was to be regulated under the changed conditions. The Italian Government, which hoped to effect an agreement with the head of the Church, worked out a plan which contained the fundamental points later incorporated in the law of guarantees. According to this draft the Pope was to be looked upon as a sovereign, even though without domain, and his person in consequence of this was to be inviolate and beyond any jurisdiction whatever. It was also the purpose to assign to the Pope such property and other means as by general agreement should be considered consonant with the dignity of the Holy Chair. These possessions were to be free of all taxation and exempt from all political influence of the Government.

In addition, ambassadorial privileges were assured the Pope, and among other clauses was the guarantee of inviolability of person, which likewise covered the representatives so long as they did not overstep their ecclesiastical missions. In all matters pertaining to his calling as head of the Church the Pope was to be free to consult with whomsoever he desired should come to him for that purpose. Legislation was contemplated with a view to obtaining the Pope's renunciation of any claim to worldly rulership. Diversity of opinion made it desirable that the plan should be placed before the Catholic powers for their mediation.

It was the task of Cardinal Santucci to lay the proposition before Pope Pius IX., who by no means placed himself in entire opposition to the matter. The tentative arrangement, however, went to pieces through the determined opposition of Cardinal Antonelli.

When the Italian Government saw

itself compelled to take possession of the rest of the Papal territory and the City of Rome, in 1870, one more effort was made to come to some agreement with the curia, or, at any rate, to obtain its silent consent to the occupation. But here again the effort met with failure, as the Papal Court declared that if it agreed to the plan proposed the authority of the Pope would be nil. The dignitaries of the Church were especially wrought up over the fact that not only had Rome been joined to the Italian States, but it had, furthermore, been chosen as the capital of the kingdom and the seat of Government. It is very doubtful, however, if, leaving Rome out of the question, this would have sufficed to bring about a reconciliation between the curia and the Italian Government, since the absorption of the Papal States without Rome already was considered a painful encroachment and a serious attack upon the status of the Pope.

Just as it was impossible for the curia and the Italian Government to come into an agreement, so also there was no chance to attain this result through the mediation of interested states that were to find a way to define the position of the Pope. Under these circumstances nothing was left for the Italian Government but to designate the independence of the Pope, as was subsequently done with the law of guaranty of May 13, 1871.

In those early days the idea of Italian nationalization centred in a political understanding, but, as shown by Machiavelli in his own time, Papal authority and secular rulership did not harmonize with the national aspirations of the Italian people.

That the Catholic Church in Italy is influenced by the currents affecting the Italian people has been shown in the most striking manner by the fact that at the outbreak of the present war with Austria the clergy in overwhelming numbers took the side of those favoring hostilities. And Pope Benedict XV. himself, while to all outward appearance maintaining the strictest neutrality, gave permission for the Roman clerical nobility of the Papal Guard to enter the Italian Army.

In view of the historical development in Italy there is slight reason to believe that the ecclesiastical power stands any chance of being restored to anything resembling its former status, no matter what may be the changes in store for the Italian people as a result of the present war. As a matter of fact, any attempt to revive the temporal authority of the Pontiff would be fraught with such serious consequences as to injure his position as it is today. Neither is it to be considered practical to assign to the head of the Church a territory outside Italy where the Papal rule would hold entire sway. The problem would remain unsolved in view of the fact that Rome for once and all is identified absolutely with the development and position of the Catholic Church. Its central importance in the affairs of the church following is such that to transplant the seat of the curia to another country would merely complicate the situation further.

Granted that this world war has brought up again the so-called Roman question, it is, nevertheless, entirely proper to look for its solution apart from what the one-time temporal rule of the Pope may have to do with the situation. Whatever inquiry is to be made regarding an independent, secure position of the Pontiff in the future must be conditioned on something like what obtains today.

It is correct to say that nations alone can exercise international prerogatives, and for that reason it seems a matter of course that since the Catholic Church is not a secular state it would be difficult to accord to the Pope an international status in the society of nations. In his capacity as head of the Church the Pontiff does not occupy a position analogous with what falls to the ruler of a nation. Nor is there any reason to claim such a position for the Pontiff. The most to be expected is that he be accorded such rights as will establish beyond peradventure his independence, liberty, and inviolability. The identical international status given to nuncios and Papal representatives in general naturally would be accorded the head of the Church himself.

It is to be understood, in view of the development that has taken place during the past century anent the relationship between Church and State, that the Catholic Church cannot be indifferent as regards the present and future status of the Pope. In some respects it is for the Church to bring about conditions that will make for Papal independence and freedom of action.

Then, again, every Commonwealth containing any considerable number of Catholics must reckon with the Papal influence on its subjects. This concerns equally those countries where the separation of State and Church is most in evidence. An example is afforded in the important rôle played by the Catholic Church in the United States of North America. It is to the interest of all States with many Catholic subjects to make certain the independence of the head of the Church. It is also to be remembered how the stay of the Popes at Avignon affected both the Church and Germany.

Since the Church, then, is unable to regulate the international status of the Pope, and since the curia does not consider the Italian law of guaranty sufficient in itself to secure the full liberty and independence of the Pontiff, there appears to be an opportunity for perfecting an international agreement that will assure the Holy See that the legal conditions will be adhered to. Of course, it will not be possible to proceed except with the sanction of the Pope, as no new rule could possibly be forced upon him.

It is, of course, a fact that up to the present time the curia has held resolutely to its position of "Restitutio in integrum," and it may be extremely doubtful if for this reason the Papal Court would consent to any international regulations that would nullify the erstwhile claims.

Apart from what the Pope and his advisers might desire, it is a question what States should participate in any such move as outlined, and especially what States should become the initiating factors. Granted that the curia would lend its consent, Austria-Hungary and Germany would, at the conclusion of a victorious war, undoubtedly be prepared to aid the Catholic Church to the best of their ability. Beyond question such a move would materially strengthen the influence of the Teutonic element with the followers of Catholicism and the Church itself.

On the other hand, it is to be doubted if the Entente powers are willing or prepared to take up the question of new international regulations for the Holy See. Italy may at once be considered beyond the range of participation, judged from past happenings. Russia, always antagonistic to the Roman Catholic Church, would hardly care to exert itself in anything affecting regulations making for the international security of the Pope. France, "eldest daughter of the Church," would scarcely go further than to show a friendly interest in the proceedings. And that England would make much of an effort in behalf of the Pontificate there are few who will believe.

Looking at the problem from whatever direction, it becomes more and more apparent that there are insurmountable obstacles in the way, and the situation as it is will most likely continue for a good while to come. The best that can be done now is to await the end of the war and observe what effect the changed conditions among the nations will have on the Church and the Papal question.

Why Italy Went Into the War

By G. F. Guerrazzi

This illuminating explanation of Italy's part in the great conflict, now first published, was written by Signor Guerrazzi, an influential Italian scholar and publicist, in the form of an open letter to the American people through his friend David Lubin, founder of and delegate from the United States to the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome. CURRENT HISTORY presents practically the whole of this brilliant and timely monograph to the American public in two installments.

I.

EVER since the first shots were fired I have been an ardent partisan of Italian intervention, and have worked with all my powers toward that end. I felt sure that you would not have understood my point of view, and consequently would not have approved it; and it is painful to find one's self in disaccord with those one loves and esteems as I love and esteem you. I now write not only to comply with your wish for information, but also because I wish to place before you the reasons which have guided me in this matter.

The opinion which I came to from the very first moment when Austria and Germany, confident in their strength and moved by greed of power and wealth, defied the world, is the opinion now held by the vast majority of Italians. Therefore I feel that in writing to you I am speaking on behalf of my country to that large section of your compatriots who, under the influence of humanitarian ideals, may be inclined to blame Italy for entering the field against two nations which for thirty-three years had been her political allies.

A BRIEF RETROSPECT

The reasons which justify this action, and which I wish to summarize, go a long way back, and it will therefore not be possible for me to be as brief as I should wish.

Although I presume that the main outlines of recent Italian history are fairly well known in America, I must, nevertheless, give a rapid glance backward.

Italy, in the eighteenth century, had bold and original thinkers and illuminated rulers, and was well prepared to receive the new ideas brought forth by the French Revolution which the sword of Napoleon had triumphantly asserted throughout Europe. The history of modern Italy dates from Napoleon; it was then that a new spirit ran through the peninsula. An active and high-minded middle class arose in the different sections of the country. The Italians who, during long years of servitude to foreign masters, had grown unaccustomed to arms, fought under Napoleon and fought with valor. A national conscience was thus formed which, nourished by the traditions of a twice glorious past, spread so rapidly that not even the fall of the Empire and the restoration of the old régime could stifle it. Independence from foreign rule, political unity, civil and religious liberty, and a system which would conserve these blessings by abolishing once and for all the obsolete privileges of the nobility and the clergy—these were the ardent aspirations of the Italians. Our revolution was, therefore, national, liberal, anti-clerical, and democratic. Now Austria always was and still is the absolute negation of nationality, of freedom in all its aspects, and of democratic institutions.

AUSTRIAN DOMINATION

Austria had domineered in Italy prior to the French Revolution, and on the fall of Napoleon resumed its authority there. It exercised direct sovereignty over our most wealthy provinces (Lombardy, Venetia, Trent, Istria, and Dalmatia) and over all the other States, both small and large, into which Italy, for her misfortune, was then divided, Austria exercised a preponderating influence, interfering directly in their domestic policy. As a result, all attempts of Italian liberals to introduce even the mildest political innovations were ruthlessly punished by Austria and by her Italian satellites, including the Church of Rome. From 1815 to 1859 the history of Italy is one long story of oppression, of exploitation, of merciless persecution, of martyrdom, and of tears. None of the Italian Princelings dared to rebel against the will of Austria, whose Government, by means of an elaborate network of spies, was informed minutely of the most secret aspirations of the Italian Courts.

ITALY LIBERATED

The House of Savoy, which ruled over Piedmont and Sardinia, at last stepped forward and, conspiring with Italy's liberators, from Mazzini to Garibaldi, secured the unity and independence of the country. As a result of the will of the people, freely expressed by means of plébiscites, Italy constituted herself a nation under a liberal and democratic régime.

This result, the aspiration and the torment of so many generations of Italians, was attained not only by a series of internal wars and revolutions, but also by three wars against Austria. The first war, waged in 1848-49 by little Piedmont, assisted by the armed forces of almost all the Italian States, ended in defeat. The second war, waged in 1859 in alliance with France, was victorious, but had to be brought to a sudden close owing to the threatening attitude assumed by Prussia toward France. As a result of this war Piedmont acquired possession of Lombardy, while with bloodless revolutions the peoples of Tuscany, Emilia, and other Italian States spontaneously placed themselves under the sceptre of the House of Savoy. The third war against Austria was fought by Italy in alliance with Prussia, to deliver from Austrian rule Trent and the Adriatic provinces.

PRUSSIA BREAKS FAITH

Italy could then have acquired those territories without striking a blow, for Austria, alarmed at the attack made on her by Prussia, offered to surrender them, through the mediation of France, as the price of Italian neutrality. But Italy refused the bargain and remained faithful to the treaty which bound her to Prussia. She entered the field without hesitation. Prussia, however, under the leadership of Bismarck, after inflicting two crushing defeats on Austria, broke faith, and, regardless of the interests of her ally, made a separate peace with the common enemy before Italy had been able to attain her ends. We were thus left in the lurch to face the whole strength of the powerful Austrian Army. It was Prussian faithlessness which stopped Garibaldi's triumphant progress when only a few miles from Trent, and which checked the advance on Trieste of General Cadorna, the father of the soldier now in command of the armed forces of Italy.

Thus Italy, despite the brave fight she had put up, found herself betrayed and abandoned, and had to submit to the humiliation of receiving from France, to whom they had been ceded by Austria, only a part of the Italian territories then under Austrian rule, i. e., Venetia and a part of Friuli. Austria remained in possession of the whole of the province of Trent, of Eastern Friuli, of Istria, and Dalmatia.

AN UNSAFE FRONTIER

The new boundaries thus fixed for Italy were neither those marked out by nature nor by ethnic conditions, and were entirely unsatisfactory from a strategic standpoint. The gates of Italy remained in Austrian hands and the Italian coast of the Adriatic was left exposed to attacks from Austria, whose position on that sea is made exceedingly strong by the innumerable harbors and natural defenses of the Dalmatian, Croatian, and Istrian coasts, which face the Italian shores. Had she not been betrayed by Prussia, Italy could have secured a safe frontier, either by continuing the war or by negotiating for peace jointly with her ally. The wretched frontier which we were forced to accept in 1866 has ever since weighed as a curse on the whole course of our foreign policy, reacting adversely on our home politics and restricting our freedom and independence.

Despite the obstacles which France

had placed in the way of the Italian occupation of Rome, Italy remained until 1870 under the political and economic influence of that country which, for a century, had set us standards in political and intellectual matters. Nor did this influence cease with the occupation of Rome. After Sedan, when France proclaimed the republic, Garibaldi, at the head of hundreds of Italians, had rushed to her defense, and in spite of the intrigues of the Clerical Party French influence never died out in the peninsula, deep-rooted as it is in sentiment and tradition.

The French defeat of 1870 and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine so deeply wounded the spirit of that noble nation that Bismarck soon had to count with the ardent and inextinguishable longing for "revanche." Alarmed at the surprising rapidity with which France revived from so crushing a blow, he began to cast around for a means to protect from this danger the empire he had created. He hesitated whether to fall on France once more before she had fully recovered, or whether to induce her to devote her energies to new enterprises, while at the same time compassing her political isolation. The Iron Chancellor at last decided in favor of the latter plan. He saw that Italy was the natural ally of France, and he began straight away to sow discord between the two nations. For this purpose he made use of Tunis, which the preponderating economic interests of Italy, the large number of Italian immigrants, and the proximity to the coasts of Sicily and Sardinia marked out as a legitimate object of the aspirations of the Italian Government and people. Bismarck urged France to occupy Tunis, while at the same time encouraging Italy to resent such occupation.

The French Government eagerly seized an opportunity to salve, by colonial expansion, the pride, so cruelly wounded by the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. Regardless of Italian claims, the republic occupied Tunis, proclaiming it a French protectorate in 1881.

The outburst of indignation in Italy was intense, for Tunis had long been looked upon almost as an Italian province. It seemed as though Bismarck had succeeded in his plan of dividing forever the two great Latin nations. But this was not to be.

IRREDENTIST MOVEMENT

A liberal internal policy had made it possible for the more ardent patriots to start a movement for the recovery of the "unredeemed" provinces, a movement which the Conservative Party had always checked. This agitation, and the tolerant attitude of the Italian Government toward it, gave rise to lively remonstrances and threats on the part of Austria. The result was that hatred of Austria and sympathy with the sufferings of the subject Italian populations took precedence over resentment at the French occupation of Tunis. Moreover, the policy of France tended to appease Italy and secretly favored her designs on Austria. The renewal of the commercial treaties, which occurred about this time, afforded an opportunity for strengthening Franco-Italian friendship, which was regarded with favor by the Governments.

Bismarck clearly saw danger ahead, and set to work to avert it. Acting in concert with Austria, he set going a diplomatic and press campaign, alternating flattery with undisguised threats, and by clever intrigues, of which he was a consummate master, he succeeded in obtaining, as a first result of his policy, that the King and Queen of Italy should signify their disapproval of the anti-Austrian agitation by paying an official visit to Vienna, accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. There King Humbert, surrounded by the pomp and circumstance of the Austrian Court, even went so far as to appear in the white uniform of an Austrian Colonel.

AUSTRIA'S RECORD

Thirty-three years have passed since those sad days, yet I cannot remember them without indignation. To understand the grief and anger which took possession of us you must bear in mind what Austria stood for to the Italians. She was our age-long oppressor, who for so many generations suffocated in Italian blood all our national aspirations.

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE

Latest Portrait of British Minister of Munitions, From a Painting by Augustus John for the Red Cross

GENERAL CHARLES ROQUES
New War Minister of France, Successor to General Gallieni

And this was still recent history for those who, like myself, had grown up amid the men who still bore on their bodies the marks of Austrian ferocity. Moreover, Austria still held under her cruel yoke a large Italian population which longed to join the mother country. Austria was the implacable enemy of those principles of nationality, of liberty, of democracy in the name of which Italy had rearisen. I was a very young man at that time, but I shall never forget the bitter, angry tears which we then shed at what seemed to us, and what was in effect an effort to extinguish the sacred flame of poetry, of pure idealism, which had led our fathers along the steep and rugged paths they had trod through long years of imprisonment, often leading to the scaffold, through poverty, the sufferings of exile, and the hardships of the battlefield, in order to give us a country independent of foreign rule, to secure for us liberty of conscience and freedom of action. The King of Italy seemed to have forgotten all this, and we saw in his act the profanation of all we held most sacred.

The rising generation of young Italy grew up under the shadow of these events.

ALL IDEALISM REPRESSED

Perhaps the most serious of all the evils inflicted on Italy by German policy has been this moral depression, for it banished all idealism from Italian politics just at a time when we had to face the gravest political and social questions. Now that all public expression of the sentiments and ideals to which Italy owed her revival was severely repressed the more daring spirits among our youth sought relief by taking part in sterile conspiracies. Another martyr was added to the Italian cause when the young student of Trieste, Guglielmo Oberdan, was hanged in December, 1882. During the ensuing ten years we young men more than once dreamed of making an armed raid on the unredeemed provinces, raising them against Austria, inducing Italy to liberate them, or at least making impossible the renewal of what seemed to us a monstrous and sacrilegious alliance.

But the spell had been broken! Years passed; our ranks were constantly thinning, and even the best of us were compelled to judge things from a more positive standpoint. Skepticism became prevalent, and the young generation grew up in a dull and disintegrating atmosphere of materialism. The ground was prepared to receive on the one hand the evil seed of socialism, on the other the yet more noxious weed of corrupt and parasitic business.

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

The direction thus given to our foreign policy was injurious to Italy not only politically but also economically. Its first result was a blow to Italian prestige. The Clerical Party in Austria would never allow the Emperor to come to Rome to return the visit paid him by our King. In the second place, our super-cautious diplomacy was so upset by the French occupation of Tunis and by the complex German intrigues which forced Italy into the Triple Alliance that it failed to seize the opportunity offered by England for collaborating with her in the occupation of Egypt. And this was no small loss.

When the Triple Alliance was ratified in May, 1882, the economic policy of Italy had for many years been one of friendship with France. French capital had financed our revolutionary wars and had largely contributed to build our railways and develop our infant industries. French markets were the natural outlet for Italian exports. A clause in the treaty expressly stipulated that the Triple Alliance was to be kept secret, and this had probably been inserted by Italy so as to safeguard her friendly economic relations with France. But such secrecy did not fall in with the views of Bismarck, whose main purpose in favoring the alliance was to bring about a Franco-Italian rupture. Therefore, with that supreme contempt which he always cynically professed for fidelity to treaties, he made no scruple of referring to the alliance in the Reichstag, only twenty-two days after the treaty had been ratified. His example was soon followed by the Austrian Minister.

Great was the irritation caused in France by this announcement, not only among the public, but also in Government circles, more especially as the republic had clearly shown her sincere desire to be on friendly terms with Italy. The French always suspected that the alliance concealed aggressive intentions, and they determined to show their displeasure by all the means in their power.

AN ECONOMIC CRISIS

French banks closed their doors against Italian paper, and when Crispi, on becoming Prime Minister, tried to parry these blows by a visit to Bismarck, designed to accentuate the German alliance, France broke off the negotiations then in progress for renewing the commercial treaties with Italy. Indeed, it is said that only the intervention of the English fleet prevented the French from making an attack on our military port of Spezia. Burning with indignation, France renewed with redoubled energy her attack on our still feeble economic life. High protective tariffs caused our exports to that country to fall by 50 per cent., while the rate of exchange rose against us by leaps and bounds, and the artificial depreciation of Italian Government stock on the Paris Bourse was fatal to our credit, both public and private. This led to a truly terrible economic crisis, during which hundreds of thousands of Italians were driven by hunger to emigrate.

A shameful moral crisis supervened to aggravate the situation. Frauds in the issue of paper money were brought to light (1891-92) and the scandal involved many parliamentarians who had availed themselves of their political position to exploit the banks. Giolitti, then for the first time President of the Council, criminally attempted to save the parties involved and to avail himself of the knowledge he possessed to strengthen his own political position. He was swept away by a storm of popular indignation, and it seemed that his political career had closed. Both King and Parliament lost prestige with the country.

ABYSSINIAN ADVENTURE

The Giolitti Ministry had wisely labored to renew friendly relations with France. On its fall, Crispi was called to the Government, and hostilities recommenced more embittered than ever. His imprudent policy gave France many opportunities to injure us. Inflamed by patriotic pride, Crispi often failed to measure his policy by the moral and economic potentiality of the country. He allowed himself to be carried away by dreams of a colonial policy in the Red Sea when a much more modest program was alone suited to a country still involved in grave economic difficulties and unprepared for colonial expansion.

Egged on by French agents, the Negus of Abyssinia raised difficulties as to the interpretation of a treaty. The impetuous attitude of Crispi envenomed the dispute, and the country found itself involved in a war which it had neither desired nor foreseen, and which was conducted to suit the personal interests of prominent parliamentarians. The result was that in spite of heroic fighting on the part of our troops, the Italians were defeated at Adua, (March, 1896.) Crispi fell, and neither the country nor the Government had the energy to repair defeat by subsequent victory.

The loss of military prestige aggravated our profound moral and economic depression. Nations are intolerant of hunger when accompanied by humiliation, and in 1898 the people rose in open revolt from one end of the peninsula to the other. Severe repressive measures followed, and short-sighted reactionary coercion laws were enacted. This intolerable state of things gave rise to the moral environment which led to the assassination of King Humbert in 1900.

AN UNNATURAL ALLIANCE

You may be inclined to think that I have an exaggerated tendency to attribute all the ills which have befallen Italy since 1881 to the German alliance. Well, I admit that political and social phenomena are complex, and that we cannot account for the distressing events which have hampered Italian development during the past thirty years by merely pointing to Germany. Nevertheless, it is my deliberate opinion that we should have avoided many evils and been better prepared both morally and economically to face those which could not be avoided had we not entered the Triple Alliance. By veering round toward Austria and Germany we avoided the paths familiar to our thinkers, our men of science, our merchants, our bankers. We abandoned markets accustomed to our products, and, what was much more serious, we were false to our traditions, to our history. The roads leading to Austria and Germany were not those trodden by Mazzini, by Victor Emmanuel, by Garibaldi, by Cavour. We had experienced the fruits of German friendship in 1866, and had come out worsted; yet we allowed ourselves to be again inveigled within the circle of German ambitions and intrigues.

WHERE DID ITALY COME IN?

As you know, Germany and Austria have not hesitated to use the most insulting language toward Italy. Of the equity and propriety of such vulgar abuse you Americans, accustomed to the dignity befitting a great nation, may be allowed to judge. But among other statements they have ascribed the recent prosperity of Italy to the friendship of the Central Empires. I will therefore try to show the kind of benefits we have received from these allies during the past thirty years.

In the first place, the Triple Alliance was not freely entered into by Italy to promote and protect her interests. The alliance was forced on us when German intrigues had alienated us from France and consequently somewhat cooled our cordial relations with England. It was forced on a country which as a result of Bismarck's action in 1866 (described by our eminent statesman, Ruggero Bonghi, as "the most disgraceful one could imagine") had been left with open frontiers and an unprotected sea coast, completely at the mercy of her age-long oppressor, Austria. The means to which Bismarck then had recourse to bend our Government to his will were the same which have again recently been tried with us, i. e., threats, intimidation, a venal press campaign, an intricate network of spies, the acquisition of interested support in Government circles.

AN EFFECTIVE THREAT

On the whole, our governing classes (to their honor be it said) were highly reluctant to enter into an alliance the moral monstrosity of which was obvious, and which they foresaw would be disastrous to our relations with France. The threat which finally overcame all hesitation was that of reopening the Roman Question, which Italy had reason to consider definitely settled by the enactment on her part of the Law of Guarantees. Nevertheless, the threat seemed serious and the danger imminent, and Lutheran Germany went so far as to offer a safe asylum to the Pope and his Court at Fulda during the conference of the powers which was to have reconsidered the position of the Roman Pontiff.

The Italian Government was thus virtually coerced into the alliance, which we had to accept in the form proposed by the Central Empires. Indeed, it was as much as our Foreign Minister, Mancini, could do to safeguard our internal independence from a clause formulated at Vienna which aimed at binding our Government down to a conservative policy. He failed to secure a mutual guarantee of the respective territories of the allies and of the equilibrium in the Mediterranean; in fact, the treaty was drawn up to favor solely the interests of the two predominant partners. Germany succeeded in detaching us definitely from France and from an anti-German policy, and Austria, having thus settled the Adriatic question, was free to carry out her policy in the Balkans.

ITALIAN HOPES DECEIVED

The immediate results of the alliance, as far as Italy was concerned, were moral and economic depression, military defeat, humiliation, hunger, and revolt. Nothing could compensate us for the sacrifice of our traditions on the altar of the alliance, but it was only natural that we looked for some compensation at least in the political and economic arena.

Those Italians who had honestly supported the alliance believed that our country would obtain some substantial advantages therefrom. They believed that by renouncing our claims to integrate our national frontiers we should at least be able to live in peace with Austria on the Adriatic, and that she would abandon the policy of persecution by which she tried to denationalize the Italian provinces still subject to her rule. They hoped that Austrian intrigues in the Balkans would cease, and that those countries and the Adriatic would be open to the peaceable and loyal competition of both peoples. They thought that by eliminating a possible enemy the cost of armaments would be reduced, and that, in case of difficulties with Austria, Italy would have the support of the third powerful ally.

It was reasonable to suppose that our allies would assist us in our efforts to maintain our position in the Mediterranean, more especially as regards France. Some also cherished the hope that our peninsula, flung out like a huge jetty into the Mediterranean, would become a great centre for trade between Central Europe and the East and Africa to the advantage of all concerned. Moreover, it was thought that our allies would be likely to consider our strength and our prosperity as advantageous to themselves, and it therefore seemed reasonable to suppose that Germany more especially would be willing to give financial and economic support to Italy in the grave difficulties which the alliance had created for us.

All these hopes were destined, however, to bitter disappointment.

AUSTRIA AS AN ALLY

Prince von Bülow, in his book, "Imperial Germany," attributes to our Ambassador, Costantino Nigra, the opinion that "Italy and Austria can only be allies or enemies." The fact is that Austria was never so dangerous an enemy to Italy as when she was her ally. We vainly hoped that the alliance would insure tranquillity on our Austrian frontier, and Austria never ceased to persecute and oppress her Italian subjects, despite the fact that, in their anxiety not to embarrass the Italian Government, they had with great abnegation restricted their nationalist agitation within the limits allowed by Austrian law. Indeed, this had greatly weakened the agitation on their behalf in Italy itself. Thus, Austria had attained the object she sought by the alliance; the nationalist movement for reclaiming the unredeemed provinces had died down. Yet she persisted in her odious system of stirring up race hatred between the various peoples subject to her rule, egging them on, the one against the other, favoring by any unjust and tyrannical means those ethnic elements which were anti-Italian.

Space will not allow me to make more than a brief reference to the truly heroic struggle of the Italians of Trent, the Upper Adige, Julian Venetia, and Dalmatia to maintain the civilization and traditions of their race against Germans, Slovaks, Magyars, and Serbo-Croatians. Nor will I dwell on the fact that most of our periodicals and other publications were prohibited in Austria, that a fierce economic war was waged against us in the Adriatic, and that only with enormous difficulty was it possible for us to maintain our relations with our ally on an even tolerable footing.

AN UNJUST DECREE

The persecution of Italians settled in Austria, who were not Austrian subjects, culminated two years ago, just after Italy had made important concessions to settle difficulties which had arisen in the Balkans, and when no other clouds were to be seen on the political horizon, by the so-called "decrees" of Prince Hohenlohe, Governor of Trieste. By a stroke of the pen, and without any warning, he dismissed some hundreds of Italians employed for long years past in the municipal, provincial, and Governmental administrations as workmen, clerks, business men, sea Captains, engineers, doctors, &c. Thus, people who had been settled in Trieste for years and years suddenly found themselves deprived of their means of subsistence and of the results of years of labor merely because they were the citizens of a friendly and allied country.

For years hardly a day has gone by but the papers have recorded some attack or provocation by the civil or military authorities of Austria against Italian citizens, territories, or interests. All this is amply proved by the works of

Virginio Gayda, Alessandro Dudan, and H. W. Stead, which show how odious and incorrigible has been the policy of the Hapsburgs toward Italy and the Italians.

You will doubtless remember that we had evidence of this inveterate antipathy of Austria for all things Italian when we were together at the International Agricultural Congress at Vienna in May, 1907. You will not have forgotten that when the initiative taken by our King for the foundation of the International Institute of Agriculture was discussed the profound aversion of the Austrians for Italy and her sovereign found clear expression in the remarks made by the President of the Austrian Agriculturists, Count Hohenblum. The fact is that loyalty, good faith, a sense of honor have always been absent in the dealings of Austria with her Italian ally.

ITALY THE ENEMY

Having by the alliance crippled Italy as an independent agent in Europe, Austria, strong in Germany's support, never renounced her designs of conquest in the Aegean Sea. The realization of this dream encountered two main obstacles in the opposition of Russia and Italy, the natural protectors of the young Balkan nations. As Russia was too formidable an adversary, Austria was always longing to pick a quarrel with Italy, who could count on no valid supporters, and whom Germany would willingly have deserted for a share in the booty.

For all these reasons Austria looked upon Italy as her natural enemy, and the clerical fanaticism which prevails in governing circles in Vienna envenomed the hatred originating in political rivalry. In Austrian military circles references to "the enemy" were understood to refer to Italy. Indeed, our country was openly referred to in these terms in certain military charts which were hung up in all Austrian barracks until a few years ago, when, as the result of a question asked in our Parliament, the name of Italy was covered by pasting over it a paper label. In short, during the thirty-three years of the alliance, the only quarter from which Italy really had to fear an attack was from Austria.

PLANS FOR INVASION

Thrice during the past few years the danger of such an aggression became acute. In 1905 the most authoritative organs of the Austrian press and eminent Austrian officials openly spoke of their intention of marching on Milan the following Spring. That this was no vain threat was made evident to me when I was in Vienna in 1907 by an authoritative and very well-informed person who added that the project was only abandoned because Austria had not yet completed one of her strategic railways leading to our frontier, and more especially because the Austrian General Staff had been unable to procure reliable information as to the efficacy of our heavy artillery.

Yet more threatening preparations for an attack on Italy were made toward the close of 1908. Austria had then mobilized her army for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Italy had resigned herself to this open violation of the status quo in the Balkans, which the Triple Alliance guaranteed, and had not even claimed those compensations in the Trentino which had been promised in such an event when the treaty was renewed in 1886. Despite this, when at the end of 1908 we were afflicted by the most terrible earthquake which history records, the occasion seemed favorable to our ally for assaulting us while her armies were still mobilized. The head of the Austrian General Staff, General Conrad, was determined on this course, which, however, the Chancellor, Count Aerenthal, thought would be a political mistake. Count Aerenthal was then in high favor owing to the success of his policy of annexation in the Balkans, and his views prevailed with the Emperor. The danger blew over for the time being.

Again, the Green Book, recently published by our Minister of Foreign Affairs, shows that we ran a grave danger of being attacked by Austria in the midst of our Lybian war, and when it will be possible to publish in full the history of that campaign it will be seen that most of the enormous expense we then had to meet was due not to the war itself but to the threats and restrictions placed by

Austria on our action against Turkey and to the danger of an attack which the military party at Vienna loudly advocated.

FORTIFYING AGAINST AN ALLY

Despite the alliance Austria spent much larger sums on strategic railways and other warlike preparations along our short frontier, on which she held magnificent natural positions, than she expended on the far longer and less naturally strong Russian frontier; and we on our side were compelled to spend far more in preparations against our ally, Austria, than against France.

Although Italy's attitude was constantly remissive, Austria's policy toward her never ceased to be insincere and hostile. At the Conference of London after the Balkan wars Italy was forced by Austria, against her wishes and her interests, to refuse a seaport to Serbia and to deprive Montenegro of Scutari, which she had won at the cost of so much bloodshed. We had to participate in the creation of that ridiculous Kingdom of Albania under the ineffable Prince de Wied; nor did this suffice, for we had to parry a whole series of Austrian intrigues to avoid being bottled up in the Adriatic at the mouth of the canal of Otranto.

THE RULING PARTNER

Such has been the Austrian alliance with Italy! Had the predominating partner, Germany, wished, she could easily have induced Austria to modify her attitude toward us, but she refrained from interfering when, indeed, she did not openly side with Vienna, as in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The fact is that the German alliance was even more disappointing in its results. Although, by Bismarck's wish, the equilibrium in the Mediterranean was not specifically guaranteed by the treaty, Italy nevertheless had a right to suppose that her alliance with the two powerful empires would strengthen her position and assist her expansion in that direction. Instead of this, the political and economic status of our country in the Eastern Mediterranean steadily declined. Before the alliance Italian commerce, faithful to the glorious traditions set by the Italian republics, was active at Saloniki, Constantinople, Smyrna, Alexandria, and throughout Asia Minor. The commercial language of those ports was Italian, a large proportion of the functionaries and contractors in Turkey and Egypt were Italians, as were also the physicians and chemists in the service of the pascias. Numbers of Italian families, grouped round the Franciscan missionaries, had been settled for generations in those countries, preserving intact their national traditions.

After the conclusion of the alliance Italy lost the valuable assistance of French finance, which instead helped the Greek merchant marine and Greek commerce. But our worst enemy in the Mediterranean was Germany herself, for while French, English, and Greek expansion was conducted on the basis of free and loyal competition, with the natural and normal diplomatic support of their respective Governments, our ally, Germany, fought our commercial development by very different means.

ECONOMIC PENETRATION

The hopes of German financial support were also destined to disappointment. When Crispi hinted at Berlin at Italian requirements, a German financial magnate hastened to Rome and proposed to Sonnino, who, luckily for us, was then Minister of the Treasury, to arrange for a loan to be guaranteed by handing over the administration of the customs of our leading seaports to Germany. True, a consortium of German bankers was formed to maintain the value of Italian Government bonds on the international exchanges, but again the advantage we derived therefrom is dubious, as it soon became an instrument for promoting German economic predominance in Italy.

The audacious and arrogant designs of Germany to establish her supremacy throughout the world have been too clearly illustrated by recent events to call for any words of mine. As a perspicacious business man and an enlightened student of economics you certainly have not failed to note the persistency with which Germany has availed herself of every means within her power, even of the most unusual and artificial, to penetrate into the economic life of every country. But had this turbulent activity been confined to purely economic ends, had it been carried on within the limits of free competition, it would not have been so dangerous and intolerable to other nations even though assisted by such devices as bounties on exports, shipping subsidies, &c., which Germany has freely used as a means of undermining the most carefully planned protective tariffs. All these devices are undoubtedly injurious to the countries against whom they are devised; still they can be parried by other treaties, alliances, coalitions, and by internal protective measures. But the economic activity of Germany aimed at political as well as economic supremacy.

The tragic events of this war have shown that German agricultural and industrial enterprises in Belgium and France, German engineers, business men, and merchants, were but the forerunners of military invasion. Much is already known, and we shall learn yet more when the history of the German preparations for this infamous war shall be written in full.

Italy had to learn that German friendship is yet more dangerous to national independence than German enmity. The multifarious activities of Germans in our country did not aim at honest co-operation in a common task, but took the form of economic exploitation; nor were they used to strengthen political ties on a basis of reciprocity and mutual independence, but to force us into a position of effective political subjection.

The means by which Germany worked to bring about the economic and political subjection of her ally have been carefully studied by two of our friends who were pioneers in the work for the International Institute of Agriculture, Maffeo Pantaleoni and Antonio de Viti de Marco. Other valuable works on this subject have been published by Ezio M. Gray, Dr. Giovanni Preziosi, and the Duke Colonna di Cesaro, a nephew of Sonnino's. Americans by consulting these works will find documentary evidence of the terrible power which Germany had acquired by various and devious means in Italy.

[To be concluded in June Issue]

Italian Humor of the War

[From L'Asino, Rome]

“ But tell me, my Bulgarian friend, why did you go into the war? ”

“ For honor.”

“ Ah, I understand. Every one fights to obtain that which he does not possess.”

Magazinists of the World on the War

Condensed From Leading Reviews

In the excerpts printed in this department of CURRENT HISTORY will be found examples of the current thought of all the warring countries, as represented by many of their leading writers and most influential periodicals.

The Reshaping of Mid-Europe

By H. N. Brailsford

An English article under the foregoing title in The Contemporay Review is devoted to a noteworthy German book, "Mitteleuropa," whose author, Dr. Friedrich Naumann, has voiced the new-born German ambition for a political and economic union of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria under Prussian leadership. Some of the more significant passages follow:

DR. NAUMANN'S argument for the creation of Mid-Europe is based on three considerations—power, security, and prosperity. The argument on power is the simplest of all:

> All the combatants in this war feel instinctively that neither now nor in the future can powers of a small or moderate size hope to conduct high policy, *(grosse Politik machen.)* Our notions of magnitude have undergone a tremendous change since this war. Only very large States have now any significance of their own; the smaller survive by using the struggles of the larger for their own ends, or else they must ask permission, whenever they want to make any unusual movement. Sovereignty, in the sense of freedom of decision in the world's history, is now concentrated on a very few spots of the earth's surface. The spirit of wholesale trade and super-national organization has gripped politics.

Repugnant as this diagnosis may seem to liberal minds, it is, I think, a fair rendering of realities. With all our sympathy for little nationalities, we have taken great care not to be a little nationality ourselves. Independence is clearly a relative term, and only an omnipotent State could be absolutely sovereign. "Only in three places," says Dr. Naumann, elsewhere, "is sovereignty really exercised," (wird es regiert,) and these three capitals are London, New York, and Petrograd. The British Empire, the United States, and Russia are all of them composite, supernational structures. They alone, in his definition, are, in the full sense of the word, world powers, which conduct their policy on the Continental scale and enjoy a real freedom of decision. There is, he thinks, no alternative between the world power and the planetary or satellite State, which must adjust its every movement to fit the revolutions of greater systems.

Besides these three world powers, Mid-Europe must be the fourth. Dr. Naumann leaves its limits carefully vague. He insists that its kernel must be a closer union of Germany with Austria-Hungary. To the elaboration of this union his book is wholly devoted, and it is only in stray passages that he hints at the subsequent adhesion of Bulgaria and Turkey, and in one place at the gradual crystallization around Mid-Europe of some of the smaller neutrals.

Dr. Naumann draws another argument, sinister, indeed, but terribly plausible, from the strategical conditions of this war. Trench warfare involves trench politics. Frontiers can no longer be an ideal line upon the map; they will be actual trenches which must follow the course of every boundary on which war is a possibility. It is a return to the Roman or Chinese wall, made this time of earth and barbed wire. There is probably no exaggeration here, and certainly the French are convinced that if they had drawn trenches before the war along the frontier, their border regions could never have been overrun. The lesson will not be lost on other peoples.

Dr. Naumann declares frankly that

the real meaning of the war lies in the struggle between two phases of capitalism, the obsolete but still powerful British phase of individualism in industry and commerce, and the more modern German phase of collective work and regulated commerce. Generalizations of this type seem to me, I confess, the merest impressionism. What he means, boldly put, is, of course, that we entered the war in the hope of destroying German trade. The play of conscious motive is never so crude as this among civilized peoples. But great industrial peoples cannot conduct war without reference to trade, and once war is declared considerations of trade will inevitably help to shape their policy.

The working of this factor on the German side is brilliantly illuminated by Dr. Naumann's argument. The new capitalism, of which he writes, is based upon the partial amalgamation of private businesses. It is organized in cartels, trusts, or syndicates, which conduct researches in common, purchase raw material in common, sell in the export market through common agencies, and allot to each business in the home market its own radius for sales. The larger the trust and the greater the home market which it can monopolize the greater is the economy from large production, and the greater, consequently, is its advantage in competing with the trade of other nations abroad. It follows (I am here supplying my own gloss on Dr. Naumann's argument) that there is a double advantage in linking up two national commercial systems, like the German and the Austrian. In the first place, you increase the horse power, so to speak, of the unified producing industry, and in the second place endow it with a wider internal market. In so far, then, as the war was ism. That German capitalism lay behind necessary for the foundation of Mid-Europe, it is possible to regard it as an expression of this new German capitalthe war, because it was bent on the economic exploitation of Turkey, was already a familiar idea to most of us. This new light on the economic conquest of Austria reveals a subtler thought, which is, one suspects, at the same time an afterthought.

At this critical point in his argument Dr. Naumann adroitly wraps his meaning in poetry. He writes with real eloquence on the German ideal of "common work" and collective industry, its "disciplined soul," its readiness to sink the individual self in the collective self, its belief in conscious and constructive reason as opposed to the blind struggle for existence of British competitive individualism. The plain prose of the argument is, however, that Austria is invited to enter, of her own will, the German industrial system.

* * *

What reaction does the idea of Mid-Europe demand from the Entente? We certainly shall not watch the creation of Mid-Europe as our fathers watched the creation of the German Empire, with satisfaction and congratulation. But we shall make a grave mistake if we assume that it is inspired by an aggressive and hostile purpose. Its aim is not world dominion, but the conquest for Germany by combination of a place in the world side by side with the three existing supernational organizations—the British, the Russian, and the American. Its purpose is not the destruction of British wealth and empire, but rather the cultivation of a great German estate by elaborate intensive methods. It is a risky and disturbing project, because in the present mood of the world it is only too likely to invite reprisals and tariff wars, and to dig broader and deeper the trenches which divide us. Dr. Naumann himself anticipates this result, and predicts that we shall return to Mr. Chamberlain's schemes. How far this tendency shall go depends as much on us as upon the Germans.

The Spirit of Russia and the War

By Prince G. Lvoff

President of the All-Russian Zemstvo Union

As a publicist and social worker Prince Lvoff is highly regarded in Russian intellectual circles. The article here presented is translated for CURRENT HISTORY from the Russkia Vedomosti of Moscow.

THE war conflagration is not yet abating. The blaze of frightfulness is expanding, lighting up ever higher and wider the skies of the world, shooting its sparks ever further and further. New fires are bursting forth on every side. And when one asks how soon the victorious conclusion will come, there is no answer, for the end is not yet in sight.

Millions of strong and noble lives have been swept away; energy has been wasted and forces have been destroyed which would have lasted for decades, perhaps for centuries, of peaceful, industrious life. Colossal natural resources have been consumed, precious treasures accumulated by human genius have been demolished, which would have subsisted many generations of humanity. And still there is no end. This merciless destruction has naturally furnished some foundation for calling this callous and monstrous war a "war of exhaustion," and for regarding the measure of full exhaustion of its participants as the measure for the duration of the war.

But is it so? Has the war really become a merely physical contest, a war for the sake of war, destruction, victory, to end in the prostration of one's powers? This unimaginable exertion of Europe's civilized forces, these numberless sacrifices—are they nothing but mankind's self-slaughter? Is there not some higher creative force in control of this tremendous effort?

The reason why the end of the war has not yet come in sight is that only now does its real meaning commence to become clear through the black clouds of smoke. Only now it begins to grow apparent that it may last as long as it had already; that it may stop and blaze up again, but cannot end either in brutal conquest or in mutual exhaustion. It can end only in the triumph of the world's creative spirits, which alone are capable of solving the fundamental problems in the lives of the nations. For this war is not waged for territorial aggression, it has not been started by one of the nations for the domination of the world. All these are but outward pretexts and outward forms for expressing the spiritual substance of the war. Its very intensity has shown that it originated and will terminate not in the realm of physical power, not in the fields of slaughter, not in general battles, but in higher, spiritual planes, in the victory of the highest moral forces.

It is not for machine guns and mortars to decide the issues of this struggle, for they are but themselves tools of the higher spiritual forces. The war will come to an end only when a way to transform the old order of life into a new one shall have been found, when humanity's spiritual efforts shall have been spent on the creation of a new life.

This war has separated the past from the present by a heavy curtain. Whenever and however it may come to an end, it is clear that we are through with the old order of things, and a new one will have to take its place. Even now, in the heat of bloody death, one can see the signs of the germinating new life. Along with the destructive energy there moves a creative energy, as there teems a new life along with death. It abates not, it subsides not, even at the front. On the contrary, that is the very place where it is coming into existence. The hands are in blood, the face is obscured in powder smoke, but there blazes in the soul a glowing love of country capable of bearing fruit. In the armies, as in a storage battery, there is being accumulated energy for a new life. And in this tempest of war, as in a tropical cyclone, the air is saturated with the ozone of spiritual forces. When the armies return home there will be wings at their shoulders. Behind them they will leave not the years of war but the thousands of years of the old life, and before them there will rise the sun of the loftiest spiritual knowledge.

Cowardly, base souls tremble at the spectre of approaching shocks, in which they see the ruin of their personal prosperity. But the bankruptcy of their sordid materialism is nothing in comparison with the revolution that will take place in the human soul. Before it all previous revolutions will pale into insignificance. It will radically change the conditions of man's life, raising it to unprecedented altitudes. It will create a new earth and a new heaven.

A metamorphosis in the form of human life seems imminent after the war, but it will come, not as a result of conquests and military activities, but as a result of internal changes in the human intellect, as a result of an enhanced consciousness. Its beginning is already becoming evident. Does not the universal rise in the spirit of the nations show it? To be sure, we are sometimes disturbed by dark spots on the screen of current events. But after looking into the substance of all of it one will perceive that these spots really belong to the cinematic film. On a rich soil, under a parching sun, there grows up along with the magnificent useful vegetation one of thorns and weeds. Thus in civilization the highest and lowest species grow side by side in human life, but under the influence of civilization the latter degenerates and makes room for the former.

The most tremendous straining of the world's spiritual and moral powers, that is what will terminate the horrors of war, that is the only way to a truly victorious end. And if the end of the great war is outside of the war, if it rests in the depths of the human consciousness, the responsibility for it should not be put on the shoulders of some exterior force, but where it properly belongs—in the consciences of all and every one of us.

We must all strain our spiritual powers and use them for the erection of a new consciousness, a new conscience, and a new life.

The Future of German Trade

By Dr. I. Jastrow

Professor of Political Economy in the University of Berlin

Writing in Zur Guten Stunde of Germany's future trade policy, Dr. Jastrow says:

NO incident in the present war has impressed the world more than the failure of the English plan of starvation. England took it for granted that her fleet and her influence would suffice to cut off all imports into the enemy's country. That is, what little would get past would be a negligible quantity. And now England sees that Germany can exist within herself. Nothing has proved more conclusive than this economic independence.

As one of the results of this many voices have been raised in support of the proposition that what has been accomplished as a matter of necessity during the war should be made a permanent thing when peace is brought about. At least, it is argued, we should keep on a permanent basis of exchange with our present allies. Those who speak thus, however, underestimate what we have been obtaining from other countries, and what we have been producing for the others. Germany's imports and exports in peace times amount to no less than 10,000,000,000 marks. To take such a huge sum from our economic life without feeling the effect would be impossible, nor would it be possible to find a way of substitution.

With the beginning of the war the Government wisely enough withheld the monthly commercial statistics, but when the time comes for restoring the figures it will be found that during the passing months the foreign trade of Germany has been by no means so inconsequential as some would have us believe. Even with the enemy countries we have done a considerable business. When it came to supplying the important English textile industry with dyestuffs, conceded to be pre-eminently a German chemical product, by way of the neutral trade routes, it was quickly forgotten that there were severe laws prohibiting any trading whatever with the enemy, directly or indirectly.

The war has demonstrated beyond any fear of contradiction that of all the nations on earth Germany is the one to be injured the least of all through interference with foreign commerce. But it would certainly be the height of folly to assume on that account that with its present allies Germany could dispense with the rest of the world. Apart from the fact that no country and no group of countries can by any possibility live for themselves, such an isolation, even though economically possible, would reach far beyond the mere economic and commercial field of action and would result in situations little considered by those who speak so loudly of self-sufficiency.

At the same time there is a good deal to say for closer ties of trade between Germany and Austria-Hungary. And in view of the fact that the countries of Islam in their direst hour of need found support only in Germany and Austria-Hungary, it is certain that there will be some economic understanding between the Turkish Nation and the Central Powers. Here arises the question as to what special political form any trade rapprochement shall assume. The commercial policies of almost all countries are based on what is termed the favored-nation clause. The underlying thought is that when two countries whose frontiers join come to an agreement regarding customs duties and the like it shall be understood that no better terms than these are to be accorded to any other competing nation. Thus all countries upholding this system are on equal terms. This system, which originated with France and England in the sixties, was found so serviceable that when Germany and France settled their dispute in 1870 it was agreed that the Germans in France as well as the French in Germany were to be treated as considerately as the people of any other nation. That is the foundation of the much-quoted Article II. of the Frankfurt Peace Agreement, which says that either nation must treat the other according to the most-favored-nation clause.

The idea of a closer customs union between the Central European nations does not owe its origin to the present war. For about a decade the matter has been under consideration, but its practical application has been prevented by the fact that whenever Germany and the Dual Monarchy agreed on customs changes these identical changes would be claimed by other countries on the basis of the favored-nation clause. The question now is whether present trade policies make it possible for neighbors to show each other preferences.

The world war has established, for one thing, that it puts an end to international treaties. Even while this fact is of negative importance for the present, yet it has the advantage that new regulations may be established. The favored-nation agreement between France and Germany has come to a timely end. So also the treaties with the other warring nations become automatically suspended.

In the coming peace treaties it is very likely that the favored-nation clause will once more be recognized as current, but the form must be different from what it has been. When the great quarrel that now occupies the world is over it will not do to make peace with a view to oppressing any one in the domain of foreign trade. In each of the many peace treaties to be signed it must be stipulated that no nation, whatever the differences before, shall be treated otherwise than friendly nations are being treated. This, and nothing else, underlies the favored-nation clause, and this principle must be maintained.

In view of what the future will decide, it is time for the allied nations of Central Europe to initiate a move for a commercial understanding that shall place Germany and Austria-Hungary in the clear light of what these countries need. Islam must be taken care of at the same time, so that she will not find her trade paths obstructed. All signs point toward even closer relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary. They will be economic competitors, but competitors that will aid rather than hinder mutual progress. As regards Turkey, they will be of one mind; due consideration will be given to climatic and cultural phases relating to the development of Islam. Germany and Austria-Hungary have no intention of taking the stand against Turkey which Russia, England, and France have taken. The "policy of partition," as it may be termed, will be done away with. Aside from some ports and coaling stations, a point not difficult to be agreed on, where the countries of Islam now are free they must remain so. And wherever Islam's liberty has been wrongfully taken away an effort must be made for restoration.

Without excluding other nations we shall endeavor to encourage the closest sympathy with our present allies. The idea of mutual exchange shall be dominant. Each exchange will centre around a policy of give and take. It is not only that the cultural productions of the West confront the natural treasures of the East. From north to south there now stretches a wonderful trade belt. From the border of North Schleswig to the mouths of the united Euphrates and Tigris, even to the southernmost point of Yemen, the territory includes every kind of vegetation. To promote mutual trade along this great route is the purpose crystallized in the magic phrase, "From Hamburg to Bagdad."

Germany's Mental Isolation

By Patrik Haglund

Professor of Medicine, Stockholm

"What impressed you most deeply in Germany?" was the question put by the Dagens Nyheter to prominent Swedes who had recently visited that country. Professor Haglund wrote in reply: "The amazing ignorance of facts among the country people," adding:

THIS mental isolation is naturally caused by the censorship, which evidently is very clever in keeping all in ignorance of everything that might give rise to inconvenient reflections. That the intellectual means of communication between people can really be stopped like that is certainly imposing from the point of view of organizing capacity. One would hardly think it possible nowadays.

Anything more meagre than the German press I cannot imagine. Besides the official war news there was hardly anything but propaganda articles and, just at that time, numbers of paragraphs about the administration of law in Belgium, which perhaps were read with satisfaction by the Germans, but which gave anybody with an ordinary sense of justice little more than a feeling of discomfort. And what kind of propaganda articles! At a railway station I bought the Frankfurter Neueste Nachrichten, to judge from its size and extensive sale by no means a small local newspaper. The whole of the first page was occupied by an article with the heading, in giant letters, "Assassination in War." In this article was put before an astonished world circumstantial evidence that ten or more Englishmen, prominent for their pro-German sympathies, who had died lately, had been done away with by the British Government.

This is only one instance. With such a press the ignorance of the people must, of course, be appalling. Thus a doctor expressed the greatest amazement when I told him that we only paid so and so much for the German mark in Sweden, and he was quite dumfounded when, in reply to his question why we did anything so mad, I answered that we considered the mark not worth more. Even officers and doctors who had been to the fronts were absolutely ignorant of everything that had not happened in their immediate circle of action.

Berlin gives one an indescribable impression of war weariness. It is not only among the civilian population that this is evident; the soldiers, wounded or unwounded, have the appearance of being mentally and physically fatigued.

On the other hand, the position of the women seems to have undergone a change. Before the war the German women, with all their incontestable excellence, always appeared to me somewhat ridiculous in the way they "looked up" to every member of the stronger sex, even the most insignificant. Now they have an air of fearlessness and of conscious self-control. They give an impression of having realized what they now have to perform, of their new position in a community where in so many directions they are taking the place of men.

The Virtues of Militarism

By Maurice Révai

Former Hungarian Deputy

This serious defense of German military ideals appeared in the Revue de Hongroie, Budapest:

MILITARISM is not a German but a French invention, for it was during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars that the army acquired the organization and importance which have resulted in the German militarism of today. Further, as far as size and cost of armies go, Germany is far from occupying the first place. No one is ignorant that the biggest military power is Russia, and that in France the army in time of peace is larger than in Germany, not only in proportion to population, but absolutely, for France has re-established the three-year-service system, while in Germany and Austria-Hungary it was two years. Nor is it true that Germany has spent most on her army. England, without compulsory service, devoted much more money to armaments. While Germany is obliged by her geographical position to maintain a powerful land force, England for the same reason increases her naval power to a far greater extent than her army. In 1913 Germany spent 1,476,000,000 marks on her fleet and army, and England 1,521,000,000 marks on hers.

In Germany military expenditure averages about $5.20, and in England $8 per head, of population. Yet the English adopted the ingenious notion of regarding as their motive in this war the danger of German militarism to the whole world. Our enemies assert that Germany has caused the war, and that if the Germans had not wished it they would not have made such careful preparations or spent so much money and their best energies in developing the power of the German Army to such a high degree. Our reply is that it is England, France, and Russia who have forced armaments on Germany; England forced Germany to arm by her policy of encirclement. And now the curious thing is that, while German militarism is blamed for the war, the complaint is made that the German example was not followed. The English press ceaselessly attacks the British Government on this score. How does it come about that this militarism which the year before was the cause of all evil is today worthy of being copied? It is simply that our enemies have now recognized that German militarism is a means of victory.

German militarism does not mean only military organization, preparation for the struggle, and concentration of all the warlike virtues, but also the spirit which penetrates with the sentiment of duty all the strata of the German people, the love of country, the unshakable faith in the power of the nation, and the firm, whole-hearted determination to emerge victorious from the struggle. The German carries into civil life this spirit of militarism which has been inculcated in him in the barracks. Since everybody undergoes military service, this same spirit of order, this same exactitude, this same scrupulousness, this same readiness for self-sacrifice, reign in the public administration, in the school, the church, the courts, in the factory, the office, and the workshop, in the family, in fact, everywhere.

It cannot be said that such militarism is the enemy of civilization, since Bernard Shaw and Chesterton, Anatole France and Bergson, declare for it in the fervor of their patriotism. In this connection it is interesting to note the view of German militarism taken by an Englishman, who is, moreover, a Socialist, namely, Robert Blatchford, who in 1910 spent six weeks in Germany studying this militarism and publishing in the anti-German Daily Mail a series of articles with the definite object of inducing England to adopt compulsory military service.

"The German workman," he said, "is more sober, orderly, and intelligent than the English workman. He owes this largely to the military training he has received in his youth, which makes him a disciplined being, producing all the habits of cleanliness, order, and politeness. A military training teaches young men to live rationally, dress neatly, and acquire a taste for open-air exercise. It is a kind of physical culture, thanks to which he becomes accustomed to early rising and getting enough sleep. This education is as beneficial to the mind as to the physique; it rouses in a man a feeling of self-respect and gives him an agile body."

German militarism realizes what Cicero called the maximum accomplishment of duty, that is to say, the virtue which consists in putting all one's energies at the disposal of the community, of subordinating the interest of the individual to that of the Fatherland. This war has shown that it is not the number of bayonets that decides battles, but the spirit by which the soldiers are animated. Now, that was exactly the spirit of the Germans. Every impartial observer had had to take account of the fact that the German Army is not a flock of sheep setting out under the order of a Prince, but a people in arms, conscious that it is fighting for all that is most sacred in the world—Fatherland, freedom, and family.

But German militarism is, moreover, a guarantee of peace. Despite her formidable army, Germany had had no war for forty-three years, while during the same period her present enemies have carried on wars—and wars of conquest—in every part of the world. German militarism is just as old as the German Empire, and since it came into existence it has left every one alone, has attacked no one, but has kept the peace. However paradoxical it may seem, the military system based upon compulsory and universal service is better fitted to safeguard peace than any other. Some Englishmen have recognized this thoroughly. General Hamilton in a book published in 1910 said that the English Liberal Cabinet had rejected compulsory service, preferring a professional army, because it is only with such an army, and not with a national army, that wars of conquest in remote countries can be undertaken and foreign policy made to conform to the imperialist traditions and aims of Great Britain. A professional army and the fleet carry on the war alone, while the rest of the people go on quietly working, paying the cost, and not regarding the war too seriously. Lord Haldane, at that time War Minister, wrote the preface to the book.

Hamilton and Haldane are right. Wars of conquest such as those of the English cannot be waged except with mercenaries. Compulsory and universal service does not provide armies of adventurers who serve for money, who look on war as a trade, and who are lacking in patriotism, but armies composed of fathers of families and young men who are the support of their parents. Such armies are ready for any sacrifice to defend their native soil. That is why an army such as the German Army is strong only when it is struggling for existence and honor against an attack from outside. It could not be used for conquest or to realize other ambitions. Militarism like that is, therefore, the surest guarantee of peace.

But there is another safeguard. This army being formed from all the elements of the nation, the rulers and statesmen have on that account a responsibility so heavy that it is impossible for a Prince or a Minister to go to war except for the most serious reasons. That is the power of German militarism; that is why England and her allies fear it so greatly.

Teutonic Ignorance of Russia

By a Russian Publicist

This article, written for the Russkoye Slovo of Moscow by its celebrated feuilletonist, Bayan, is regarded by Russians as one of the best analyses of Germany's failure to understand Russia that have appeared since the outbreak of the war.

THE German press is interpreting in many different ways the party discords in the Duma. The stenographic reports of the speeches made by the party leaders are fully reproduced. Germany is paying not less attention to our political life than to our front. And in Berlin and Vienna more is expected from our political strife than from our material disorganization.

During the last decade the Germans have been forming a very light view of our society and people. Our political parties are little known to them. As everywhere, they had heard of the Cadets and Octobrists. But the first are being confused with the students of the military academies, and the second are known as the "serfs" of our boyar Gutchkov. To the Germany which knows so well our geography, topography, and all the details of our military defense, which has made the minutest study of our economic system, which has learned so unmistakably where and how our ills are located—to this Germany, which has spent hundreds of millions on military, economic, and other espionage, Russia's political life is still a dark mystery.

Germany, which has considered Russia a rich pasture, a German colony, always entertained nothing but contempt for our political organism and our political consciousness. Germans did not think us capable of such things. Entirely engrossed in enslaving Russia's material forces, they have overlooked our spiritual forces. Till the outbreak of the war and even during its first months they were cognizant of only two currents in Russia's political life—the Government and anti-Government forces. In Russia, it was thought, only destructive elements were at large in society, (nihilism, anarchism, rebellion,) and the Government existed only for the purpose of bridling them. Because of this view, the Russian Government was to Germany the symbol of order and law. Russia, according to Germany, owed its comparative civilization to the Government, and, her interest in Russia being purely materialistic, calling only for outward civility, Germany always clung to the Government and the reactionary forces behind it. Germany supported the power that maintained order in her immense Russian pasture, the shepherds who were guarding the German flocks feeding upon it. Had Miliukov and Tcheidze happened to play the rôles of shepherds, Germany, in all probability, would have supported them as ardently as it did Count Witte and Kokovtzov.

Russia's enormous and complicated political life thus slipped by Germany as a Chinese shadow, showing only some comical figures of Cadets and Octobrists. While German commercial agents were studying the Russian markets in a

LORD ROBERT CECIL
British Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Who Is Also Cabinet Minister of Blockade and Contraband
(Photo by Elliott & Fry)

MAJOR GEN. CHARLES TOWNSHEND
Whose British Expedition to Bagdad Has Been Besieged for Months at Kut-el-Amara, on the Tigris
(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)

phenomenal fashion, and German spies were discovering on Russia's infinite boundaries little elevations for concrete foundations to be built for Germany's mortars, Germany's correspondents and diplomats were thoughtlessly and stupidly passing by the growth of Russia's political consciousness. At the beginning of the war German diplomacy assured the Kaiser that the Russian people were on the eve of a revolution, and that the Russian intellectuals were ready to support the Prussian King.

In the last six months Germany has lived through, as far as disillusionment and sobering up is concerned, sixty years. In this period of time she has, among other things, rediscovered the power of Russia, "buried" by her strategists after the capture of our fortresses. It is difficult to find out when and how this metamorphosis regarding Russia took place. There were no public announcements or explanations about it. Neither the General Staff nor the newspapers have refuted their previous fanfaronades. And, though confidence in ultimate victory has remained in Germany, it is not what it used to be, being colored in a different dye. Silently but resolutely Germany has acknowledged the indestructibility of Russia's military power, and to the Teutons the Russian Army has again become a portentous factor. Russia's material power is depressing Teutonic confidence. And contemporaneously with it there appears the relief of another terrible Russian power—the Russian spirit.

Germany has not yet penetrated the secret of Russia's political life, of her political ideals. The conflicts among these are still puzzles to her. Germany eagerly seizes the scandalous in our political life and spreads that diligently, supporting and justifying her former stupidity. The Germans are still being brought up in the doctrine that Russia is a barbarous country, unripe for citizenship. But at the same time they are being prepared for surprises by some of her leaders, who, without spending much time on investigations and study, have been able, with their characteristic German practicality, to sense our secret.

Thus we witness as silent and abrupt a change in Germany's attitude toward our body politic as toward our front. She now acknowledges our second elemental force—the Duma. This recognition has become so general that her official organ was compelled recently to formulate it. The famous article in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, denying Wilhelm's leanings toward the Russian reactionary forces, was only the expression of Germany's newest view of political Russia. Our rights to citizenship are now recognized, and the Duma is now held to be the personification of these rights and of our political maturity. Official Germany has finally come to the conviction that the voice of the Russian people can be heard only in the Duma, that there and thence flow all the currents of our spiritual life. Hence—her convulsive attempts at a separate peace.

The Russian Government can either strengthen or weaken this conviction. Whatever may happen in the Duma, the fact of its existence alone is a terror to our enemy. The army and the Duma are the Russian Scylla and Charybdis. It is inconceivable how the German ship could pass through them.

Germany's Total War Losses in Men

By Hilaire Belloc

As the result of a series of studies on German war losses, Mr. Belloc publishes the following totals in Land and Water, London:

WHEN the history of the war can be written with all documents available, no careful student of the situation will be surprised if the total German losses of every kind up to the end of 1915 prove close on four millions.

We have now established all the four categories of absolute permanent loss. The first category arrived at by the calculation already presented to my reader gives us one million dead. The second category gives us about a quarter of a million prisoners. The third category, the permanently disabled wounded, gives us 1,600,000. The fourth category, the permanently disabled from sickness, gives us 600,000. We should have altogether from these categories just under three million—2,850,000 men.

Then, to this number which is the minimum permanent dead loss, what have we to add for the wounded and sick that will ultimately return, but are still in hospitals or in convalescence?

There again we have the analogy of the allied statistics to guide us. The average period in hospital and convalescence is four months. The admissions to hospitals per month, counting those only who will ultimately emerge cured and counting sick and wounded together, cannot possibly, for an army of the German numbers, be less than 100,000. We have, therefore, to add to our total a floating balance of 400,000, and we bring to the end of the year an irreducible minimum off the strength of three and a quarter millions.

A man making out the very best case for German losses, pleading as a German would plead to some neutral power to prove the continued resources of his armies, could not by any form of argument whatever get the losses below three and a quarter millions up to Dec. 31, 1915.

There is no object in making calculations of this sort save the discovery of the truth.

Those who ridicule them as "mere arithmetical work" are in intelligence and science exactly on a par with the yokel who ridicules the doctor for using a thermometer to take the temperature in a case of fever. An estimate of numbers is the very soul of judgment in war. I have been at pains to put the very lowest figures admissible by any man who regards the problem seriously. I know very well that those figures are below the truth.

What's Wrong With the War?

By Robert Crozier Long

Following is the substance of an article in the April issue of The Fortnightly Review, London:

A CLOSER inquiry into what is wrong with the war shows that nearly every single thing that is wrong has its close analogue in domestic politics. The war is mistakenly carried on with the precepts and practices of home government and home struggles, instead of on the wholly different principles and practices of foreign policy and international conflict. During the "British inefficiency" and "British decadence" agitation started after the Boer war, (nót in Germany, as is pretended, but in England,) home politics and politicians were belabored in the full measure. The indictment contained love of humbug; catchword phrases, belief in bluff, in demonstrations, and in magic short cuts; reckless promise making; belief in the stupidity, perverted mentality, and factionism of opponents; make-believe that political defeats are victories; belief in one's own party's natural right to win. As these failings were common to all parties, they did not materially affect the balance of party power. The result is different when they are the chief intellectual weapons against foreign enemies whose intellects are differently armed.

A just measurement, consistently held to and acted on, of the qualities and quantities of opponents is essential to success in any struggle. In this war that principle is as flagrantly ignored as it is in home politics, and ignored precisely in the same way. It is amazing that in the second year of war we have no consistent official conception of our enemies. True, there is endless characterization in talking and writing of Germans, Austrians, Turks, and Bulgarians; but, again, the practice is not to paint our enemies as they are, or even as, from the standpoint of high policy, it is desirable we should believe them to be. The practice is to blurt out the first thing that pleases listeners, according to their mood of overconfidence or anxiety, and in particular to interpret the enemy in terms of the particular contention or plea which is uppermost for the moment.

Not only has the Cabinet no policy, but individual Ministers do not agree with themselves. In the same speeches, sometimes in consecutive sentences, the Germans are derided as corrupt, worthless, feeble, and misgoverned, and praised as terrible by virtue of an "organization," a patriotism, and an energy which are reproaches to our miserable selves. When the war began, the Cabinet (that is, one of the hundred voices of its twenty members) proclaimed that the Kaiser is a lunatic. To prove this was cited, without verification, a fabricated war speech in every word differing from what the Kaiser did say, (I heard the speech myself, and it was painfully sane.) As the Kaiser was both mad and a despot who meddles everywhere, Englishmen were left to conclude that German strategy (like Napoleon's in Austrian eyes) would be mad. The Germans, the nation officially learned, would rejoice if we helped them to overthrow their mad despot. The Germans (to quote only Cabinet expressions) are "hogs," "wild beasts," "venomous reptiles"; they can accomplish in life nothing but slaughter; and even (so said one Minister) they cannot slaughter efficiently, for they kill more civilians than they kill enemy soldiers. Austria is "a ramshackle empire." The Germans do not know how to conduct a war; their "calculations one and all have been completely falsified"; on the day Hindenburg entered Warsaw—presumably by accident—the nation learned that the Germans had never succeeded in one of their plans. Naturally, with such official leading, the unwiser of the unofficial heads produced masterpieces; a prominent Baronet says that German commanders are chosen, not for their brains, but for their "ferocious appearances"; if shells batter Verdun, they are fired to gratify the Crown Prince's vanity, because the contemptible Germans are not influenced by the motives which govern the actions of intelligent belligerents.

The nation has been told in succession that money, resources, mechanism, and "superiority in munitions" are the secrets of success. The intellectual resource of millions, from Ministers to crossing sweepers, when faced with pessimism or criticism, is to say: "Yes, but this is a war of * * *," filling in the blank with anything but the right words: military superiority. The detached or neutral thinker is amazed to hear that this is a war of resources, with the implication that superior resources, automatically, and independently of their use, brings victory. * * *

The propaganda that only shells are needed is good as incitement to shellmakers, but it is injurious in its effects on national thinking as to the real secrets of success. The Russian General, Radko-Dimitriyeff, told me on the Dunajec, shortly before the unlucky battle of Gorlice-Tarnow, that he had plenty of shells; and most Russian retreats, and many other retreats in the war, were not at all determined by shortness of shell. The munitions catch phrase keeps favor not merely because of its use in helping shell production. Of all catchwords it is most considerate to personages. The implication is that our inferiority in an impersonal thing like shell supply is an ugly, inevitable unfairness of nature; nobody is guilty; Ministers, organizers, Generals, are all worthy and genial; but shells, which of course were never heard of in other wars, failed in their duty. * * * Probably the war can be won only by military means—by putting in the field better armies than the enemy's, led by better Generals. The last and only compelling catch phrase will be: "This is a war of war."

Napoleon and Hindenburg in Russia

By Professor August Fournier

In the Deutsche Revue this noted Vienna scholar deals with the campaign of Napoleon in Russia as compared with the recent conquests of Germany in the great empire to the east.

WE must not overrate the value of historical data for the purpose of making comparisons with contemporaneous events, but in the light of recent happenings, the unique personality of Napoleon I. in his conquest of so large a portion of the earth can only heighten the interest attaching to his character ever since. The fact that Russia proved the barrier to his advance has likewise occupied many historians dealing with the events of 1812. The destruction of the greatest army of the greatest commander of all time is today emphasized more than ever before as we follow in the footsteps of Napoleon and breast a still more powerful Russia.

On the 24th and 25th of June, 1812, Napoleon crossed the Niemen at Kovno, which was then on the Russian frontier. According to the noted historian and geographer, Georg Hassel of Goettingen, the Russian Army of 1812 consisted of 550,000 men, among them 100,000 irregulars, who had a military organization, but had to maintain themselves. But, adds Hassel, these figures were merely on paper. In the political world it was an established fact that of the Russian Army only half the numbers on the official list were available.

Confronting Napoleon was a force of no more than 180,000 Russians, divided into three parts. Two of these divisions, a larger under Barclay's command and a smaller led by Prince Bagration, had the choice of opposing a thrice superior force at the Dvina or retiring to a previously fortified position at Drissa. The third army was charged with taking care of the Austrians under Schwarzenberg in Volhynia. This was the Russian plan of campaign. It is nonsense to talk about any previously arranged plan of retirement in order to draw Napoleon into the interior, even to the extent of letting him have Moscow so as to destroy him there. As a matter of fact, today no Russian historical writer of standing would care to make such a statement. No, the Russians were ready to fight, at the Dvina, if not before.

Napoleon had in mind at the furthest to gain the border of the old Polish kingdom where the country of the Muscovite began, with a view to defeating the enemy there and wintering in Vilna. Before the war started he had frequently so remarked to his companions, and even when Vilna was reached he told General Sebastiani that to cross the Dvina unquestionably spelled ruin. It was only when Alexander refused to make peace that he decided in the following year to penetrate to the centre of the empire in anticipation of "finishing the business" some time in May. We know how differently things shaped themselves from what either party had expected.

Napoleon overestimated the strength of the Russian Army, and he shaped his plans accordingly. [His own total force was about 550,000.] He decided to send one army corps, composed of Frenchmen and Prussians under Macdonald, to the left against Riga and Petersburg, securing his right with the aid of the Austrians and employing the main army in the centre. This force, consisting of 400,000 men, was ranged in three divisions in the form of a wedge between the armies of Barclay and Bagration with a view to splitting them up and defeating them separately.

The wedge succeeded, but nothing came of the anticipated battles. Exactly because they had been separated the two Russian commanders refused to accept battle against the superior enemy. They retreated in the hope of joining later. Barclay even went beyond the fortified position at Drissa, because he failed to get into touch with Bagration. On the heels of both Russian armies came the Frenchmen, but the best that was offered the pursuers was an occasional skirmish with rearguards. The latter fought bravely enough, but soon disappeared behind a screen of Cossacks, a trick in tactics that even today the Russians are past masters in performing.

It was while on this hurried march through the poor and incomparably desolate Lithuania that Napoleon's army sustained its worst, and one may well say decisive, losses. Of course, the Emperor must have known that in the sparsely inhabited and little cultivated country he could not provision his troops as in either Austria or Prussia. For this reason enormous food depots were established in Dantsic, as well as in Poland and East Prussia. From here the troops were to be kept supplied. This was to be done partly by the way of water transportation, or else by thousands of wagons drawn by oxen. But the further the soldiers went in pursuit of the retreating enemy the greater became the distance separating the army proper from the supply trains, which could only follow at a much slower pace. Soon the men began to go hungry, for the enemy had taken good care to remove or destroy every possible article of service to the oncoming army. Many thousands stepped from the ranks to search for food, and they never returned. No less than 50,000 marauders were thus brought into existence, plundering wherever they could, and later killed by the returning peasants, who had been driven from their homes.

When Vitebsk was reached on July 25, 130,000 men failed to answer the roll call. And still no battle in sight, something Napoleon had assuredly expected at this point. As for Barclay and Bagration, neither had they succeeded in joining forces here. They finally met at Smolensk, and they immediately took the offensive against the approaching enemy, who compelled them to seek the city. The guns of the Emperor managed to set fire to the wooden houses of the place, but he could not break down the massive walls. The result was that the Russians had time to evacuate and continue on their retreat. And the sanguinary battle had still brought no decision.

As in the case of the present campaign of the Russians thus far, so also in the matter of Moscow and Warsaw, there had been no thought of giving up territory merely to lead the enemy further and further into the interior in order to destroy him. The burning of Moscow was a sacrifice beyond compare. Now that we ourselves are at war with Russia and our troops are deep in the enemy's country, our leaders will know how to take advantage of the Napoleonic experience.

Kaiser Wilhelm as far back as October declared in his address to the guard that the offensive campaign against Russia was virtually at an end. The east front stands solid, as invulnerable, in fact, as the fronts facing France and Italy. We battle now mainly for the purpose of securing points of resistance toward the east, while we carry our offensive elsewhere. Whether the opportunity for a new attack on the Russians would change the present plans is another question.

Dr. Liebknecht's Diagnosis of War

Denouncing the demoralizing effects of war, Dr. Karl Liebknecht, the one uncompromising Socialist in the German Reichstag, caused a turbulent scene in that body on March 16 with the following words:

Education today serves to strengthen militarism and capitalism. You act as if you wished to throw open to the people the road to education, but that is only because capitalism requires soldiers. The teaching of history is systematically distorted for the purpose of introducing certain political convictions into the schools and also hatred against England. The militarizing of schools converts them into training stables for war. You educate your children to be war machines. With regard to war, their ideals seem to be embodied in poisoned gas bombs. In the schools should be taught not only that the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria at Serajevo was an incident which should inspire horror, but it should also be taught that there were wide circles in Germany and Austria in which this murder was regarded as a veritable godsend.

Human Documents of the War Fronts

Behind the dry official reports of military events is a vast fund of emotional human interest. It is the aim of this department of CURRENT HISTORY to give each month the best available glimpses of this side of the war, as found in private letters, personal experiences, and thrilling episodes of courage, humor, or pathos.

The Valiant

By Réné Bazin

Member of the French Academy

I HAVE heard magnificent sayings of our soldiers; others have been written to me by those who heard them. I would not have them perish. It seems to me that they naturally form a part of the epoch we are living through; that they are good to read and meditate on, unconscious testimonies of that which historians will call the new life of France, of that which has ever been her deeper life, widened and developed in this hour of trial.

Therefore I shall record here not all these sayings and traits, but some of them.

At B., in the hospital of the Grand Hotel, a wounded soldier was to have a limb amputated. But he was so weak that the surgeon hesitated.

"If we could only give him some blood!"

"If that is all that is needed I am ready to give it!" answers another wounded soldier, a Breton.

The transfusion is made. The staff of the hospital, touched by the devotion of this wounded soldier, who was known to be very poor, made a little collection here and there, very quietly, and gathered five hundred francs, which they took great satisfaction in offering to him. One day one of them came close to his bed, spoke of the service he had rendered, thanked him and offered him the money. Mark his answer:

"Oh, no! I give my blood; I do not sell it!"

A very young soldier from the North, with a beardless and rather childish face, is stretched at the back of a trench, dying from a terrible shell wound in the stomach. In spite of the frightful wound he does not complain, he does not repine, and in his wide, upward-gazing eyes one could just perceive the expression of sadness which he often had. For since mobilizing he had received no news from his home in the occupied territory. His comrades are doing what they can for him, offering him water to drink, unbuttoning his tunic, trying to stanch the blood. Opening his eyes, which he had kept for a long moment closed, and no longer with an expression of suffering, he said to one of his comrades, a big, hairy fellow, who was bending over him:

"Friend, you must not tell mother what a frightful wound I had! A bullet is better than what I have!" Then he distributed a few little things he had in his pocket—his knife, his purse, a corkscrew, a tinder-box—a last testament soon ended. Finally, with difficulty, he opened his notebook and, setting himself to write, though he could no longer see very clearly, he traced a few lines. When he had finished his soul departed. * * * Three minutes later, as the word of his end spread along the trench, at this time not under heavy bombardment by the enemy, a Captain arrived, smeared with mud up to the shoulders. He saw the soldier. "Oh, poor boy! One of my bravest!" Respectfully he took the notebook, which had fallen on the ground, opened it and read: "Au revoir, father; au revoir, mother; au revoir, little sisters; I am dying for my country. Vive la France!"

Sergeant Raissac of Beziers was mortally wounded in an assault on a German trench. When they lifted his body his hand still held a photograph representing his mother, his sisters and himself, and on the back of the picture he had managed to write, with his last effort, "Adieu! No tears, but a Christian acceptance. I am at peace with God."

Yesterday, during his two days' leave, I met the son of a poor countrywoman, a workman whom I have loved for a long time. When I took leave of him, saying, "Good luck to you, Marcel!" he looked up with unreproaching eyes and answered me: "On the one side, and on the other, I fear nothing!" And this meant: "Life? Death? What does it matter? I am ready!"

What does all this signify? It is the poetry of chivalry that continues; it is the unfinished Crusade; it is God making Himself manifest through purified France.

Those who seek the sublime will find nothing better.

The Heroism of Children

By Maurice Barrès

In Memory of Max Barthou, Who Volunteered at Eighteen

I BELIEVE that young heroes abound at this moment when every family is cruelly involved in the war. The son dreams of helping his father, his elder brothers, of joining them, of avenging them. Are his city and his home invaded? With his whole heart he tries and examines himself as to what his duty and his honor demand. I remember how the minds of my companions, some 10 years old, and our slightly older brothers were fired in 1870. * * *

Do you wish me to bring you my contribution to the monument of our young patriots?

First, a little story. On Nov. 24, 1914, on a cold day, about 3 in the afternoon, the Prussians, whom they call "Boches," are once again trying to cross the frontier, to enter France. It is very cold, there is a high wind, and snow covers the ground. Who tells the story? A workman at the front, who, from the neighborhood of Pont-à-Mousson, writes to his two little children at his home at Neuillez sur Marne. They gave me his letter. I should spoil it if I retouched it. I transcribe it just as it is:

"My dear little Marcella, this story, which happened to some French soldiers, you are to tell to your little Charlie and your companions, and you are to show them how two little children saved the lives of twenty-eight papas.

"In a lonely farmhouse a detachment of reservists, composed of thirty men, are resting from the labors of the night in an underground cellar, waiting for the next night to begin their work again and accomplish their mission.

In a room about them, two children, Liza and John, are sitting beside their mamma near the fire. All three talk the old country dialect. All at once the mother rises, runs to the door and sees some horsemen coming from a distance.

"'My children,' she says, pressing them to her heart, 'I think the Prussians are coming. They will see that we have lodged and fed French soldiers, and they will surely want to make us tell where they are. They will take them and shoot them.'

"'We must say they have gone away there, just in the opposite direction!' said little John.

"'Oh, no!' said their mamma; 'if we deceive them with a lie they will come back and take vengeance. Listen rather! I shall speak to the Prussians only in dialect, and they won't understand a word. Do you also do as I do, and, to everything they say, answer always in the same phrase, in dialect.'

"The clatter of hoofs was heard, and the rattle of weapons.

"'Courage, my children!' said their mamma. The door opens. The Boches enter. They ask questions, but the mother's answers are unintelligible to them.

"'Look at these two children! They

must learn French at school,' said the officer, who spoke a little French.

"One of the Germans seized little Lisa, while another caught little John.

"'Where is your father?' he asked in a harsh voice. 'Where are the French that passed here?'

"Lisa raised her blue eyes to this foreign soldier and, all trembling, replied in dialect. John did the same. The soldiers, irritated, suspecting a trick, searched the house, but did not find the trap-door which had been previously covered with dirty straw. They threatened to cut the children's throats. They told them they would kill their mother, too, if they did not answer. The poor children began to cry, but, faithful to their mother's directions, they repeated, through their tears, the same phrase.

"The French soldiers who were in the cellar and who heard everything through a ventilator felt their blood boil, and, but for their officer, would have come forth to protect the poor children, and, without doubt, would have been killed, for they were outnumbered.

"The Prussians did not think that such young children, threatened with death, would be capable of such heroic discretion; they ended by believing that they could not make themselves understood and rode away.

"And that is how two little children, Lisa, aged 8, and John, aged 10, by their obedience to their mother and by their courage kept thirty men from being killed; twenty-eight wives still have their husbands, and forty-seven little children have their papas. Among these forty-seven little children my little Marcella and my little Charlie will perhaps see their papa again."

I leave this story in its fine simplicity. A workman who had become a soldier chats with his children far away. But the chief attraction in it for me is that the fact reported is quite authentic. I know the farm in the district of Meurthe et Moselle, and later on I shall tell its name, as well as those of the farmer's wife and the two children, who have received a well-earned reward.

The Work of the Women

By Gabriel Hanotaux

WE are beginning to see the little hats of the women chauffeurs, the women cab-drivers, multiplying in Paris. The straw and ribbons give them a certain charm, and it is a change for us from the caps and gray beards of their antique colleagues. In the Post Offices, in the banks, women bend over their work, assiduously scratching paper. Everywhere the tic-tac of the typewriter strikes you, and the stenographer, a pencil between her lips, keeps her company. As there is no more piano playing, this is a different kind of duet; that is all.

Slowly women's work takes the place of men's work. It is very necessary. Skilled labor is rare and sought after; the most urgent tasks have to wait. And then lightness of touch, skill, taste, all the qualities necessary in a host of Parisian industries, can no longer be learned, when, through the passage of years, one has lost the habit of them. Why should we not see women barbers, women watchmakers, women decorators? And I say nothing of the endless branches of commerce in which women, when they wish, succeed as well as men.

The women are courageous, industrious, careful; they do not shirk pains; but they ought to be encouraged, guided in the new phase of our common existence in which they are necessarily called to take the places of men at the front. If it had only been a question of a very short war, as was expected, we should have adapted ourselves; but the months mount up; we must provide not only for the present but for the future also.

The wives of soldiers at the front receive for themselves and for their children a rightful allowance. But many among them ask nothing better than to increase by work a sum that hardly goes beyond the strict necessaries. And then not all women receive the allowance; these also need to earn their living. In a host of professions yesterday occupied by women a lack of work makes itself cruelly felt.

We must consider this. * * * But it is already being considered! To organize courses and apprenticeships, to prepare, for the future, workwomen, women workers, well trained and prepared, is a way as good as many another to assure the rapid restoration of economic and social France after victory * * * while waiting for our leaders to make the recruiting of the class of 1935 not fall too far short.

The Aerial Attack on Ravenna

By Paolo Poletti

In L'Illustrazione Italiana this distinguished Italian author expresses his indignation at the bombardment of Ravenna by Austrian aviators, when the ancient Basilica of Sant' Apollinare narrowly escaped destruction.

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY]

I WRITE with a feeling of relief. My beautiful Sant' Apollinare is uninjured, or nearly so. A blind bomb may have furrowed the April sky of my city, in this marvelous foretaste of Spring; but the criminal attempt has been in vain. And, with me, innumerable citizens of Ravenna have breathed a sigh almost of content. It is true that there were human victims. But our pity for them is too deep for any comment to be adequate; the only way to commemorate them worthily is to avenge them. But it is not of this wrong we wish to speak today. We wish only to bring together and to distill into a brief comment the living essence of the spirit of Ravenna, as it has affirmed itself in this historic, solemn hour.

The people of Ravenna have felt a lightning flash of sudden revolt because of the outrage perpetrated on their monuments. The citizens of Ravenna, if they have not, for the antique glories of their city, the fully conscious veneration which we shall hardly expect to find among them, nevertheless do breathe in from these monuments a deep impression of exaltation and well-founded pride. Our readers will remember those " Monologues " which Gigi Easi wrote with such grace and such penetrating humor. In one, " The Art of Delivering a Monologue," he introduces as speakers the inhabitants of the various capital cities of Italy, each of whom magnifies the beauty of his own city.

So it happens that, along with the Florentine, the Neapolitan, the Venetian, and the rest, there is not lacking a good citizen of Ravenna who, with vibrant words and potent adjectives, in intense and enthusiastic exaltation, energetically affirms the supremacy of his mosaics and his basilicas. The scene is not only most exhilarating, but also, from the point of view of psychology, profoundly true. Our populace lives, and feels that it lives, with its mighty memories and with its great historic personages, whose moral significance at least it knows how to estimate, and whose remoter glory it understands by a kind of natural and traditional intuition, and respects it, I might almost say, by a distant residuum of atavistic suggestion.

Galla, daughter and sister of Emperors; Theodoric sleeping, sleeping, according to these humble fancies, a secular sleep under his heavy monolith; Justinian, upraiser of precious churches and reviser of the imperial idea and the laws of Rome; Theodora, the dancing girl become a Queen, speak a language incomprehensible to the rough minds of our people, yet a secret fascination emanates to them from the rich vaults, heavy with gold, of the antique basilicas;

from those vaulted roofs toward which, in their time, rose the thunderous hosannas of triumphal victories, and the humble supplications of tragical misfortunes; those vaulted domes, dazzling with emerald and ruby, to which were raised hands wrung in despair and menace, or joined in the lowly adoration of prayer; toward which were raised foreheads tormented with gnawing hatred or consoled by illuminating love. * * *

The basilica of Theodoric, made the target of the iniquitous attempt of the Barbarians, ever speaks to the people in the mysterious tongue of days long gone. * * *

Oh, my beautiful Sant' Apollinare! we dreaded to see shattered thy gleaming mosaics; we dreaded to see cut in two and mutilated thy ten-centuries-oil campanile, which sends forth joyful peals in the luminous evenings of May; we feared that the voice would be stilled, which arises from thee, to chant a profound poem of history and of art.

We recall your founder, Theodoric, and his reign in Ravenna; his wise and successful attempt to bring together in peaceful relations the conquerors and the conquered, engrafting into the ultimate stem of Latin civilization the young shoot of fresh barbaric energy; so that his terrible invasion did not interrupt the continuity of history, but proceeded to develop harmoniously in the integration of the old Roman elements with the new, blended in a single composed form of enduring life.

Of the art which reminds us, through the verses of Gabriel d'Annunzio, of the millenary of Ravenna, one might also speak: of the "Purple night, gleaming with gold"; of the Virgins of Sant' Apollinare, in Francesca's passionate speech:

"The Virgins of Sant' Apollinare burn not so bright in their heaven of gold"; and the prophecy:

"Oh, Prisca, another hero will draw the bow from thy desert toward the infinite. * * * Clad in armor, he awaits the new days; thy warrior awaits the certain dawn, when a voice through the desert paths shall call forth the ancestral valor!" * * *

We fit the augury to the new times; and, to meet the new Barbarians, we invoke the sacred vengeance of Italy here, from this furthest bourne of our Garibaldian land!

The Fight of the Clan MacTavish

By Michael MacIntyre

Third Officer

When the German sea raider Möwe captured the Appam on Jan. 15 she also sank the Australian merchant vessel, Clan MacTavish, after the latter had made one of the pluckiest fights on record. The story of that encounter became known in full on March 3, when eighteen of the crew of the Clan MacTavish landed in England after weeks of imprisonment on the Möwe. The following is the remarkable narrative by the third officer based on his diary:

WHEN I went on the bridge to relieve the chief and the fourth officer for tea it was just getting dark. The day was glorious, with only a slight breeze and swell, and we were sailing without lights. A vessel ahead was burning her foremast headlight. We were overhauling her rapidly, and just before 6 o'clock she was quite close, about six points on our port bow.

She started to call us on the Morse signal, and I answered. She then asked "What ship?" I reported to the Captain, and he told me to make no answer. She again asked the question, and we then inquired her name. She answered "Author, from Liverpool," and we then gave our name. By this time she was abaft our beam, and she immediately signaled "Stop at once, I am a German cruiser." The Captain instantly ordered the engineers to give us all the speed they could, and at the same time I bluffed and signaled to them that we were stopped. The German then signaled for us to stop, as he was sending a boat aboard. When he saw our signal he at once stopped his own engines, with the result that he was left astern.

But as soon as he found that we were not stopped he started again full speed ahead, and fired across our bows. Our own gunners then got busy at the Captain's orders and fired back. Then the fun began. The next shell struck us on the fo'c'sle head, smashing up the windlass and the lookout man, a Lascar. The third went through the second officer's room and the steward's room; it seemed to be shrapnel, and splinters were hurled all over the deck, the port dinghy on the bridge being smashed up. All this time our own two gunners were firing as hard as they could, and we could see that they were hitting. A number of shells seemed to go singing by our ears. The German was only 200 yards away, but nearly all their shots missed, only four actually striking us.

The next to hit us struck the top of the engine room, killing seventeen men and wounding five, all Lascars. Another hit us below the water line in No. 5 hold, badly damaging us. It was obviously useless to carry on the fight, and the Captain then ordered "cease fire," and stopped the ship. I signaled the German in Morse to this effect, but owing to the smoke some time passed before they could see our signal, and they continued to fire. Even as I signaled our gun went off owing to the order "Stop fire" being delayed in transmission. And that, of course, caused more trouble.

The whole thing was over in less than fifteen minutes. They signaled to ask if we had any wounded aboard. Being on the bridge, I did not then know our full casualties, and replied that we had only one. They signaled that they would send a boat, and we began to get out our own lifeboats. It was not until we were taken on board the raider that we ascertained the extent of their casualties. Although our shells were so small—the gun was only a six-pounder—it seems we had done a good deal of damage, and their bluejackets told us we had killed four of their crew and wounded two.

When the German commander came aboard he asked for the Captain, and on Captain Oliver coming forward he demanded to know why the Clan MacTavish had fired on them. "I wanted to get away, of course," replied the Captain, "and I fired to protect my ship. My Government put a gun on board, and I used it. It wasn't put there for ornament!"

They lined us up on the deck, and a number of men mounted guard with drawn revolvers, threatening to shoot without warning the first man who made a movement. We were kept at attention for some time, and then ordered into the boats, the Captain's and chief officer's going to the cruiser, while mine and the second officer's were ordered to the Appam—as we found the second vessel to be.

On board the latter we were taken below, and kept under armed guard in a first-class stateroom all that night and the next day, when we were transferred from the Appam to the cruiser.

The raider was later disguised by being repainted a dark yellow, like the P. & O. boats, with a yellow funnel. They also cut off a conspicuous derrick post aft and put bulwarks where there had been rails.

Whenever she chased another vessel we were confined below in the forecastle. While they were firing at the Flamenco we found an old gramophone there with a number of tunes, and all the time she was chasing and firing at the Flamenco we played these tunes, "Tipperary," "The Stars and Stripes," and "The Double Eagle" being among them.

We were told that the commander of the Möwe was Count von Donah, and that he was a junior Captain in the German Navy.

The vessel was nothing but a huge floating bomb. She had huge stores of torpedoes and shells, and mines and bombs were lashed everywhere. They were fastened on her decks and in all the rooms, and we were told she could be blown up at a moment's notice. They were determined not to be captured, they said. If we had only had a bigger gun and could have got some shells home she would have gone up.

We did not see the sinking of the Clan MacTavish after we had left her, but it was accomplished by two bombs with time fuses, hung over her side, and the firing of one torpedo.

At the end of twenty-four days the Möwe took the steamer Westburn. That night they came and told us that all the crews of the ships captured were to go to Teneriffe in her, with the exception of the Clan MacTavish men, who were to stay behind for firing upon the cruiser. They added that they intended to keep us with them until they reached Germany or were sunk. The beggars kept us in suspense until the very last moment, when all the other crews had embarked, and then informed us that we could all go except the Captain and the two gunners—Reece and Angus. Altogether 228 of us went on to the Westburn, the captain and second officer of which were also kept on the cruiser.

A guard of eight men were put on board with us, the commander being a German petty officer, who wore the Iron Cross. Bombs and mines were lashed everywhere in the ship, ready to blow it up at a moment's notice, and we were warned that on the slightest trouble this would be done. Every time one of the guards came aft to speak to us he carried a bomb ready to throw.

We arrived at Teneriffe on Feb. 22 and found that, only half an hour before, an English cruiser coming from another direction had entered the harbor and anchored. We learned that our German colors were seen just before we entered territorial waters, but it was then too late for the warship to do anything. As we passed close to her the German petty officer jeered at the Englishmen's helplessness in the matter and exclaimed: "If I were the commander of that British cruiser I would shoot myself."

Sunk at Sea by a U-Boat

By Arnold C. B. Groom

Late Captain of the British steamer Coquet

This stirring story of the experiences of a trading ship's crew plying between American and Mediterranean ports has interest alike as a true tale of adventure and as a historic example of the cruelties of U-boat warfare. The Coquet was sunk somewhere on the route between Port Said and Malta.

ABOUT 10:45 A. M., Jan. 4, 1916, I was writing in the saloon of the Coquet when I heard a gun fired. On my reaching the bridge the third mate told me it was fired across our bow. Then another was fired across the bow, one over the bridge and one under the stern from a submarine on the port quarter. At the same time one or two people told me there was another submarine on the port bow. I stopped the engines and indicated that I had done so by flag signals. The firing stopped and the submarine was soon close to us with signals flying "abandon ship." Immediately I took the chronometer, sextant, and chart in the starboard boat and we left the ship. The other boat left a little before us. We had no sooner got clear of the ship than the submarine started firing at her. Eight shots were fired. One of them broke the signal halliards on the bridge. They stopped firing then and coming close to the boats ordered us alongside. This was a dangerous proceeding, as the submarnie's deck was just awash and there was a big swell. I was ordered aboard the submarine and then some Austrians armed with revolvers and cutlasses were sent in our boats and the two boats returned to the Coquet.

All hands were given twenty minutes to get what they wanted from the ship. At the same time the Austrians looted whatever they could in the time given.

They lowered one of the small boats to take them and their loot back to the submarine. When they had all they wanted they ordered the two lifeboats to return to the submarine, then they set two time-fuse bombs under water abreast of Nos. 1 and 2 holds and left the ship themselves. Shortly afterward there were two explosions, and the ship settled down by the head. Four or five minutes after, the explosions of the Coquet lifted her stern high in the air. Something hit the whistle lanyard, and with a pitiful scream the Coquet disappeared.

While all this was happening the commander of the submarine asked me a good many questions. The two lifeboats were near the submarine again now, and bailing was in full progress in each boat with two or three buckets. I pointed this out to the commander of the submarine, and the fact that both of the bilge planks of the boats had most likely been sprung alongside his awash deck. I told him it was nothing short of murder to send thirty-one men away like that, in the middle of Winter, too, so far from land. He laughed, and said he would save the next ship and send her to look for us.

The boats were alongside by this time, and the Austrians searched them for anything valuable, taking chronometers, sextants, and charts, and also every scrap of paper they could find. They would not let me keep even the account of the wages of the crew or any of my bills, although I asked them specially for these later, and pointed out to them what they were, and that they were of no earthly use to them. They ordered me back into my boat, and then left us.

With a heavy sea running we were very soon all wet through, and remained so practically for the next six days. All the time we were in the boats all the able-bodied men had to take turns at bailing, two at a time. The steward, who was old and ill, I exempted from this work, also four boys I had who were very young, also seasick and somewhat frightened, I fancy. The boat was overloaded with seventeen in it, and was ankle deep with water, in spite of the vigorous bailing with two buckets.

The next day we lost sight of the second boat, which was not seen again.

By the night of the 7th everybody was chilled to the bone. With that cold northerly wind blowing right through our saturated clothes we all used to look forward to daytime coming in the hope of getting a little sun, but it was nearly always covered with clouds. Several of us had excruciating pains in our ankles, knees, and wrists. A poor little Italian messroom boy was crying all one night with them, and of course I could do absolutely nothing for him. I had them badly myself. Early on the morning of the 8th the weather moderated some, and I decided to set sail and make for the African coast.

On the 10th we landed at a small bay, with houses in the background. These afterward were found to be uninhabited cave dwellings. The boat's crew slept that night on the sands, and on the morning of the 11th I set out with three men to try to find some human being who could tell us which way to head for the nearest civilized place. We met an Arab who returned with us to the camp, where there was a Greek fireman who spoke Arabic.

The Arab suggested that I go with him to the nearest town afoot. This I could not do, as I was utterly done up with six or seven hours of walking that day after being cramped up in the boat, but eventually I sent two Greek firemen with him.

After a night in the cave dwellings the rest of us, fifteen in number, next morning were attacked by Arabs with rifles. I was wounded and lost consciousness.

When I awoke everything was quiet, except for the groaning of the carpenter, who was rolling between me and the edge of the water about six feet away. I found he was horribly mutilated, but still alive. He asked me to drag him away from the sea. I tried, but he was a big man and my wound was very painful. A little way out in the water the steward was floating face downward. Whether he was shot or drowned, or both, I do not know. Further up the little Italian messroom boy was lying dead. I could see nothing of anybody else, and was afraid to go out of the trench, thinking that if the Bedouins saw me alive they would come back and finish me off.

Soon afterward a small Italian steamer, with the commander of Fort Marsa Susa aboard, entered the bay. A sailor named Lord was found lying in the sand, wounded by both bullet and bayonet. He said the other ten of them had been carried off by Bedouins. He thought they left him because they believed him to be dying.

The commander of Fort Marsa Susa then took us aboard the little steamer, also the bodies of the steward and the messroom boy, and our wounds were washed and bandaged. The carpenter died just as we were starting to wash his wounds.

A Russian Fight for Trebizond

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY from Russkoe Slovo, Moscow]

FOR ten months the Turks had been strengthening their position at Arkhave, on the shore of the Black Sea. For this reason, at the time when our attack began, the struggle on the shore sector was marked by exceptional obstinacy. We had to fight for every foot of ground.

Justice compels me to admit that the Turks rivaled our soldiers in bravery, and fought like fanatics. Our army literally squeezed them out, capturing one position after another. And all along the fleet supported the attack by artillery fire from the sea.

On the opening day of the fight the fleet demolished the positions of the Turkish howitzers, which, as General L. expressed it, "passed into eternal silence!" But after this the Turks still possessed mountain batteries which, in spite of heavy fire from the fleet, seemed to be intact, invulnerable. Yet the position of these mountain batteries was known accurately; our army had observed their fire during ten months.

The heavy shells of our naval guns hammered the heights where the mountain guns were for several hours. The guns had begun firing, but were quickly silenced. But hardly had the sun hidden behind the summit of the mountains when, in the thickening twilight, the flashes of shots from the invisible battery lashed out again malignantly. It was only on the next day that the battery was smashed to pieces and finally silenced.

The destructive force of the heavy naval shells was so great that only two of the mountain guns remained uninjured. The others were twisted up by the splinters of our big shells. Then the invulnerability of the battery was explained.

In the mountainside on which the battery was placed the Turks had pierced a tunnel. In this tunnel, covered by a many-storied shell of natural armor, the guns were concealed while the fleet bombarded them. The shells of the fleet had turned the heights into a plowed field. The deep craters were ranged almost side by side.

The desolation was colossal. Bushes were pulled up by the roots. Trees drooped with broken tops. Everything that was above the surface was knocked to pieces. But the shells could not pierce the solid substance of the mountain, and the battery was untouched. We smashed it to pieces when it came out to shell our advancing army.

To move the Turkish artillery from place to place communicating galleries had been constructed, with a well-built causeway on which rails were laid, with cisterns for water. We found a number of gun emplacements, and the position of the batteries could be constantly changed.

According to the reports of prisoners, special construction battalions had been toiling day and night for several months on the positions at Arkhave. The whole surrounding population had been forced to work on the fortifications of the sector.

The moment the fire of the enemy's

artillery weakened, the forces of our shore army moved forward to the attack. We were separated from the Turks by the rather deep and swift mountain torrent of the Arkhave. The Turks have left uninjured all the bridges over the Arkhave, but our sappers discovered that the bridges had been mined.

In spite of the extreme cold and the icy temperature of the water our men plunged into the stream and waded across. The picture of their crossing gripped the imagination. The water was up to the soldiers' waists; in places the depth of the river was even greater, taking them up to the breast; our men fixed their chattels to their bayonets, and carried their bread also transfixed on the bayonets. Holding hands in twos and threes, they made their way across to the other bank, which was held by the enemy.

The water of the river literally boiled with bullets poured into it by the rifles and machine guns of the enemy. Our soaked, shivering soldiers scrambled up the bank and eagerly rushed against the hills that were held by the Turks.

Colonel L. was in command of this part of the operations. His men formed a very clear opinion of their leader.

"He has only to look on to something and the thing is done!" they say of Colonel L.

We were now making the effort to hook on to the heights that dominate the Arkhave. Officers and soldiers rivaled each other in valor. They told me about Captain B. He was wounded shortly after our men got across the torrent. Paying no attention to his wound, he urged his men forward, occupied a greatly needed position, and then collapsed from loss of blood. His wound was found to be very serious, perhaps fatal.

The evening drew in very chilly. Our army consolidated itself in the positions we had just gained from the Turks. At several points we had time to dig trenches just deep enough to kneel in while firing. Every one of us was wet from head to foot. Ice and snow all about us. Our teeth chattered incessantly because of the cold. Some of our men were able to find blankets in the neighboring huts. In this way they succeeded in gaining a little warmth. As night came on we expected the Turkish counterattack. There was a general feeling of tension and excitement.

No sooner had the last shot melted into silence when our officer went to find out whether his watch was correct. At one point of the trench he saw a soldier who was energetically rubbing his face with snow, and then scraping his cheeks with a blunt razor.

"What are you doing?" asked the officer.

"Well, Sir, I found a razor, and so I decided to have a shave. My beard had grown too long. And I have no soap!"

So quickly had peaceful occupations taken the place of war!

Young Girls Fighting on the Russian Front

STORIES are filtering in from the various belligerent countries telling of actual fighting in the ranks by women. There are numerous authenticated reports from Serbia of women who are doing the work of soldiers, and there is official confirmation of the promotion of Slavia Tomitch, a young Serbian girl, who enlisted in the regiment of Wojo Tankositch, and who is credited with being the instigator of the plot, which resulted in the assassination of the Austrian Grand Duke. This girl fought through the Serbian campaigns, was twice wounded, and was promoted to the rank of Sergeant. Martha Malko, the wife of a Russian subofficer, fought beside her husband until he was killed and she was taken prisoner by the Germans. She is now interned at Schoulen.

A correspondent of the Novoe Vremya tells an interesting story of the experiences of twelve young Russian girls who fought in the ranks as soldiers of the line. The story, as related by one of their number, was also authenticated by the Petrograd correspondent of The London Times, who wrote as follows:

" She was called Zoya Smirnov. She came to our staff straight from the advanced positions, where she had spent fourteen months wearing soldier's clothes and fighting with the foe on even terms with the men.

" Zoya Smirnov was only 16 years old. Closely cropped hair gave her the appearance of a boy, and only a thin girlish voice involuntarily betrayed her sex.

" At the beginning Zoya was somewhat shy; she carefully chose her words and replied confusedly to our questions; but later she recovered and told us her entire history, which brought tears to the eyes of many a case-hardened veteran who heard it.

" She and her friends decided to go to the war on the eighth day of mobilization —i. e., at the end of July, 1914; and early in August they succeeded in realizing their dream.

" Exactly twelve of them assembled; and they were all nearly the same age and from the same high school. Almost all were natives of Moscow, belonging to the most diversified classes of society, but firmly united in the camaraderie of school life.

We decided to run away to the war at all costs, said Zoya. It was impossible to run away from Moscow, because we might have been stopped at the station. It was therefore necessary to hire izvozchiks and ride out to one of the suburban stations through which the military echelons were continually passing. We left home early in the morning without saying a word to our parents and departed. It was a bit terrible at first; we were very sorry for our fathers and mothers, but the desire to see the war and ourselves kill the Germans overcame all other sentiments.

" And so they attained the desired object. The soldiers treated the little patriots quite paternally and properly, and having concealed them in the cars took them off to the war. A military uniform was obtained for each; they donned these and unobstructed arrived at the Austrian frontier, where they had to detrain and on foot proceed to Lemberg. Here the regimental authorities found out what had happened, but not being able to persuade the young patriots to return home allowed them to march with the regiment.

" The regiment traversed the whole of Galicia; scaled the Carpathians, incessantly participating in battle, and the girls never fell back from it a step, but shared with the men all the privations and horrors of the march and discharged the duties of ordinary privates, since they were taught to shoot and were given rifles.

" Days and months passed.

" The girls almost forgot their past, they hardly responded to their feminine names, for each of them had received a masculine surname, and completely mingled with the men. The soldiers themselves mutually guarded the girls and observed each other's conduct.

" The battles in which the regiment engaged were fierce and sanguinary, particularly in the Spring, when the Germans brought up their heavy artillery to the Carpathians and began to advance upon us with their celebrated phalanx. Our troops underwent a perfect hell and the young volunteers endured it with them.

" Was it terrible? " an officer asked Zoya. " Were you afraid? "

" I should say so! Who wouldn't be afraid? When for the first time they began to fire with their heavy guns, several of us couldn't stand it and began to cry out."

" What did you cry out? "

" We began to call ' Mamma.' Shura was the first to cry, then Lida. They were both 14 years old, and they remembered their mothers all the time. Besides, it seems that I also cried out as well. We all cried. Well, it was frightful even for the men."

" During one of the Carpathian engagements, at night, one of the twelve friends, the sixteen-year-old Zina Morozov, was killed outright by a shell. It struck immediately at her feet, and the entire small body of the girl was torn into fragments.

Nevertheless, we managed to collect her remains [Zoya stated with a tender inflexion in her voice]. At dawn the firing died down and we all—that is, all the remaining high school volunteers—assembled near the spot where Zina had perished, and somehow collected her bones and laid them in a hastily dug grave. In the same grave we laid also all Zina's things, such as she had with her. The grave was then filled up and upon the cross which we erected above it the following inscription was written: " Volunteer of such and such a regiment, Zina Morozov, 16 years old, killed in action on such and such a date in such and such year."

On the following day we were already far away, and exactly where Zina's grave is I don't remember well. I only know that it is in the Carpathians at the foot of a steep rocky incline.

"After the death of Zina other of her friends were frequently wounded in turn—Nadya, Zhena, and the fourteen-year-old Shura. Zoya herself was wounded twice—the first time in the leg, and the second time in the side. Both wounds were so serious that Zoya was left unconscious on the battlefield, and the stretcher-bearers subsequently discovered her only by accident. After the second wound she was obliged to lie at a base hospital for over a month. On being discharged she again proceeded to the positions, endeavoring to find her regiment, but on reaching the familiar trenches she could no longer find a single regimental comrade, nor a single fellow-volunteer; they had all gone to another front, and in the trenches sat absolute strangers. The girl lost her presence of mind, and for the first time during the entire campaign began to weep, thus unexpectedly betraying her age and sex. Her unfamiliar fellow-countrymen gazed with amazement upon the strange young non-commissioned officer with the Cross of St. George and medal on her breast, who resembled a stripling and finally proved to be a girl. But the girl had with her all necessary documents, not excepting a certificate giving her the right to wear the St. George's Cross received for a brave and dashing reconnoissance, and distrustful glances promptly gave place to others full of respect.

"Zoya was finally induced to abandon the trenches, at least for the time being, and to try to engage in nursing at one of the advanced hospitals. She is now working at the divisional hospital of the N— division, in the village of K., ten versts from the Austrian town of Z.

"From her remaining friends whom she left with the regiment which went to another front Zoya has no news whatever.

"What has befallen them? Do these amazing Russian girls continue their disinterested and heroic service to the country, or do graves already hold them, similar to that which was dug for the remnants of poor little Zina, who perished so gloriously in the distant Carpathians?"

Hindenburg

By Sven Hedin

From his new book "Eastward," in which he recounts his journeys and experiences on the eastern German battle front.

WHEN I stood before the famous man I was reminded of the ancient Germans in the Teutoburg forest. His deeds, like theirs, will live until the end of time, for they have impressed themselves upon the national consciousness as super-human, and the people's love has already woven a shimmering legend around their hero. Hindenburg is a descendant of an ancient Germanic race of chieftains—is himself a chieftain. It is not that any special feature is striking or reveals the presence of extraordinary qualities—were the victor of Tannenberg a German peasant no one would be struck by his appearance. One would only say that this peasant had unusually strong, virile and honest features and one would guess that he had worked and worried much in the sixty-eight years of his life. But in the case of Hindenburg, his whole bearing proclaims who and what he is—the General who shattered the Muscovite steamroller and who, at the post at which he was placed by his sovereign, will continue to destroy Germany's enemies.

That is how he looked to me the first time that I saw him, the personification of security and reliability, radiating an atmosphere of imperturbable calm. And I comprehended a little of the power of personality in the war, the power with which the leader controls the mass.

The room had grown absolutely silent and every one was standing at attention. But the Field Marshal did not move a muscle; he was just as serious as before when he shook my hand and repeated the words:

"You are very welcome!"

Then he greeted the other guests, made a slight bow to the staff, and invited us to follow him to the adjoining dining room. * * *

The Field Marshal asked me a few questions concerning my impressions at the western front, and gave expression to the hope that I might not be disappointed in my expectations at the eastern front. He spoke of the Kaiser, the Commander in Chief of the Army, and expressed his happiness that he might still serve such a monarch in the fall of his life. When I said that it must be a source of great joy and satisfaction to him to know that he had freed his menaced Fatherland from a mighty and rapacious foe, he answered simply and unassumingly:

"My dear doctor, a soldier must also have luck!"

For his great victories, Paul von Hindenburg gives the credit first of all to God, Who was with him in his battles; to the Kaiser, who intrusted him with the responsible post in the east, to Ludendorff, the indispensable, clearsighted Chief of Staff; to his entire excellent corps of officers, and last, but by no means least, to his brave soldiers. For his part he does not make any claim to distinction or glory. It is probably an inner joy for him to feel that he has the love and the everlasting gratitude of the entire German Nation. But he does not plume himself on it. He is thankful for the glory which his Fatherland has achieved through him, and is and will always be humble before God and the world.

The evening meal was at an end and the coffee cups were empty.

"Perhaps you gentlemen would like to come to the front room and drink a glass of beer?"

And we went as he suggested and grouped ourselves around our famous host. It was an unconventional gathering, with merry words and jests. It was difficult to believe that we were at one of the centres of the war and at the focus of the military operations of the German Army in the east. The hand that had just struck such a hard blow was now peacefully concocting a drink of water, lemon, and sugar. No one was in a hurry. No orderlies and messengers passed in and out. Cares were laid away as soon as the desk was closed for the day. It was as if the war were already at an end and there could be no more danger. The Field Marshal was leaning back comfortably in his armchair, his fingertips lightly pressed together while he recounted reminiscences of his youth, of the war of 1870, and of the coronation at Versailles. Then he spoke of the recent events in the northeastern section of Poland, and finally proposed that after I had visited the province of Suwalki I should also take a trip into those parts of East Prussia which had been devastated by the Russians. For whoever had not seen the terrible traces of a Russian invasion, he said, did not know what "the Russian peril" meant. * * *

Later, I often had the honor of being Hindenburg's guest and he gave me a number of glimpses into his mode of life. On this information, but above all on the report which his son-in-law gave me one evening, is based the following short description:

First of all I wish to emphasize the characteristic point that during the Russian campaign, Hindenburg has changed his ordinary habits of peace times as little as possible. He works, goes walking, eats and sleeps at the same hours and just as long as in peace times. He does not permit his habits and his calm to be disturbed. He adheres to what is dear and of benefit to him.

In war, as in peace, he begins work directly after breakfast. In Summer he rises at 6, in Winter an hour later. His work lasts until about 11, and then he takes a long walk, irrespective of weather or season. Several times I saw him enter his automobile and drive out into the country with his adjutant to wander along the more or less beaten tracks in some peaceful wood. At five minutes to 1 he returns to get ready for the noonday meal, which begins at 1 o'clock sharp. You could set your watch by his exact division of the day. The meal is a simple one and he likes to drink a glass of moselle with it.

When he rises from the table he goes directly to his room to rest. At 4 o'clock work begins again and continues until a few minutes before 8. In time of peace he partakes of coffee and cake with his family at about 4 o'clock; then he receives visitors and either takes a walk or works. He always has guests at table and takes great pleasure in conversing with them and giving his opinion on the burning questions of the day.

Punctually at 8 o'clock supper is served and conversation over a glass of beer continues until 11. One day is like the other, without interruption. Just as the war has been unable to change Hindenburg's mode of life, just so the rigor of the war and its events of world-historical bearing have not been able to disturb his composure. He was as unruffled at the time of the Mazurian battles as he is today. When every one feared for the safety of Scheffer and Litzmann, who appeared to be hopelessly surrounded by the Russians east of Lodz, Hindenburg retained his calm, and when the anxiety was at its height asked where the splendid cake on the dinner table had come from. The mother of a young Lieutenant had sent it and Hindenburg did not neglect to send her his thanks for the gift. The apparently surrounded corps broke through with that cold decision which the General felt justified in expecting of them and took 12,000 prisoners in the bargain! Such absolute calm is for the most part a gift of nature, but it is also a result of the training to bear heavy responsibilities, in which German officers are drilled from the start.

Hindenburg is the idol of the soldiers, for victory is tied to his baton. By the mere mention of his name the soldiers are inspired to make the greatest efforts and go to meet death with enthusiasm. The General is like a father to his troops and he looks out for their every comfort.

The relation between Hindenburg and his Chief of Staff is touching. Only death can break their alliance. It has often been asked whether the Field Marshal or the Chief of Staff plans the operations, but one may feel convinced that the two supplement one another. The General alone bears the burden of responsibility, however. The two men are thus inseparably bound, not only by ties of friendship, but also by common successful work. When you see the two men in conversation you have the feeling of invincible, overwhelming power. The "General of the future" is the name which the Field Marshal has given to Ludendorff, and the latter's opinion of his superior is well-known to every one at the eastern front. The words which Prince Joachim once wrote to Hindenburg's son-in-law may stand for an expression of the feeling which the entire army cherishes for the victor of Tannenberg:

"You know I am not given to making phrases, but I would gladly die for Hindenburg!"

Heard on the Balkan Express

By Emil Ludwig

This picture of life on the famous Balkan Express, which has been making semi-weekly trips between Berlin and Constantinople since Jan. 15, *appeared originally in the Berliner Tageblatt.*

THE Balkan Express drew into Sofia. Fifty men, whose origin, honesty, and state of cleanliness had been officially approved, crowded anxiously against the windows of the waiting room until this announcement was made in four languages: "Eleven persons leave the train here." This message undeceived the other thirty-nine travelers, as everything here goes by number, and one man cried loudly through the room: "I will give 500 crowns for a ticket to Vienna!"

Prominent among those who were pacing up and down the platform was a Persian. Under his magnificent yellow-bordered furs the big man wore a bell-shaped long khaki jacket, narrow trousers, and high boots, and his head was covered with a high fur cap. His heavy, short beard was blonde and was parted in the middle in the Persian style.

"I hear," said an Austrian officer to him in French, "that you come from Teheran. Is it possible that you have heard something of the fate of my friend, Staff Surgeon H.? He was a member of my corps, and is said to have escaped from Russian captivity."

"At your service," said the Persian in German as he saluted. "I am Staff Surgeon H. myself."

Later he recounted the almost incredible story of his flight from Askarpad, whither he had been dragged from Przemysl to serve as a doctor, a flight including a stretch of more than 800 kilometers to Teheran and then a trip to Asia Minor, so graphically and with such a wealth of detail that I dare not forestall his desire to be the first to tell it in public.

In the same dining car in which this "Persian" was directing the imaginations of the travelers to a barren mountain range, to the longings and fears of the prisoner and to his bewilderment at being free again, was heard the kaleidoscopic chatter and buzz of thirty voices—army contractors, diplomats, agents, officers, all inspired by the spirit of the present that never seems livelier or more entrancing than here in the Balkans, whose name the new train carries in letters by far too large. German officers in Turkish uniforms sit beside naval officers from Gallipoli and point out that one is going home on leave after fifteen months' service and another after seventeen. One tells about the marmalade jars the English left behind at Sedd-el-Bahr, another details his trip on a raft on the Tigris, and a third points to a piece of shrapnel on his watch chain that was dug out of his thigh.

Over there a gentleman is explaining the blessings of the Central Purchasing Company to a doubter. * * * "And it logically follows that the victory of the blockaded Central Powers is guaranteed, not only by their arms, but also by the intelligent purchasing of the materials that we lack. My department in particular is so important for the interest of the public, that." * * *

"I assure you," says somebody behind me, "that we Zionists never were stronger than at present. The Government is now taking a great interest in having the Jews in Poland return to their homes. I, myself, am going to Budapest, to" * * *

"You are mistaken," declares an ingratiating voice in front of me, "today nothing depends upon the attitude of Greece. The whole thing is plainly narrowing down to the fate of the Irak region. I, myself, had an opportunity to learn things through confidential talks with X.—things—I tell you—"

"Cargo room!" The voice rolled through the car like thunder. "Cargo room, that's the question! If the British did not have much less cargo room than people naturally thought they had, as the first seafaring nation, they would now be able to send enough reinforcements to Egypt. I was an officer for three years in one of those lousy English cargo boats, myself, and I can tell you I know the breed."

This loud and positive, if not logical, judgment enlivened the crowd, which, between cheese and apples, considered events from the viewpoint of personal experiences and recklessly foretold their outcome. And then I thought how far we all were in the dark regarding the development of events, the outcome of which would affect every one of us.

The Slaughter at Douaumont

By a French Soldier

This narrative of one of the bloodiest fights at Verdun, translated from the Paris Figaro, comes hot from the trenches and breathes the fierce spirit of the war:

DESPITE the horror of it, despite the ceaseless flow of blood, one wants to see. One's soul wants to feed on the sight of the brute Boches falling. I stopped on the ground for hours, and when I closed my eyes I saw the whole picture again. The guns are firing at 200 and 300 yards, and shrapnel is exploding with a crash, scything them down. Our men hold their ground; our machine guns keep to their work, and yet they advance.

Near me, as I lie in the mud, there is a giant wrapped in one of our uniforms with a steel helmet on his head. He seems to be dead, he is so absolutely still. At a given moment the Boches are quite close to us. Despite the noise of the guns one can hear their oaths and their shouts as they strike. Then the giant next to me jumps up, and with a voice like a stentor shouts " Hier da! Hier da! " Mechanically some of us get up. (My wound, which had been dressed, left me free and I had forgotten.) I was unarmed and so I struck him with my steel helmet and he dropped, with his head broken. An officer who was passing sees the incident and takes off the man's coat. Below is a German uniform. Where had the spy come from and how had he got there?

But the Boches are returning again massed to the assault, and they are being killed in bulk. It makes one think that in declaring war the Kaiser had sworn the destruction of his race, and he would have shown good taste in doing so. Their gunfire is slackening now, and ours redoubles. The fort has gone, and if under its ruins there are left a few guns and gunners the bulk of the guns are firing from outside. The machine guns are coming up and getting in position, and our men are moving on in numerous waves. I find a rifle belonging to a comrade who has fallen and join the Chasseurs with the fifty cartridges that I have left. What a fight it is, and what troops! From time to time a man falls, rises, shoots, runs, shoots again, keeps on firing, fights with his bayonet, and then, worn out, falls, to be trampled on without raising a cry. The storm of fire continues. Everything is on fire—the wood near by, the village of Douaumont, Verdun, the front of Bezonvaux, and the back of Thiaumont. There is fire everywhere. The acrid smell of carbonic acid and blood catches at our throats, but the battle goes on.

They are brave, but one of our men is worth two of theirs, especially in hand-to-hand fighting. They bend and fall back, and the sound of the song they sing to order, " Heil dir im Siegerkranz," only reaches us in hiccoughs. Our reinforcements continue to arrive. We are the masters. Our officers, with wonderful coolness, control the ardor of the troops. The infantry action is over. By its tirs de barrage the artillery is holding that of the enemy, and we keep awaiting the fresh order for action in silence.

Important War Books in Press

This department is devoted mainly to significant extracts from advance sheets of books relating to the great European war or to world affairs directly affected by the war. Some of the volumes are still in press, but all are to be out early in the month. The object is to give interesting advance information as to the contents of each book.

German Power Analyzed

THE GERMAN EMPIRE BETWEEN TWO WARS. By Robert H. Fife, Jr. New York: The Macmillan Company. $1.50.

MR. FIFE, who is Professor of German in Wesleyan University, offers a general survey of the German Empire from 1871 to 1914, taking up the matter in three sections. In the first he studies the development of relations between Germany and other nations; in the second he takes up internal politics during the same period, and in the third he considers various phases of the growth within the empire socially, industrially, and politically.

In a chapter discussing the "Expansion and Ambitions" of the German Empire Mr. Fife pays especial attention to the efforts and methods by which Germany has endeavored to gain an outlet through Turkey, finding in the incidents and policies extending through a number of years the antecedents of the present comradeship in war. He sums up as follows:

> It was then, as co-worker and heir of the Turk that the German hoped to find outlet for a part of his surplus political and commercial energy. Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, with a heterogeneous and in part very energetic population, have great natural resources and only wait the touch of European capital to awaken to great wealth. Germany had long recognized this, and her leverage at the Court of the Sultan was early brought to bear in the effort to secure a foothold here. She regarded this field as peculiarly hers; hence the clever flattery of Abdul Hamid through so many years, hence the failure to co-operate with the other European powers in their protests against the brutalities of Turkish rule and their efforts to assist the Hellenic people in Crete and elsewhere, hence the hostile attitude of the German press against Italian occupation of the Islands of the Aegean in 1912 and the eager championship of the Turkish cause by the same papers at the outbreak of the first Balkan war. German efforts were crowned with preliminary success, and the peaceful penetration of Anatolia by German capital went on apace.

In his study of the internal policies of the empire the author explains and justifies the dominance of Prussia:

> Not only does the empire rest upon Prussia, but Prussia has become to a certain extent the empire. Prussia's monarch is its Emperor and the commander of its army and navy, Prussia's Minister-President is its Chancellor, the Prussian capital is its capital. Prussia includes nearly 65 per cent. of the empire's area, more than 61 per cent. of its population, and 60 per cent. of its taxable values. Prussia's methods in official administration have become the model for the smaller States. The military forces of the greater part of the smaller duchies and principalities are attached to Prussian commands, and the railways of all the Central States are at Prussia's mercy and therefore completely subordinate to the Prussian administration.

"If we were obliged," says Professor Fife, in a chapter on "The Proletarian in Politics," "to cover with one word the development of Germany in the four decades between the two great wars, that word would certainly be 'socialism.'" He goes on to outline the socialistic development and its causes. Then follows an inquiry into the reasons why the Socialist Party should be so constantly at odds with the Government and with all other parties. The author concludes:

> Largely through its own choice the Social Democracy, although representing one-third of the voters in the empire, has been deprived of any considerable share in government and remained in an attitude of sullen hostility to the State. So well have the class organizers of past decades done their work that they have developed among the industrial workers who make up the Social Democratic Party a class feeling that is nothing more nor

less than than an independent class culture. It is not merely a political gulf which the Socialist leaders have fixed between the workman and every other class in Germany.

Mr. Fife's discussion of "The Press and Public Opinion" illuminates much in German progress and affairs that Americans find difficult to understand.

Russia's Strength Increasing

VICTORY IN DEFEAT. By Stanley Washburn. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co.

As correspondent of The London Times Mr. Washburn was at the front with the Russian Army from October, 1914, until last November. During that time he was with every active Russian army but one, and was present at most of the important engagements. His book describes in detail the campaign in Galicia, the retreat through Poland, the evacuation of Warsaw, and the subsequent retirement before the German forces until the establishment of Winter quarters in November. The author says that it was during the early part of last Fall that he began to detect "that subtle seepage of morale which was beginning to manifest itself among the German soldiers," due to the fact that they had been assured that the fall of Warsaw would mean a separate peace with Russia. The Germans now in Russia, he says, because they have lost such volumes of young men, "are gradually losing their capacity to drive home attacks, because the new troops have not the punch of those marshaled for war a year ago." Comparing the outlook for the two countries, he has this to say:

> In the meantime, when even the best friend of Germany must admit that she has passed the zenith of her resources both in men and material, Russia has passed her ebb tide and is getting stronger day by day. I have heard tales of only old men left in Russia to fight. This is a mere fiction. There are two million of Russia's young manhood trained and awaiting only arms to go to the front. Can Germany ever again put in this war two million young men in the field? Russia can put twice that this year if she gets material, and a million a year thereafter for as long as the war lasts. The Russian tide is coming in as the German is beginning to ebb.

Mr. Washburn considers Alexieff "the cleverest and most capable General the Russians have ever had in their history." A chapter is devoted to description and analysis of the Russian Chief of Staff, of whom he says:

> He has no recreations save work, and he lives practically twenty-four hours of the day for the single purpose of winning this war. I have met many Generals in this and other wars, but can say without reservation that Alexeieff is the hardest worker that I have ever known, either in the military or any other profession.

In a chapter on the commercial opportunity presented to this country by present conditions in Russia, which the author considers the greatest American trade has ever known, Mr. Washburn explains at some length why it will be impossible after the war for the Germans to slip back into their former commercial relations with Russia. Two of these reasons, which will operate equally with regard to South American and Far Eastern markets also, will be the lack of financial backing to make possible the long lines of credit Germany formerly extended and the depleted ranks of her skilled industrial workers now being sacrificed so freely, "types of men that she cannot for a generation duplicate." A reason affecting Russia alone is, he says, the result of the realization by the Russians, after the breaking out of the war, of the extent to which Germans, under cover of the commercial influence they had gained, were exerting a powerful influence on domestic affairs.

> Perhaps it is not strange, then, that Russia today is looking for a substitute for the German trade. "What we want," the Russians say, "is a trade that will supply us with our wants, but that will bring with it no political influence." Naturally and logically, then, the eyes of intelligent business men have been looking toward America to step into the breach and fill the gaps in trade which the cessation of relations with Germany

has created. "We are determined to rid ourselves of this influence," Serge Sazonoff, the Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs in Petrograd, has said to me ten times if he has said it once; "why are you Americans doing nothing to take advantage of this extraordinary condition in the Russian market? Russia wants American trade, and anything which the Government can do legitimately to encourage this trade will be done and gladly."

A Plea for Pan-Americanism

MODERNIZING THE MONROE DOCTRINE. By Charles H. Sherrill. Introduction by Nicholas Murray Butler. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. $1.25.

MR. SHERRILL'S study of the problem of how to make the Monroe Doctrine a practical, up-to-date method, beneficial for all concerned, of directing the interests of both the United States and South America, is the result of his own intimate acquaintance with both continents. He was for some years United States Minister to Argentina, where he paid much attention to the commercial, political, and intellectual developments of South American life, and he is now Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Chambers of Commerce of the United States. In this latter position he is devoting himself to the task of bringing this country into closer relations, not only commercially but in every way, with the South American republics. Within a week after the publication of his book the publishers received requests for permission to translate it into Russian, Japanese, and Spanish.

In his introduction the author thus sets forth his position:

> I believe in Pan-Americanism and its great future because it is at the same time the most altruistic and the most practical foreign policy to which any country has ever devoted itself. It honorably reconciles the two seemingly irreconcilable shibboleths, "Safety First" and "America First," because it satisfies both our patriotism and our desire for security. It is based upon a study of and a regard for the viewpoint of other nations, thus educating the spirit of our own nation: advance the spiritual side of a whole people and things material will take care of themselves. It provides a definite foreign policy upon which the most practical of men may consistently unite with extreme idealists. It is an attempt to assemble the finest traits of twenty-one republics so as to employ them in combination for the common good of all, meanwhile disregarding their shortcomings: this mixture of appreciation and toleration will surely be as effective when applied in the family of nations as it has proved in many a family of individuals. Once this attitude of mind is gained, it matters little how much the republics concerned differ in racial traits. Pan-Americanism makes for a broader and deeper type of patriotism, because it adds consideration for the viewpoint of other nations to the narrower and often selfish patriotism for one's homeland, whose interests, nevertheless, it safeguards. * * * Some policies are only beneficial when completely worked out, but Pan-Americanism, even when incomplete, is beneficial, and complete it would be an immeasurable blessing. It is the most practical agent for international peace thus far devised.

In the early part of the book the author cites many facts and describes many conditions in the attempt to show the people of this country the truth about South America, its life and its people, in matters concerning which there is here much misconception. He shows, for instance, that the Latin originals of South America have been as much modified in character as have the immigrants who came to this country, and it is his conviction that the process of Americanization "has been working simultaneously in both North and South America until we have almost reached a point of Pan-American equilibrium." He urges that in every possible way, especially by utilizing the help of newspapers in the dissemination of news in this country about South America, and in South America about the United States, by bringing the Chambers of Commerce of the two regions in closer touch, and by creating reciprocal interests in their colleges and universities, South and North America be brought to a clearer understanding of each other's needs, views, and possibilities of mutual helpfulness.

Passing from consideration of the means by which peace and mutual understanding can be assured, he advances a plan for the removal of friction between this entire hemisphere and Europe on the one side, and Asia on the other. It is, in brief, that the United States should exchange the Philippine Islands for certain European territory in the Western world:

> Trade the Philippines for all European possessions to the south of us, plus freedom of hand in the Panama Canal by an agreed annulment of the Hay-Paunce-fote treaty, and then turn the Guianas and British Honduras into free republics, return the Falkland Islands to Argentina, and take under our own flag the West Indian Islands, so important to the defense of the great canal.

"Germany vs. Civilization"

GERMANY VS. CIVILIZATION: NOTES ON THE ATROCIOUS WAR. By William Roscoe Thayer. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. $1.

MR. THAYER, author of noteworthy biographies of John Hay and Cavour, calls the present conflict the Atrocious War throughout his book. Not only does he charge Germany with aggression and with savage methods, but he also condemns President Wilson bitterly for not protesting at the outset against German violations of international law in Belgium. He says:

> We were the most powerful free people in the world, and to possess power imposes the obligation to use it in behalf of the weak. The little countries looked to us for leadership, looked and listened and waited, and we gave them neither sign nor sound. They would have joined us in protest even at the risk of bringing on themselves the fury of the Germans, within whose reach they dwelt. Our silence—the silence of President Wilson, letting "I dare not" wait upon "I would"—brought to them the desolating conviction that the United States would officially utter no declaration in behalf either of neutrality or of humanity. We tacitly admitted that a small nation has no rights, that neutral nations may be overrun and destroyed at the pleasure of a powerful aggressor.

Having devoted chapters to the Kaiser, Kultur, and the barbarous strain in the German nature, Mr. Thayer gives one to "Germanizing America," in which he addresses himself to the plots and activities of Germans in the United States. His view is indicated in the following passages:

> Germany practiced a peculiarly ignoble form of deceit in permitting her subjects who came to this country to become naturalized American citizens, with the tacit understanding that when they returned home they might resume their German citizenship. The purpose of this double shuffle was evident as soon as the war broke out. Germans who had resided here for years, never hinting that they wished to become Americans, suddenly applied for naturalization papers, and were soon presiding at pro-German meetings or editing pro-German journals, and setting themselves up as expounders of the Americanism of Washington and Lincoln. One hardly knows which to despise more, the deceit or the impudence. * * *

Glancing at the recoil of these activities upon German-Americans themselves after the war, Mr. Thayer says:

> Only men convinced that they must win at any cost and by any means could resort to the terrorist methods which these agents use. But what if the Kaiser does not win? In what state will the hyphenate, seditious Germans here be left? Can they suppose that the Americans who are and intend to remain Americans will welcome them as neighbors? Will the American workmen who have been thrown out of employment by the blowing up of their factories feel kindly toward the Teutons who committed these crimes? Will American business men, whose legitimate business and investments have been blocked by German capitalists, cherish no resentment? Will American universities tolerate professors who have been slyly preaching sedition? It is far more likely that for a generation to come the very word "German" will be detested in the United States and that every German will have to show cause why he should not be regarded as a secret enemy of this country.

In his final chapter Mr. Thayer views the war as a death grapple between despotism and democracy.

A German Reply to "J'Accuse"

A SLANDER: NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF THE PEROID PRECEDING THE WORLD WAR. By Professor Doctor Theodor Schiemann. Berlin: J. S. Preuss.

PROFESSOR SCHIEMANN, an eminent German historian, and friend of the Kaiser, has undertaken to answer the most damaging of all the anti-German books on the war—"J'Accuse." His answer is in the form of a brochure entitled "A Slander," narrating the diplomatic history of the years preceding the war, and seeking to prove that there was a conspiracy of France, England, and Russia to strangle Germany. His main propositions are these:

> That this war was desired by France in the first instance, was brought closer by the Russian-French alliance, and, through England's joining hands with those conspirators, became, under English leadership, necessary and inevitable.
>
> That these three powers had long since resolved to break Germany's powerful strategic position in Central Europe, and had been systematically working to educate the world up to the notion that this proceeding was a moral necessity.
>
> That in this war which has been forced upon us our goal should be the permanent safeguarding of our borders and the freeing of the seas from English tyranny.

Professor Schiemann holds that Bernhardi merely pointed out the necessity of grasping the sword before this conspiracy became active. The plot, he says, began with King Edward's entente with France, but it first became dangerous when England and Russia got together in 1907 and divided Persia between them. "This was designed above all else," he believes, "to make of Persia the booty by means of which Russia should be led to an understanding with England over the great questions of European policy." Then followed the crisis of 1908 and the meeting of King Edward and the Czar, with their diplomatic representatives:

> Iswolsky declared himself ready to proceed with England against Germany as soon as Russia should have sufficiently strengthened itself in a military way. Six or eight years was the longest period contemplated for this purpose, that is to say, till between the years 1914 and 1916. As long as Clemenceau remained in office it could be reckoned on that France would under all circumstances join in.

To Dr. Schiemann's mind the defensive agreements entered into by Great Britain and France at critical moments in the succeeding years were aggressive acts in a settled program for the ultimate and deliberate crushing of Germany. The most important of the comparatively new evidence that he cites is in regard to a secret naval convention entered into between Great Britain and Russia about two months before the war broke out. As the actual signing of this convention admittedly took place only after hostilities had begun, little has been said about it; but Dr. Schiemann gives it several pages, with details said to be taken from the minutes of an Admiralty conference held at St. Petersburg May 26, 1914, agreeing upon concerted action of the British and Russian navies.

If this brochure lacks the sweeping eloquence of "J'Accuse," it has the power of quiet earnestness and of a trained historical mind.

THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS

[German Cartoon]

Wilson's Highest Ambition



—© *Simplicissimus, Munich.*

"There is an English Viceroy of India—why not also one of America?"

[Australian Cartoon]

The Banquet of Death



—*From The Sydney Bulletin.*

THE BANQUETER: "This is the feast of my life."

[German Cartoon]

Rich Jonathan and Poor John



—© *Kladderadatch, Berlin.*

John Bull: "Now I know, at least, what has become of my big stomach."

[Italian Cartoon]

A Thirsty Plant



—From L'Asino, Rome.

It must be watered often—with blood.

[English Cartoon]

Hohenzollern Madness



—*Louis Raemaekers in Land and Water, London.*

Verdun: Storming "l'Homme Mort."

The Cornered Beast



—*From Le Matin, Paris.*

The Death of the Zeppelin



—*From Le Matin, Paris.*

The German Goliath Brought to Earth by the French Seventy-five.

[German Cartoon]

"And the Levite Passed By—"

Luke x., 32.



—© *Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.*

" The Anglican Bishop of London praised the English seamen who refused to rescue our Zeppelin crew."

[American Cartoon]

Mars in America



—*From The San Francisco Chronicle.*

He Sends Them Kiting.

[German Cartoon]

Dr. Briand's Resuscitation Experiment



—© *Simplicissimus, Munich.*

BRIAND: "Do you feel better now?"
THE ITALIAN MARS: "Yes, a little. I—am—convinced—of our—final—victory."

[American Cartoon]

Wearing-Down Tactics



—© 1916, *by The Philadelphia Inquirer.*

"Attrition" Gone Mad.

[German Cartoon]

Tommy the Horse Butcher



—© *Ulk, Berlin.*

ENGLAND: "With my great overweight I shall yet ride all my horseflesh to death."

[Dutch Cartoon]

A Diplomatic Parley



—By Louis Raemaekers, Noted Dutch Cartoonist.

The American Attitude On the German Submarine Policy.

[German Cartoon]

As Seen From Mars



—© *Ulk, Berlin.*

" How peacefully the Earth shines there in the evening sky! "

[Dutch Cartoon]

The "Way" of the Kaiser



—*From De Nieuwe Amsterdammer.*

Kaiser: "Each battle is a step along the way in which Almighty God so graciously leads us."

[German Cartoon]

Protection Against U-Boats



—© *Simplicissimus, Munich.*

"Where did this wire fence come from all at once?"
"That is the grating behind which the ruler of the world-seas has to hide herself."

[Referring to the mysterious wire trawls that are said to have baffled German submarines in the English Channel.]

[American Cartoon]

German Peace


PEACE GRANTED ON GENEROUS TERMS
BELGIUM
FRANCE
ROBERT CARTER

—*From The New York Evening Sun.*

"I Forgive Them!"

[Italian Cartoon]

The Accord of the Allies



—*From L'Asino, Rome.*

All United For One Aim.

[German Cartoon]

The German Plagues



—©- *Ulk, Berlin.*

JOHN BULL: "Again I say, I will have nothing more to do with German products."

Watch Your Step!



—From The Nashville American.

And Still He Insists In Putting His Foot In It.

[French Cartoon]

The Other Trench



—*Forain in Le Figaro, Paris.*

"The women of France also are doing their own brave part for la Patrie."

Progress of the War

Recording Campaigns on All Fronts and Collateral Events From March 12 Up to and Including April 12, 1916

CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE

March 13—Heavy artillery fighting north of Verdun, in the Champagne district, and north of the Aisne.

March 16—Both sides fight at Verdun to hold Le Mort Homme.

March 17-19—Fierce German assaults on Vaux and Douaumont.

March 20—Fresh German troops make strong attack between Malancourt and Avocourt.

March 21—French forced to retire from Avocourt woods with loss of 2,500 prisoners.

March 24—Haucourt trenches taken by Germans; Hill 304 under hot fire.

March 25—Town of Verdun set afire by German shells.

March 27—British troops smash German salient in front of St. Eloi.

March 28—Germans repulsed with great slaughter in attack on Avocourt-Bethincourt salient.

March 30—Germans win Malancourt and gain footing in Le Mort Homme region by fierce attacks on Hill 295.

April 2—German assaults penetrate Caillette Wood.

April 6—Village of Haucourt carried by Germans after night attack.

April 9—French abandon Bethincourt salient, straightening their lines from Avocourt to Cumières.

April 10—Germans penetrate French lines on Hill 295; furious assaults on Hill 340.

April 12—Germans repulsed in renewed assaults on Le Mort Homme and Cumières.

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN EUROPE

March 13—Austrians report repulse of Russian offensive on the Dniester and Bessarabian fronts.

March 19—Germans repulse Russian attacks east of Vilna; 9,270 Russians killed near Lake Narocz.

March 20—Russians lose heavily in attack on German positions south of Wichnevski Lake and north of Postavy.

March 21—Austrians forced to evacuate bridgehead fortifications northwest of Uscieczko and to abandon their transports.

March 23—Russian armies in Galicia and Bukowina continue their advance and pierce German line in Riga region.

March 31—Teutons repulsed in attack on Russian line in Jacobstadt sector and in forests south of Mokritza.

April 9—Germans bombard Shlok in the Riga region and are repulsed north of Lake Narocz.

April 12—German attacks southwest of Pinsk repulsed.

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

March 13—Italian infantry charges against enemy's position near Plava.

March 14—Italians storm Austrian redoubt at San Martino and capture Dante del Croviglio.

March 18—Austrians capture Italian position north of Tolmino bridgehead.

March 30—Austrians repulsed by Italians in counterattacks in Sugana Valley and in the Monte Nero zone.

April 2—Italians capture blockhouses on the Rauchkofel and a trench near Sielz.

April 8—Italians repulsed at several points in the Doberdo sector.

April 10—Italians take Austrian trenches on the Mrzli.

ASIA MINOR AND EGYPT

March 17—Russians occupy Mamhuatan, on the Euphrates.

March 18—Russians resume progress westward from Erzerum, and march on Sivas.

March 22—Turks evacuate fortress of Erzerum.

March 24—Turks report success on the Tigris, near Felahie.

April 1—Turks advance in the Tchoruk Valley.

April 3—British driven from their positions in Arabia by surprise attack, and retreat to Sheikh Osman.

April 5—British carry Turkish intrenched position at Umm-el-Henna, below Kut-el-Amara.

April 6—British capture town of Felahie.

April 8—Russians frustrate attempt of the Turks to cross the Kara Dere River.

April 9—British fail in attempt to take Turkish position at Sannayyat, and are repulsed near Felahie after losing more than 3,000 killed.

AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

March 13—British forces occupy Mushi in German East Africa.

March 20—Germans driven from Arusha and from a strong defense along the Ruwu River.

April 11—Portuguese forces occupy Kionga, in East Africa.

AERIAL RECORD

The western front was the scene of many aerial combats and raids. Six French aeroplanes dropped bombs over the German lines at Brieulles on March 13. On March 20 sixty-five allied aeroplanes raided the coast of Belgium and bombarded Zeebrugge and Houttave. Twenty-three allied aeroplanes raided Mülhausen. It was estimated that at least fifty machines were engaged in the ensuing battle. In one day four German aeroplanes were brought down in the region of Verdun. A Zeppelin raided Dunkirk, killing two civilians and wounding four. In retaliation, allied aeroplanes dropped bombs on Keyen, Essen, and neighboring towns.

Italians brought down three of five seaplanes which bombarded Ancona and dropped bombs on Adelsberg and Opicina in Trieste, killing two men and wounding several. A raid on Ancona by a squadron of ten Austrian naval aeroplanes was successful.

On March 19 four German seaplanes raided the east coast of Kent, killing nine persons and injuring thirty-one. On March 31 five Zeppelins raided the eastern counties of England, dropping ninety bombs; twenty-eight persons were killed and forty-four injured. One Zeppelin, the L-15, was shot down, and sank off the mouth of the Thames after the capture of her crew by a patrol trawler. On April 1 two airships raided the eastern coast, killing 16 people and injuring 100. The coast of Scotland and the northern and southeastern coasts of England were raided by six Zeppelins on April 2. Ten persons were killed and eleven wounded in Scotland. The southeast coast was again raided on April 4, and on April 5 a Zeppelin attacked the northeast coast, but was driven off by anti-aircraft defenses.

NAVAL RECORD

The German steamer Esperanze, carrying food for the Turks, was sunk in the Black Sea by a Russian warship. Turkish submarines sank a Russian transport northeast of Balum.

A British light cruiser rammed and sank a German destroyer off the North Frisian Coast.

Four British and three German destroyers were reported engaged in a battle off the Belgian coast on March 20.

Forts St. George and Sanjak and other coastal defenses of Smyrna were destroyed by a British warship on April 3 after three hours' bombardment.

In the Adriatic Sea, the French torpedo boat destroyer Renaudin was sunk by a submarine.

The Danish steamer Stjerneborg was torpedoed and sunk off Sardinia.

The liner Minneapolis, used as a transport, was sunk in the Mediterranean. The crew was lost.

In the war zone the submarine campaign was carried on with renewed vigor. It is estimated that the loss to merchant shipping of countries at war with Germany amounted to 100,000 tons in March and to 81,000 tons between April 1 and April 12. At least twenty-three British ships and four French ships were sunk, and the Italian liner Unione was torpedoed without warning. The loss to neutral countries has also been enormous. Eleven Norwegian ships, six Danish ships, and the Swedish steamers Hollandia and Murjsk have been destroyed. Attacks on the Spanish steamers Santanderino and Vigo were made the subject of inquiry by the Spanish Government. The Dutch steamers Duiveland, Tubantia, and Palembang were attacked. A protest was sent to the German Government by Holland, and the Dutch Shipping Council, which was intrusted by the Netherlands Government with the official inquiry, reported that the Tubantia and the Palembang were torpedoed.

The lives of Americans were again jeopardized in attacks on the Eagle Point, the Berwindvale, the Englishman, the Manchester Engineer, and in an alleged attack on the Channel liner Sussex. On April 10, in reply to an inquiry by the United States Government, Germany sent a note dealing with all five cases. She denied that a German submarine had torpedoed the Sussex, but admitted an attack on another vessel at approximately the same time and place. Spain also protested against the Sussex attack because of the death of Spanish subjects, including Enrique Granados and his wife.

MISCELLANEOUS

Sir Edward Grey, in reply to the protest from the United States Government against the removal of thirty-eight Germans, Austrians, and Turks from the American steamship China, declared that the British Government was satisfied that the men were engaged in a plot to make Manila a base for the perpetration of unneutral acts against the Entente allies.

The Governments of the Entente allies presented to Secretary Lansing, on April 3, a joint reply to the protest made by the United States against the seizure, detention, and censoring of neutral mails. The note declared that no legitimate letter mail had been confiscated nor any treaty violated, but asserted the Allies' intention to continue searching parcel post packages for contraband.

Greece protested against the declaration by the Allies of their intention to land forces on the island of Cephalonia.

Rumania signed a commercial treaty with Germany providing that each country should export to the other all goods unnecessary for home consumption.

RETURNING FROM A DIFFICULT MISSION

(From a Painting by Lady Butler)

BELGIAN ROYAL FAMILY

King Albert, Queen Elizabeth, Prince Leopold, Prince Charles, and Princess Marie-José at Their Villa in Flanders

PERIOD XXI.

The Irish Revolt and Its Suppression—Verdun; the Epic of the War—Defense of the British Blockade—Note on the Sussex Sinking—The Two Gorgon Heads—Why Europe Was Deceived—Germany's Invasion of French Industry—Life on a Submarine—The Pope and the Peace Conference—With the Russians in Persia—The Bagdad Railway and the Sultan.

WORLD EVENTS OF THE MONTH

NOTEWORTHY FEATURES

CURRENT HISTORY presents in this number several features which will prove of especial value. "The Defense of the British Blockade," Sir Edward Grey's official reply to the representations of the United States regarding interference with neutral trade, has not heretofore been printed in this country, except in very abbreviated form. It is a document of profound interest to all the neutral nations. The detailed account of what occurred in the Belgian Foreign Office on the fateful night of the German ultimatum, as related by the Belgian Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, is a moving drama of thrilling interest, and a human document that will always rivet attention. The complete correspondence leading up to the final triumph of President Wilson's diplomacy in relation to submarine warfare is given in chronological order; nowhere else has it appeared in this permanent form, with all the documents collated into one consecutive serial. It is a completed chapter of American diplomacy which will rank with the most momentous in our nation's annals. The dramatic chapter of Ireland's ill-starred adventure in independence is also given in completed form, with the official copy of the declaration of independence and a careful and correct narrative of what actually occurred. It is an ideal form in which to preserve the story of one of the most memorable episodes growing out of the war. These are only four features of the June number, but they serve to emphasize the purpose of CURRENT HISTORY, namely, to bring to its readers authentic and complete narrations of the chief events of the world's history each month, its scope being confined at present to such episodes as bear directly or indirectly upon the European war.

* * *

ACTUALLY A "WORLD WAR"

THE extent to which the entire world is concerned in the war was shown at the recent conference of the Allies at Paris. The following countries were officially represented, and acted in concert:

	Sq. Kilom.	Population.
Belgium and Congo...	2,394,451	22,424,000
France and colonies...	12,927,364	86,361,000
Italy and colonies.....	1,920,260	37,338,000
Japan and colonies....	673,681	73,385,000
British Empire........	29,819,400	424,089,000
Russian Empire.......	22,556,520	176,400,000
Serbia	87,300	4,633,000
Portugal and colonies..	2,185,000	15,170,000
Total...............	72,563,976	839,800,000

Estimating the total population of the earth at 1,600,000,000, and the superficial area of the world at 135,420,000 square kilometers, it will be observed that the Allies alone represent over one-half the total. The Teutonic and Turkish Empires and Bulgaria, including the German colonies, represent a population of about 150,000,000 and an area of 6,150,000 square kilometers. Hence the total number of people actually involved in the war is approximately 1,000,000,000 and the area of "hostile territory" is nearly 80,000,000 square kilometers, or about 32,000,000 square miles. The area of the United States is 3,200,000 square miles, hence the warring nations represent ten times the population and ten times the area of our nation.

* * *

TALK OF PEACE

THE indirect references to peace in Germany's submarine note to the United States, with the Pope's letter to President Wilson and a cloud of less definite peace rumors, have caused much talk, but have no solid significance as yet, beyond emphasizing the self-evident fact that Germany is weary of the war. The failure at Verdun, the pressure of the blockade, the tightening food crisis in Germany, the resignation of Dr. Delbrück, Minister of the Interior, and the proposed appointment of a "food dictator"—these are straws that seem to show an adverse wind of destiny for the Central Powers and an increasing desire for the end of the war. For the real situation regarding peace, however, one must question not Germany, but the Entente Allies, who now have the stronger battalions. The answer is found in the words of President Poincaré, spoken at Nancy on May 14:

> France will not expose her sons to the dangers of new aggressions. The Central Empires, haunted by remorse for having brought on the war, and terrified by the indignation and hatred they have stirred up in mankind, are trying to make the world believe that the Allies alone are responsible for the prolongation of hostilities—a dull irony which will deceive no one.
>
> Neither directly nor indirectly have our enemies offered us peace. But we do not want them to offer it to us. We do not want to submit to their conditions; we want to impose ours on them. We do not want a peace which would leave Imperial Germany with the power to recommence the war and keep Europe eternally menaced. We want peace which receives from restored rights serious guarantees of equilibrium and stability. So long as that peace is not assured us, so long as our enemies will not recognize themselves as vanquished, we will not cease to fight.

Sir Edward Grey has said the same thing in his own way. Peace is a year nearer than it was a year ago, but the evidence of it is not yet in sight. As Secretary Lansing pointed out a few days ago, the time has not yet come for any neutral to take the initiative in that direction.

ENLARGING OUR ARMY

THE Conference Committees of House and Senate, to which their differences on the new Army bill were referred, reached a compromise which Congress doubtless will promptly ratify; hence, by the end of May, our first measure of preparedness will become law. The compromise provides as follows: The maximum strength of the regular army in time of peace will be 11,000 officers, 175,000 men, in addition to the enlisted men of the Signal, Medical, and Quartermasters' Corps and Philippine Scouts, bringing the total to 11,000 officers and 200,000 men; this can be increased by Executive order, when war threatens, to 11,500 officers and 225,000 combatant troops, plus the necessary Staff Troops, Philippine Scouts, &c.

The increase will consist of thirty-four regiments of infantry, ten regiments of cavalry, fifteen regiments of field artillery, five regiments of engineers, two battalions of mounted engineers, ninety-three companies of coast artillery, and eight aero squadrons. The company units, instead of skeletons as heretofore, will consist of two-thirds of the war strength, as follows: Infantry company, in peace, 100; in war, 150; cavalry troop, in peace, 70; in war, 105; battery, in peace, 126; in war, 190 men.

The measure provides a minimum strength in time of peace of 160,000 men; there was no minimum provision before. The maximum force of National Guard under the new bill is 17,000 officers and 440,000 enlisted men—800 for each Senator and Congressman. National Guardsmen are required to take the Federal as well as the State oath of allegiance, and will be given stronger inducements to improve; provision is made for compensating the officers and enlisted men of the Guard. A provision for Federal Volunteers was stricken out, but all necessary expenses of men at the National Training Camps are to be paid by the Federal Government. An important provision makes the enlistment term seven years, three to be served with the colors and four in the reserves. Provision is also made for the erection of nitrate plants for the fixation of atmospheric nitrogen by the development of water power. It is estimated that this will require an outlay of approximately $20,000,000. Such a plant can be utilized in the manufacture of fertilizers in time of peace.

* * *

BLOCKADE PROBLEMS

THE British blockade is now receiving renewed attention at the hands of the United States Government. The latest British note appears elsewhere in this issue. Our Government declined to consider the question in connection with the German submarine issue, but now that the latter appears to have been adjusted, the interference with our trade and mails is to be made the subject of a serious protest.

The British contend that the blockade is impartial: that since it is impossible to put a stop to importation of goods across the inland sea from Scandinavia, or across a land frontier, as from Holland, a blockade that fails to inclose such inaccessible parts of an enemy's territory is nevertheless binding and to be respected. This is a moot question which some future international conference must settle. Our greatly increased exports to neutral countries give color to the charge that Americans thus seek to evade the blockade, and the British authorities give assurance that every effort will be made to minimize delays and make the restraints of trade as little burdensome as possible. The news from Germany indicates that food shortage there is becoming an acute question, and this apparently confirms the English contention that the blockade is effective, and hence binding upon neutrals. Our Government, however, is restive under the British seizure of mails. We are assured that the British Government is striving to eliminate these delays and interferences, but that it cannot relinquish its right to prevent the use of the mails for the transmission of goods or information by her enemies.

A strong point is made by Great Britain that the Orders in Council do not control her prize courts, the intimation being strong that if our rights are in any way infringed we shall be sure of redress and justice in the courts. Certain phases of the question, however, are due to receive more serious attention, now that the acute stage of the submarine controversy has passed, and it is not unlikely that the whole issue may be submitted to international arbitration. The question will then arise, Shall the orders be suspended during the pendency of the arbitration? However settled, there is no fear that the issue will not be amicably arranged by diplomacy.

* * *

AN EPOCH-MAKING BUDGET

THE British budget for 1916-17 is epoch-making, the greatest by all odds in the history of the empire, exceeding by millions the sum raised through taxation by any other Government. The total budget is $2,045,000,000. The national revenue of Great Britain was $1,335,000 in 1914-15, $1,683,835,000 in 1915-16, with an increase of over $350,000,000 for the current year. The interest debt charge is over $700,000,000 for 1916-17. The new budget, on the basis of peace expenditure, notwithstanding the colossal interest charge, would yield a surplus of $425,000,000.

The new taxation for 1916-17 will amount to about $380,000,000, and is derived from the following new assessments: Increased income taxes, $200,000,000, beginning at 56 cents in $5 on incomes not exceeding $2,500, and reaching $1.25 in $5, or 25 per cent., on incomes over $12,500; on unearned incomes, where total earned and unearned income does not exceed $1,500, 75 cents in $5 up to $1.25 in $5, or 25 per cent., on incomes exceeding $10,000. Taxes on railway tickets range from 2 cents for a fare of 25 cents to 2 cents in the shilling with a tax of $1 on Continental journeys; 1 cent on tickets to entertainments where the admission does not exceed 4 cents, to 25 cents on tickets costing $3.12, and 25 cents for every $2.50; 87½ cents on every 10,000 friction matches; 8 cents a gallon for table waters, fermented, and 16 cents a gallon on other table waters; 8 cents a gallon on cider; an extra 1 cent a pound on sugar; on cocoa 12 cents a pound; on coffee 12 cents a pound; on motor cars $21 for 6½ horse power to $315 for 40 to 60 horse power and over; $10.50 on motor cycles. On excess profits the tax and super-tax reach 77 per cent. on the biggest firms, it is estimated that this source of revenue alone will be worth $430,000,000 to the Treasury in 1916-17.

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MERCHANT MARINE LOSSES

IT is estimated that the loss in ships and cargoes inflicted on the British marine since the beginning of the war exceeds in value $150,000,000. In one week in April, 1916, when the warfare was at its height, the British merchant marine lost eighteen ships, with a gross tonnage of 64,000. During the twenty months of the war, about 2,000,000 tons of British merchant shipping have been sunk. On March 31, 1916, there were 424 ships building, with a gross tonnage of 1,423,435. It is claimed by the British Admiralty that the present total tonnage is greater than at the beginning of the war, but this claim is disputed. The records show that from March 1, when the new German submarine warfare was begun, to March 18, nineteen ships, with a gross tonnage of 40,000, were sunk. From March 15 to March 28 the total tonnage lost was 70,000. From March 28 to April 12 the total losses to the Allies and all neutrals aggregated 81,000 tons. Unofficial reports show that between March 1 and May 15, 1916, ninety-eight ships were sunk by Teutonic submarine and mines, with a total tonnage of 225,000.

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GERMANY YIELDS

THE firm attitude of President Wilson in his note to Germany following the sinking of the Sussex, threatening an immediate rupture in diplomatic relations unless the German submarine warfare was conducted in accordance with international law, evidently accomplished its purpose, and Germany has now determined definitely to yield. The correspondence in full appears elsewhere. It was supplemented on May 12 by a note verbale delivered by Count von Bernstoff to Secretary Lansing, which evidently confirms the purpose of the German Government to adhere rigidly to its agreement.

In this note the German Government suggests that the masters of merchant vessels be given to understand that in the event of their being stopped by "German public (sic) vessels the provisions of international law must be observed to the letter, [as to compliance with the order,] and that their special attention be called to the danger incurred by turning their ships on a submarine." This note was occasioned by the confusion which arose when a Dutch merchantman, upon being signaled to stop, turned and approached the submarine in order to facilitate examination and search, and thereby narrowly escaped being torpedoed. It is evident from this note that Germany wishes to take all precautions to avoid a repetition of mistakes such as she says occurred in the cases of the Sussex, the Tubantia, and other passenger ships recently sunk.

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FULL COMPULSION IN ENGLAND

THE British Prime Minister introduced in the House of Commons on May 3 a bill for applying general compulsion to men of military age in England, Wales, and Scotland. It requires enlistment to be imposed on every male, whether married or single, between the ages of 18 and 41. Every young man as he reaches the age of 18 is to be brought in after a month's grace; time-expired men are to be recalled if under 41 years of age. The bill passed its third reading in the House May 16, and is expected to become a law before June 1, 1916.

Premier Asquith announced when he presented the bill that, aside from Indian troops, Great Britain and her colonies had enlisted since the war began 5,000,000 men in the army and navy. It is estimated that there are 4,560,000 men of military age in Great Britain, of whom fully 4,000,000 have already enlisted; hence there remain available under the

Compulsory bill about 500,000 men, from which must be deducted the physically unfit.

For the first time in history Great Britain is engaged in military operations on land upon an extensive scale. Marlborough never had more than 12,000 British troops in his army at one time. England's largest contribution to the allied cause in the Napoleonic wars was 30,000 men with Wellington. There were but 300,000 British men under arms in the Boer war. There are now, according to Premier Asquith, 1,500,000 British troops at the various fronts, and 2,500,000 are being prepared for the front, with at least 400,000 more in sight as the result of compulsory enlistment.

* * *

MEXICAN BORDER TROUBLES

PATIENCE, firmness, and good diplomacy seem to have turned up the silver edge of the war cloud in Mexico. At the present writing the situation is reported by General Funston to be more hopeful than at any time since the American troops crossed the border in pursuit of Villa's bandits.

After the attack by Carranza troops upon American soldiers at Parral on April 12 General Funston sent reinforcements to Pershing, and at the same time the latter's forces were recalled as far as Namiquipa to avoid a clash. On April 13 General Carranza sent a long official note to Washington asking for the complete withdrawal of American troops from Mexico. The demand was refused, but arrangements were made for a frank discussion of the whole subject at a conference in El Paso between General Alvaro Obregon, representing the Carranza Government, and Major Gen. Hugh L. Scott, representing the American Government.

This conference lasted through the first ten days of May, and, though no signed protocol was obtained, it is believed to have solved the hardest part of the problem. It was almost frustrated by two new bandit raids on the Texas border—in the Big Bend country—which occurred while it was in session, and which caused the militia of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico to be called out. But General Scott succeeded in convincing General Obregon of the absolute good faith of the United States, a better triumph than a battle; apparently this, together with the firm determination to keep our troops in Mexico, has worked a complete change in the attitude of the Mexican de facto Government.

The net result of the El Paso conference is a verbal agreement by which the two Governments divide the patrol of the lawless area, the Americans continuing to cover the region between the New Mexican border and Namiquipa, while the Carranzistas undertake to police the Big Bend hinterland and the whole region south of Parral. Ten thousand Mexican troops have already been assigned to this work. General Funston now has nearly 50,000 militia and regulars to guard the border and do our part of the task. The ultimate withdrawal of our forces from Mexican soil now depends upon the promptness with which General Carranza's army is able to demonstrate its ability to restore law and order.

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BUILDING A GREAT NATION

DR. NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, President of Columbia University, delivered a memorable address before The Associated Press in New York on April 25, in which he described the present war as "the Nemesis of nation-building conceived as an end in itself." Unless a nation have some purpose above and beyond self-interest, he said, war must continue to devastate the earth until "the last and strongest man, superb in his mighty loneliness, shall look out from a rock in the Caribbean upon a world that has been depopulated in its pursuit of a false ideal." Urging upon Americans the higher ideal of service to mankind, Dr. Butler continued:

> We are the inheritors of a great tradition. What poets and philosophers have dreamed, that we are trying day by day to do, our stumblings, our blunders, our shortcomings are many; but if we keep our hearts clean and our heads clear he who a thousand years from now writes the history of liberty and justice and happiness among men will be able to tell to those far-off generations the story of the rise and influence of the American Nation.

Interpretations of World Events

After Verdun—What?

THE tentative German "explanation" of the Crown Prince's armies to take Verdun—that the Germans were greatly outnumbered by the French—is as curious as it is unconvincing. Imagine, only two years ago, the Teuton war lords confessing that the military force of France at any point hopelessly outnumbered and overmatched the military force of Germany. The thing would then have been inconceivable. But its significance goes deeper, and sheds much light on the probable next moves of the mighty game. Now that Verdun seems to be impregnable, or, to speak more truly, now that the armies of France must appear to their opponents to be invincible, shall we see that great "forward drive" of the Allies which has been promised and expected ever since the Marne? And shall we see, on the Russian front, a converging drive, carrying the Czar's forces back across Poland and Galicia, and, perhaps, much further? Possible, yet not very probable. First, because defensive war is now so exceedingly strong, offensive war so exceedingly costly. Next, because all indications show that the Allies can get the prize without paying the price.

General Shuvayeff, Russia's New War Minister

GENERAL SHUVAYEFF, who recently succeeded General Polivanoff at the War Ministry at Petrograd, is a big, deliberate man with a cool head and enormous energy. An infantry General, he was appointed about a year ago Chief of Commissariat to Grand Duke Nicholas. Before that he had been for six years head of the Commissariat Department at the Ministry of War. He put through a drastic series of reforms in his department, beginning with 1911, and taking as his watchword the rather caustic epigram, "The Commissariat Department exists for the army and not the army for the Commissariat Department," a sufficiently vivid commentary on the work of some of his predecessors. In taking over the War Ministry, General Shuvayeff announced that he would be ruled by conscience, not by fear; and that he confidently expects Russia and her allies to gain a decisive victory.

Dmitri Savelevitch Shuvayeff was born in 1854. As a junior officer, Dmitri Shuvayeff took part in the Turkestan campaigns of 1873-75. There is a certain tragedy in the fact that the soldier who presided at the Petrograd Ministry when the war broke out, and under whom General Shuvayeff had served as a departmental head, is at present a prisoner in the fortress of SS. Peter and Paul in that city, on charges growing out of the ammunition famine, which compelled the disastrous retreat from Poland and the loss of Warsaw, Vilna, and other important cities. General Sukhomlinoff professes his innocence of any willful fault, but, unhappily, both the shortage of shells and the dire retreat remain unforgettable facts.

English and Russians in Mesopotamia

THE surrender of General Townshend's force at Kut-el-Amara is likely to have less effect on the actual fighting on the eastern verge of the Sultan's empire than on the future relative standing of Russia and England there and in neighboring Persia. For, while the English have met with reverse after reverse, from Ctesiphon to Kut-el-Amara, Russia has, during the same period, won a series of victories, from Erzerum to Sultanabad, from Hamadan to Trebizond. In mid-May the Czar's forces were announced to be within 100 miles of Bagdad, on the east, among the Persian foothills; they were pressing south from Bitlis and west, toward Constantinople, from Trebizond.

The failure of the English Government to send an adequate relief force up the Tigris to Kut-el-Amara is the more extraordinary in view of the fact that before the war the English "Residency" at Bagdad, as the Consulate General there was called, maintained a private line of shallow-draft steamships on the

Tigris, which plied up and down between Bagdad and the head of the Persian Gulf. As the gulf is only five days from Bombay, it would seem exceedingly easy to ship any amount of men right up the Tigris, all the lower waters of which had been fought for and won, step by step, and were in English hands for months before the battle of Ctesiphon. But the loss to England is less of military strength than of political prestige in the eyes of Turkey, of Persia, and of the Mohammedans of India. Yet even here it may be said that English expeditions have time and again met with equal misfortune, as, for example, the Afghan expeditions, and that English prestige and credit have very solidly weathered the storm. But Russia's stock has gone up.

The "Irish Republic" of 1916

A VERY curious, very strange, and very pathetic episode of the world war was the "Irish rebellion," which flared up in Dublin, and as suddenly burned out, having cost, it is said, a loss of 521 soldiers and supporters of the British crown, and about four times as many "Irish Republicans." Curious, yet neither strange nor unprecedented, having in view the facts of Irish history.

The gravamen of the charge against the present "rebels" is, of course, that they struck at England at a moment of national peril, associating themselves for that purpose with England's most dangerous enemies. But this has happened many times before. When England was threatened by the invincible armada of Philip II. of Spain, in 1588, the Irish rebels of that day were intriguing with the Spaniards against England. A century later, their successors in Ireland, who had espoused the cause of the banished Stuarts, received aid and comfort from Louis XIV. of France, then the most determined opponent of England. The Irish rebellion of the Spring of 1798, and other movements of the same period, sought help and received encouragement from England's arch-enemy, Napoleon. And without doubt it was this readiness to rush into the arms of England's enemies, far more than her nationalism, that earned for Ireland the suspicion and distrust of England, the cause of so much suffering and discord.

By their appeal to Germany at this juncture the Irish aspirants for "liberty" and "nationalism" have done much to forfeit any sympathy that might have been extended to them; by their deliberate and calculated opposition to the expressed will of the vast majority of their fellow-countrymen they have forfeited all claim to the title of nationalists. It is noteworthy that, on this occasion, as so many times before, from the days of John Mitchel to the days of Parnell, many of the leaders of the "Irish rebellion" have been either of English birth or of English descent —"more Irish than the Irish themselves."

Cutting the Bagdad Railroad

IN order finally to secure domination in the Mesopotamian area it will be necessary for the Allies—and this means chiefly the rapidly advancing Russian forces of the Grand Duke Nicholas—to cut the Bagdad Railroad, and thus make it impossible for the Teuton-Turkish powers to send further reinforcements, and, in particular, guns and munitions to the Tigris-Euhprates valley. The suggestion has been made, and it is distinctly among the possibilities of the immediate future, that the effective way to do this would be for a Russian force to cut its way through from the Euphrates, in the region of Urfa, the ancient Edessa, to Aleppo, the junction, from which the Pilgrims' Railroad runs south toward Medina and Mecca; and, from Aleppo to Alexandretta, near St. Paul's birthplace, Tarsus; a force of French and English meanwhile operating against Alexandretta from the Mediterranean, and, if successful there, cutting inland toward Aleppo, which is only some seventy miles from the coast. Admiral Degouy, who advocates this plan, makes an interesting comparison with Sherman's march through Georgia, and his junction, at Savannah, with the Federal fleet in 1865, thus cutting the armies of the South in two. Sherman, with 60,000 troops, not abundantly supplied with guns or ammunition, relied upon the Federal fleet to make good what he lacked; and in the same way a Russian army might make forced marches, in light order, across the open country between Urfa and Aleppo, there meeting an allied force, with a strong naval base at Alexandretta, secured by the Allies' enormous preponderance of sea power in the Mediterranean Sea. This plan has two manifest advantages—it would effectually prevent the Turks from sending any of their now slender forces to Mesopotamia, and it would render wholly impossible any further attacks, or even threats, against Egypt by way of the Suez Canal.

The Iron Bones of War

IF gold be the sinews of war, then we may say that the bones of war are iron, especially in these days when huge steel guns, in enormous numbers, and therefore consuming enormous masses of steel shells, play the predominant part in every battle. It is a curious thought that the shells made with heavy steel casings, especially when carrying a charge of high explosive, practically go out of existence and are lost as completely as if, as in Jules Verne's story, they were shot to the moon; this meaning an enormous and unceasing destruction of the very substance of iron.

A French Senator, M. Berenger, has been quoted as saying that without the additional sources given to Germany by her possession of the iron mines of Northeastern France, and especially those of the Briey Valley, north of Metz, Germany would, before this, have been compelled to seek peace, from sheer inability to provide the raw material of her heavy shells. It is even suggested that the need to preserve her hold on the Briey Valley accounts for Germany's obstinate attacks on Verdun—to anticipate and check a French offensive toward Metz and the iron mines of Briey; a suggestion of very great interest in itself.

Along the same lines of thought an American economist has suggested that the Allies, if they are victorious and if they wish finally to draw the teeth of Prussian militarism, should confiscate Germany's coal fields, thus cutting at her manufacturing power and her munition plants at one blow, and forcibly turning her back into an agricultural nation. That Germany is enormously productive, agriculturally, is, of course, evident from the fact that she has been able to feed her population of nearly seventy millions, during the greater part of two years, without any imports of foreign food; a task that England would at present be quite incapable of. The Allies, according to this proposal, should divide Germany's western coal fields between France and Belgium, and give her eastern coal fields, in Silesia, to Russia, or, perhaps, to a reconstituted Poland.

Perhaps the realization of some such possibilities as these is the motive which is at present urging Germany, while making claims of victory, at the same time to put out feelers in the direction of peace; indicating terms which, at each repetition, are less stiff, less favorable for Germany, more favorable for the Allies. The latest terms seem to be something like these: Northern France and Belgium to be evacuated, an indemnity being paid to Belgium; Poland to be erected into an autonomous kingdom, (presumably with a pro-German ruler, after the models of Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria,) and Germany to get back her colonies in Africa and the Pacific.

What England Is Doing for France

THERE is a recurring disposition to suggest that, on the side of the Entente, England is not fighting her weight. A statement of the French Committee on War Publications—which contains men like General Malleterre, Joseph Bédier, Ernest Lavisse, and Emile Boutroux, the two last being members of the French Academy, and Henri Bergson, who to that honor adds a repute which is world wide—makes it quite clear that, in France, the part being played by England is more truly estimated. At the beginning of the war the expeditionary force which England was able to send to France numbered, says this statement, only four divisions, or 80,000 men. In August, 1915, England had under arms 3,000,000 men, and this number, through the supreme sacrifice of the traditional principle of voluntary service, has now been increased to 4,000,000 men, of whom 1,000,000 are already on the soil of France. England, at the beginning of 1916, counted 550,000 men among her losses, yet this left her with practically untouched reserves of force.

"When Germany has no more men," says the statement, "England will draw on her inexhaustible wealth of warriors. And her 'new armies,' supple, gay, already inured to toils and perils, the living image of a nation of athletes," will be ready to speak their word. The French recorders include, with lively recognition, "the Canadians of Ypres, the Australians of the Dardanelles"; Canada alone has already given 250,000 soldiers; she promises 500,000. But men alone are not enough. Early in the war, says the committee, the Allies, each in turn, came to realize that Germany must be beaten by artillery blows. And England set herself to do her part. At the outset almost everything was lacking. In a few months thirty-three huge munition factories rose out of the earth. This was the beginning; by Feb. 1, 1916, 2,720 factories were organized, all over England, and in this number vast enterprises, analogous to the famous Creusot gun factories, count as units. In England there are nearly 2,000,000 munition makers. In Canada 320 factories are making munitions, employing 100,000 skilled workmen.

An item of another sort: since the war began, England has made for the Allies a strip of cloth for military uniforms 15,000 miles long; three-fifths of the world's girth at the equator. And, side by side with this enormous host, the field army of 4,000,000, the army of 2,000,000 engaged in munition making, England maintains, at the highest point of efficiency, the greatest and strongest fleet the world has ever seen. "The English blockade, slowly, perhaps, but inflexibly," says the committee, "is making victory certain. Let us not, then, be chary of our admiration, our faith! she has given us so abundantly of both; for she has praised, with an ardent heart, the heroism and the resolution of France! We are witnesses of a 'moral mobilization' which exalts and unites all the energies of England into an irresistible 'will to conquer.' The power of England is an ancient, potent spring. Slow to extend itself, it is now extended; with continuous weight it will press upon the enemy. Other peoples are more subtle, more swift; none is more vigorous. The grain of this metal has no flaws; it is impossible to break it."

The Teuton reader of these generous words will see, with a peculiar twinge of pain, the application to England of the famous Nietzschean phrase "the will to conquer," which Germans have in times past so habitually applied to themselves. But the deeper import of these words is the indication which they furnish, that the present Entente powers will, after the war, be held together by bonds stronger than triple steel; they will form the great nucleus of world power.

Russia and the Golden Horn

IN the Autumn of 1877, when the armies of Alexander II. were swinging forward toward the Sultan's capital, an English music hall song brought into being a new word which has since enjoyed a measure of fame. The word is Jingo, and, roughly, it is the reverse of pacifist. The song ran thus:

We don't want to fight, but, by Jingo, if we do,
We've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too;
We've fought the Czar before, and we'll fight him yet again,
And the Russians shall not have Constantinople!

This is what the late Lord Salisbury called "putting England's money on the wrong horse"; and it would seem that, still to adhere to racetrack metaphors, there has been a complete reversal of form, coupled with the determination that "the Russians shall have Constantinople"—if they can take that fair city, with or without the help of England and France. That a clear-cut agreement to divide the sick man's heritage exists is implied by the recent statement, in the Imperial Duma, of Professor Milyukoff, who weighs his words, and does not go off at half-cock. Milyukoff said: The question is no longer whether the Bosporus and the Dardanelles should become Russian or remain Turkish. The question is, whether they are to become Russian or remain German. Let us not be deceived. The question now pending may be decided once for all. But the conditions may never again be so favorable for us. The chief element in our favor is the attitude of our allies toward our national problem. Berlin-Bagdad is too great a menace for England, because of India and Egypt, and for France, because of her plans in Syria. Because of this real danger, therefore, these two powers cannot fail to come to an agreement with us, after centuries of suspicion. March, 1915, should be a memorable epoch for us, for then our agreement with our allies was reached.

The Modern Use of Monitors

AGAIN and again it has been noted that the history of war has been moved backward through the centuries. Steel helmets, long discarded, are once more in universal use. Hand grenades, which, generations ago, gave a name to a famous British corps, the Grenadiers, are rife along the whole line. Sapping and mining are about what they were in Hamlet's day, or, at least, in Shakespeare's—who made the Danish Prince speak of countermining a yard below his antagonist, the manoeuvre so constantly used today. One more weapon of war esteemed outworn is once more in fashion, the low-lying monitor, which is about half way between a surface battleship and a submarine. Of these monitors there are a number now in the British Navy, each with two big guns in a turret in the bow, able to slip in close to the shore of Belgium, and to rain big-calibre shells on the west end of the long German line. Each of these craft carries an odd-looking mast, only less unsightly than the lattice masts of our American battleships; they resemble the three legs on which gypsies support their kettles, and, presumably, form the support of a battery of machine guns. Since these monitors do their work not far from Zeebrugge, the German submarine base, they are specially protected, by auxiliary craft continually on the lookout, against submarine attack. The complete success of these monitors in breaking into the sea end of the German line would mean the establishment of a British base near Ostend, with the possibility of outflanking the Teutons there, and so compelling a withdrawal in the direction of Bruges and Brussels.

General Yudenitch, the Hero of Erzerum

NICHOLAS YUDENITCH, who commanded the field forces of Russia at Erzerum, is one of the youngest army commanders in the present war, being only 53. When the Turks first entered the war, at the close of 1914, their plan of campaign included a swift invasion of the Russian Caucasus, a drive toward Tiflis, its capital. The battles of Sarikamysh and Ardahan, where Yudenitch led the troops of the Czar, smashed this movement of invasion and put the Turks on the defensive. The hero of these victories, after a course at the Alexandrovski Military School at Moscow, got his commission as a Second Lieutenant in the Guards, being then 18 years old. Three years later he entered the Military Academy at Petrograd. Thereafter he had practical experience on the staff of an army corps and as Chief of Staff of a brigade of Turkestan Rifles; was gazetted Colonel at the age of 33, and was put in command of the Eighteenth Regiment of Rifles. At the head of this regiment Colonel Yudenitch fought through the Russo-Japanese war, being seriously wounded on a Manchurian battlefield. In recognition of his war services he was promoted to the rank of Major General. Shortly after this he was stationed in the Caucasus, with a staff appointment; five years later he received the epaulets of a Lieutenant General, and the appointment of Chief of Staff of the military district of the Caucasus, in which position he rapidly acquired the deep-seated local knowledge which enabled him to carry out one of the most brilliant campaigns of the world war, the campaign which is likely to cause larger territorial changes than in any other area save, perhaps, Africa; for, after the war, the Black Sea will be practically a Russian lake.

THE REVOLT IN IRELAND

THE sudden attempt of a group of idealists to secede from the British Empire and set up an Irish republic has furnished one of the most dramatic surprises of the war. A direct connection between the plotters and Germany, through the person of Sir Roger Casement, both magnifies the significance of the revolt and helps to account for the swift and savage punishment administered to its captured leaders.

In its hidden causes the outbreak harks back to the crisis over home rule two years ago, when the two sections of Ireland armed against each other; its supporters were drawn partly from the Irish Volunteers, who organized and armed themselves in behalf of home rule at that time, but the movement also received financial aid from Irish sympathizers in America, while practical aid from Germany was expected. The conspiracy centred in Dublin, and its leaders for the most part belonged to the Sinn Fein, a secret society of extremists for whom home rule was not enough. The project which has cost them their lives is revealed in the following document, issued on April 24, the first day of the revolt:

PROCLAMATION

The Provisional Government of the Irish Republic to the people of Ireland:

Irishmen and Irishwomen, in the name of God and of the dead generations from which you received the old traditions of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom, having organized and trained her manhood through her secret revolutionary organization, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military organization, the Irish Volunteers, and the Irish citizen army.

Having patiently perfected their discipline and resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal itself, she now seizes that moment, and, supported by her exiled children in America, and by her gallant allies in Europe, by relying on her own strength, she strikes, in full confidence of victory.

We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies to be sovereign and indefeasible. Long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and Government has not extinguished that right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people.

In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty. Six times during the past 300 years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right, and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a sovereign, independent State, and we pledge our lives and the lives of our comrades in arms to the cause of its freedom, its welfare, and its exaltation among nations.

The Irish Republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every Irishman and Irishwoman. The republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens, and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation, and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences, carefully fostered by an alien Government, which have divided the minority from the majority in the past.

Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the establishment of a permanent National Government, representative of the whole people of Ireland and elected by the suffrage of all her men and women, the Provisional Government hereby constituted will administer the civil and military affairs of the republic, in trust for the people.

We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the protection of the Most High God, whose blessing we invoke upon our arms, and we pray that no one who serves that cause will dishonor it by cowardice, inhumanity, or rapine. In this supreme hour the Irish Nation must, by its valor and discipline and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called.

Signed, in behalf of the Provisional Government:

THOMAS J. CLARKE,
S. MacDIARMAD,
THOMAS MacDONAGH,
P. H. PEARSE,
E. CEANNT,
JAMES CONNOLLY,
JOSEPH PLUNKETT.

The first inkling of the revolt reached the outside world when the British authorities announced on April 24 that Sir Roger Casement, a former Consul General, had been captured in the act of trying to land German arms on the west coast of Ireland; that he had been conveyed thither in a German submarine, with two Irish soldiers from German prisons, and that a German auxiliary cruiser loaded with 20,000 rifles and ammunition had been taken and sunk at the same time. The vessel had been sunk by its own men, and the twenty-two German bluejackets on board had been made prisoners.

Casement had last been heard of in Germany, where he had attempted to induce Irish prisoners of war to join an anti-British expedition to Ireland. Testimony at his preliminary trial in London subsequently showed that on Good Friday he had landed near Tralee from the German submarine U-19 with a soldier named Bailey and another named Monteith. In " McKinna's Fort " he was seen to drop a paper containing a code and the words: " Await further instructions. Have decided to stay. Further ammunition and rifles are needed. Send another ship." The small collapsible boat in which he and his companions had landed also helped to betray them, and Casement and Bailey were arrested before they could get away in the automobile which was waiting for them.

At the same time a German auxiliary cruiser from Kiel, disguised as a Norwegian merchantman, was caught in an even more dramatic way. The signalman of the British patrol boat which made the capture afterward told the facts thus briefly in court:

> Early Good Friday morning the Bluebell was on patrol duty off the southwest coast of Ireland, when we sighted a ship flying the Norwegian colors. We signaled her and asked who she was and where she was bound. She replied that she was the Aud, bound from Bergen for Genoa. At that time we were about 130 miles west of Queenstown.
>
> We ordered the Aud to follow us, but she did not do so until we fired a shell. Then she proceeded with us.
>
> When we got near Daunts Rock the Aud stopped her engines. The Bluebell was then a cable's length away from her, and we saw white smoke coming from her after hold. Two German ensigns were run up on her masthead. The Aud lowered two boats, which were rowed toward the Bluebell. We fired around these boats. They flew flags of truce, and the occupants put up their hands. They were made prisoners. They proved to be nineteen or twenty German bluejackets, with three officers. Ten minutes later the Aud sank, about a mile and a quarter from the lightship.

Sir Roger Casement had been in the United States at the beginning of the war, but had made his way to Berlin to offer his services in some capacity to the German Government. At the present writing he is a prisoner in the Tower of London awaiting trial for high treason.

OUTBREAK IN DUBLIN

Announcement of Sir Roger's capture was made public by the British Government on Easter Monday, April 24, and on the same day the insurrection broke forth in Dublin. The first move was a dash by members of the Sinn Fein Society into the General Post Office, where they drove all officials from their posts, and cut the telephone and telegraph lines, with the intention of severing communication with England and the rest of Ireland. Many of these men were in the uniform of the Irish Volunteers. They posted armed sentinels at the doors and windows. On the streets other rebel bands began shooting all persons in khaki. Several unarmed British officers thus fell victims in the first moments of the uprising.

The authorities, taken unawares, ordered the police and soldiers to retire to their headquarters, as they were without arms. Meanwhile the rebels established themselves in the City Hall, Liberty Hall, and Stephen's Green, and also occupied many houses in Sackville Street and the side streets leading into it. Sharpshooters took up positions on the roofs and at the windows of houses. An attempt was made to seize Dublin Castle, but the little guard of Royal Irish Constabulary and soldiers prevented the rebels from getting beyond the gate at which they killed the policeman on duty.

A REBEL NEWSPAPER

On the 25th they continued to hold the places they had taken, as the military force at hand was still insufficient to attack them. Sniping continued, and Dublinites who tried to go about their regular business were the chief sufferers. In the midst of this confusion the Sinn Feiners published a newspaper called The Irish War News. The following extract from it reveals the atmosphere of self-delusion in which they lived:

> At the moment of writing this report, 9:30



SCENE OF THE FIGHTING IN DUBLIN

A. M. Tuesday, the Republican forces hold their position and the British forces have nowhere broken through. There has been heavy and continuous fighting for nearly twenty-four hours; the casualties of the enemy have been much more numerous than those on the republican side. The republican forces everywhere are fighting with splendid gallantry.

The population of Dublin is plainly in support of the republic, and the officers and men are everywhere cheered as they march through the streets. The flag of the republic flies from the General Post Office. Commander General Pearse is Commander in Chief of the Army of the Republic and is President of the Provisional Government. Commander General James Connolly is commanding in the Dublin district.

Communication with the county is largely cut, but reports to hand show that the county is largely rising. Bodies of men from Kildare and Fingall have already reported in Dublin.

ARRIVAL OF TROOPS

A large body of troops under General Sir John Maxwell was already on its way from England, and on the morning of the 26th a cordon of fighters had been drawn around the rebel strongholds. Then bloodshed began in earnest. The insurgents had abundant ammunition and used it so freely that it was dangerous even for peaceful citizens to sit at a window or walk across a street.

Martial law was proclaimed in the City and County of Dublin. A gunboat came up the River Liffey and fired several shells into Liberty Hall, demolishing it and driving out the rebel officers who had their headquarters there. The cordon of troops was tightened, and the fighting became fast and furious.

By Thursday, the 27th, Dublin was a roaring battleground, with the streets full of barricades. The rebels in some force had taken a position in a flour mill on the south side of the Custom House quay, from which they harried the troops on the north side until the authorities decided to use artillery to dislodge them. A dozen shells did deadly work, and the rebels retired to a disused distillery further south; there a naval gun and field artillery opened fire upon them. The bombardment was spectacular. From the top of the distillery floated the green rebel flag. Forty-eight shells hit the building, wrecking it, but the flag continued to wave, and it still hung there after the rebels had evacuated the structure.

IN SACKVILLE STREET

In the Sackville Street region the fighting also had grown hotter, and by the 28th sniping by rebel sharpshooters had become so troublesome that the artillery officer in charge ordered the shelling of the Post Office and adjoining houses. Eight shells were fired into the Young Men's Christian Association Building, two into the Catholic Club, and two into the Post Office. A cessation of the cannonade was then ordered, as some houses had caught fire and it was feared the entire city might be placed in peril. Additional fresh troops had arrived, and the cordons were further tightened.

The rebels started fires in several places in the hope that the flames would reach the Castle. On Friday night the sky for miles around was illuminated and flames shot up from many points. The green rebel flag that flew over the Post Office was sharply outlined by the glow. Rebels were seen walking on the roof. It was afterward discovered that they had sprinkled petroleum over the building and set fire to it before retiring to the Coliseum, where they again put up a stout fight.

A SUDDEN COLLAPSE

Early on Saturday morning the rebel leaders realized the folly of their undertaking and asked to be allowed to surrender, as their commander, James Connolly, had been severely wounded. Padraic H. Pearse, the "Provisional President," issued a proclamation to his followers: "In order to prevent the further slaughter of unarmed people, and in the hope of saving the lives of our followers, who are surrounded and hopelessly outnumbered, the members of the Provisional Government at headquarters have agreed to unconditional surrender, and the commanders of all the units of the republican forces will order their followers to lay down their arms." This order failed to reach some of the isolated bands for many hours, and sniping continued throughout the day.

The final collapse came on Sunday, when the main body of the rebels in Dublin surrendered, beginning with those in the College of Surgeons. The prisoners here included the Countess Georgina Markiewicz, the Irish wife of a Polish nobleman, with 120 youths who had taken part in the fighting under her leadership. At the hour agreed upon for her surrender she marched out of the College of Surgeons with her followers arranged in ranks by twos. She was dressed entirely in green, and dramatically kissed her revolver before handing it to a British officer with the words, "I am ready." Her followers were then disarmed and marched away to Dublin Castle.

COUNTING THE COST

By Sunday evening more than 1,000 rebels had surrendered, and the military authorities, under General Sir John French, at once began transferring the rank and file of them to England. The leaders, however, were retained at Dublin Castle, where they were speedily put on trial by court-martial under General Maxwell. The other rebel bodies outside the city, notably those at Enniscorthy, surrendered the next day. Except in Dublin the uprising had met with little support. And in Dublin itself it was all over. It had left new bitterness, and the centre of Ireland's capital was a heap of smoking ruins.

On May 12 Mr. Asquith announced that the civilian dead, including rebels, numbered 180, the wounded, 614. The military losses were 124 killed and 388 wounded, making a total of 304 killed and 1,002 wounded. More than 1,800 prisoners were taken. At that date fourteen men had been executed, seventy-three condemned to various periods of penal servitude, and 1,706 deported.

The total damage by fire in Dublin was estimated at $15,000,000. The buildings destroyed numbered 179. An eyewitness says:

> When I stood on O'Connell Bridge and saw the gaunt walls of what had been hotels and shops and the tottering masonry of the great Post Office Building it was with feelings of profound sorrow for the country and its capital. Sackville Street was full of women who had come from the slums at the back of Marlborough Street and Tyrone Street. Their object was to get news of the misguided men who had worked this ruin. As we came up the street ambulance men were bringing bodies of rebels out of the ruins of the fallen buildings. Now and again a heart-rending scream of grief would tell the despair of some distracted creature whose husband or son had been lured to his death by the emissaries of the Kaiser. Round the Doris Gresham Hotel another crowd was clamoring for any broken meats available.
>
> Round the corner in Chancery Lane evidences of the struggle were more apparent. There were great shot holes in the corner of the Four Courts.
>
> Crossing the Liffey over Wine Tavern Bridge, we walked down King Edward Street to Dublin Castle. Here we met a detachment bringing in about 200 rebel prisoners of all ages, all sizes, and all conditions of life. Some wore the green uniform of the Sinn Fein, some the uniform of the Irish National Volunteers, but most were in civilian dress. There were three or four boys of 13 or 14, and old men of 60 on.
>
> Down Nassau Street and Grafton Street again we crossed to College Green and went down Westmoreland Street to O'Connell Bridge. From this point a scene of horror disclosed itself. Lower Sackville Street from the Nelson Pillar to the bridge was destroyed. The Metropole Hotel and office of The Freeman's Journal had disappeared and were now heaps of smoking ruins. The Post Office had been burned clean out, nothing being left standing save the bare walls and the front portico. The street in front was littered with telegraph forms, account books, ledgers, dockets, and piles of paper. Right in front of the Post Office lay the body of a horse, evidently dead for some days. Dead bodies were being brought out of the building.
>
> The same destruction extends down Henry Street. In the middle of Abbey Street and round Byeden Quay to Beresford Place firemen were busy among the ruins and the last embers of the great conflagrations we had been watching for three consecutive nights.

IRISH PUBLIC OPINION

The Irish Nationalist Party denounced the revolt as "an attempt to torpedo home rule," and its foremost Parliamentary leader, John E. Redmond, cabled to the editor of an Irish-American newspaper:

> The whole thing has been organized by those in Ireland and in America who have always been the open and irreconcilable enemies of home rule and of the Irish Party. Though the hand of Germany was in the whole thing, it was not so much sympathy for Germany as hatred of home rule and of us which was at the bottom of the movement. It was even more an attempt to hit us than to hit England. The whole disgraceful plot is viewed with execration by the Irish people. It was almost entirely a Dublin movement; partly the creation of the Sinn Fein cranks and German agents there, partly of the remnants of that mass of discontent and anarchy which was left by the disastrous Larkinite strike.

In New York City there were enough Irish and German sympathizers with the Dublin outbreak to fill a theatre to overflowing and to pass resolutions in the tenor of the following:

> We affirm Ireland's right to a separate and distinct national existence, and we remind the American people that the freedom of the seas, which is necessary to the world's peaceful commerce, and to no nation more than to the United States, which is now controlled and restricted by England for her own selfish interests alone, can only be permanently secured by the independence of Ireland. We affirm that, freed from the blight of English rule, and the deliberate crippling of her industrial and economic life, which has prevailed for many centuries, and the continuance of which is provided for by express provision in the so-called "Home Rule bill," Ireland could support a population of 25,000,000 and become a thriving hive of industry, capable of maintaining her independence and defending her rights.
>
> We thank the Government of Germany for extending to Ireland as far as the present military situation will permit the same kind of aid as was rendered to the infant American Republic by France. We hope that aid will be enlarged so far as circumstances will permit, but Ireland will be recognized as a belligerent and an ally of the Central Powers, her civil and military rights asserted, and a place secured for her in the congress of the nations which will settle the terms of peace.

On the other hand, the United Irish League of America, representing "the solid belief of the vast majority of the Irish people in Ireland," passed resolutions in support of Mr. Redmond and voiced the prevailing sentiment by deploring the misguided efforts of the rebels, which, though sincere, "could only bring anguish to the Irish heart and greatly prejudice the cause for which a forty-five-year peaceable contest has been waged and which was on the threshold of actual fruition." The same resolutions denounced those leaders who had acted " either from blind hatred of the English people, or, worse, with German gold in their pockets."

FATE OF THE REBELS

The military court at Dublin has meted out punishment to the rebel leaders with a swift severity that has aroused alarm even in England. At the present writing (May 18) fourteen of them have been shot after a summary trial. Every man whose name was attached to the proclamation of the " Irish Republic "—or any other official document of the revolt—has suffered the extreme penalty for high treason. The trial of Casement and Bailey in the civil courts upon the same capital charge promises to be one of the sensational events of British history.

The executions began on May 3 with that of Padraic H. Pearse, the " Provisional President," Thomas J. Clarke, and Thomas MacDonagh. The next day Joseph Plunkett was shot at dawn, after having been married in prison at midnight. Edward Daly, Michael O'Hanrahan, and William Pearse, also were executed on that day. A day or two later Major John McBride was added to the death roll, and on the 7th Eamonn Ceannt, (Edmund Kent,) Cornelius Culbert, Michael Mallon, and J. J. Heuston, followed. On the 9th Thomas Kent of Coole was put to death, and on May 12 James Connolly, " Commander General of the Irish Republican Army," suffered the same fate, along with S. MacDiarmad, the last of the signers of the fatal proclamation. The sentence of Countess Markiewicz was commuted to penal servitude for life. Upward of a hundred others have thus far been tried and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.

HIGH OFFICIALS RESIGN

The Irish revolt has caused the resignation of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Baron Wimborne, and of his chief secretary, Augustine Birrell, who has held that responsible post since 1907. The Under Secretary, Sir Matthew Nathan, also is out. A commission headed by Lord Hardinge, former Viceroy of India, has been appointed to investigate the causes of the Irish outbreak. The admission by the Government that F. Sheehy Skeffington, editor of The Irish Citizen, and two other journalists were executed in the Portobello barracks at Dublin without the knowledge of the military authorities has helped to raise a demand for less drastic methods in dealing with the situation. Mr. Asquith, the Premier, has himself gone to Ireland to quiet the excitement and diffuse a spirit of calmer justice.

At the same time John E. Redmond, the Nationalist leader, and Sir Edward Carson, the Ulster leader, with other members of the Irish Parliamentary Party, have issued a manifesto to the people of Ireland pleading for their allegiance to the constitutional movement. The manifesto says in part:

> It is true that Ireland has been shocked and horrified by a series of military executions by the military tribunals in Dublin. These things have been done in the face of incessant and vehement protests of the Irish leaders, and these protests will be pressed continually and strongly until the unchecked control of the military authorities in Ireland is abolished. But it is also true that, in spite of bitter provocations, the people of Ireland have had no hesitation in condemning the rising in Dublin as a dangerous blow at the heart and hopes of Ireland.
>
> On the morrow of this tragedy we feel called upon to make a solemn appeal to the people of Ireland to draw the conclusions which these events force upon them. We must leave no misunderstanding in their minds as to our convictions and our resolves. Either Ireland is to be given over to unsuccessful revolution and anarchy, or the constitutional movement is to have the full support of the Irish people and go on until it has completed its work.

The coming together of the Ulster and Nationalist leaders on this unfortunate episode is regarded by some observers as a hopeful augury for a settlement of the difficult home rule problem.

THE REBELLION IN IRELAND



PADRAIC H. PEARSE
"Provisional President"
Executed



SIR ROGER CASEMENT
On Trial for High Treason
(© *Brown & Dawson*)



COUNTESS MARKIEWICZ
Penal Servitude



AUGUSTINE BIRRELL
Chief Secretary, Resigned



BARON WIMBORNE
Lord Lieutenant, Resigned

DUBLIN AFTER THE REVOLT



Sackville Street Looking Toward the O'Connell Bridge



The Post Office, of Which the Outer Shell Remains

Origins of the Irish Revolt

WRITTEN FOR CURRENT HISTORY

By Padraic Colum

Irish Author, Playwright, and Journalist

THE revolutionary movement in Ireland began in the year 1912. In September of that year thousands of men in Northeast Ireland, directed by Sir Edward Carson, entered into a covenant to resist the administration of a Government which the King, Lords, and Commons of the United Kingdoms purposed to set up in Ireland. At the time the covenanters had already a military discipline and a military manner. Rumors came that they were actually acquiring arms. A small shipment of rifles was seized at Belfast, and from that time on much space was given in the newspapers to the formation, the movements, and the declarations of the Ulster Volunteers.

The editorial writers on the Conservative papers in England and Ireland rather missed the significance of happenings in Northeast Ulster. They thought that the arming of men there would kill Home Rule and the Liberal Government and safeguard the veto of the House of Lords. But the significant thing was that a section of the people of Ireland were handling guns. The British Government had always been jealous of Irishmen arming themselves. In the sixties and seventies men had been given long terms of penal servitude in horrible prisons for smuggling arms into Ireland. Of course Nationalist Ireland knew that Northeast Ulster was privileged. Still it was brought to the notice of Nationalists that the Arms Embargo act had been repealed.

Nationalist Ireland made no effort to obtain arms. Why should she? A Home Rule bill that satisfied the Nationalist leaders was being passed. Northeast Ulster was said to be preparing to make it inoperative, but then, as the Nationalists thought, the Government was not so impotent as it seemed. Besides, Northeast Ulster had bluffed through all history, and there was no reason to believe it was doing anything else now. Nationalist Ireland regarded the Ulster Volunteers and the Ulster Provisional Government as theatrical.

Coincidentally with the arming of the Ulster Volunteers came labor troubles in Dublin, Wexford, and Cork. The Dublin troubles amounted to civic disturbances in the Fall of 1913. Dublin has practically the same population now as it had in the eighteenth century—about 360,000 people. But in the eighteenth century Dublin was an industrial centre and had a spending population. Her industries decayed, her gentry vanished with her Parliament, but her population remained the same. Dublin can give adequate employment for only about 200,000 people. The city has a great brewery and great distilleries, but it is now mainly a centre for distribution and transportation.

The Dublin Transport Workers had been organized by Mr. James Larkin. They had headquarters in a former hotel near the quays—Liberty Hall, and they had a base in Croydon Park, a piece of ground they owned. In the lockout of 1913 the employers had been able to bring the authorities against the workers. The labor revolt was crushed, and baton charges by the police had broken up meetings in the streets. The intellectuals who had allied themselves with Liberty Hall and the two labor leaders saw that the workers would have to have some means of defense against police attacks.

Talk of arming men was in the air. One of the intellectuals who had allied themselves with the workers, a gentleman who had been an officer in the British Army, offered to organize a defense force from among the workers themselves. Most of the Transport Workers had been in the militia. They were easily drilled and easily led. In a few weeks the first organized force outside Ulster was drilling in Croydon Park. This was the Citizen Army.

Meanwhile Nationalists in Northeast Ulster were becoming alarmed. Men who regarded Home Rulers as enemies were in possession of arms, and at any time a storm of hatred might break out. Appeals for assistance began to come from the Home Rulers of the Northeast. In response to these appeals a distinguished Ulster Nationalist living in Dublin, Professor MacNeill, published in the Gaelic League journal " An Cleadheamh Soluis " a project for the creation of a body of volunteers for Nationalist Ireland.

In November, 1913, the enrollment of the Nationalist Volunteers began. The response was eager. The Irish are a soldierly people, and this was the first time in 200 years that they had had the chance to organize along military lines in defense of a national principle. In March, 1914, came the Curragh Camp mutiny. Eminent officers in the army declared they would not obey orders if they were sent to put down any revolt in Northeast Ulster. " The army has killed Home Rule," vaunted the Conservative press. There was a crisis in Parliament, and the incident helped enormously the recruitment of the Irish Volunteers.

The Ulster and the Irish Volunteers had now to arm themselves surreptitiously. In November, immediately on the formation of the latter body, an embargo on arms going into Ireland had been declared. In May, 1914, the Ulster Volunteers ran a big cargo of arms into Larne. The authorities made no move to stop the shipment. At the end of July the Irish Volunteers ran a cargo of arms into Howth, just outside of Dublin. The authorities moved to intercept the volunteers on their return to the city. The military was called out, and the regular and irregular forces met half way between Howth and Dublin. The volunteers dispersed and got away with their arms. As the military went back through the streets they were hooted by a Dublin crowd. Stones were thrown at them. The commanding officer, Major Haig, gave his men an order to fire on the populace. They fired, and afterward charged with the bayonet, killing and wounding men and women.

A week later the European war broke out. Ireland was swept into it with a fresh memory of citizens killed by British soldiers and with a sense of unfair discrimination as between the Nationalist and the Ulster Volunteers.

The historian of the Irish insurrection has now to account for certain happenings in Irish public life during the eighteen months of war—first, the loss of accord between the Irish people and their Parliamentary representatives; secondly, the determination of the Irish Volunteers to hold their arms at all costs; thirdly, the growing ascendency of a secret society that in 1912 was regarded as moribund, and, fourthly, the exasperation that made Irish men and women long for the day of combat—these happenings made the insurrection of Easter, 1916.

A big minority of the Irish people supported the Allies in the war. But among the bulk of the people the belief persisted that any war in which England engaged was a war for conquest and spoliation. The Parliamentary party helped to recruit for the army in Ireland. Still, as Mr. Redmond and his followers spoke at recruiting meetings, many Nationalists were noting that while their men were being sent to the front, pains were being taken to keep the Ulster Volunteer organization intact. No accord was established between the Irish people and the men who, to the Irish mind, stood for the English ascendency. In the first month of the war Mr. Balfour made a demand that the Home Rule bill be withdrawn. Finally the Home Rule bill was put upon the statute book. No date was given for its being made operative, and the measure was tied up with an amending bill that would reduce powers and perhaps curtail Irish territory.

Three threats kept the Irish nationalist public in a state of alarm. The first was that of conscription. Ireland's effective male population had been terribly reduced by emigration and people felt instinctively that the loss of many more young men would have a grave effect on the Irish stock. The second threat was that of a taxation that would leave the people hardly any margin for life. The third was that of actual famine. The Irish people have ghastly recollections of the famine of 1846-7. Then, as they believe, the food they produced was swept into England to pay landlords' rents. If there was a scarcity of food in England, their stock and crop, they thought, would be swept out of the country to supply the English industrial centres. In order to safeguard the food supply, to guard against conscription, and to put up a threat against increased taxation, the Irish Volunteer command issued instructions that the rank and file of the volunteers were to resist disarmament.

A split had occurred in the volunteer ranks. Those who favored Mr. Redmond's policy separated themselves as the National Volunteers, and those who remained with Professor MacNeill kept the title of Irish Volunteers. The Irish Volunteers became more and more uncompromising in their attitude to the administration in Ireland. Meantime the Liberal Government that had put the Home Rule bill on the statute book had gone out of existence, and the new Coalition Cabinet included such opponents of home rule as Sir Edward Carson, Mr. Bonar Law, and Mr. Arthur Balfour.

It was the apparent inability of the Irish Parliamentary Party to save the country from a devastating taxation that broke the accord between the people and Mr. Redmond and Mr. Dillon. Before the war Ireland, it was calculated, was overtaxed to the amount of $15,000,000. Then she had to raise a revenue of $45,000,000. She had now to raise a revenue of $85,000,000—that is to say, the revenue she had to raise was greater by $10,000,000 than the revenue of Bulgaria, greater by $10,000,000 than the revenue of Norway, greater by $25,000,000 than the revenue of Denmark. In England and Scotland there were compensations for the increased taxation. Workmen were earning high salaries in the military and naval arsenals. But in Ireland, outside of Belfast, there were no such compensations.

More and more the Irish public turned toward Professor MacNeill and the Irish Volunteers. And now, for some reasons not yet apparent, many of the volunteer higher command — Professor MacNeill was not among them—went over to a secret revolutionary organization—the Irish Republican Brotherhood. Using secret and open means, and supported more or less by an alarmed and exasperated public, the seven men whose names appeared on the republican proclamation prepared for revolt. An understanding now existed between members of the Irish Volunteer command, representing the Nationalist professional, business, and farming classes, and the command of the citizen army, representing the Dublin workers.

About last March the heads of the revolutionary organization were made to feel that a crisis had come. Several journals were suppressed, and men important in the volunteer organization had been arrested. Threats of conscription and disarmament had come up again. Public meetings were being held in Dublin to protest against overtaxation and deportation of prisoners—a private letter written at the time said, "Things have reached the breaking point here."

On April 19 a document was read to the Dublin Corporation which had an effect on the revolutionary preparations. It purported to be a secret order issued to the military; it was in cipher, and had been stolen off the files in Dublin Castle. According to this document all the heads of the Irish Volunteers, the National Volunteers, the Citizen Army, the Sinn Fein Council, and the Gaelic League were to be put under arrest on an order from the military commander. With this document made public the revolutionary group felt that they would have to move at once or their preparations would end in a fiasco like that of 1867. So on Easter Monday the Irish Volunteers and the Citizen Army paraded, and the revolutionists struck their resounding blows in Dublin and the country districts.

* * *

The Battle of Verdun

An Authoritative French Account Based on Official Records

By M. Ardouin-Dumazet

Military Editor of Temps and Figaro

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY]

BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE

THE City of Verdun itself, in spite of its high, encircling walls and citadel covering an immense subterranean town, has no longer any military significance; it owes its importance to the belt of detached forts which, spreading over a circuit of forty-eight kilometers, (thirty miles,) was intended to render stationary an entire army, to insure the investment of the city in view of a regular siege. General Séré de Rivières, the creator of the intrenched camp, estimated that it would take four army corps (160,000 men) to besiege it. But the present attack had forces of a very different character and means of action which Séré de Rivières could not have guessed at, and was made at first on a sector of about seven kilometers, (four and a half miles,) that is to say, on one-seventh of the line of forts.

Séré de Rivières held that an offensive against Verdun must of necessity be directed against the works on the left (west) bank of the Meuse, which make a curve from Dugny, down stream, to Charny, up stream; he thought that the line of the ridges of the Meuse was too strong to be the object of an attack, and considered hazardous any operations on the central sector. Yet this sector was the one attacked.

The enormous human flood, rushing upon a narrow stream, is without example in history, even in this war. It explains the successive withdrawals of our troops up to the limits fixed by Séré de Rivières for the advanced defenses toward Douaumont, limits which the enemy did not quite reach, since Pepper Ridge (Côte du Poivre) is still two miles from the Terre-Froide works, and these are in front of the line of forts which immediately cover Verdun — Belleville, Saint-Michel, Souville—and protect the road and railway to Metz.

For several days the French commanders knew that the attack was near; our intelligence department had noted the preparations of the enemy; beginning with Feb. 15, we looked for the first storm of cannon shots. These were fired on Sunday, Feb. 20. An enormous quantity of artillery of all calibres, of all ranges, disposed on a front of thirty miles, from Montfaucon in Eastern Argonne, to Etain in the heart of Woevre, opened fire on our trenches, on the forts on the northern sector, and on the City of Verdun itself, which was soon subjected to a systematic destructive fire. The Governor of the town was forced to order the departure of the last inhabitants who lingered in the unhappy city.

Monday, Feb. 21.—In the evening, after a lively cannonade, the Germans made a first infantry attack with very considerable forces; capturing certain of our first line trenches, they reached our second line, from which counterattacks drove them back.

Tuesday, Feb. 22.—The enemy bombardment stretched across both banks of the Meuse, covered the ridges and was prolonged in Woevre to the neighborhood of Etain, near the village of Fromezey. The conflict was intense.

To the north of Verdun the Meuse descends by wide and harmonious curves as far as the village of Brabant; its course, skirted by the railroad to Sedan, exceeds twelve and a half miles, but the road which cuts across its curves is only nine miles. Opposite Brabant the Forges brook enters the Meuse; its valley up to its source almost exactly marks the line between the French and German trenches. On the right (east) bank of the Meuse

Map of Entire Area of the Battle of Verdun



SHOWING ALL GERMAN ADVANCES DURING THREE MONTHS' TERRIFIC FIGHTING the hills merge with a gentle slope into the Meuse ridges. Their tops are wooded —Haumont Wood, Caures Wood, Herbébois. From the Meuse to Herbébois is six miles. In this space there are only two villages — Haumont-les-Samogeux and Beaumont, the latter on a hillside at the foot of which passes the road from Montmédy to Verdun, which, with the Sedan road, formed principal approaches for the Germans.

On Feb. 22 the enemy bombarded this whole front, and then began a series of very violent infantry attacks. These were almost everywhere repulsed, but at the Haumont Wood, and in the salient to the north of Beaumont, toward the Joli-Coeur house and the Caures Wood, the Germans were able to secure a footing. Their losses were considerable, but this did not stop the movement.

While this was going on in the north another attack was being prepared in the east, in Woevre, to the northwest of Fromezey, in the space between Fromezey and Mogneville, occupied in part by the Haute-Charrière Wood. As soon as the enemy appeared here he was subjected to a barring fire so heavy that he was unable to complete the proposed movement. On this side the fighting was confined to the artillery—a slow and continuous duel.

Wednesday, Feb. 23.—Between the Meuse and the Herbébois Wood the bombardment was continued throughout the night. We replied with vigor, and at dawn on Wednesday infantry fighting was resumed on a front of nine and a half miles. The village of Haumont was the scene of especially furious fighting in which the enemy suffered severe losses, but gained possession of the ground. To counterbalance this a part of the salient occupied the evening before by the Germans, in the Caures Wood, was retaken by us and a strong attack to the north of Ornes, against our Herbébois line, was stopped short by our fire. The Germans squandered men belonging to seven different army corps; the prisoners we took said that certain enemy units had been completely destroyed. The enemy came forward, wave after wave, only to crumble under our fire, sowing the slopes and the hollows with thousands and thousands of corpses.

EVACUATION OF BRABANT

Thursday, Feb. 24.—All night long the bombardment continued, from the right bank of the Meuse near Brabant as far as Ornes; the violence of the cannonade was such that it was necessary to order the evacuation of Brabant. It was made without difficulty, thanks to the darkness, while our batteries on the left bank, above Regnéville and Forges, answered the German cannon. This retirement brought us to Samogneux, 1,600 meters to the south, (one mile,) where, at dawn, the enemy launched a strong attack, which was repulsed. But the enemy was more fortunate on the northeast; they took back from us a part of the Caures Wood, employing a brigade for this assault. We only retained an angle of the wood. Our troops fell back before Beaumont and held their position there for part of the day, in spite of vigorous offensives. The village was then abandoned and we organized a line of resistance behind it.

In the same way we had had to give up Herbébois to take up a position in the open passage at the source of the Ornes, between this position and the Chaume Wood, near the village of Ornes. These movements, the tactical reasons for which, as well as the perfect order with which they were executed, were recognized later, brought us to the line of the heights extending from the hamlet of Neuville, in the Commune of Champneuville, to the south of Ornes, where are the Caurières and Vauche Woods.

PEPPER RIDGE

Friday, Feb. 25.—The night of Feb. 24-25 was broken only by artillery fire; no infantry attack was developed. Snow began to fall abundantly; it did not stop the German offensive, which on Feb. 25 began again with unheard-of violence along the whole line, and brought the battle line further to the south, to the edge of the village and fort of Douaumont.

The struggle once more took on the character of the most sanguinary fighting, on the Pepper Ridge, a long backbone whose culminating point, near Louvemont, reaches 347 meters (1,138 feet) in height, and which comes to an end above the Meuse at Vacherauville, where the Meuse flows past at a distance of 200 meters, (220 yards.) This position commands the roads from Longuyon and Sedan, by which arrived enemy masses that multiplied their assaults without succeeding in breaking in our front.

On this side the battle was terrible; the stories of the wounded give tragic details of the heaping up of German dead; our report said, "The enemy no longer count their sacrifices."

Even more violent was the struggle around Douaumont; there it took on a character of sanguinary slaughter. Innumerable enemy corpses covered the slopes, and new masses ceaselessly presented themselves, having for objective the village, the fort, and the row of redoubts which border the strategic road leading to the Terre-Froide position.

Douaumont, the culminating point of the intrenched camp of Verdun, had been the object of a terrible bombardment; the fort, at the end of the day, was nothing but a ruin. The defense of the positions near it, notably of the Vauche Wood between Douaumont and Bezonvaux, caused fierce combats; more than once the German assaults were broken before the resistance had fixed itself on the culminating point of the plateau.

DEFENSE OF HAUDROMONT

Saturday, Feb. 26.—The fighting throughout the day of Feb. 26 seems to have been the fiercest, the enemy then making his greatest efforts; our command, on its part, marked a halt in the movement of retreat, or, if the word be preferred, withdrawal. The German batteries redoubled the violence of their bombardment along the whole front, on both sides of the Meuse, to assure the success of this effort which might prove decisive, for, if the lines of Douaumont were forced, the assailants would be able to reach the row of forts which border the passage through which runs the railroad to Metz. Attacks launched with the help of large forces toward Neuville (Champneuville) and on Pepper Ridge were repulsed. Bloody contests were renewed, without reaching such a paroxysm as marked the struggle about Douaumont. The fort, shaken by the firing of enormous guns, was the object of repeated assaults which cost the enemy enormous losses.

Finally, his success seemed decisive; the defenders having had to abandon the ruins, a Brandenburg regiment, the Twenty-fourth Infantry, effected an entry. This advantage was immediately announced to the whole world by a dispatch from German General Headquarters, proclaiming the capture of the fort of Douaumont, "the northeastern cornerstone of the principal line of permanent fortifications of the fortress of Verdun." The Imperial General Staff was in too great haste to record a great victory. Hardly had the fort been taken from us when a strong counterattack was launched; all the lines were retaken and even passed, the fort was half surrounded without the Brandenburgers having evacuated it.

At the close of the day the enemy outlined two attacks on the flanks of the position; one, to the east, attempted to drive us from the Haudromont farm, situated on a wooded slope between Louvemont and Douaumont, between two folds along which passed roads leading to Bras; our artillery and machine guns broke it; a counterattack pushed back our assailants on the heights of Louvemont.

With equal violence other large enemy contingents made a drive against our Hardaumont positions, between Rezonvaux and Vaux; there also the enemy was repulsed.

The entire effort of the day had, therefore, been concentrated between the road from Louvemont to Bras and the edge of the ridges at Hardaumont. The enemy had failed wherever he attacked, except in the centre, where the fate of Douaumont, reached by the Brandenburgers, and then repassed by us, remained uncertain.

During these three last days events were being prepared in Woevre; we shall later devote a special paragraph to them.

DOUAUMONT AND VAUX

Sunday, Feb. 27.—On the plateau, between the Meuse and Woevre, the enemy's effort was aimed against our right wing; except for artillery action, the region of Champneuville and the Pepper Ridge were not the theatre of any fighting; but, between these two points, the Talou Ridge, (288 meters, 945 feet,) on which we had for a short time made a stand, had to be evacuated, without the enemy being able to gain a footing there, however, as the position, under artillery fire from both sides, had become untenable.

While the bombardment continued along the whole front, the Germans were directing furious efforts against the village and fort of Douaumont, to try to disengage the Brandenburgers, who seem to have remained in the ruins as in a trap. But we held on; repeated furious assaults did not overcome the tenacity of our soldiers. A movement on the east, to the north of the village of Vaux, that is, near the Hardaumont Wood, was not more fortunate. In spite of the unheard-of losses to which they consented, the Germans remained unable to retake the ground from which we had pushed them back.

Monday, Feb. 28.—On Monday also the enemy multiplied attacks around Douaumont, but without giving them the character of massed rushes such as marked the preceding days. These partial attempts at one time resulted in the occupation of one of the redoubts attached to the fort, but a hand-to-hand fight drove the enemy out again. These attacks continued at night, sometimes with great violence; they involved bayonet fighting, in which our men got the better of it.

Tuesday, Feb. 29.—The attacks slackened greatly; all were not noted in the dispatches, for the one of that night announced that the enemy was intrenching on the north slope of Pepper Ridge. But we had been told that our men held that long crest since they had given up the Talou Ridge, on which neither French nor Germans could stand the artillery fire. The Talou Ridge had, therefore, been passed. If the north flank of the Pepper Ridge was now furrowed by the trenches of our adversaries, the crest remained in our possession. Further, the enemy had still only small numbers on the ground won, since we had shelled a single battalion collected at Samogneux, three miles to the north, on the Meuse.

Except for this incident, the day was only marked by intermittent bombardments.

ATTACKS IN WOEVRE

In the above description of the phases of the great battle, day by day, we have passed over the symptoms which manifested themselves in Woevre of an attack against the eastern front of the intrenched camp, that is, the barrier of the ridges of the Meuse. At the outset we explained the value of these escarpments, and detailed the fortified works which were established there at a time when it could not be supposed that artillery would one day have a power superior to all armor. This line of positions, so long considered impregnable, was threatened in its turn; attacks were produced in three directions, including that of the heights of Vaux-before-Damloup, which we connected with the Douaumont fight.

When the great battle began our lines extended a considerable distance in Woevre, to the outskirts of Etain on the north, and around Fresnes-in-Woevre on the south. Enemy movements against these positions took place to the west of Etain, near Fromezey, as noted under Feb. 22. During the days of Feb. 23 and 24 the bombardment continued on this side with such intensity that a serious attack could be foreseen. Before this threat our command had the posts of the first line withdrawn; this operation was carried out rapidly, with a skill and success so complete that the enemy became aware of it only several hours later. None the less it was announced as a German victory. But we had not fired a shot.

On Feb. 27 the enemy, recovering from his surprise, advanced along the Etain road toward the Eix defile, through which both the road and the railroad from Verdun to Conflans and Metz enter the Woevre district. Our troops occupied the railroad station 2,000 meters (1¼ miles) from Eix and 1,500 meters from

Abaucourt, and bearing the name of these two villages. This station is important because the narrow-gauge railroad from Commercy to Verdun and Montmédy cross the railroad to Metz. Violently attacked, it was taken from us; it was retaken, then taken from us again, and finally remained in our hands.

To the south of the station, at a distance of a little more than 2 kilometers, (1¼ miles,) a hillock which dominates by some 30 meters (100 feet) the lower parts of the plain is traversed by a road coming from Etain and going to the entrance of the ridges at Moulainville. This position, strongly occupied by us, had already been bombarded; it was attacked at the same time as the Eix station, but all assaults were repulsed. The front of Moulainville and its attached batteries dominate by 200 feet this crest, which is bordered by two streams.

About six miles to the south the enemy attacked the village of Manheulles, on the direct road from Verdun to Metz, at the point of junction of a road coming from Pont-à-Mousson, with the road which skirts the base of the ridges of the Meuse. The point is thus important; it was energetically defended; the Germans were repulsed. On Monday two attacks directed against Fresnes-in-Woevre failed. But the enemy returned to the charge. He succeeded in seizing Manheulles; but, if he held the village, we retook the approaches to it. The objective of this operation of the Germans was the high promontory of Haudromont, (363 meters, 1,190 feet,) which dominates the plain by more than 100 meters (328 feet) and beneath which the road from Verdun climbs the pedestal of the plateau which holds the fort of Rozellier. Manheulles is 3 kilometers (3,280 yards) away.

ATTACKING DOUAUMONT

As might have been foreseen by noting the constant intense bombardment of our positions on the left (west) bank of the Meuse, an attack, not less serious than that on the front between the Meuse and Woevre, was being prepared on that side; it developed on Monday, Feb. 28, and on Tuesday, Feb. 29, had assumed very large proportions. It was, then, in Eastern Argonne, and perhaps also in Woevre, that the Germans were preparing to direct their effort, while they confined themselves to demonstrations along the lines of Douaumont. We shall follow the incidents of each of these sectors separately.

The last events which we noted between the Meuse and Woevre were the hand-to-hand combats during the night of Feb. 28-29 around Douaumont, and the lodging of the enemy on the northern slope of Pepper Ridge, the crest of which we continued to hold.

Wednesday, March 1.—The only event was a fairly brisk bombardment; the Germans were preparing infantry attacks which took place on the following day with extreme violence.

Thursday, March 2.—We have not been told the exact points against which these successive assaults were directed; "the region of Douaumont" only was indicated. The fire of our troops pushed back the waves of the enemy while our cannon replied to our adversary and covered with shells the paths by which their columns were advancing to the assault. Our adversaries then resumed the bombardment of the village and made new attacks with redoubled violence. Several times the assailants, cruelly tried, had to retire; a last effort finally allowed them to get a lodging among the ruins.

Another action was going on meanwhile to the east of the village of Vaux, hidden in a hollow dug out in the breast of the ridges of the Meuse, at the outlet of a pond from which flows an affluent of the Ornes. Vaux spreads along this hollow; at the foot of a hill 349 meters (1,144 feet) high, 100 meters (328 feet) above the plain, and crowned by a fort bearing its name, facing the Hardaumont works. The struggle was bloody; the enemy, descending by a kind of defile between the Douaumont fort and the Hardaumont works, rushed against Vaux, without these repeated assaults enabling him to force our wire entanglements. Our machine guns and cannon inflicted enormous losses on him. Finally he withdrew, leaving numerous corpses on the wires.

Friday, March 3.—The struggle was

resumed with great heat around the village of Douaumont. If the enemy was in the ruins, we held the top of the slope under which these lay. A counterattack brought us to the immediate approaches to the hamlet, and, in the evening, we retook them. The affair might have been extended, for troops were seen descending from Beaumont, moving against Pepper Ridge, bombarded since the day before—but our batteries dispersed them.

The enemy did not give up the game. The bombardment was continued.

Saturday, March 4.—Douaumont was once more attacked; the Germans regained a footing there; we drove them out again; they returned; the whole day passed in alternations of successes and withdrawals from this lamentable heap of crumbling dwellings. In the evening the fight took on a larger development; the enemy bombarded the whole sector, more than 3 kilometers, (3,280 yards,) included between the woods which surround the Haudromont farm, near Pepper Ridge, and the fort of Douaumont. A very lively attack followed the cannonade; our barring fire sufficed to stop it. We still held the approaches of Douaumont.

Sunday, March 5.—The bombardment, resumed, was not able to drive us from Douaumont. On the same day an attempt to take from us the little wood covering the extremity of Pepper Ridge, toward Vacherauville, was repulsed.

The Germans had shown a great deal of activity in these regions; troops on the march appeared toward the Fosses Wood near Beaumont, and at the approaches of the village of Louvemont, offering a target to our batteries, which directed their fire upon them.

Monday, March 6.—On the following night no infantry action was attempted; in compensation, the artillery was active, especially between Douaumont and the Meuse. Perhaps the cannonade on this side should be considered a participation in the events which were being prepared on the left (west) bank of the river.

Tuesday, March 7.—The enemy attempted a new attack to the east of Douaumont, against our Hardaumont Wood positions. After a bombardment which drew a reply from our batteries, troops were launched in an assault; the enemy got a footing in a redoubt; a counterattack drove him out of it.

Wednesday, March 8.—He reoccupied it.

IN WOEVRE

Before following the contests which suddenly carried the interest to the west, we must record what took place in Woevre, or rather in a small corner of that region, around Fresnes-in-Woevre.

We have seen that the enemy had succeeded in seizing Manheulles, a village situated on the road from Metz to Verdun, 2,500 meters (2,733 yards) from the promontory of Haudiomont, which sticks out, high and abrupt, before the mass of the ridges. But an attack against the neighboring town, Fresnes-in-Woevre, failed. Renewed on March 1, after an intense bombardment, it had a brief success; certain elements of our trenches were entered. A counterattack restored them to us. During March 2 a bombardment of like force took place; it was continued through the night; however, when the Germans attempted to advance our barring fire sufficed to push them back. Thereafter the cannonade continued, becoming constantly more intense. On March 7 it covered not only Fresnes but the villages which fringe the base of the ridges of the Meuse, and was followed by a very powerful infantry attack; our troops resisted valiantly, causing the adversary heavy losses, but had finally to abandon the town, without doubt withdrawing through Bonzée-in-Woevre on the ridges of the Meuse, to the north of Les Eparges, where mine contests took place. Les Eparges is at least five kilometers (three miles) to the southwest of Fresnes. The artillery struggle was continued with vigor. The fire of our batteries on Blanzée and Grimaucourt makes it probable that the enemy was active near the Conflans railroad.

In this region the enemy gets supplies by the railroad from Commercy to Montmédy, which receives, at Vigneulles-les-Hattonchâtel, the munitions and food supplies sent from Metz by the strategic railroad from Thiaucourt to St. Mihiel.

On different occasions the Vigneulles junction was bombarded by our airmen and long-range guns; this firing was renewed, for Vigneulles has an important part to play in events; several trains were hit, a locomotive blew up, fires were observed. These results bring credit to our fire, which was directed from a long distance.

WEST OF THE MEUSE.

General Séré de Rivières, creator of the intrenched camp of Verdun, held that the most threatened point of the great fortress would be the western sector, that is, the left bank of the Meuse. He feared that an enemy coming from Champagne and Argonne might get very close to the town, on the high hills which form the watershed between the Meuse and the Aire. He had proposed to cover the place along the line of the summit, by establishing a fort ten kilometers (6 miles) from the town on the plateau of Sivry-la-Perche. By expressing the fear that the enemy might get a footing on the northeast—toward Mort Homme Hill —he indicated that these heights should have been occupied.

It was the organization of this position that had to be considered in 1914, when the French and Germans had fixed their defense between Verdun and Montfaucon. Violent battles extending from Montfaucon to the Meuse ended by giving us as our barrier, after many fluctuations, the valley of the Forges stream, a rivulet born near the twin villages of Malancourt and Haucourt, and passing through Béthincourt on its way to join the Meuse opposite Brabant-on-the-Meuse, from which the battle of 1916 developed. The stream separated the two sides; from Malancourt the lines of the trenches descended toward Avocourt, left to the enemy the woods of Cheppy, to the French the forest of Hesse, then, by a sinuous line, crossed and divided the peak of Vauquois, passing the Aire at Boureuilles, which remained in our bands, and finally climbing up into the Argonne forest toward the Fille-Morte and the Haute-Chevauchée.

The enemy made Montfaucon, a feudal stronghold perched on the top of a conical hill, the centre of his position. Thence he threatened the whole region between the Aire and the Meuse—the eastern Argonne. The movement which took place in March had been foreseen for a long time.

Malancourt, in our hands, is only 4 kilometers (2½ miles) from Montfaucon. The watershed is a range of ridges reaching 304 meters (1,000 feet) between the villages of Malancourt and Esnes, which is dominated by a hill 310 meters (1,017 feet) high. There is here a series of very strong positions; a valley coming down from Béthincourt separates them from a system of hills which slope down to the Meuse at Regnéville, opposite Samogneux. On these hills there are some well-marked crests—two at the Mort Homme are, the one 265 meters, the other 295 meters, (870 and 968 feet;) a long ridge which separates the Forges brook from the broad valley of the Meuse toward Cumières reaches 265 meters (870 feet) between this village and Regnéville. It is called the height of Goose Ridge at the place where the Forges road crosses it.

This whole system of heights which descends in a gentle slope, like a glacis, toward the Forges Valley, had been submitted to bombardment from the beginning of the battle of Verdun. This artillery action was even more accentuated beginning with March 1, being particularly directed against the Mort Homme, Goose Ridge, and the passages of the Meuse, and then extending toward Malancourt. The cannonade was continued during the night of March 4-5, through the whole of Sunday, (March 5,) and the forenoon of March 6, from Béthincourt to the Meuse.

Then the infantry came on the stage. The village of Forges, where we had a post, was vigorously attacked—a fierce struggle which compelled us to evacuate Forges to transfer the defense to Goose Ridge. The enemy launched several successive attacks against these slopes without succeeding in reaching the summit. Our counterattacks drove him back into the village.

This was only the beginning. On March 6, after an intense bombardment, a new and more violent attack was made.

Troops which came from Forges followed the railroad track, on which a marked curve follows more regularly the curve of the Meuse at Regnéville, and, coming in small groups, concentrated to climb up the slopes, while an entire division, coming up from Forges, under our fire, reached the summit, 265-Meter Hill, a kilometer (1,093 yards) to the east of Goose Ridge. In spite of heavy losses they were able to gain a foothold. But the height of Goose Ridge remained in our hands; we remained masters of Béthincourt, of the woods of Corbeaux and Cumières and, consequently, of the Mort Homme hillocks. This line of defense, violently bombarded by large-calibre guns during March 7, was the object of multiplied attacks; all were repulsed, but the enemy was able to gain a footing at the centre of our lines in the Corbeaux Wood sector; thus at two points he held the crest between the Forges Valley and the meander formed by the Meuse around the territory of Champneuville. These two points, between which is the height of Goose Ridge, are the approaches of the Corbeaux Wood, if not the wood itself, and 265-Meter Hill.

On March 8 we counterattacked in the Corbeaux Wood and drove out the enemy, who held on only in the extreme east. A German attack with large forces against Béthincourt was repulsed at the same time. Violent fighting continued for two days, at the end of which the Germans had succeeded in regaining the position from which we had driven them.

Thursday, March 9.—We pushed our assailants back from the Corbeaux Wood, and carried on an artillery duel while our long-range guns shelled convoys signaled on our extreme left wing in the wooded region comprised between Avocourt and Montfaucon. On the next day, also, our batteries took as a target an enemy column in the same direction. It must be noted that, each day since the battle began, there had been similar firing on this side. But, in spite of the activity shown by the movements of the enemy in this forest formed of communal woods, there was, up to this, no infantry action.

Friday, March 10.—Was marked by repeated assaults against our Corbeaux Wood position. In vain did our shells, the fire of our machine guns and the rifle fire from our trenches break up their ranks; new waves swept forward. Finally, to break our resistance, the enemy launched against us forces estimated at not less than a division, (20,000 men.) At a cost of enormous losses he succeeded in dislodging us from the part of the wood which we had retaken. In the night the effort was directed against Béthincourt, along the road which connects this village with Chattancourt, by the Mort Homme positions. The enemy penetrated a connecting trench, from which a counterattack drove him immediately.

Saturday, March 11; Sunday, March 12.—There was a continuous bombardment, to which we replied with success.

Monday, March 13.—The fire of our adversaries redoubled, directed against the Mort Homme and, more to the south, the undulating region whose highest points are occupied by the Bois-Bourrus Woods, 400 hectares (1,000 acres) in extent. These woods give their name to one of the forts which cover a long crest that comes out over the Meuse above Charny, a series of works separated by 6 kilometers (3¾ miles) from the citadel and circuit wall of Verdun. On this day our long-range guns reached the enemy organizations, the shelters and field railroads in the region of Montfaucon, where were organized the forces destined to operate against Béthincourt and the movement of which was carried out on the following day.

Tuesday, March 14.—After several hours' bombardment the enemy directed a strong attack against the three-mile front between the Béthincourt road and Cumières. The enemy was repulsed, but gained a footing in certain elements of the trenches between Béthincourt and the Mort Homme.

Wednesday, March 15.—He lost a part of this by a counterattack, after which our front was marked out by Béthincourt, the Mort Homme, the edge of Cumières Wood, and Cumières village.

THE FIGHT FOR VAUX

Events between the Meuse and the plain of Woevre had been more important. It will be remembered that, on March 7, the Germans essayed against the Hardaumont Wood an attack which allowed them to keep a redoubt that was long contested. On March 8 the struggle began once more, very fiercely, between Douaumont and the village of Vaux. Several times running, large forces, the whole of the Third Corps, it was said, sustained by violent artillery fire, drove against our lines without bending them. The enemy was continually repulsed; at one time the village of Vaux was entered; our men freed it by a counterattack with the bayonet.

The fight was continued all night and the following day with growing violence. The Germans directed furious assaults against Vaux, covering the ground with their dead. Other troops were launched against the steep slopes which led to the fort; in massed formations, the enemy tried to climb the cliff-like ascent, but crumbled under our fire; their losses were enormous. The enemy believed themselves certain to succeed; the German General Staff telegraphed to Berlin to announce the taking of Vaux and the armored fort; the name of the victorious General was given, and the numbers of the regiments that had gained the victory. The large cities were illuminated. Our command was compelled to issue a contradiction; the Germans, caught in the act, extricated themselves by announcing that we had "retaken" the fort, which we had never lost. Our enemy's sacrifices in men had been terrible; yet they prepared to renew them on the same day, when our artillery, reaching their organizations, forced them to disperse.

On March 10 they returned to the charge, after having once more directed an intense bombardment against the ravine-like hollow with precipitous sides. Assault after assault was directed against the heaps of ruins that had been Vaux. All these efforts only enabled the enemy to occupy a few houses around the church, built at the spot where the ravine opens out into the plain, the opening of which the enemy had been able to reach, thanks to the fog.

At the same time the steep hill on which is the fort and its batteries had been approached by the Germans; in spite of terrible losses, our enemy reached the slope of the plateau; but there they found themselves against our barbed wire entanglements; they could not even reach them, as our fire drove them back in masses over the edge of the hill.

On the same day (March 10) our trenches to the west of Douaumont, that is, toward the wood which covers the ravine-cleft curve that opens beneath the Haudromont farm, were attacked with unprecedented violence. Three times successively, in columns of four, the enemy surged against our lines. Each time our cannon and machine guns broke up these masses, which, decimated and exhausted, were forced to retreat to the shelter of the trenches. But the German artillery continued firing with great intensity against Douaumont and Vaux. After this, the infantry did not attack this region again except on March 13, toward Haudromont; a strong reconnoissance was stopped as soon as it appeared.

An advance was made close to the Meuse. On March 11 a grenade attack took place in a thicket called the Bois-Carré, at the end of Pepper Ridge, next the river. On March 12 the gathering of troops was signaled by our observers in the ravine hollowed out on the north of that ridge, whose sides, carpeted with short grass, remained in our hands. Our shells rained on these groups, and reached the German batteries installed between Louvemont and the Longuyon road.

On Monday, March 13, the enemy's activity was concentrated in a violent bombardment against Vaux and Damloup.

In Woevre, except for an unimportant infantry attack, which, on the evening of March 11, took from us one element of our trenches on the road from Verdun to Conflans, to the north of Eix, there was only an artillery duel, but this was continuous. It was especially violent, beginning with March 10, along the whole line of the ridges, from Eix to the height of Fresnes-in-Woevre. Eix, Moulainville, and its steep slopes, then, beyond Haudromont, Villers-under-Bonchamps, and Bonzée, and, later, Ronvaux on the north slope of the Haudiomont promontory, were cannonaded; our artillery replied to the enemy, whose infantry did not intervene.

The Germans tried to interfere with our communications between the two banks of the Meuse by launching floating mines at St. Mihiel on March 10; they hoped to blow up the bridges which we had thrown across the river and the permanent bridges of Verdun. But the river is well guarded; the terrible engines were discovered and fished out.

Thursday, March 16.—As on the preceding day, gun fire was particularly violent. Our batteries had to hammer the works which the enemy constructed between Douaumont and Haudromont. Movements of troops were signaled near Vaux, and caught under the fire of our guns. It was the prelude of an attack which developed toward 8 in the evening, and which the usual bombardment enabled us to foresee. It consisted of a whole series of furious actions, directed against the village of Vaux and the slopes crowned by the fort. Twice the village was assailed; the enemy, subjected to our fire, was compelled to retreat, leaving numerous dead in the ruins. The heights were twice subjected to equally furious attacks; there also the troops that attempted to scale the cliff were broken up. The enemy did not admit that they were defeated; taking advantage of the night, they entered, to the southeast of the village, a sunken road by which they hoped to get behind the fort; but our men were vigilant; cannon and machine guns dispersed the attacking column. It would seem that in these attacks our infantry played a subordinate part; the artillery and machine guns overcame the attack.

Friday, March 17; Saturday, March 18.—On Saturday the Germans returned to the charge, attempting, in the forenoon, along the whole front from Haudromont to Vaux, a series of partial attacks, which did not succeed in reaching our trenches. In the afternoon, after vigorously bombarding Vaux, the slopes of the fort, and the ridges, toward Damloup, they launched a new assault, but our barring fire pushed them back again, and they were compelled to retire. After this Vaux was left in peace. On Wednesday, March 22, the bombardment was still going on.

THE MORT HOMME REGION

Events on the left (west) bank of the Meuse were more important. On March 15, after having retaken a part of the trenches on 265-Meter Hill, to the north of the principal height of the Mort Homme, we held a line going from Béthincourt to Cumières, by the Mort Homme and the fringe of the wood of Cumières, which joins the Corbeaux Wood. The enemy seemed to be keeping quiet, but, on March 16, he resumed the bombardment of this front and, in the afternoon, made a strong attack in waves of assault which were broken forthwith by our fire. It appears that six divisions (120,000 men) were engaged.

They did not attack again on this side, but our guns continued to shell the connecting roads behind their front, anticipating a movement from the southwest. March 18 was marked only by the fire of our guns against the positions near the Mort Homme and the Corbeaux Wood.

Sunday, March 19.—Quiet reigned all along the front.

Monday, March 20.—An intense bombardment with shells of the largest calibre suddenly broke out to the west and southwest of Béthincourt, on the sector extending from the village of Malancourt to Avocourt, the two villages being separated by a wooded hill which forms a part of the sylvan zone called the Forest of Montfaucon. After this preparation an entire division was launched in an attack. It had not up to this time taken part in the operations before Verdun, and arrived intact from a distant front. Preceded by men who projected flaming liquids, it rushed against our lines; in spite of the violence of the assault, our fire held the enemy; cannon, machine guns, infantry fire caused such losses that the assailant was forced to retire, holding only the east end of the woods.

The bombardment began again, and lasted throughout the night.

Tuesday, March 21.—Repeated infantry attacks were preceded by the projectors of flaming liquids. Our fire inflicted enormous losses on the enemy, but was not able to prevent his getting a footing in the southeast end of the forest, called the Avocourt Wood.

While this fighting was going on the enemy's long-range fire continued to sweep the ground between Malancourt and the approaches of the Bois-Bourrus. The 304-Meter Hill, between Malancourt and Esnes, was a special target. Its occupation would have made it possible to attack the Mort Homme from the rear. On March 21 the artillery struggle was intense, but the Germans made no new infantry attacks.

Wednesday, March 22.—Several attacks were directed against our fronts comprised between Malancourt and the angle of the Avocourt Wood. All the attempts of the enemy to advance from the wood were checked, and he only gained a foothold on a hillock to the southwest of Haucourt.

During the next week no infantry fighting took place around Verdun. It might have been thought that the battle was ended.

Tuesday, March 28.—The struggle began again in the Malancourt-Avocourt region, without advantage to the enemy.

Wednesday, March 29.—We made appreciable gains. We had foreseen a renewal of infantry fighting which had been announced by the almost continuous bombardment of our lines, and the fire which we directed on the woods constituting the forest of Apremont and, beyond, on the region where the departments of the Meuse and of the Ardennes march together, from the defile of Grandpré, in the Argonne Forest, to the approaches of Montfaucon. On Wednesday morning our artillery opened fire on the Avocourt Wood, which we had had to abandon during the preceding week, and prepared an attack on the southeast corner. Our infantry, sent forward to the assault, seized trenches on a depth of more than 300 meters, (330 yards,) reached a work called the Avocourt redoubt, powerfully held by the enemy, and seized it. The Germans tried to regain this ground; they threw against our positions a brigade which had recently arrived and had not yet been engaged. It suffered the fate of other assaulting troops; its effort was broken; after great losses, it was thrown back to the west.

The enemy at the same time resumed his attack, with considerable forces, against the village of Malancourt; he seized an advance work, to the north, and two houses, but could not press home this slight success.

DOUAUMONT-VAUX LINE

Between the Meuse and the plain of Woevre also there were only intermittent bombardments, more sustained on the sector Douaumont-Vaux-Damloup. On this side also the enemy's fire was extended to reach our second lines, the row of forts to the north of the Metz railroad. The German dispatches boasted of the destruction of the City of Verdun by incendiary bombs, a procedure to which Rheims, Soissons, and Arras have accustomed us.

Our cannon replied vigorously to the enemy from Pepper Ridge and Douaumont and Vaux.

In Woevre there was a renewed artillery attack on the ridges of the Meuse, from Moulainville to Eparges; Châtillon, between Moulainville and Haudiomont was also bombarded. Noting troop movements, our airmen bombarded the enemy's railroad communications, setting fire to a train of cars on March 27. Three days earlier a train of munitions had been destroyed at Vigneulles.

Thursday, March 30.—The Germans approached our trenches, which they had bombarded on the previous day. Preceded by projectors of flaming liquids, they threw themselves on us. In spite of their barbarous methods of surprise, they were pushed back, but soon returned to the charge, to be thrown back again after suffering heavy losses.

But they did not give up the game. In the afternoon they resumed the bombardment with extreme violence, keeping it up all night on a front of 5 kilometers (3 miles) from the woods of Haudromont, near Pepper Ridge, to Vaux.

Friday, March 31.—During Friday night they launched two attacks in great force against Vaux. The first was not even able to approach our lines, as our gun and rifle fire broke it up. The second, directed especially against the village, was very lively; the Germans succeed in occupying the western part of Vaux.

Saturday, April 1.—The enemy, wishing to extend his success, tried to dislodge us from the ravine which comes down from the fort of Douaumont to Vaux, but our barring fire stopped him.

Sunday, April 2.—The fight became more violent. A bombardment with large calibre shells was prolonged for a considerable time. When the enemy thought the desired effect had been produced he sent forward four columns at once, more than a division, (20,000 men,) on the whole front from Douaumont to Vaux. To the south of the road which joins these two villages there is a wood of some size, which is called La Caillette. The Germans succeeded in penetrating it, but counterattacks took most of it away from them again; they were pushed back on the north of the wood, near Douaumont fort. At Vaux they failed to drive us from the approaches of the village.

Monday, April 3.—Our troops vigorously counterattacked, and succeeded in retaking most of the Caillette Wood, and, throwing themselves on Vaux, retook the part of the village which had been taken from us. This last action was carried out with exceptional energy.

Tuesday, April 4.—After a bombardment lasting till 3 P. M., compact masses of the enemy appeared coming out of the little Chaufour Wood, 500 meters (547 yards) to the northwest of the village of Douaumont, followed at a distance by columns ready to profit by a breach in our lines, situated between Douaumont and the row of redoubts joining the fort to the Terre-Froide Ridge. Our batteries and machine guns immediately opened fire on these masses, which were estimated to contain more than a division, (20,000 men.) Whole ranks were mowed down; twice the wave broke against our trenches, small isolated columns coming up to sustain the assault, while the reaping continued. At last the enemy troops flowed back in disorder, seeking cover in the Chaufour Wood, from which they had come. Our batteries, concentrating their fire, dug new hollows in the masses taking refuge in the bushes. No help could come from the German detachments occupying the north corner of the Caillette Wood; these also were pushed back by our troops, who pressed them vigorously against the Douaumont fort.

Wednesday, April 5.—The slopes on which is the fort of Moulainville, on the ridges of the Meuse, were very heavily bombarded, as far as Châtillon. Floating mines, sent down from St. Mihiel, as before, to destroy the Verdun bridges, were stopped.

IN AVOCOURT WOOD

In the night of March 28-29, the Germans several times threw themselves on that part of the Avocourt Wood from which we had driven them; each time, our barring fire drove them back, inflicting terrible losses. The principal attack was against the redoubt, where their dead bodies were piled up in heaps.

On the following day the Avocourt zone was quiet except for two grenade contests, but at Malancourt, after a night bombardment, the enemy launched a series of massed attacks, approaching the village from three sides. We had only a battalion (1,000 men) there, while the forces launched against them were estimated at five brigades, (50,000 men.) Our little troop resisted valiantly, inflicting enormous losses, and then withdrew without losing one unwounded prisoner. The Germans then occupied the ruins of Malancourt, but were able to go no further; we held all the approaches.

Until April 2 there was only intermittent bombardment. On April 2 repeated assaults failed to capture the Avocourt redoubt. Our trenches on the left bank of the Forges rivulet, rendered untenable by the taking of Malancourt, had been evacuated on the night of March 31, without the enemy discovering it; throughout the whole of April 1 he bombarded these empty galleries unceas-

A HISTORIC MOMENT IN THE SUBMARINE CRISIS



President Woodrow Wilson Delivering His Address to Congress on the Ultimatum to Germany, April 19, 1916

CONFERENCE OF THE ALLIES IN PARIS, MARCH 27-28



Presided over by President Briand of France, who is No. 25 in the photograph. The others are (1) Premier Asquith of England; (2) Lord Bertie, (3) Lloyd George, Minister of Munitions, both of England; (4) M. Thomas of France; (5) Lord Kitchener and (6) General Sir William Robertson of England; (7) an English military aid; (8) Ambassador Tittoni, (9) Premier Salandra, (10) Baron Sonnino, (11) General Cadorna, and (12) General Dall' Olio, all of Italy; (13) Mr. Matsi, Japan; (14) Senhor Chagas of Portugal; (15) General Gilinski, (16) M. Isvolsky, of Russia; (17) Premier Pashitch, (18) General Vesnitch, and (19) Yovan Yovanovitch, of Serbia; (20) General Rochitch; (21) General Castelnau, (22) General Joffre, (23) Admiral Lacaze, (26) General Roques, (27) General Bourgeois, all of France; and (29) Sir Edward Grey of England.

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ingly and on April 2 launched a strong attack against them. We had transferred our defense to the right bank of the Forges rivulet, where bare slopes, forming a glacis, gave us a superb shooting range. From these slopes our guns, aided by the guns of Béthincourt, which took the assailants obliquely, mowed the enemy down without their finding a man in front of them.

The bombardment from Avocourt to Béthincourt was resumed, but the expected infantry attacks did not develop, with the exception of an assault against Haucourt on the afternoon of April 4. It was repulsed.

SUMMARY OF LATER EVENTS

[By the Translator]

To bring the account of this terrible and unprecedented battle up to date, it is necessary only to enumerate the oft-repeated and as often-repelled attacks at three points: First, in the Woevre region, the plain which lies to the east of the ridges of the Meuse on the east of Verdun, between the great intrenched camp and Metz; secondly, on the right (east) bank of the Meuse, in the region between Douaumont and Vaux, and, third, on the left (west) bank of the Meuse, against the Mort Homme Hill, 304-Meter Hill, and 287-Meter Hill, all of which have been described again and again in the foregoing narrative. The attacks, beginning with April 5, are as follows:

1. In the Woevre, April and May, almost incessant bombardment; few infantry attacks.
2. East of the Meuse, April 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 17, and 27, and May 8.
3. West of the Meuse, April 5, 7, 9, 10, and 22, and May 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

In each of the three battle sectors practically the same ground was fought over, week after week; where the Germans made small gains French counter-attacks invariably drove them out.

From a consideration of these facts two conclusions follow: First, that during the last week of February the French were not retreating from a strong position, but were retreating to a strong position; and, having reached their definitive line of defense, they have been able to hold it against the greatest and most furious assaults ever made in the history of war, prepared by the most tremendous artillery forces that have ever been brought together. This successful defense forms one of the finest military achievements ever recorded, and brings higher glory to the soldiers of France, from General Joffre, General Castelnau, and General Petain to the privates in the trenches, than did even the great and decisive victory of the Marne. Secondly, it is quite evident that, after the first two weeks of the battle—when the original plan miscarried—the German Great General Staff has had no plan at all, no strategic, no tactical, conception; it has simply been a case of blindly, obstinately hammering away; and the rotation of the attacks, against the three sectors we have indicated, might just as well have been settled by the rattling of the dice-box. On this point a military writer recently said:

> In short, with ever-ebbing vigor, the German Army is smashing its head against the walls of Verdun. The weight and vigor of the blows decrease, but the suicidal mania continues. Two months have passed since the early success of the German attack ended with the capture of Vaux village. Each resumption of the attempt to take Verdun since that time has been a cause for increasing wonder. What is there about this enterprise that has turned it into a fatal obsession, from which the German high command cannot escape, however great the cost of continuance?

A BERLIN ARTIST'S VIEW OF GERMAN WAR TRIUMPHS

[A German Interpretation]

Verdun: The Epic of the War

Written for Current History

By H. H. von Mellenthin

Foreign Editor New Yorker Staats-Zeitung

VERDUN has brought war back into honor, the sort of war in which the individual man and personal courage are given their full chances and values. At Verdun the bearing-down strategy, the open battle, comes back into honor. Trench warfare is that form of wearing-down strategy which plays the bloody game with the least possible risk, and which has no great fondness for battle.

This war, like all others, will be won not in the trenches, but on the battlefield. The wearing-down strategy, which aims at tiring the opponent to the point of utter exhaustion, at winning the war by a gradual wearing-out, is false. The view that trench warfare means the last word of strategy has long since been disproved. The last word is still the same today that it was in the days of the great bearing-down strategists, Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Napoleon, Gneisenau, Sheridan, Moltke.

The strategy which aims at defeating the enemy in open battle becomes folly only when it becomes recklessness—the kind of recklessness which "puts all on one throw." But Verdun is not a "throw." The results that can be expected from the wearing-out strategy are definitely limited; the effects of the bearing-down strategy, however, are decisive. That is the lesson of the history of world wars, the great teacher and admonisher. The decisive effects whereof we speak embody victory.

Verdun will bring the decision. And the victory will be fought for with legitimate weapons and with open visor. At Verdun bombardments are carried on neither with "silver bullets" nor with "paper notes." The battle is fought neither with the intrigues of back-stairways nor from ambush. At Verdun there are no "hymns of hate," no "boches," and no "degenerates." The sole commander upon that battlefield is military genius. The fight is fought, breast to breast, by man's courage, the sort of courage that does not deny even to the enemy the recognition that is due him.

In the midst of the tragedy, after the various satires and farces of this war of nations, Verdun is an epic, a song of heroism. Let Thersites return! Patroclus lies in his grave of honor before Verdun, too; Verdun is the Epopeus, the Iliad of this war.

Priam's fortress fell. Verdun, too, will fall.

* * *

The German General Staff figured the duration of the Verdun campaign at five months. The Imperial German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, declared in the Reichstag that the operations against the fortress of Verdun were developing in accordance with an accurately pre-determined plan which provided for all possibilities.

The Prussian War Minister, General Wild von Hohenborn, made the following statement in the Reichstag session of April 11, last:

"These are not, as our enemies are pretending to believe, the last exertions of an exhausted nation, but the hammer blows of a strong, invincible people which commands sufficient reserves in men and all other means for the continuation of the hammer blows."

With the accuracy of clock-work and with the force of hammer blows the German campaign against Verdun takes its course. Like a giant glacier, slowly but irresistibly, the solid mass of German warriors sweeps down upon Verdun.

That is the German view of the events which have taken place since February 21 on the fronts of Verdun, and of the military situation as it has developed.

The French view is reflected in the announcement that the Verdun campaign as such is already a closed incident, and in the decree which bestowed upon General Petain, the defender of Verdun—who, in the meantime, has been hurled upon the Tarpeian rock—the highest dignity of the Honor Legion: "It is due to his calm firmness and to the wisdom and foresight of his orders that he succeeded in improving a precarious situation and in inspiring all with confidence."

The ultimate goal of every war consists in beating the enemy army, in putting it out of action. As against this ultimate aim, which means victory, fortresses are, in themselves, without significance. Their military importance for the development and often for the decision, is based solely upon the question as to whether and in what respect they are suitable to the army as bases in an offensive and as points of refuge in a defensive, and whether and how they are suitable as the "starting points" for a great drive.

Antwerp, which was regarded as the strongest and most modern fortress, had lost its military importance from the moment it was divested, by the rapid and victorious march of the German troops through Belgium, of its suitability as a base for an allied march into Germany. The fortress could not even serve as a refuge point.

The whole powerful fortress chain on the eastern frontier of Russia was important for the development of the war only by virtue of the fact that it covered the retreat of the Russian armies and created for them the possibility to escape the threatened envelopment.

Verdun, however, is not at all a fortress in the accepted sense of the term. Verdun represents an entirely novel and modern strategic factor. As a link of the French chain of fortresses which extends down to Belfort, Verdun had been constructed and built out first, as a point of concentration of the military forces for an offensive; second, as the gate from which these forces were to be put into motion against the enemy; third, as a point of refuge for the event of the failure of an offensive, and fourth, as a battlefield upon which a possible invasion was to be resisted.

A starting point for an offensive against the enemy is at the same time a point of incidence for the enemy. Verdun represents the "Anti-Metz." But the German frontier stronghold also represents the "Anti-Verdun." With Metz as their base, the Germans are driving against Verdun, which blocks the advance into the interior of France. To open the door for this advance—that is the task the German General Staff has set itself in the campaign against Verdun.

The fall of Verdun would bring the purpose and aim of every war, the disabling of the hostile army, very considerably nearer its realization.

The events up to date before the fortress have given the military situation the following aspect:

Verdun, intended as a starting point, has completely lost its value as such and as a base for an offensive. It no longer forms a refuge point for the army, but must be defended by the army in open battle. The defense already has devoured such huge masses of troops that in these circumstances there can scarcely be any question of an offensive at any other point of the front.

What do these things mean? They mean that the German General Staff is aiming, with the campaign against Verdun, at an advance into the interior of France. Such an advance would bring into motion all other fronts as well.

The achievements up to date of the German operations against Verdun may be comprised thus:

1. Verdun is no longer a starting point for an offensive, but has become the point of incidence for the enemy.

2. A large part of the French army has been completely withdrawn from active part in the war and is partly "tied up" on a very small part of the front.

3. The successes of German arms won thus far create all the pre-conditions for the systematic extension of that which has already been achieved. This means that they are driving further and further toward the ultimate goal of all wars: the disabling of the enemy's army.

As for the discussions in the allied countries, the Verdun campaign, as a military undertaking with a definite aim in view, has already been relegated to the "closed incidents" and is merely considered an offensive operation on a larger scale, comparable to the French drive in Artois and Champagne last September. Again, on the German side, the wishes were so "well winged," and the marching gait of expectations was so rapid, that the German troops and the successes have not always been able to keep an even pace. A closer understanding of the tactics employed in the fighting against Verdun teaches one to realize the reasons for this slow and systematic pushing forward. The rate of the forward movement is determined, first, by the strength of the resistance it meets, and, second, by the careful sparing of human material.

The operations at Verdun since Feb. 21 can be divided into three sections. Each new phase forms the continuation of that which preceded it on the militarily logical line of development. The first phase, the shortest, consisted of the advance against the northern outer fortifications in the terrain lying in front of the fortress, and in the capture of the area necessary for a concentrated attack and for the bringing up of the heavy guns. It culminated in the storming of Fort Douaumont, Feb. 25.)

The second phase was initiated by the extension of the attacking front to the east, from the Woevre plain against the Côte Lorraine. This advance brought the attackers as far as the foot of the Meuse Heights. The northernmost point of this line south of the railway leading from Verdun to Metz is the village and railway station of Eix; to the north of the railway this line stretches as far as Dieppe. From Eix two roads lead in a westerly direction against Verdun, through the two valleys of the Meuse Heights; the old army road and the railway. North of the railway the advance started out from the line Damloup-Dieppe. In that area the contact was established between the German northern army and the Woevre army. Both armies were participating in the fighting against Vaux, which aims at the possession of the whole plateau between Douaumont, Hardaumont, and Vaux—fighting which is still in progress.

The third stage of the Verdun battle carried the extension of the German front of attack to the west, to the left bank of the Meuse, from the line Forges-Malancourt to within the firing range against Le Mort Homme and the Côte de L'Oie. This new offensive is directed against the northwestern outer fortifications of Verdun, as well as against the railway which leads from Verdun to Paris and which is today the only great line of supply—and the logical line of escape.

The first move in this offensive was the advance (March 14) against Le Mort Homme (Dead Man Hill) on the sector Béthincourt-Cumières and then (March 20 to 22) through the large wooded area between Malancourt and Avocourt. As a consequence, the French front had assumed the form of a salient whose head, extending beyond Haucourt to Malancourt, reached far into the German positions. This head was crushed in by the Germans through the capture of Malancourt. The loss of the northern slopes of Termiten Hill (Hill 287) on April 7 forced the French to evacuate their positions south of the Forges Brook between Haucourt and Béthincourt, as well as to abandon the latter village itself, all these positions being exposed to the German flanking fire. The new French line now ran from the southern slopes of Bois d'Avocourt over Hill 304 to the southern slopes of Le

Mort Homme and the Bois des Corbeaux. The taking up of this new front marked the conclusion of the third stage of the campaign, a stage which, with artillery duels and occasional infantry attacks, lasted into the middle of April.

The fourth phase of the campaign of Verdun will one day be the object of deep and extensive study for the history of wars. This phase is taken up by a great military surprise: a French counteroffensive. The French had, by means of occasional counterattacks, made repeated attempts to escape encirclement by the Germans at Verdun. The surprise, however, consisted of the fact that the French General Staff had actually weighed the possibility of a great counteroffensive against Metz. It was as a result of the consideration of such a possibility that the counterattacks at Le Mort Homme, as well as in the area of Douaumont, were launched—evidently with entirely fresh troops. The force of this countermovement was, for a time, such that the German line had to be taken back at certain points. It was this force which deceived the military experts on the allied side into the theory that the German campaign at Verdun was already ended. The necessity to meet such a force of the French counterattacks is also the reason for the temporary lull in the German forward movement.

The great Spring offensive had been the hope of the Allies and the pride of the French. With the tremendous army reserves of General Joffre the German lines were to be penetrated, France's sacred soil was to be cleared of the invaders. This offensive was spoken of in Paris in the whispering tone of worship; it was the sacred event-to-be, the evangelism of the French.

A recently published report of the French War Ministry shows that the view was originally held in the French camp that the German attacks against Verdun were merely a "make-believe" manoeuvring, aimed at diverting attention from the preparations for a really great offensive at some other point of the front; a view which has found its echo in the neutral countries as well. The important reserves of General Joffre were to be saved for the great allied Spring offensive. Therefore the attempt was first made when the Verdun campaign began to get along with the reserve formations in the neighboring forts.

However, the development of the military situation has made it necessary for France to mass in the Verdun area alone thirty divisions, with a total strength of 450,000.

As early as January there was circulated among the peasant population of Lorraine the rumor of an impending French offensive against Metz. French fliers dropped messages foreshadowing the event, telling the residents of Metz to leave the town because it was to be completely destroyed. From the direction of Pont-à-Mousson the frontal terrain of Metz was bombarded by heavy calibre guns; the Germans were to be driven from the Combres Height on the Côte Lorraine and ejected from St. Mihiel, and among the French troops west of the Meuse the word was passed that they were to be sent forth against Metz. April 15 was fixed as the date for the beginning of the offensive.

It was about this time that we witnessed the beginning of a French attempt at a counteroffensive at Verdun. West of the Meuse it was set in motion from the salient position on Hill 304 and on the eastern slopes of Mort Homme, as well as in the area between Bois des Corbeaux and the Bois de Cumières. To the east the movement was launched on the front between Vaux and Douaumont and against the German positions in the Bois Caures and on the hills to the southwest of Douaumont, as well as against the whole German line from Douaumont to the ravine of the Vaux Brook.

Simultaneously with these moves there appeared in the press a Reuter dispatch to the effect that the civil population of Metz was about to evacuate the city. That was a distinct echo of the previous warning of the French fliers.

The analysis of this French offensive, the great military surprise, will one day furnish the history of wars a highly interesting chapter of the Verdun campaign. Today it is only known that the French counterattacks on both banks of the Meuse broke down with terrific losses to the attackers. Perhaps the change in the chief command of the Verdun defense, coming as it does at a truly critical moment, may be explained by the ineffectiveness and the heavy losses of that offensive. This fourth phase of the campaign around Verdun was stifled in blood.

The fifth phase began a few days ago with the storming of Hill 304, to the northwest of Verdun, which was the initial success in the resumption of the German attacks.

The gravity of the French situation lies in the losses suffered. The number of killed is so great that the number of unwounded prisoners is only 40 officers and 1,280 men. The consequences of the new German success are, for the French, even more serious. According to a French account of the situation the French Commander in Chief had stationed his ablest army corps along the line Hill 304-Dead Man Hill, on which a German frontal attack took place. The hill was taken by a frontal attack. The possession of Hill 304 will carry the German line further to the Avocourt-Esnes-Chattancourt line, the straight continuation of which extends to the eastern bank of the Meuse. The possession of Hill 304 embodies the control of the Verdun-Paris railway. It makes the French positions between Avocourt, Cumières and Chattancourt untenable; Cumières and Chattancourt are about to share the fate of Malancourt, Haucourt, and Béthincourt.

The area between the Bois de Corbeaux and the Bois de Cumières has been the scene of violent fighting of late. Here there ascends from the village of Cumières on the edge of the Meuse Valley, against Hill 295, a ravine whose northern rim is formed by the Bois de Corbeaux and the Bois de Cumières, while the southern edge is called Les Caurettes. The little Bois Caurettes has already been mentioned repeatedly in the French official reports, as the objective of German storming attacks threatening to cut the French off from the village of Cumières, and again as the scene of very violent French counterattacks which were aimed at averting that danger. After the loss of Hill 304 the French will find themselves compelled to evacuate this area, too. Then the entire terrain on the left bank of the Meuse, to the line Avocourt-Esnes-Chattancourt, will be cleared of the French.

An official Berlin report contains the first intimation as to the strength of the German troops standing before Verdun. The strength on the French side is estimated by this report at fifty-one divisions, of which some have several times gone into fire after the losses had been replaced. The German force before Verdun, the report says, is not even half that figure. Figuring upon 20,000 men in a French division, we would arrive at the staggering number of more than 1,000,000 French troops on the various fronts of Verdun. That seems to us an exaggeration. Nevertheless, the Berlin report states the numerical proportion between the French and German troops. This proportion may also serve as a factor in the estimate of the losses on both sides.

Those are presumptions. The fact is that the storming of Hill 304 represents a great success for the Germans. The military situation of the Verdun campaign is developing upon the straight line of military logic. The advance proceeds slowly, in accordance with the given circumstances and the tactics employed, but unhaltingly toward the ultimate goal. Dead Man Hill—the name of the oft-mentioned and furiously fought for hill to the west of the Meuse—is the miners' name for the razed part of a ravine. The frontal terrain of Verdun is being systematically "razed" by the German troops. The last stage of the Verdun campaign, the stage which will be the shortest of all, will bring the fall of the fortress proper.

The original theory that the German attacks before Verdun were only feints, destined to veil other intentions at other points of the far-flung front which stretches from the North Sea to the Swiss mountains, has been rectified by the events of the last two months. The latest forward movement by the German troops after the storming of Hill 304, against the Verdun-Paris railway and the western outer fortifications of Verdun, show clearly that the German campaign there is by no means ended. The once popular assertion that the various pauses by which the German advance is interrupted were the result of exhaustion of the German forces is heard no longer. The view that the German General Staff inaugurated the Verdun drive in order to forestall the so loudly heralded allied Spring offensive is contradicted by many weighty military considerations. The Entente press still thinks the Germans capable of deeper plans. It speaks of threatening preparations for a new German offensive on the Yser and in Northern France, and its latest sensation is the announcement of German attempts at landing on the coast of England.

As long as the definite decision has not come to pass at Verdun, it is improbable that a new movement on a large scale will be launched at any other point of the large western front.

At the outbreak of the war Germany set out to force the decision by the bold dash against Paris from the north. At that time the strategy of destruction had developed into recklessness. It had to atone for it with failure.

From Verdun the gate from the east is to be opened for the advance into the interior of France; recklessness has given way to caution.

The number of prisoners taken and guns captured as well as the size and importance of the hostile territory occupied are, viewed from the higher military perspective which comprises the ultimate success, irrelevant. The conclusions which history will deduce from the events before Verdun will culminate in the lesson that, many as have been the surprises of this war, the final decision always falls upon the battlefield, in open field battles such as that of Verdun.

There, at Verdun, men are fighting men, as in the ancient epics. There the proof will be furnished that the bullets of iron and steel after all shoot straighter and safer than those of silver; that the sword that is swung is, after all, still more powerful than the pen that writes notes.

Not very far from Verdun lies the great military camp of Chalons. Over Chalons leads the road from Verdun to Paris. The camp rises upon the historic Catalaunic fields on which, in 451, the western Goths defeated King Attila. Legend has it that at the same time there was fought, high in the air, above the field of carnage, a battle of ghosts. Above Verdun, too, the ghosts are fighting today, not only smokelessly, but inaudibly as well. And in this battle of ghosts the prize is peace.

Verdun

H. A. CRUSO in Westminster Gazette

Two faiths there be which lighten earthly ways:
  One overhigh for reason to attain,
A morning star, invisible at noon's blaze,
  A star for which all wanderers are fain,
But the more striven toward the more obscured
  By flickering creeds of fancy, till they cry
"It is not!" so sometimes at even, cured
  Of restless reason, glimpse it ere they die.
The other gemlike, patiently sought out,
  Fashioned in stress, by courage lit, cut fine
From flaw by sharp experience and doubt
  Till man's thought quickens to a flame divine.
This is thy faith, for this thy sons have died;
  For this, great France, we battle by thy side.

War Events From Two Viewpoints

In order that no phase of the truth may be overlooked CURRENT HISTORY offers two expert interpretations of the military events of the month, one written from the German, the other from the American point of view.

[AMERICAN VIEW]

The Month's Military Developments

From April 15 to May 15, 1916

By J. B. W. Gardiner

Formerly Lieutenant Eleventh United States Cavalry

[MAP OF VERDUN ON PAGE 419]

THE dominant features of the month are, first, the capture of Trebizond by the Russians; second, the surrender of General Townshend and his army of British at Kut-el-Amara to the Turks; and, third, the continued fighting in the Verdun sector. I give them in their order of importance as well as in their chronological order, for, as the Russians work their way westward, the movement from the Caucasus is becoming daily more important.

Suddenly and unexpectedly reports reached us that the Russians, forcing the Turkish position along Kara Dere, had taken Trebizond. It seems that they advanced in three columns, with some indefinite connection between them, one clinging close to the seacoast, the other along the road from Erzerum, and the third from Bitlis. The only column, however, which appears to have contributed directly to the capture of Trebizond was that operating along the coast. The Kara Dere was the only defensive line covering the city. The river, rising in the Alps of Pontus, runs from the escarpment of these mountains through a very deep gorge with almost perpendicular sides. So rapid is the descent from the plateau to the Black Sea that its current is really torrential. The eastern bank of the river had been, some time previously, thoroughly strengthened by the Turks, in all probability under the guidance of the German engineer corps. With the Black Sea guarding one flank of this line, and the almost impassable mountains of the Alps of Pontus on the other, it was obviously impossible to turn the position either from the north or the south. The only alternative was a frontal attack, and this is what the Russians made.

Points which can be used as bases of supplies are in this country few and far between, because roads are so few and railroads conspicuous for their absence. There is, therefore, no line by which supplies and ammunition can be sent forward to the various parts of the front, and, indeed, no way by which the bases themselves could be stocked up. It is necessary, therefore, if the Russians hope to continue their advance, that they establish a base which they can readily feed, which base has also means of reaching if not the entire front at least the most important of the three columns. No other point in this part of the theatre of operations answers this need as does Trebizond. The Russian fleet is in absolute and complete control of the Black Sea, and therefore it is a matter of no difficulty to maintain a flow of supplies into any Black Sea port which their land forces control. Moreover, the only passable roads in this whole section have branches running to Trebizond.

With Trebizond firmly in Russian hands, there are few points of importance in Asia Minor that cannot be fed with supplies of all kinds. From the standpoint of the Turks, moreover, Trebizond is for the same reason of equal importance. That port is the main avenue of



ONE RUSSIAN COLUMN HAS TAKEN TREBIZOND AND IS PUSHING WESTWARD TOWARD CONSTANTINOPLE. ANOTHER IS NEAR ERZINGAN, AND A THIRD IS THREATENING DIARBEKR AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY, WHILE A FOURTH HAS JUST FOUGHT ITS WAY ACROSS THE PERSIAN BORDER NORTHEAST OF BAGDAD.

supply upon which all the Turkish forces in that region depend, and it is through that port that all reinforcements in men and material must come. This affects not only those forces between the mountains and the sea, but also the troops in Armenia further south. In holding Trebizond, therefore, the Russians, in the final analysis, command all that maze of eastern mountain country as far south as the plain of Mesopotamia.

The Russian operations must be regarded as having for their immediate object the stretching of a line across Asia Minor from the Gulf of Alexandretta to the Black Sea. Therefore the various Russian successes or reverses must be analyzed with reference to their effect on that purpose. Such a line presupposes the capture also of Erzingan and Diarbekr. It was not, however, until the fall of Trebizond that the occupation of these points and the establishment of the line mentioned became a possibility. Once these places have fallen the railway which leaves the main road from Constantinople to the east at Aleppo will be almost in Russian hands, as they will be but a short distance from Raz-el-Ain, its extreme eastern point. It is but fair to say, however, that the present part of the journey is the most difficult. Now the Russians are in the mountains, a wild tangle which forms almost the entire eastern part of Asia Minor. Once these have been passed they will have the advantage of an advance over the great central plain, which will make the latter stage of the fighting much simpler from the standpoint of terrain.

The Russians are pursuing their advantage with no delay. Their right wing, which has been somewhat to the east of their left and centre, has made great strides through Persia and is now only about 100 miles east of Bagdad. This move, combined with the successes further north, threatens all the Turkish forces that participated in the capture of the British at Kut. It is not known just how extensive this Turkish force is. It is apparent, however, that 100,000 men would be a very conservative estimate. It will be remembered that Townshend had about 9,000 men under him and that the relief force was about 80,000 strong. To oppose these two forces and prevent a junction between them when they were separated by only a few miles necessitated a body of troops at least as large as that stated.

In fact, the situation of this body of Turks is fast becoming precarious. They are dependent entirely on the Tigris and the Euphrates for supplies. The strong British relief force is south and east of them, so that they cannot draw from Persia or from the country between Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. Once Bagdad is reached, the line of the Tigris has been cut, and the line of the Euphrates is only twenty miles away. West of them is the great Syrian Desert, from which, of course, nothing can come. It is beginning to look as if the Russians had stolen a march on the German General Staff, striking in a quarter where they were not expected and going forward at a rate which was not thought possible, thus capturing in an incredibly short time fortified places which the world was certain the Turks could hold, and all this at a time when the Germans had thoroughly involved themselves in an inextricable fashion at Verdun.

The great war will not be decided in Asia Minor. There can be no two ways about that. But the campaign against the Turks may prove the straw that will break the camel's back.

Much stress has been laid on the surrender of the British forces under General Townshend at Kut-el-Amara. As a military proposition it is entirely negligible. Only about 9,000 men surrendered, the rear guard of the British army which started in 1914 from the Gulf of Persia to capture Bagdad and was thrown back at Ctesiphon. It was not a particularly brilliant feat of Turkish arms. The British were hopelessly outnumbered. Its only value to the Teutonic allies is found in the damage it causes British prestige in the Orient. The British, of course, rule over the largest number of Moslems in the world, those in India. If Turkey were strong enough to cause a holy war it might be disastrous. If such a thing were at all probable, however, it would have happened long ago. Instead, there are strong indications that the Moslems in India are more ready to take up arms for England and against their co-religionists than to do the reverse. It is easy to overrate the effect of the British defeat, and this is what is pretty generally being done. All this might be different were the Russians not running loose through Asiatic Turkey. But any danger which the Kut episode might have had to England is more than offset by the fact that today the Russians are at least fifty miles nearer the city of the Caliphs than the British ever were. In the east, then, in spite of British reverses, the fighting during the last month distinctly favors the Allies, and as this article is being written, it seems, from such information as is at hand, that nothing can save Bagdad from falling into Russian hands. Once this happens the entire face of the Mesopotamian operations may change, as it is impossible to estimate the effect on the Moslem world of seeing that city in the hands of the Christians.

Before Verdun the Germans are still continuing what seems to be a useless sacrifice for something of very doubtful value. The German press still speaks of Verdun as the heart of France and the gateway to Paris. Verdun is not in any sense the way to Paris. Had the city fallen in the first days of the attack, as it is now evident the Germans expected it would, the damage to the French would have been considerable. Now no such event is possible. The French are still hard and fast on their main line of defense on the east bank of the river, from which line the heaviest of German attacks do not appear to have sufficient force to move them. On the west bank the French are still several miles in advance of their main line, and the Germans have not as yet been able to make any appreciable dent in the more important of their advance posts.

So sure are the French of their ground that they have yet to make a general sustained counterattack. At certain important positions they have attacked, and, wherever this has been done, have invariably gained what they sought. The month has been marked by this later phase, the offensive of the French in defense of crucial points. It has been particularly noticeable at two points—the Woods of Avocourt and in front of Le Mort Homme. In the former case the Germans had taken a small redoubt near the southern edge of the woods. In the latter case, they had through persistent and expensive attacks taken a series of trenches on the northern and western side of the hill. The French in a few days had recovered the Avocourt redoubt and had thrust the Germans back again to the foot of Le Mort Homme. Seeing this, the Germans replied with another violent assault on Hill 304. The assault showed all the power, all the concentration of heavy artillery fire that had marked the opening days of the battle. The gain was insignificant. There was some, it is true, and they did gain a foothold on the northern slopes. But there they are held fast.

As the battle has developed, it is beginning to appear as a very serious miscalculation of the German General Staff. That they had expected to carry Verdun in the first rush of the battle is most evident. That their failure has upset all their calculations is also evident; for from the way the attack is now shifting from one point to another, marking a failure at each point, it is beginning to appear that the Germans do not know quite what to do. But one thing is certain—that, as matters stand today, the Germans have at least 200,000 men less than they had on Feb. 21, and they have nothing to show for their sacrifice.

[German View]

Military Events of the Month

In a review of the war from April 15 to May 15, chief attention belongs, beside Verdun, to the Mesopotamian Tigris city Kut-el-Amara, the ancient Parthian stronghold which for thousands of years had passed from memory, and which today once again stands in the midst of the flooding life of world-historic development.

As the fighting at Verdun constitutes the last phase of the European war, so does the fate of Kut-el-Amara present a decisive factor in the world war. The capitulation of the British army under General Townshend at the end of April, and the occupation by the Turks of the Tigris city, which lies 400 kilometers to the northwest of the Persian Gulf and 40 kilometers to the southeast of Bagdad, sounds the deathknell to a policy.

The organizer of the victory at Kut-el-Amara, von der Goltz Pasha, Field Marshal of two empires, rejuvenator of the Osmanic Army, was not destined to witness the crowning of his life's work in Turkey; in the City of Bagdad, which served him as general headquarters, he succumbed to illness shortly before the victory came.

The military significance of the fall of Kut-el-Amara overshadows the discontinuance of the Dardanelles campaign. For, after all, that campaign was merely a military adventure and a political accident. The Mesopotamian campaign, on the other hand, represented the straight and logical continuance by war of a centuries-old policy. That British policy was to be guaranteed its extreme and ultimate materialization through the possession of the land of the Euphrates and Tigris. The union jack hoisted over Bagdad would have rammed the doors to the roads leading from the north to the Persian Gulf, which form one of the routes to India. Through the medium of the tracks of the Bagdad Railway Germany proposes to establish the connection with the gulf.

By means of the Bagdad Railway Germany proposes to reach her place in the sun of the Near East. After the fall of Verdun an understanding between Germany and France will be feasible. Kut-el-Amara already has furnished the basis for an understanding between Russia and Germany. Nor will England be able to escape the consequences—military and political—of these two most important events of the war.

The collapse of the French offensive against the Plateau of Douaumont-Vaux, east of the Meuse, and the capture by storm of Hill 304, in the territory west of the river, [this is denied by the French,] have given added weight to the probability that the decision will fall in the latter region. This was predicted even last March by Colonel Repington, the well-known military expert of The London Times. He went so far in his prediction as to foreshadow the evacuation by the French of the entire region east of the Meuse after it had fulfilled its task of serving as a bridgehead, in order that the whole defensive strength might be concentrated upon the territory to the west of the river.

On that bank the German attacking front now runs from south of the Bois d'Avocourt, over Hill 304, then south of Le Mort Homme, to the bank of the Meuse north of Cumières. The next objective of the German attacks is the road Avocourt-Esnes-Chattancourt. The village of Esnes, however, already is the aim of a lively Germany artillery activity. The village, an important intersection of communications, is also connected by a road with Montzéville, to the south. From there a road leads to Donbasle-en-Argonne, which is a station on the Verdun-Paris railway.

For this reason the bombardment of that region has provoked excitement and consternation in Paris, which is met by military critics by pointing to the strength of the second French defense position. The principal points of protection of that defense line are Montzéville, between Hill 310, southward of Esnes, and Hill 272, and the Bois Bourrus. With the latter wood the French line of defense already enters into the immediate province of the fortress proper.

It is on this line that the decision will fall after the still projecting French front between Le Mort Homme and Cumières has been crushed in in the region of the Bois de Courettes. Hill 310, to the south of Esnes, according to the French military critics, embodies the hope in a successful beating off of the German onslaughts. This position has been built out after all rules of modern arts of fortification and with utilization of the lessons of the present war. General Petain, who in the meantime has found a successor in the person of General Nivelle, as a consequence of the costly failure of the offensive movement on the right bank, is said to have personally supervised this construction.

All these hills are densely wooded, and particularly the Forêt de Hesse, the pivotal point of the left flank of the French line, is adapted for the establishment of a defense position because of its impassability and its dense wood. As everywhere around Verdun, the "co-operation" between hills and woods form the brilliant precondition of the French defense.

However, after the positions of the first French line have been gradually crushed in and the region of Esnes has, with Hill 304, lost its last bulwark, the second defense line will scarcely put greater obstacles in the way of the German advance than were presented by the difficult territory to the north of Hill 304.

One must not attach too great a military significance to the German attacks against various positions of the far-extended British front, which now reaches to south of the Somme. This front has been thinned to such a degree by the withdrawal of French forces that even the Australian and New Zealand regiments had to be called upon to fill in. In spite of the weakening of the fronts to the south of the Somme the German operations against the British positions between the Somme and Maricourt, and upward to the La Bassée Canal, are not to be interpreted as preparations for an attempt to break through, but rather as a "feeling out" of the respective fronts for possible thrusts in the future.

The reported plan of a new offensive on the Dvina front by Field Marshal von Hindenburg against the Russians, of which Petrograd tells us, will probably materialize as little as will the reported advance of Bulgarian, German, and Austro-Hungarian troops against the allied positions before Saloniki. During the last month there has not been a single action in the Russian or in the Balkan theatre that could have furnished the slightest relief for the French before Verdun.

The Russians have continued during the last thirty days their operations in the Caucasus and in Persia. After the capture of Erzerum by the Russians, it was predicted that they would now promptly hasten to the aid of the hard-pressed British expeditionary force in Mesopotamia. After the fall of Kut-el-Amara the allied military critics triumphantly prophesied that now the Russians would cut off the Turks from the rear.

However, the principal directions of the Russian advance point southward, to the Persian Gulf, and to the west, to the Mediterranean. Russia's appearance on the Mediterranean would signify a new menace to England. The possession of Armenia includes the control of Western Asia. Erzerum and Erzingan dominate the northern, Kharput and Malatia the central and southern, part of Asia. From Armenia and across Kurdistan the roads lead to Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and Syria. Russia has occupied Kars, has taken Erzerum and Trebizond, and is about to break through to the Mediterranean by way of Kurdistan and Chilicia. The goal is Alexandretta on the Bay of Iscanderum, opposite the British Island of Cyprus. But the way is still long and extremely difficult. The Turkish army still stands protectingly before Erzingan. It has been reinforced through bodies of troops released after the fall of Kut-el-Amara.

The Russians will not get beyond Trebizond, the base of their right wing on the Black Sea. In the centre the Turks have repeatedly assumed the offensive, on the line Baiburt-Manachatun-Kope Mountain. On their left wing, on the Felahie front, the Russians have suffered considerable reverses.

With the military occupation of Ispahan, the second capital of the Persian Empire, Russia had already reached the southern border of its sphere of interests as stipulated through the Russo-British Convention of Aug. 30, 1907, and had approached within 200 miles of the Persian Gulf, the goal of its ambition for the open sea.

The fighting on the Perso-Mesopotamian frontier, which is described as having Bagdad as its objective, and in which the Turks have been driven back by the Russians from Kasri Shirin to Chanykin, 110 and 100 miles, respectively, from Bagdad, are entirely remote from the principal roads leading through Persia to the gulf.

At Kut-el-Amara England has lost a campaign. By way of Erzingan the Russians are striving for the Mediterranean. Through Persia they are seeking a way to the Persian Gulf. Before Verdun the French offensive power has been broken and its defensive power will exhaust itself. The events of the last month, on widely separated roads, are pointing to the final decision and to peace.

THE SUBMARINE CRISIS

Text of American Note to Germany, With Appendix on Sussex Case

The diplomatic correspondence of the United States with Germany on the submarine issue has extended over more than a year, several times threatening a break in the relations of the two countries. President Wilson's first note of protest was sent on Feb. 10, 1915, *just after Germany had declared the waters around England a "war zone." The issue became acute with the note of May* 15, *sent eight days after the destruction of the Lusitania. The documents exchanged in the intervening twelve months will be found in the files of* CURRENT HISTORY. *In our May issue the unsatisfactory German reply regarding the Sussex was presented with data indicating the approach of a grave diplomatic crisis. Herewith we print the four notes in which that crisis was met and its acute stage passed—by the yielding of Germany. President Wilson's historic note of April* 18 *won the desired promise that merchant vessels, "both within and without the area declared a naval war zone shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives unless the ship attempt to escape or offer resistance"; and his supplementary note of May* 8 *rejected absolutely the complicating conditions which Germany had sought to impose. The official documents follow.*

Department of State,
Washington, April 18, 1916.

The Secretary of State to Ambassador Gerard:

You are instructed to deliver to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs a communication reading as follows:

I DID not fail to transmit immediately by telegraph to my Government your Excellency's note of the 10th inst. in regard to certain attacks by German submarines, and particularly in regard to the disastrous explosion which on March 24 last wrecked the French steamship Sussex in the English Channel. I have now the honor to deliver, under instructions from my Government, the following reply to your Excellency:

Information now in the possession of the Government of the United States fully establishes the facts in the case of the Sussex, and the inferences which my Government has drawn from that information it regards as confirmed by the circumstances set forth in your Excellency's note of the 10th inst. On the 24th of March, 1916, at about 2:50 o'clock in the afternoon, the unarmed steamer Sussex, with 325 or more passengers on board, among whom were a number of American citizens, was torpedoed while crossing from Folkestone to Dieppe. The Sussex had never been armed; was a vessel known to be habitually used only for the conveyance of passengers across the English Channel; and was not following the route taken by troop ships or supply ships. About eighty of her passengers, noncombatants of all ages and sexes, including citizens of the United States, were killed or injured.

A careful, detailed, and scrupulously impartial investigation by naval and military officers of the United States has conclusively established the fact that the Sussex was torpedoed without warning or summons to surrender, and that the torpedo by which she was struck was of German manufacture. In the view of the Government of the United States these facts from the first made the conclusion that the torpedo was fired by a German submarine unavoidable. It now considers that conclusion substantiated by the statements of your

Excellency's note. A full statement of the facts upon which the Government of the United States has based its conclusion is inclosed.

The Government of the United States, after having given careful consideration to the note of the Imperial Government of the 10th of April, regrets to state that the impression made upon it by the statements and proposals contained in that note is that the Imperial Government has failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation which has resulted, not alone from the attack on the Sussex, but from the whole method and character of submarine warfare as disclosed by the unrestrained practice of the commanders of German undersea craft during the past twelvemonth and more in the indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations. If the sinking of the Sussex had been an isolated case the Government of the United States might find it possible to hope that the officer who was responsible for that act had willfully violated his orders or had been criminally negligent in taking none of the precautions they prescribed, and that the ends of justice might be satisfied by imposing upon him an adequate punishment, coupled with a formal disavowal of the act and payment of a suitable indemnity by the Imperial Government. But, though the attack upon the Sussex was manifestly indefensible and caused a loss of life so tragical as to make it stand forth as one of the most terrible examples of the inhumanity of submarine warfare as the commanders of German vessels are conducting it, it unhappily does not stand alone.

On the contrary, the Government of the United States is forced by recent events to conclude that it is only one instance, even though one of the most extreme and most distressing instances, of the deliberate method and spirit of indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations which have become more and more unmistakable as the activity of German undersea vessels of war has in recent months been quickened and extended.

The Imperial Government will recall that when, in February, 1915, it announced its intention of treating the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland as embraced within the seat of war and of destroying all merchant ships owned by its enemies that might be found within that zone of danger, and warned all vessels, neutral as well as belligerent, to keep out of the waters thus proscribed or to enter them at their peril, the Government of the United States earnestly protested. It took the position that such a policy could not be pursued without constant gross and palpable violations of the accepted law of nations, particularly if submarine craft were to be employed as its instruments, inasmuch as the rules prescribed by that law, rules founded on the principles of humanity and established for the protection of the lives of noncombatants at sea, could not in the nature of the case be observed by such vessels. It based its protest on the ground that persons of neutral nationality and vessels of neutral ownership would be exposed to extreme and intolerable risks, and that no right to close any part of the high seas could lawfully be asserted by the Imperial Government in the circumstances then existing. The law of nations in these matters, upon which the Government of the United States based that protest, is not of recent origin or founded upon merely arbitrary principles set up by convention. It is based, on the contrary, upon manifest principles of humanity and has long been established with the approval and by the express assent of all civilized nations.

The Imperial Government, notwithstanding, persisted in carrying out the policy announced, expressing the hope that the dangers involved, at any rate to neutral vessels, would be reduced to a minimum by the instructions which it had issued to the commanders of its submarines, and assuring the Government of the United States that it would take every possible precaution both to respect the rights of neutrals and to safeguard the lives of noncombatants.

In pursuance of this policy of submarine warfare against the commerce of its adversaries, thus announced and thus entered upon in despite of the solemn protest of the Government of the United States, the commanders of the Imperial Government's undersea vessels have carried on practices of such ruthless destruction, which have made it more and more evident as the months have gone by that the Imperial Government has found it impracticable to put any such restraints upon them as it had hoped and promised to put. Again and again the Imperial Government has given its solemn assurances to the Government of the United States that at least passenger ships would not be thus dealt with, and yet it has repeatedly permitted its undersea commanders to disregard those assurances with entire impunity. As recently as February last it gave notice that it would regard all armed merchantmen owned by its enemies as part of the armed naval forces of its adversaries and deal with them as with men-of-war, thus, at least by implication, pledging itself to give warning to vessels which were not armed and to accord security of life to their passengers and crews; but even this limitation their submarine commanders have recklessly ignored.

Vessels of neutral ownership, even vessels of neutral ownership bound from neutral port to neutral port, have been destroyed, along with vessels of belligerent ownership, in constantly increasing numbers. Sometimes the merchantmen attacked have been warned and summoned to surrender before being fired on or torpedoed; sometimes their passengers and crews have been vouchsafed the poor security of being allowed to take to the ship's boats before the ship was sent to the bottom. But again and again no warning has been given, no escape even to the ship's boats allowed to those on board. Great liners like the Lusitania and Arabic, and mere passenger boats like the Sussex, have been attacked without a moment's warning, often before they have even become aware that they were in the presence of an armed ship of the enemy, and the lives of noncombatants, passengers and crew, have been destroyed wholesale and in a manner which the Government of the United States cannot but regard as wanton and without the slightest color of justification. No limit of any kind has, in fact, been set to their indiscriminate pursuit and destruction of merchantmen of all kinds and nationalities within the waters which the Imperial Government has chosen to designate as lying within the seat of war. The roll of Americans who have lost their lives upon ships thus attacked and destroyed has grown month by month until the ominous toll has mounted into the hundreds.

The Government of the United States has been very patient. At every stage of this distressing experience of tragedy after tragedy it has sought to be governed by the most thoughtful consideration of the extraordinary circumstances of an unprecedented war and to be guided by sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people and Government of Germany. It has accepted the successive explanations and assurances of the Imperial Government as, of course, given in entire sincerity and good faith, and has hoped, even against hope, that it would prove to be possible for the Imperial Government so to order and control the acts of its naval commanders as to square its policy with the recognized principles of humanity as embodied in the law of nations. It has made every allowance for unprecedented conditions and has been willing to wait until the facts became unmistakable and were susceptible of only one interpretation.

It now owes it to a just regard for its own rights to say to the Imperial Government that that time has come. It has become painfully evident to it that the position which it took at the very outset is inevitable, namely, the use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce, is, of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels employed and the very methods of attack which their employment of course involves, utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred immunities of noncombatants.

If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of

A BATTLE VIEWED FROM A BRITISH BIPLANE



Wonderful View of a German Gas Attack. With Massed German Troops Ready to Rush Forward, and French Shells Bursting Over Them

(© *American Press Association*)

GLIMPSES OF A FRENCH FRONT

"Here Comes a Fokker!"

Dinner on a Cold Day

Using a Periscope

commerce by the use of submarines, without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether. This action the Government of the United States contemplates with the greatest reluctance, but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations. LANSING.

APPENDIX

STATEMENT OF FACTS IN SUSSEX CASE, ACCOMPANYING NOTE TO GERMAN GOVERNMENT OF APRIL 18, 1916.

The French Channel steamer Sussex, employed regularly in passenger service between the ports of Folkestone, England, and Dieppe, France, as it had been for years, (French Foreign Office,) left Folkestone for Dieppe at 1:25 P. M. March 24, 1916, with 325 passengers and a crew of fifty-three men. (Declaration of Captain Mouffet; Rear Admiral Grasset's report.) The passengers, among whom were about twenty-five American citizens, (telegram London Embassy, March 25, and Paris Embassy, March 26 and 28,) were of several nationalities and many of them were women and children and nearly half of them subjects of neutral States. (Report of Commander Sayles and Lieutenant Smith; Rear Admiral Grasset's report.) The Sussex carried no armament, (French Foreign Office report of Commander Sayles and Lieutenant Smith; affidavits of American passengers,) has never been employed as a troopship, and was following a route not used for transporting troops from Great Britain to France. (British Admiralty statement; French Foreign Office.)

The steamer proceeded on its course almost due south after passing Dungeness. (Declaration of Captain Mouffet.) The weather was clear and the sea smooth. (Affidavits of Edna Hale, John H. Hearley, Gertrude W. Warren.)

At 2:50 P. M., when the Sussex was about thirteen miles from Dungeness, (declaration of Captain Mouffet,) the Captain of the vessel, who was on the bridge, saw, about 150 meters from the ship, on the port side, the wake of a torpedo. (Declaration of Captain Mouffet.) It was also seen very clearly by the first officer and the boatswain, who were with the Captain on the bridge. (Report of Rear Admiral Grasset.) Immediately the Captain gave orders to port the helm and stop the starboard engine, (declaration of Captain Mouffet,) the purpose being to swing the vessel to starboard so as to dodge the torpedo by allowing it to pass along the port bow on a line converging with the altered course of the steamer. Before, however, the vessel could be turned far enough to avoid crossing the course of the torpedo, the latter struck the hull at an angle a short distance forward of the bridge, exploded, destroyed the entire forward part of the steamer as far back as the first water-tight bulkhead, carried away the foremast with the wireless antennae, and killed or injured about eighty of the persons on board. (Declaration of Captain Mouffet; report of Rear Admiral Grasset; deposition of Henry S. Beer.) At the time no other vessel was in sight. (Affidavits of Samuel F. Bemis, T. W. Culbertson, John H. Hearley, and others.)

The approach of the torpedo was witnessed by several other persons on the vessel. (Affidavits of Samuel F. Bemis, Henry S. Beer, Gertrude W. Warren.) One of these, an American citizen named Henry S. Beer, was leaning on the port rail, about ten feet behind the bridge and gazing seaward when he saw the approaching torpedo about 100 yards away and exclaimed to his wife and companion: "A torpedo!" Immediately following his exclamation the missile struck the vessel. (Depositions of Henry S. Beer and Mrs. Henry S. Beer.)

In further corroboration of the fact that the Captain saw the torpedo coming toward the vessel is the sworn statement of the engineers on duty that the order to port the helm and to stop the starboard engine was received and obeyed. (Report of Admiral Grasset.) No reasonable explanation can be given for this unusual order other than that the Captain saw something which caused him to change his course sharply to starboard.

In addition to this evidence, which would in itself appear to be conclusive that the agent of destruction was a torpedo, is that of Lieutenant Smith, U. S. N., attached to the American Embassy at Paris, who, accompanied by Major Logan, U. S. A., of the Embassy, went to Boulogne, inspected the hull of the Sussex and personally found beneath the mass of water-soaked débris of the wreck fifteen pieces of metal, which they retained in their possession, as they did not believe the pieces formed part of the vessel. The inspection of the hull disclosed that the vessel was wrecked by an external explosion, the boilers being intact, and that a short distance forward of the bridge was a large dent, showing that the vessel had received a heavy blow, the direction of impact being from abaft the beam along a line at an acute angle with the keel of the vessel. (Report of Lieutenant Smith, cabled April 9.) This evidence coincides with and corroborates the statement that the vessel was swinging to starboard and away from the torpedo when struck.

The pieces of metal which the American officers had collected were compared by Lieutenant Smith, Lieut. Commander Sayles, and Major Logan with mines and plans of mines in possession of the French naval authorities at Boulogne, Rochefort, and Toulon, and British naval authorities at Portsmouth. These officers are positive in their opinion that these pieces of metal were not parts of a mine. (Report of Lieutenant Smith, cabled April 2 and 5.)

Among these fifteen pieces of metal were two screw-bolts showing the effects of an explosion, which were stamped with "K" and "56" on faces of the head of one, and "K" and "58" on faces of the head of the other. On examining German torpedoes in the possession of the French naval authorities at Toulon, and of the English naval authorities at Portsmouth, the American officers found that identical screws with the letter "K" and a number were employed to fasten the "war" head (Kopf) to the air chamber. (Lieutenant Smith's reports, cabled April 2, 5, and 13.)

The screws used in French and English torpedoes have no markings and are of a slightly different size. (Same reports.) Furthermore, the American officers were able by comparison and close examination to positively identify and locate all the remaining pieces of metal as parts of a German torpedo as follows:

Fragment 3, part of inner seat of water relief valve of engine valve.

Fragments 4 and 5, punto bands of engine room casing.

Fragments 6 and 10, inclusive, and 12, parts of engine cylinders.

Fragments 11, 13, 14, 15, parts of steel warhead still bearing the distinctive red paint common to German torpedo warheads. (Report of Lieutenant Smith, cabled April 5.)

In view of these authenticated facts there can be no reasonable doubt but that the Sussex was torpedoed and that the torpedo was of German manufacture. As no vessel was seen by any person on the Sussex, the conclusion is irresistible that the torpedo was launched without warning from a submarine which was submerged at the time of the attack and remained beneath the surface after the explosion.

The conclusion thus reached from the evidence (the affidavits being those of American citizens) collected by the Department of State is substantiated by the statement in the Imperial Government's note of April 10, 1916. According to those statements—

(A) *A German submarine torpedoed a steamer one and one-half miles southeast of Bull Rock Bank.*

Department's Comment—The point of attack is exactly in the course which was taken by the Sussex after passing Dungeness and about one-half mile from the place where the Captain of the Sussex states he was torpedoed.

(B) *The attack took place at 3:55 o'clock P. M., Central European time.*

Department's Comment—3:55 P. M. Central European time would correspond to 2:55 P. M. Western European time. The time of the striking of the torpedo, according to the Captain of the Sussex, and the stopping of the clocks on board the vessel, was 2:50 P. M. Western time.

(C) *The torpedo when it struck caused an explosion which tore away the whole foreship up to the bridge.*

Department's Comment—The forepart of the Sussex was wrecked as far back as the first watertight bulkhead, according to the official reports.

(D) *The German submarine was submerged when the torpedo was launched, and there is no statement that it came to the surface after the attack.*

Department's Comment—The conclusion was reached that the submarine was submerged from the fact that no one on the Sussex saw a submarine, though the weather was fine.

(E) *No warning was given and no attempt was made to give one, since it is not mentioned.*

Department's Comment—The evidence collected shows affirmatively no warning was given.

(F) *A sketch by the submarine commander of the steamer which he torpedoed does not agree with a photograph of the Sussex in The London Graphic.*

Department's Comment—This sketch was apparently made from memory of an observation of the vessel through a periscope. As the only differences noted by the commander, who relied on his memory, were the position of the smokestack and the shape of the stern, it is to be presumed the vessels were similar in other respects.

(G) *No other German submarines on that day attacked steamers in that locality.*

Department's Comment—As no vessel is reported to have been torpedoed without warning by a submerged submarine other than the Sussex, it is beyond question that that vessel was torpedoed by the submarine whose commander's report is relied upon in the note of April 10.

LANSING.

President Wilson's Address to Congress

Joint Session, April 19, 1916

On the day after the foregoing note to Germany had been dispatched the President informed Congress of his action in a noteworthy speech delivered before both houses in joint session. In part his address was necessarily a repetition of the substance of the note. After summarizing the situation Mr. Wilson continued:

IN pursuance of the policy of submarine warfare against the commerce of its adversaries, thus announced and entered upon by the Imperial German Government, despite the solemn protest of this Government, the commanders of German undersea vessels have attacked merchant ships with greater and greater activity, not only upon the high seas surrounding Great Britain and Ireland but wherever they could encounter them, in a way that has grown more and more ruthless, more and more indiscriminate, as the months have gone by, less and less observant of restraints of any kind, and have delivered their attacks without compunction against vessels of every nationality and bound upon every sort of errand. Vessels of neutral ownership, even vessels of neutral ownership bound from neutral port to neutral port, have been destroyed along with vessels of belligerent ownership in constantly increasing numbers. Sometimes the merchantman attacked has been warned and summoned to surrender before being fired on or torpedoed; sometimes passengers or crews have been vouchsafed the poor security of being allowed to take to the ship's boats before she was sent to the bottom. But again and again no warning has been given, no escape even to the ship's boats allowed to those on board. What this Government foresaw must happen has happened. Tragedy has followed tragedy on the seas in such fashion, with such attendant circumstances, as to make it grossly evident that warfare of such a sort, if warfare it be, cannot be carried on without the most palpable violation of the dictates alike of right and of humanity. Whatever the disposition and intention of the Imperial German Government, it has manifestly proved impossible for it to keep such methods of attack upon the commerce of its enemies within the bounds set by either the reason or the heart of mankind.

[After summarizing the facts of Germany's new campaign, announced in February, against armed liners, and recalling typical cases of violation of international law from the Lusitania to the Sussex case, he concluded with these words:]

I have deemed it my duty, therefore, to say to the Imperial German Government that if it is still its purpose to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines, notwithstanding the now demonstrated impossibility of conducting that warfare in accordance with what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue and that unless the Imperial German Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, this Government can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the Government of the German Empire altogether.

This decision I have arrived at with the keenest regret; the possibility of the action contemplated I am sure all thoughtful Americans will look forward to with unaffected reluctance. But we cannot forget that we are in some sort and by the force of circumstances the responsible spokesmen of the rights of humanity, and that we cannot remain silent while those rights seem in process of being swept utterly away in the maelstrom of this terrible war. We owe it to a due regard for our own rights as a nation, to our sense of duty as a representative of the rights of neutrals the world over, and to a just conception of the rights of mankind to take this stand now with the utmost solemnity and firmness.

I have taken it, and taken it in the confidence that it will meet with your approval and support. All sober-minded men must unite in hoping that the Imperial German Government, which has in other circumstances stood as the champion of all that we are now contending for in the interest of humanity, may recognize the justice of our demands and meet them in the spirit in which they are made.

American Memorandum on Armed Merchant Vessels

BY direction of the President a memorandum was prepared during March, 1916, in regard to the status of armed merchant vessels in neutral ports and on the high seas. A week after sending the note of April 18 to Germany this memorandum was made public as a statement of the American Government's attitude on the principles relating to submarines and armed merchantmen in war. The full text of Mr. Lansing's memorandum is given below.

Department of State,
Washington, March 25, 1916.

I.

The status of an armed merchant vessel of a belligerent is to be considered from two points of view: First, from that of a neutral when the vessel enters its ports, and, second, from that of an enemy when the vessel is on the high seas.

First—An armed merchant vessel in neutral ports.

(1) It is necessary for a neutral Government to determine the status of an armed merchant vessel of belligerent nationality which enters its jurisdiction, in order that the Government may protect itself from responsibility for the destruction of life and property by permitting its ports to be used as bases of hostile operations by belligerent warships.

(2) If the vessel carries a commission or orders issued by a belligerent Government and directing it under penalty to conduct aggressive operations, or if it is conclusively shown to have conducted such operations, it should be regarded and treated as a warship.

(3) If sufficient evidence is wanting a neutral Government, in order to safeguard itself from liability for failure to preserve its neutrality may reasonably presume from these facts the status of an armed merchant vessel which frequents its waters. There is no settled rule of international law as to the sufficiency of evidence to establish such a presumption. As a result a neutral Government must decide for itself the sufficiency of the evidence which it requires to determine the character of the vessel. For the guidance of its port officers and other officials a neutral Government may therefore declare a standard of evidence, but such standard may be changed on account of the general conditions of naval warfare or modified on account of the circumstances of a particular case. These changes and modifications may be made at any time during the progress of the war, since the determination of the status of an armed merchant vessel in neutral waters may affect the liability of a neutral Government.

Second—An armed merchant vessel on the high seas.

(1) It is necessary for a belligerent warship to determine the status of an armed merchant vessel of an enemy encountered on the high seas, since the rights of life and property of belligerents and neutrals on board the vessel may be impaired if its status is that of an enemy warship.

(2) The determination of warlike character must rest in no case upon presumption but upon conclusive evidence, because the responsibility for the destruction of life and property depends on the actual facts of the case and cannot be avoided or lessened by a standard of evidence which a belligerent may announce as creating a presumption of hostile character. On the other hand, to safeguard himself from possible liability for unwarranted destruction of life and property the belligerent should, in the absence of conclusive evidence, act on the presumption that an armed merchantman is of peaceful character.

(3) A presumption based solely on the presence of an armament on a merchant vessel of an enemy is not a sufficient reason for a belligerent to declare it to be a warship and proceed to attack it without regard to the rights of the persons on board. Conclusive

evidence of a purpose to use the armament for aggression is essential. Consequently an armament which a neutral Government, seeking to perform its neutral duties, may presume to be intended for aggression, might in fact on the high seas be used solely for protection. A neutral Government has no opportunity to determine the purpose of an armament on a merchant vessel unless there is evidence in the ship's papers or other proof as to its previous use, so that the Government is justified in substituting an arbitrary rule of presumption in arriving at the status of the merchant vessel. On the other hand, a belligerent warship can on the high seas test by actual experience the purpose of an armament on an enemy merchant vessel, and so determine by direct evidence the status of the vessel.

The status of an armed merchant vessel as a warship in neutral waters may be determined, in the absence of documentary proof or conclusive evidence of previous aggressive conduct, by presumption derived from all the circumstances of the case.

The status of such vessel as a warship on the high seas must be determined only upon conclusive evidence of aggressive purpose, in the absence of which it is to be presumed that the vessel has a private and peaceable character, and it should be so treated by an enemy warship.

In brief, a neutral Government may proceed upon the presumption that an armed merchant vessel of belligerent nationality is armed for aggression, while a belligerent should proceed on the presumption that the vessel is armed for protection. Both of these presumptions may be overcome by evidence—the first by secondary or collateral evidence, since the fact to be established is negative in character; the second by primary and direct evidence, since the fact to be established is positive in character.

II.

The character of the evidence upon which the status of an armed merchant vessel of belligerent nationality is to be determined when visiting neutral waters and when traversing the high seas having been stated, it is important to consider the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents as affected by the status of armed merchant vessels in neutral ports and on the high seas.

First—The relations of belligerents and neutrals as affected by the status of armed merchant vessels in neutral ports.

(1) It appears to be the established rule of international law that warships of a belligerent may enter neutral ports and accept limited hospitality there upon condition that they leave, as a rule, within twenty-four hours after their arrival.

(2) Belligerent warships are also entitled to take on fuel once in three months in ports of a neutral country.

(3) As a mode of enforcing these rules, a neutral has the right to cause belligerent warships failing to comply with them, together with their officers and crews, to be interned during the remainder of the war.

(4) Merchantmen of belligerent nationality, armed only for purposes of protection against the enemy, are entitled to enter and leave neutral ports without hindrance in the course of legitimate trade.

(5) Armed merchantmen of belligerent nationality under a commission or orders of their Government to use, under penalty, their armament for aggressive purposes, or merchantmen which, without such commission or orders, have used their armaments for aggressive purposes, are not entitled to the same hospitality in neutral ports as peaceable armed merchantmen.

Second—The relations of belligerents and neutrals as affected by the status of armed merchant vessels on the high seas.

(1) Innocent neutral property on the high seas cannot legally be confiscated, but is subject to inspection by a belligerent. Resistance to inspection removes this immunity and subjects the property to condemnation by a prize court, which is charged with the preservation of the legal rights of the owners of neutral property.

(2) Neutral property engaged in contraband trade, breach of blockade, or unneutral service obtains the character of enemy property and is subject to seizure by a belligerent and condemnation by a prize court.

(3) When hostile and innocent property is mixed, as in the case of a neutral ship carrying a cargo which is entirely or partly contraband, this fact can only be determined by inspection. Such innocent property may be of uncertain character, as it has been frequently held that it is more or less contaminated by association with hostile property. For example, under the Declaration of London, (which, so far as the provisions covering this subject are concerned, has been adopted by all the belligerents,) the presence of a cargo which in bulk or value consists of 50 per cent. contraband articles impresses the ship with enemy character and subjects it to seizure and condemnation by a prize court.

(4) Enemy property, including ships and cargoes, is always subject to seizure and condemnation. Any enemy property taken by a belligerent on the high seas is a total loss to the owners. There is no redress in a prize court. The only means of avoiding loss is by flight or successful resistance. Enemy merchant ships have, therefore, the right to arm for the purpose of self-protection.

(5) A belligerent warship is any vessel which, under commission or orders of its Government imposing penalties or entitling it to prize money, is armed for the purpose of seeking and capturing or destroying enemy property or hostile neutral property on the seas. The size of the vessel, strength of armament, and its defensive or offensive force are immaterial.

(6) A belligerent warship has, incidental

to the right of seizure, the right to visit and search all vessels on the high seas for the purpose of determining the hostile or innocent character of the vessels and their cargoes. If the hostile character of the property is known, however, the belligerent warship may seize the property without exercising the right of visit and search which is solely for the purpose of obtaining knowledge as to the character of the property. The attacking vessel must display its colors before exercising belligerent rights.

(7) When a belligerent warship meets a merchantman on the high seas which is known to be enemy owned and attempts to capture the vessel, the latter may exercise its right of self-protection either by flight or by resistance. The right to capture and the right to prevent capture are recognized as equally justifiable.

(8) The exercise of the right of capture is limited, nevertheless, by certain accepted rules of conduct based on the principles of humanity and regard for innocent property, even if there is definite knowledge that some of the property, cargo, as well as the vessel, is of enemy character. As a character of these limitations, it has become the established practice for warships to give merchant vessels an opportunity to surrender or submit to visit and search before attempting to seize them by force. The observance of this rule of naval warfare tends to prevent the loss of life of noncombatants and the destruction of innocent neutral property which would result from sudden attack.

(9) If, however, before a summons to surrender is given, a merchantman of belligerent nationality, aware of the approach of an enemy warship, uses its armament to keep the enemy at a distance, or after it has been summoned to surrender it resists or flees, the warship may properly exercise force to compel surrender.

(10) If the merchantman finally surrenders, the belligerent warship may release it or take it into custody. In the case of an enemy merchantman it may be sunk, but only if it is impossible to take it into port, and provided always that the persons on board are put in a place of safety. In the case of a neutral merchantman, the right to sink it in any circumstances is doubtful.

(11) A merchantman entitled to exercise the right of self-protection may do so when certain of attack by an enemy warship, otherwise the exercise of the right would be so restricted as to render it ineffectual. There is a distinct difference, however, between the exercise of the right of self-protection and the act of cruising the seas in an armed vessel for the purpose of attacking enemy naval vessels.

(12) In the event that merchant ships of belligerent nationality are armed and under commission or orders to attack in all circumstances certain classes of enemy naval vessels for the purpose of destroying them, and are entitled to receive prize money for such service from their Government, or are liable to a penalty for failure to obey the orders given, such merchant ships lose their status as peaceable merchant ships and are to a limited extent incorporated in the naval forces of their Government, even though it is not their sole occupation to conduct hostile operations.

(13) A vessel engaged intermittently in commerce and under a commission or orders of its Government imposing a penalty, in pursuing and attacking enemy naval craft, possesses a status tainted with a hostile purpose which it cannot throw aside or assume at will. It should, therefore, be considered as an armed public vessel and receive the treatment of a warship by an enemy and by neutrals. Any person taking passage on such a vessel cannot expect immunity other than that accorded persons who are on board a warship. A private vessel, engaged in seeking enemy naval craft, without such a commission or orders from its Government, stands in a relation to the enemy similar to that of a civilian who fires upon the organized military forces of a belligerent, and is entitled to no more considerate treatment.

Germany's Reply, Conceding Reforms in Submarine Warfare

Berlin, May 4, 1916.

The undersigned, on behalf of the Imperial German Government, has the honor to present to his Excellency the Ambassador of the United Sates, Mr. James W. Gerard, the following reply to the note of April 20 regarding the conduct of German submarine warfare.

THE German Government handed over to the proper naval authorities for early investigation the evidence concerning the Sussex, as communicated by the Government of the United States. Judging by the results that the investigation has hitherto yielded, the German Government is alive to the possibility that the ship mentioned in the note of April 10 as having been torpedoed by a German submarine is actually identical with the Sussex.

The German Government begs to reserve further communication on the matter until certain points are ascertained, which are of decisive importance for establishing the facts of the case. Should it turn out that the commander was wrong in assuming the vessel to be a man-of-war, the German Government will not fail to draw the consequence resulting therefrom.

In connection with the case of the Sussex the Government of the United States made a series of statements, the gist of which is the assertion that the incident is to be considered but one instance of a deliberate method of indiscriminate destruction of vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations by German submarine commanders.

The German Government must emphatically repudiate the assertion. The German Government, however, thinks it of little avail to enter into details in the present stage of affairs, more particularly as the Government of the United States omitted to substantiate the assertion by reference to concrete facts.

The German Government will only state that it has imposed far-reaching restraints upon the use of the submarine weapon, solely in consideration of neutrals' interests, in spite of the fact that these restrictions are necessarily of advantage to Germany's enemies. No such consideration has ever been shown neutrals by Great Britain and her allies.

The German submarine forces have had, in fact, orders to conduct the submarine warfare in accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, the sole exception being the conduct of warfare against enemy trade carried on enemy freight ships encountered in the war zone surrounding Great Britain. With regard to these, no assurances have ever been given to the Government of the United States. No such assurances are contained in the declaration of Feb. 8, 1916.

The German Government cannot admit any doubt that these orders were given or are executed in good faith. Errors actually occurred. They can in no kind of warfare be avoided altogether. Allowances must be made in the conduct of naval warfare against an enemy resorting to all kinds of ruses, whether permissible or illicit.

But apart from the possibility of errors, naval warfare, just like warfare on land, implies unavoidable dangers for neutral persons and goods entering the fighting zone. Even in cases where the naval action is confined to ordinary forms of cruiser warfare, neutral persons and goods repeatedly come to grief.

The German Government has repeatedly and explicitly pointed out the dangers from mines that have led to the loss of numerous ships.

The German Government has made several proposals to the Government of the United States in order to reduce to a minimum for American travelers and goods the inherent dangers of naval warfare. Unfortunately the Government of the United States decided not to accept the proposals. Had it accepted, the Government of the United States would have been instrumental in preventing the greater part of the accidents that American citizens have met with in the meantime.

The German Government still stands by its offer to come to an agreement along these lines.

As the German Government repeatedly declared, it cannot dispense with the use of the submarine weapon in the conduct of warfare against enemy trade. The German Government, however, has now decided to make a further concession, adapting methods of submarine war to the interests of neutrals. In reaching its decision the German Government is actuated by considerations which are above the level of the disputed question.

The German Government attaches no less importance to the sacred principles of humanity than the Government of the United States. It again fully takes into account that both Governments for many years co-operated in developing international law in conformity with these principles, the ultimate object of which has always been to confine warfare on sea and land to armed forces of belligerents and safeguard as far as possible noncombatants against the horrors of war.

But although these considerations are of great weight, they alone would not under present circumstances have determined the attitude of the German Government. For in answer to the appeal by the Government of the United States on behalf of the sacred principles of humanity and international law, the German Government must repeat once more, with all emphasis, that it was not the German, but the British, Government which ignored all accepted rules of international law and extended this terrible war to the lives and property of noncombatants, having no regard whatever for the interests and rights of neutrals and noncombatants that through this method of warfare have been severely injured.

In self-defense against the illegal conduct of British warfare, while fighting a bitter struggle for national existence, Germany had to resort to the hard but effective weapon of submarine warfare.

As matters stand, the German Government cannot but reiterate regret that the sentiments of humanity, which the Government of the United States extends with such fervor to the unhappy victims of submarine warfare, are not extended with the same warmth of feeling to many millions of women and children who, according to the avowed intention of the British Government, shall be starved, and who by sufferings shall force the victorious armies of the Central Powers into ignominious capitulation.

The German Government, in agreement with the German people, fails to understand this discrimination, all the more as it has repeatedly and explicitly declared itself ready to use the submarine weapon in strict conformity with the rules of international law as recognized before the outbreak of the war, if Great Britain likewise was ready to adapt the conduct of warfare to these rules.

Several attempts made by the Government of the United States to prevail upon the British Government to act accordingly failed because of flat refusal on the part of the British Government. Moreover, Great Britain again and again has violated international law, surpassing all bounds in outraging neutral rights. The latest measure adopted by Great Britain, declaring German bunker coal contraband and establishing conditions under which English bunker coal alone is supplied to neutrals, is nothing but an unheard-of attempt by way of exaction to force neutral tonnage into the service of British trade war.

The German people knows that the Government of the United States has the power to confine the war to armed forces of the belligerent countries, in the interest of humanity and maintenance of international law. The Government of the United States would have been certain of attaining this end had it been determined to insist, against Great Britain, on the incontrovertible rights to freedom of the seas. But, as matters stand, the German people is under the impression that the Government of the United States, while demanding that Germany, struggling for existence, shall restrain the use of an effective weapon and while making compliance with these demands a condition for maintenance of relations with Germany, confines itself to protests against illegal methods adopted by Germany's enemies. Moreover, the German people knows to what considerable extent its enemies are supplied with all kinds of war material from the United States.

It will, therefore, be understood that the appeal made by the Government of the United States to sentiments of humanity and principles of international law cannot, under the circumstances, meet the same hearty response from the German people which such an appeal otherwise always is certain to find here. If the German Government, nevertheless, is resolved to go to the utmost limit of concessions, it has been guided not alone by the friendship connecting the two great nations for over one hundred years, but also by the thought of the great doom which threatens the entire civilized world should the cruel and sanguinary war be extended and prolonged.

The German Government, conscious of

Germany's strength, twice within the last few months announced before the world its readiness to make peace on a basis safeguarding Germany's vital interests, thus indicating that it is not Germany's fault if peace is still withheld from the nations of Europe. The German Government feels all the more justified in declaring that responsibility could not be borne before the forum of mankind and in history if after twenty-one months of the war's duration the submarine question, under discussion between the German Government and the Government of the United States, were to take a turn seriously threatening maintenance of peace between the two nations.

As far as lies with the German Government, it wishes to prevent things from taking such a course. The German Government, moreover, is prepared to do its utmost to confine operations of the war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents, thereby also insuring the freedom of the seas, a principle upon which the German Government believes, now as before, that it is in agreement with the Government of the United States.

The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the Government of the United States that German naval forces have received the following order:

> In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels, recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared a naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives unless the ship attempt to escape or offer resistance.

But neutrals cannot expect that Germany, forced to fight for existence, shall, for the sake of neutral interests, restrict the use of an effective weapon, if the enemy is permitted to continue to apply at will methods of warfare violating rules of international law. Such a demand would be incompatible with the character of neutrality, and the German Government is convinced that the Government of the United States does not think of making such a demand, knowing that the Government of the United States repeatedly declares that it is determined to restore the principle of freedom of the seas, from whatever quarter it has been violated.

Accordingly, the German Government is confident that in consequence of the new orders issued to the naval forces the Government of the United States will also now consider all impediments removed which may have been in the way of a mutual co-operation toward restoration of the freedom of the seas during the war, as suggested in the note of July 23, 1915, and it does not doubt that the Government of the United States will now demand and insist that the British Government shall forthwith observe the rules of international law universally recognized before the war, as are laid down in the notes presented by the Government of the United States to the British Government Dec. 28, 1914, and Nov. 5, 1915.

Should steps taken by the Government of the United States not attain the object it desires, to have the laws of humanity followed by all belligerent nations, the German Government would then be facing a new situation in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of decision.

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the American Ambassador assurances of highest consideration. VON JAGOW.

Answer by the United States

President Wilson instructed the American Ambassador at Berlin to deliver the following reply to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs:

Washington, May 8, 1916.

THE note of the Imperial German Government under date of May 4, 1916, has received careful consideration by the Government of the United States. It is especially noted, as indicating the purpose of the Imperial Government as to the future, that it "is prepared to do its utmost to confine the operations of the war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents" and that it is determined to impose upon all its commanders at sea the limitations of the recognized rules of international law upon which the Government of the United States has insisted.

Throughout the months which have elapsed since the Imperial Government announced, on Feb. 4, 1915, its submarine policy, now happily abandoned, the Government of the United States has been constantly guided and restrained by motives of friendship in its patient efforts to bring to an amicable settlement the critical questions arising from that policy. Accepting the Imperial Government's declaration of its abandonment of the policy which has so seriously menaced the good relations between the two countries, the Government of the United States will rely upon a scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy of the Imperial Government, such as will remove the principal danger to an interruption of the good relations existing between the United States and Germany.

The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state that it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the Government of the United States and any other belligerent Government, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages in the Imperial Government's note of the fourth instant might appear to be susceptible of that construction. In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and noncombatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative.

LANSING.

A British Reply to Germany's Note

By Lord Robert Cecil

Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs

In behalf of the British Foreign Office the following comment upon certain portions of the German note was made public by Lord Robert Cecil:

THE reply of the German Government to the American note of April 20 respecting submarine warfare is not a communication upon which any general comment can properly be made in this country, as the questions at issue concern the United States and Germany, and any interference by a third party would be presumptuous. Since, however, the German note contains certain misstatements of fact respecting the actions of Great Britain the following observations may not be thought out of place:

The German Government state that

they have, so far as is possible, instituted a far-reaching restraint upon the use of the submarine weapon, solely in consideration of neutral interests and in spite of the fact that these restrictions were necessarily of advantage to Germany's enemies. It is alleged that no such consideration has ever been shown to neutrals by Great Britain and her allies.

Do the facts bear out these assertions? So far as is known, the measures taken by Great Britain against German trade have cost no neutral his life. Great Britain maintains that they are in accord with the principles of international law and is prepared to make good that claim. They can surely compare favorably, so far as consideration to neutrals is concerned, with a policy whose fruits are seen in the tragedies of the Lusitania, the Arabic, and the Sussex.

The Germans maintain that it was owing to the illegal conduct of the British warfare that Germany was forced to resort to her submarine campaign. This is not the first time that the Germans have attempted to justify their submarine warfare on the ground that it is a measure of reprisal against the action of the British Government in cutting off supplies from Germany. The following list of incidents, in chronological order, should suffice to dispose of this plea:

September, 1914.—Dutch vessel Maria, from California for Dublin and Belfast with cargo of grain for the civil population, sunk by the German cruiser Karlsruhe.

Oct. 26, 1914.—The Admiral Ganteaume, with 2,000 unarmed refugees, sunk by a German submarine.

December, 1914.—Admiral von Tirpitz foreshadowed adoption of submarine campaign.

Jan. 27, 1915.—American ship William P. Frye, with wheat from Seattle for Queenstown, sunk by German auxiliary cruiser Kronprinz Wilhelm.

[The William P. Frye was sunk by the Prinz Eitel Friedrich, according to the records.]

Feb. 4, 1915.—Declaration by the German Government of their intention to institute a general submarine blockade of Great Britain and Ireland, with the avowed purpose of cutting off all supplies from these islands. This blockade was put into effect officially Feb. 18, although, as a matter of fact, a merchant ship had been sunk by a German submarine at the end of January.

It was not until March 11, 1915, that the present measures against German trade were put in force by Great Britain. Before the enforcement of those measures the Germans had destroyed cargoes of foodstuffs coming to the civilian population of this country, had declared their intention of instituting a system of submarine outrage, and had actually submarined merchant vessels without warning.

As for their pretended tenderness for noncombatants, their slaughter of old men, children, women, and girls in Belgium and Northern France, not to speak of the unreported proceedings of their honored allies in Armenia, forever prevents them from being heard in such a cause.

The German Government speaks of many millions of women and children who, according to the avowed intention of the British Government, are to be starved and who by their sufferings shall force the victorious armies of the Central Powers into an ignominious capitulation. In this connection it is interesting to remember that at the beginning of last month the German Chancellor made the following remarks in the Reichstag:

> I can understand that in 1915 the enemy would not give up hope of starving Germany, but I cannot understand how cool heads can cling to it after the experience of 1915. Our enemies forget that, thanks to the organizing powers of the whole nation, Germany is equal to the task of the distribution of victuals. Our stocks of bread and grain will not only be sufficient, but will leave an ample reserve with which to commence the new year. We have not run short of anything in the past, nor shall we run short of anything in the future.

There is a curious contradiction between this statement and the present appeal on behalf of starving women and children. However, presuming that the statement of the Chancellor in the Reichstag was untrue, it is interesting to recall the opinions of two former German statesmen, Prince Bismarck and Count Caprivi, as to the right of a belligerent to cut off supplies from the enemy.

In 1885, at the time when his Majesty's Government were discussing with the French Government the question of the right to declare foodstuffs not intended for the military forces to be contraband, Prince Bismarck made the following statement to the Kiel Chamber of Commerce:

> I reply to the Chamber of Commerce that any disadvantage our commercial and carrying interests may suffer by the treatment of rice as contraband of war does not justify our opposing a measure which it has been thought fit to take in carrying on a foreign war. Every war is a calamity which entails evil consequences, not only on the combatants but also on neutrals. The measure in question has for its object the shortening of the war by increasing the difficulties of the enemy, and is a justifiable step in war if impartially enforced against all neutral ships.

In 1892 Count Caprivi made the following remarks in the Reichstag in the course of a discussion respecting the question of international protection for private property at sea:

> A country may be dependent for her food or for her raw products upon her trade. In fact, it may be absolutely necessary to destroy an enemy's trade. The private introduction of provisions into Paris was prohibited during the siege, and in the same way a nation would be justified in preventing the import of food and raw produce.

These older German authorities were right. The truth is, all war is cruel, horrible, but those who have drenched Europe in blood; who scatter death and destruction among combatants and non-combatants by their Zeppelin bombs and submarine torpedoes; who, by their poisoned gas and high explosive shells have maimed, tortured, and slain millions of the best and bravest of their fellow-creatures, are presuming too far on the toleration of mankind when they complain of such a comparatively humane method of warfare as blockade.

Of the German peace overtures, if such they are to be called, I will say little. It was only in last December that their Chancellor declared that we believed it to be in our interests to attribute falsely to them peace proposals. Yet the German Government now say that twice within the last few months Germany has announced before the world her readiness to make peace. Which is the truth?

It may be that the Germans want peace. If so, it is because they fear defeat. It may be only that they want to appear peaceful. For us it matters not. Our attitude, at any rate, is unchanged. We drew the sword unwillingly. We shall sheathe it gladly. But we should be untrue to our trust, we should be betraying civilization if we abandoned our task until we have re-established in Europe the supremacy of law, the sanctity of treaties, and the right of all nations, great and small, to live their lives, to fulfill their destinies, free from the intolerable menace of Prussian militarism.

Germany's Note Admitting the Sinking of the Sussex

In this note, which virtually closes the episode, Germany admits the torpedoing of the Sussex, and offers reparation. The official text, as cabled by Ambassador Gerard, is as follows:

American Embassy,
Berlin, May 8, 1916.

SUPPLEMENTING his note of the 4th instant concerning the conduct of the German submarine warfare, the undersigned has the honor to inform his Excellency, the American Ambassador, Mr. James W. Gerard, that the further investigation made by the German naval authorities concerned in regard to the French steamship Sussex, on the basis of the American material, has been concluded in the meantime. In conformity with the result of this investigation the assumption expressed in the note of the undersigned of the 10th ultimo, that the damage of the Sussex was to be traced back to a cause other than the attack of a German submarine, cannot be maintained.

Such an assumption had to be arrived at with certainty from the material in the possession of the German Government, for itself, and without further knowledge of the circumstances connected with the torpedoing of the Sussex, the more so as apart from the points enumerated in the note of the 10th ultimo the following facts had come to the attention of the Admiralty Staff of the Navy through reliable information: March 24, 1916, approximately at the same time as the Sussex, an auxiliary warship left the port of Folkestone with a large transport of British infantry on board. On the same day a transport steamer was torpedoed in the Channel. A few minutes preceding the explosion on the Sussex she had passed through a mass of ship wreckage, which created the impression that a ship had sunk at that spot shortly before. All these facts justified the conclusion that the only case of torpedoing which could be considered under the circumstances had struck the British war vessel, whereas the Sussex had met with an accident in some other way.

However, on the basis of the American material, the German Government cannot withhold its conviction that the ship torpedoed by the German submarine is in fact identical with the Sussex, for in accordance with this material the place, the time, and the effect of the explosion by which the Sussex was damaged agree in the essential details with the statement of the German commander, so that there can no longer be any question of the possibility of two independent occurrences. An additional reason is constituted by the fact that officers of the American Navy found fragments of an explosive in the hold of the Sussex which are described by them upon firm grounds as parts of a German torpedo.

Finally, the counterevidence which was deduced in the note of the 10th ultimo from the difference in appearance of the vessel described by the submarine commander and the only reproduction of the Sussex then available has proved to be untenable, inasmuch as according to a photograph of the damaged Sussex now to hand the characteristic distinctions no longer existed at the time of the accident. While the Sussex in the photograph of my (the) Daily Graphic inclosed in the note only carried one mast and also showed the white gangway customary on passenger vessels on the level with the portholes, O. W. S., the reproduction of the damaged Sussex shows a second mast and a uniform dark color, and thus approaches in her outer appearance the description of the vessel as furnished by the submarine commander.

In view of the general impression of all the facts at hand the German Government considers it beyond doubt that the commander of the submarine acted in the bona fide belief that he was facing an enemy warship. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that, misled by the appearance of the vessel, under the pressure of the circumstances, he formed his judgment too hurriedly in establishing her character and did not, therefore, act fully in accordance with the strict instruction which called upon him to exercise particular care.

In view of these circumstances the German Government frankly admits that the assurance given to the American Government, in accordance with which passenger vessels were not to be attacked without warning, has not been adhered to in the present case. As was intimated by the undersigned in the note of the 4th instant, the German Government does not hesitate to draw from this resultant consequences. It therefore expresses to the American Government its sincere regret regarding the deplorable incident and declares its readiness to pay an adequate indemnity to the injured American citizens. It also disapproved of the conduct of the commander, who has been appropriately punished.

Expressing the hope that the American Government will consider the case of the Sussex as settled by these statements, the undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to the Ambassador the assurance of his highest consideration.

VON JAGOW.

A German Medal Celebrating the Torpedoing of the Lusitania

PHOTOGRAPHS of a satirical German medal issued in commemoration of the destruction of the Lusitania have recently reached this country. The medal is engraved and issued in bronze by Karl Goetz of Munich, and is offered for sale all over Europe, being catalogued by a large Amsterdam coin dealer at the price of 7¼ florins. The Numismatist calls the attention of Americans to it with the mild remark that the average collector in this country "will wonder why, considering it from any point of view, it should have been issued."

On the obverse appears the prow of the Lusitania at the moment of sinking, with an aeroplane and a mounted gun, (which the whole world now knows it did not carry.) Above is the inscription, "Keine Bannware," ("No Contraband,") and below "Der Grosse Dampfer Lusitania durch ein deutsches Tauchboot versenkt, 7 Mai, 1915," ("The Great Steamship Lusitania, Sunk by a German Submarine, May 7, 1915.") On the reverse is a figure of Death, in the Cunard Line office, selling tickets to passengers for the fatal journey. The satirical inscription is "Ge-



GERMAN MEDAL OF LUSITANIA DISASTER

schäft über alles," ("Business First.") The medal is cast in bronze, is 2 3-16 inches across, and has a beveled edge.

This treatment of an act which caused the death of 1,198 passengers, of whom 124 were Americans, is commented upon in a two-column article in the Paris Figaro, from which the following is an extract:

"I am not quite sure that the fact of having issued this 'satirical' medal to commemorate and glorify the crime of the German pirates is not something, if not more hideous, at least more ignominious than the crime itself. The German Emperor and his Grand Admiral, von Tirpitz, are malefactors under the common law, the one decorated, the other crowned. They at least run the risk of public malefactors, like a Cartouche or a Mandrin. The submarine officers who fired the murderous torpedo are slaves, gross and brutal, in passive obedience. There is not a marine officer in all the other fleets of the world, the Austrians and Turks excepted, who would not have broken his sword rather than execute so infamous an order.

"But of what mud can that soul be made, if one can call it a soul, which in the guise of an artist sneeringly celebrates that atrocious hecatomb as a victory, and hawks it about for money! And the whole German Nation, which also has glorified the abominable and cowardly crime, and which amuses itself with this abject commemoration! That is what, in the space of half a century, the Hohenzollern dynasty has made of the Germany of Goethe and Kant. If we do not crush the wild beast in its lair, what will become of the rest of the world?



Why Americans Are Pro-Ally

By Booth Tarkington

Popular American Novelist

At the request of an English friend Mr. Tarkington recently wrote this pithy analysis of American war sentiment for the information of the British public.

ALL normal and educated Americans have been from the beginning, and now are, "pro-ally." There are no exceptions. A few "prominent citizens"—not a dozen, all told—have been entertained and personally enlightened by the Kaiser, or by his close adherents, and are "pro-Germans"; but that sort of enlightenment is, of course, destructive to education, and these troubled gentlemen have had no visible influence, though one hears that two or three of them have been able to convert their wives to the German view. There are also, here and there, a few "pro-German" oddities, quirk-brained persons and tender-hearted souls, who are "for Germany" because everybody else is cursing Germany. They are of no consequence and may fairly be classed as not normal.

BOOTH TARKINGTON

It should be understood, of course, that the educated "German-American" is not an educated American. The "German-Americans" are becoming consistent lately: they advocate the hyphen for all persons dwelling within the United States; they would not forbid even Colonel Roosevelt to be known as a Dutch-English-German-American, though the Colonel himself appears to be sluggish in claiming his rights in the matter. We may dismiss the "German-Americans" from this consideration, not without compassion: they are human and they are sweating blood.

Officials are all neutral. They are neutral because the United States is officially neutral. Politicians, for the greater part, affect to be neutral. That is because they are politicians and wish to offend nobody. The end will be, of course, that as feeling grows higher they will offend everybody. Neutrality always offends everybody.

Almost all of the newspapers are "pro-ally," though numbers of them pose as neutral. But you may accept it as the fact that all officials and politicians and editors who are educated Americans are actually "pro-ally." The "great mass of the proletariat" are vaguely "pro-ally," but more definitely, as about everything, pro-nothing. They do not know that the war affects them, and they do not think about it.

The American is "pro-ally," but not because he is characteristically of English descent. Characteristically he doesn't know his descent. He sometimes guesses at it, idly, concluding, if his name be Baker, or Knight, or Thompson, that his ancestors may have been English—he doesn't care. Nor does he regard England as the "Mother Country"; nor is that saying much in his mind: "Blood is thicker than water." He is not "pro-ally" out of sympathy. Who thinks he is fails to understand the American. The American is pro-Belgian out of sympathy; and he is anti-Teuton, in the Belgian matter, out of indignation; but he is "pro-ally" because history is "pro-ally."

We were the onlookers from the beginning, and we saw that Germans made the war. We saw that the German Nation went into the war with a patriotic stupidity, magnificent and horrible; that the German Nation was wholly in the grip of a herd instinct which had been used by manipulators; and that these manipulators, having made the Germans into a loyal, warlike tribe, brought on the war in the approved manner employed by all war chiefs desiring a war. Their unblemished hypocrisy was of an old, old model always employed by war chiefs—and absolutely obvious to any mind not under the sway of herd instinct.

The Germans saw what had happened here. They understood that an impartial national mind had judged them; so they naturally organized a stupendous campaign attacking our judgment. For their purpose, their propaganda accomplished precisely nothing.

* * * Now, this is the American mind; this is how the American thinks of the war: "The German Nation has been revealed as a warlike tribe, wonderful in that capacity, but not to be thought civilized merely because it uses typewriters. Its will is the will of its chieftains and its credulity is theirs to use as they choose. The chieftains, for their own greater power and greater glory, as they, in their barbaric way, conceive glory, and for the expansion and increased riches of the tribe under their control, made this war. They forced it at a chosen time—as they forced the last three wars which they have made. They then began operations with a crime which would dishonor a civilized nation but which a barbaric tribe would consider creditable. Their descendants, who will probably become civilized in the course of time, will be dishonored by this crime, but the barbarians who committed it will naturally never comprehend the shame of it.

"England came into the war for good reasons, whether those reasons were to protect herself, or because the violation of Belgium demanded it. The latter motive is the finer, but the former is sufficient. Probably both motives operated together, strengthened by a promise to aid France—a good promise. My birdseye view is of an England fighting to make a predatory tribe learn to keep the peace. And England must win. I am not worried about the freedom of the seas under England: I am worried about freedom anywhere under Germany. There were some sufferers down South wailing about their cotton, and there are others out in pocket and complaining of the high hand of England; and our Government, being neutral, must send bothersome notes to England—the Government is literally bound to do so. These are 'technicalities'; I wish they could be abolished. I do not want England bothered. We have a real note pending with Germany; the Lusitania case is just what it was last May, and we have waited so long that other nations have forgotten that we are only waiting, or they think that our waiting means a pitiable acquiescence. Not yet!

"And about our getting rich through the sale of munitions to the Allies, I am sorry if that sale is what causes our prosperity. It is a horrible way to make money. It is absolutely necessary that we furnish munitions to the Allies, and we shall not tolerate interference with our manufacture and shipping of these munitions, but I wish there were no profit-taking. However, under any circumstances, the Allies must be supplied with munitions—*for they must win!*"

That is the American thought.

Working against the American is something fermented of sloppy materials and waste, stirred and brewed into a gas by the ebullience of these times. The fermentation takes place, where history informs us that many of our fermentations of ignorance, for the last sixty years, have taken place, within the Democratic

Party; its opponent, the Republican Party, specializing, at times, in the fermentations of corruption, until it is forced out of power and into reformation. Mr. Bryan, late Secretary of State, is the witch of the Democratic caldron, and, to drop the figure, he is trying to prevent the President's renomination. Mr. Bryan has often used "mob ignorance" to effect his purposes; but it is generally believed that he is quite sincere, and that upon the frequent occasions when he makes use of mob or Congressional ignorance he is honorably and consistently ignorant himself. He is a man of unsullied conscience; he has never in his life done a thing which he believed to be wrong; and his career reveals a long series of coincidences, in each of which his sincere view of the True and the Right and the Elevating was precisely that which seemed most likely to elevate Mr. Bryan. However, nobody believes him to be a hypocrite; it is felt, merely, that he is incapable of analyzing his own real motives.

He still has power within the Democratic Party, and he has used it to embarrass the President in the latter's dealings with the German Government. Mr. Bryan can now count upon the German-Americans and the pacifists, and also upon a number of personal henchmen. He hopes for a vast addition, contributed by public ignorance, to these forces; he hopes that there will develop a great body of voters to whom international law and all foreign relations mean nothing; who are unaware that they dwell upon a round world; who are indifferent to the outcome of the war—in brief, who have never beheld the sea and would riot to keep from having to fight for some incomprehensible nonsense about submarine boats. So far, however, this body of reserves for Mr. Bryan and his rather nauseating Congressmen—and the German-Americans and pacifists—has not developed. In our belief it will not be at all formidable.

Except for an army or navy man, here and there, it is the fact that in August, 1914, almost all Americans thought that there would be no more great wars. Now we think of little except preparation for our own defense. Defense against whom? Who was it that so utterly changed our minds? Not England. Not France. Not Russia. There is not a sane American who thinks of England or France or Russia or Italy when he thinks of "preparedness." And "preparedness" is in either the foreground or the background of every American mind continually. Shall we fight without "preparedness"? We still hope for honorable peace, whether we are prepared or not prepared for war, but the American answer to the question just asked is, "Yes, if we have to!" England, whom we fought twice when we were unprepared, need not doubt it.

Colonel Watterson on German Hopes

Colonel Henry Watterson, once an officer in the Confederate Army, now the dean of American journalism, writes in The Louisville Courier-Journal:

God bless the noble, patient, puissant, helpless people of Germany. As mistaken as the noble, patient, puissant people of the Confederacy, they have fought and are fighting as wondrous, as inflexible, and as futile a battle. There can be but one end of it. If the world is not again to sink into the Dark Ages, if another fall from civilization into barbarism be not before us, the gigantic, bloodthirsty, savage dominion of Prussian militarism must be as completely dissolved as the armies of the South in the great war of sections in America were dissolved. In the one case republican government went with the armies of the Union; on the other hand, civilization and Christianity. If the Confederacy had won, democracy had been proved a failure. If Prussia could win, the world were lost.

The Best Way to Enforce Peace

WRITTEN FOR CURRENT HISTORY

By John Cadwalader, Jr.

THREE contingencies as to the outcome of the European war present themselves: (1) A complete victory for Germany, (2) a complete victory for the Allies, or (3) a draw in which Germany's fleet and army remain intact. It is, of course, probable that a complete victory for the Allies will leave us free from all immediate danger of foreign attack. But there is still Mexico as a plague spot, and there is small chance, if one of the foreign belligerents—say, France, Italy, Russia, or Japan—thought its citizens in danger there, and their rights ignored, that the aggrieved nation would not feel amply justified in intervening to protect them. Once having intervened it would find it very difficult to let go. This Government in such case would be obliged to interfere.

The Monroe Doctrine is a standing insult to every nation except one, and just because we have for 100 years pursued what seems to most of the world a "dog in the manger" policy we cannot tamely relinquish it without forfeiting all respect. It has been treated by our statesmen, and in the main rightly so, as not only an altruistic principle of protection to our weaker neighbors, but as also a measure of self-defense essential to the free development of America's twin offspring, liberty and democracy.

Words cannot describe what would inevitably happen to this country in the event of a German victory. We have been given undoubted proof that "live and let live" is no part of Germany's scheme. Her aims are purely selfish, and she will carry those aims to the logical extreme. Covetousness in Germany is a virtue, and if there is any portion of America that Germany covets she will seize it when the time is ripe, or if perchance she believes, as she truly does, that she could administer our Government far better than we can ourselves, she will unquestionably lay her plans, not in a hurry, but very carefully and systematically, to take it from us.

The consequences to us in the event of a draw in the European war are almost equally serious. In that case, assuming that Germany retains her fleet and her army, and is deprived of any possibility of expansion in Africa or Asia, what more certain than that she will look toward Mexico or South America to make up her losses? Popular writers have suggested the further possibility of an immediate descent on our unprotected coasts and the collection of an indemnity from the cities of the eastern seaboard sufficient to pay all the expenses of her war. As it now seems likely that Congress will do something in the way of preparedness to block this scheme, it is more probable that the attack will be made indirectly on Central or South America, giving Germany a much better chance to establish herself there firmly before we could exert any considerable pressure against her.

Optimists and pacifists, of course, say that these are mere bogies of the imagination, because Germany will be too exhausted after the war, even should it end in an even draw, to think of beginning another; but the teaching of history is against this "flattering unction." What aggressive nation has ever stopped fighting because it had enough? The lust for conquest grows by feeding on itself, and the people at home that blindly follow such a government must be kept fed up on more and more conquests, lest they turn their attention to home problems and to the question, "What good came of it at last?"

But apart from all other possibilities, fraught with danger as they are to the richest and the most unprepared nation on earth, does not the bare possibility of a German victory stiffen the limbs and freeze the blood of every true

American? The triumph of the most ruthless aggressor, fortified with the most devilish instruments of science and with the most indefatigable determination to pursue his ends regardless of the rights of any living thing; cynical and indifferent to law, religion, and humanity—can such an event be contemplated and not arouse all our manhood to instant action?

The law, whether it be national or international, is made for the protection of the weak; but, as the German leaders of thought have said again and again, the weak have no place in the scheme of things when it comes to their interfering with the strong. Religion, unless it be the worship of Thor and Odin, the gods of Thunder and of Battles, is the product of weak minds, and Christianity especially is a confession of failure.

Humanity, or what is left of it since the German began his assaults, makes no appeal to men whose one thought is to devise some new form of frightfulness; but what is left of it—and this the German knows and gloats on—has still the capacity to suffer, and the limit of its capacity for this at least is not in sight.

Whither, therefore, does our argument lead? We have two contingencies, one dangerous, the other more so, and we have a third contingency, the possibility of which should make us tremble for all that is dear to us and all that is sacred in life.

Let us for a moment conceive what would have happened to us if England had not throughout the war controlled the seas. If Germany had been in complete control as England has been we should have been her vassal. Trade with the Allies would have been altogether stopped, and trade with neutrals only permitted so far as it did not interfere with Germany's plans.

This, of course, is the least that we might have suffered, inasmuch as Germany believes in exercising her power to the fullest extent, and having the power to seize and hold for ransom any or all of our sea coast cities, she would have done it without hesitation or scruple.

But supposing that England and Germany had been more evenly matched on the ocean, so that neither could be said to have control; our position would have been well-nigh as perilous, and our commerce at the mercy of both belligerents.

Granted that our trade has been diverted to English harbors, and that we have suffered vexatious delays and hindrances as the result of England's blockade or quasi-blockade of Germany, at least she has not sunk our ships nor massacred passengers and crews. Until this war began such practices were reserved for pirates, and it was not considered possible that the lives of noncombatants at sea could be endangered by any power that called itself civilized. The record of the Confederate navy in our civil war was a model in this respect.

Ample justification existed for our Government to declare in the cause of humanity as well as in its own self-interest that the torpedoing or sinking of passenger or merchant vessels by submarines in view of the unavoidable danger to lives was absolutely violative of the spirit of international law, and thus by one bold stroke we should have made the freedom of the seas a reality. The Constitution gives to Congress the power "to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations," and we have asserted the power to override rights that were generally recognized by international law, as, e. g., when we declared by special statute the slave trade to be piracy, although previously sustained on general principles by the Supreme Court in the case of the Antelope, 10 Wheat., 66.

What more glorious edict, the equivalent of a worldwide emancipation proclamation, than an act of Congress proclaiming to the world that this country would punish as felons and pirates all those who took the lives of noncombatants at sea by submarine attack, whether those noncombatants were enemies or neutrals!

But, alas, we have permitted the piratical practice to continue, and the ruthless aggressor has grown more ruthless as the desperation of his case grows ever greater.

The remedy, and the only remedy, that will "provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity" is a union, alliance, or diplomatic understanding between all English-speaking peoples for the policing of the seas. With England, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, the freest and most democratic Commonwealths of the world, united with us in such a way that each is bound to help the other against any power that endangers the lives of noncombatants at sea, there need be no fear that international law may become the sport of any ambitious power.

Dr. Eliot argues earnestly and ably for an offensive and defensive alliance of England, France, and America, with others to follow, for the freedom of the seas.

It is better, it seems to the writer, to describe it as a treaty for the policing of the seas, which is at all times a matter of vital interest to ourselves and not less so to England and her colonies, and which would not involve us in a departure from our traditional policy of isolation in matters relating to European politics. Furthermore, with such policing guaranteed by an overwhelming combination sufficient to paralyze the trade of any two powers who sought to oppose it, no matter what offensive strength they might develop on land, the way of the transgressor would be hard, indeed.

If we should feel that Anglo-Saxon character and civilization were not sufficient guarantee against the use of such power at all times for improper ends, it would be easy to provide that if any one of the constituent powers were guilty of piratical acts the remaining members of the league should be absolved and free to adopt measures of repression against it.

What more simple, complete, and effective league to enforce peace could be devised? Simple, because the peoples involved are already one in spirit and in aspiration; complete, because our race has its young and virile democracies growing up in every section of the globe; effective, because the sea, our own element, is the greatest medium of civilization and of bringing together the scattered elements of the human race.

Thus we come back to the ideal with which liberalism started—that the world must draw closer together, else it fall asunder altogether—but a liberalism based on the protection of the law and of that strongest bond to draw all nations to observe the law, the majesty of a truly majestic Anglo-Saxon fleet.

The problem would no longer be "The Influence of Sea Power on History," but "The Maintenance by Sea Power of the Liberties and Rights of all Mankind."

The argument for an immediate denunciation of the attacks on noncombatants at sea seems unanswerable. If this nation feels that Germany's submarine war is opposed to every principle of humanity as well as to the spirit if not the letter of international law, now is the time to say so. By waiting till the war is over, the practices that we abhor become precedents for the next war. Furthermore, what faith will England put in any of our high professions if we show a continued unwillingness to maintain our principles at any sacrifice?

The country is moving toward the assertion of protection for noncombatants at sea, as the recent vote in Congress shows. That there were any Senators or Representatives willing to abandon our citizens to their fate by warning them not to travel on armed merchantmen is a deplorable fact. But that the great majority stood up for human rights against the clamor of the commercial interests, the pacifists, and the German corruptionists offers great hope for the future. If submarine warfare is limited to its proper sphere, viz., operations against ships of war, there will be small temptation for any naval power to attempt any future campaign of frightfulness.

The destruction of the enemy's commerce is the chief purpose of naval warfare, and it has in the opinion of the ablest thinkers been the deciding factor in most wars. Can we not confidently expect that if America takes her stand against the barbarous practices of submarine warfare it will be a great factor in ending not only the present awful struggle, but also all future projects for world dominion by " blood and iron "?

The plan proposed, so far as the writer is aware, presents no legal or constitutional difficulty. An agreement for the policing of the seas may require the use of force to suppress acts which the high contracting parties define as piracy and, therefore, may of course lead to war. That act, however, which would in fact be the declaration of war in such case, would be the act of a foreign power. A state of war would, therefore, exist without a declaration by Congress and without any usurpation of such authority by the President.

The honor of the country is placed ultimately in the hands of Congress, which could, if it saw fit, refuse to provide for the common defense even in case of invasion, just as it has the power to abrogate any treaty that has been entered into and so to violate our plighted faith. But just as it has never refused to vote appropriations to foreign powers in treaties made by the President and ratified by the Senate, although the House has often shown a stubborn spirit, so it is not conceivable that a treaty of the sort herein advocated, when duly ratified by the Senate, would not receive the fullest support from our direct Representatives, just as from that great, crude, uncouth, but withal simple and generous-minded mass of humanity that we call the American people.

We must have faith in that better side of our national character and not expose to foreign view that very raw side of one type of American

"That bids him flout the law he makes;
That bids him make the law he flouts;
Till, crazed by many doubts, he wakes
The drumming guns that have no doubts."

PHILADELPHIA, Penn.

If Great Britain Had Remained Neutral

By Dr. BERNHARD DERNBURG

In concluding a long article in the Berliner Tageblatt on the economic consequences of the war to Great Britain, Dr. Dernburg, at one time the Kaiser's confidential envoy in the United States, declared:

If England had remained neutral, not taken a hand in the Austro-Serbian row, and not encouraged Russia to take part in it, she would not only have saved the fourth of her national wealth, which this war is, directly and indirectly, costing her, but she would have been able to attain a position like that of the United States, which in the year 1915 had an excess of exports amounting to 7,800,000,000 marks, ($1,950,000,000,) a sum which must be paid to her by foreign nations, either in gold or its equivalent. The conclusion to be drawn from this exposition is that it is impossible for even the richest country of the world to maintain its trade, industry, and commerce intact, lend enormous sums to its allies in cash and still larger amounts in munitions and services, and at the same time maintain the biggest navy and a mighty army—the British enlistments have exceeded 3,800,000 men—and that, consequently, it is extremely improbable that after the close of this struggle England will possess any economic preponderancy over Germany or be able to attain such a position.

The Two Gorgon Heads

By Pierre Loti

Member of the French Academy

[Translated for Current History from Le Figaro]

"I begin by taking. Afterward I can always find learned men to demonstrate that it was my good right."—Frederick II. (whom, for lack of a better, they call the Great.)

I.

THEIR KAISER

HIS is one of those accursed faces upon which, with age, emerge all the horror and all the night that lurked in the bottom of the soul. The features at times are not ignoble, no, but on such faces something has been inscribed that is a thousand times worse than ugliness, and one cannot look at them. * * * Thus it is with their Kaiser. To freeze you, his sinister likeness, the least of his portraits glimpsed in a newspaper, is sufficient. Oh! that viperine eye, ambushed under flabby eyelids, that smile twisted by all his inner defects; skilled hypocrisy, unhealthy brutality, cold ferocity, without counting that excess of arrogance, in whose presence inanimate whips start up and begin lashing!

PIERRE LOTI

I once saw, at the back of an old temple in Japan, a hideous image which was regarded as a masterpiece of its kind, and which had been kept for ages under a veil in one of the treasure boxes. (You know the veneration of the Japanese for demon images, and the mastery of their artists in the horrible.) It was a human mask, with rather regular and refined features, but when you had looked at it well its atrocious expression, at once cruel and dead, pursued you for days and nights. In the midst of the corpselike flesh and pallid wrinkles its two eyes, half closed, the one more than the other, glittered and seemed to wink, as if to say, "For a long time, in my box, I have been pondering something frightful for you, and at last you have come, and I have you, and here it is!"

Well, for any one who knows how to see, the face of their Kaiser is as frightful as that one hidden in the old temple yonder, whatever may be the fashion of the helmet, with point or with death's head, in which he may fancy to deck himself. Through all the years that the dreadful look of that man has pursued me I have had a presentiment, like the rest of the world, that he was "pondering something for us," but also that it would be diabolically worked out, and more frightful than all the old crimes of the barbaric ages. And I said to myself that for the safety of humanity that thing ought to be killed!

Kill it, yes! Strike down the hyena! It should have been done before its latent rage was fully in evidence—or at least it should have been chained, muzzled, imprisoned behind closed and solid bars!

Their Kaiser, their unnamable and proteiform Kaiser: every time that you imagine you have said all there is to say about him he confounds you with something new which one would never have foreseen. After his almost stupid obstinacy in trying to represent his Germany as the attacked victim, in face of the most blinding evidence, the most formal written proofs, and the most crushing confessions of his accomplices, has he not of late felt the need of " swearing before God " that his conscience was pure and that he had not desired war! Before what God? Before his own, naturally; before " his old God," whom in private he must surely call " My old Beelzebub! " What elegance, too, in that epithet " old " applied to such a name!

It seems that their Kaiser has received from his old Beelzebub, besides the mission of spreading over the earth the greatest amount of mourning, of causing the most blood and tears to flow, also the other mission of hunting down every beauty, every religious remembrance, in order to profane all, to soil everything, and to render ugly all that he could not destroy. He has succeeded even in dishonoring science, in degrading it to the rôle of accomplice to his crimes.

And not only will this war of his own making—this war which he had willed with so much infernal premeditation—be a thousand times more destructive of human lives than all past wars put together, but he and his set must needs wreak their rage upon all those treasures of art which should have been the inviolable patrimony of civilized Europe. And if ever he had been able to become the absolute master which his vanity of a sick man dreamed of being, it would no longer have been by explosives and scrap iron that he would have succeeded in destroying everything, but by the incurable bad taste of his Germany. It is enough to have visited Berlin, capital of the crude, the gilt, the parvenu, in order to imagine what would have become of our cities. And one shudders also to think of the swift and final downfall of the wonderful Orient, with Stamboul, Damascus, Bagdad, on the day when he shall be the one to make the laws there.

Their Kaiser, whose look has death in it, baffles reason and common sense. The morbid degeneracy of his brain is incontestible, yet in certain lines it is superiorily organized for evil, and is specialized in killing. For the honor of humanity let us agree that he is mad, as a certain Prince of Saxony has just declared. Granted, he is mad; in any country but Germany his war would have brought him a straitjacket in a dungeon. But, to the misfortune of Europe, his birth has made him Kaiser of the only people capable of accepting and following him—a people " cruel by nature, whom civilization has rendered ferocious," as Goethe says—and a people whose stupidity is infinite, as Schopenhauer confessed in his solemn testament.

In this " infinite stupidity " he himself shares at certain points; otherwise, would he have fumbled so irremediably his first move in 1914, through having imagined, up to the last minute, that England would not budge, even in the presence of the great sacrifice of Belgium? And is there not at least as much stupidity as ferocity in his massacres of civilians, his plots in America, his Zeppelins, poison gas, and the rest, all things of which he is personally the odious instigator, and which have succeeded only in accumulating against him and his Germany all the hatreds and disgusts in the world?

At the end of forty years of desperate preparation, with means so formidable, that he should recoil at no method however atrocious or vile, that he should care naught for any human law, any human pity, any conscience; that he should wallow thus in blood only to end in a fiasco—no, truly, something essential is lacking in the head of that assassin! And one must be the German people in order to go on allowing one's self to be led to destruction by such an unbalanced knave.

Destruction and barbarism! And will there be no limit to the sheeplike submission of those people, who, at the present moment, are getting themselves slaughtered like cattle in charges conducted with an imbecile rage by a microcephalic youth as devoid of intelligence as he is of soul?

II.

FERDINAND OF COBURG

Tsar of Bulgaria

To find a being more abominable than their Kaiser and their Crown Prince would at one time have seemed an impossible wager, but the wager has been accepted and won; this Coburg has been found!

And when one recalls that he had stirred the enthusiasm, in his hour, of most of our French women! About 1913, when I alone was beginning to nail him to the pillory, they were exalting his name and wearing his colors. A paladin of the cross, he was called. Oh! a free paladin, indeed, carrying a scapulary and saturated with masses after the style of Louis XI., but a man who, one fine morning, when the Queen could not see him, had forced his son to apostatize. It is known, besides, that he is now preparing for us the comedy of a reconversion to Catholicism, which he had formerly abjured for political reasons—and he will find priests yonder to bless that operation with serious faces.

A Gorgon's head is this other, too, his face marked likewise with the stigmata of knavery and crime. The first time that I encountered the furtive glance of his too-little eyes—it was twenty-five years ago at Sofia—I felt passing through my nerves that shudder of disgust by which instinct warns one of the approach of a monster. And I asked, "Who is that vampire?"

In a low and frightened voice some one replied, "Why, that is our Prince; you ought to salute him!"

"No! The idea!"

A cowardly assassin in his private life, but an assassin at a distance, he was wont to pass prudently beyond the frontier whenever his executor of high commissions had "work" to do under his orders; and then, when this hangman threatened to compromise him too much, he would have the official's hands cut off, (Panitza, Stambouloff, &c.)

And this man, like the other, *prays!* When it was hoped recently that the great accomplice was about to die of the hereditary vices in his blood, he knelt for a long time between two rows of Germans summoned as spectators, to ask Heaven for the invalid's recovery—a monster praying for a monster; and then he rose, all steeped in grace divine, to say to the bystanders: "Never before have I prayed with such fervor!" Could even the thick-headed Boches, for whom this play-acting was intended, resist the impulse to mad laughter?

Assassin likewise in political life—assassin of nations! After his first enormous crime against the Serbs, his allies then, whom he had knifed in the back without a declaration of war, he attempted, as you may remember, to throw the crime back upon his Ministers when it turned out badly. And against this same heroic people, already crushed by barbarian hordes, he has just renewed—without warning, as always—his traitorous blow: the sort of oily cut-throat that would come up behind and finish off a man already in the grip of a band of highwaymen. If the alliance of Germany with Turkey did not of itself reach the point where it was necessary to compass the "suicide" of the heir apparent, it has done so in the case of Bulgaria. Their Kaiser and this Coburg, a diminutive copy of him, must have a fatal understanding with each other; one might have guessed as much merely from comparing the two faces, the two looks of beasts of the night. How comes it, then, that our diplomats at the little Court of Sofia did not suspect twenty months sooner that the brigand pact was signed in the shadow? And today, behold these two united to the point of half devouring each other, these two repulsive creatures in whose presence the most degraded criminals who drag the bullet in convict prisons seem to have committed only innocent peccadillos!

III.

THE NEUTRALS

Wake up, then, you small or large neutral countries, who do not yet realize that without us it would have been your turn to be stamped upon like Belgium, like Serbia and Montenegro! The world can breathe only after the complete crushing of these last of the barbarians; how have you failed to feel it? What do you need to open your eyes? If it is not enough to see all our ruins—intentional and needless ruins—to read the many irrefutable attestations of enraged murders, not sparing even our smallest infants, if all that is not enough, then at least look among yourselves, look at the insolent irony of the pressures which the people of prey make you endure, or look at all the attacks, bold and secret, already committed on the other side of the ocean!

Or, again, if you are absolutely unable any longer to see what is happening around you, at least glance through what their intellectuals, their "great men," have written for centuries; on every page you will be frightened to find the most barefaced apologies for violence, rapine, and crime. Thus you will discover that all the horror overwhelming Europe today has existed in germ in the Teutonic brain from the very beginning, and that no other race in the world would have dared to denounce itself with so much cynical nonchalance.

And you, prelates or monks of a neighborhood clergy, who reproach us for being irreligious, and who make for our enemies the blindest of propaganda, pray leaf over a little the official manifesto of the Bishops of Belgium, and tell us what kind of a soul those people have who all the time profane the name of the Most High in their burlesque prayers, and then run amuck against all the sanctuaries of the faith, cathedrals or humble village churches, overthrowing crucifixes and killing priests!

Unless one belongs to their cursed race is it logically possible to be pro-German? One may be neutral, I know, but only through terror, or because one is unprepared, or perhaps, without knowing it, because of the allurement of a certain momentary profit, or because of a little unrealized and short-lived egotism. It is terrible, of course, to throw one's self into such a struggle; but neutrality or even hesitation is becoming more than a dangerous mistake, and has already become almost a crime.

An insane villain had dreamed of dragging us all back twenty centuries to the old degrading servitudes and the old darknesses; he was plotting to realize for his own profit a vast bankruptcy of progress, of liberty, of human thought, and in his plans of an insatiable ogre it was you, neutral peoples, you who were marked next for attack. At least help us a little, so that this may end more quickly, this orgy of theft, of destruction, of massacre, of showering the earth with blood. Enough! Let us get out of this nightmare! Enough! Let all the world arise! Will not he who holds his hand today be ashamed afterward to keep his place in the sun of victory and peace which shall shine on us again? And we, when at last we shall have beaten down the mad hyena, losing our blood in streams, shall we not be almost in the right to say, with our arms still in our hands: "You neutrals, who will profit from the deliverance without having taken part in the struggle, at least pay us a little with your lands and your gold!"

Oh, let the tocsin sound in all directions, regardless of boundaries, from one end of the earth to the other; let it sound the supreme alarm; let the drums of all earth's armies beat the charge! And have at the German Beast!

Why Europe Was Deceived

By Guglielmo Ferrero

Italy's Foremost Living Historian

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY from Le Temps of Paris]

THERE is no denying that during the ten years that preceded the European war Germany had risen greatly in the opinion of the world, while France had fallen. Everywhere the Germanophile movement was gaining ground irresistibly. More and more all classes, professions, and parties in Europe and America agreed in regarding Germany as a model. The industry, commerce, banking, science, schools, army, merchant marine, navy, and many social institutions of Germany were the objects of growing admiration in all the world.

One scarcely dared to remark that the diplomacy of the powerful empire was sometimes maladroit, that the attitudes of the Emperor were not always quite serious, that German industry and commerce were trying to develop themselves with the aid of complicated and laborious expedients. One often ended by finding in these criticisms of detail the occasion for new encomiums. If the Government had faults, the people were admirable; their efforts, in all departments of human activity, were prodigious.

Even revolutionary parties which could not sympathize with the "feudal" institutions of Germany had become more or less Germanophile. The organization of the Socialist Party and its apparent strength, the law for workingmen's pensions, the efforts made by the Government and the municipalities to solve the problem of proper housing and insure healthful living conditions to the masses—these things had touched the most hardened revolutionary hearts in many countries. The conservative classes, too, admired Germany as the only country in Europe that did not yet tremble before those whom it should rule. Admiration for Germany had become so great that the world counted especially upon its strength and wisdom to preserve peace. As late as July 30, 1914, statesmen, both young and old, in the various countries of Europe believed that once again the world would be indebted for peace to the German Empire.



GUGLIELMO FERRERO

On the other hand, a singular and growing mistrust enveloped France. It is true that the French were still universally credited with intelligence, culture, taste, and many agreeable and brilliant qualities; but men denied their possession of the solid and serious qualities—the energy, the perseverance, the audacity, the breadth of view—necessary for enterprises of great spread of wing. France was "aging and falling off." Stingy, foresighted, prudent to the verge of timidity, torn by religious and political struggles, weakened by the errors and excesses of a Government grown more and more democratic, it seemed to be a country of small industries, of moderate fortunes, and of routine, destined to be effaced increasingly before better endowed rivals.

France was reproached with being a laggard in many ways, in spite of all the revolutions she had wrought. She was acknowledged to be rich, but her envied wealth was attributed to the weakness of her spirit of initiative, which led her to economize, as if the gold pieces fell from the sky upon her privileged soil to be picked up by a nation of happy idlers! She was still regarded, after so many years, as the chief menace to European peace because of her secret aspirations for an impossible revenge; but at the same time many were convinced that her military power had been destroyed by wealth, pleasures, and anti-militarism, by democratic theories, by the incurable disorganization of the army. Between these two reproaches there was an evident contradiction, but Europe did not appear to perceive it. Men repeated everywhere at the same time that France desired war and that she no longer knew how to make war.

How often I have discussed these questions in the last decade in Europe, even in France, and in my journeys through the two Americas! But all arguments shattered themselves against an invincible mistrust. One doubted. French society seemed to be menaced from without and from within—by Germany, by alcoholism, by depopulation, by anti-militarism, by civil strife, by moral corruption, by political and bureaucratic disorganization. A fact no less grave, the new generations were everywhere more favorable to Germany and more hostile to France than the old. This could easily be noted in Italy. The prestige that Germany enjoyed in Italy has often been ascribed to her victories. That was true, in a measure, of the generation that concluded the Triple Alliance in 1882 and witnessed the wars of 1866 and of 1870, but not of the generation that followed. And the latter admired Germany much more than did its predecessor. One could justly say that everybody in Italy had become or was becoming Germanophile after 1900.

When one recalls that state of things the sudden change produced by the war appears all the more extraordinary. It will not be easy for future historians to describe the shudder of horror and of terror that everywhere seized the admirers of Germany when they discovered all at once the sombre ambitions that lay concealed at the bottom of the feverish activity which had so long blinded the world. During the first months of the war France was avenged for the calumnies she had suffered, by the anguish with which many of her former detractors prayed God's pardon for having misjudged her. The change has been so sudden and so complete that we need not be astonished if many of the converts have ended by believing that it is not their opinion which has changed, but France herself; that a miracle was wrought, and that in two days this "aging" country renewed its youth.

The self-esteem of men is never at a loss for expedients when it wishes to excuse a fault or error. But, however great may be the faith in miracles which Europe has put to the test since the beginning of the war, that faith cannot hide from clear-sighted minds the fact that our epoch had deceived itself. A problem—a grave problem—arises, then, and will long confront us: Why and how could so enlightened an age deceive itself so egregiously?

The solution of this enigma probably will be a hard and painful task for our epoch; for the underlying error is bound up with too many ideas which had come to be accepted as proved beyond discussion, with too many sentiments which seemed to us a part of honor and of human nature itself, with too many interests which we were accustomed to regard as sacred. Yet this error, like so many others committed by humanity, was merely the too sweeping application of a principle which, within certain limits, was true. It might be defined by saying that our epoch had convinced itself that numbers are not merely one species of power, but power itself.

Why did the world so admire Germany for twenty years? Because Germany was the one country in Europe where the prodigious swarming of the people on a soil restricted, but rich in coal, produced the most rapid and immediate development of industry, of commerce, of wealth, and of military power. With a population multiplying rapidly on land very rich in fuel, Germany could and did become the first metallurgical power in Europe and the second in the world. The growth in population and in metallurgy in turn shaped the rapid development of a great number of industries and public services of which iron is the principal element. The whole empire was covered with railways and factories of every kind; the army was constantly increased; an enormous merchant marine and the second war fleet in the world were created in a few years; cities grew larger everywhere, and almost all were rebuilt; the wealth of the people increased in reality each year, but it seemed to increase still more, because the rapidity of the circulation increased along with its mass, keeping up a perpetual movement throughout the country.

This rapid and complex development won the admiration of the world. On the other hand, what harmed France was the relative slowness of her development, which seemed to connote, in last analysis, the opposite type of demographic phenomenon.

It was, in short, a purely quantitative conception of progress that dominated Europe and America up to the beginning of the war; that furnished the standards of measurement for judging peoples, governments, generations, and that caused the world to dedicate Germany to the uninterrupted triumphs of youth and France to the bitter disillusionments of age. This conception, moreover, which makes progress consist in the increase of wealth and of all that serves to produce it—men and tools—has never been seriously contested by philosophy; it has spread through the masses and become one of the directing ideas of our civilization. It has, incontestably, the great advantage of offering, for the measurement of the world, a standard that seems certain. If progress consists in the growth of population and production, statistics will tell us with mathematical precision what nations are most progressive and in what proportion each of us has accomplished his duty.

This conception of progress, indeed, is true, at least in part. No one would deny that numbers are a power. The war has shown that the increase of population, the development of industry, and the strength of the Government had made of Germany a military force even more formidable than we had believed. It is evident, besides, that Germany would have been completely defeated long ago if France had counted ten or fifteen million more inhabitants.

But this conception of progress must also contain an element of error if the world, which believed in it with so blind a faith, has been so stupefied upon seeing hordes of conquerors suddenly leaping the frontiers of the country where, according to that conception, the arts of peace should have found their inviolable asylum. Neither Europe nor America expected to see such a hurricane of violence come out of the progressive effort of our epoch, and through the ambition of the nation which had been for ten years their favorite. What, then, was the defect in that conception? Why does the world deplore the fact that it was so grievously mistaken concerning Germany and France? Because—permit me to repeat it—if numbers are *a power*, they are not *the power*.

The quantitative conception of progress has reduced the life of nations, which is very complex, to elements which are too simple, neglecting a great number of moral and intellectual forces that cannot be reduced to figures. There lies its defect. A nation and a civilization are not merely quantities that can be expressed in figures; they are also a sum total of qualities—vices and virtues—which elude any numerical evaluation and which must be appreciated with the aid of standards more delicate and less sure. These standards are more difficult to apply, and their combinations are sometimes very difficult to foresee. The apparent order which the police maintain in the streets, the cleanness of the stations, or the coldest statistics of population and commerce may hide the most extravagant madness of a whole nation, exalted by cupidity and pride. A country where population increases little, where political contests are sharp and the services of the highway commissioner mediocre, can nevertheless preserve a feeling of right, of honor, and of justice, which will make it, in a great historical crisis, a necessary element of equilibrium and of safety.

To this simple truth the eyes of the world were almost completely closed for thirty years. To this truth they are beginning, little by little, to be reopened under the shock of the most tragic of events. The supposed miracle in France means nothing else. It is the quantitative theory of progress, in which our epoch had believed with so much faith, because it seemed to simplify the most complicated problems of life, that has deceived the world. The world is beginning to realize it, and to perceive that the great problems of moral life cannot, like so many others, be simplified by the ingenuity of man; for their difficulty is the very reason for their existence.

How an epoch which has done such great things, and has surpassed in knowledge all those that preceded it, could so long delude itself regarding the value of the standards it used, and could judge the most delicate things of life so carelessly and grossly, is another formidable problem which the European war has just propounded to us. If our age wishes seriously to solve it, it can, upon the ruins accumulated by the immense catastrophe, turn toward the past and better understand in its essence all the history of the nineteenth century. It can get hold of itself more easily in the midst of the dreadful surprises that have been overwhelming it for the last eighteen months. It can also get its bearings and find the way to the future more quickly in the midst of the present upheavals, and prepare itself, by a profound and complete examination of its conscience, for the formidable tasks that await it after the war.



Burdens and Dangers From Europe's Colossal War Debts

THE hostilities in Europe will have gone on two years should the war continue to Aug. 1. Attempts to gauge its burden to all the powers involved have resulted in a calculation that, if it is still in progress on the second anniversary, the direct cost of the struggle will have been in excess of $45,000,000,000. The total military expenditure in the first year was approximately $17,500,000,000. In the second year it will have been $28,000,000,000.

These figures, as the Mechanics and Metals National Bank of New York points out, represent simply the expenditure for carrying on the hostilities. They do not allow for the destruction of cities, railways, ships, factories, warehouses, bridges, roads, or agricultural values. Neither do they allow for the economic loss through the killing and maiming of men, the loss of production in occupied territories, the decrease in stocks of food, metal, and other materials, the derangement of the machinery of distribution, or the cost of pensions. They measure in a common term an expenditure of capital which, to the Governments concerned, will in the end be translated for the most part into permanent additions to their national debt.

If the war costs $45,000,000,000 it will represent a sum three times greater than the entire capitalization of the railways of the United States, and four times greater than the total deposits of all our national banks. It will represent a sum six times greater than that expended in the civil war. It will represent forty times the amount of the present national debt of the United States, 120 times the cost of the Panama Canal, 500 times the amount of the annual American gold output. Direct cost of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-71 was $2,500,000,000, and of the South African war $1,250,000,000.

The aggregate amount named for a full two years' warfare is believed to be well within the actual total. Dr. Karl Helfferich, Germany's Finance Minister, has named precisely that amount, $45,000,000,000, as an outside figure of the war cost to only March 31.

Great Britain's expenditures are now in the neighborhood of $25,000,000 a day. The daily average was $14,000,000 a year ago. France is spending $18,000,000 a day, according to the latest estimate of Alexandre Ribot. Last year France spent $8,000,000 daily. Russia, which a year ago spent an amount equal to that of France, is now spending $15,500,000 daily, according to Pierre Bark. These daily war expenditures of the Entente Allies make a total of $58,500,000.

Germany's present daily war cost is $16,600,000, on the authority of Dr. Helfferich. That of Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria combined, on the same authority, is $10,900,000. The aggregate for the Central Allies is therefore $27,500,000. Altogether, the cost of strife to all of the belligerents is approximately $86,000,000.

It is estimated that in spite of the present relative position of the nations as regards war cost, the direct cost to the chief nations of the Central Alliance has been only a little short of that of Great Britain, whose aggregate up to the present time has surpassed that of any other single belligerent. Great Britain's expenditure has increased gradually. Germany's was large from the first, because of extensive campaigns on two fronts, and because of the superior number of individual enemy nations.

Great Britain has lent funds on an extensive scale for the purchase of military supplies to Russia, France, Italy, Belgium, and certain neutral countries. France has made advances to Russia, Belgium, Serbia, and neutrals. Germany has extended credits to Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. Advances, or loans, by the strong powers to the weaker belligerents and to neutrals have amounted to $3,500,000,000. Figures from

English sources indicate that Russia in this manner has received $1,125,000,000, Italy $675,000,000, Belgium and Serbia $875,000,000. Turkey and Bulgaria have received perhaps $700,000,000.

Pro-rated over the entire population, the direct war cost has meant more to France than to any other belligerent. England is second on the list, Germany third, and Russia, because of its vast population, nearly last. Reduced to a per diem basis, the war has cost France 30 cents daily for each inhabitant of the republic. It has cost England 28 cents a day for each inhabitant, Germany 22 cents, and Russia 6 cents.

ANALYSIS OF THE DEBTS

Professor W. S. Rossiter analyzes in detail the debts of the warring nations in the Atlantic Monthly, asserting that the total losses, direct and indirect, in the first two years, amount to $80,000,000,000. Mr. Edgar Crammond of the Royal Statistical Society, London, computes that the aggregate value of human life lost in the first year of the war was $11,475,000,000 or $2,933 per man based on the average earning power of the man in the various countries. The increase during the last century, in the national debts of the principal powers—Great Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Germany—presents some striking contrasts. It appears that the total in 1816 was $6,182,180,000, of which Great Britain owed $4,502,180,000, while in 1916 the total was $56,631,437,017, an increase of fourteen-fold; in that same period the national wealth increased six-fold, and the population two and one-half times. Data are offered by Professor Rossiter, showing the proportion of debt as it actually existed before the war and what the percentage would have been if computed on the debt basis of 1816:

RELATIVE PROPORTION OF DEBT

Nation.	If Computed on Debt Basis of 1816.	Actual, 1916.
Great Britain	61	13
Russia	12	19
Austria-Hungary	4	16
France	20	21
Italy	1	11
Germany	2	20
	100	100

The aggregate of war loans contracted up to March 15, 1916, was $31,900,150,554. The debts of the warring nations in less than two years increased one-third more than the accumulations of 100 years prior to the war. The aggregate national debts of the nations at war and the per capita burdens now and in 1816 are as follows:

Nation.	Total Debts, 1916.	Per Capita. 1816.	Per Capita. 1916.
Germany	$13,114,078,000	$5	$192
France	12,358,459,444	9	310
Great Britain	11,269,768,463	224	242
Russia	8,710,233,000	17	*61
Austria-Hungary	6,338,300,000	14	124
Italy	4,015,080,000	7	113
Belgium	825,518,000	...	106

*Russia in Europe population basis.

The following table by Professor Rossiter shows the proportion which the war debt contracted in two years bears to the total debt:

WEIGHT OF THE WAR AND TOTAL INDEBTEDNESS ON SCALE OF 100

Country.	Weight of Debt. War Debt.	Weight of Debt. Aggregate Debt.
Germany	26	23
Great Britain	25	20
France	23	22
Austria-Hungary	8	11
Russia	13	16
Italy	5	7
Belgium	..	1
Total	100	100

The following table shows the actual war loans as contracted up to March 15, 1916, (computed by The London Economist:)

WAR LOANS OF NATIONS AT WAR, MARCH 15, 1916

Country.	Amount.	*Unit.	Dollars.
Germany	34,681,000,000	Mark	†8,254,078,000
Great Britain	1,662,600,000	£	8,077,320,000
France	40,576,827,566	Franc	7,425,559,444
Austria-H'g'y	524,200,000	£	2,547,500,000
Russia	8,073,000,000	Ruble	4,117,533,110
Italy	8,212,000,000	Lira	1,478,160,000
Total			31,900,150,554

*Custom House standard: £4.86; Mark .238; Franc .183; Ruble .51; Lira .18.

†The first German loan realized 4,460 millions of marks, the second 9,060, the third 12,101. The fourth loan is now in process of flotation, and although the amount realized is unknown, it is an important factor of indebtedness. In the German debt here given the fourth loan is included as approximating the second—9,060 millions of marks.

Germany's Invasion of French Industry Before the War

By Raphaël-Georges Levy

[By arrangement with The Quarterly Review, London]

DURING the last twenty-five years the nature of German emigration has undergone a radical change. The poorer classes of Germany, which, about the middle of the nineteenth century, poured in large numbers into the United States and other American countries, have almost ceased to leave their native land. The richer Germany grew, and the more work there was at home, the less temptation to go abroad. On the other hand, Germany was seeking in all parts of the world markets for her manufactured goods, and endeavoring to obtain fresh supplies of the raw materials needed by her factories.

In order to attain these ends, she began to send abroad, not destitute workmen, but an army of clerks, commercial travelers, engineers, contractors, who settled temporarily or permanently in the countries from which they hoped to draw the resources needed at home or which they intended to flood with goods manufactured in Germany. If necessary, Germany exported also the capital needed to start the works which she intended to set up in foreign parts, or to purchase those suited for her purpose, because in doing so she prepared customers for German industry.

One great problem for Germany has been to secure a sufficient quantity of iron ore. Her iron lodes are small, and by no means in proportion with her collieries. Her coal output is rapidly increasing and nearly equals that of the United Kingdom. In France the reverse is the case. The iron deposits of French Lorraine have proved to be very important. During recent years great lodes of iron ore have been discovered in Normandy. Germany has bought leases, and she has sold, to the owners of the ore deposits, coal or coke in exchange for their ore. Herr Thyssen is the man whose name has been most often heard in connection with the German ante-bellum invasion of France. In the French Lorraine basin he owns the mines of Batilly, Jouaville, Bouligny; in Normandy he has bought the mines of Perrières, Soumont, and Diéllette. All these enterprises have turned out well for Herr Thyssen, whose wealth is estimated at $100,000,000. One-seventh part of the French Eastern basin and one-half of the Normandy basin belonged to German manufacturers, who owned besides mining interests in other parts of France and in French colonies. The few shares taken by Frenchmen in German undertakings are not to be compared with the control acquired by Germans over French mining resources. Once having got the ore, the Germans built mills near the mines or bought mills situated in the neighborhood.

Germany was not satisfied with establishing her industrial captains on our territory; she was selling us a growing quantity of goods manufactured within her borders. In 1912 she sent us 94,000 tons of engines and 26,000 tons of tools and machinery, whereas she bought from us only 5,200 tons of the former and 4,000 of the latter.

Much has been said about the conditions of German competition. In many instances it was based on the practice known as "dumping," i. e., offering goods abroad at a price much under cost, so as to compete successfully with the native products of the country which it is intended to conquer. For this purpose, the exporting manufacturers must be linked together in a strong pool, so as to be able to uphold high prices in their own country. By these they get compensa-



THE BLASTED REGION OF VERDUN

German Shells, Some of Which Are Seen Bursting, Have Cut Off the Trees and Honeycombed the Earth With Great Holes

(© *Underwood & Underwood*)



THE CATHEDRAL OF YPRES

West Front as Seen From the Cloth Hall: the East Front Is Totally Destroyed by German Shells

(© *American Press Association*)

tion for the losses which they sustain temporarily through their sales abroad. This loss, in the mind of the members of the pool, is only a temporary one; the final aim is to crush the industry of the country which they invade. As soon as this part of the program is realized, they put up the prices and gain ample compensation for the sacrifices made during the struggle with their former competitors.

One of the most habitual forms of this invasion of France by German industry has been the formation of French companies the capital of which was owned by Germans, and under whose shield they sold their products. German firms are on the watch for opportunities of getting an interest in French companies, and even endeavor to absorb them entirely.

The manufacturing of chemical and pharmaceutic products is one of the fields where German supremacy has been most effective during the last thirty years. This is the more surprising as nearly all the great discoveries which have been the origin of the dyer's industry were made by Frenchmen. The latter have not drawn from their discoveries all the practical results which our foes have subsequently evolved. In accordance with their habit, they created in France companies with a French frontage, whose only business it was to act as agents of German factories. Similar phenomena occurred in the manufacture of oily materials.

The German electrical companies have tried in several ways to get a footing in France. The celebrated Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft (A. E. G.) founded the Compagnie Centrale d'Energie Electrique, through which they acquired some interests in Rouen, Châteauroux, Alger, and Oran. The Schuckert, another great electrical concern, had also a share in several French companies. In this field, as in metallurgy, the object was the same—to conquer the French market; but the method was different. The invaders concealed themselves; they tried to keep French frontages in order to make people believe that the products sold by them were made in France and sold by Frenchmen.

Among the agencies working for German export trade the first place should be given to the great shipping companies. Besides these agents, who, by virtue of their business, are a kind of official pioneers of the export trade, one must not forget the innumerable Germans established in France, especially in the Departments of the East and the North, where the men served in business firms as servants or masters and in the towns as workmen, the women as teachers or nurses. They were constantly engaged in spying out and preparing means of approach for the tradesmen as well as for the soldiers of their country. The main factors of success in their commercial campaign were the cheapness of their goods, the quickness of their deliveries, and their easy terms of payment.

One of the secret supplements of the Deutsche Export Revue, which is sent only to German subscribers, declares that, in order to conquer a country economically, it is necessary to export into it men; this has been done with the tenacity which is one of the features of the German character. Where the ground was favorable, as in Antwerp, they flooded it. In France, where they knew that public sentiment was, in a certain sense, against them, and where they met with powerful national organizations, they acted more modestly. But everywhere they were doing their underground work, trying to extend their influence, to penetrate all the secrets of the country of which they were the guests, and to prepare in silence a way for their armies.

Frenzied German Trade a Cause of the War

Professor Millioud's Book

MAURICE MILLIOUD, a noted Swiss economist, who holds the Chair of Sociology in the University of Lausanne, has made a study of the economic conditions which helped to precipitate the European war. This volume, written in French, is now published in English by the Houghton Mifflin Company of Boston under the title "The Ruling Caste and Frenzied Finance in Germany." In the first section of his book Professor Millioud analyzes the feudal and militarist caste that rules Germany, finding that, while Pan-Germanism represents the ideal and mental state of that caste, it is really the lower or uneducated class that has been most powerfully influenced by that ideal.

In the second section Professor Millioud discusses "Germany's Aims at Conquest by Trade and by War," finding the chief cause of the war in economic conditions. For Germany's action in setting Europe on fire he finds four contributing causes, which, he says, pieced together, show "a terrible organizing for conquest and power which staggers one by its heinousness and terrifies by reason of the inexorable severity which it threatens." In his study of the first of these four causes he rejects the explanation given by the Germans themselves, that they were the victims of a plot hatched by Russia, and after examination concludes: "It is clear, then, that the war was intended, the consequences had been considered, and it was entered into of deliberate purpose."

Of the explanation accepted in all foreign countries, especially England and the United States, that Germany was forced into the war by the militarist class and the impelling force of Pan-Germanic aims, he says that these forces must be considered as a symptom, a clue, rather than a cause. The idea that political necessity caused the war is not satisfactory, because Germany's political and military hegemony on the Continent was undisputed. In the economic theory, the determination to use the army for the profit of industry and trade and to crush competition and destroy financial resources in two or three rival powers, the author finds many more facts and arguments to explain Germany's reason for precipitating war.

"Everything," he says, "points to the fact that the war was a step taken in despair, a stroke carefully planned, threatened several times before, * * * yet at last hurriedly rushed into in 1914."

He outlines the German scheme of trade conquest and explains the methods that were employed. These methods required huge amounts of capital, and it was, Professor Millioud thinks, the methods of using that capital, the overextension of trade and the pyramiding of loans by which it was financed, making possible Germany's long-credit system, that brought on the troubles which were the chief factor in plunging the nation into war.

"Threatened by no one, Germany felt herself menaced on all sides. She claimed to be fighting for very existence, and she spoke truth. Her manufacturers, financiers, and statesmen had dragged her so deeply and by such methods into a war of economic conquest that she could not withdraw. The methods employed were now working against her. Without having entirely miscarried, victory [in economic domination] was clearly beyond her grasp. Must she wait the inevitable crash, the stoppage of trade, the downfall of her credit, the misery which must overwhelm her people, and the fury which would perhaps possess them in consequence? Would not such a state of things make war inevitable sooner or later, and was it not better to make war while there was most likelihood of its ending rapidly and victoriously in her favor?"

Sir Edward Grey on the Cause of the War and Peace Conditions

[BY SIR EDWARD GREY, THE BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THROUGH EDWARD PRICE BELL OF THE CHICAGO NEWS.]

PRUSSIAN tyranny over Western Europe, including these islands, our people will not stand. The pledges given by Mr. Asquith as regards the restoration of Belgium and Serbia shall be kept. We have signed a pact to make peace only in concert with our allies. This pact, I need not say, we shall honor strictly and to the end." Thus spoke Sir Edward Grey. He continued:

"What we and our allies are fighting for is a free Europe. We want Europe free not only from the domination of one nationality by another, but from hectoring diplomacy and the peril of war; free from the constant rattling of the sword in the scabbard, and from the perpetual talk of shining armor and war lords.

"In fact, we feel that we are fighting for equal rights, for law, justice, and peace, and for civilization throughout the world, as against brute force, which knows no restraint and no mercy."

"What do you mean by the destruction of Prussian militarism?" was asked.

"What Prussia proposes as we understand her," replied Sir Edward, "is Prussian supremacy. She proposes a Europe modeled and ruled by Prussia. She is to dispose of the liberties of her neighbors and of us all.

"We say that life on these terms is intolerable. This also is what France, Italy, and Russia say. We are not only fighting Prussia's attempt to do in this instance to all Europe what she did to non-Prussian Germany, but we are fighting the German idea of the wholesomeness, almost desirability, of ever recurrent war. Prussia under Bismarck deliberately and admittedly made three wars.

"We want settled peace throughout Europe which will be a guarantee against aggressive war. Germany's philosophy is that settled peace spells disintegration, degeneracy, and the sacrifice of the heroic qualities in the human character. Such philosophy, if it is to survive as a practical force, means eternal apprehension and unrest. It means ever-increasing armaments. It means arresting the development of mankind along the lines of culture and humanity.

"We are fighting this idea. We do not believe in war as the preferable method of settling disputes between nations. When nations cannot see eye to eye, when they quarrel, when there is a threat of war, we believe that the controversy should be settled by methods other than those of war.

"Such other methods are always successful when there is good-will and no aggressive spirit. We believe in negotiation. We have faith in international conferences. We proposed a conference before this war broke out. We urged Germany to agree to a conference. Germany declined to do so.

"Then I requested Germany to select some form of mediation—some method of her own for a peaceful settlement. She would not come forward with any such suggestion. Then the Emperor of Russia proposed to Germany to send the dispute to the tribunal at The Hague. There was no response.

"Our proposal of a conference was rejected by Germany. Russia, France, and Italy all accepted it. Our proposal that Germany suggest some means of peaceful settlement met with no success, nor did the Czar's proposal. No impartial judgment of any kind was to be permitted to enter. It was a case of Europe submitting to the Teutonic will or going to war.

"If the conference in London in the Balkan crisis of 1912-13 had been worked to the disadvantage of Germany or her allies, the German reluctance for a conference in 1914 would have been intelligible, but no more convincing pledge of fair play and a single-minded desire for a fair settlement than the conduct of that conference in London has ever been given.

" And in 1914, after Serbia had accepted nine-tenths of Austria's demands, a settlement of the outstanding questions would have been easy. Russia ordered no general mobilization till Germany had refused the conference and till German preparations for war were far ahead of Russia's. Germany declared war on Russia when Austria was showing every disposition to come to terms, and Germany was in fact at war with Russia four or five days before Austria was, though the quarrel at that time was one that primarily concerned Austria and not Germany.

" These two methods of settling international disputes—the method of negotiation and the method of war—I ask you to consider in the light of this struggle. Do we not see the disaster of the war method conclusively shown?

" How much better would have been a conference or a reference to The Hague in 1914 than what has happened since industry and commerce have been dislocated, the burdens of life heavily increased, millions of men slain, maimed, or blinded; international hatred deepened and intensified, and the very fabric of civilization menaced? These have come from the war method.

" The conference we proposed, or The Hague reference proposed by the Czar, would have settled the quarrel in a little time. I think a conference would have settled it in a week, and all these calamities would have been averted. Moreover—a thing of vast importance—we should have gone a long way toward laying the foundations of international peace."

" Do you think the neutrals ever will be able to help toward peace? " he was asked.

" The injustice done by the war has got to be set right. The Allies can tolerate no peace that leaves the wrongs of this war unredressed. When persons come to me with pacific counsels I think they should tell me what sort of peace they have in mind. They should let me know on which side they stand, for the opponents do not agree. If they think, for example, that Belgium was innocent of offense, that she has been unspeakably wronged, that she should be set up again by those who threw her down, then it seems to me that they should say so. Peace counsels that are purely abstract and make no attempt to discriminate between the rights and wrongs of this war are ineffective, if not irrelevant."

Sir Edward was reminded that desire for conquest, lust for revenge, and jealousy of an economic competitor in the world market were suggested by Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg as the three driving forces of the " coalition against Germany before the war."

NO ANTI-GERMAN COALITION

" There was no coalition against Germany before the war," answered Sir Edward. " Germany knew there was no coalition against her. We had assured her in the most formal and categorical way that in no circumstances should we be a party to any aggression against her. She wanted us to pledge ourselves to unconditional neutrality, wanted us to declare that, no matter what she did on the Continent, we should not interfere.

" It is true that she always referred to a possible war being forced on her. The trouble was that she gave us no test of a war forced on her. She remained free to claim that any war was forced on her. Now she claims that this war was forced on her. I need hardly remind you that Italy, the third member of the Triple Alliance, at the outset definitely refused to accept that view of it.

" No one thought of attacking Germany. There was not a measure taken by any power that was not purely defensive. The German preparations were for attack and were far ahead of the others on the Continent."

" You have observed the German Chancellor's recent reference to Belgium as a bulwark," the interviewer suggested.

"Belgium was a bulwark," answered Sir Edward. "Defensive of Germany, of France, and of European peace. This bulwark, until Germany decided to make war, was in no danger from any quarter. In April, 1913, we had given a renewed assurance to Belgium to respect her neutrality. When war threatened, we asked France if she would adhere to her pledge to respect the neutrality of Belgium and she said 'yes.' We asked Germany the same question, and she declined to answer. Immediately afterward, in scorn of her signature, she assaulted and destroyed the bulwark.

"Von Bethmann Hollweg acknowledged the wrong, pleading that necessity knows no law, and promised that as soon as Germany's military aims were realized she would restore Belgium. Now he says there can be no status quo ante either in the east or the west. In other words, Belgium's independence is gone as Serbia's and Montenegro's independence is gone unless the Allies set it up again.

"To all this we say to Germany: 'Recognize the principle urged by lovers of freedom everywhere and give to the nationalities of Europe real freedom, not the so-called freedom doled out to subject peoples by Prussian tyranny, and make reparation as far as it can be made for the wrong done.'"

"Would you mind indicating the object of Britain's rapprochements in recent years?" Sir Edward was asked.

"Good relations and an end to quarrels with other powers. Going far back we had working relations with the Triple Alliance, but we were habitually in friction with France or Russia. Again and again it brought us to the verge of war, and so we decided to come to an arrangement with France and then with Russia, not with any hostile intent toward Germany or any other power, but wholly to pave the way to permanent peace. So, instead of preparing for war, as Germany asserts without a vestige of truth in support of the assertion, we were endeavoring to avoid war, and German statesmen knew we were endeavoring to avoid war and not to make it."

PEACE THAT DOES JUSTICE

"German statesmen assert that England is the only real obstacle to peace," the interviewer remarked.

"Nobody wants peace more than we want it, but we want a peace that does justice and a peace that re-establishes respect for the public law of the world.

"Presumably Germany would like the neutrals to think that we are applying pressure to keep France, Russia, and Italy in the war. We are not. France, Russia, and Italy need no urging to keep them in the war. They know why they are in the war. They know they are in it to preserve everything that is precious to nationality. It is this knowledge which makes them determined and unconquerable.

"It is impossible for me to express to you our admiration for the achievements of our associates in this struggle. And as is the measure of our admiration, so also will be the measure of our contribution to the common cause.

"There are two statements that come from German sources: One is that we are preventing the Allies from making peace; this goes to the address of the neutrals. The other is that we are advocating a separate peace with the Allies. This goes to the address of one or other of the Allies. Each statement is absolutely untrue."

"You have noted that Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg affirms that Britain wants to destroy united and free Germany."

"We never were smitten with any such madness," answered Sir Edward. "We want nothing of the sort, and von Bethmann Hollweg knows that we want nothing of the sort. We should be glad to see the German people as free as we ourselves want to be free, and as we want the other nationalities of Europe and of the world to be free.

"It belongs to the rudiments of political science. It is abundantly taught by history that you cannot enslave a people and make a success of the job; that you cannot kill a people's soul by foreign despotism and brutality. We aspire to embark upon no such course of folly and futility toward another nation. We believe that the German people, when once the dreams of world empire cherished by Pan-Germanism are brought to naught, will insist upon the control of its Government. And in this lies the hope of a secure freedom and national independence in Europe, for a Prussian militarism has plotted war to take place at a chosen date in the future."

SIR EDWARD'S PEACE VISION

In the midst of war Sir Edward's great vision remains a vision of peace—not a peace vulnerable to political and militarist intrigue and ambition, but a peace secured by a unified and armed purpose of civilization. Long before the war Sir Edward hoped for a league of nations that would be united, quick and instant to prevent, and, if need be, punish violations of international treaties of public right and of national independence, and would say to the nations that came forward with grievances and claims:

"Put them before an impartial tribunal; subject your claims to the test of law or the judgment of impartial men. If you can win at this bar you will get what you want; if you cannot, you shall not have what you want; and if you start war we shall adjudge you the common enemy of humanity and treat you accordingly. As footpads, burglars, and incendiaries are suppressed in a community, so those who would commit these crimes, and incalculably more than these crimes, will be suppressed among the nations.

"Unless mankind learns from this war to avoid war," said Sir Edward in conclusion, "the struggle will have been in vain. Furthermore, it seems to me that over humanity will loom the menace of destruction. The Germans have thrown the door wide open to every form of attack upon human life. The use of poisonous fumes or something akin to them was recommended to our naval and military authorities many years ago and was rejected by them as too horrible for civilized people to use.

"The Germans have come with floating mines in the open seas, threatening belligerents and neutrals equally. They have come with the undiscriminating and murderous Zeppelin, which does military damage only by accident. They have come with the submarine, which destroys neutral and belligerent ships and crews, in scorn alike of law and mercy. They have come upon blameless nations with invasion, incendiarism, and confiscation. They have come with poisonous gases and liquid fire. All their scientific genius has been dedicated to wiping out human life. They have forced these things into general use in the war.

"If the world cannot organize against war; if war must go on, then all the nations can protect themselves henceforth only by using whatever destructive agencies they can invent, till the resources and inventions of science end by destroying the humanity they were meant to preserve. The Germans assert that their culture is so extraordinarily superior that it gives them a moral right to impose it upon the rest of the world by force. Will the outstanding contribution of the 'Kultur,' disclosed in this war, be such as to lead to wholesale extermination?

"The Prussian authorities apparently have but one idea of peace—an iron peace imposed on other nations by German supremacy. They do not understand that free men and free nations will rather die than submit to that ambition, and that there can be no end to the war till that aim is defeated and renounced."

Germany's Reply to Sazonoff's Charges Regarding Outbreak of the War

[Summarized for CURRENT HISTORY from an Official German Document]

IN his speech at the opening of the Duma, Feb. 22, 1916, Mr. Sazonoff, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, took occasion to renew the charge that Germany was guilty of bringing about the present war and that Russia had been dragged into it.

The German Government thereupon issued a communiqué to the semi-official North German Gazette in which it meets this charge. This communiqué is of interest in that it adds fresh material to the already published German White Book on the events leading up to the war. This material deserves attention from all students of the political developments immediately preliminary to the great conflict. Essential portions of this communiqué are quoted herein.

Despite the solemn denials made by her highest military personages, it is definitely known that Russia started war preparations as early as July 25, 1914. Count Pourtalès, the German Ambassador at Petrograd, made earnest representations to Mr. Sazonoff, and drew up the following promemoria, now published for the first time:

"I gravely pointed out that it was of the utmost importance not to let military measures interfere with the work of diplomacy. In this respect, I remarked to the Minister, I had to tell him frankly that it had come to my knowledge that Russia was actually making military preparations, and that this news alarmed me to the utmost. I added that among the Military Attachés the rumor even circulated that several corps on the Russian western border had already received mobilization orders. Mr. Sazonoff replied that he could guarantee to me that no mobilization orders had been issued. But he admitted that some military preparations had been made. In a long and detailed argument I explained to Mr. Sazonoff how dangerous an attempt to support diplomatic action by military measures appeared to me. The Minister retorted that military measures taken for the sake of not being taken unawares by events were far from signifying a desire for war. He then asked me:

"'Surely, with you mobilization is not identical with war either?'

"I answered that perhaps it was not identical in theory, but that in a highly civilized State such as Germany mobilization was a measure which cut so deeply into all peaceful conditions that it was only resorted to in the last moment, when war appeared inevitable, i. e., when the safety of the empire was seriously menaced. True, when, then, the button was pressed and the machinery of mobilization was set in motion, it could no longer be stopped. Our geographical position with two fronts that had to be defended, I said, compelled us to act quickly if our national life was endangered."

The Ambassador's reasoning obviously made such an impression on Mr. Sazonoff that he immediately communicated it to the Minister of War. On that same evening General Suchomlinoff requested the German Military Attaché, Major von Eggeling, to call in order to give the Major further assurances on the General's word of honor. (German White Book. Exhibit 13.)

On the evening of July 26 the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Imperial Ambassador a telegram, quoted in the German White Book, to the effect that military preparations on the part of Russia would compel Germany to take countermeasures which would consist in the mobilization of her army, and that mobilization meant war. In accordance with that telegram, in the afternoon of July 27, Mr. Sazonoff was once more warned by Count Pourtalès not to proceed with military preparations, whereupon the Minister referred to declarations given by General Suchomlinoff to the Military Attaché.

On July 28 the Ambassador again discussed with Mr. Sazonoff the Russian military measures. In regard to this, the Ambassador sent the following telegram to Berlin:

"I pointed out to the Minister that trustworthy information had reached us which left no doubt that military preparations were being made exceeding what the Minister of War had told the Military Attaché. I said that I could only explain this to myself by assuming that the military district commanders might be going further in the measures ordered by them than was intended in Petrograd. At any rate, I felt compelled, I said, most earnestly to point to the danger which at the present critical moment might arise from making far-going military preparations."

On the same day, that is to say as early as July 28, the Ambassador felt obliged to enter an energetic protest against the destruction of the wireless telegraph apparatus on a German merchantman that lay in the harbor of Petrograd.

Midday of July 28, after the Minister had informed the Ambassador that because Austria had mobilized against Serbia, Russia felt it necessary to mobilize against Austria, and after Count Pourtalès had raised the gravest objections to such a measure, the Ambassador, in a second interview, spoke of the Russian mobilization order as a "grave mistake, as long as Russia declared her earnest desire to find a peaceful solution."

In the evening of July 28 the Imperial Chancellor gave the Ambassador telegraphic instructions to point out to Mr. Sazonoff most emphatically that a further progress of the Russian mobilization measures would compel Germany to mobilize, and that then a European war could hardly be averted. Those instructions were carried out in the evening of July 29.

On July 30 the mediating activity of the Kaiser and of the German Government took the course already well known to the world, and resulted—as is known from the speech delivered by the Imperial Chancellor on Aug. 19—in the resumption of the temporarily halted exchange of opinions between Vienna and Petrograd.

In the night July 30-31, the general mobilization of the entire Russian Army and Navy was ordered. No sooner did the news become known than the Imperial Ambassador at Petrograd called at the Foreign Office in order to declare that war seemed inevitable to him unless those orders were canceled. He reported events as follows:

"Early on the 31st I was just about to go to the Foreign Office when the Military Attaché, Major von Eggeling, reported to me that general mobilization orders were just being posted at the street corners. Although the telegram from Vienna had raised some hope, I was now convinced that war was inevitable. As I had learned meanwhile that Mr. Sazonoff was with the Czar at Peterhof, I went at once to see his assistant, Neratow. I expressed myself to him to the effect that I was afraid that the mobilization which was directed against us had utterly ruined those prospects for an understanding which had recently opened up. I felt convinced, I said, that the news of a general mobilization would strike Germany like a flash of lightning, since that measure, in the present state of negotiations, meant a grave menace and provocation to Germany, which the German people could not brook. I said that I could not understand how the Russian Government, just after solemnly assuring us that military measures would not be taken against us, could decide on the fatal step of a general mobilization at the very moment when that Government knew that our Kaiser and the German Government were endeavoring most zealously and successfully, as had just been shown, to mediate between Petrograd and Vienna. I went on to say that the general mobilization of the Russian army could only be interpreted by us in the sense that Russia wanted war at all costs, and that the step would therefore let loose a hurricane in Germany. Mr. Neratow made no answer, but merely observed that he would inform the Minister of my arguments."

Directly after the interview with Mr. Neratow, the Ambassador went to the Czar at Peterhof with the object of giving the monarch a personal explanation of the consequences which the Russian general mobilization was sure to have. Count Pourtalès pointed out to the Czar that Austria had just shown her willingness to negotiate with Russia. He dwelt on the new prospects which that attitude gave to a peaceful settlement of the crisis and asked the Czar to withdraw the mobilization order, because otherwise the preservation of peace seemed to be out of the question. The Czar declined the request, saying that a recall of the mobilization order was impossible "for technical reasons."

The German communiqué enters into detail in an analysis of the initial attitude of the British representative. It says:

"On July 25 the British Ambassador pointed out to Mr. Sazonoff that he must be prepared for a German declaration of war as the German countermeasure against a Russian general mobilization.

"The fatal character of the Russian general mobilization was presumably also the reason why the Russian Government delayed in notifying the French ally of it. It is a matter of common knowledge that on the evening of July 31 the French Government had not yet been informed of the fact that Russia had ordered general mobilization in the night July 30-31. We must conclude that the French Ambassador in Petrograd, however incredible it seems, had omitted immediately to report the fact to his Government. The German countermeasure became known in Paris before news of the Russian movement reached the French capital, and so the French public more readily fell into the error of considering the situation as a menace from the German side.

"Hence Russia has not been 'dragged into the war.' The Russian Government let it loose. Mr. Sazonoff knew what the consequences of the Russian mobilization would be; he did not prevent it because he wanted the war, since he felt sure of success. Only the retrogressive movement of the Russian armies makes him so modest now as regards his activity in the matter of having started the conflict. His case is similar in regard to the Russian war object, which he announced to the world in earlier speeches. Besides the conquest of Constantinople and the strait and the domination of the Balkans, the crushing of Austria-Hungary and Germany also played a part, while, according to his present speech, he is graciously resolved to permit our further existence, and declares the notion of letting a nation of seventy millions 'disappear' to be absurd. If Mr. Sazonoff saw himself nearer the realization of his kind intention, which surely he originally had, if he saw himself nearer it than is the case, it is quite certain that he would now be proud of his strong, resolute action in starting the war.

"Today, the calculations of the Triple Entente are clear as daylight. In this place, let us only refer to two utterances of the Novoye Vremya. On March 7, 1914, that paper discussed the 'approaching hour' and the 'necessity of improving the army from top to bottom by night and day.' On July 20, 1914, it said: 'The superiority of the Entente on land and sea justifies a more energetic language in the councils of Europe.' This certainty of victory, in the critical days prior to the outbreak of hostilities, seems to have overcome all of Mr. Sazonoff's scruples against a solution by the sword. His confidence in England's co-operation took all restraint from his will to have war. On July 29, 1914, the Reuter correspondent in Petrograd reported:

> "In Russian eyes the die is cast and only a political miracle can avert war. A partial mobilization has already been ordered, and there is every indication that the whole of the vast military machinery will soon be set in motion. An imperial manifest is awaited tonight. Confident of England's support, about which doubts have mostly disappeared, the Russian public is prepared to accept war.

"One day later, on July 30, 1914, according to the report of the Reuter correspondent in Petrograd, the English measure of naval preparedness in conjunction with Japan's peaceful assurances 'more than confirmed Russia's determination to stand by her guns.'"

These newly published documents cast

a new light upon the involved activities in Petrograd in the hours preceding the declaration of war. In German eyes they are a complete contradiction of any Russian statement as to "being dragged into the war."

What Russia Is Fighting For

By Professor Milyukoff

Russian Liberal Leader in the Duma

In the course of a noteworthy speech in the Russian Duma M. Milyukoff stated that a definite agreement of the Allies concerning the future of Constantinople had been reached early in April, 1915. *Other important passages of his address are here translated verbatim:*

SOCIALISTS in most countries are saying that the war was begun by the Governments against the wish of the peoples. This is false. Even the majority of the Socialists have to agree that it is not true, at least so far as Germany is concerned. The German people and the majority of German Socialists have resolutely supported the Government, and when we speak of the responsibility of the German Emperor we must remember that the Emperor William was forced by his own people to begin the war. Therefore in this case the responsibility for the present butchery must be equally divided between the people and the Government.

But perhaps in Great Britain the Government acted against the will of the people in going into the war? Nothing of the kind. In free England the Government which would act against the will of the people in such an important question would be swept away the very next day. It is true that free British thought has expressed, and is expressing, all sorts of opinions, among them those of an anti-militaristic nature. It is true that when the war began there were very many criticisms against Sir Edward Grey, but we know that in the course of time British democracy showed an astonishing preparedness for the greatest sacrifices, and we can only bow before it. The country has not even stopped at destroying old traditions, and has voluntarily sent millions of its sons to engage in a life and death struggle, and when the stream of volunteers dried up they went so far as practically to accept compulsory military service. That great country does not follow its Government, but practically leads the Government, and sets us the greatest example of the conscientious union of a whole nation for the accomplishment of a great national task.

The Socialists also ask, "Where are all those great principles in the name of which the war has been proclaimed?" But the war is really being fought for big principles. The fate of Belgium, Serbia, and Poland is brought up against us. This fate is certainly our concern, but only in the sense that we cannot stop the war before Belgium, Serbia, Poland, and Armenia have been fully compensated for everything they have suffered. Therefore, we cannot make a separate peace, but must fight on to the end.

These Socialists regret that the idea of the necessity for crushing militarism goes astray, and that the principles of international life are beginning to be ignored. But we do not forget this idea; it is only those who are ready at the end of this unprecedented war to return to the old state of things in Europe, when the rights of the people were ignored, and when armaments went up regardless. No, we have not sacrificed millions of our sons for nothing, and we do not want to see such a state of things again!

If we return from large perspectives concerning the whole world to the more narrow historical problems of different nations, we must say that these must be also realized to the full extent. These problems are being faced by all the nations. We have them also, and it were a crime to say that the blood of our people was shed not for their realization, but for somebody else's foreign interest.

Our Russian interest in this war can be defined very briefly: We need an outlet to a free sea. We did not begin the war for this, but without it we shall not end it. The annexation of the Dardanelles is in no way an attempt to enlarge the Russian frontiers. Russia is big enough, and has no need for new territories; but her complete development without an outlet to a free sea cannot possibly be realized. In our time, when the old idea of continentalism is dead, when international relations demanding a seaway have become the order of the day, the State without such communications is an organism without the necessary organs.

You can say to me: "If Turkey had been wiser we could not possibly have realized this aim. We would have had to wait." But when Liman von Sanders entered Constantinople, when the Turkish War Minister became a servant of Germany, and the Turkish fleet became controlled by Germans, the whole situation changed. We fully realize what is the plan of Germany, and for what she is carrying on this war. It is clear to everybody that in the case of victory Germany would create in Europe a central State, and would capture or subjugate Turkey economically, and then politically. "Berlin-Bagdad," that is the German idea; and since it has been created we have no other choice. The question now is not whether the strait shall become Russian or remain Turkish; the question is whether it shall become Russian or remain German.

We must make no mistake. The question which is now being decided will probably be decided forever, but there will scarcely ever be such favorable conditions as there are now. The chief of these conditions is the attitude of our allies toward our national problem. "Berlin-Bagdad" is too real a danger, not only for us, but for Great Britain, with India and Egypt; and for France with her prospects in Syria. On the basis of this real danger an agreement has become possible between powers which for centuries were suspicious of each other.

The end of March (O. S.) and the beginning of April (N. S.) in 1915 is a date which is well worthy of remembrance by large masses of the Russian people. This is the date when a definite agreement was reached betwen us and our allies.

[In conclusion Mr. Milyukoff urged the necessity of going on with the war. A neutral had come to him to suggest peace.]

He told me that he had come to Russia in order to ascertain what the feeling is with regard to a separate peace. He said: "You cannot imagine how in Germany they wish for peace. Probably the evacuation of Belgium and the evacuation of Serbia might be made the basis for further negotiations."

I answered him: "We know well the feelings of Germany; but in your country they should know who started this war, and whether it is possible by any sort of international agreement based on a simple return to the status quo ante to divert Germany from her aims. We do not want to crush Germany, but we must make it impossible for her in the future to upset the peace of Europe; and by her own free will she will never consent to anything in that direction." No, the fate of a democratic Europe cannot be decided at a congress of diplomats. The new Europe must create new forms of intercourse, and to do this she must show a real creative spirit. That is an enormous task to accomplish, but one which our generation has to face, and it can only be brought to a successful issue by the whole nation's taking part in the shaping of the future destinies of Europe.

Human Documents of the War Fronts

Behind the dry official reports of military events is a vast fund of emotional human interest. It is the aim of this department of CURRENT HISTORY to give the best available glimpses of that side of the war, as found in private letters, personal experiences, and thrilling episodes of courage, humor, or pathos.

The Puzzled German

By Rudyard Kipling

In occasional letters to Herbert Ballie, (Municipal Librarian,) Wellington, New Zealand, Mr. Kipling writes with refreshing vigor about the war. In a letter dated Jan. 12, from Bateman's Burwash, Sussex, England, he remarks:

I WAS at a hospital the other day which held 900 samples of all the stock we raise, and I met a youngster from Auckland, a farmer, half full of sharpnel, but going strong. Also, a Maori, who interested him immensely.

You're quite right in what you say about the new relations between the dominions. All that was small and petty in their rivalries has been washed out in blood. All that was best is better even than before. There is a sort of grave courtesy and affection now at the back of all the chaffing and joking. That is very fine and touching to see. And they do chaff each other, too!

Don't you be too concerned over our bickerings and back talk at this end of the show. It is the ancient habit of the English to grouse and argue and growl over every job they engage in. I had to listen to a long lecture the other day from a wounded bank clerk on the sin of calling the Germans names. He said it was not right to abuse them for following their "national ideals." He was of opinion that no German was fit to live, because his "national ideals didn't square with the ideals of civilization," and he looked forward to the complete wiping out of Germany as a power. But (and he talked about it for ten minutes) that didn't justify "coarse and vulgar abuse." Well, that is a point of view that would not strike most people.

This sort of thing puzzles the German badly. He cannot understand why men who grouse and criticise their own side keep on hammering him. There was a man called Napoleon who, if you remember, was puzzled in very much the same way, and the worry eventually killed him. The Germans do not yet understand why the "colonies," as they call them, have not "revolted" from England. I cannot help feeling for them. Here they are winning at least one victory per week, and an extra big one once a month. And here are the Allies with their infernal stupidity not yet recognizing that Germany, if properly approached, would be ready to impose "a victorious peace." (They are rather keen just now on "victorious peace" in Germany, but nowhere else!) Instead of which the silly Russians and foolish French and the fatheaded English and the deluded "colonies," who cannot be making money out of the game, are sending up more men and guns against them.

If I were a German I would really be grieved at the blindness of all the rest of the world, and, judging from their papers, they are grieving in multitudes. But I fancy it is a long way yet for them and for us. They have got to go on winning victories for another year, if their men and their money run to it. They will probably finish up with a splendid victory, and then those "damn fool" Allies will "reform their line" and pick up the pieces and get ready to be beaten again—very likely not far from where the lines are now. Then the show will shut up with Germany victorious to the last, and the Allies methodically carving her up into nice harmless pieces. Maybe I am wrong—I hope I am—but that is the way I see it: Germany winning all the victories, and the Allies winning the war.

One thing we must get into our thick heads is that wherever the German—man or woman—gets a suitable culture to thrive in, he or she means death and loss to civilized people, precisely as germs of any disease, suffered to multiply, mean death or loss to mankind. There is no question of hate or anger or excitement in the matter, any more than there is in flushing out sinks or putting oil on water to prevent mosquitos hatching eggs. As far as we are concerned, the German is typhoid or plague—Pestis Teutonicus, if you like. But until we realize this elementary fact in peace, we shall always be liable to outbreak of anti-civilization. Make this clear by all means in your power.

I see that Australia has begun to restrict German trade. That is right. Where a bale or box of German goods comes into a civilized country there is always the chance of exposing mankind to danger sooner or later. This has been proved before all mankind in every quarter of the world. * * * We must put the work through, for the sake of all mankind and for the saving of our own souls.

An Officer's Story

Retold by V. Ropshin

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY from the Niva, Petrograd]

I SHOUTED, "Forward!" jumped over the parapet, and ran forward over the field of beetroot. I remembered that I was an officer, and must keep in front of my men.

I heard no shots. At the German trench I felt a blow on my shoulder, just as if some one had hit me with a riding whip. But I did not at first realize that I was wounded. Without stopping, we leaped across the trench. When we were across it I felt a sudden catching of the breath, and everything went black before my eyes. On the right was a deep funnel, the crater of a 12-inch shell. I jumped into the crater.

The funnel was wide, with crumbling edges, and with a sticky, clayey bottom. I sat down on the damp earth and felt that my arm was very sore. I struck a match and began to smoke.

Now I heard the thunder of guns; I distinguished the rattle of howitzers and the whistle of bursting shells. I had a feeling of depression. Involuntarily I closed my eyes.

I sat a whole hour unconscious in this way. When I came to myself I saw a German in front of me, a German officer, in a gray-green cloak and with a round cap of the same color. The officer was standing straight before me, and was looking me in the face. I tried to rise, but he said in French:

"You are my prisoner! Sit down!" and he covered me with his revolver.

I answered: "Shoot!"

I felt certain that he would shoot me. But he unexpectedly lowered his arm. His face was tanned, with thick, dark hair and wide, blue eyes. After a short silence he said:

"I could shoot you—but I do not want to. We are both prisoners in this hole!"

And he added, saluting: "I am a Captain in the 238th Prussian Regiment; Müller!"

I also gave him my name. We were now sitting at opposite sides of the hole, he a German and I a Frenchman. We remained silent. We both felt awkward, and I tried not to look at him. At last he said:

"You are wounded?"

"Yes."

"Allow me! I shall fix a bandage for you!"

I answered: "Pray, do not trouble yourself!"

But he came over to me and pulled out cotton wadding and bandages. And as he touched me with his hands I experienced a curious transformation. He ceased to be a German, a detested enemy, a man who wanted to shoot me, one of the armed bands whose presence pollutes our land. He was simply Captain Müller, my chance and already kind acquaintance.

He bandaged me skillfully and rapidly. When he had finished he smiled, and said in German: "So!"

I thanked him in French: "Merci!"

Then we sat together, once more in silence. The firing did not diminish, and sometimes the bombs burst near by, quite close to us. The earth trembled, a dark, narrow column rose up, and we were spattered with dirt, with lumps of earth, and smoke. But neither I nor the German stirred. We did not wish to show that we were afraid.

Toward evening the fire grew more intense. The German was now listening to the guns.

"That was yours; that's mine; that's a 120, that's a 75, that's a 77, that's another 75."

My arm was numb and ached severely. I said: "Will you kindly get a flask out of my pocket? I have some cognac."

We drank some brandy, both from the same bottle. First he, then I; and when we had drunk from the same bottle he blushed and raised his big, blue eyes.

"You are married?"

"Yes; I am married."

"Have you any children?"

"No."

"I have—two."

He rose and said, with a wave of his hand: "I own a brickyard, over there, in Hanover. I am a peaceful man. I have managed the brickyard all my life. I wanted peace—and I have gone to war. And now we are living like moles. We sleep in the water. We risk our lives every minute. People have gone mad. Black has become white, and white black. Tell me, why are we fighting?"

"Your Wilhelm wanted it!"

"Ach! Wilhelm! And did my children want war? Wilhelm wanted it and they did not want it. And I obeyed not them, but Wilhelm! And here I am, on French, on foreign soil, beside you, in this hole; and perhaps I shall die today. I shall die, or you will. They will kill me or you. Why?—What for? For Germany? For my brickyard? When will this war end? When will we go home again? Or shall we not go home? Tell me, why are we fighting?"

I wanted to answer him. I wanted to tell him that we Frenchmen were defending our country, and that the Germans were bandits, not guests! But I suddenly felt that I was thrown up into the air, that it had become hot, that there was a rank smell of smoke, and that everything about me was red. This lasted a second—or it may have been a year—and when I came to myself I saw the blue sky overhead. I made an effort to rise. I noticed that the crater was smashed down at the edge, and had grown smaller and deeper. From beneath the overturned, damp earth a pair of boots stuck forth, worn at the heel; and beside them, close to me, lay an officer's round cap, with the brim torn off. I understood—my companion had been killed. My arm ached; I stumbled and lost consciousness. During the night the men of my regiment picked me up.

Real Letters From the Front

Written to an American Artist

IT has seemed to us of interest to present the following extracts from letters of French soldiers, in order that the reader may see for himself the difference between real expressions from men on the battlefield and the words commonly attributed to them. As one soldier recently put the matter, in speaking of a near relative who had fallen: "We know his last words; and they were not a grandiose sentiment about la patrie, but just 'My poor wife! My poor child!'"

The passages here printed are not expressions of the supreme moment, but they are from men who have been the constant witness of it among their comrades. And this fact should be considered in connection with another—that the writers of these letters are all intellectual men, artists, littérateurs, and physicians. From the temper of such men, thrown into terrible conditions so foreign to their usual lives, one gets a new sense of the spirit of the French armies and a new understanding of the respect with which the world stands before them today.

From an artist, Nov. 23, 1914:

Our rôle as territorials is not a very active one, as one thinks of war; just now we are digging trenches. Still there is talk of our occupying some of them shortly. And what of my painting, you will ask me? I think of it a good deal, and I hope to ripen many things while waiting for the moment when I can have the happiness of materializing them—that is, if the future and events permit.

From the same, April 13, 1915:

The glimpse of your family life I get from your letter makes me glad for you and a little jealous for myself, who am so far from home, living an almost subterranean existence. I am far, too, from all my old preoccupations and speculations. And yet it does not seem as if one should look on all this as a misfortune, though of course one is at the mercy of a bullet or a shell—and the Lord knows if there isn't a big enough rain of them sometimes, and then you will always get a bunch the size of a nice little woman, all at once.

Looking out through my loophole, I see a stretch of beautiful country. As Spring came on, nature assumed an almost mystical significance. There was a whisper of life out there, and through "the blue incense of pale horizons" one could hear it singing in the grass, in the trees, in the air. It chattered volubly, and one seemed to feel its astonishment at finding men so wicked. But life does not stop for such considerations; it goes on in that populous plain—where for days we would see no man.

For a long time now sounds have meant more to me than things seen. One extends the power of one's eyes through sounds—even if they are more generalized than such concrete matters as a burned cottage or a postcard from home, or the poilu who brings you your soup. For us who so much of the time cannot look about us (it is the foolhardy ones who get killed first) sounds mean things they never did before: there is information in them, often a warning. And what variety, and how full of suggestion!—a volley of bullets has the sound of a breaking wave; a shell passes—it is like the rush of trains in the métro; a bullet close to you sounds like a bee.

* * * There is a sad procession of wounded after each day of fighting—but their vehement enthusiasm, (I speak of the more slightly wounded,) their desire to get back into the furnace, stirs your entrails.

From a physician who had been attending the wounded on the firing line:

I am on a month's furlough, granted on account of illness brought on by overwork. I shall go to the Midi, and then return to the front, that I have not left for a year. I hope to stay there till the end of the war or till my own end. That life has an irresistible attraction for one who has once tasted it, everything back of the front seems mean and miserable; the proximity of death gives to life a powerful savor that makes you enjoy it in all its aspects. The further I go the more I look on civilization—or, rather, one civilization—not as a moral phenomenon, but as an aesthetic phenomenon, in which war may play a necessary rôle in exalting the taste for life, the energy to realize, and our driving onward to the unknown.

I continue to write and to prepare the future as if nothing were happening. This war has not surprised me, and if it strikes me grievously in some of my affections, it does not throw me out of the track that my instinct traces for me. I have never been more the master of my mind nor more prodigal of my heart.

I am happy at the success that L.'s painting had in America, but it is a bitter happiness, and one in which the terrible irony of life reveals itself. L. was killed some months ago during an attack on a German trench—without enthusiasm and without fear. He had not, any more than I, the hatred of Germany, but he had the feeling that France and we ourselves could find in this formidable contact, sources of new energy, of which our victory on the Marne revealed the existence with a sort of supernatural splendor. On that day David, covered with blood and dust, struck Goliath on the forehead, and since then, in spite of his marvelous vitality, in spite of his strength and his mass, the knees of the colossus are trembling, and in the end he will fall. I saw that miracle from within, I was a part of it, with a million other Frenchmen; it is one of the great recollections of my life, and I believe, since that day, that France will not perish. If she dies, she will have revealed in her last gesture what a flash of light may yet start from the soul of a great dying people.

From a journalist in a hospital where he was recovering last Summer from injuries caused by the fall of his horse, which was killed under him while he was carrying a message:

The poilu in the bed next to mine has been for a long time at a part of the line where the fighting has made the country uninhabitable for the peasants for a long distance round about. He is pretty badly cut up, but just now he said a real droll thing: " This nurse is the first woman I have seen in three months; it was worth getting wounded just for that."

From the same man after his return to the front, some months later:

The cold weather has set in, and it is cold, indeed. I was not caught in the trenches by it, as I was just sent back here for my days of rest. But imagine what it's going to be soon, standing there at a loophole, as motionless as a statue, your feet in that icy mud, impassable under the snow and sleet that cracks your skin like the bark of an old tree. The poilu is there like a tree in the wind, and as nameless as an elm or an oak, and like them a son of the soil of France.

I am a Second Lieutenant in a brave infantry regiment now—one that has given the measure of its boldness many a time. The spirit is excellent, and I keep it up with reading the war poems of the great Walt Whitman, " Drum Taps."

From an artist:

For the last three months, since I have been at the front, the time passes with the most terrific rapidity, and that disquiets me sometimes, because it emphasizes the fact that we shall have difficulty in making up for the loss of energy withdrawn from our personal ideal. And for how many days yet?—or months, I'd better say. However, I am getting back my taste for work; as badly placed for it as I am, and lacking many things I need, I make the best use I can of chance-found elements and continue my researches. At X. that was quite impossible; I need these surroundings of intense activity to arouse me. We are a strange mechanism.

But there is no denying it, the grandeur of a battle line is impressive, and it gives to the mind a measure of objects unknown before in one's accustomed atmosphere. Is it the idea of death, always present in the thunder of the cannon and the falling shells, that transposes our relative state by broadening its limits? Is it the idea of life, agglomerated in powerful masses, which grows greater through the disappearance of the individual in a gigantic body? I do not know. At all events, synthetic thought makes great progress here, and, for my part, the judgment that I can make of the intellectual past gains in strength here. In this respect the flight of time will not be entirely a detriment to us.

Confidence reigns among us, and the feeling that little by little we are becoming the masters of the hour. For our country and for all of us this long effort of sixteen months was needed, to bring us to what we hoped was abolished forever. And it is hard, I assure you, to relinquish, even for a limited time, the dream of universal union that should have been the ideal of all. Will it finally mean the death of personal power and of secret diplomacy? I am very much afraid that after this drama we shall have a lot of trouble in finding in the tangled skein the spool of thread we had so much work in rolling up.

* * * I have been deeply concerned about my brother, for his post was one of the uttermost danger; once he was slightly wounded and once he was buried alive for a considerable time when a shell demolished the trench he was in. I shall never forget a luncheon we had together, with the shells flying over our heads, one day when I paid him a visit in his trench. We separated that day not wanting to let our secret disquietude show, but I knew what a hell I was leaving him in, with the rapid-fire guns centred on his position, and I did not live till he returned to the reserves.

Two Weeks on a Submarine

By Carl List

This article, by a German-American sailor on a Norwegian ship bound for Queenstown with a cargo of wheat, was communicated to L'Illustrazione Italiana, from which it is here translated.

THE Norwegian ship on which I was embarked was nearing the Irish Channel. The afternoon was misty, the sea rough. We were warned by an English steamer of the presence of German submarines in the vicinity. There was a certain depression among those on board.

I asked the Captain if there were anything to do. " No," he answered. Boom! a cannon shot was heard at the very moment. General confusion. All the men ran up on deck and looked about, terrified. Boom! another cannon shot. Then one of the German sailors, pointing to a spot on the horizon, said: " A German submarine."

It was true. The black spot grew rapidly larger, and then one could make out some human figures near the small



AN OFFICE IN RHEIMS

Effect of a Single German Shell That Plunged Through the Building and Deep Into the Earth Beneath

COUNT FERDINAND VON ZEPPELIN

Creator of the German Cruiser of the Skies. A New Portrait by Schwormstadt, Drawn From Life

(By arrangement with Illustrirte Zeitung, Berlin; © 1916)

cannon on the deck. It was the famous U-39. We hoisted our flag and awaited events. The Captain sent the mate with our ship's papers over to the submarine, which was now near. Soon those who were not German received orders to take to the boats. The Germans were taken on board the U-39, I among them. When this was done our ship was sunk.

So there I was on board a submarine. The impression of it was strange enough. The first evening, quite exhausted, I threw myself down in a corner. I heard a few short orders, then the sound of the machinery. * * * After that everything was in absolute silence. Some said we were navigating at such a depth that big ships could pass overhead of us. * * * I fell asleep.

Next day on waking I tried to get my bearings. We Germans were treated as friends. We were permitted to go about everywhere.

The boat had the shape of a gigantic cigar, about 200 feet long, divided into numerous compartments. They were full of shining instruments. Now there was a buzzing sound, like the inside of a beehive, now absolute silence reigned. Every nerve was tense with the expectation of the orders on which our lives depended. Toward the prow was the room from which the torpedo was launched, a room full of tubes and valves. The officers' lodgings are very restricted, since the space on board a submarine proscribes any comfort. The commander was Lieut. Capt. Foerstner, a tall young man, thin and pale—which is not surprising, since he never had a moment's repose; neither he nor the men of the crew ever got their clothes off during the twelve days I was on board.

The periscope, the eye of the submarine, made known to us everything that took place on the surface of the water, and it did so with such clearness that it was almost like looking through a telescope. There was always a man on watch there.

Suddenly a ship comes in sight. Its smoke is like a black line drawn on the horizon. A bell rings. It is a signal for each man to be at his post. The U-39 slowly rises to the surface. A last look is given at the mirror of the periscope; no English coast guard is in sight. So everything is ready for action. We hear the command, "Empty the water cistern." Freed from her ballast, the submarine rises to the surface. "Both engines ahead at full speed!" The boat cleaves her way through the water that cascades her sides with foam. In a short time the ship is reached. The submarine hoists her flag and fires a cannon shot. No flag betrays the nationality of the captured ship, but we can read the name, Gadsby, on her side. She is English. We signal that her whole crew is to take to the lifeboats, and quickly! At any moment we may be surprised.

Through the megaphone we indicate to the men the nearest way to land; then a cannon shot, then a second one. The captured ship, after pitching for a while, sinks.

The time necessary for the sinking of a ship differs considerably in different cases. Some disappear in five minutes, others float for several hours. The finest spectacle I witnessed was the sinking of the Fiery Cross. The crew received orders to get off in the boats. Some of our men rowed up close to the abandoned ship and attached hand grenades to her sides. They were fired and the three-master was blown up with all her sails spread and set. The hull and the rigging went down to the depths, but the sails spread out on the surface of the water like so many little fields of polar ice. Eleven ships were destroyed during my stay on board. Quite a number of others were captured besides these, but they were let go again.

This trip, which I shall never forget, lasted twelve days. It was dangerous, but it was exciting and so fine that I would not have missed it for anything in the world.

The Sinking of the Provence II.

By N. Bokanowski

Deputy of the Department of the Seine

The French Auxiliary cruiser La Provence II., formerly a passenger liner, was sunk by a submarine in the eastern end of the Mediterranean while serving as a troop transport. Nearly 4,000 men are said to have been on board, of whom only 870 were saved. One of the survivors, M. Bokanowski, wrote this thrilling description to President Poincaré of France:

Malta, Feb. 29, 1916.

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT: You are doubtless familiar, in all its details, with the fate of the Provence II. I should like to describe to you—to assuage in a measure the grief of France—the noble behavior of those who made ready at that moment, between sea and sky, to die for their country.

We had on board a battalion and some detachments of the Third Colonial Regiment of Infantry. At the moment of the explosion I was on the bridge, with the commander of the ship, his second in command, and several of the higher officers. We directed the steps to be taken, distributing lifebelts, superintending the launching of boats and liferafts. Not an outcry, not a complaint, not the slightest sign of panic—only the dignified tranquillity of men who long ago had consecrated their lives to the sublime cause that had put arms in their hands.

Everybody would have been saved had it depended only on officers and crew. Unfortunately the ship sank rapidly. The water soon found its way into the boilers. When they began to explode, about ten minutes past 5, I jumped into the sea and swam as fast as I could in order to get beyond the radius of suction. A few moments later there were several deafening explosions. I turned and saw the end. The ship was going down stern foremost. Captain Vesco, still standing on the bridge, cried in a voice that rose above the tumult: "Adieu, mes enfants!" The men, grouped in clusters on the forward deck, replied with an enthusiastic shout: "Vive la France!" The survivors, swimming about the ship, or safe on boats and rafts, saw the Provence make a sudden plunge, her forward deck standing perpendicular in the air. They, in their turn, saluted with a cry of "Vive la France!" It was a quarter past 5.

After swimming for half an hour I succeeded in reaching an overloaded raft, the occupants of which pulled me aboard. Night was falling, the wind was chill and nipped the flesh of the men, who were almost entirely naked. Throughout the endless night, not a whimper! My companions in misfortune had no words except to lament the fate of those who were drowned and to curse the Boche, who, neither before nor after his treacherous shot, had dared to appear and show his flag. In water up to the waist, with teeth chattering from the cold, but upheld by the desire to survive and be able to punish the villains, we were picked up eighteen hours later by a trawler. Several men had died from the cold on the rafts, and several others had lost their reason.

An English patrol and a French torpedo boat divided the survivors between them, some heading for Milo, others for Malta. I was among the latter, and we arrived here about 1 o'clock yesterday. Captain Vesco, who was in command of the Provence II.; Lieutenant Besson, second in command; Colonel Duhalde, commanding the Third Colonial Regiment of Infantry, remained on the bridge until the very last second of the ship's life in the most noble spirit of self-sacrifice, giving with perfect calmness precise and effective orders for saving the passengers.

The gunners of the Provence's stern gun, having loaded it when the torpedo struck, remained at their posts, trying to discover the hidden foe in order to repay him in his own coin, until the piece was entirely submerged.

Lieutenant Noël, commanding the trawler Canada, having picked up the signal of distress, hastened in search of the survivors, succeeded, after prolonged efforts, in discovering them, and went about the business of saving them under extremely difficult conditions when he had been without rest for thirty-six hours.

Surgeon Navarre of the Third Colonial Regiment, being taken aboard a trawler nearly exhausted by his eighteen hours on a raft, refused to change his drenched clothing or to take any food until he had dressed the hurts of the wounded and looked after the sick. He was prostrated a long while after such superhuman labors.

And I must mention this other incident, which brings tears to my eyes:

Gauthier, Assistant Quartermaster of the Provence, having been taken on board a greatly overloaded raft, was hailed by a soldier asking for help; he jumped into the water to give him his place, saying: "A sailor's duty is to save the soldiers first of all."

He was picked up, twenty-one hours after the wreck, clinging to a plank.

I call attention also to the devotion and zeal—meriting our profound gratitude—of Lieutenant Sinclair Thomson, commanding the English patrol Marguerite, and of his officers and crew, by whose labors about 300 survivors were taken from the place of the wreck to Malta.

Pray pardon the form of this story, Monsieur le Président. I have written it hurriedly, with a bruised hand, and with a head still in a sad muddle. I wished, before my impending departure for Saloniki, to say to you with all my heart: "That is what these noble fellows did!"

BOKANOWSKI.

Sunk and Saved by a U-Boat

By John D. Harrison

This remarkable story of adventure is told by a young Chicagoan who had shipped at Rio de Janeiro on board the Margam Abbey, an English vessel engaged in provisioning British cruisers in the Atlantic:

THE first excitement came when the assistant steward, a man named Kral, who had shipped as a Hollander on the Margam Abbey at Seattle, where the flour was taken on board, got into a fight with the chief engineer over the war. He had long been suspected as a German. The Captain ordered his effects to be searched, and discovered two magazine pistols and papers of discharge from the Hamburg-American Line. For two days Kral was kept in irons. In the harbor of Pernambuco the Captain signaled for a police boat and went ashore with him, and that was the last I ever heard of him.

We left Pernambuco on March 5, bound for the Canary Islands, and in the middle of the Atlantic we got in touch with an English second-class cruiser by wireless and supplied her with flour and canned beef. The Captain gave us news of the German raider Möwe, which had captured the Appam about a month before, advising us to take a southerly route, keep our lights out, and paint everything black. At 5 o'clock in the morning, on March 12, the Captain called me to the bridge and said we had been followed all night by what he supposed was a British war vessel. I looked through the glass and told him I thought it was a cargo vessel. Then the pursuer began to speed up. The Captain signaled for all steam, and we made about 14½ knots, but the other boat kept gaining. Half an hour later she fired a shot across our bow. Whether she was the Möwe or not I do not know, but probably not, as it was reported that the German raider returned safely to Germany about March 5. Fortunately for us the weather grew foggy, we changed our course, and in two hours the pursuing vessel was out of sight.

Two days later we reached Madeira, and after staying four days went to Bordeaux, where we landed a big cargo of flour for Verdun. We received orders to proceed to Cardiff, Wales, where were the offices of the owners of the vessel. Two days after leaving Bordeaux, while we were at the head of the Bay of Biscay, the first mate, at 3 o'clock in the morning of April 10, sighted a submarine off the starboard bow. We immediately put on steam. The German boat was about two miles off. She chased us and began firing explosive shells, and one rendered us helpless by carrying away half of the propeller. Before that, however, we were in a sinking condition, for fully fifty shots were fired and many struck us below the water line. We carried no guns. The only man on board to be hit was the Chief Engineer. His right shoulder was torn away with a shot as he was putting some provisions in a lifeboat, and he died from his wounds.

We carried two lifeboats. One had twelve holes shot through it, but they were plugged up. The Captain ordered them launched, and we left the ship. One boat pulled toward the Island of Ushant, France, about sixty miles off, while the Captain's boat, in which I was a passenger, turned toward the coast of England, about eighty miles away. After rowing for about two miles, the submarine disappeared. The Margam Abbey was half submerged, but the Captain suggested that we go back, believing we might stand a better chance to be picked up. The Captain and I went aboard to get some medicines from the cabin, when the submarine emerged 300 yards away and fired two more shots, one passing over my head in the cabin. I ran out on the port side and jumped into the water, while the Captain jumped in on the starboard side, where the boat was, and was picked up, and the sailors rowed away, but not before the German commander had called out that he would pick me up. I had on a life belt and was supported by some planks. I was in the water twenty minutes when the submarine came alongside and pulled me in.

The first thing I told the submarine commander was that I was an American. He asked me a lot of questions about the ship, where we were bound, what our cargo was. Then he took me down the conning tower and told the steward to give me some breakfast. I had hot coffee, ham, and bread, and it surely tasted good. I never saw so much machinery in so small a compass before as in that submarine. She was a big boat, 300 feet long, carrying two six-pound guns, fore and aft, and with two torpedo tubes. The crew numbered about thirty men, all young, fine-looking fellows. I asked the commander if I could take off my clothes to dry them, and he ordered some dry ones to be given to me. I was surely treated very well, and everything about the submarine was in the neatest and cleanest order.

The submarine had in some manner picked up our liferaft and was towing it. The commander and his officers held a consultation, and I was asked to go on deck. It was then that we saw the Margam Abbey sink. We stayed around the place about an hour, and then the commander said he was going to set me adrift on the liferaft. He said I would soon be picked up by one of the English patrol boats, for he said they had been hunting for him for a week, "but tell them from me," he added, "that we are still here."

Well, they put me on the raft in my dry German suit. Half of the crew were on top of the submarine watching me, and they waved their caps and all shouted in English, "Good-bye!" The submarine moved off and soon submerged, and that was the last I saw of her.

The sea was very calm, and I waited, all alone on the raft, to be rescued. About two hours later the patrol boat Kinalde, a Scotch vessel from Aberdeen, hove in sight and took me aboard. I told them that the two boats with the Margam Abbey's crew were not far distant. We found the Captain's boat in three hours with the body of the engineer. His body was carried to England and sent to his home at Sunderland. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon we picked up the other boat, and at night we got to Falmouth and I slept in the hospital. There was great excitement when we told our story, but we learned afterward that this same German submarine had sunk seven boats within a week.

How I Entered Germany

By a Russian Newspaper Correspondent

A correspondent of the Retch, a Russian newspaper, recently managed to pass the German boundary on a false passport, on his way to Berlin. Following is a sample of his cross-examination by German officials:

WITHOUT saying a word the Lieutenant hands to the Captain a few Baedekers. I recognize their red bindings.

"You say you have lived so many years at N.? Can you tell me where you lived there?"

I name a street and the number of a house which I know to exist in N., but where I have never lived.

"You know of course the street Y.? Can you tell me how the square at the end of it is called?"

I give the necessary reply and submit to a further string of such questions. I have to tell the whereabouts of the Post Office, the palace, such and such a theatre, shops, statues, &c. In short, I had to give such information as the Captain could easily check by his Baedeker. I passed the examination with honors.

"You say you lived constantly at—" he does not finish his sentence, as if wishing to trip me up. I repeat the name of a little town in a small, neutral country, and I cannot help laughing inwardly at the perplexity in which the German officer will soon find himself, because I know that a description of this little town will not be found in any of the Baedekers. He searches his Baedeker for the place, and, having found only a tiny dot on the map, angrily gives up the game.

"Now will you follow me," says one of the Lieutenants, and guides me to a corridor, along both sides of which run cubicles like cloak rooms in a miniature theatre in some provincial town. We enter one of the cubicles.

"Will you have the goodness to undress, but, first of all, please take off your boots." The Lieutenant takes the boots and hands them over to the soldier who accompanies us.

"Have no fear. We shall rip them open and take off the heels, but we will sew them up again and return in good condition."

Of course, it is useless to protest; I take off everything. All my body, right down to my feet and nails, is carefully inspected by means of an electric lamp. The lining of my suit is all ripped open, but is not sewn up again. The contents of my pockets are carefully examined. Needless to say, I have no letters, books, papers, nor documents, except my passport. The Lieutenant takes his glasses and looks through my passport, opens my watch, looks at its mechanism, reads the trade mark of the manufacturers, and then takes my fountain pen, with which I never part, pours out the ink, and is busy probing its inside with a hatpin.

"What can one hide there?" I ask inquisitively.

"Have you never seen pendants, rings, and other things? You hold them up to the light, and through a tiny little point you see highly magnified views of cathedrals, of mountains, or of towns, &c. You can do the same with any document —reduce it photographically and carry it at the bottom of you fountain pen."

I had to agree that this was quite possible. The Lieutenant is chatting freely with me, at the same time, of course, trying to catch me unawares. But I am on my guard. My boots were brought in, and, indeed, on the soles one could see new, neat stitches.

I dress, and at last the final stage is reached. A fifth officer haggles with me about the time I should spend in Germany, and I obtain permission to stay ten days in Berlin and four in Dresden.

I breathe freely once more and go on the platform. I look at my watch; all these investigations and searches have taken up altogether fifty-five minutes. I find my place in the train and make myself comfortable. Four hours hence I shall be in Berlin.

Somehow I cannot believe it, and it seems to me that it is all a dream.

What the British Are Doing

By Count Alexei H. Tolstoy

Eminent Russian Journalist

I KNOW not in what manner our Russian views of certain national types are being formed. The English, for instance, we always thought cold, calculating, sly. At the beginning of the war Sir Edward Grey, speaking for an entire nation, seemed almost sphinx-like in his baffling manner. Kitchener seemed the personification of the severe ruler, who will not know human weakness. John Bull is pictured by the cartoonists of all countries as a fat, slyly-winking glutton. And all this turned out to be untrue and just about the reverse in reality.

John Bull is generally a thin, tall man, and simple-natured. The austere Kitchener, who speaks only in monosyllables, is in reality but a representative figure, magnificently adapted for advertising purposes on the screen or posters. They are practical and efficient in their task, but neither this task, nor the organization, nor yet the domination of the world is their goal; not even England for the English. It seems to me the English dream now of universal harmony, when all forces shall be strained, all passions free; when no adventure shall disturb the peace and calm reigning on earth; when falsehood, diplomacy, and guns shall become antiquated.

Sir Edward Grey is the most simple and sincere man in England. Having decided to show us, the Russian journalists, the army, works, and fleet, the English have shown us many secrets, in their simplicity, which we should have forgotten instantly. And we were not even told that it was forbidden to write or talk about them, leaving this to our own sense of decency.

For three days, spent at the front, I studied these young and old Englishmen. They are frank, candid, with that ever-present spark of humor somewhere in their eyes. The difference between them is that one commands entire armies while the other has charge of fifty men in a trench. And every one of them is first of all a man and a gentleman.

Another mistake we make concerning the British army. Some of us say the only things they do there is to play football, eat pudding, and let the Allies bleed to death. But the British army is great. Haig told us that it now occupies a fourth of the entire front. It began with a hundred thousand and is already passed the million mark. But they think that it is not sufficient for a decisive offensive. And so the English are preparing to strike a terrible and crushing blow at Germany. They are accumulating shells and men, they build whole cities of concrete, where food, clothing, and ammunition from all corners of the world are being gathered, and daily there flows from the Isles to the Continent a river of troops and artillery.

On the third day we finally succeeded in getting to the first line trenches and seeing with our own eyes a little part of that impregnable wall, behind which the English are preparing their blow. At 10 o'clock we arrived in the woods, which were but recently in German hands.

It was warm and clear. White clouds slowly swam in the blue of the sky. Naked, the forest was full of the roar of cannon and shrieking of shells. Somewhere in the distance grenades were exploding. And in the intervals of silence one could hear the chirping of birds. Many trees lay uprooted, and many others bore the marks of shrapnel on their trunks. We entered the trenches. Here we could walk in couples only. Mr. Balfour and I passed through a hole to the extreme trench, which is one endless ditch, running from the sea to Switzerland. It has the depth of a man, and zigzags regularly from horizon to horizon, each of its two sides protected by sacks of sand. It is the ditch that has called a halt to the German hordes, defying millions of tons of steel. A Scotsman was lying on bags on his back, his legs protruding into the air. At his head was his rifle. In his hands were two small mirrors. He had been lying thus since morning, looking into the glasses, awaiting the appearance of a German helmet on the other side of the sand bags. Another one had made a piece of metal his mirror, also awaiting his prey. Some were cleaning their rifles, some repairing the damage done by grenades.

We were returning. Shells were flying and bursting in our direction, and an iron bird was circling above us. And then some shrapnel shrilled over us, on its way to the German trenches. I looked at Balfour. His nose was all covered with mud. "The d—d Boches!" he said; "a grenade exploded, and then I suddenly felt something wet on my face."

We went to the famous hill, from where the enormous panorama of the battlefield unfolds itself to the observer's eye. It is a high and abrupt hill. There stretches before one's view an infinite space, in the background of which, far, far in the distance, one could discern the white tower of unfortunate Ypres. Ypres, the wonderful capital of Flanders, has been erased from the surface of the earth. Only by some miracle has the tower escaped.

Flying Across Mount Ararat

By a Russian Airman

Aeroplanes are now being made in New England which will be able, it is said, to fly to Europe under their own power. An English aeroplane has recently made the flight from the Gulf of Saros to Constantinople and back, incidentally dropping bombs on the powder factory in the Pera quarter north of the Golden Horn. But perhaps the most picturesque story of flight that has yet come to hand is this—in the Russkoe Slovo—of a Russian airman flying among the peaks of the "frosty Caucasus," where the valleys are already more than a mile in the air, Erzerum being about level with the summit of Mount Washington.

YOU know what an airman generally looks like, if he is getting ready to do a pretty big climb, under the regulation circumstances of war work; warm clothing, fur gauntlets, a thickly padded helmet; everybody is probably familiar with these attributes of the airman, at least from pictures.

Here, beyond the Caucasus, we dress differently. We do not enjoy the comparative comforts with which the aviation squads carry on their work on the other war fronts, where they have warm quarters and repair shops within easy reach. We have to fit out under an ordinary service tent, and how much it protects you from the icy cold you can easily imagine!

Picture to yourself a human form in underwear, which other human beings are leisurely and effectively wrapping in —newspapers! Oh, paper keeps out the cold splendidly! Any florist at home will tell you that. And here, where we see flowers only in our dreams, we have only one prayer to address to you: Send us newspapers, more newspapers! We not only read them, we wear them!

The paper packing is the first part of the airman's toilet. Next comes an undervest, then the uniform, a fur jacket or cloak and trousers. Sometimes these latter are fur-covered above, when the aviator ready for flight is hardly distinguished in appearance from a bear. Warm felt shoes; huge fur gloves, in which you have difficulty at first in wiggling your fingers. A warm helmet with holes only for the eyes and mouth. The last detail of the toilet is the "make-up"; the airman's face, as much of it as remains uncovered, is thickly smeared with vaseline as a protection against the icy cold.

In the aerodrome the motor of the aeroplane, set at low speed, is already humming. Human figures are bustling about it. They clothe and warm it also—into the radiator they pour almost boiling water; the oil cylinders are filled with lubricating oil heated over wood fires. These are the ordinary Winter measures.

We have a lot of "special" tricks. In our spare time, we ourselves, our mechanics and motormen are busy trying to find out ways to warm our aeroplanes during flights, so that the oil may not freeze, cakes of ice form in the radiators, and so on. And we have accomplished a great deal in that direction. At least, in our work, cases of motor failure owing to cold have been very rare.

Now for flight. I have had experience in flying over the Eastern European battle front. I have had to be on the lookout for upsets and descents into forests and marshes. I am well acquainted with shrapnel fire. More than once I have looked down upon the picture of massed movements, of separate actions, of big battles. Flights here, beyond the Caucasus, have their peculiar danger, their special difficulties. But nowhere do they give such fascinating beauty as they give here.

You remember how we said that aviation, making such enormous progress during the war, would, after the war, open up new horizons for mankind, not only technical, but also philosophical and psychological horizons; some one, I remember, insisted on new moral horizons also. I want to expand even these prospects. Now more than ever I am convinced that aviation will open new chapters in the art of painting.

Oh, if the late Vrubel could seek and create his colors here, up aloft, above the summits of the highest mountains and passes! And that first flight was far from being the richest in an artistic sense.

Below, it was cold, monotonous. Heavy flakes of snow were falling. In the narrow ravines the wind howled and whirled about. You only know that to the spurs of the mountains on the right or on the left, it is so far; to the cliffs before and behind you, it is so far. You define, so to say, only the frame, within the limits of which you are to climb upward. And later, in flight, you do not observe these limits by sight—snow blinds your eyes—but only by inner feeling and by catching the gusts of wind that rock your plane.

The motor roars rather hoarsely. It quivers with a strange note in the avalanche of white, icy cold crystals and fatal butterflies that have their birth in the ice zone above the clouds. You stretch your hand out over the edge of the "gondola," and instantly it is white; the white "butterflies" cling about it. The unfortunate observer is still worse off. The gusts of wind whirl around him more violently. Swarms of white "butterflies" unceremoniously settle on his helmet, filling up the eyeholes. A whole carpet of them, dead but as icy cold, lie on the floor of the gondola between the observer's back and the oil and benzine reservoirs.

And now the whirling "butterflies" grow fewer. It is becoming lighter. The motor roars louder, as if rejoicing in its victory over the elements. The aeroplane goes more evenly. A few minutes more and the clouds of the snowstorm are below us. For an instant—but this is only from the unexpectedness, from the brilliant sun rays suddenly striking my tired eyes—the aeroplane pitches downward. The cloud we have just come out of seems unwilling to let us escape from its clutches.

But that is only for an instant. The effort to turn sooner in the direction of the sun, of the expanse, of something infinitely beautiful, which I have not yet had time to become fully conscious of, is transmitted instinctively to my hands, which control the rudders, and the apparatus is once more above the clouds in the cherishing sunlight and the limitless blue sky.

Not only I myself, but all of us who are working here, feel only a single wish in such minutes of "outbreak toward the sun"—to let go the handles of the rudder and give one's self up wholly to the observation of the kingdom of beauty opening out before us.

All about us, in tints of blue or rose, the silent, unpeopled hills, the deep precipices, spread out their gamut of soft or menacing, gentle or repellent tones. There are now glistening, now dull patches of undulating glaciers. There are deceptively near or deceptively distant fields of white, untouched, eternal snow in its inviolable virginity. There are dark blue, black, green patches of secular forests, a setting, as it were, to bring out these effects of beauty.

The aeroplane goes still higher, still wider prospects open out around us, bathed in sunlight, and everything below, about, above us seems to be molded of crystal and mother of pearl. * * *

Speaking generally, flying is a tranquil enough thing. It is true that, after flying across the plains, you feel that here your attention is more keenly fixed, you become more a single organism with your aeroplane. But it is possible that this only seems to be so, because you have to struggle all the time to tear yourself away from this fascinating beauty and fix your thought on "business." Probably this struggle creates the illusion of general psychological and physical concentration.

The machine "wabbles" generally only over precipices and when approaching passes. This is intelligible. In the first case, there are strong ascending currents, and, in the second, the stream of air rolling over the peaks forms something like a waterfall—you meet with an "airfall" and you only need to guess its near proximity in time and to divine its "rapids" in order to be able to rise higher, where flying is once more tranquil and smooth.

It is much worse when you fall into a "basin." That is our name for a moderate-sized level space surrounded by broken mountains. Here the wind blows as if "from all corners at once." The air strata are in the highest degree uneven, and often, after flying through a dence layer, the apparatus suddenly plunges downward; then, seeming to strike with all its weight against a denser layer, it again flies evenly, and then plunges again. And so sometimes, after a long time, by mere accident, by feeling out your way, you find a layer of even density and get out of the basin through one of the ravines. These plunges and blows are very dangerous; many a time, in the case of a blow against a dense air layer, we have broken a stay from the sharp change of air pressure on the wings.

Is it cold? Cold as the arctic, ferociously cold! When you are flying over a big glacier you feel that the cold not only wraps itself around your whole body, however well you may be protected by all possible means, but it gets inside you and begins to stop your breathing. Your hands suffer most of all. I and others of my colleagues have had to pick out some safe spot and "land," just because our hands had been frozen into blocks of ice. To "land" among the mountains is something that has happened to me more than once.

Sometimes, though very rarely, the motors have begun to play tricks on account of the cold. Sometimes there have been repairs to make after a course of plunges and bumps in some treacherous "basin." So far, these landings have come off safely; probably because, when you are flying, you instinctively notice some level spot in case of need. You fly on ahead, you leave your landing place behind, but without fail you look out for another and take note of it. This is the way it always is in our work.

Once my machine wabbled badly and began to plunge downward. The elevation was very considerable, there were no sharp peaks, and it seemed that it would be easy to land. And we landed, but—on a billowy glacier which, from above, had seemed a smooth and level stretch. We descended, landed, and began to roll forward. The aeroplane glided with ever-increasing velocity. And we could not take to flight because, on descending, we noticed that one of the wire stays was broken.

Only with great difficulty, with the help of the observer, who slid down to the bottom of the frame and there operated the release handles of the motor, did we succeed in turning the aeroplane sideways and stopping it—not very far from a precipice, bottomless, as all the precipices are here. * * *

Only a Dog

The following sketch, giving a concrete example of the work done by thousands of hospital dogs in the Germany Army, was written for The New York Volkszeitung by a soldier recently returned from the front.

IT was growing dusk. The last ray of sunlight gilded the broad expanse of snow. The ice crystals sparkled like diamonds. The blue shadow of the mountains lay like a veil over the snow and the crevasses.

Franz Böhnke was unconscious of all this beauty. He lay wounded under a bush. The snowshoes that he still had on his feet made his position still more uncomfortable, but he was not able to take them off, because every movement hurt the wound in his right leg, from which the red blood was trickling over the white snow.

There he lay, quite alone. Not a man in sight. Not even an animal, or a bird. The shooting of men had naturally frightened them from their quarters.

Then the horrible thought came to him that it would soon be night and that, because of his wound, which was not dangerous in itself, he would be obliged to lie there and perish from cold or exhaustion.

Then he heard the distant barking of a dog. Were the hospital dogs looking for him? Then he would be saved. He listened breathlessly. The animal would surely bring him aid.

How strange it was, thought he, that man, blessed with reason, crippled and killed his fellow-man, while the dumb brute brought him aid and salvation! If I heard human beings approaching me now I should be filled with terror, for they might be Serbian volunteers who would wickedly attack me, a helpless man. The dog that is barking over there will not hurt me. He will whine joyously and call loudly for help. Haven't we men something to learn from the animal?

He sank back exhausted. The barking had ceased. It was becoming quite dark. He had been separated from his comrades for three hours. The ski patrol had scattered at the edge of the forest in order to search the neighborhood for the enemy. The members were to reunite in an hour at the old post. They certainly must miss him by this time.

Again he heard the barking of a dog. Perhaps it was only a hallucination caused by the fever that was beginning to grip him.

He thought of the poor, hard-working dogs in the city that pantingly drag their wagons, rest their heated bodies on the cold stones, and welcome every little caress of their masters with such grateful looks. When he was in the city he had never thought much about that. Why, it was only a dog. But now in the solitude he could not understand how men could be so indifferent.

Now he plainly heard the panting of a dog. Something woolly and shaggy brushed against his face. It was the fur of a dog. The animal barked loud and long, so as to attract the men of the hospital corps to the spot.

Franz put both arms around the neck of the shepherd dog, half out of thankfulness. The dog, which up to then had been capering about him, now held still and barked lightly, as if not to shock the wounded man. And so the hospital men found him.



Magazinists of the World on the War

Condensed From Leading Reviews

In the excerpts printed in this department of CURRENT HISTORY will be found examples of current thought in all the warring countries, as represented by their leading writers and more influential periodicals.

Germany's Changed Attitude

By Arnold Bennett

In the course of a recent article in The London Daily News the famous English novelist says:

WE are not simply drifting, and we most certainly are making progress. To perceive that this is so, surely one has only to compare the attitude of Germany eighteen months ago, twelve months ago, even three months ago, with her attitude today. How long is it since Germany was determined to annex Belgium? How long is it since she was determined to stick to Northern France and to take and keep Calais for a menace to Britain? How long is it since she was counting on indemnities to recoup her for the damage of war? Not long ago. Less than two months ago she had arranged to be in Paris at Easter. The recent speech of Bethmann Hollweg, though a proud oratorical effort that had its reward in the cheers of the Reichstag, sang a very different tune from the tune of last year. And it may be prophesied that, if the majority of Britons show anything like the grit that Mr. Asquith consistently displays, the tune six months hence will be a very different tune still—a third tune!

Certain persons say to me in accents of pained and superior incredulity: " But do you really think that we shall defeat Germany in the field? " I'm quite sure we shall if we stick to it. Why not? To hear certain persons talk one would think that there was some magic protection over Germany, and that she had never been defeated before. To this day there are people in this island who believe in Germany as they believe in a first cause. It is strange in face of the facts. Some of their arguments, as that if Germany could not push the French back from Verdun we cannot push Germany back, absolutely silence rejoinder. What, indeed, is one to say to a man who reasons that because A tries to defeat B and fails, therefore B cannot defeat A? Anyhow, the allied armies, and the mass of the allied nations, believe that we can defeat Germany. And that is what we are now fighting for.

We are fighting, not for terms, but to defeat Germany for the sake of defeating her. It is an instinct, and I think it is a good instinct. It may be an instinct of brute force, but the reign of force is not yet finished on this planet. The exercise of force, and nothing else, has saved Europe from German domination. Physical pluck, ruthless homicide—not arguments nor the enunciation of broad principles—have kept the Germans out of Paris and out of Calais, and the menace of force alone keeps them out of Britain.

It is, of course, not a certainty that we shall defeat Germany in the field. There are factors working against this consummation—irresponsible and venal mischief-makers in Britain, the limits of population in France, and the unshakable traditions which govern Russian administration. But these factors, in my opinion, are immensely outweighed by the obstinate, slow-learning, imperturbable perseverance and the proved financial power of Britain, the magnificent military genius and valor of France, and the vastness of the Russian machine, together with the individual qualities of the Russian soldier. And, be it remembered, that though ourselves and Russia have made disastrous mistakes in the field, and may make more, Joffre has not made mistakes. Further, though I expect a German defeat in the field, I do not count on it as an essential for a win. The British Navy, the limits of the enemy population and the limits of the enemy wealth, could satisfactorily finish this war even if the armies never conquered a foot of ground. Nor at best do I anticipate a sensational German collapse, with the Kaiser handing over his sword in the manner of Napoleon the Little, and German statesmen on their knees to our envoys.

A writer in "War and Peace" says confidently: "Be the time long or short, peace will be made in the end as they [the pacifists] say it will." Well, I am inclined to think that on the surface peace will be so made—that is, by argument, successive presentations of terms, and compromises. But only on the surface. At the bottom of the affair, controlling the affair, will be the profound, unspoken German conviction that Germany is beaten, and the compromises will be spectacular rather than real. We are all now satisfactorily engaged in knocking the said conviction into the German skull, and our method of penetrating the skull is the sole efficacious method.

Discontent in Germany and Austria

By M. Likiardopoulo

M. Likiardopoulo is a Russian journalist and connected with the management of the famous Moscow Art Theatre. Being a Greek by birth and an accomplished linguist, he was able to avoid suspicion when he made a trip through Germany and Austria a few months ago. The extracts given below are from an article in the Mercure de France.

THE first impression of a traveler who, like myself, has made several previous sojourns in Berlin, is thoroughly depressing. It is a different Berlin, a dirty Berlin, without movement and without life. * * * I have witnessed street scenes which showed an irritable temper ready to burst into clamor. At the approach of people of wealth or authority threats are often to be heard, while expression is loudly given to the discontent over the duration of the war. A crowd gathers on the sidewalk; some talk and others listen; a man exhorts a woman with a little girl to be calm. "It is necessary to suffer," he says, "since Germany is on the way to conquering her enemies, whom she has already beaten." "Yes," replies the woman, "that is what is said, but we do not see this victory. What is the good of victory to me if I have nothing to eat, and even with money and food cards nothing is to be had? And if it is victory, why don't our men return?"

Neither in Berlin nor in Dresden have I been able to find the "Hymn of Hate." I learned that the authorities had confiscated all the placards and post cards and that police circulars had stopped the rising flood of hate. Another proof that German jingoism has subsided is that in the cafés and public places patriotic songs become rarer. Even at the movies when the portrait of the Kaiser appears on the screen there are no longer cries of "Hoch!" and "Hurrah!" The people remain perfectly calm and quiet. The famous "Eiserne Hindenburg" (the Hindenburg in iron) has remained "in wood." In spite of all efforts to stimulate the public to drive in iron nails at a mark apiece, silver nails at ten marks, and golden nails at a hundred marks, the Field Marshal is still in wood with the exception of his boots and a small part of the tail of his tunic.

Germany is now only thinking peace, talking peace, and working for peace. The dominating word is "Friede," (peace.) In the populous districts there are to be met with from time to time long processions of women with a flag on which is inscribed "Brot und Frieden," (bread and peace.) So as not to rouse the crowd too much the authorities deal indulgently with these demonstrations and disperse the paraders without having recourse to arms. Nevertheless, great care is taken not to let them reach the centre of the city where they would be seen by the foreigners. The reports of shooting and slaughter to put down these demonstrations, which appear in allied and neutral newspapers, are therefore exaggerated; but, on the other hand, one cannot believe the German press when it pretends that there have never been any demonstrations against the war and the famine.

"We know," I was told, "that all the newspapers are lying, the foreign ones like our own. At the Café Victoria I have often heard the Daily Liar asked for, and without hesitation the waiter brought The Daily Mail of London. Germany has generally entered on a period of doubt. Even the most reliable official news is received with mistrust."

No one thinks of the territorial gains except perhaps a few junkers. Every German knows the Latin phrase, "Status quo ante bellum," and quotes it when peace is spoken of. An influential majority is ready even to give up Alsace-Lorraine. In Dresden I went to see an old friend. "Even if we conquer," he said, "how many decades must it be before we cease to be pariahs and outlaws in the eyes of the whole world? After this war I shall never leave Germany. I would be ashamed to admit that I am a German."

In Vienna the cost of living has gone up by 200 to 250 per cent. Although externally relations are excellent, the traveler who stays some time in Germany and in Austria soon notices that the Germans despise the Austrians, while the Austrians hate the Germans. The further one gets from the German frontier, especially toward Hungary, the more noticeable is the hatred of the German. The cost of living in Berlin and Vienna appears excessively cheap in comparison with what it is in Budapest, but in spite of all that, there, as in Vienna, there is no thought of economy. All classes of society have been seized by a kind of frenzy. In the restaurants, from the humblest to the most elegant, wine flows in streams to the music of Hungarian bands from 6 in the evening till 2 in the morning. A swarm of disreputable girls has thrown itself on the city, and it is they with the military of all arms and ranks who are in evidence everywhere. Sympathy with the French is openly professed, but on the other hand there is no love for the Slavs, whether Russians, Poles, Serbs, or Rumanians.

After leaving Budapest and crossing the Rumanian border, I had as companion a customs officer. When he learned of the trip I had just made, he brought in four of his colleagues. I had to tell them my story; and then from the mouths of these men I heard such an explosion of hatred against Germany and Austria and such strong assurances that all Rumania is thinking as they that to my mind there is no doubt that Rumania will join the side of the Entente. They told me of the German spies who swarm in Bucharest, of the stream of German gold to buy up public opinion, and of the plots against Take Jonescu, Filipesco, and other representatives of the Entente Party.

The German Chancellor's Speech

By Gilbert K. Chesterton

Noted English Essayist

Analyzing the German Chancellor's Reichstag address of April 5, Mr. Chesterton says, in the course of an article in Land and Water, London:

ALL that the Chancellor has here really succeeded in doing is making by implication three rather important admissions, which he would probably rather not make. First, he admits that, in spite of all the talk about the earth-devouring British ogre, Britain really desired all powers to remain powerful and on a sort of equality. Second, he admits that, in spite of the talk about the decadence and disappearance of France, that country has still a considerable chance of playing the first part in Europe. And third, in the case of Russia and Poland, he admits that the one consistent and conspicuous piece of advice that Prussia ever gave to Russia was uncommonly bad advice, which was indeed the case. Prussia first proposed and pressed the partition of Poland. She afterward prevented the emancipation of Poland. She has since incessantly bragged of the natural inferiority of Poland and the complete subjugation of Poland. She now says, with an unsmiling visage, that she will not give poor Poland to shocking, improper Russia; though it was only by her own wish that Poland was ever given to anybody. Much might be said in a gay and pleasurable spirit about this attitude, or antic, but for practical purposes a simple and sober fact will suffice; and that is the fact that nobody ever heard, or dreamed of hearing, a Prussian talk in such a tone until after the battle of the Marne.

Here I merely remark on the advantage of hearing the Imperial Chancellor publicly repudiate the chief work of Frederick the Great. It is not the only confession of somewhat the same kind. It is worth while to note one other implied admission, which may have been more intentional, the contrast made between Germany's present aims and her aims in 1870, "when Germany was dreaming of Alsace and empire." No German would deliberately dissociate himself from any imitation of Moltke and the example of Alsace, if he were not bidding cautiously for peace. Truly, Germany is not now thinking of Alsace—in that sense. She has become magnanimous. She is not troubled about getting her neighbor's goods, but only about keeping them.

The first stamp of this sort of stuff is an illogical vanity. The second is an utterly dead and disembodied pedantry. The best summary of it is Rousseau's "*nier ce qui est, et expliquer ce qui n'est pas.*" The Prussian is an outlaw and the enemy of everything in existence; but he is very careful in preserving the things which do not exist. Thus, there was and is a compact, unmistakable, independent kingdom called Belgium, which he and every one else not only recognized but guaranteed. He has suddenly and savagely overpowered it, and now says there must be a new Belgium, by which he means, of course, a German Belgium. That is, we are to declare to all future ages that any Prince who chooses to invade a weaker country shall be rewarded with that country even if he is conquered.

So far the thing, though a joke, might be held to be an old joke. This is not the first, though it might well be the worst, case of a kind of impudence which, being also impenitence, may quite properly be called damned impudence. But what is unique and German, what would only be conceivable in a German, is the fact that the Chancellor covers up this moral tragedy with a sort of scientific fairy tale. He suddenly becomes very much excited on behalf of something which he calls "the long suppressed Flemish race," which must have something which he calls "a sound evolution" based on its national character. The Flemish race would seem to have been so long and so successfully suppressed that the Flemings have forgotten all about it, and are all fighting tooth and nail for a country which they call Belgium. No doubt if the Germans were still in a position to do so, they would invade England to provide a sound evolution for the Jutish race; but I will not speculate, for even in answering such words one wanders out of the land of the living. It is as if a man who had just cut my mother into small pieces told me he had been very careful of her astral body.

The Chancellor remarks that Germany is the only State threatened with destruction. If we may take this as meaning that Prussia is the only country that the Allies, or any other people in the civilized world, have any reason for putting under lock and key, it may be true. If it means that the Allies and the civilized world will probably be in a position at the end of the war to put Prussia under lock and key, this also we may concede to the eager intelligence of the Imperial Chancellor. But it might be noted, as a preliminary point of fact, that whatever nation may be threatened with destruction at the end of the war, at least two nations were threatened with destruction at the beginning of the war, and were actually visited with practical destruction in the course of the war. The independence of these two nations was threatened by Germans alone, and was destroyed by Germans alone. The sovereignty of Serbia and the neutrality of Belgium were abolished at a blow by the Teutonic Powers, not as part of a difficult settlement of Europe, but as part of a perfectly wanton unsettlement of it. Whether or no any sort of annexation would be Europe's last word to Germany, it was certainly Germany's first act against Europe.

The Chancellor seems to suppose that because he has behaved like an anarchist, he has turned the world into an anarchy. He thinks that the mere fact, which we are ready to concede to him, that Germany has broken the civilization of the world into pieces, means that we have entirely forgotten how it was put together, and shall be content with any patchwork he may pick and choose for us. In short, he thinks that his bravoes have not only knocked us on the head, but knocked us silly; so that we have forgotten our father's name and our baptism and even the wrong that he has done us. He is mistaken. The story of the German adventure has been dreadful; but we do not find it in the least dubious. It is the character of a crime to shock, but it need not of necessity bewilder; and in this we do not see any particular mystery except the mystery of iniquity. At the end of it the Prussian will not find himself picking up whatever he can get in a scramble; he will find himself more and more separated from his dupes and tools, and punished impartially, and punished alone.

America's Opportunity

By H. G. Wells

In the course of a long article in The London Chronicle entitled "Looking Ahead," Mr. Wells says:

SO far as I can judge, the American mind is eminently free from any sentimental leaning toward the British. Americans have a traditional hatred of the Hanoverian monarchy and a democratic disbelief in autocracy. They are far more acutely aware of differences than resemblances. They suspect every Englishman of being a bit of a gentleman and a bit of a flunky. There is nothing to reciprocate the sympathy and pride that English and Irish republicans and radicals feel for the State. Few Americans realize that there are such beings as English republicans. What has linked them with the British hitherto has been very largely the common language and literature; it is only since the war began that there seems to have been any appreciable development of fraternal feeling. And that has been not so much discovery of a mutual affection as the realization of a far closer community of essential thought and purpose than has hitherto been suspected.

The Americans, after thinking the matter out with great frankness and vigor, do believe that Britain is, on the whole, fighting against aggression and not for profit; that she is honestly backing France and Belgium against an intolerable attack, and that the Hohenzollern empire is a thing that needs discrediting and, if possible, destroying, in the interests of all humanity, Germany included. And they find that, allowing for their greater nearness, the British are thinking about these things almost exactly as they think about them. * * *

The war and the great occasions that must follow the war will tax the mind and the intellectual and moral forces of the pledged Allies enormously. How far is this new but very great and growing system of thought and learning in the United States capable of that propaganda of ideas and language, that progressive expression of a developing ideal of community * * * which must necessarily take the place of the organized authoritative Kultur of the Teutonic type of State? As an undisguisedly patriotic Englishman I would like to see the lead in this intellectual synthesis of the nations, that must be achieved if wars are to cease, undertaken by Great Britain. But I am bound to confess that in Great Britain I see neither the imaginative courage of France nor the brisk enterprise of the Americans. I see this matter as a question of peace and civilization; but there are other baser, but quite as effective, reasons why America, France, and Great Britain should exert themselves to create confidence and understandings between their populations and the Russian population. There is the immediate business opportunity in Russia.

There is the secondary bussiness opportunity in China that can best be developed as the partners rather than as the rivals of the Russians. Since the Americans are nearest, by way of the Pacific, since they are likely to have more capital and more free energy to play with than the pledged Allies, I do, on the whole, incline to the belief that it is they who will yet do the pioneer work and the leading work that this opportunity demands.

Origin and Meaning of the War

By Professor N. Kareyev

Leading Russian Scholar, Member of Academy of Sciences

[Written in Russian and translated for CURRENT HISTORY]

THERE exists already a whole literature on the origin and meaning of the present great struggle. Properly speaking, it is yet too early to write about the meaning of the war to humanity, as this meaning will be made clear only at the end, which still lies in the future, and the subject can therefore be only a matter of guessing, based on one's hopes and wishes, as well as one's doubts and fears. The war has put forward a series of questions, which can receive different answers, depending upon the course which the history of tomorrow may take; and not only different answers, but also unexpected ones, for, after all, the war itself was a great surprise. Even though we take into consideration the fact that the war was predicted by many, there was no knowing when and on what occasion it would commence.

The Governments of the warring countries have all issued collections of diplomatic documents in book form, under colored covers, and they contain enough material for rendering the decision as to who was responsible for the war and in what quarters the guilt is to be located. Many details of the historic week which preceded the declaration of war may remain unknown to us; but whatever revelations may be made in the future, whatever historians may dig out of the archives, there will hardly be any essential change in the present indictment of the originators of the war.

Guilty are they who placed a burning match to the tinder that had accumulated in a long period of time. It is true that history, not the originators of the explosion, had created and accumulated that mass of inflammable material. But it was possible to handle it in various ways, not to throw into it burning matches, or to permit similar acts by others. Of itself automatically nothing happens in history. A historical process is a personal process, and not an impersonal evolution. And whatever appears to be impersonal in history is really the result of individual efforts. Each generation of humanity has to deal with a certain aggregation of conditions created by its predecessor, but how the inheritance of the past will be regarded by its heir, and what will become of it, that, in the last analysis, will be found to depend upon the work of separate individuals or social groups. History ties some very hard knots, which people either entangle still more or try to untie, or simply sever by sword without attempting another solution.

The twentieth century inherited from the past three difficult knots, which could have been let alone, could have been made the object of a concerted effort at disentanglement, could have been more entangled, or could have been severed by sword. Whoever refused to preserve the status quo, or to attempt a peaceful solution, is responsible for the war. The matter certainly was in the hands of one or more individuals for decision. There is little support for those publicists who make general causes responsible for the war, as if "general causes," without individual volition, could accomplish anything in history. Of course, I am infinitely distant from the Carlylean thesis that all history is the product of one will, of the so-called hero or great man. But I am just as distant from the Tolstoyan doctrine, claiming that history is the result of all, minus those persons generally called great.

Much as we may seek the cause for current events in the collective psychology of the German Nation, we shall find that the frame of mind of that nation cannot be held responsible directly for the conflagration. Figuratively, one may speak of guns discharging themselves. In life it never happens. That the mental attitude of the German public was different from the Russian, French, or English, that it was more militant and aggressive, cannot be doubted. But though it constituted a menacing atmosphere, it cannot be held directly responsible for the war, as it in itself was the creation of the real originators of the war.

If, from the question of responsibility, which could be answered in a judicial manner as it has already been done by the American jurist Beck, we pass to the more historical question of the genesis of the war, the collective frame of mind of the German public cannot be left out of consideration. Their military, economic, political, and cultural successes turned the heads of the Germans, and it is impossible not to bear this in mind while considering the origin of the war. But also some purely materialistic, economic conditions were responsible, though the problems born of these conditions could have been solved peacefully as well. Another cause of the war was the conviction among the German people that earlier or later it would have to take place. Other peoples shared this conviction to some degree.

The great war, if we regard it from all concrete sides, was a surprise. But war, nevertheless, was expected. For a long time its possibility, and even inevitability, was discussed. And to a higher or lesser degree all nations were preparing for war. These very preparations have to a considerable measure prepared the war itself. Growing militarism was justified on the plea of insuring peace, but it contained itself the danger of war.

If it is comparatively easy to locate the causes of the war, it is because long before it broke out the antagonisms on whose foundations the possibility of war rested became clear to all. Past history has formed three complicated major knots in international relations, which, combined with some others of minor importance, constitute the great political tangle of the world war.

The first knot came into existence in 1871, when Germany appropriated Alsace-Lorraine. This was the Franco-German knot, which has been a menace to the peace of the world ever since.

The second may be called the Austro-Russian or Balkan knot. Its beginning in modern history goes back to 1875, when the Herzegovina uprising occurred. Squeezed out from Italy and Germany, Austria turned to the Balkans, where her policies came into conflict with those of Russia. The Hapsburg monarchy found support for its Balkan policies in Germany, which soon began to seek expansion in the same direction, having for its ultimate objective Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Russia's opponent in the Balkans was not only Austria-Hungary, but also Germany.

The last circumstance served as a tie between the two knots, Franco-German and Austro-Russian; but a third soon joined them, more recent in origin, but very important at that.

At the opening of the present century the Anglo-German knot entered history, forcing England to make friends of her antagonists, Russia and France. So long as Germany remained an agricultural, Continental State, and purely European, England had little to do with her. But the development of German industry and commerce, the creation of Germany's mercantile and naval fleets, the acquisition of colonies, and her movements in Asia to the Persian Gulf, compelled England to modify her attitude toward Germany. The Anglo-German knot became interlocked with the first two, forming a Gordian knot in international politics, which had grown still more complicated, owing to a series of secondary knots connected with each major one. But, grave as the situation was, it was still capable of a peaceful disentanglement. There was no lack of plans for such a happy solution. It was left for the powers to choose between war and peace. And we know now which side was desirous of avoiding war and which was resolved to draw the sword.

As soon as the great war was declared a flood of new problems rushed before the public eye, demanding solutions. This in itself proves the import of the struggle and the meaning attached to it. In each of the two camps these problems are being offered for solution in different ways, and each of the warring countries wishes to solve them in its own way. Each puts its own meaning into the struggle, according to the efforts exerted by each. Quite frequently the wildest chimeras are suggested, but not infrequently practical problems are advanced which cannot remain unanswered, the Polish question, for example.

The true meaning of the war will appear only when these problems that are clamoring for solution shall have been solved, once for all, definitely and sanely. That can come only after the close of hostilities.

The Pope and the Peace Conference

An interesting glimpse of the Italian attitude regarding the status of the Pope is given in these excerpts from the Nuova Antologia.

I.

ANSWER TO ERNESTO NATHAN

By Filippo Crispotti

SIR: You write that "the spectacle presented by Italy today is wonderful; we are all united, parties have virtually disappeared." And, so far as concerns the military and civil contribution to the war, you are right. Then you add: "It is not advisable to raise questions apt to disturb this 'Truce of God,' to sow discord in anticipation." And to a great degree you are right once more. But he who, like the Hon. Soderini and myself, and many others, opposes the a priori exclusion of the Pope from an eventual Peace Conference, is not sowing discord.

We have not proposed to the powers, much less to Italy, to invite the Pope. The possibility of this invitation was suggested by many voices, on all hands. We have opposed ourselves to those who, having heard these voices, proposed to Italy that she should place herself antecedently and absolutely "in the negative," the first in authority among these being Senator Rolandi Ricci and Deputy Tommaso Mosca. To them we said, very temperately, that it was not right in this way to cause a disturbance of the Truce of God. At the same time I permit myself to say to you, now that you, not from a fear of injuring the Guarantees, like Deputy Mosca, but because of a supposed lack of title in the Pope—a thesis sufficiently general, and one touching the character of the Congress itself, and not only Italy's interest—in part follow Rolandi Ricci, as he in his turn follows the thought of Zanichelli on The Hague Congress, and affirm that the Pope would have no title to be admitted to the Peace Conference, and would find nothing to do there.

To controvert these arguments of yours is not to raise unsuitable or untimely questions, or to sow discord. It is to restore the question, which has already been brought before the world, to its natural development, to disencumber it from obstacles which seem to me to be out of place, and to make room for certain truths which, like every truth, are not tares of discord, but elements of concord. You ask: "Is it possible to know on what grounds the Pontiff should take his place in the contemplated Synedrion, and not delegates of the Anglican or Lutheran Church, or of the Mohammedan or Buddhist religions, the latter dear to the Japanese?" And the interrogation is stated thus, in order to remain within the limits of State religions, without taking into account the representatives of the Israelites, the Baptists, and those who embrace different forms of philosophic thought, and, fighting in the armies, freely give their lives in battle, even though not enrolled under a State religion.

The reply is simple. If the Pope were invited because of his spiritual title, or because of his just title, no obligation of consistency would constrain the State to issue similar invitations to others, nor to change the Peace Conference into a Conference of Religions, for the reason that it is inaccurate to say that there are other personages having titles equal to those of the Pope. And I affirm this, quite apart from the divine origin of the Pope's mission, which is incommunicable to the ministers of other confessions. Since I have to discuss the question with you, I must remain on ground that is common to us both, and I know that you would not follow me on theological ground. I confine myself to purely palpable facts.

To begin with, what religion has, like the Catholic, a life and organization so distinct from the life and organization of States, nations, races, upheld by its moral force alone? Where are the heads of religions who, like the Pope, have throughout the world so great importance due solely to a religious title? In the second place, in what religion has the office of head the significance, the scope, which it has in the Catholic religion? In the confessions which you have enumerated the place left for liberty of individual conscience is so great, and the variety of local customs is so large, as to render impossible either a genuine body of doctrine, with a single authority, or a true organism, apt for discipline, worship, hierarchy. The head, when there is one, far from being the master, the legislator, the governor, as the Pope is, in our religion, has a much more restricted authority, sometimes merely an honorary primacy. And I say, "when there is one," because, especially in the aberrant Christian sects, the supremacy is exercised in part, as it is in theory, by the temporal sovereign, in the other part, and in practical details, by a sacerdotal body or person.

Finally, to all these reasons why the spiritual figure of the Pope is unique, even in an earthly sense, it is to be added that infidels and heretics themselves recognize this unique position. Have Governors and Kings, of whatever belief, ever been seen to send Ambassadors to the Chief Rabbis, or to the Chief Priests of Brahma and Buddha, respectfully visiting them in their sees, and considering them, at least in the formality of precedence, as superior to themselves; treating them, that is, as they treat the Pope?

II.

HEADS OF MANY CHURCHES

BY MONSIGNOR UMBERTO BENIGNI

* * * Another capital proof is this: that, at the future Peace Conference, at which the presence of the Roman Catholic Pope is not desired, other Popes will be present. * * * And this undeniable fact will suffice to prove the reality of certain objections—namely: In the coming Peace Conference, an active and decisive part will be taken by the official heads of different Churches: the King of England, head of the Anglican Es-

tablished Church; the King of Prussia, summus episcopus of the Evangelical Church of his kingdom; the Czar of Russia, head of the Orthodox Church of his empire and religious protector of the other Orthodox Christians; the Sultan of Turkey, Padishah, Vicar of Allah for Islam; the Mikado of Japan, son of the gods and head of the religion of his nation.

Italians are so little familiar with such facts that their minds refuse to see in these sovereigns real heads of Churches. Confusing ecclesiastic supremacy with the ecclesiastical function, Italians are led to consider these sovereigns not as the heads of the respective confessions or religions, but, at the most, as exercising civil control over religious life, in the same manner as the Italian Government gives or refuses the exequatur or the placet to the Bishops and parishes of the Kingdom of Italy. Yet the former view is true, not the latter. The fact that the King of England does not distribute the sacrament to his faithful, and that the Czar does not officiate in the Orthodox Cathedral at Petrograd, does not contravene the fact that the one and the other are the heads, the true heads, of their Churches, since, to be the head of a Church, it is enough to be the direct superior of its hierarchy and its functioning. * * *

How then? It was proclaimed by well known thinkers and politicians, before 1870, that it was necessary to liberate the Pope from the bonds of temporal power in order that he might be able better to occupy himself with the spiritual interests of the Catholic world; now it is proclaimed that, to occupy himself with them, like the other "Popes" in Congress, he should be a temporal sovereign!

Cadorna: Italy's Idol

By Luigi Barzini

In a long and enthusiastic article in the Corriere della Sera of Milan the author thus sketches the chief commander of the Italian Army:

THE great spirit of General Luigi Cadorna is really the moral fulcrum of our army. His person, bony but square of build, solid, full of a vigor that seems to belie his age, quickly reveals his energy and simplicity. None of the trappings of pomp supports his prestige. One who has never seen Cadorna and who enters his office for the first time has no conception of the modest appearance of the old gentleman soldier who awaits him, erect, dressed in the rough uniform of the field, on which glistens the insignia of his rank. The frank cordiality of his salutation, his courteous gesture of invitation, his open smile, the bright expression of his proud, thin, tormented, genial face immediately dispel the slight disquietude of one who approaches a personage in power, which is perhaps merely a putting one's self on guard. And before speaking you have a certain ineffable sense of confidence that opens the way to your fullest sincerity.

His thick mustache is white, his sparse, straight hair rises from a forehead lined by thought, his whole face has the wrinkles that the cares of life print, but a verdant youth looks out of his clear eyes. They flash, they laugh, those eyes of his, and from them shines the freshness of a spirit that is unalterable because it is perhaps the freshness of a whole soldierly race descended to him with an atavistic confidence in war.

He is not, like Joffre, a silent man, but he is not one who wastes words. He economizes them like ammunition; he saves them up to attain an object, to which they go straight as a cannon shot. Often he is silent for a long time, and seems distraught, but he is listening; and if, in the conversation there comes up an error to be destroyed or a truth to be demonstrated, then he will let go a sentence. It is a blaze of ideas, a brief gust, but the whole web of conjectures, of ratiocinations and of hypotheses that had been spun about him is broken and thrown into disorder, the truth appears. For Cadorna has made of common sense the fundamental law of his thought. "The art of warfare," he has written, "should inspire itself from pure and simple common sense." In this maxim is the whole science of life.

Cadorna understood that to wait meant getting a trench war in our own country; he felt the absolute necessity of using every disposable means at once for a bold attack, even if a dangerous one—both to carry the struggle out of Italy at one blow and to push the front out and have its roots enter as deeply as possible, correcting the most dangerous weaknesses of the frontiers, taking away from the enemy the passes that threatened us the most. He made his demands, and when Cadorna demands he is inflexible, because he does not get the strength of his reasoning from the consensus of other men's opinion. He is sure. He has in himself all the elements of certainty. No objection can move him, for he has made them all to himself already. His will draws things along just through the intuition that every one has of his logic. When he does not draw, he overturns.

Thus the sparse covering troops went outside their limits and little by little became an army, they knit together during the offensive action, broadening out gradually through the arrival of the mobilized forces that were coming from the arteries of the country. It was a technical prodigy.

Behind the field of military operations which are burning, tangible, there went on for a long time an intense work of creation, of formation, of strengthening—obscure, vast, marvelous. Let us not forget that when Italy felt the need of its army there was no army. Political evils had reduced it to an appearance. In nine months it was called up out of nothing. During that long vigil of waiting, while Europe was on fire, Cadorna improvised the work of decades with an activity that would seem superhuman if one were not acquainted with the iron calm of this man, who knows with preciseness and order what is to be done, and who knows it without knowing fatigue. He deserves the name of the Father of the Army. But even performing miracles, the preparation could only be maintained by a constant effort equal to that demanded by events. And necessity made ever greater demands. The instrument of the struggle had to continue renewing itself right through the struggle. This work of Cadorna's, necessarily the least known, is not the least splendid. It was constantly and urgently his task to face the peril of disproportion between his needs and his means. All the organisms were brought to the extreme of efficiency, were raised to the maximum of their yield, by a veritable wave of energy and will, of enthusiasm and faith that came down from the General in Chief.



Defense of the British Blockade

Great Britain's Reply to Protests of the United States on Interference with Neutral Trade

The State Department at Washington made public on April 24 Sir Edward Grey's official answer to the protest of the United States Government—a protest sent last November—in regard to allied interference with neutral trade. The note contains 13,000 words and has several appendices. All its essential portions are reproduced in full in the following pages of CURRENT HISTORY, *with the section numbers of the original. The document is of lasting historical importance. It has not been published in so complete a form elsewhere in the United States.*

THE communication addressed by the United States Ambassador in London to Sir E. Grey on Nov. 5, 1915, has received the careful attention of his Majesty's Government in consultation with their allies, the French Government, and his Majesty's Government have now the honor to make the following reply:

2. The first section (Paragraphs 3-15) of the United States note relates to cargoes detained by the British authorities in order to prevent them from reaching an enemy destination, and the complaint of the United States Government is summarized in Paragraph 33, to the effect that the methods sought to be employed by Great Britain to obtain and use evidence of enemy destination of cargoes bound for neutral ports and to impose a contraband character upon such cargoes are without justification.

3. The wording of this summary suggests that the basis of the complaint of the United States Government is not so much that the shipments intercepted by the naval forces were really intended for use in the neutral countries to which they were dispatched, as that the dispatch of goods to the enemy countries has been frustrated by methods which have not been employed by belligerent nations in the past. It would seem to be a fair reply to such a contention that new devices for dispatching goods to the enemy must be met by new methods of applying the fundamental and acknowledged principle of the right to intercept such trade.

4. The question whether the exercise of the right to search can be restricted to search at sea was dealt with in Sir E. Grey's note of Jan. 7, 1915, and his Majesty's Government would again draw attention to the facts that information has constantly reached them of attempts to conceal contraband intended for the enemy in innocent packages, and that these attempts can only be frustrated by examination of the ship and cargo in port. Similarly, in Sir E. Grey's note of Feb. 10, 1915, it was pointed out that the size of modern steamships and their capacity to navigate the waters where the allied patrols have to operate whatever the conditions of the weather, frequently render it a matter of extreme danger, if not of impossibility, even to board the vessels unless they are taken into calm water for the purpose. It is unnecessary to repeat what was said in that note. There is nothing that his Majesty's Government could withdraw, or that the experience of the officers of the allied fleets has tended to show was inaccurate.

5. When visit and search at sea are possible, and when a search can be made there which is sufficient to secure belligerent rights, it may be admitted that it would be an unreasonable hardship on merchant vessels to compel them to come into port, and it may well be believed that maritime nations have hesitated to modify the instructions to their naval officers that it is at sea that these operations should be carried out, and that undue deviation of the vessel from her course must be avoided. That, however, does not affect the fact that it would be impossible under the conditions of modern warfare to confine the rights of visit and search to an examination of the ship at the place where she is encountered without surrendering a fundamental belligerent right.

ADMIRAL JELLICOE'S VIEWS

6. The effect of the size and seaworthiness of merchant vessels upon their search at sea is essentially a technical question, and accordingly his Majesty's Government have thought it well to submit the report of the board of naval experts, quoted by the United States Ambassador in Paragraph 7 of this note, to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe for his observations. The unique experience which this officer has gained as the result of more than eighteen months in command of the Grand Fleet renders his opinion of peculiar value. His report is as follows:

" It is undoubtedly the case that the size of modern vessels is one of the factors which renders search at sea far more difficult than in the days of smaller vessels. So far as I know it has never been contended that it is necessary to remove every package of a ship's cargo to establish the character and nature of her trace, &c.; but it must be obvious that the larger the vessel and the greater the amount of cargo, the more difficult does examination at sea become, because more packages must be removed.

"This difficulty is much enhanced by the practice of concealing contraband in bales of hay and passengers' luggage, casks, &c.; and this procedure, which has undoubtedly been carried out, necessitates the actual removal of a good deal of cargo for examination in suspected cases. This removal cannot be carried out at sea except in the very finest weather.

"Further, in a large ship the greater bulk of the cargo renders it easier to conceal contraband, especially such valuable metals as nickel, quantities of which can easily be stowed in places other than the holds of a large ship.

"I entirely dispute the contention, therefore, advanced in the American note that there is no difference between the search of a ship of 1,000 tons and one of 20,000 tons. I am sure that the fallacy of the statement must be apparent to any one who has ever carried out such a search at sea.

"There are other facts, however, which render it necessary to bring vessels into port for search. The most important is the manner in which those in command of German submarines, in entire disregard of international law and of their own prize regulations, attack and sink merchant vessels on the high seas, neutral as well as British, without visiting the ship, and therefore without any examination of the cargo. This procedure renders it unsafe for a neutral vessel which is being examined by officers from a British ship to remain stopped on the high seas, and it is therefore in the interests of the neutrals themselves that the examination should be conducted in port.

"The German practice of misusing United States passports in order to procure a safe conduct for military persons and agents of enemy nationality makes it necessary to examine closely all suspect persons, and to do this effectively necessitates bringing the ship into harbor."

7. Sir John Jellicoe goes on to say:

"The difference between the British and the German procedure is that we have acted in the way which causes the least discomfort to neutrals. Instead of sinking neutral ships engaged in trade with the enemy, as the Germans have done in so many cases in direct contravention of Article 113 of their own Naval Prize Regulations, 1909, in which it is laid down that the commander is only justified in destroying a neutral ship which has been captured if

(a) She is liable to condemnation, and

(b) The bringing in might expose the warship to danger or imperil the success of the operations in which she is engaged at the time

we examine them, giving as little inconveience as modern naval conditions will allow, sending them into port only where this becomes necessary.

"It must be remembered, however, that it is not the Allies alone who send a percentage of neutral vessels into port for examination, for it is common knowledge that German naval vessels, as stated in Paragraph 19 of the American note, 'seize and bring into German ports neutral vessels bound for Scandinavian and Danish ports.'

"As cases in point, the interception by the Germans of the American oil-tankers Llama and Platuria in August last may be mentioned. Both were bound to America from Sweden, and were taken into Swinemünde for examination."

FRENCH MINISTRY OF MARINE

8. The French Ministry of Marine shares the views expressed by Sir J. Jellicoe on the question of search at sea, and has added the following statement:

"La pratique navale, telle qu'elle existait autrefois et consistant à visiter les navires en mer, méthode que nous a léguée l'ancienne marine, ne s'adapte plus aux conditions de la navigation actuelle. Les Américains ont pressenti son insuffisance et ont prévu la nécessité de lui en substituer une plus efficace. Dans les Instructions données par le Département de la Marine américaine, du 20 juin, 1898, aux croiseurs des Etats-Unis, on trouve déjà la prescription suivante:

"'Si ces derniers (les papiers de bord) indiquent de la contrabande de guerre, le navire devra être saisi; sinon, il sera laissé libre, *a moins qu'en raison de puissants motifs de suspicion, une visite plus minutieuse paraisse devoir etre exigee.'*

"Toute méthode doit se modifier en tenant compte des transformations subies par le matérial que les hommes ont à leur disposition à la condition de rester une méthode humaine et civilisée. (Navy Department, General, No. 492, 'Instruction to Blockading Vessels and Cruisers.' Paragraph 13.)

"L'Amirauté française estime qu'aujourd'hui un navire, pour être visité, doit être derouté sur un port toutes les fois que l'état de la mer, la nature, le poids, le volume, l'arrimage de la cargaison suspecte, en même temps que l'obscurité et l'absence de précision des papiers de bord, rendent la visite en mer pratiquement impossible ou dangereuse pour le navire visité.

"Au contraire, lorsque les circonstances inverses existent, la visite doit être faite en mer.

"Le déroutement est également nécessaire et justifié, lorsque, le navire neutre entrant dans la zone ou le voisinage des hostilités, (1) il importe, dans l'intérêt même du navire neutre, d'éviter à ce dernier une série d'arrêts et de visites successives et de faire établir, une fois pour toutes, son caractère inoffensif et de lui permettre ainsi de continuer librement sa route sans être molesté; et (2) le belligérant, dans son droit de légitime défense, est fondé à exercer une surveillance particulière sur les navires inconnus qui circulent dans ces parages."

9. The question of the locality of the search is, however, one of secondary importance. In the view of his Majesty's Government the right of a belligerent to intercept contraband on its way to his enemy is fundamental and incontestable, and ought not to be restricted to intercepting contraband which happens to be accompanied on board the ship by proof sufficient to condemn it. What is essential is to determine whether or not the goods were on their way to the enemy. If they were a belligerent is entitled to detain them, and having regard to the nature of the struggle in which the Allies are engaged they are compelled to take the most effectual steps to exercise that right.

In Paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 Sir Edward Grey's reply deals with various objections raised to British prize court procedure, and points out that rules formerly governing such procedure are no longer applicable. The note goes on:

14. It may be doubted whether any belligerent Government would be ready to forego the right of capture of goods on their way to an enemy in every case where such destination was not disclosed by the ship's papers or the evidence of those on board the ship. The difficulty which the United States naval officers found even as early as 1862 in complying with the old rule is illustrated by the quotation from Lord Lyons's note of April 22, 1863, in connection with the case of the Magicienne, one of the cases which is dealt with in the appendix to this note, in which he drew attention to the habit of the United States cruisers of seizing vessels on the chance that something might possibly be discovered ex post facto which would prevent the captors from being condemned to pay damages.

TRADERS' RISKS

15. The contention advanced by the United States Government in Paragraph 9 of their note, that the effect of this new procedure is to subject traders to risk of loss, delay, and expense so great and so burdensome as practically to destroy much of the export trade of the United States, to neutral countries in Europe is not borne out by the official statistics published in the United States, nor by the reports of the Department of Commerce The first nine months of 1915 may be taken as a period when the war conditions must have been known to all those engaged in commerce in the United States of America, and when any injurious effects of the prize court procedure would have been recognized. During that period the exports from the United States of America to the three Scandinavian countries and Holland, the group of neutral countries whose imports have been most affected by the naval operations of the Allies and by the procedure adopted in their prize courts, amounted to $274,037,000, as compared with $126,763,000 in the corresponding period of 1913. It is useless to take into account the corresponding figures of 1914 because of the dislocation of trade caused by the outbreak of war, but taking the pre-war months of 1914, the figures for 1913, 1914, and 1915 were as follows:

1913	$97,480,000
1914	88,132,000
1915	234,960

16. In the face of such figures it seems impossible to accept the contention that the new prize court procedure in Great Britain has practically destroyed much of the export trade of the United States to neutral countries in Europe, and the inference is suggested that if complaints have been made to the Administration at Washington by would-be exporters, they emanated not from persons who desired to engage in genuine commerce with the neutral countries, but from those who desired to dispatch goods to the enemy under cover of a neutral destination, and who found it more difficult to conceal the real facts from the Prize Courts under the new procedure.

17. At this point it would have been opportune to introduce a reply to the contention that appears at first sight to be advanced in Paragraph 13 of the United States note that Great Britain, while interfering with foreign trade, has increased her own with neutral countries adjacent to Germany, but this is rendered unnecessary by the explanation given by Mr. Page at the time that he presented the note, and since confirmed by a statement given out to the press at Washington, that no such meaning is to be attributed to the paragraph. Moreover, the subject has been dealt with in the note which Sir E. Grey sent to Mr. Page on the 13th August last, and again in the note given to the State Department by the British Ambassador at Washington on the 27th December.

The questions of non-interference with goods intended for the "common stock" of a neutral country, and discrimination between bona fide neutral commerce and that intended for the enemy, are dealt with in Paragraphs 18, 19, and 20, and some illuminating examples are given of the way in which efforts were made to get goods through to Germany on the "common stock" excuse, as, for example, the fact that while the quays of Gothenburg were congested for cotton, none was available for the use of Swedish spinners. The note proceeds:

BOGUS CONSIGNEES

21. However sound the principle that goods intended for incorporation in the common stock of a neutral country should not be treated as contraband may be in theory, it is one that can have but little application to the present imports of the Scandinavian countries. The circumstances of a large number of these shipments negative any conclusion that they are bona fide shipments for the importing countries. Many of them are made to persons who are apparently nominees of enemy agents, and who never figured before as importers of such articles. Consignments of meat products are addressed to lightermen and dock laborers. Several thousands of tons of such goods have been found documented for a neutral port and addressed to firms which do not exist there. Large consignments of similar goods were addressed to a baker, to the keeper of a small private hotel, or to a maker of musical instruments. Will it be contended that such imports ought to be regarded as bona fide shipments intended to become part of the common stock of the country?

22. Similarly several of the shipments which the allied naval forces are now obliged to intercept consist of goods for which there is in normal circumstances no sale in the importing country, and it has already been pointed out in a recent decision in the British Prize Court that the rule about incorporation in the common stock of a neutral country cannot apply to such goods. The same line was taken in some of the decisions in the United States Prize Courts during the civil war.

23. In the presence of facts such as those indicated above the United States Government will, it is believed, agree with his Majesty's Government that no belligerent could in modern times submit to be bound by a rule that no goods could be seized unless they were accompanied by papers which established their destination to an enemy country, and that all detentions of ships and goods must be uniformly based on proofs obtained at the time of seizure. To press any such theory is tantamount to asking that all trade between neutral ports shall be free, and would thus render nugatory the exercise of sea power and destroy the pressure which the command of the sea enables the Allies to impose upon their enemy.

24. It is, of course, inevitable that the exercise of belligerent rights at sea, however reasonably exercised, must inconvenience neutral trade, and great pressure is being put upon the United States Government to urge the technical theory that there should be no interference at all with goods passing between neutral ports, and thus to frustrate the measures which the Allies have taken to intercept commerce on its way to or from the enemy. It may not be out of place to recall that the position is somewhat similar to that which arose in the United States in the war between the North and the South. All students of international law and of military history are aware that the blockade of the Southern States was the most important engine of pressure possessed by the North, and that it was on the point of being rendered ineffective through the use by blockade runners of neutral ports of access. It is well known that the United States Government took immediate steps to stop such trade, and that the United States Supreme Court extended the doctrine of continuous voyage so as to cover all cases where there was an intention to break the blockade by whatever means, direct or indirect.

CIVIL WAR EXAMPLES

25. The configuration of the European coast is such as to render neutral ports the most convenient for the passage of German commerce, and just as it was essential to the United States in the civil war to prevent their blockade from being nullified by the use of neutral ports of access, so it is essential to the allied powers today to see that the measures which they are taking to intercept enemy commerce shall not be rendered illusory by the use of similar ports. The instructions issued by Mr. Seward during the civil war show that he regarded the continuance of the blockade against the Southern States as absolutely vital, and he repeatedly instructed American representatives abroad to assure foreign Governments that, while he was fully alive to the great inconveniences caused by the cutting off of the supplies of cotton from Europe, yet he could not, as American Secretary of State, "sacrifice the Union for cotton." The American representatives in Europe in their published reports again and again expressed the opinion that, whatever might be the policy of the Government, the peoples of Europe would never consent to side with the power that upheld slavery against the power which represented freedom. Their opinion was entirely justified by the result, and in fact neither the French nor the English Government took any decided steps toward breaking the blockade, in spite of the tremendous pressure which was brought to bear upon them, and the terrible suffering of the cotton operatives of this country. Indeed, President Lincoln himself acknowledged in a message to the laboring classes of Manchester his high sense of the spirit of self-sacrifice which they had exhibited in their policy toward America. His Majesty's Government has, of course, no desire to enter upon any examination of the issues involved in that historic conflict, but no one will question the respect which is due to the determination then shown by the French and British peoples not to range themselves on what they believed to be the side of slavery or consent to action which they held might be fatal to the democratic principle of Government, however great the pressure exerted by commercial interests might be.

NEUTRAL TRADE

26. His Majesty's Government desire to assure the United States Government that every effort is being made to distinguish between *bona fide* neutral commerce and that which is really intended for the enemy. The task is one of exceptional difficulty, and the statistics show that a great volume of imports intended for the enemy must have passed through adjacent neutral countries during the war. As an instance, the imports of lard into Sweden during the year 1915 may be taken. In that year the total import of lard into Sweden from all sources was 9,318 tons, of which no less than 9,029 tons came from the United States. In the three years before the war, 1911-13, the annual average import of the same article was only 888, of which 638 tons came from the United States. It is difficult to believe that the requirements of Sweden in respect of lard, even when every allowance is made for possible diversions of trade due to the war, could suddenly have increased more than tenfold in 1915. The inference, indeed, is irresistible that the greater part of these imports must have had another and an enemy destination.

27. It may readily be conceded that the efforts to intercept enemy commerce passing through neutral countries cannot fail to produce some soreness and dissatisfaction. His Majesty's Government have therefore spared no pains in their endeavor to mitigate the inconvenience which must inevitably be occasioned to neutral traders. In pursuance of this object they are resorting to the policy of ascertaining the total requirements of the country concerned, and intercepting such imports as may be presumed, because they are in excess of those requirements, to form no part of the normal trade of the country, and therefore to be destined for the enemy.

28. The total net imports of a particular commodity by any country in normal times give a satisfactory index to its requirements, and where these are provided for on a generous scale, suitable allowance being made for the commercial dislocation inseparable from a state of war, it is not unfair, after eighteen months of war and in the light of the experience which has now been gained, to invite the prize court to regard with suspicion further consignments of any kind of goods of which the imports have already exceeded a figure ample to satisfy the country's requirements.

29. It ought not to be difficult to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with all parties on the subject, as the official statistics afford information not only as to the quantities of particular commodities required by neutral countries, but also of the sources from which they are usually obtained. Arrangements of this nature will be of great service in removing the friction and misunderstanding which now arise, as it will help the commercial classes in the neutral countries to form an idea of the limits within which their trading operations are not likely to encounter difficulty.

30. The adoption of such a system, although not unattended by difficulty, has been greatly facilitated by agreements made with the organizations which control imports in the neutral countries, as well as by arrangements with some of the shipping lines, and with several of the interests concerned in the import of particular commodities from neutral countries. His Majesty's Government intend to avail themselves of every opportunity which may present itself in order to bring about a more extended adoption of this equitable system.

31. Moreover, the fact that a neutral country adjacent to the enemy territory is importing an abnormal quantity of supplies or commodities, of which her usual imports are relatively small, of which the enemy stands in need, and which are known to pass from that neutral country to the enemy, is by itself an element of proof on which the prize court would be justified in acting, unless it is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. Hostile destination being a question of fact, the court should take all the relevant circumstances into consideration in arriving at its decision, and there seems to be no reason in principle for limiting the facts at which the court is entitled to look in a case of this kind.

EFFECTIVE BLOCKADE.

32. The second section of the United States note (Paragraphs 16-24) deals with the validity of the measures against enemy commerce which were embodied in the British Order in Council of March 11, 1915, and in the French Decree of March 13, and maintains that these measures are invalid because they do not comply with the rules which have been gradually evolved in the past for regulating a blockade of enemy ports, and which were summarized in concrete form in Articles 1-21 of the Declaration of London.

33. These rules can only be applied to their full extent to a blockade in the sense of the term as used in the Declaration of London. His Majesty's Government have already pointed out that a blockade which was limited to the direct traffic with enemy ports would in this case have but little if any effect on enemy commerce, Germany being so placed geographically that her imports and exports can pass through neutral ports of access as easily as through her own. However, with the spirit of the rules, his Majesty's Government and their allies have loyally complied in the measures they have taken to intercept German imports and exports. Due notice has been given by the Allies of the measures they have taken, and goods which were shipped or contracted for before the announcement of the intention of the Allies to detain all commerce on its way to or from the enemy countries have been treated with great liberality. The objects with which the usual declaration and notification of blockade

are issued have therefore been fully achieved. Again, the effectiveness of the work of the allied fleets under the orders referred to is shown by the small number of vessels which escape the allied patrols. It is doubtful whether there has ever been a blockade where the ships which slipped through bore so small a proportion to those which were intercepted.

34. The measures taken by the Allies are aimed at preventing commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany, and not merely at preventing ships from reaching or leaving German ports. His Majesty's Government do not feel, therefore, that the rules set out in the United States note need be discussed in detail. The basis and the justification of the measures which the Allies have taken were dealt with at length in Sir E. Grey's note of July 23, and there is no need to repeat what was there said. It need only be added that the rules applicable to a blockade of enemy ports are strictly followed by the Allies in cases where they apply, as, for instance, in the blockades which have been declared of the Turkish coast of Asia Minor or of the coastline of German East Africa.

TEST OF RESULTS

35. Some further comment is perhaps necessary upon the statements made in Paragraph 19 of the United States note, where it is said that because German coasts are open to trade with Scandinavian countries the measures of the Allies fail to comply with the rule that a blockade must be effective. It is no doubt true that commerce from Sweden and Norway reaches German ports in the Baltic in the same way that commerce still passes to and from Germany across the land frontiers of adjacent States, but this fact does not render the measures which France and Great Britain are taking against German trade the less justifiable. Even if these measures were judged with strict reference to the rules applicable to blockades, a standard by which, in their view, the measures of the Allies ought not to be judged, it must be remembered that the passage of commerce to a blockaded area across a land frontier or across an inland sea has never been held to interfere with the effectiveness of the blockade. If the right to intercept commerce on its way to or from a belligerent country, even though it may enter that country through a neutral port, be granted, it is difficult to see why the interposition of a few miles of sea as well should make any difference. If the doctrine of continuous voyage may rightly be applied to goods going to Germany through Rotterdam, on what ground can it be contended that it is not equally applicable to goods with a similar destination passing through some Swedish port and across the Baltic, or even through neutral waters only? In any case, it must be remembered that the number of ships reaching a blockaded area is not the only test as to whether it is maintained effectively. The best proof of the thoroughness of a blockade is to be found in its results. This is the test which Mr. Seward, in 1863, when Secretary of State, maintained should be applied to the blockade of the Confederate States. Writing to Mr. Dayton, the United States Minister in Paris, on March 8, he said: "But the true test of the efficiency of the blockade will be found in its results. Cotton commands a price in Manchester, and in Rouen and Lowell four times greater than in New Orleans. * * * Judged by this test of results, I am satisfied that there never was a more effective blockade." Similar language was used in a dispatch to Mr. Adams in London. The great rise in price in Germany of many articles, most necessary to the enemy in the prosecution of the present war, must be well known to the United States Government.

COTTON AS CONTRABAND

36. Attention is drawn in the same paragraph to the fact that cotton has since the measures announced on March 11 been declared to be contraband, and this is quoted as an admission that the blockade is ineffective to prevent shipments of cotton from reaching the enemy countries. The reason for which cotton was declared to be contraband is quite simple. Goods with an enemy destination are not, under the Order in Council, subject to condemnation; they are restored to the owner. Evidence accumulated that it was only for military purposes that cotton was being employed in Germany. All cotton was laid under embargo, and its use in textile factories was prohibited except in very special cases or by military permission. In these circumstances it was right and proper that cotton with an enemy destination should be subjected to condemnation and not merely prevented from passing, and it was for this reason that it was declared to be contraband. The amount of cotton reaching the enemy country has probably not been affected in the least by its being made contraband on Aug. 20, as supplies from overseas had been cut off effectually before that date. Even the Konfektionär, a German technical paper dealing with the textile industry, admitted in its issue of July 1 that not a gram of cotton had found its way into Germany for the preceding four weeks.

37. Before leaving the question of the validity of the measures which France and Great Britain have taken against enemy commerce, reference must be made to the statement made in the thirty-third paragraph of the United States note that "the curtailment of neutral rights by these measures, which are admittedly retaliatory and therefore illegal, * * * cannot be admitted." His Majesty's Government are quite unable to admit the principle that to the extent that these measures are retaliatory they are illegal. It is true that these measures were occasioned and necessitated by the illegal and unjustifiable proclamation issued by the German Government on Feb. 4, 1915, constituting the waters

surrounding Great Britain, including the whole English Channel, a "war zone," into which neutral vessels would penetrate at their peril and in which they were liable to be sunk at sight. This proclamation was accompanied by a memorandum alleging that the violation of international law by Great Britain justified the retaliatory measures of the German Government owing to the acquiescence of neutrals in the action of this country. The legitimacy of the use of retaliatory measures was thus admitted by the Germans, although his Majesty's Government and their allies strongly deny the facts upon which their arguments were based. But although these measures may have been provoked by the illegal conduct of the enemy, they do not, in reality, conflict with any general principle of international law, of humanity, or civilization; they are enforced with consideration against neutral countries, and are therefore juridically sound and valid.

On the more abstract question of the legitimacy of measures of retaliation adopted by one belligerent against his opponent, but affecting neutrals only, Sir Edward Grey (in Paragraph 38) observes that such a discussion might well be deferred, but he takes his stand on the principle of equal liberty of action. The note continues:

LEGAL REMEDIES

39. The third section of the United States note deals with the question of the means of redress which are open to United States citizens for any injury or loss which they suffer as the consequence of an unjustifiable exercise of the belligerent rights of the Allies. The contention put forward in these paragraphs appears to be that there is no obligation on neutral individuals, who maintain that they have been damnified by the naval operations of the belligerents to appeal to the prize courts for redress, because the prize courts are fettered by municipal enactments which are binding upon them, whereas the very question which those individuals wish to raise is the validity of such enactments when tested by the canons of international law.

40. These arguments seem to be founded on a misunderstanding of the situation, and to overlook all that was said in Sir E. Grey's note of July 23 on this subject. The extract there quoted from the decisions given by Lord Stowell shows that in Great Britain the prize court has jurisdiction to pronounce a decision on the very point which the United States note indicates, viz., whether an order or instruction to the naval forces issued by his Majesty's Government is inconsistent with those principles of international law which the court is bound to apply in deciding cases between captors and claimants, and is entitled, if satisfied that the order is not consistent with those principles, to decline to enforce it. The jurisdiction of the prize court in Great Britain, therefore, affords every facility to a United States citizen, whose goods are detained and dealt with under the Order in Council of March 11, to take his case to the prize court and there claim that the order under which the naval authorities have acted is invalid, and that its enforcement entitles him to redress and compensation.

41. In some matters it is true that the prize court is bound by the municipal enactments of its own country. It is the territorial sovereign who sets up the court, and who, therefore, determines the matters which are incidental to its establishment. His Majesty's Government have already pointed out that each country determines for itself the procedure which its prize court shall adopt, but certainly under the British system—and his Majesty's Government were under the impression that, in this matter, the United States had taken the same course—the substantive law, which the court applies as between captor and claimant, consists of the rules and principles of international law, and not the municipal legislation of the country. If reference is made to the case of the Recovery, (6 C. Rob. 341,) it will be seen that Lord Stowell refused to enforce in the prize court against a neutral the British navigation laws.

42. Sir E. Grey's note of July 23 was intended to make this point clear, and so far from having intended to "give the impression that his Majesty's Government do not rely upon its soundness or strength," his Majesty's Government wish to lay stress on the fact that the principle that no encroachment should be made upon the jurisdiction and the competence of the prize court is one which they regard as vital.

In subsequent paragraphs dealing with claims made by shippers for compensation, Sir Edward Grey outlines the procedure to be followed by England, and incidentally he touches upon the cases of the Magicienne, the Don José, the Labuan, and the Saxon, as cited in the American note. These cases, Sir Edward Grey says, establish the very principle for which his Majesty's Government is now contending—that where the prize court has powers to grant relief no recourse should be had to diplomatic channels.

Full details of the cases in question are contained in an appendix to the note. Sir Edward Grey's concluding remarks in the note itself are as follows:

CONSIDERATION FOR NEUTRALS

49. Finally, his Majesty's Government desire to assure the United States Government that they will continue their efforts to make the exercise of what they conceive to be their belligerent rights as little burdensome to neutrals as possible. Some suggestions have already been referred to in this note which, it is believed, would have that effect, and they are quite ready to consider others. For instance, they have already appointed an impartial and influential commission to examine whether any further steps could be taken to minimize the delays involved in the present methods of dealing with neutral vessels. Again, it has been suggested that it would be a great commercial convenience if neutral shippers knew, before they made arrangements for ship space and for financing their consignments, whether they would be held up by belligerent patrols. A scheme is already in operation which ought to succeed in accomplishing this object. Other suggestions of a like nature might perhaps be made, and the Allied Government would be prepared to give favorable consideration to any proposal for the alleviation of the position of neutrals provided that the substantial effectiveness of the measures now in force against enemy commerce would not be thereby impaired.

50. His Majesty's Government are of opinion that it is to such mitigations that the Allies and the neutrals concerned should look for the removal of the difficulties now encountered, rather than to abrupt changes either in the theory or application of a policy based upon admitted principles of international law carefully adjusted to the altered conditions of modern warfare. Some of the changes which have been advocated would, indeed, if adopted in their entirety, render it impossible for the Allies to persist with effect in their endeavors to deprive the enemy of the resources upon which he depends for the prosecution of operations carried on both by land and sea with complete disregard of the claims of humanity; for instance, the practice of visiting exclusively at sea, instead of in port, vessels reasonably suspected of carrying supplies to the enemy; or, again, the adoption of the principle that goods notoriously destined for the enemy may not be intercepted if they happen to be carried by a neutral vessel and addressed to a neutral consignee, could not fail to have this result.

51. His Majesty's Government have noted with sincere satisfaction the intimation contained in the concluding passages of the United States note, of the intention of the United States to undertake the task of championing the integrity of neutral rights. The first act of this war was the unprovoked invasion by the enemy of neutral territory—that of Belgium—which he was solemnly pledged by treaty to protect; the occupation of this territory was accompanied by abominable acts of cruelty and oppression in violation of all the accepted rules of war, atrocities the record of which is available in published documents; the disregard of neutral rights has since been extended to naval warfare by the wanton destruction of neutral merchant ships on the high seas, regardless of the lives of those on board. In every theatre and in each phase of the war has been visible the same shocking disregard by the enemy of the rights of innocent persons and neutral peoples. His Majesty's Government would welcome any combination of neutral nations under the lead of the United States which would exert an effective influence to prevent the violation of neutral rights, and they cannot believe that they or their allies have much to fear from any combination for the protection of those rights which takes an impartial and comprehensive view of the conduct of this war, and judges it by a reasonable interpretation of the generally accepted provisions of international law and by the rules of humanity that have hitherto been approved by the civilized world.

Complete List of Contraband Articles

A BRITISH WHITE PAPER issued in April gives an alphabetical list of the articles declared contraband by proclamations now in force. As the former distinction between absolute and conditional contraband has been abolished, the list of absolutely prohibited articles is the most sweeping in the history of wars and commerce. So long as the exceptional conditions in Germany continue, says the British Foreign Office, Great Britain's belligerent rights with regard to the two kinds of contraband are the same, and the treatment of them will be identical. The articles that will be seized if shipped, directly or through neutral ports, to the Central Powers, are these:

Acetic acid and acetates, acetic ether; acetones, and raw and finished materials, usable for their preparation; aircraft of all kinds, including aeroplanes, airships, balloons, and their component parts, together with accessories and articles suitable for use in connection with aircraft; aluminium, alumina, and salts of aluminium; ammonia liquor, ammonium salts, aniline and its derivatives; animals, saddle, draught, or pack, suitable, or which may become suitable, for use in war; antimony, together with the sulphides and oxides of antimony; apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war, or for the manufacture or repair of arms or of war material for use on land or sea; armor plates; arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their component parts; arsenic and its compounds, arsenical ore, articles especially adapted for use in the manufacture or repair of tires, asbestos.

Barbed wire, barium chlorate and perchlorate, bauxite, benzol and its mixtures and derivatives; bladders, guts, casings, and sausage skins; bones in any form, whole or crushed, and bone ash; boots and shoes suitable for use in war; borax, boric acid, and other boron compounds; bromine.

Calcium acetate, calcium nitrate, and calcium carbide; camp equipments, articles of, and their component parts; camphor, capsicum, carbon disulphide; carbon, halogen compounds of; carbonyl chloride, carborundum in all forms, casein, caustic potash and caustic soda, celluloid, charges and and cartridges of all kinds and their component parts; chlorides, metallic (except chloride of sodium) and metalloidic; chlorine, chrome ore, chronometers, clothing and fabrics for clothing suitable for use in war, clothing of a distinctively military character; cobalt, copper pyrites and other copper ores; copper unwrought and part wrought, copper wire, alloys and compounds of copper; cork, including cork dust; corundum, natural and artificial, (alundum,) in all forms; cotton, raw, linters, cotton waste, cotton yarns, cotton piece goods, and other cotton products capable of being used in the manufacture of explosives; cresol and its mixtures and derivatives, cyanamide.

Docks, parts of.

Emery in all forms, equipment of a distinctively military character, ethyl alcohol, explosives, whether specially prepared for use in war or not.

Ferro alloys, including ferro-tungsten, ferro-molybdenum, ferro-manganese, ferro-vanadium, and ferro-chrome; field forges and their component parts; field glasses, flax; floating docks and their component parts; foodstuffs, forage, and feeding stuffs for animals; formic ether; fuel, other than mineral oils; fuming sulphuric acid, furs utilizable for clothing suitable for use in war.

Glycerine, gold, gun mountings and their component parts.

Hair, animal of all kinds, and tops, noils, and yarns of animal hair; harness and saddlery, harness of a distinctively military character, all kinds of; hemp, hides of cattle, buffalos, and horses, horseshoes and shoeing material, hydrochloric acid.

Implements designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war, or for the manufacture or repair of arms or of war material for use on land or sea; implements for fixing and cutting barbed wire, iodine and its compounds; iron, electrolytic; iron hematite, and hematite iron ore; iron pyrites.

Kapok.

Lathes capable of being employed in the manufacture of munitions of war; lead and lead ore, leather belting, hydraulic leather, pump leather; leather, undressed or dressed, suitable for saddlery, harness, military boots, or military clothing; limbers and limber boxes and their component parts, lubricants.

Machines capable of being employed in the manufacture of munitions of war, manganese and manganese ore, manganese dioxide, maps and plans of any place within the territory of any belligerent, or within the area of military operations, on a scale of four miles to one inch or any larger scale, and reproductions on any scale, by photography or otherwise, of such maps or plans; materials especially adapted for use in the manufacture or repair of tires, materials used in the manufacture of explosives, mercury, methyl alcohol, military wagons and their component parts; mineral oils, including benzine and motor spirit; molybdenum and molybdenite, motor vehicles of all kinds and their component parts and accessories.

Naphthalene and its mixtures and derivatives; nautical instruments, all kinds of negotiable instruments, nickel and nickel ore, nitric acid and nitrates of all kinds.

Oils and fats, animal, fish, and vegetable, other than those capable of use as lubricants, and not including essential oils; oleaginous seeds, nuts, and kernels; oleum.

Paper money, paraffin wax, peppers, phenol (carbolic acid) and its mixtures and derivatives; phosphorus and its compounds, phosgene, potassium salts, powders, whether specially prepared for use in war or not; projectiles of all kinds and their component parts, prussiate of soda.

Railway materials. both fixed and rolling stock; ramie, rangefinders and their component parts; rattans, realizable securities, resinous products; rubber, (including raw, waste, and reclaimed rubber, solutions and jellies containing rubber, or any other preparations containing rubber, balata, and gutta-percha, and the following varieties of rubber, viz.: Borneo, Guayule, Jelutong, Palembang, Pontianac, and all other substances containing caoutchouc,) and goods made wholly or partly of rubber.

Sabadilla seeds and preparations therefrom, scheelite, searchlights and their component parts, selenium, silver, skins of calves, pigs, sheep, goats, and deer, skins utilizable for clothing suitable for use in war, soap, sodium, sodium chloride and perchlorate, sodium cyanide, solvent naphtha and its mixtures and derivatives, starch, steel containing tungsten or molybdenum, submarine sound signaling apparatus, sulphur, sulphur dioxide, sulphuric acid, sulphuric ether.

Tanning substances of all kinds, including quebracho wood and extracts for use in tanning; telegraphs, materials for; telephones, materials for; telescopes, tin, chloride of tin and tin ore; toluol, and its mixtures and derivatives; tools capable of being employed in the manufacture of munitions of war; tungsten, turpentine, (oil and spirit,) tires for motor vehicles and for cycles.

Urea.

Vanadium, vegetable fibres and yarns made therefrom; vehicles of all kinds, other than motor vehicles, available for use in war, and their component parts; vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds.

Warships, including boats and their component parts of such a nature that they can only be used on a vessel of war; wireless telegraphs, materials for; wolframite, wool tar and wood tar oil; wool, raw, combed, or carded; wool waste, wool tops and noils; woolen or worsted yarns.

Xylol and its mixtures and derivatives.

Zinc ore.

A supplementary order announced on May 4 that the following articles would be added to the contraband list:

Brooms and brushes; bulbs, flower roots, plants, trees, and shrubs; canned, bottled, dried, and preserved vegetables and pickles; horns and hoofs, ice, animal and vegetable ivory; moss, rubber tires, tubes for motor cars and motor cycles; salt, starch, dextrine, farina, and potato flour.

Origin of the Word "Boche"

By DOUGLAS L. BUFFUM

Since the beginning of the European war numerous attempts have been made to explain the origin of the word "boche," which is now almost universally used by the French soldiers when speaking of the Germans. The correct explanation is probably as follows:

Boche is an abbreviation of caboche, (compare bochon, an abbreviation of cabochon.) This is a recognized French word used familiarly for "head," especially a big, thick head, ("slow-pate.") It is derived from the Latin word caput and the suffix "oceus." Boche seems to have been used first in the underworld of Paris about 1860, with the meaning of a disagreeable, troublesome fellow. In the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 it was not applied to the Germans, but soon afterward it was applied by the Parisian printers to their German assistants because of the reputed slowness of comprehension of these foreign printers. The epithet then used was tête de boche, which had the meaning of tête carrée d'Allemand. The next step was to apply boche to Germans in general.



Groß Berlin

Butterkarte

für Erwachsene

1. bis 8. Woche

Gültig nur am Montag, Mittwoch, Freitag, Sonntag

Nicht übertragbar!

Rückseite beachten!

1/4 Pfund Butter gültig vom 27. März bis 2. April

1/4 Pfund Butter gültig vom 3. April bis 9. April

1/4 Pfund Butter gültig vom 10. April bis 16. April

1/4 Pfund Butter gültig vom 17. April bis 23. April

1/4 Pfund Butter gültig vom 24. April bis 30. April

1/4 Pfund Butter gültig vom 1. Mai bis 7. Mai

1/4 Pfund Butter gültig vom 8. Mai bis 14. Mai

Nicht übertragbar Nicht übertragbar

Kartoffelkarte

Berlin und Nachbarorte

Gilt für die Zeit vom 20. März bis 18. Mai 1916

Rückseite beachten!

10 Pfund Kartoffeln gilt für die Zeit vom 20. März bis 31. März

10 Pfund Kartoffeln gilt für die Zeit vom 1. April bis 12. April

10 Pfund Kartoffeln gilt für die Zeit vom 13. April bis 24. April

10 Pfund Kartoffeln gilt für die Zeit vom 25. April bis 6. Mai

10 Pfund Kartoffeln gilt für die Zeit vom 7. Mai bis 18. Mai

BUTTER AND POTATO CARDS USED BY RESIDENTS OF BERLIN

How the Great War Began

Official Narrative of the Momentous Scenes Which Led to the Invasion of Belgium

By Albert de Bassompierre

Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Belgium

[Translated for CURRENT HISTORY from Revue des Deux Mondes]

ON July 23, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia burst like a thunderclap in the European sky, which had seemed to recover its serenity during the month that had passed since the drama at Serajevo. From that moment acute distress reigned in the Chancelleries of all the States threatened by the impending catastrophe. At Brussels the strain was intense, for we knew that, although the political crisis of the last few years had not led to war between the great European powers, they had more than once come very near it; and we instantly realized the grave danger of a general conflagration which the Austrian note to Serbia had abruptly laid bare. The Central Empires evidently desired war, since they imposed upon the Ministers at Belgrade conditions that were impossible of acceptance by a proud and independent nation, and since it was certain, on the other hand, that Russia would be morally forced to uphold Serbia's resistance.

The understanding between Berlin and Vienna touching the terms of the note did not for a moment seem to us susceptible of doubt. The reports of Baron Beyens and the Comte de Dudzeele, our Ministers at Berlin and Vienna, hardly allowed us to entertain any illusions in that regard. It was becoming evident, or at least infinitely probable, that it seemed to Germany and Austria-Hungary a favorable opportunity to utilize the formidable engine of destruction which had been in preparation, with meticulous care, for forty years; and to crush Russia and France before the military superiority of the Germanic Empires could be challenged.

It was therefore in an atmosphere of depression that we passed the last days of July.

For years past the problem which was destined to confront Belgium at the outbreak of a European war in which her powerful neighbors—guarantors one and all of her neutrality—should be belligerents, had been carefully studied at the Foreign Office. We had tried to imagine all the attacks on our neutrality which might conceivably be made, and to scrutinize each one of them, always asking ourselves the question: "In this particular case, what attitude would our duty to ourselves and to Europe command us to assume?"

Notes had been drawn up to summarize the results of these studies. They presupposed, purely *ex hypothesi*, violations of our neutrality by all our neighbors, including the loyal guarantors who are fighting by our side today. They aimed to mark out lines of conduct for the Government on the day of peril.

If these notes, which were read and reread eagerly during the last week of July, 1914, are published some day, they will demonstrate the absolute good faith, the perfectly honorable attitude of Belgium, even in the eyes of those—if any such there shall still be—whom the Germans have succeeded in inducing to believe that we had in advance abandoned our neutrality in favor of France or England; even in the eyes of the Germans themselves, I would say, if it were not certain that our enemies have never had the slightest doubt in that regard,

MOLDERS OF RUSSIA'S DESTINIES

Emperor Nicholas II. and General Alexeieff at Staff Headquarters in Petrograd



ARCHDUKE EUGENIUS OF AUSTRIA

Commander in Chief of Austrian Troops on Italian Front: In Costume of Grand Master of the Teutonic Order

(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)

and that they have knowingly been guilty of the evil action called calumny in bringing against us the accusation of having been false to our duty as neutrals. This calumny, no less, and perhaps even more, than all the blood that has been shed has dug a chasm between Germany and Belgium which will never be bridged over.

The notes that are still on file in the Foreign Office show that there might have happened cases of violation of our neutrality in which the correct attitude for us to assume would have been very hard to decide unhesitatingly and speedily. (For instance, the case of simultaneous or almost simultaneous violations by several belligerents, each accusing his adversary of having been the first offender and ascribing to his own entry upon our territory the character of an act in support of the guarantee.) But, I say again, they prove conclusively the firm resolution on the part of the Government to acquit itself, in every possible conjuncture, with scrupulous rectitude and without regard to what the cost to the country might be, of the duties imposed upon Belgium by the treaties of 1839.

The status of guaranteed neutrality was intended, in the collective purpose of Europe, to place us outside of all contentions and, if that result could not be secured, to furnish our weakness with aid against a possible aggressor. Today the world can judge whether, when the supreme test came, guaranteed neutrality met the hopes that had been based upon it; and the Belgian people are in a position to determine whether this gift of the great powers has been, when all is said, a benefaction to them.

Among the powers that neighbor Belgium are there any which constitute a menace to her existence? And are there others upon which she can rely to safeguard her? Would not the defeat, the humiliation, or the diminished strength of these last, at whatsoever time it might happen, be likely to be the signal for her disappearance as an autonomous nation? Consequently, is there good reason to base the future policy of the kingdom on these considerations, or is it possible to recover a sentiment of equal tranquillity and confidence with respect to all the powers which were formerly set over us? That is the problem with which the war has brought the Belgian people and Government face to face.

But on Aug. 2, 1914, a single fact controlled the situation—Belgium had the status of guaranteed conventional neutrality,* and we must allow ourselves to be guided only by the anxious desire to fulfill its obligations.

To be perfectly frank, we must admit that the eventuality which confronted us that day was that which had appeared to us beforehand most improbable, because it was too brutal and too simple—that of a power which was one of the guarantors of our neutrality requesting us directly and formally to renounce in its favor the neutrality guaranteed by itself, and threatening us with all its destroying wrath if we dared to confine ourselves to the performance pure and simple of a duty which, under those conditions, was so manifest that there was really no need of specialists in the law of nations to point it out to the country!

The German ultimatum* attempted, it is true, to justify the action of the Imperial Government by a labored and awkward insinuation against the adverse party. It began by declaring that "the Imperial Government knew from an unquestionable source the intention of France to march upon Germany over Belgian territory." But this was so manifestly a pretext, it was so outrageously contrary to the truth, it was in such flagrant contradiction with the solemn declaration that France had made to us the day before—as we shall see further on—and with the assurances that the authorities of the republic had repeated so often in the course of recent years, and with what was known of the movements of French troops, that the German Government cannot have been deceived for an instant as to the degree of credence with which its declaration would be met in Belgium.

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*The official text of the ultimatum and the reply, together with the treaty articles guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality, appear at the end of this article.

Between July 23 and Aug. 2, amid the confused mass of news that reached us from every direction, amid the feverish readings and re-readings to which we had to resort to fix accurately in our minds the studies we had made in view of a possible war, the measures of every sort which must be taken in haste—telegrams, diplomatic visits, and telephone calls—a few facts stand out in my memory as being of most importance in that period of excitement.

In the first place, on July 28 we learned by a telegram from the Comte de Dudzeele, our Minister at Vienna, of the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Serbia. That same evening the Council of Ministers met under the presidency of the King. In face of the warlike preparations that were being made on all sides, the question was raised whether prudence did not demand the mobilization of the Belgian Army.

The Council decided to take a step provided for by the law, the first stage of mobilization; that is to say, to put the army on the reinforced peace footing.

On the next day, July 29, the Moniteur Belge published, in connection with the Austro-Serbian war, the declaration calling attention to the statute of Belgian neutrality, which was a formal performance at the beginning of every war.

On Friday, July 31, we learned that the German Government had proclaimed the Kriegzustand, that is to say, the measure preliminary to general mobilization of the land and naval forces of the empire. Holland having, for her part, placed her army on a war footing during the day, the Belgian Council of Ministers likewise, at 6 in the evening, decreed a general mobilization. Aug. 1, at midnight, was fixed as the time when it was to begin. It was to be completed, so to speak, in the evening of the 2d.

In the evening of the 31st, about 10 o'clock, the English Minister called to inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs that, in view of the possibility of a European war, Sir Edward Grey had inquired of the French and German Governments if each of them was prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium, provided that no other power should violate it. Sir Edward Grey, Sir Francis Villiers added, assumed that Belgium would do everything in her power to maintain her neutrality, and that it was her wish that the other powers should observe it and maintain it.

M. Davignon made haste to assure the English Minister of our determination to omit nothing to maintain the neutrality of the country. He begged his Excellency to note the evidence of this determination in the decision to place the army on a war footing, and he warmly thanked Sir Francis Villiers for the important communication that he had made on the part of the British Government.

This proceeding was, in truth, a proof that England still regarded the neutrality of Belgium as an essential matter. It justified the belief—although Sir Francis Villiers did not say it in so many words—that Great Britain, loyal to the Treaty of 1839, would intervene to defend us against any power that should undertake to violate our neutrality.

On Aug. 1, in the morning, M. Klobukowski, the French Minister, called to communicate to M. Davignon the categorical declaration reproduced in the First Gray Book as No. 15: "I am authorized to declare that, in the event of an international conflict, the Government of the republic will, as it has always promised, respect the neutrality of Belgium. In the event that such neutrality should not be respected by another power, the French Government, to safeguard its own defense, might be led to modify its attitude."

Such was the response, clear and unequivocal, of France to the question asked by the British Government on the preceding day. France did not leave to Great Britain the duty of communicating it to us.

The silence of Germany was becoming alarming. On the day before, July 31, Baron von der Elst had tried to sound Herr von Below-Saleske, the Minister of that country. He had reminded him of a conversation that he had had in 1911 with his predecessor, Herr von Flotow—a conversation which had drawn from the Imperial Chancellor a message reassuring to Belgium. Germany, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg had said, had no intention, whatever any one might say, of violating Belgian neutrality in case of war; but the Chancellor considered that a public declaration to that effect would impair the military situation of the empire in respect to France, who, being relieved from anxiety as to her northern frontier, would concentrate her full strength on the east.

Baron von der Elst also reminded Herr von Below-Saleske of the declarations of Herr von Jagow to the Budget Committee of the Reichstag in 1913, as to the recognition by Germany of the treaties guaranteeing Belgian neutrality. The German Minister confined himself to replying that he remembered those declarations, and that he was sure that the sentiments expressed by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg in 1911, and by Herr von Jagow in 1913, had not changed.

On Aug. 1, after M. Klobukowski's declaration in the name of France, I was instructed by M. Davignon to go to Herr von Below and inform him of this declaration as well as of the measure taken by the British Government at Berlin and at Paris, which Sir F. Villiers had brought to our knowledge the day before.

The Foreign Minister intended by this means to give the representative of Germany an opportunity to tell us whether his Government had replied in the same sense as France to Great Britain's inquiry concerning respect for our neutrality.

I was to go at first to Sir F. Villiers to ask him if he had any objection to my informing Herr von Below of what he had said to us the day before. The English Minister, who had people in his office, came into the reception room where he received me at once with his usual amiability. He reflected a moment concerning the question I put to him and replied: " The communication that I was instructed to make to the King's Government was made without reservation or condition; it belongs to them, therefore, and they can make such use of it as they deem proper."

I hastened to the German Legation, where I arrived about 12:30 o'clock. I placed before Herr von Below the inquiry made by Great Britain at Berlin and Paris. I repeated to him the unequivocal and loyal declaration made to us that morning by M. Klobukowski in the name of the French Republic. Lastly, in accordance with M. Davignon's instructions, I told him that the French Legation had requested the press to publish a communiqué making known the attitude of its Government. That communiqué would appear that same evening.

Herr von Below, when I had finished, threw himself back in his chair, and, looking up at the ceiling, with his eyes half closed, he repeated with phonographic accuracy everything that I had first said to him, using the very words that I had used—until I began to wonder whether it was simply a proof of a good memory or whether he was already cognizant of the whole affair before my visit. But when he had finished repeating my communication, he paused a moment, then added: " You will be good enough, I beg, to say to M. Davignon that I am deeply obliged to him for his message, and that I shall inform my Government of it." Thereupon he indicated to me, in the clearest fashion, by rising and offering me a cigarette, that he had nothing more to say to me officially. But he went on almost immediately, in a familiar, conversational tone, to say that personally he was fully convinced that Belgium had nothing to fear from Germany, and that his Government would doubtless consider it unnecessary to amplify or even to repeat its earlier declarations to that effect.

This same language Herr von Below repeated to M. Davignon in the morning of Aug. 2—the very day when he was to deliver the ultimatum of his Government! And he made—always in his individual name—analogous reassuring declarations to the representatives of the press. " Your neighbor's roof may burn, perhaps, but your house will be safe," he said to one of the editors of Le Soir, who published the interview at 3 in the afternoon. Moreover, Captain Brinckmann, the German Military Attaché, said, at 11 in the morning, to one of the editors of the XX^e Siècle who questioned him by telephone, "It is not true that Germany has declared war. Our troops have not occupied the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. These are all false reports put forth by persons hostile to the German Empire." The XX^e Siècle published these statements of the Military Attaché in its 3 o'clock edition.

Aug. 2 was a Sunday. In the morning we learned by a telegram from the Belgian Minister at St. Petersburg, sent on the previous evening, of the declaration of war by Germany against Russia and the general mobilization of the German armies. In the afternoon a telegram from M. Eyschen, Minister of State of Luxemburg, advised us of the contemptuous invasion of the Grand Duchy by the imperial forces.

Thus the day was full of excitement; about 7 in the evening, having finished my work, I left the office with Baron de Gaiffier. Before reaching the main door of the department, on the Rue de la Loi, we went into the Secretary General's office. With Baron von der Elst we went over the news that had come since morning. It was no longer possible to foster illusions; the operation of the alliances was drawing the powers one after another into the whirlpool. Russia was already at war with Germany. The invasion of Luxemburg indicated clearly that a Franco-German state of war was a question of hours. Were we destined to be engulfed in the catastrophe, or would the miracle of 1870 be repeated? The loyalty of France was manifest. Germany said nothing, and that fact seemed of evil augury, but Herr von Below was so reassuring! Moreover, the step taken by England and the threat which it implied—were not they calculated to make Berlin think twice? In view of the late telegrams, might we not suppose that the German forces assembled along the frontier would move toward the Moselle and would avoid encroaching upon Belgian territory? Was not this hypothesis warranted by the fact that the motives alleged for the violation of Luxemburg did not exist with respect to Belgium?

We were trying to cling fast to this hope, as shipwrecked men cling to a bunch of straw, when an usher opened the door and, with a perturbed air, announced hastily and unceremoniously: "The German Minister has just gone into M. Davignon's Cabinet."

We realized, all three of us, that at that fateful moment the destiny of our dear little country was about to be decided.

Ten minutes passed, which seemed to us like hours. Then, at 7:30, the haughty figure of Herr von Below appeared on the other side of the courtyard, and the German Emperor's representative, quite impassive, passed out to the street, where his motor car awaited him.

In an instant we were in M. Davignon's office. It was empty, but at the same moment the Minister, who had gone into the adjoining room to summon Comte Leo d'Ursel, his chief clerk, came in with a paper* in his hand, and followed by the Count and by M. Costermans, the second clerk. All three seemed deeply moved.

"This is bad, very bad," said the Minister, who was extremely pale. "Here is the German note, of which Herr von Below gave me a résumé. They demand that we allow the German army to pass over our territory."

"And what reply did you make, Monsieur le Ministre?"

"I took the paper and said that I would go over it with the King and my colleagues. We have twelve hours to reply. But I could not contain my indignation! I told Herr von Below that we could have expected anything save this! Germany, claiming to be our devoted friend, yet proposing to us such a dishonorable course! Let us translate it quickly and send for M. de Broqueville."

I took my pen and seated myself at the Minister's desk, while Comte Leo d'Ursel and Baron de Gaiffier took possession of the German note and immediately set about translating it. I wrote as they dictated. M. Davignon and the Secretary General followed the work anxiously, seated at the right and left of the fireplace, facing the desk. The whole scene is indelibly engraved on my memory: the faces of the auditors, the thoughts that jostled each other in my mind—even the look of the paper on which I transcribed in French the words of the ultimatum; I believe that I shall never forget a single one of these details.

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*Text of note reprinted at end of this article.

The translation was not simple, certain German phrases admitting of diverse interpretations. There were discussions as to the meaning of more than one such phrase, and the first French draft of that historic document bears many erasures and interlineations. Doubtless, too, an expert would detect in the handwriting signs of the extreme nervous tension of the man who held the pen, although outwardly I remained perfectly calm, as did the Minister and most of those present.

We had done about a third of the note when the Prime Minister entered. He saluted us hurriedly and seated himself beside M. Davignon. I read to him the sentences already translated, after M. Davignon had in two words told him of his interview with Herr von Below. M. de Broqueville folded his arms and sat absorbed in thought until the translation was finished. Then he asked me to read the note in French, which I did with deep emotion, striving to maintain my usual tone.

A silence, a tragic silence of several minutes' duration, followed the reading. We had just heard for the first time the infamous ultimatum, and we were reflecting. In the mind of each one of us the passionate memory of our adored, peaceful, blessed country gave place, it may be, to a vague premonition of the horrors that were moving swiftly toward her; but the predominant element in our thoughts was, beyond question, the firm determination to show ourselves worthy of our ancestors in the great days of trial.

It was evident that the German Government put forward the purpose of France to march upon the Meuse solely as a pretext, and that the ultimatum was a pure and simple demand that we abandon our neutrality in favor of Germany the formidable. They who drafted it did not think for an instant that Belgium, that tiny country that fills so little space on the map of Europe, would dare to refuse to submit without parley to the will of her all-powerful neighbor! They who read it, having a different sort of mentality, were, on the contrary, immediately, spontaneously, without discussion, without hesitation, without even making their thoughts known to one another, filled with the conviction that but one reply was possible—an indignant and peremptory No!

The Secretary General, Baron von der Elst, broke the silence by asking the War Minister:

" But, Monsieur le Ministre, are we ready ? "

There was another silence, shorter than the first but no less impressive. Then M. de Broqueville, very calm and self-controlled, speaking slowly, with measured words, replied:

" Yes, we are ready. Mobilization is going forward under extraordinarily favorable conditions. Though begun yesterday morning, it is almost completed. Tomorrow evening the army will be in condition to march—tomorrow morning, indeed, if it should be absolutely necessary. But—there is a ' but ' —we have not yet got our heavy artillery."

A few more brief sentences were exchanged. Then M. de Broqueville abruptly pulled out his watch. " It is ten minutes past 8," he said; " we must notify the King at once and ask his Majesty's permission to summon the Council to meet at the Palace at 9, the Ministers of State at 10."

He started almost immediately for the Palace, where he gave the King full information as to the situation. M. Davignon and Baron von der Elst were left alone. The chief clerk went to arrange with M. Costermans for summoning the Council.

I found quite a large party assembled in Comte d'Ursel's office. The report that something was going on had spread through the department like a train of powder. A few officials and diplomats, who had remained late at their work, were present, watching for those who were closeted with the Ministers to come out. M. de Gaiffier and I posted them as to what was happening. It is with a thrill of genuine pride that I declare that not a man there dreamed for an instant that the reply to the German note could be anything other than an indignant refusal. Some were dismayed, but the great majority were all a-quiver with the patriotic emotion that was to convulse the entire nation on the morrow.

"It is better that Germany has put her cards on the table. We know where we are. There is no possible excuse for hesitation now, whereas we might well have dreaded the most painful uncertainty as to what we ought to do. The army will know at once where the enemy is, and will fight with enthusiasm. And, after all, we shall be supported by France. England will come in. She can't allow Belgium to be sacrificed. Her honor and her self-interest forbid it. And then, if we are crushed, we shall be crushed gloriously, and our fate will be no worse, in the last analysis, than if we did what they demand. If we should yield, we could never again look a Frenchman or an Englishman in the face."

Such were the sentiments that passed from mouth to mouth. There were very few references to the shocking consequences which our reply—it seemed as if it had already been sent—was likely to bring upon our dear and ill-fated land.

About 8:30 o'clock I went out and dined hurriedly, alone, in a restaurant on Place Royale. I remember the strange impression that that brilliantly lighted room produced upon me, and the sort of distress with which I watched the diners at nearby tables. They knew nothing; they had read the afternoon papers containing the reassuring statements made to the reporters during the morning by von Below; they were light-hearted and heedless. And I—I was borne down by the weight of what I knew; of the secret which would be revealed the next day and would bring such a cruel awakening to everybody about me. I asked myself if I were the plaything of a nightmare or if I were really awake.

A little after 9 I returned to the department. M. Davignon had gone to the Palace, and Baron von der Elst with him. The latter was present at the two councils that were held during the night.

The Baron de Gaiffier was at work in the Minister's office, where I joined him. He had already begun to prepare the draft of a reply to the German ultimatum.

"You see," he said, "the Minister will return very soon and ask us to prepare the reply; and, as there is no possible doubt as to the tenor of it, I have begun it, to save time."

Doubtless some day the details will be written of the meeting of the Council of Ministers which, beginning at 9 o'clock under the Presidency of the King, and being joined at 10 by those Ministers of State when they had succeeded in getting together, continued without interruption until midnight, and was resumed at 2 A. M., to last until nearly 4.

During the early part of that long session the general principles of the reply were agreed upon. About midnight a drafting committee was named and instructed to go to the Foreign Office to prepare a draft of a note. MM. de Broqueville, Minister for War; Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Carton de Wiart, Minister of Justice; von der Henvel and Hymans, Ministers of State, and Baron von der Elst returned to Rue de la Loi. There they found Baron de Gaiffier, who had completed his draft. Without knowing what decision was being reached at the Palace, he had written exactly what it had been there agreed to reply to Germany. So true is it that all Belgians were absolutely one in thought and feeling on perusal of the German ultimatum. A few sentences only were rewritten by the drafting committee.*

While this work was being done, at 1:30 A. M. the German Minister appeared and asked to see Baron von der Elst. Everything goes to show that his Excellency's purpose was to surprise on the faces of such persons as he might meet telltale indications of the tenor of our final decision. The Secretary General received him in his office.

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*Text of Belgium's reply will be found at the end of this article.

The German Minister must have noticed the chilliness of the welcome accorded him. This is how a memorandum printed in the Gray Book (No. 21) describes this nocturnal call:

"At 1:30 A. M. the German Minister asked to see Baron von der Elst. He told him that he was under instructions from his Government to inform us that French dirigibles had dropped bombs, and that a patrol of French cavalry, in violation of the law of nations, since war was not declared, had crossed the frontier.

"The Secretary General asked Herr von Below where these things had taken place. 'In Germany,' was the reply. Baron von der Elst observed that in that case he could not understand the purpose of the communication. Herr von Below said that those acts, contrary to the law of nations, were calculated to arouse suspicion that France would commit other acts contrary to that law."

Half an hour later the draft of the reply to Germany was taken to the Palace and definitively approved by the Council presided over by the King.

About 3:30 o'clock in the morning Comte d'Ursel was called to the telephone by M. Klobukowski, who declared that he had seen distinctly in the sky intermittent flashes which unquestionably came from the searchlights of a German dirigible proceeding toward France. Several persons had told M. Klobukowski that they had seen the same lights.

Shortly after this incident I left the department. The mobilization was still causing some excitement in the neighboring streets. All the windows in the War Department, at the corner of the Avenue des Arts and Rue de la Loi, were brightly lighted, and several motor cars were standing at the door.

At 8 in the morning of Aug. 3 I returned to the department. M. de Gaiffier arrived at the same time; he told me that he had waited till the end of the Cabinet Council, and that M. Davignon, returning from the Palace at 4 o'clock, had instructed him to deliver personally to Herr von Below-Saleske the reply to the German ultimatum. M. de Gaiffier had had it copied quickly, had gone home about 5 o'clock, and, after trying to get a moment's rest, had gone on foot to the German Embassy on Rue Belliard, where he arrived at exactly 7 o'clock. Admitted to the study of the Minister, who was awaiting him, he handed him the note. Herr von Below read it with an air of detachment, and asked if there was anything else to be said. Baron de Gaiffier replied in the negative, saluted the Minister, and returned to Rue de la Loi.

The legations of France and England were advised without delay of what had taken place. About the same hour the Etoile Belge published the news of the German ultimatum.

At 9:30 Mr. Webber, attaché at the English Legation, in a state of excitement which he did not attempt to conceal, appeared at my office, where, at that moment, I happened to be alone. He came from Sir Francis Villiers to take copies of the German note and of our reply. He knew the general tenor of the documents but not the precise words. I read them both to him. When I came to the sentence, "The Belgian Government, by accepting the proposals that are made to it, would sacrifice the honor of the nation, at the same time that it would be false to its duties toward Europe," I felt my throat swell, and my emotion almost mastered me. I succeeded, however, in reading to the end.

Webber had not moved a muscle; he remained on his feet in front of me. He took my two hands, and, having gazed at me a moment in silence, "Bravo, Belgians!" he said simply, in a voice that was not quite steady. Then he swiftly copied the two notes in shorthand and hurried off with them to his chief.

After he had gone, about 10 o'clock, my attention was attracted by the increasing noise which came up from the city, across the courtyards of the Government buildings, to my open window. It was composed of the cries of the newsboys selling the papers with the news of the ultimatum, of exclamations of surprise and wrath, and of the rapidly increasing agitation aroused in the streets by the terrible intelligence.

On that day, Aug. 3, the Council of Ministers, which sat from 10 o'clock till noon, decided to request the diplomatic support of the powers that had guaranteed our neutrality—other than Germany and Austria-Hungary, of course. The request for military support was designedly, and after mature consideration, postponed until Germany should have consummated her criminal purpose by sending her soldiers upon our territory. We did not propose to give her, until then, any pretext which she could allege for saying that we had broken our neutrality in favor of her enemies. One chance still remained—pitifully slight, it is true, but sufficient to keep hope alive in some persons among us: that Germany, disappointed by our reply to her ultimatum, would hold back at the last moment and countermand the orders to her troops.

M. Arendt, who had preceded Baron de Gaiffier as Directeur Général, (1896-1912,) called upon me in the afternoon about 4 o'clock. He read the ultimatum and our reply, and even he, who had made so profound a study of the guaranteed neutrality which the powers had imposed upon us, and who was the principal author of the memoranda mentioned at the beginning of this paper, actually thought for a moment that our attitude, so decided and so entirely in line with our duty, would cause the German colossus to hesitate. The political blunder that Germany would commit in beginning a world war by an absolutely unjustifiable violation of the neutrality of a friendly country seemed to him so enormous, and the universal reprobation which must inevitably follow it seemed to him so certain to weigh heavily in the final adjustment of accounts, that he was still inclined to doubt.

The Germans had expected to intimidate us. They had reckoned on a consent due to our knowledge of our weakness. The tone of our reply could not leave them in any doubt as to the blunder they had committed. As they knew now that they would have to overcome the desperate resistance of an army which, though far from numerous, was brave and supported by strong fortresses, would they not fear that all their calculations, that their whole plan, based upon a swift passage across Belgium, would be endangered? Would they not consequently adopt an alternative plan which they probably had in readiness for that eventuality?

Such were the questions which were asked, even at that supreme moment, by the one man of all living Belgians who had undoubtedly meditated most frequently upon the day of anguish that we were now living through.

May we not believe that his clear vision was unerring, and that if Germany had, at the last moment, decided to keep off our soil, she would have given proof of wisdom from the military, and even more from the political, standpoint?

One thing is certain, at all events, because it has been demonstrated by results, and that is that the "crushing" offensive against France through Belgium was an ill-advised operation. It resulted in a fatal failure for Germany. The battle about Liége thwarted it irremediably by causing the imperial army to lose nearly three weeks. The battles of the Marne, the Yser, and Ypres definitively checkmated it.

However that may be, on Aug. 3 there was still some slight doubt as to what Germany would really do, since she had not as yet actually violated our territory; and that doubt seemed to the Belgian Ministers, in their determination to act as men of honor to the end, a sufficient reason why they should not call to their succor, on that day, the armies of the other guarantors of our neutrality and independence. It is proper to remark that at the hour when the Ministers were deliberating, Germany was not officially in a state of war with France or with Great Britain.

On Aug. 4, at 6 A. M., Herr von Below handed M. Davignon a note which put an end to all uncertainty in the minds of those who had still been able to hope. It informed the Belgian Government that Germany, in consequence of Belgium's refusal to accept the "well-intentioned offers that had been made to her, found herself compelled, if need be by force of arms, to take such measures of security as she deemed indispensable in face of the French manoeuvres."

At 9:30 a telegram informed us that Belgian territory had been violated by German troops at Gemmenich, a village very near the frontier, a few kilometers from Aix-la-Chapelle. (The German vanguard crossed the frontier at precisely two minutes past 8 in the morning of Aug. 4.) On the north it touches Dutch Limbourg. The first shots of the war were fired by Belgian gendarmes on guard at that frontier post! Blood had flowed—the irremediable act was committed!

On the day before the King had ordered the Legislative Chambers to be summoned to meet on this 4th of August, at 10 o'clock. Although the news had had so short a time to become known, and despite the early hour, a dense crowd filled the streets about the park through which the royal procession would pass. The Foreign Office stands beside the Palace of the Nation, where the Chambers hold their sessions. One of its fronts is on the little square before the Palace, the other on Rue de la Loi, at right angles to the first.

Just before 10 o'clock I went into the Secretary General's office on the ground floor, the windows of which look on Rue de la Loi. The city had taken on the festal aspect which it retained until after the arrival of the Germans. On the day before every house had spontaneously hoisted the national flag. By this proud gesture the people had given expression to the satisfaction they felt in knowing that the Government, in its reply to Germany, had faithfully interpreted the deep-rooted sentiment of the whole nation.

At 10 o'clock the first thrill of enthusiasm ran through the crowd, when an open Court carriage brought the Queen and her children to attend the session of Parliament. The whole journey from the Palace was one long and touching ovation.

Three minutes later a tremendous outburst of applause reached my ears across the park. The King had left the Palace; he was coming along Rue Royale; his arrival was announced by the tempest of excitement and outcries that shook the multitude in the streets, on balconies, even on housetops. The procession turned the corner of the park; preceded by an escort of cavalry of the Civic Guard, and followed by the officers of the royal household, our sovereign approached on horseback, booted and spurred and in campaign uniform, outwardly calm, but visibly controlling his emotion. With an expression of grave solemnity he replied slowly with his hand to the heartfelt, ringing acclamations of the crowd: " Vive, vive le Roi! Vive, vive la Belgique! " It seemed as if the people would never be done with repeating those cries, which blended in a magnificent ovation.

When the King reached the centre of the square before the Palace of the Nation he dismounted, and I saw him, amid a tremendous, unrestrained clamor from the multitude, walk toward the entrance where a deputation of Senators and Representatives awaited him. Their emotion was no less intense and profound than that of everybody else. With arms outstretched, the country's spokesmen seemed to long to embrace the King, to tell him—for the last time, perhaps—how the nation worshipped its independence and the institutions which she had freely bestowed upon herself eighty-four years before.

Those who were present at the scene will never forget it, and very, very few are they who, having witnessed it, could honestly deny that they shed tears as the King passed, while they voiced their love of the fatherland in frenzied shrieks of " Vive le Roi! "

At the window at which I was then standing, and at the others in the same room, were most of the higher officials of the department. Clerks and ushers were mingled with them, and a few ladies had found their way in and added their acclamations to ours. The Comtesse X., wife of a young officer in the Guides, who was to meet a glorious death before the foe a few days later, was among the most agitated. In the middle of the room, a little apart from the rest, stood the counselor of the Austro-Hungarian Legation. His presence there was accidental; he had come with some communication from his Government, altogether foreign, it may be, to the dramatic events of the moment. He was unable to withstand the universal emotion that encompassed him. I did not see him until I turned away from the window after the King had entered; he was wiping the tears from his eyes.

Outside the tumult continued unabated. Beside the park, General de Coune, who commanded the Civic Guard, rose in his stirrups and revived the acclamations of the crowd by his enthusiastic vivats, punctuated by windmill-like wavings of his sword, long after the King had disappeared.

Oh, the sacred and unforgettable emotion that those Belgians lived through on that morning who were privileged to assist at that triumphant apotheosis of the plighted faith, that superb affirmation of the will to live, of a whole people!

I was not present at the historic joint session of the Chambers, but an eyewitness told me that it would be impossible to describe its grandeur.

In that deeply moved assemblage, where the King could declare that there was but one party, that of the fatherland, many military uniforms stood out in relief. That of M. Hubin was especially remarked—a Socialist Deputy, formerly Sergeant of Carabineers, who had re-entered the service—and that of the Duc d'Ursel, a Catholic Senator, who had enlisted the day before as a private in the Guides, at the age of 41!

Customarily, and very naturally, the diplomatic gallery of a Parliament is not a place where the sentiments of the legislative body find a very distinct echo. On that day, when the King declared that a country which defends itself compels universal respect and cannot perish; when M. de Broqueville hurled at Germany his admirable defiance, "We may be conquered—but submit, never!" when the whole hall seemed likely to fall in under the frenzied acclamations of the hemi-cycle and the galleries, the epic grandeurs of the spectacle drew tears from the eyes of more than one foreign diplomat. Those tears did honor to those who shed them no less than to those whose splendid courage caused them to flow.

On the following day Brussels learned of the first battles at Visé, and the successful resistance of the Liége forts to the formidable onrush of five corps d'élite of the German Army.

By resolutely carrying political honor to its extremest consequences, Belgium had, at a single stroke, entered into glory.

Official Text of the German Ultimatum to Belgium

Note handed in on Aug. 2, 1914, at 7 o'clock P. M. by Herr von Below-Saleske, German Minister, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, 2d August, 1914.
Imperial German Legation in Belgium.
[Highly Confidential.]

The German Government has received reliable information according to which the French forces intend to march on the Meuse, by way of Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France of marching on Germany through Belgian territory. The Imperial German Government cannot avoid the fear that Belgium, in spite of its best will, will be in no position to repulse such a largely developed French march without aid. In this fact there is sufficient certainty of a threat directed against Germany.

It is an imperative duty for the preservation of Germany to forestall this attack of the enemy.

The German Government would feel keen regret if Belgium should regard as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of the enemies of Germany oblige her on her part to violate Belgian territory.

In order to dissipate any misunderstanding the German Government declares as follows:

1. Germany does not contemplate any act of hostility against Belgium. If Belgium consents in the war about to commence to take up an attitude of friendly neutrality toward

Germany, the German Government on its part undertakes, on the declaration of peace, to guarantee the kingdom and its possessions in their whole extent.

2. Germany undertakes under the conditions laid down to evacuate Belgian territory as soon as peace is concluded.

3. If Belgium preserves a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in agreement with the authorities of the Belgian Government, to buy against cash all that is required by her troops, and to give indemnity for the damages caused in Belgium.

4. If Belgium behaves in a hostile manner toward the German troops, and in particular raises difficulties against their advance by the opposition of the fortifications of the Meuse, or by destroying roads, railways, tunnels, or other engineering works, Germany will be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this case Germany will take no engagements toward Belgium, but she will leave the later settlement of relations of the two States toward one another to the decision of arms. The German Government has a justified hope that this contingency will not arise and that the Belgian Government will know how to take suitable measures to hinder its taking place. In this case the friendly relations which unite the two neighboring States will become closer and more lasting.

The Reply by Belgium

Note handed in by M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below-Saleske, German Minister.

Brussels, 3d August, 1914.
(7 o'clock in the morning.)

By the note of the 2d August, 1914, the German Government has made known that according to certain intelligence the French forces intend to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur and that Belgium, in spite of her good-will, would not be able without help to beat off an advance of the French troops.

The German Government felt it to be its duty to forestall this attack and to violate Belgian territory. Under these conditions Germany proposes to the King's Government to take up a friendly attitude, and undertakes at the moment of peace to guarantee the integrity of the kingdom and of her possessions in their whole extent. The note adds that if Belgium raises difficulties to the forward march of the German troops Germany will be compelled to consider her as an enemy and to leave the later settlement of the two States toward one another to the decision of arms.

This note caused profound and painful surprise to the King's Government.

The intentions which it attributed to France are in contradiction with the express declarations which were made to us on the 1st of August, in the name of the Government of the republic.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, a violation of Belgian neutrality were to be committed by France, Belgium would fulfill all her international duties and her army would offer the most vigorous opposition to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, establish the independence and the neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the powers, and particularly of the Government of his Majesty the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations; she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality; she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality or to make it respected.

The attempt against her independence with which the German Government threatens her would constitute a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies the violation of that law.

The Belgian Government would, by accepting the propositions which are notified to her, sacrifice the honor of the nation while at the same time betraying her duties toward Europe.

Conscious of the part Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, she refuses to believe that the independence of Belgium can be preserved only at the expense of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope were disappointed the Belgian Government has firmly resolved to repulse by every means in her power any attack upon her rights.

[See Text of Belgian Neutrality Treaty on following page.]

Text of Treaty Guaranteeing Belgium's Neutrality

The following summary of the treaty stipulations which Germany violated when invading Belgium is taken from a Belgian official statement:

THE peculiarity about Belgian neutrality is that it has been imposed upon her by the powers as the one condition upon which they recognized her national existence. No sooner had the Belgians proclaimed their independence than the five powers—England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia—met in conference in London. There they signed, on June 26, 1831, the document known as "The Treaty of 18 Articles." The text of Articles 9 and 10 of the said treaty is as follows:

"Article 9. Belgium, within the limits traced in conformity with the principles laid down in the present preliminaries, shall form a perpetually neutral State. The five powers, without wishing to intervene in the internal affairs of Belgium, guarantee her that perpetual neutrality as well as the integrity and inviolability of her territory in the limits mentioned in the present article.

"Article 10. By just reciprocity Belgium shall be held to observe this same neutrality toward all the other States and to make no attack on their internal or external tranquillity while always preserving the right to defend herself against any foreign aggression."

This agreement was followed up, on Jan. 23, 1839, by a definitive treaty, accepted by Belgium and by the Netherlands, which treaty regulates Belgium's neutrality as follows:

"Article 7. Belgium, within the limits defined in Articles 1, 2, and 4, shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. She is obligated to preserve this neutrality against all the other States."

All the articles of this treaty were placed under the guarantee of the powers. Belgium has always loyally and strictly fulfilled her duties inherent in this neutrality.

German Claims That Belgium's Neutrality Was Forfeited

DR. KARL RATHGEN, Director of the College of Political Economy and Colonial Politics at the University of Hamburg, and one of Germany's chief authorities in his field, devotes an article in No. 162 of the "Preussische Jahrbücher" to an investigation of the motives which induced Belgium, years before the war, to enter into a military agreement with Great Britain. That this agreement invalidated Belgium's claim to be considered a "guaranteed neutral State" is the German contention. Dr. Rathgen thus defines the reason: "The fear of losing its Congo possessions was one of the chief motives of the Belgian Government before the war. This led to the military plans."

"As soon as the idea of transferring the Congo State from the possession of Leopold II. to the Belgian State, clear-sighted politicians," says Dr. Rathgen, "expressed the fear that Belgium's secure position was forfeited by this step. Through its neutralization the Belgian State was exempt from the opposition of the groups of powers in Europe; the Congo State, which was not neutralized, was exposed to it, however, since the European rivals, England, France, and Germany, as well as the Portuguese African possessions and South African Rhodesia, surrounded it and gave free rein to their rivalry within its territory. From the day of its incorporation, Nov. 15, 1908, anxiety in regard to the Congo State drove Belgium from the secure position which it had formerly occupied.

"Fear of British lust for expansion assumed especial significance. This fear existed while King Leopold II. had exercised despotic control of the territory. The State had been called into life against England's opposition, and the vehemence with which all King Leopold's plans of expansion to the northeast toward the Nile were greeted showed that this opposition was implacable. The English peril seemed to become especially dangerous because of the claims which the South African Union was making more and more openly on the southeastern corner of the State, the district of Catanga. The protection of the mixed breeds in the mining districts here furnished the English with the pretext of intervening in the independence of the Transvaal. In Brussels a repetition of a Jameson raid on Catanga was feared daily. Added to this was the open British threat to segregate Southern Catanga entirely from the rest of the Congo State 'to prevent the sleeping sickness from spreading.' Every discovery of gold and diamonds was carefully reported in order to increase English greed.

"Smuts, the South African Minister of War and Finance, declared at Pretoria on Oct. 22, 1913: 'The day is not far off on which all or almost all the territory south of the equator will belong to the South African colony.'

"Botha, in an address a few days later at Nigilstrom, emphasized these words by declaring that 'the highest goal of South Africa is a union which shall extend as far as possible to the north.'

"Excitement over these utterances was rife in Belgium. When the Belgian Consul General in Johannesburg still pointed out the danger of the South Africans 'trekking' to Catanga and the Vice Governor of Catanga officially discussed the danger of an invasion, the Belgian Government greatly feared, as Waxweiler states in his work, 'Belgium Neutral and Loyal,' a British menace to its colony in case of a European war.

"This anxiety was increased by the indignation of the British from 1900 on at the atrocities of the Belgian system of exploitation in the Congo, which were reported from authoritative sources. The Government endeavored to quell this indignation, it is true, but it spread further and further. The importance of public opinion was shown in the attitude of the British Government. The alarm in Belgium was great. Fears were also awakened by the fact that the British Government postponed from month to month the official recognition of the annexation of the Congo State by Belgium on Nov. 15, 1908, although it had before this, in the Spring of 1906, urged this step, even forced it by its threats of intervention in the Congo.

"When the French press, however, with an unequaled wealth of slanderous vituperation, began, from the Summer of 1911 on, its campaign against Germany, one of its most potent slogans was 'German greed wants to have the Congo State.' The Belgian Government of King Albert ceased to exercise that calm of deliberation which it had shown at the time of Leopold II., to the chagrin of Edward VII. Despite the friendly attitude of Germany, which it had always enjoyed since the establishment of the Congo State, harried and nervous from fear of German attack, scourged by the goading French press, held in suspense by England's delay in recognizing the incorporation of the Congo, it flung itself into the latter's arms for protection. On April 30, 1913, it forced the Belgian Chamber to accept the great Belgian military law demanded by the British negotiators, and on May 29 of the same year Sir Edward Grey announced in the House of Commons the recognition of the incorporation of the Congo in the Belgian State, with the refusal of which the country had been frightened and goaded for five years."

Dr. Rathgen concludes: "With the halter of fear for the Congo, Belgium was driven into the stable of the Entente."

The Self-Revelation of the German War Party Before the War

By E. W. Hallifax

The significance of this remarkable article, here summarized from The Hibbert Journal, lies in the completness with which the German war party's object was perceived and denounced in a German book that appeared in 1913.

THE most complete and crushing ex post facto indictment of Germany and Austria that has been formulated was published last Spring in Lausanne—and from a German pen. With merciless persistency and acuteness the author of "J'Accuse" unravels the web of fiction, distortion, and suppression which German and Austrian diplomacy wove around its plot to bring about the world war, and succeeded at least in deluding a large part, if not the majority, of the German Nation. For the delusion of a defensive war was beyond doubt necessary even in the degenerate Germany of today, in order to still the surviving conscience and weld the whole people into one.

But there had not been wanting in Germany even before the war men who perceived the dangerous character of the influences that were at work, and raised warning voices against the war crusade that was being preached. Such, among the books which appeared in 1913, were the anonymous "German World Policy Without War" and Professor Dr. Nippold's "German Chauvinism." The ante factum indictment of the latter volume and the evidence, alluded to by the author of "J'Accuse," which it adduces, throw a searchlight on the mind of Germany during the period 1912-14, and form a striking pendant and supplement to the reasoning of that remarkable book. To readers who have not access to the original some account of it may therefore be of interest.

"German Chauvinism," one of a series of publications of the Union for the Promotion of International Understanding, consists mainly of a selection, from a mass of material "which would fill volumes," of 109 closely printed pages taken from reports of speeches and newspaper articles dealing with the coming war. In his preface Dr. Nippold remarks: "There is no doubt that chauvinism has prodigiously increased in Germany, especially in the last decade. This fact strikes those most who have lived a considerable number of years abroad and now return to Germany. Many Germans in this position have expressed to me their surprise at the fundamental change which has taken place in the soul of the German people in recent years. I, too, can state that I was astonished at this psychological change, when after many years I returned to Germany." The author then allows the war party to reveal themselves in their own speeches and writings, some specimens of which are printed below, and sums up the evidence in a concluding essay, of which the following is a condensed paraphrase:

The chauvinism or fanatical nationalism of which these pages give proofs [thus wrote Dr. Nippold in 1913] not only combines exaggerated self-exaltation with contempt and hostility for foreign nations, thus relapsing into the barbarian notions of antiquity, but, supported by Pan-German ambitions on the one side and the agitation of the Armaments League on the other, it glorifies war as an end in itself and incites the German people to war in a way that a few years ago would have been considered impossible. Still worse, a deliberate system is revealed, whose object is by every means, whether it be distortion of facts or malicious calumny, to win over the nation and, if possible, the Government to the aims of the chauvinists. These people, who dislike a long peace, no matter whether a reason for war exists or not, are systematically educating the German people to desire war, teaching it that it needs war, and endeavoring in any event to bring war about. They begin by inculcating the longing for war in the youth of the nation as the thing most to be desired in life, and work upon the students in the universities, while such organizations as the Pan-German Union and the Armaments League seek to gain the present generation. Here is a typical specimen:

From the Jungdeutschland Post, a weekly periodical for the youth of Germany, published by the League of Young Germany. No. 4, Jan. 25, 1913. "War," by Otto von Gottberg.

> Honor and duty teach even us Germans and Christians that the souls of the dead and the living are without rest until a contest has ended with the victory and triumph of our arms. * * * Therefore war is the sublimest and most sacred expression of human action. It affords opportunity of sacrificing the highest possessions for one's brethren according to God's command, and bestows eternal life on the brave. We see this when we go on Sunday to the military church of our town. From our hymn books our eyes fall involuntarily on tablets on the walls. Above long, long lists of names are the words: "These died the hero's death with God for King and Fatherland." Let us desire each Sunday to be registered some day upon those tablets. Then we shall live forever and be envied centuries hence. * * * For us, too, the great and joyous hour of conflict will one day strike. * * * Into the street where we walk today with merry chatter and laughter there will soon fall, still moist, a printed sheet, and from the lips of the first German who reads it there will burst, strong and confident: "A call like echoing thunder sounds." A genuine battle choral is this song, and yet it is thrilled through with the German's exultant joy in war and heroic death. * * * Yes, that will be a great and glad hour, which we may secretly wish for ourselves.
>
> The wish for war when uttered aloud often becomes vain boasting and ludicrous rattling of the sword. But deep and still in the German heart there must live joy in war and a longing for war, because we have enemies enough, and victory comes only to a nation that with music and song goes to war as to a festival. Honor to our lord and ruler who unweariedly guards the world's peace, because he one day has to give account before God's throne not only for Germany's power, honor, and renown, but for every drop of blood shed at his bidding. On his shoulders the anxieties of a conflict will rest with terrific responsibility. We, however, may at his call seize our weapons with light and glad hearts and rejoice in the war. Let us, then, laugh with all our might at the old women in men's clothes who fear war, and therefore bewail it as dreadful and hateful. No! War is grand. Its august greatness lifts men's hearts high above earthly and commonplace things.
>
> For us, too, such hours are waiting. We will met them with the manly knowledge that it is grander and nobler after they have passed to live forever on the roll of honor in the church than to die a nameless and common death in our beds. On the world's round antheap we are of importance only as members of a community, of a Fatherland. What becomes of us must and ought to be indifferent to us. Thus did our fathers think, who were able to create the empire only because, along with the resolute will for victory and death, they carried with them to battle their firm, pious faith. A soldier's song tells us how they conceived of their heaven and their reward. Up there in the Hall of Clouds are seated hero Frederick, hero Blücher, the men of the deed, (but not the stay-at-homes who want to make us dislike war.) The great Kaiser, his Moltke, his Roon, his Bismarck, are there. And when a battle is fought on the earth with German weapons, and the faithful slain mount to heaven, a Lance Corporal from Potsdam calls out the guard. Old Fritz leaps from his golden chair, gives the order to present arms, and in imperious tones harangues the Kings and heroes: "Attention, gentlemen! Heroes, too, are they whom I now introduce, and at their head the King's Grenadiers."
>
> Such be Young Germany's Kingdom of Heaven. Thus let it yearn to knock at our diers."

The quintessence of their teaching is that a European war is not merely an eventuality against which it is necessary to be prepared, but a necessity, which in its own interests should be a cause of rejoicing to the German people. The method employed is to set up as an unimpeachable dogma the inevitableness of a war, and then to urge that the time most favorable to Germany should be chosen, in other words, that Germany should bring about war when it best suits her, and, above all, as soon as possible. The German people are believed to be ready, not as of old for a merely defensive war with compelling cause, but for an aggressive war without cause. No longer is it a question of Si vis pacem, para bellum, because German national interests require a war; and then, too, what a pity if the splendidly prepared army should be put to no use!

If it is asked to what extent these ideas have been adopted and assimilated by the nation at large, the answer is that, while the claim of the chauvinists to have the whole nation behind them is false, a great part of the German people has already been infected; and unless the systematic efforts, the arrogant claims, and misrepresentations of the chauvinists are opposed, there is a danger that this movement will gain the upper hand in the near future. The driving forces in this direction are, as the extracts show, organizations like the Pan-German Union and the Armaments League; the nationalistic press; Generals such as Keim, Liebert, Bernhardi, Eichhorn, Wrochem, and others who meddle with politics; and politicians like Harden, Bassermann, and their fellows. "When the political situation has cooled down, and causes of war cannot be discerned on the European horizon, they fan the war flame artificially. And they are never so much in their element as when the political situation seems in any way critical, as has frequently happened in recent months. But they would at no time admit that real material for a conflict was wanting. In the absence of any other material as an incitement, the chauvinism in other countries has to serve the purpose. * * * Incidents are of course exploited to the full and exaggerated, no matter whether they are important or not."

Many of these chauvinists [wrote Dr. Nippold] have lost all touch with modern civilization, and indeed with any kind of reality. "Morality and right are conceptions which, as they admit, have little value for them. They set them aside just as they do all the other results that humanity has achieved. * * * Consciously or unconsciously, these gentlemen preach to the German Nation nothing else than barbarism, the mediaeval right of the strongest, as the sole object worth striving for. For what else is it when a predatory war is urged upon the German people, when with this grand purpose it is pressed simply to disregard international law and the limits which morality imposes?

"That the Pan-German political visionaries are out for the acquisition of colonial territory suits these war Generals excellently, but they regard it only as means to an end. * * * For, according to their theory, however many colonies Germany acquired, it would need another war after a few decades, since the nation would once more be in danger of moral degeneration. War is to them merely a normal institution in the life of nations, and not simply a means of solving great conflicts to which recourse is had only in case of real necessity. * * * They brand as weak what is said by Governments as to defensive war and the world's need of peace. While other chauvinists at least assume a war to be forced upon Germany—although in fact no one wants to force a war on Germany, this idea being part of the means of suggestion employed by the Pan-Germans—the war Generals have no need of this motive. They are fully prepared to force a war on others. * * * Germany is far more threatened today with danger from itself than from abroad. The Balkan war seemed at last to give the lovers of war their longed-for opportunity. Now they are the more disappointed that even this occasion, which seemed to hold the last great material for a European conflict, has apparently passed by without one."

Dr. Nippold finds grave reason for concern in the fact that these preachers of war have secured so numerous a public, and one so ready to give ear to and blindly to follow them, and that their influence is extending over ever-widening circles. Especially are the educated classes infected, and that this infection is general is proved by the small number of the younger historians who have escaped it.

The political as distinct from the moral danger which threatens from these influences becomes grave as soon as they have the power to affect the decisions of the Government. This may soon come about under the pretense that the chauvinists represent and are identical with the nation. Further, they do mischief abroad and are taken as typical of German feeling, thus earning for Germany the reputation of being the chief disturber of European peace. "But this is certain. If there is anything that could really en-

NICHOLAS PASHITCH

Serbian Prime Minister, Who, Though an Exile in Italy, Still Helps to Direct Serbia's Destinies

KING GUSTAV V. OF SWEDEN

Whose Country Is Disturbed by Reports That Russia Is Fortifying the Aland Islands in the Baltic

(Photo from Underwood & Underwood)

danger the German Empire, it is solely and exclusively the chauvinistic movement and the risk of its gaining the upper hand. This, and not the Triple Entente, is the enemy of Germany. * * * Chauvinism is a political danger against which the country cannot be warned with sufficient speed and energy."

How is the sudden growth of chauvinism in Germany to be explained? The nation has failed to see the new and great international tasks in which since its union it has been called upon to share. Its gaze has been turned backward to the deeds which founded the empire instead of forward to its mission in co-operation with other nations, which mission, together with internal development, would have offered a worthy field for the energies of a rising State. "Conscious of its strength, it has yearned for great deeds, and, missing the true ideal, has given ear to those whose ideal is war. The 'deed' about which the chauvinistic papers are always writing, what is it but 'a gay and festive war,' equivalent to a predatory expedition? Such a predatory policy may have been an ideal of the Middle Ages, but it is one for which there is not and never will be room in the modern civilized world." But Germany disregarded the tasks in behalf of civilization which called for her help, and even set herself in opposition to them, e. g., to the labors of The Hague Conferences. With the catchword "internationalism" she thrust them away. For her feeling of nationhood was too youthful, and she feared it might suffer harm. "Thus Germany failed to recognize the true goal, * * * and threw herself into the arms of the chauvinists who preach * * * war, notwithstanding that today the interests which the nations possess in common far preponderate, and that national tasks have therefore no need of war for their fulfillment." This is shown even for those who advocate an "expansion policy" in the recent publication, "German World Policy Without War."

Thus does a German, more than a year before the outbreak of war, describe the efforts made in Germany to provoke a war. That Dr. Nippold and the members of his society do not stand alone in their fears and warnings is shown by sixteen extracts in which other writers, and such journals as the Frankfurter Zeitung, the Vossische Zeitung, and the Strassburger Neue Zeitung, bear similar witness.

An article in März by Ludwig Thoma, entitled "Poisoners," on March 29, 1913, tells the same tale: For a moment quiet reigns after the furious strife, and calm voices are heard declaring the instigation to war of the last few weeks to be criminal folly. In reality the noise is all about nothing. The German and French Governments are agreed about the questions in dispute, (viz., the Lunéville and Nancy incidents,) both swear they are armed only for defense; the two peoples have no cause of quarrel nor any intention of adventuring their lives and their well-being in war. Whence, then, the distrust, rage, hatred, the shrieks and threats? Not from events, deeds, or desires of conquest. No! render to the chauvinistic press its due. It has conquered. This is its work. A public speech is incomplete without an allusion to the time when we must stake all we hold dear. Interest in scientific inventions is concentrated on them as means of destruction, and is shown by calculating how many hundredweights of dynamite can be hurled down by a Zeppelin. "Everything is poisoned, and this we owe to the nationalistic press. Honor to whom honor is due." It should be noted that the 110 militant extracts, taken from nearly fifty different newspapers, are selected by Dr. Nippold from thousands of speeches and articles of similar tenor. He adds that the worst of them are far exceeded in warlike tone by many recent pamphlets, of which only the titles are quoted, e. g., "The End of France in 19??: a Forecast." * * *

With the aid of the captured Government the Pan-German faction accomplished in the last days of July, 1914, the capture of the remnant of the nation. How completely it has mastered both, recent history makes all too plain.

The Bagdad Railway and a Remarkable Arabian Sultan

[Written for Current History]

WHERE will the Bagdad Railway end? That is the chief question the war will decide, so far as German *Weltpolitik* is concerned.

Before the war, Berlin, by long and determined negotiations, induced Constantinople and London to allow the extension of the railroad to Busrah, the port of Mesopotamia, on the Shatt Al Arab, the Arab River, sixty miles from the Persian Gulf. If Germany determines the terms of peace after the present war, there is no doubt that the *Bagdadbahn* will have its terminus at Kuweit, 100 miles south of Busrah and right on the Persian Gulf. That would give Germany a base from which, in the next war, she could seize India from the British.

SHEIK MUBARAK

In November, 1899, the Kaiser got his concession for the Bagdad Railway from the Turkish Sultan, Abdul Hamid. In 1900 he tried to get a concession for the terminus of that railway at Kuweit from Sheik Mubarak, the ruler of that town. He was one year too late. In January of 1899 Sheik Mubarak had cast in his lot with the British. He had agreed to follow their advice in all his dealings with foreigners. In return they gave him their protection. He needed it, for in 1901 a Turkish corvette came to Kuweit to carry him off to Constantinople. A British warship arrived just then and drove the Turks away. When the Germans came to lease twenty square miles of his land, Sheik Mubarak refused to have anything to do with them. It was because Sheik Mubarak so effectually blocked the German plans for a port on the gulf that the British were able to hold up the full development of German ambitions in the Orient.

In is only in the light of these facts that the importance of the approaching battle of Bagdad can be appreciated. The Germans will have to help the Turks to drive the British from the whole Mesopotamian valley before they will be able to get by war what they could not gain by negotiation. That they are determined to succeed there is evident. One of the first measures introduced into the present Turkish Parliament was a bill for a loan of £T2,112,000 ($10,000,000) to be raised in Germany for the *completion* of the Bagdad Railway.

Now one of the chief characters in this Near East drama has passed away. Sheik Mubarak has died at Kuweit. Whether this introduces any new element into the situation remains to be seen. But the Germans will probably have no more success in dealing with Sheik Jabir, the son and successor, than they had with Sheik Mubarak himself. The latter was nearly 80 years old, and the British, in their treaties with him, planned for his heir as well as himself.

Sheik Mubarak was a most interesting personality. He was a typical Oriental ruler. In many ways he reminded one of Haroun al-Raschid. In all his dealings with the British, however completely he was guided by them in his foreign relations, he never allowed them to interfere in the least in his domestic affairs. He was absolutely independent, as far as his own subjects were concerned. He showed his power in ways that Western rulers use only in times of war. The result was that he was known as a "strong" governor. But as only evildoers had to fear his punishment, his dominion prospered. Life and property were so safe that Kuweit imitated America in attracting immigrants from Turkey, Persia, and other places where disturbances were too frequent for business prosperity. During the twenty years of Mubarak's reign, Kuweit's population continually increased until it now numbers 50,000 persons. It was always hard to find an empty house in the town, although new ones were constantly being built.



KUWEIT IS A CENTRE OF THE PEARLING INDUSTRY AND OF CARAVAN TRADE.

Some months before his death Sheik Mubarak received the decoration of K. C. S. I., (Knight Commander of the Star of India.) On that occasion Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, then Viceroy of India, made a formal visit to Kuweit while on his way to Busrah, which had been captured from the Turks. The form of address had some significant elements that showed that the position of Kuweit was no longer anomalous, nominally Turkish but practically British. Lord Hardinge, in making the presentation, said: "This is a token of regard from the King-Emperor in grateful recognition of your loyal co-operation and efforts to preserve order and quiet in his dominions." Kuweit is now in the India postal system, to show that it is a British protectorate. But it has its own flag, with the word Al Kuweit in Arabic in white on a red field, to show that it is independent.

Mubarak's dominion included the town of Kuweit itself and about 100 miles of territory to the south and west and fifty miles to the north. His influence extended much further. Partly because of his age, always a matter of regard among the Arabs, and partly because of the strategic position of his town as the best harbor on the gulf and the seaport for Central Arabia, he maintained a strong place in the politics of all the Arab tribes from Mecca in the west to Ahwaz in Persia, and from Nasaria on the Euphrates to Katif in El Hassa. He aided his friend Sheik Khazal in subduing the rebellious Bakhtiari Arabs in Western Persia, and he induced Abd al Aziz, the Emir of Nejd, to acknowledge the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan over El Hassa. His native counsel will be missed and his influence over the Arabs will be longed for in settling the affairs of that increasingly important part of the world.

Sheik Mubarak was practically illiterate. He could read nothing but the handwriting of his own secretaries. But it would be a great mistake to infer that he was ignorant. While ability to read and write would have been invaluable to him, still he was wise beyond the fathoming of his few educated subjects. Nor would a Westerner, after a conversation with him, think of calling him unenlightened and uninteresting. His portrait shows the shrewd, strong character of the man. When Mubarak came to the throne, on the death of his father and older brother, Kuweit was an Arab town out of contact with the world and untouched by modern influence. Not a white man lived in the place. But the new Sheik encouraged ships to come there. He welcomed a British political agent. He invited American missionaries to establish a dispensary and bookstore there. He introduced the first telephone, automobile, and electric light in the town. Old as he was, he was more progressive than most of his subjects cared to be. He modernized his kingdom as rapidly as he could. It is to be hoped that his successor will follow in his father's footsteps.

If the Germans win the war, the town will be Europeanized in short order, whether the present ruler desires it or not.

With the Russians in Persia

By E. Simais

L'Illustration, which has from the very beginning of the war been distinguished by the excellence of its first-hand material, not only describing events in France, but also covering the Russian and Serbian fields, and going as far from home as the Cameroons and China, now gives what is the first intelligible account of Russia's startlingly dramatic campaign in Persia, the importance of which in world politics is greatly increased by the collapse of the English campaign in Mesopotamia. Russia's victory in the East, not only over Germany, but over her old rival and present ally, seems to be complete.

Germany's plan, intrusted to her representative in Persia, Prince Henry of Reuss, was to make the Shah's realm a bridge between the Turkish Empire and India over which would sweep the wave of the Holy War against the "infidel" Allies; the proclamation of the Holy War against Christians having been obtained by Kaiser Wilhelm from the Sheik ul Islam, as the Kaiser's published telegram to the Crown Prince shows. Russia's plan was, in part, to break down this bridge, thus helping her ally, England; in part, to provide a strong left flank movement for her advance from the Caucasus into Armenia and down the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. She has brilliantly succeeded in both these objects, and her prestige is now further increased by the surrender of General Townshend's army at Kut-el-Amara.

THE Germans, in their plan to involve Persia in the war, had reckoned on the following elements in their favor: An irresolute sovereign, and Government internally divided between the two tendencies which just now divide the world, a vast country almost devoid of all organized means of communication, the absence of a regular army that might serve as the basis of authority, and, so far, no means of assuring the collection of taxes with any regularity. In these troubled waters Germany fished.

Their first incitement to revolt against Russian influence had at least a partial success in the interior of Persia, notably at Ispahan, where, after the assassination of M. Vonkaver, the Russian Consul, and the attempted assassination of the English Consul, every European who was not a German was forced to flee from the city and take refuge at Teheran. The same thing happened at Kermanshah, Hamadan, Sultanabad, and Shiraz. At this point the Russian Government, in conjunction with England, addressed a note to the Persian Government, demanding that the Persian troops who had entered German service should be disarmed. In his reply the Shah declared his inability to compel this disarming, and in consequence his powerlessness to answer for the lives of Europeans belonging to the allied nations.

Russia, therefore, sent a force of 24,000 men who, at the end of last October, disembarked at Enseli, on the south shore of the Caspian Sea, some seventy or eighty miles from the nearest seaport in the Russian Caucasus, and at the head of the caravan road through Resht to Teheran.

From this point the Russian force advanced along the road as far as Kasbin. The effect of this move was soon felt. As soon as it was officially announced that 4,000 Russian soldiers had left Kasbin for Yeng-Iman, a considerable village about fifty miles from Teheran, the Germans became seriously alarmed, and with them their Persian supporters and armed forces. Alarm became panic, when, on Nov. 14, they learned that 1,000 Russians, who had arrived that morning at Herej, twenty-five miles from Teheran, were marching on the capital.



RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN IN PERSIA

All the furniture and archives of the German Legation were transported during the night to the American Legation, which was forced to hire a large building to store them in. The Austrian Legation turned its effects over to the Spanish Minister. As for Turkey, her representatives loaded all their possessions on carts drawn by an odd assortment of animals, and fled with them to Shah Abdul Azim. The German Minister betook himself to Kum, the second holy city in Persia after Meshed, between eighty and ninety miles south of Teheran; and there he organized a pretended Committee of Defense, as against the influence of Russia. Shortly after this the Russian advance in Central Persia forced the Germans and their committee to evacuate Kum, and to go first to Kashan and then to Ispahan.

Before these later developments Prince Henry of Reuss and his accomplices had established an ascendency over the Shah who, at their instance, and terrified by the picture which they painted for him of the Russian invasion, had decided to transfer the Persian Government from Teheran to Ispahan. The Shah therefore ordered preparations for departure to be made. On Nov. 14, at 11 A. M., every hired vehicle in Teheran, to the number of 300, was requisitioned, as well as all available horses, donkeys, mules, and camels. The Teheran police and the Persian gendarmes, under the orders of their Swedish instructors, left the city to take up posts along the road from Teheran to Kum, which the Shah was to take.

But the Shah had not finally made up his mind. For five days he gave audiences alternately to the Ministers of Austria and Turkey, who were persuading him to depart, and to the representatives of Russia and England, who wished to keep him. The last won. Like a skillful diplomat, the Russian Minister promised the Shah that the Czar's troops would not pass Yeng-Iman if he remained in Teheran; the Shah remained. Then followed what the Germans have not hesitated to call a grand transformation scene, and what was in reality a bit of comedy shameful enough for its pitiable actors; the Swedish officers, Major Fric, Major de Mare, and Major Helstroem, and Captain Hellemare, who was in command of the Second Regiment of Gendarmes, refused to return with the First Regiment and the police, which adhered to the Government, and went over, bag and baggage, to the Germans. The Swedish Government later disclaimed all responsibility for the acts of these Swedish officers.

Relying on the promise of the Russians not to enter the capital, the Germans recommenced, directly or by their agents, their campaign of propaganda in Teheran itself.

To triumph over the influence of Russia, they counted especially on arousing a fever of fanaticism among the Persians, worked up by their priests on the day of the Ashura, (the tenth day of the month of Mohurram, the first month of their year.) On that day certain fanatics, wearing long shirts of white cloth and armed with swords, slashed their shaven heads, crying out "Hassan-Hussein!—Death to the Russians and the English!" In this fashion they passed through the principal districts of the city, sprinkling with red the streets and the passersby, some of whom, infected by their fever, distributed among themselves pieces torn from the blood-stained shirts. Leaders pronounced orations to disturb the populace. Groups discussed the "Russian menace," which was problematical, and the "German promises," which were even more so.

Very fortunately, there was more idle trifling than genuine emotion in all this. The arrival of the Russian troops had the effect of a stone fung into a flock of sparrows. The leaders fled without thought of coming back, and the people of Teheran, coming to their senses, recovered the calm which befits peaceable Orientals, whose only enemy is adventure.

The Russian Government, or rather the Grand Duke Nicholas, Viceroy of the Caucasus, whose spirit of energy and decision are so widely recognized, had not hesitated, in presence of the German bravado, which was tolerated, if not actually encouraged by the weakness of the Persian Government, to push forward an imposing force into the heart of Persia. It should be added at once that this was to render the Shah the greatest service by putting at his disposal, or at least at the disposal of the forces of order, a powerful army. And it was thus that, on Jan. 8, 1916, General Baratoff in person, the Commander in Chief of the Russian Armies in Persia, accompanied by his staff, was in a position to review the "Cossack Brigade" on the Teheran review ground.

The history of this brigade is odd enough. In 1878 the Shah Nasr ed Din, on a visit to St. Petersburg, was so strongly impressed by the martial bearing of the Cossacks of the Imperial Guard that he forthwith arranged with certain officers of the Czar to organize a similar bodyguard for him at Teheran. Since then, the Cossack Brigade of the Shahs has always been supplied with Russian officers. It forms the only military body in Persia which is composed of clean, disciplined, well clothed, well armed, and regularly paid soldiers. Besides these Cossacks the Government forces consisted of police and gendarmes, placed under the order of Swedish officers. We have seen what German money effected among them.

There is also, it is true, a Persian "army." But certain explanations are necessary to make clear the exact meaning which is to be given to that expression. Faithful supporters of his Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia, these soldiers pay no attention to politics, and consider their bayonettes as handy cleavers to chop wood or to cut up a sheep. The cities are not called on to furnish recruits; the human tribute is drawn from the villages. The number of men whom they must supply to the State is proportional to the amount of taxes that they pay, and is calculated at the rate of 100 tomans per head. In other words, in obedience to the "Bonitche" law, a village paying 500 tomans in taxes must, in addition, furnish five soldiers—at least if called upon to do so. And in this case the money will serve to maintain the men in the army, to which the proprietor of the village must send them. As the law lays down no limits of age or strength, the proprietor sends whom he pleases, and unless he himself happens to be a regimental General, is very careful not to deprive himself of men who are really fit for agricultural work. The same thing happens where the village belongs to several small proprietors. We must not forget that, in Persia, we are still in the epoch of feudalism, and that every peasant is the serf of a lord of the manor.

The number of intermediate ranks in the Persian Army is insignificant. The organization consists chiefly of Generals. Of these, there are four ranks—the Sartip, a General commanding theoretically 100 men; the Mirpench, with 500 men; the Amir Toman, with 1,000 men, and, finally, the Sidar, the General over 5,000 men, who is a sort of Field Marshal. Their principal revenue is drawn from the exploitation of the right conferred on them by their commissions to raise a number of men corresponding to their rank. As every soldier must offer a sheep to his officer each year, the latter's only concern is to count his sheep, leaving his men to their own devices, and every one is happy.

In the last forty years the Persian Government has several times tried European instructors, of many nationalities. Their efforts are immediately confronted by an insurmountable difficulty, as the most insignificant European Corporal cannot, for the reasons already indicated, hold a rank inferior to that of General—save for the sheep tribute, be it understood. But where do Generals drill recruits? No prestige could stand it. The only memory the old Persian soldiers have preserved of these attempts is that the officers tried to make them march, and that no one ever succeeded in so doing.

The Shah's Government decided, late in the day, to dismiss the army, and to consecrate the money it cost to the formation of a body of gendarmes under Swedish officers. We have seen that the experiment did not succeed, and that the sole support of the Government, except for the Russian expeditionary corps, was the Cossack brigade. The effective force of the latter, which began with 1,000 men, has just been raised to 10,000.

THE RUSSIAN FORCE

Two facts, in themselves unimportant enough, made an impression on the Persians.

The first was the arrival at Kazer Kadjar, the camp of the Cossack brigade, of the first aeroplane, piloted by a Russian aviator—the machine was a Blériot. The excitement was so great that the Shah himself went to the landing place. The officers strongly insisted that his Majesty should enter the machine and be photographed. Their prayers were in vain. The Shah, overcome by misgivings, was in dread that the machine might suddenly take flight and carry off its precious passenger. He would only consent to mount on a bench, placed behind the pilot, convinced that in this way the illusion would be complete. But, when the proof was printed, the imperial legs were visible below! * * *

But the impression caused by the aeroplane was a small thing compared with the effect produced by the first Russian armor-clad automobile which passed through Teheran on its way to Kum, in pursuit of the rebels. This auto, with the very latest improvements, was armed with two machine guns at the sides and a three-inch quick-firing gun behind, and provided also with a searchlight and a periscope. With its guns, and without the men needed to work it, this war auto weighs 8,400 kilograms, and can do forty-five kilometers an hour, (twenty-eight miles.) Two inscriptions in Arabic adorn its sides; one is the word of the Prophet Mohammed: " All that has been created will perish; all that man builds shall fall." The Moslems must, of necessity, feel a profound respect for the men who are masters of such a mechanism as this! The other inscription reads thus: " I give death only to my enemies, while I protect my friends."

But the real discovery was the painting of death's heads at the four corners of the auto. The mere sight of this motor-fort produced a complete right-about in the minds of the local Russophobes; every one became, or declared himself to be, Russophile. Such is Persian character; for four months the Germans had been promising two Prussian army corps, the first battalion of which had not appeared, while the power of Russia had become visible.

As may be seen, the Russians did not neglect any of the refinements of diplomacy. But they knew how to back it up by military force, the only kind that counts. As early as Dec. 21, at Rabat Karim, situated 40 kilometers (25 miles) to the south of Teheran, 300 Cossacks completely defeated 1,400 gendarmes and volunteers, commanded by the celebrated Swedes, killing 218 men. This was only a skirmish.

On Jan. 2, Russian scouts fell in with a Turkish army 14,000 strong, at Sanj-Bulak, in the province of Azerbijan, to the south of Tauris. At Mian-do-Ab they rejoined the Russian advance guard which, in face of the numerical superiority of the enemy, retired on Maraga, where the bulk of the Russian force, numbering 18,000, was. The Turks, by forced marches, rushed into the jaws of the wolf, and after five days' fighting left their artillery and 10,000 prisoners in the hands of the Russians. Never before had the Sultan's troops suffered such a defeat in Persia. The tribes that were hostile to Russia fled instantly to their mountains.

The Grand Duke Nicholas on Jan. 6 visited Julfa, a town on the Russo-Persian frontier, to learn the result of the battle of Maraga. He went back to Tiflis as soon as he knew that victory was won.

The Russian army operating in the province of Azerbijan, on the Turkish frontier, was under General Chernozuloff, who had been for three years Colonel of the Cossack brigade at Teheran. By the end of January the Russian forces occupied the towns of Kum, Kashan, Hamadan, Sultanabad, and Kengaver, in Central Persia. The bands of rebels and the German officers were massed at Sahneh, between Kengaver and Kermanshah, supported by Turkish regulars. The Czar's force, well supplied with artillery, advanced slowly but surely. Its losses were insignificant compared with those of the Persian bands. The latter, recruited from the tribes of Luristan and Kurdistan, levy taxes for their own purposes, oppress the inhabitants, pillage the villages. The rôle of the Germans, who have ceased to command in the military sense of the word, consists in organizing brigandage to supply the want of money which is already felt; for the attempt to issue paper money guaranteed by the German Government was a fiasco. Not a day passes without the inhabitants of the villages thus maltreated coming to implore the protection of the nearest Russian troops. General Baratoff's energy and strategic ability are rapidly clearing Persia of these German officers who are brigand chiefs, unworthy of the name of soldiers.

British Disaster at Kut-el-Amara

General Townshend's Surrender

MAJOR GEN. CHARLES V. TOWNSHEND'S Anglo-Indian expeditionary force, which started out a year ago to capture Bagdad, and which had been besieged since the 8th of last December at Kut-el-Amara, surrendered unconditionally to superior Turkish forces on April 28, after a heroic resistance of 143 days. According to British official figures, the surrendered army consisted of 2,970 English and 6,000 Indian troops; the Turkish figures, which probably include servants and followers of Indian troops, place the total at 13,300. General Townshend destroyed his guns and munitions before yielding, but Khalil Bey, the Turkish commander, captured much booty, including a large sum of money.

The Turkish official report adds:

> In addition to General Townshend, we captured at Kut-el-Amara General Povna, Commander of the Sixth Infantry Division; General Dabmack, Commander of the Sixteenth Brigade; General Hamilton, Commander of the Seventeenth Brigade; Colonel Evans, Commander of the Eighteenth Brigade, and an officer named Smith, Commander of Artillery. The number of officers made prisoners is 551, of whom half are Europeans and half Hindus. Of the soldiers captured 25 per cent. are Europeans and the remainder Hindus.
>
> Although the enemy destroyed a large quantity of arms before the fall of Kut-el-Amara and dropped others into the Tigris, we have found up to the present time forty cannon, twenty machine guns, and nearly 5,000 rifles, which will be ready for use after slight repairs have been made. We also took a large amount of ammunition, one large ship, one small ship, four automobiles and three aeroplanes. Arms and ammunition which were dropped into the Tigris are being recovered by us.

This new and dramatic disaster to British arms, second only to that at the Dardanelles, is again a result of underestimating the strength of the enemy. General Townshend and his men have received only praise for the heroic tenacity with which they maintained an impossible position so many months. The initial blunder is laid at the door of the India Office, which set too large a task for so small a force. The original expedition was under the direction of General Sir John Nixon; after the failure to reach Bagdad he was superseded by General Sir Percy Lake, who is still in general command of the Mesopotamian operations. The fighting, however, has been led throughout by Townshend, Gorringe, and Aylmer. The relief force under Aylmer is still hemmed in a few miles below Kut.

The story of this attempt to capture the legendary location of the Garden of Eden from the Turks and Germans is long and romantic, as well as tragic. It begins with a series of brilliant successes, among the most notable of which was General Townshend's victory over the Turks at Kut-el-Amara in September, 1915, on his way up the Tigris Valley to Bagdad. All the earlier operations have been described in detail by General Nixon in an official report issued April 5, 1916, part of which is reproduced verbatim after the close of the present article. General Nixon's operations to clear Mesopotamia of Turkish resistance were carried on chiefly by collaborating forces under Townshend and Gorringe, consisting of two divisions of Anglo-Indian troops, or a few over 40,000 men. His report covers the six months from April to September, 1915, and includes the following achievements of British troops:

> Clearing Persian Arabistan and securing and repairing the pipe line to the oil fields.
>
> General Townshend's advance from Basra toward Bagdad—as far as Ctesiphon.
>
> The battle of Kurna and the capture of the town on May 31 by General Townshend.
>
> The battle of Amara and the taking of that town by General Townshend on June 3, with 740 Turkish prisoners.
>
> The capture of the Arab stronghold of Nasiriyah, on the Euphrates, July 24, with 1,000 prisoners and many rifles and stores.
>
> General Townshend's victory at Kut-el-Amara on Sept. 28, where a strong army



BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA

under Nur-ed-Din Bey was defeated, thus clearing the way for an advance toward Bagdad.

From Kut-el-Amara General Townshend pushed northward, part of his force following the old caravan trail and part the river, where his troops were transported by boats, most of which had been brought from India and were as primitive as those which the Turks and Arabs brought to oppose them. By Nov. 22 he had fought his way nearly 100 miles northward to Ctesiphon, within eighteen miles of Bagdad. There he was attacked by an overwhelming force and suffered a severe defeat. Though he regained the lost ground the next day, he saw nothing but a siege before him. His water supply gave out, and he decided to retrace his steps and await reinforcements. This retirement, accomplished under extraordinary disadvantages, was hailed in England as a remarkable achievement. Not only did General Townshend ward off the pursuing Turks with comparatively small losses, but he succeeded in taking with him all his wounded.

The main body pushed ahead, but on Dec. 5 Townshend determined to make a stand with the rear guards, at the scene of his previous victory, Kut-el-Amara. This guard, consisting of something over 10,000 men, made an intrenched camp around the place, while the remainder of his force passed on down the Tigris.

Kut-el-Amara is nothing but a mud collection of ramshackle houses on somewhat raised ground. Behind the river front are a mosque and a collection of one or two storied Arab houses.

Three days after he began to intrench, (that is, on Dec. 8,) Townshend's communications with the main body of troops were cut off, and ever since then he has been besieged. Almost daily attacks were made by the Turks. Townshend is said to have captured over 3,000 Turks and Arabs by sorties.

When it became evident that Townshend was so beset that he could not fight his way out, steps were taken to send a relief expedition. Thirty thousand Indian troops were dispatched, and two Anglo-Indian divisions, which had been fighting in France, were transported to the head of the Persian Gulf, making, with the remnants of Townshend's main expedition, a relief force of 90,000 men. General Sir Percy Lake was placed in command of the entire forces, in succession to Sir John Nixon, and command of the relief expedition itself was given to Major Gen. Aylmer.

This expedition was poorly supplied in regard to transport and river gunboat service, and Aylmer's march up the river again turned to a retreat after the first dash. The march began on Jan. 6, when the advanced guard left Gherbi, about eighty miles by river southeast of Kut-el-Amara. By Jan. 8 he had reached Sheikh Saad, forty miles to the north, where he defeated the Turks in two pitched battles. Between Jan. 15 and 19 he reached Orah, and on Jan. 21 he was at El Gussa, only eight miles from Kut-el-Amara. On the following day he attacked the Es Sinn intrenchments, which the Turks had built across the river eight miles from Kut, but failed to take them. Floods came to add to the trouble, due to lack of equipment, so that his position became almost as precarious as was Townshend's at Ctesiphon. Like him, Aylmer retreated.

Up to this time the campaign had been under the direction of the India Office, but the War Office in London now took a hand, and a large body of Colonials, including the Thirteenth Division of Gallipoli fame, with full equipment and supplies, was sent from Egypt, together with a flotilla of gunboats. In February Aylmer again started from his base at Gherbi, and General Lake himself joined the expedition. By the middle of March the expedition was near El Owasa and defeated the Turks there, after having met with a reverse at Felahie.

On April 5 the British force carried by assault the Turkish intrenched position at Umm-el-Henna, twenty-two miles from Kut-el-Amara. The next day the capture of Felahie was officially announced. Even then the relief expedition was about fifteen miles further away from Townshend's beleaguered force than it was on Jan. 21. Formidable masses of Turks were gathered on both sides of the Tigris below the invested town, holding intrenched and strongly fortified posts to contest the further advance.

The fighting in this region has been severe ever since, but the relief force, although gaining some ground, was never able to win a decisive victory.

The losses on both sides recently have been heavy. On April 14 it was admitted that the Tigris army had lost 8,100 men up to that time. Since then there have been several battles between the Turks and the relief expedition. In one engagement alone, according to the Turkish accounts, the British lost 4,000 men.

General Townshend's surrender was brought about by the starvation of his forces. Attempts were made to carry supplies to him by aeroplane, but the location of Kut in a bend of the river made it difficult for airmen to land. A shipload of provisions on its way to him ran aground in the Tigris only four miles from the hungry soldiers. With this final misfortune he decided that surrender was the only course left for his beleagured army.

The Battle That Won Kut-el-Amara

By General Sir John Nixon

Of Sir John Nixon's detailed report of the Mesopotamian operations under his command, made public on April 5, we give here the most interesting portion, namely, his story of how General Townshend captured Kut-el-Amara on Sept. 28, 1915:

THE defeat of Nur-Ed-Din and the occupation of Kut-el-Amara became my next objective as soon as Nasiriyah was secured, and I commenced the transfer of troops toward Amara on the following day.

By Sept. 12 the force was concentrated

at Ali al Gharbi. Thence the advance was continued by route march along the river bank, accompanied by a naval flotilla and shipping, until Sannaiyat (some eight miles below the enemy's position covering Kut-el-Amara) was reached on Sept. 15. Intense heat prevailed during the period of this march, with temperatures ranging from 110 degrees to 116 degrees in the shade. The column remained halted at Sannaiyat until Sept. 25, receiving reinforcements during this period.

Nur-Ed-Din Bey's army lay astride the river some seven miles northeast of Kut and eight miles from General Townshend's force at Sannaiyat. It occupied a line naturally favorable for defense, which, during three or four months of preparation, had been converted into a formidable position. On the right bank the defenses extended for five miles southward along some mounds which commanded an extensive field of fire. The river was blocked by a boom composed of barges and wire cables commanded at close range by guns and fire trenches. On the left bank the intrenchments extended for seven miles, linking up the gaps between the river and three marshes which stretched away to the north. The defenses were well designed and concealed, commanding flat and open approaches. They were elaborately constructed with a thoroughness that missed no detail. In front of the trenches were barbed wire entanglements, military pits, and land mines. Behind were miles of communication trenches connecting the various works and providing covered outlets to the river, where ramps and landing stages had been made to facilitate the transfer of troops to or from ships, while pumping engines and water channels carried water from the river to the trenches.

Nur-Ed-Din's army held this position, one division being on each bank, with some army troops in reserve on the left bank, near a bridge above the main position. A force of Arab horsemen was posted on the Turkish left flank; most of the Turkish regular cavalry were absent during the battle on a raid against our communications at Sheikh Saad.

On Sept. 26 General Townshend advanced to within four miles of the Turkish position. His plan was to make a decisive attack on the left bank by enveloping the Turkish left with his main force, but in order to deceive the enemy as to the direction of the real attack, preliminary dispositions and preparatory attacks were made, with the object of inducing the Turks to expect the principal attack on the right bank.

On the morning of the 27th our troops advanced by both banks. The principal force, on the right bank, made a feint attack on the trenches south of the river, while the left bank detachment intrenched itself within 3,000 yards of the enemy. Meanwhile a bridge had been constructed, and under cover of night the main force crossed from the right bank and deployed opposite the enemy's left flank. On the morning of Sept. 28 a general attack was made against the enemy on the left bank. The Eighteenth Infantry Brigade, under Major Gen. Fry, with its left on the line of the river, made a pinning attack, while Brig. Gen. Delamain, commanding the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Infantry Brigades, advanced in two columns against the enemy's left, one column being directed frontally against the flank intrenchments, while the other moved wide around the flank and attacked in the rear. General Delamain's right flank was protected by the cavalry brigade.

The first troops to enter the enemy trenches were the First Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment, One Hundred and Seventeenth Mahrattas, and Twenty-second Company Sappers and Miners, who made a brilliant assault, well supported by the artillery, and soon after 10 A. M. captured a redoubt and trenches on the enemy's extreme left, inflicting heavy losses and taking 135 prisoners. A combined attack by the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Infantry Brigades was then made, and after hard fighting, during which the enemy made several unsuccessful counterattacks, the whole of the northern part of the enemy's position was in our hands by 2 P. M.

General Delamain reorganized his troops on the captured position and gave them a much-needed rest, as they were exhausted by the great heat, the long march, and hard fighting. After a brief rest General Delamain moved his column southward to assist the Eighteenth Infantry Brigade, by attacking the enemy opposed to it in rear. Before this attack could develop strong hostile reserves appeared from the southwest, in the direction of the bridge. General Delamain immediately changed his objective, and attacked the new troops, supported by his guns firing at a range of 1,700 yards.

The sight of the approaching enemy and the prospect of getting at him in the open with the bayonet put new life into our infantry, who were suffering from weariness and exhaustion after their long and trying exertions under the tropical sun. For the time thirst and fatigue were forgotten. The attack was made in a most gallant manner with great dash. The enemy were routed with one magnificent rush, which captured four guns and inflicted heavy losses on the Turks. The enemy fought stubbornly, and were saved from complete destruction by the approach of night.

General Delamain's troops bivouacked for the night on the scene of their victory, about two miles from the river, both men and horses suffering severely from want of water, as the brackish water of the marshes is undrinkable. In the morning the column reached the river, and the horses got their first water for forty hours.

Throughout the battle the naval flotilla co-operated with the land attack from positions on the river. Late in the evening of the 28th, led by the Comet, (Lieut. Commander E. C. Cookson, R. N., acting senior naval officer,) the flotilla advanced upstream and endeavored to force a passage through the boom obstruction. The ships came under a terrific fire from both banks at close range. The Comet rammed the boom, but it withstood the shock. Lieut. Commander Cookson was shot dead while most gallantly attempting to cut a wire cable securing the barges.

The Turks evacuated their remaining trenches during the night and escaped along the bank of the Tigris. On the morning of the 29th a pursuit was organized, troops moving in ships preceded by cavalry on land. The cavalry, consisting of four weak squadrons, overtook the enemy on Oct. 1, but had to wait for the support of the river column, as the Turks were making an orderly retreat, covered by a strong rearguard with infantry and guns. The progress of the river column was so delayed by the difficulties of navigation due to the constantly shifting shallows in the river that it was unable to overtake the retreating enemy. When the ships reached Aziziyah on Oct. 5 the enemy had reached their prepared defensive position at Ctesiphon, covering the road to Bagdad, where they were reinforced.

The Turks lost some 4,000 men in casualties, of whom 1,153 were prisoners captured by us. In addition, we took fourteen guns and a quantity of rifles, ammunition, and stores. Considering the severity of the fighting, our casualties were comparatively small. They amounted to 1,233, including a large proportion of men only slightly wounded.

The defeat of Nur-Ed-Din Bey completed the expulsion of Turkish troops from the Basrah Vilayet. Apart from material gains won at Kut-el-Amara, our troops once again proved their irresistible gallantry in attack, and added another victory to British arms in Mesopotamia.

I am glad to place on record my appreciation of the ability and generalship displayed by Major Gen. C. V. F. Townshend, C. B., D. S. O., throughout these operations. His plan for turning the Turkish left was the manoeuvre whereby the position could best be captured without incurring very heavy losses.

Brig. Gen. Delamain, who commanded the main attack, showed himself to be a resolute and resourceful commander. His leadership during the battle was admirable.

The troops under the command of Major Gen. Townshend displayed high soldierly qualities, and upheld the reputation they have earned during this arduous campaign.

How the British Left Gallipoli

By General Sir Charles C. Monro

Commander of Mediterranean Expeditionary Force

This graphic report, dated March 6, 1916, is addressed to Lord Kitchener, head of the British War Office. General Monro, who is now fighting in France, took command at Gallipoli on Oct. 28, 1915, and shortly afterward recommended immediate evacuation. All the essential and historic portions of the document appear below.

ON Oct. 20, in London, I received your Lordship's instructions to proceed as soon as possible to the Near East and take over the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

My duty on arrival was in broad outline:

(a) To report on the military situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

(b) To express an opinion whether on purely military grounds the Peninsula should be evacuated or another attempt made to carry it.

(c) The number of troops that would be required—

(1) To carry the Peninsula.

(2) To keep the strait open, and

(3) To take Constantinople.

GENERAL MONRO

The positions occupied by our troops presented a military situation unique in history. The mere fringe of the coast line had been secured. The beaches and piers upon which they depended for all requirements in personnel and material were exposed to registered and observed artillery fire. Our intrenchments were dominated almost throughout by the Turks. The possible artillery positions were insufficient and defective. The force, in short, held a line possessing every possible military defect. The position was without depth, the communications were insecure and dependent on the weather. No means existed for the concealment and deployment of fresh troops destined for the offensive—while the Turks enjoyed full powers of observation, abundant artillery positions, and they had been given the time to supplement the natural advantages which the position presented by all the devices at the disposal of the field engineer.

Another material factor came prominently before me. The troops on the Peninsula had suffered much from various causes — exposure to shell fire, disease, the dearth of competent officers owing to earlier losses, and "makeshifts" due to the attachment of Yeomanry and Mounted Brigades to the Territorial Divisions. Other arguments, irrefutable in their conclusions, convinced me that a complete evacuation was the only wise course to pursue.

On Nov. 21 the Peninsula was visited by a storm said to be nearly unprecedented for the time of the year. The storm was accompanied by torrential rain, which lasted for twenty-four hours. This was followed by hard frost and a heavy blizzard. In the areas of the Eighth Corps and the Anzac Corps the effects were not felt to a very marked degree owing to the protection offered by the surrounding hills. The Ninth Corps was less favorably situated, the water courses in this area became converted into surging rivers, which carried all before them. The water rose in many places to the height of the parapets and all means of communications were prevented. The men, drenched as they were by the rain, suffered from the subsequent blizzard most severely. Large numbers collapsed from exposure and exhaustion, and in spite of untiring efforts that were made to mitigate the suffering I regret to announce that there were 200 deaths from exposure and over 10,000 sick evacuated during the first few days of December.

From reports given by deserters it is probable that the Turks suffered even to a greater degree.

The problem with which we were confronted was the withdrawal of an army of a considerable size from positions in no cases more than 300 yards from the enemy's trenches, and its embarkation on open beaches, every part of which were within effective range of Turkish guns, and from which in winds from the south or southwest, the withdrawal of troops was not possible.

I came to the conclusion that our chances of success were infinitely more probable if we made no departure of any kind from the normal life which we were following both on sea and on land. A feint which did not fully fulfill its purpose would have been worse than useless, and there was the obvious danger that the suspicions of the Turks would be aroused by our adoption of a course the real purport of which could not have been long disguised.

Rapidity of action was imperative, having in view the unsettled weather which might be expected in the Aegean. The success of our operations was entirely dependent on weather conditions. Even a mild wind from the south or southwest was found to raise such a ground swell as to greatly impede communication with the beaches, while anything in the nature of a gale from this direction could not fail to break up the piers, wreck the small craft, and thus definitely prevent any steps being taken toward withdrawal.

Throughout the period Dec. 10 to 18 the withdrawal proceeded under the most auspicious conditions, and the morning of Dec. 18 found the positions both at Anzac and Suvla reduced to the numbers determined, while the evacuation of guns, animals, stores, and supplies had continued most satisfactorily.

It was imperative, of course, that the front-line trenches should be held, however lightly, until the very last moment and that the withdrawal from these trenches should be simultaneous throughout the line.

The good fortune which had attended the evacuation continued during the night of the 19th-20th. The night was perfectly calm with a slight haze over the moon, an additional stroke of good luck, as there was a full moon on that night.

Soon after dark the covering ships were all in position, and the final withdrawal began. At 1:30 A. M. the withdrawal of the rear parties commenced from the front trenches at Suvla and the left of Anzac. Those on the right of Anzac who were nearer the beach remained in position until 2 A. M. By 5:30 A. M. the last man had quit the trenches.

At Anzac, four 18-pounder guns, two 5-inch howitzers, one 4.7 naval gun, one anti-air craft, and two 3-pounder Hotchkiss guns were left, but they were destroyed before the troops finally embarked. In addition, fifty-six mules, a certain number of carts, mostly stripped of their wheels, and some supplies which were set on fire, were also abandoned.

At Suvla every gun, vehicle and animal was embarked, and all that remained was a small stock of supplies, which were burned.

On Dec. 28 your Lordship's telegram ordering the evacuation of Helles was received, whereupon, in view of the possibility of bad weather intervening, I instructed the General Officer Commanding Dardanelles Army to complete the operation as rapidly as possible. He was reminded that every effort conditional on not exposing the personnel to undue risk should be made to save all 60-pounder and 18-pounder guns, 6-inch and 4.5 howitzers, with their ammunition and other accessories, such as mules, and A. T. carts, limbered wagons, &c.

At a meeting which was attended by the Vice Admiral and the General Officer Commanding Dardanelles Army I explained the course which I thought we should adopt to again deceive the Turks as to our intentions. The situation on the Peninsula had not materially changed owing to our withdrawal from Suvla and Anzac, except that there was a marked increased activity in aerial reconnoissance over our positions, and the islands of Mudros and Imbros, and that hostile patrolling of our trenches was more frequent and daring. The most apparent factor was that the number of heavy guns on the European and Asiatic shores had been considerably augmented, and that these guns were more liberally supplied with German ammunition, the result of which was that our beaches were continuously shelled, especially from the Asiatic shore. I gave it as my opinion that in my judgment I did not regard a feint as an operation offering any prospect of success; and it was decided the navy should do their utmost to pursue a course of retaliation against the Turkish batteries, but to refrain from any unusually aggressive attitude should the Turkish guns remain quiescent.

General Sir W. Birdwood had, in anticipation of being ordered to evacuate Helles, made such complete and far-seeing arrangements that he was able to proceed without delay to the issue of the comprenhensive orders which the consummation of such a delicate operation in war requires.

The evacuation, following the same system as was practiced at Suvla and Anzac, proceeded without delay. The French infantry remaining on the Peninsula were relieved on the night of Jan. 1-2, and were embarked by the French navy on the following nights. Progress, however, was slower than had been hoped, owing to delays caused by accident and the weather. One of our largest horse ships was sunk by a French battleship, whereby the withdrawal was considerably retarded, and at the same time strong winds sprang up which interfered materially with work on the beaches. The character of the weather now setting in offered so little hope of a calm period of any duration that General Sir W. Birdwood arranged with Admiral Sir J. de Robeck for the assistance of some destroyers in order to accelerate the progress of re-embarkation.

Meanwhile the Eighth Corps had maintained the offensive spirit in bombing and minor operations with which they had established the moral superiority they enjoyed over the enemy. On Dec. 29 the Fifty-second Division completed the excellent work which they had been carrying out for so long by capturing a considerable portion of the Turkish trenches, and by successfully holding these in the face of repeated counterattacks. The shelling of our trenches and beaches, however, increased in frequency and intensity, and the average daily casualties continued to increase.

On Jan. 7 the enemy developed heavy artillery fire on the trenches held by the Thirteenth Division, while the Asiatic guns shelled those occupied by the Royal Naval Division. The bombardment, which was reported to be the heaviest experienced since we landed in April, lasted from noon until 5 P. M., and was intensive between 3 and 3:30 P. M.

Jan. 8 was a bright, calm day, with a light breeze from the south. There was every indication of the continuance of favorable conditions, and, in the opinion of the meteorological officer, no important change was to be expected for at least twenty-four hours. The Turkish artillery was unusually inactive. All preparations for the execution of the final stage were complete.

About 7 P. M. the breeze freshened considerably from the southwest, the most unfavorable quarter, but the first trip, timed for 8 P. M., was dispatched without difficulty. The wind, however, continued to rise until, by 11 P. M., the connecting pier between the hulks and the shore at "W" Beach was washed away by heavy seas, and further embarkation into destroyers from these hulks became impracticable. In spite of these difficulties the second trips, which commenced at 11:30 P. M., were carried out well up to time, and the embarkation of guns continued uninterruptedly. Early in the evening reports had been received from the right flank that a hostile submarine was believed to be moving down the strait, and about midnight H. M. S. Prince George, which had embarked 2,000 men, and was sailing for Mudros, reported she was struck by a torpedo which failed to explode. The indications of the presence of a submarine added considerably to the anxiety for the safety of the troop carriers, and made it necessary for the Vice Admiral to modify the arrangements made for the subsequent bombardment of the evacuated positions.

At 1:50 A. M., Gully Beach reported that the embarkation at that beach was complete, and that the lighters were about to push off, but at 2:10 A. M. a telephone message was received that one of the lighters was aground and could not be refloated. The N. T. O. at once took all possible steps to have another lighter sent in to Gully Beach, and this was, as a matter of fact, done within an hour, but in the meantime, at 2:30 A. M., it was decided to move the 160 men who had been relanded from the grounded lighter to "W" Beach and embark them there.

At 3:30 A. M. the evacuation was complete, and abandoned heaps of stores and supplies were successfully set on fire by time fuses after the last man had embarked. Two magazines of ammunition and explosives were also successfully blown up at 4 A. M. These conflagrations were apparently the first intimation received by the Turks that we had withdrawn. Red lights were immediately discharged from the enemy's trenches, and heavy artillery fire opened on our trenches and beaches. This shelling was maintained until about 6:30 A. M.

Apart from four unserviceable fifteen-pounders which had been destroyed earlier in the month, ten worn-out fifteen-pounders, one six-inch Mark VII. gun, and six old heavy French guns, all of which were previously blown up, were left on the Peninsula. In addition to the above, 508 animals, most of which were destroyed, and a number of vehicles and considerable quantities of stores, material, and supplies, all of which were destroyed by burning, had to be abandoned.

The entire evacuation of the Peninsula had now been completed. It demanded for its successful realization two important military essentials, viz., good luck and skilled disciplined organization, and they were both forthcoming to a marked degree at the hour needed. Our luck was in the ascendant by the marvelous spell of calm weather which prevailed. But we were able to turn to the fullest advantage these accidents of fortune.

Lieut. General Sir W. Birdwood and his corps commanders elaborated and prepared the orders in reference to the evacuation with a skill, competence, and courage which could not have been surpassed, and we had a further stroke of good fortune in being associated with Vice Admiral Sir J. de Robeck, K. C. B., Vice Admiral Wemyss, and a body of naval officers whose work remained throughout this anxious period at that standard of accuracy and professional ability which is beyond the power of criticism or cavil.



Why Italy Went Into the War

By G. F. Guerrazzi

In this second and concluding installment of his monograph on Italy's relations with Austria and Germany Signor Guerrazzi discusses the evil political effects of Germany's commercial activities in Italy, the Teutonic betrayal of Italian interests, and the popular uprising that turned the scales for war.

II.

THE extraordinarily rapid progress of Germany had impressed even those Italians who were least inclined to admire it, and German influences had permeated our universities and scientific bodies. All this, together with the ill-concealed hostility of the French and the somewhat cool friendship of the English, favored the development of our relations with Germany.

It must be remembered that our country is comparatively poor in natural resources. We have very little iron, no coal, practically no mineral wealth; a large portion of our soil consists of rocky, unwooded mountains; even our seas are poor in fish. For these and other reasons the accumulation of wealth is laborious and slow, and modern industrial organization, which can perform such miracles, is still in its infancy with us, and is perhaps not well suited to the Italian temperament. For all these reasons foreign economic influences were bound to react powerfully on Italian life, especially during a period of national depression.

UNWHOLESOME POLITICS

With the completion of our national unity, the chief political questions before us were those of internal liberty and the right to the suffrage. Every now and again an economic question, such as the abolition of the duty on milling, the State control of the railways, &c., would react on politics, and little by little Parliamentary majorities were formed for the protection of special interests of persons and districts. The divergent conditions and needs of Northern and Southern Italy, the defective political education of the southern electorate, socially subject to a middle class neither wealthy nor active, led to a struggle between two warring sets of interests, resulting in an unwise system of industrial and agrarian protectionism.

As has more than once occurred in conflicts between agriculture and industry, the former sold its best interests for a mess of pottage, obtaining a protective tariff of seven lire on every 100 kilograms of wheat and other illusory benefits, while manufacturers secured a large measure of protection, more especially for steel, cotton fabrics, and sugar refineries. This policy, the result of compromises between hostile groups of interests, was injurious to agriculture, but it was vastly more injurious to the country as a whole in view of the political consequences to which it gave rise.

One of these was the rapid rise of socialism, which secured a firm hold on the imagination of the proletariat and extended its influence to almost all classes of Government and municipal employes. The idealistic programs of the old democratic parties lost their hold on the nation; the attention of the masses was centred exclusively on material advantage; even the Catholic Party had to enter the economic arena in order to keep its hold on its adepts.

RULE OF SPECIAL INTERESTS

All this led to great political confusion, and "special interests" began to rule supreme. The clear vision of their own needs gave them the power to domineer over the Government. Little by little political influence passed, in fact if not in semblance, into the hands of a group of interests, incredibly petty when compared to those of the nation as a whole, but which succeeded in dominating the country for a series of years.

These interests were mostly centred in men who had but recently emerged from obscurity, who had grown rich rapidly and not always honorably at the cost of the country by building railways or harbors, contracting for military and naval supplies, and so forth. These were the people mainly interested in those industries which clamored for and obtained an excessive measure of protection. Around them were formed those multitudinous currents of interests which succeeded in establishing under a Parliamentary régime a virtual dictatorship, and which paved the path along which Germany, by making use of banking influences, came to exercise political as well as economic power in Italy. Of this unclean coalition of interests the political dictator was Giovanni Giolitti, and the central economic organ the Banca Commerciale Italiana.

GIOVANNI GIOLITTI

Giovanni Giolitti has been a really harmful man to Italy. He not only submitted to, but favored and promoted in a shameless manner this coalition of special interests, serving and being served by them in his political ambitions. Though an adult in the memorable days of our national revival, he was absent from the battlefields and took no part in the conspiracies and labors which led to national unity. He rose from the ranks of the bureaucracy, and his name was never associated with any movement for the realization of high political ideals. He entered Parliament in middle age and was raised to power by intrigue to serve the special interests of his supporters and their friends. Devoid of culture, of idealism, of breadth of views, his strength was based on his lack of scruple, which allowed him to favor the baser elements in the political life of the country and to raise to power men of mediocre character and intellect, of dubious political and often personal morality.

Lacking in civic courage, when corruption, intimidation, and other means worthy only of the abominable traditions of the police under the old tyrannical régimes seemed inadequate to overcome the difficulties arising from his unsound policy, he deserted his post and withdrew from the Government, waiting to seize the reins of power once more by threats and lobby intrigues when the difficulties from which he had fled should have blown over, or when his successor for the time being seemed likely to acquire a solid footing in Parliament.

CORRUPTING PUBLIC LIFE

Giolitti was in power, with but brief intervals, for more than thirteen years, and unfortunately he was at the head of the Government on the four occasions on which a general election was held. He was thus enabled to secure a Chamber to his own liking, giving his support to those candidates who were loyal to him personally, preferring nonentities or tarnished reputations as being more easily held in hand. His electioneering policy was one of corruption with Government funds or with money provided by banks or business men whom he compensated at the nation's expense by concessions for public works and yet more costly favors. He did not hesitate to have recourse to the most unheard-of police violence and the most brazen-faced trickery to fight those candidates who had the courage to withstand him. His supporters were rewarded with all the favors at the disposal of a Prime Minister; his adversaries were never forgotten. By similar means he secured control over the Senate and over all the branches of the public administration, weeding out those who were not his creatures.

By such means Giolitti succeeded in corrupting Italian public life in all its branches, creating an atmosphere unbreathable to the best men of all parties and rendering unsound the most delicate springs and wheels in the machinery of State. Placed in power by Court intrigue, the banking scandals in which he was involved during his first tenure of the Premiership reacted adversely on the estimation in which the monarchy was held, and during the recent tremendous political crisis which he brought on the country he came within an ace of involving the monarchy in his own downfall.

EVIL POLITICAL RESULTS

Such a man and such a policy should have met with strenuous opposition, especially in the ranks of the democracy. But the men who succeeded the leaders of our national revival were unable to resist the temptations set in their path by Giolitti, and were faithful to him rather than to the parties they were supposed to represent. The political corruption which he had sown soon spread. The more noisy section of the democracy was bought at the price of unheard-of concessions and favors granted to Socialist and Republican co-operative associations to the detriment of the State, and with disastrous effects on the political morality of the country. Finally, the support of the advanced parties was purchased by the promise of universal suffrage and payment of members, reforms which should have been conquered and not purchased by submission. As it is they have indeed been costly to the country and to democracy, which by this compact helped to consolidate a political régime which may well be described as the triumph of parasitism in finance, in industry, in the ranks of the proletariat and of the bureaucracy, all united to protect their petty special interests to the injury of the real interests of the nation as a whole, conspiring to form a régime of plutocrats and demagogues capable of disintegrating even the most solidly constituted body politic.

GERMANY FINDS A TOOL

It was this inexhaustible flood of greed and personal ambition which broke down all barriers and made it possible for foreign influences to gain a footing in the State. The chief instrument at the service of this execrable coalition of parasites has been the Banca Commerciale Italiana.

When the Bank of France ceased to support Italian commerce on the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, German financial circles waited to come to our assistance until our leading banks had failed, leaving our commerce and industry an easy prey. They then came forward and founded the Banca Commerciale Italiana. The amount of German capital invested in this enterprise was limited, but the management was German. Germans were strongly represented on the Board of Directors, and a large number of the secondary positions were filled by them. Those banks which had survived the financial shipwreck were soon absorbed. Then the industries and businesses which still existed were attacked. They were supplied with abundant credit, which, when the opportune moment came, was curtailed and then withdrawn, and the debt toward the bank compulsorily converted into part ownership at the cost of heavy depreciation. Germans were appointed as managers of such concerns or on their Directorate, thus insuring the Banca Commerciale a preponderating influence. At the same time new industries were started under its patronage, and here again the plant and the management had always to be German, and preference was given to Germany in the purchase of raw material. All this was done at a very small outlay, but with great ability in selecting the right moment for action.

MILITARY DESIGNS

Now, all this, if limited strictly to the economic sphere, may be regrettable from the standpoint of Italian interests, but would not deserve the censure of business men. Unfortunately, however, this financial activity served as a cloak to political aims. As in France and in Belgium, so in Italy many of these factories installed by German capital were organized to serve military purposes; land was acquired at places which could be used as signaling stations and to assist the enemy in case of an armed invasion by Austria-Germany, and many German business houses in Italy became centres of a well-organized system of espionage.

Fortunately for us, we have been able to take the offensive on the enemy's territory in the present war, or we should have had to pay dearly for our unsuspecting confidence in our former allies. The preponderating influence which the Banca Commerciale acquired in all our more important steel and metal works, and engineering and naval industries, secured for it a most noxious influence over our military armaments, and was certainly one of the reasons why Italy found herself unprovided with artillery when the European war broke out.

The connection between Giolitti's Cabinet and the Banca Commerciale became so intimate that high political and administrative posts were conferred exclusively on people who met with the approval of the bank, and well-known manipulators and brokers in its service were even raised to the dignity of Senators. But it was the Lybian war which brought most clearly into light the political influence of the Banca Commerciale in Italy.

THE LYBIAN WAR

The agreements we had come to with France and England regarding Morocco and the Mediterranean had set our minds at rest about Lybia. No one in Italy dreamed of annexing that country; all we wanted was to be certain that no other great power would establish itself there, precluding us from future expansion and curtailing our safety. It was, however, desirable that we should build up commercial relations with that country, and these were always hindered by the Banca Commerciale, which severely abstained from all activity in those regions.

At last the Banco di Roma undertook the task of commercial penetration, in spite of the undisguised hostility of the Turkish authorities. It would have been easy for Germany, then all powerful at Constantinople, to have favored her ally in this modest attempt at pacific penetration in North Africa. But just as she had never consented to say a word on our behalf at Vienna, so she now abstained from befriending us at Constantinople.

Italy was celebrating in 1911 the jubilee of her national unity. Giolitti was at the head of the Government; a cholera epidemic was threatening; no one had any idea of going to war. Suddenly, in September, one of the constantly recurring incidents with Turkey arose; our reasonable requests were flouted; Germany, as usual, abstained from using her good offices; and Italy declared war.

DUE TO GERMAN AIMS

What on earth had occurred to drive peace-loving and Giolitti-governed Italy to such a decision? The inside history of these events is not yet known, but it would seem that Germany, after her failures at Agadir and in Morocco, was preparing virtually to annex Tripoli. It would have been easy for the German Ambassador at Constantinople to induce the Sultan to intrust to a German protectorate the remainder of the Ottoman Empire in North Africa. Italy's claims to consideration could, it was thought, be set aside, and, anyhow, what could Italy have done if Germany had decided to act?

Indications show that something of this sort was being discussed between Berlin and Constantinople when a power, friendly to Italy and unwilling to see Germany installed on the Mediterranean, got wind of the matter, and Giolitti was faced with the alternative of going to Tripoli or seeing this other power go there. Had Tripoli been lost to Italy, as Tunis had been, there could be no doubt as to the outburst of popular indignation which would have ensued. Giolitti declared war on Turkey.

GERMANY AND THE TURK

The displeasure of Austria and Germany was shown in no uncertain terms. Giolitti conducted the war hat in hand, almost asking leave of our irate allies before daring to have a shot fired. Time was given to the slow Turkish Navy to take safe refuge in the Dardanelles because such was the good pleasure of Berlin. When the Duke of the Abruzzi directed his cannon against Prevesa, Austria immediately opposed her veto; Italy must attack neither Saloniki, nor the Epirus, nor Smyrna, nor any really vital part of the Ottoman Empire.

All this is clearly shown in the Green Book, in Salandra's speech, and in Sonnino's statements. Consequently we had to drag out a most costly war, while Italian subjects and interests in Turkey were neglected by the German Ambassador to whom they had been intrusted, and Marshal von der Goltz openly assisted the Turkish officers in preparing their plans of campaign.

AN UNFAVORABLE PEACE

In the Summer of 1912 peace negotiations were opened with Turkey on the initiative of a certain Volpi who had been the leading spirit in the organization of the so-called Italian companies founded by the Banca Commerciale in Montenegro and at Constantinople. This same Volpi, under the pretext of acting as "technical agent," and the ex-Ministers Bertolini and Fusinato were appointed as plenipotentiaries to negotiate peace, and the son of the leading German member of the Directorate of the Banca Commerciale was named Secretary.

Meantime the first Balkan war was declared, but the Italian Government shut its eyes to the favorable possibilities which the formation of the Balkan League offered to Italy, nor did it avail itself thereof to secure favorable terms. After all our heavy loss of life and money, peace was made when it suited Turkey and on conditions entirely to her advantage. In face of all this, can any one deny that our allies, and more especially Germany, did all in their power on this occasion to injure our interests?

AUSTRIA IN THE BALKANS

Not only the positive but also the negative advantages of the alliance were denied us. The main purpose of the treaty was to safeguard Italy against the danger of Austria's upsetting the equilibrium in the Balkans and the Adriatic, while guaranteeing Austria against Italian nationalist movements in territories subject to her rule. Now, the Green Book, Salandra's speech in the Capitol, the address recently delivered by our Ambassador in Paris, and the well-known actions of Austria all clearly show that the Dual Monarchy was constantly seeking to attack the rights of the Balkan States which she was pledged to respect. To say nothing of minor incidents, it will suffice to recall the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, the diabolical policy which led to the destruction of the Balkan League, and the threatened Austrian occupation of Montenegro in April, 1913.

In July of the same year it was only the stubborn opposition of Italy which prevented Austria from attacking Serbia with the assistance of Germany, while all the time she was carrying on criminal intrigues in Albania. It is thus clear that the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, which occurred toward the end of June, 1914, was a mere pretext for the brutal and unheard-or ultimatum which Austria sent to Serbia on June 23 of that year.

ITALIAN NEUTRALITY

It would be superfluous for me to waste time in convincing you that Austria and Germany, but more especially the latter, were determined to bring about the present war. Italy had no hesitation in following the course of action left open to her by the terms of the alliance, and consonant to her position in the European concert and to her traditions. Austria had left Italy completely in the dark as to her intentions with regard to Serbia, thus committing a flagrant violation of her treaty obligations. This being the case, no one could claim that we were obliged to assist her when she took, without our consent, a course of action diametrically opposed to our interests, interests which we had entered the alliance to protect.

It is not difficult to show that Italy might have derived material advantages by joining Germany and Austria in their attack on France. We should certainly have been able to claim ample compensation in the shape of a share in France's African colonies and in the indemnity which would have been extorted from the French Treasury. Indeed, a current of opinion in Italy favored such a course, and rightly held that the military equipment of Italy, though it left much to be desired, was yet quite adequate to insure the success of the German plans for occupying Paris. By such a policy Italy could have secured a share in a rich booty at the cost of much smaller sacrifices than those which she is now making.

ITALY'S REAL MOTIVES

But the Italian Nation would never have consented at such a grave crisis in the history of Europe to a policy inspired purely by selfish motives. Even had the Government wished, the Italian people would have refused to march against France and England. In the case of France the affinity of race and civilization is too strongly felt, while in England we have always admired the cradle of civil liberties. Moreover, the Italians have a keen sense of honor and of the respect due to treaties, and the brutal Austrian aggression on Serbia, the disloyal way in which Germany began the war by violating the neutrality of Belgium, the cynical manner in which the German Chancellor tried to excuse that action, aroused our deep indignation.

While the ever-present desire to free our brothers from thralldom to Austria has contributed to make the war popular, this was not the foremost consideration in determining our action. You may be sure that if we had not had a foot of national soil to redeem from subjection our feelings would not have been different. Always and under all circumstances the Italians would have felt an irrisistible repugnance to fighting side by side with the authors of the Belgian massacres, with the oppressors of Serbia; they would have considered it an unspeakable crime to assist in extinguishing those splendid beacons of civilization, France and England.

TRIPLE ALLIANCE BROKEN.

Such was the feeling of the country, shared from the first by the Government. At the very outbreak of the conflict, as we now know, Salandra and San Giuliano informed the German Ambassador (July 25) that the Austrian ultimatum was a breach of the treaty of alliance, and similar statements were made through Italian Ambassadors at Vienna and Berlin. But how could the remonstrances of Italy hold back the two empires from their premeditated assault?

Perhaps if we had been in a position to send our armies to the front our voice might have been listened to; but Italy was practically unarmed. The Giolitti Government had mismanaged the Lybian war, depleting the military stores and never replenishing them, although the enormous cost of the campaign had been justified to the Chamber by asserting that this had been done. * * * Under the circumstances the only course open to us was to proclaim our neutrality, and from that moment the alliance was virtually at an end. Austria and Germany had taken the initiative in breaking it, and our place was henceforth beside the powers of the Triple Entente.

A NATIONAL AWAKENING

The laborious negotiations which ensued between the Italian Government and the Central Empires can be studied in the Green Book, which will be a lasting monument to the rectitude and firmness of our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sonnino. During this long period of alternating hopes and fears those who clearly saw that the only path of safety and honor open to Italy was to fight by the side of France and England carried on uninterruptedly their work of national education and preparation toward this end. The thicker grew the intrigues and conspiracies of Giolitti and his followers, the more active the policy of corruption and alternating threats and blandishments of the German Ambassador von Bülow, the harder we worked. And little by little the good seed fructified. When on Jan. 6 the body of Bruno Garibaldi, the grandson of our national hero, was brought back from the battlefields of France to be buried in Rome the impressive spectacle offered by the vast crowds which lined the streets of the Eternal City clearly indicated that the Romans realized and accepted the necessity of war.

A factor which had contributed powerfully toward this end was the constantly recurring atrocities committed by the Germans. We Italians have a strong sense of humanity and justice, and, being largely a nation of seafarers and emigrants, the sinking of merchant ships and harmless passengers so systematically carried out by the German submarines aroused our profound indignation. The sinking of the Lusitania had no small share in determining the current in favor of armed intervention. The events which took place here from the end of April to May 20 deserve the close attention of all who wish to understand the forces which moved Italy during the most critical period of her history since national unity was attained.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH AUSTRIA

Negotiations with the Austrian Government, initiated with a view to finding a new basis for an understanding with Austria now that her action had rendered the Triple Alliance null and void as far as we were concerned, had been carried on slowly and with difficulty during the whole Winter. Sonnino, with his usual straightforwardness, had followed the path to which circumstances had limited his diplomatic action, clearly realizing his responsibilities toward the country and our real interests. The Green Book shows that Austria had no serious intention of giving us satisfaction, but aimed at killing time. In urging Austria to make concessions Germany was half-hearted, due undoubtedly to the confidence which Bülow felt that he would be able to insure the permanent neutrality of Italy by getting his Italian friends to defeat the Salandra Ministry.

Sonnino's firmness at last induced the Austrian Chancellor to state the concessions which he was prepared to make to Italy, concessions in themselves so small and hedged in with so many conditions as to be entirely unacceptable. Mindful of the Parliamentary situation and of the need of making it clear to the Chamber and to the country that every honorable means of avoiding war had been tried, Sonnino submitted counter-proposals drawn up in a spirit of great moderation. Our claim on Trieste was relinquished, and Austrian interests in the Adriatic duly respected.

PEOPLE DEMAND WAR

Meantime our military preparations had been carried on with ceaseless energy; men had been recalled to the colors; the officers of the reserve, the students, and the thousands on thousands of volunteers who had enlisted brought to the army new faith and enthusiasm. The universities, the independent press, and the public demanded war. In vain the official section of the Socialist Party and German and neutralist gold, assisted by the underhand working of the Giolittiani and of the venal press, made a final effort to falsify public opinion and to intimidate the Government. Protestant Germany even went the length of sending a special envoy to win over the Vatican to its point of view, and through it to act on the Italian people, but all was in vain.

Twice the Salandra Ministry had been intrusted by the unanimous vote of the Chamber with the guardianship of the supreme interests of the nation. It had carried out this arduous duty with due regard to what it knew to be the wishes of the Parliamentary majority. Faithful to the mandate received, when it saw that it would be impossible to attain our ends without recourse to arms it had felt in duty bound to look not only to the Chamber but still more to the country, and had directed its efforts resolutely to prepare for war.

On the 5th of May a monument to Garibaldi and the Thousand was to be unveiled at Quarto, near Genoa. On this occasion, when Italy was to commemorate the fifty-fifth anniversary of that culminating episode in her struggle for national unity, the King had consented to accompany the Ministers who were to be present at the ceremony. For reasons not yet known Victor Emmanuel was unable at the last moment to attend, but he sent a message which electrified the nation and echoed far and wide throughout the land. Who now could hinder Italy in her march toward new and more glorious destinies?

THE CONSPIRATORS

The attempt was made by Giolitti and his partisans. They still hoped by a Parliamentary intrigue to defeat the Ministry, thus compromising the future of Italy. Soon after the arrival of Prince von Bülow in Rome, Giolitti had conferred with him and had published through the press a letter to one of his partisans in which he tried to revive the hopes of the neutralists by giving them to understand that "much" could be obtained by diplomatic action, thus attempting to undermine the confidence of the country in Salandra, while hampering and circumscribing the negotiations which were then going on between Austria and Italy. He had then retired once more to the country, relying on the activity of his followers in the capital. When the decisive moment came, just before the reopening of the Chamber, he returned to Rome.

Giolitti called on Salandra and had from him full particulars as to the diplomatic and military situation, and it might have been supposed that the grave reasons which induced men of prudence and acumen, such as the Prime Minister and Sonnino, to conclude for the necessity of war would have convinced Giolitti also, and that he would have imposed silence on the indecent carpings of his Parliamentary majority. Yet in spite of all he declared himself resolutely opposed to war and favored an agreement with Austria. Nor was he deterred by the fact (of which he was apprised) that the safety of the country had made it desirable to come to a preliminary understanding with the Triple Entente, and that military secrets had been confided to the Italian General Staff which made the understanding binding in honor on the nation, even though it had not yet received final official sanction.

PARIAMENTARY CRISIS

Giolitti's next step was to go to the King. According to his own statement he was summoned, but he failed to say whether the summons had been requested and by whom. It has been openly stated that Prince von Bülow secured the audience. He went armed with a legal opinion prepared by one of his partisans to demonstrate that the pledges made to the powers of the Entente were not binding, although they had already led to action, on the ground that they had not yet received the royal sanction; as though pledges which involve the honor of a nation could be set aside by legal quibbles! Giolitti felt that he had the large majority of the Chamber in his hands, and believed that all things were permitted to him. What he said to the King is not known. It is said that he stated that the movement in favor of intervention was only superficial and that the vast majority of the country was adverse to war; that little confidence could be placed in the army, while the struggle would be a long and exhausting one. This man who for so many years had been at the head of the Government knew the temper of the country so little that he really thought he could play with its destinities at a critical moment just as he had played in the past the game of Parliamentary intrigues.

The attitude of the leader of the Parliamentary majority convinced Salandra that his Cabinet would be defeated in the Chamber. Such a defeat would have been interpreted by the world at large as proof that the Italian Parliament was deaf to our national aspirations. To save the country from such a disaster the Ministry handed in its resignation to the King.

ITALY'S "PASSION WEEK"

The resignation of Salandra and his colleagues gave a shock to the whole of Italy, including those who until then had held aloof from the struggle. All had the clear sensation that the country was in danger, and grief gave place to desperation and to magnanimous anger. The interventionists feared for a moment that all was up and felt that the time had come for supreme resolutions and grave responsibilities, and they prepared themselves resolutely for action.

But the whole country rose unanimously in a great burst of indignation. You know what Rome was like during those sixty hours of the Ministerial crisis. The people, including representatives of every class, realized that foreign influences were deciding the fate of Italy, and they protested in no uncertain terms. If on the Sunday morning which closed what had veritably been a "Passion Week" for the whole Italian Nation, the announcement had been made that Giolitti or one of his satellites had been called to the Government, there is no doubt that Rome, and with Rome the whole of Italy, would have arisen and the army would certainly not have been on the side of Giolitti!

Thus the Italian people resolutely carried out a revolution which will be memorable in history. I use the word revolution advisedly, for the movement of those memorable days of May overthrew a régime which had held sway over the country for many years. The political power, detained by a small minority of persons and of interests, was revindicated by the nation as a whole, and used for the defense of its supreme national interests. And the Italian people, having overthrown the barriers which had been set up between it and its King, resolutely faced the task before it. It faced with full knowledge and grim determination the tremendous sacrifices of a fierce and lengthy war. History tells us that wars have generally been decreed by the few. This war was decreed by the people. I do not know of any other instance in which a whole nation has realized the need of a war and has forced its representatives to declare it.

CHAMPION OF RIGHT

I wish that the American people would clearly realize that the Italians have not entered on this war, as some have said, to come to the assistance of the victors. After overcoming internal difficulties of all sorts, we entered the field when the final outcome of the struggle was still uncertain and far off. The Italian people did not desert its allies of thirty years' standing; those allies deserted us secretly, and in a way and for a purpose which amounted to betrayal. The Triple Alliance, the result of political intrigues which caused irreparable injury to Italy, had never been considered by the Central Empires as forming a bond of friendship between them and us, but had always been used by them to exploit Italy economically and politically. Consequently, when Austria acted in flagrant violation of the treaty on which it was based we were no longer bound by it.

To protect her very existence, to safeguard her prestige, to preserve those principles in the name of which we reasserted our national existence, and on which the whole of modern civilization is based, Italy has entered the field to defend the cause of progress threatened by the German desire of universal dominion. And in so doing our country is taking the position assigned her by her whole history in a struggle between two hostile tendencies, two hostile races, two hostile civilizations.

When the time comes to discuss the terms of peace Italy will range herself with those who respect the principle of nationalities; her influence will be on the side of moderation. She will labor to secure an enduring peace by eliminating the causes of future conflicts. If, as we hope, the arrogant militarism of Prussia will be undone, Italy will unite with England in opposing a policy aimed at humiliating or oppressing the German peoples. They should in the future have all the liberty to expand and develop compatible with the similar needs of other nations.

A MEMORABLE EVENING

On the memorable evening on which I went with the citizens of Rome to the Capitol, the starting point of so much of the history of the human race, to celebrate the initiation and draw the auspices for the future of our war, I had an almost mystic intuition of happier destinies yet reserved for the nations of the earth. Our national poet, d'Annunzio, had evoked in a moving speech the virtues of our forefathers. The sun had set. The ground on which I stood was historic, most solemn the hour and the occasion. Just then the great bell of the Capitol filled the evening air with its sonorous vibrations. A great silence fell over the vast crowd which had gathered there, and all heads were reverently uncovered as though the voices of past centuries were announcing to the peoples of the earth that a new and better epoch was dawning for them.

And I, in the name of my country, and of all that is good and noble, conclude with the wish that this sensation which came over me, the result of patriotic exaltation and of the inspiration of the place and the occasion, may be justified by events, and that the nations which are now grappling in a death struggle may one day be bound together by the ties of love.

THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS

[Canadian Cartoon]

Twelve o'Clock Rapidly Approaches



—*From The Montreal Star.*

The Time of Day for Germany: What will happen when the hour and minute hands come together?

[French Cartoon]

The Assassins



—*Maurice Neumont in L'Esprit Satirique en France.*

Setting forth to murder the peace of Europe.

[German Cartoon]

Out of an Anguished Soul



—© *Simplicissimus, Munich.*

" Oh, Lord on High, how couldst thou permit these barbarians, and not us Englishmen, to discover the Zeppelins! "

[English Cartoon]

In the Submarine Zone



—Louis Raemaekers in Land and Water, London.

VOICE ON THE U-BOAT: " Seems to be neutral; send him down."

Joffre's Explanation

"The Germans are at the end of their rope. They have no way out except victory."

French War News



—© *Simplicissimus, Munich.*

"The situation gives no cause for uneasiness."

[German Cartoon]

Mammon, King of America



—© *Jugend, Munich.*

" Blood, after all, is the best fertilizer for the dollar crop! "

[English Cartoon]

After a Zeppelin Raid



—Louis Raemaekers in Land and Water, London.

The Kaiser Counts the Bag.

Stinging Himself



The scorpion is said to sting itself to death when it cannot get through a ring of fire.



—From The Westminster Gazette.

Wide Awake After the Winter.

Russia Returns From the Hindenburg Jubilee



—© *Kladderadatch, Berlin.*

"Kuropatkin, my son, you look pretty badly off."

"Oh, father, if I had known that Hindenburg was just celebrating his fiftieth year as a soldier, I would have postponed my visit."

Italy's Predicament



—© *Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.*

The Roman She-Wolf is trying hard to escape being sucked dry, but the English-French twins will not let go.

[Polish Cartoon]

Egypt Germanized



—From the Mucha, Warsaw.

How Egypt Would Appear if Ruled From Berlin.

[French Cartoon]

Voices From the Deep



—From Le Matin, Paris.

"Pirate! What was our crime?"

[Rumanian Cartoon]

Bouquets for the Kaiser



—From the Veselia, Bucharest.

His Victims "Strafing" Him With Thistles.

[Russian Cartoon]

Turkish Delights



—From the Novi Satiricon, Petrograd.

"Our present position is very comfortable, indeed."

[German Cartoon]

In Mesopotamia



—© *Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.*

History repeats itself! Six thousand years after Adam and Eve, two other sinners have been driven from the Garden of Eden.

[French Cartoon]

German Courage


A MON BRAVE AMI ZISLIN

—Maurice Neumont in L'Esprit Satirique en France.

Killing civilians in Belgium.

[German Cartoon]

The British Lion



—© *Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.*

“Heavens, the beast is flying right over me!”

[German Cartoon]

An Austrian Visits Venice



—© *Simplicissimus, Munich.*

"That is the only stranger we have seen this year!"

[Russian War Loan Poster]

Help the Defenders!



"Whoever is not repelling the enemy with his own breast should buy the 5½ per cent. war loan bonds."

Helpful Suggestions for German Church Architects





—From The Westminster Gazette.

A Death's-Head Willie Window.

A Saintly-Sultan Window.

[American Cartoon]

"Everybody's Doing It"



—*From The New York Times.*

Isn't it about time to stop the favorite sport?

[French Cartoon]

The Bogey Man



—From La Vie Parisienne, Paris.

A Nightmare of Springtime, 1916.

[American Cartoon]

Fluttering Again



—From The Los Angeles Times.

Not a Good Place to Alight.

[Austrian Cartoon]

Diogenes Skouloudis of Greece



—*From Die Muskete, Vienna.*

General Sarrail: "And now, my dear friend, is there anything else you desire?"

Prime Minister Skouloudis: "Only a quiet spot somewhere in the shade."

[American Cartoon]

Irish Patriots


THE WEARING OF THE GREEN
ROBERT-C CARTER

—*From The New York Evening Sun.*

An Old Tune by a New Orchestra.

Progress of the War

Recording Campaigns on All Fronts and Collateral Events From April 12 Up to and Including May 11, 1916

CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE

April 13—German artillery bombards Hill 304 and lines from Le Mort Homme to Cumières.

April 15—Berlin reports defeat of French in fight at Le Mort Homme; British repel German bombing attacks at St. Eloi.

April 17—Germans resume furious assault on French lines between the Meuse and Douaumont and gain footing in Chauffour Wood.

April 19—German guns pound Hill 304, Le Mort Homme, Cumières, and the region of Douaumont and Vaux.

April 20—Russians land large force at Marseilles; Germans capture 600 meters of French trenches in Ypres-Langemarck road.

April 22—Russian troops move toward Verdun; Germans make vain assaults on Le Mort Homme positions.

April 25—Second Russian force arrives in France; Germans pound Hill 304 and Moulainville in the Woevre.

May 1—Germans shell Hill 304, and are repulsed in heavy assault on Le Mort Homme.

May 2—French offensives carry German trenches on 500-meter front near Douaumont and gain ground at Le Mort Homme.

May 4—French have thrown back Germans on the northwest side of Le Mort Homme beyond the line held at the beginning of March.

May 5-6—Germans win foothold in advanced French trenches north of Hill 304.

May 7—Germans gain a footing in first French line west of the Meuse, between Haudromont Wood and Fort Douaumont.

May 8—French drive Germans out of captured trench at Hill 304.

May 9—French repulse heavy attacks at Hill 304.

May 10—French repulse strong attack at Hill 287.

May 11—Violent bombardment of French positions in the Caillette Wood.

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN EUROPE

April 15—Russians take the offensive in sector comprising village of Garbunovka and wrest two hills from the Germans.

April 21—Germans repulsed near Olyka and Mourivatza; Russians silence Ikskull batteries.

April 29—Germans take Russian positions south of Lake Narocz, together with more than 5,600 prisoners.

May 1—Russians check three German attacks southeast of Olyka.

May 6—Germans direct violent bombardment on Dvina front against Ikskull and region east of Friedrichstadt.

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

April 14—Italians capture Austrian positions on the crest of Lobbia Alta in the Adamella zone.

April 18—Austro-Hungarians repulse attacks in the Sugana Valley and capture many prisoners.

April 19—Ialians occupy Monte Fume Pass.

April 26—Austrian troops reoccupy part of Col di Lana.

May 1—Italians destroy village of Pannone, south of Mori, and carry a strong mountain position on the Upper Aviso.

May 2—Italians take Covento Pass and Lares Pass and positions at Crozzon and Crozzon di Sares.

ASIA MINOR AND EGYPT

April 14—Russians report repulse of Turks west of Erzerum.

April 15—Russians defeat Turkish division near Bitlis.

April 16—Turks ejected by Russians from a position seventeen miles east of Trebizond.

April 17—Russians enter area of Trebizond fortifications; British defeated in battle on the right bank of the Tigris, more than 4,000 killed or wounded.

April 18—Russians take Trebizond, with the aid of the fleet, putting a garrison of from 50,000 to 60,000 Turks to flight.

April 20—Russians press on toward Baiburt and Erzingan; position of British army, besieged in Kut-el-Amara, becomes critical because of food shortage.

April 23—British repulsed after entering Turkish trenches on the Tigris; British in Egypt attacked in village of Quatia and compelled to withdraw, but beat off hostile force at Dueidar.

April 24—British bombard Sannayyat on the Tigris; Russians stop Turkish offensive in the direction of Kharput on the Caucasus front.

April 29—British army at Kut-el-Amara under General Townshend surrenders to the Turks because of exhaustion of supplies; 8,970 troops, 514 British officers, including four Generals, and $5,000,000 in cash taken.

May 1-4—Three Russian army groups make steady progress toward Baiburt, Erzingan, and Diarbekr.

May 10—Turks report Russians checked in region of Kirvaz.

May 11—Turks drive Russians out of positions nearly ten miles in length in the Mount Kope sector.

AFRICAN CAMPAIGN

April 22—British capture Umbugive and Salanga, in German East Africa.

April 24—British occupy Kondoa, in the district of Irangi.

AERIAL RECORD

On the Austro-Italian front, an Austrian air squadron raided Ravenna, May 4, and engaged in a running fight with Italian destroyers southwest of the mouth of the Po. Italians, on several occasions, dropped bombs on Trieste.

Russian positions on the Gulf of Riga were raided by German aircraft.

Constantinople was raided on April 14 by British naval aeroplanes, which dropped bombs on the Zeitunlik powder factory and aeroplane hangars. On April 27 the city was again attacked by Russian hydroaeroplanes.

On the western front, twenty-six aeroplanes were shot down by German aviators during the month of April. The Germans lost twenty-two machines.

A Zeppelin was destroyed by a British light cruiser off the German coast near Schleswig and another was destroyed at Saloniki.

Raids on the east coast of England and Scotland continued. For three successive nights, April 24-April 26, Zeppelins were active, but no casualties resulted and they were driven off by British aeroplanes. On May 2 five German airships attacked the northeast coast of England and the southeast coast of Scotland, killing thirty-six people. The Zeppelin L-20 was destroyed on the Norwegian coast after the raid and later was blown up by the Norwegians. The following day bombs were dropped on Deal. One man was injured and several houses damaged.

NAVAL RECORD

On April 25 German warships bombarded Lowestoft and Yarmouth on the east coast of England, but were driven off in twenty minutes by British ships and aeroplanes. Four persons were killed and twelve wounded in Lowestoft, and several British vessels were hit. British warships attacked German positions on the Belgian coast and inflicted heavy damage on Zeebrugge.

In the Mediterranean Sea the British battleship Russell, the mine sweeper Nasturtium, and the armed yacht Aegusa, formerly Sir Thomas Lipton's Erin, were sunk by mines.

About forty vessels, belligerent and neutral, were sunk in the war zone. These included two ships under charter by the American Commission for Relief in Belgium—the British ship Hendonhall and the Swedish ship Fridland. The Brazilian Government ordered an inquiry into the sinking of the steamer Rio Branco on May 2. A German submarine was sunk off the east coast of England on April 28. On May 8 the White Star liner Cymric, engaged in freight service, was torpedoed without warning. Five members of the crew were killed and many injured. There were no Americans on board.

MISCELLANEOUS

On April 21 Sir Roger Casement and two Irish confederates, with twenty-two Germans, were captured from a German ship that attempted to land arms in Ireland. Coincident with this occurred a revolutionary outbreak in Ireland, fostered by the Sinn Fein Society, and an Irish republic was proclaimed with Patrick H. Pearse as "Provisional President." This was promptly suppressed by British troops, but not without heavy casualties. On May 11 Premier Asquith announced in Parliament that 180 rebels or civilian noncombatants were killed and 614 wounded, besides 124 soldiers or policemen killed and 388 wounded. Fourteen persons were executed, seventy-three sentenced to penal servitude, six to hard labor, and 1,706 deported.

There has been a further interchange of notes between the United States and Germany concerning submarine warfare. On April 18 Secretary Lansing sent a note to Germany declaring that "unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether." With the note was sent an appendix containing a statement of facts concerning the attack on the Sussex. On April 19 President Wilson addressed a joint session of Congress on the subject. The German reply, dated May 4, admitted the possibility that the Sussex had been torpedoed and said that German submarine commanders had been ordered to apply the principles of visit and search, due warning, and provision for the safety of those on board, both within and without the war zone, but it demanded that the United States insist that the British Government observe the rules of international law concerning blockade. On May 8 Secretary Lansing replied, accepting Germany's promise of a new submarine policy, but rejecting any condition as to the British blockade. On the same day Germany sent another note on the Sussex case, admitting that the ship was torpedoed, expressing regret, offering indemnity, and saying that the commander of the attacking submarine had been punished.

WITHDRAWN

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